[00:00.060 --> 00:11.360] [SPEAKER_00]: Here are some of the most inspirational and life-changing recordings ever made, from artists like Otis Redding, the Soul Clan, Etta James, Wilson Pickett, James Brown, and many, many others.
[00:11.540 --> 00:16.560] [SPEAKER_00]: That's a deep shade of soul on Friday, August 3rd from 12 midnight to 3 a.m.
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[00:21.000 --> 00:25.400] [SPEAKER_00]: Hear the music that influenced generations, the real classic soul.
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[00:35.540 --> 00:38.600] [SPEAKER_13]: Stay tuned now for Off The Hook.
[02:36.410 --> 02:38.930] [SPEAKER_13]: And this is Off The Hook on WBAI in New York.
[02:39.070 --> 02:40.070] [SPEAKER_13]: Emmanuel, are you there?
[02:43.210 --> 02:43.970] [SPEAKER_07]: I guess not.
[02:44.150 --> 02:46.650] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, as you know, the show is Off The Hook.
[02:46.910 --> 02:49.030] [SPEAKER_07]: I'm Redbird, joined in the studio with...
[02:49.030 --> 02:50.030] [SPEAKER_07]: Jim over here.
[02:50.270 --> 02:50.490] [SPEAKER_07]: Jim.
[02:50.770 --> 02:52.150] [SPEAKER_13]: And Emmanuel, now you're there, right?
[02:52.430 --> 02:53.450] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm here now, yes.
[02:53.530 --> 02:54.890] [SPEAKER_14]: I could hear you, but you couldn't hear me.
[02:55.350 --> 02:56.850] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm actually up in Montreal.
[02:56.850 --> 02:59.310] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm in an airport in between planes.
[03:00.270 --> 03:04.870] [SPEAKER_14]: Actually, it's going to be kind of interesting because technically my plane boards during the show.
[03:05.210 --> 03:14.630] [SPEAKER_14]: So I'm going to have to do the show while I'm walking and maybe do the show while I'm on the airplane and do the show until the flight attendant tells me to turn it off.
[03:14.790 --> 03:17.230] [SPEAKER_08]: I could see this turning ugly very soon.
[03:17.550 --> 03:18.230] [SPEAKER_14]: It could.
[03:18.390 --> 03:20.210] [SPEAKER_14]: We have a potential for an international incident here.
[03:20.490 --> 03:25.910] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm on my way to the Chaos Communications Camp, which is taking place in early August.
[03:25.910 --> 03:32.930] [SPEAKER_14]: And again, I urge people, if they have not already made their plans to go there, to do so because it's a once-in-a-four-year hacker event.
[03:33.050 --> 03:37.950] [SPEAKER_14]: It takes place outside in a campground over in Germany.
[03:37.950 --> 03:39.310] [SPEAKER_14]: It's five days of fun.
[03:39.690 --> 03:43.250] [SPEAKER_14]: And we're going to be talking to all kinds of people about that over the next couple of weeks.
[03:44.130 --> 03:45.590] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm up here in Montreal.
[03:45.590 --> 03:48.790] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm also with not Kevin, who is traveling with me.
[03:48.970 --> 03:50.390] [SPEAKER_14]: We're going over to London.
[03:50.550 --> 03:53.150] [SPEAKER_14]: We'll be at the 2600 meeting this Friday over there.
[03:53.150 --> 03:55.670] [SPEAKER_14]: But I believe in the studio we have... I heard your voice, Jim.
[03:55.990 --> 03:56.810] [SPEAKER_08]: Yes, you did.
[03:56.930 --> 03:58.330] [SPEAKER_08]: And that's because I'm in the studio.
[03:58.930 --> 03:59.250] [SPEAKER_14]: All right.
[03:59.350 --> 04:00.690] [SPEAKER_14]: And I think Redbird is there as well.
[04:00.810 --> 04:01.270] [SPEAKER_07]: I'm here.
[04:02.210 --> 04:03.110] [SPEAKER_14]: Welcome to you as well.
[04:03.210 --> 04:05.690] [SPEAKER_07]: And we've got two additional guests on the phone today.
[04:06.310 --> 04:08.690] [SPEAKER_07]: As usual, we have Bernie in Philadelphia.
[04:09.370 --> 04:10.550] [SPEAKER_14]: Yes, we have Bernie in Philadelphia.
[04:11.110 --> 04:11.370] [SPEAKER_14]: And...
[04:11.370 --> 04:12.110] [SPEAKER_14]: Bernie from Philadelphia.
[04:13.170 --> 04:14.190] [SPEAKER_14]: And welcome, Bernie.
[04:14.750 --> 04:15.090] [SPEAKER_14]: Hello.
[04:15.450 --> 04:16.570] [SPEAKER_07]: And Mike should be here too.
[04:18.030 --> 04:19.090] [SPEAKER_14]: Is Mike here now?
[04:19.190 --> 04:19.770] [SPEAKER_07]: He should be.
[04:19.910 --> 04:20.450] [SPEAKER_07]: Mike, are you there?
[04:22.170 --> 04:23.950] [SPEAKER_14]: I think Mike is on super delay.
[04:24.030 --> 04:24.630] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, he...
[04:24.630 --> 04:25.150] [SPEAKER_14]: We're going to have to...
[04:25.150 --> 04:26.910] [SPEAKER_14]: We're going to have to pause wherever I am.
[04:27.870 --> 04:30.350] [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, Mike, what we're going to do is we're going to let you...
[04:30.350 --> 04:33.070] [SPEAKER_14]: We're going to leave a space after someone talks for you to finish.
[04:33.430 --> 04:34.130] [SPEAKER_14]: Mike, hello.
[04:37.340 --> 04:38.220] [SPEAKER_14]: Hello, how are you?
[04:38.500 --> 04:40.440] [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, it didn't really take you that long, did it?
[04:40.600 --> 04:41.300] [SPEAKER_13]: Seven seconds.
[04:42.480 --> 04:43.160] [SPEAKER_14]: My goodness.
[04:43.580 --> 04:44.520] [SPEAKER_14]: This is going to be tough.
[04:45.340 --> 04:46.460] [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, so we have...
[04:46.460 --> 04:47.420] [SPEAKER_14]: And Mike, where are you right now?
[04:50.080 --> 04:55.280] [SPEAKER_02]: I am on an island that holds a former prison in Stockholm, Sweden.
[04:55.840 --> 04:57.940] [SPEAKER_02]: Did you get into some trouble over there or something?
[05:00.480 --> 05:01.220] [SPEAKER_02]: No, no, no.
[05:01.260 --> 05:02.540] [SPEAKER_02]: It's no longer a prison.
[05:02.540 --> 05:04.840] [SPEAKER_02]: It's just a nice island these days.
[05:05.920 --> 05:06.280] [SPEAKER_14]: Okay.
[05:06.840 --> 05:09.220] [SPEAKER_14]: Mike, you're using an interesting calling method.
[05:09.400 --> 05:12.700] [SPEAKER_14]: Well, actually, we're sort of combining two different calling methods to communicate with you.
[05:12.700 --> 05:16.600] [SPEAKER_14]: You want to tell us something about the worldwide SIM thing you've got going?
[05:19.450 --> 05:27.430] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, well, apparently there's this great delay, as you've noticed today, although previous calls I've been making with it haven't had this problem.
[05:27.630 --> 05:28.190] [SPEAKER_02]: I've got...
[05:28.190 --> 05:39.650] [SPEAKER_02]: There's a company called Global SIM Card that makes a SIM card that I put in my phone, and it gives me a phone number on the Isle of Man, which is part of the United Kingdom, apparently.
[05:39.650 --> 05:41.030] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't really know what it is.
[05:41.030 --> 05:46.910] [SPEAKER_02]: And the interesting thing about it is that people, if they want to reach me, they just have to dial the United Kingdom.
[05:47.210 --> 05:54.630] [SPEAKER_02]: They get charged to call United Kingdom Mobile, which from the United States is maybe, I don't know, 20, 30 cents, depending on your plan.
[05:55.150 --> 06:01.070] [SPEAKER_02]: And then anywhere in Europe, I can receive that call without incurring any additional charge.
[06:01.270 --> 06:02.490] [SPEAKER_02]: So it's kind of nice.
[06:03.530 --> 06:05.270] [SPEAKER_02]: I can also make calls from it.
[06:05.390 --> 06:15.450] [SPEAKER_02]: For some reason, here in Sweden, the rate is 88 cents a minute, but elsewhere in Western Europe, the rate is 30 to 40, maybe 50 cents a minute.
[06:15.730 --> 06:19.230] [SPEAKER_02]: So maybe this thing just doesn't like Sweden.
[06:19.230 --> 06:19.750] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know.
[06:19.850 --> 06:23.270] [SPEAKER_02]: But it's a sort of interesting SIM chip.
[06:23.450 --> 06:28.870] [SPEAKER_02]: It's sort of like the one that you've used in the past from Lichtenstein, except that you don't have to call Lichtenstein.
[06:29.090 --> 06:30.270] [SPEAKER_02]: You just have to call the UK.
[06:30.930 --> 06:34.170] [SPEAKER_14]: Well, why is it any better to call the UK than to call Lichtenstein?
[06:34.170 --> 06:35.750] [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, the rate is about the same, isn't it?
[06:39.090 --> 06:49.030] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, at least in the past when we've tried, it's been very expensive to call Lichtenstein as much as a dollar a minute, although I think that's changing for some unknown reasons.
[06:49.690 --> 06:52.770] [SPEAKER_14]: Well, what we're also doing is we've combined technology.
[06:52.770 --> 07:00.610] [SPEAKER_14]: So we're using this other service that we've utilized many times in the past, where we have a toll-free number that we can forward to any number in the world.
[07:00.870 --> 07:03.590] [SPEAKER_14]: And it's a very useful service to have.
[07:03.590 --> 07:06.110] [SPEAKER_14]: In fact, it's something that I'm surprised local phone companies don't provide.
[07:06.610 --> 07:15.830] [SPEAKER_14]: Basically, we're able to call a particular set phone number, and that phone could ring in China, it could ring in England, it can ring in the United States, wherever we decide to program it.
[07:15.950 --> 07:20.150] [SPEAKER_14]: And it's very handy for when we need to get somebody like we're getting you tonight.
[07:20.650 --> 07:22.350] [SPEAKER_14]: However, there is a problem with that.
[07:22.430 --> 07:24.750] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm not sure if that's where the delay is coming from.
[07:24.750 --> 07:27.290] [SPEAKER_14]: I suspect not, because we've used the system many times before.
[07:28.110 --> 07:33.170] [SPEAKER_14]: But what happens is it takes your phone a very long time to ring, sometimes up to 45 seconds.
[07:33.730 --> 07:38.570] [SPEAKER_14]: And the service that we're using, after 45 seconds, says your party's not answering.
[07:38.890 --> 07:40.410] [SPEAKER_14]: So it's kind of a catch-22.
[07:40.670 --> 07:43.950] [SPEAKER_14]: Your phone hasn't rung, and yet you're being accused of not answering your phone.
[07:44.090 --> 07:47.130] [SPEAKER_14]: So we have to try you multiple times in order to get you to answer.
[07:51.020 --> 07:52.460] [SPEAKER_02]: Whatever you do, you can't win.
[07:53.360 --> 07:54.720] [SPEAKER_14]: No, it appears not.
[07:54.900 --> 07:58.080] [SPEAKER_14]: You know, I've got to tell you, we had quite an adventure.
[07:58.620 --> 08:03.640] [SPEAKER_14]: Actually, technically they're boarding my flight now, but I'm going to stay here, because we have plenty of time.
[08:04.320 --> 08:11.080] [SPEAKER_14]: But not Kevin and I, we're traveling up here earlier this afternoon from Newark Airport.
[08:11.080 --> 08:14.840] [SPEAKER_14]: But we really ran into a bit of a snag.
[08:15.080 --> 08:16.580] [SPEAKER_14]: The unthinkable happened.
[08:17.060 --> 08:18.900] [SPEAKER_14]: We were supposed to meet at the airport.
[08:19.460 --> 08:23.760] [SPEAKER_14]: And, well, we both went to the airline that we were supposed to go to.
[08:24.420 --> 08:31.620] [SPEAKER_14]: And I knew something was odd when Kevin told me that he couldn't find Terminal A.
[08:31.620 --> 08:34.780] [SPEAKER_14]: He could find Terminal 7, but not Terminal A.
[08:34.980 --> 08:37.760] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm like, why do you have numbers instead of letters?
[08:37.760 --> 08:43.480] [SPEAKER_14]: Well, it turns out that through a colossal misunderstanding, he wound up at JFK and I wound up at Newark.
[08:44.100 --> 08:48.920] [SPEAKER_14]: And we had less than two hours to figure out how to bring us together so we could make our flight.
[08:49.900 --> 08:52.400] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm going to put not Kevin on to explain how that was accomplished.
[08:52.400 --> 08:54.740] [SPEAKER_14]: But I've got to tell you, it was an epic story.
[08:55.980 --> 08:59.780] [SPEAKER_03]: Well, the first thing Emmanuel told me to do was to run down stairs and grab a taxi.
[08:59.780 --> 09:05.040] [SPEAKER_03]: So I found the craziest Russian guy I could, told him to drive as fast as he could to Newark, and I'd pay him extra money.
[09:05.680 --> 09:13.000] [SPEAKER_03]: Basically, that turned out into a, you know, one and a half hour car ride through New Jersey of him taking wrong turns and illegal U-turns in the middle of highways.
[09:14.480 --> 09:18.180] [SPEAKER_03]: But I did get there with 10 minutes to stay before we boarded our flight.
[09:18.880 --> 09:20.700] [SPEAKER_03]: Rushed through the boarding.
[09:21.460 --> 09:23.500] [SPEAKER_03]: People were nice enough to let us cut through security.
[09:23.720 --> 09:27.460] [SPEAKER_03]: And we made the flight $145 later.
[09:27.460 --> 09:35.200] [SPEAKER_08]: When you say cut through security, does that mean that they really should have shut the airport down and evacuated everyone?
[09:35.720 --> 09:39.200] [SPEAKER_03]: No, the people in line were nice enough to let us cut through.
[09:39.620 --> 09:40.340] [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, okay.
[09:42.500 --> 09:47.160] [SPEAKER_08]: Just want to establish to everybody that it's not us hackers that cause these problems.
[09:48.260 --> 09:51.520] [SPEAKER_14]: Well, like Kevin said, the people were very nice.
[09:51.860 --> 09:52.760] [SPEAKER_14]: It was incredible.
[09:52.920 --> 09:54.760] [SPEAKER_14]: Everyone said, yeah, I've been there, I understand.
[09:55.360 --> 09:58.300] [SPEAKER_14]: But it's something that we'll permit this time.
[09:58.600 --> 10:02.200] [SPEAKER_14]: And we left the cut ahead of maybe 30 or 40 people, and everybody was just so very nice to us.
[10:02.260 --> 10:12.960] [SPEAKER_14]: So a big thank you to the people waiting in line at Newark Airport who basically saved their asses because we would have missed two planes and would have definitely cast a shadow over this whole thing.
[10:13.660 --> 10:16.140] [SPEAKER_14]: So anyway, that's where we are right now.
[10:16.620 --> 10:21.260] [SPEAKER_14]: We'll be in London shortly, I guess, and we'll be boarding this plane any moment now.
[10:22.140 --> 10:25.060] [SPEAKER_14]: Now, Bernie, I believe you're down there in Philadelphia, correct?
[10:25.700 --> 10:26.300] [SPEAKER_14]: That's right.
[10:27.500 --> 10:32.960] [SPEAKER_14]: I saw an interesting story about surveillance cameras down there.
[10:32.980 --> 10:34.280] [SPEAKER_14]: I want to read you a little bit of this.
[10:35.040 --> 10:43.980] [SPEAKER_14]: Apparently, residents down there are staging a protest calling the surveillance camera program set up by the Philadelphia Commercial Development Corporation.
[10:44.240 --> 10:46.040] [SPEAKER_14]: Maybe you can tell us something about who they are.
[10:46.360 --> 10:49.560] [SPEAKER_14]: Calling that program a joke and calling for an investigation.
[10:50.400 --> 11:05.620] [SPEAKER_14]: They had members of the Philadelphia Alliance Against Drugs and Violence, as well as others at the rally, who were outraged to learn that, once again, the five surveillance cameras set up to monitor crime were down, and none of them recorded a shooting death that took place early Sunday morning.
[11:06.640 --> 11:14.860] [SPEAKER_14]: The new executive director of PCDC blamed a lightning strike and hackers for the cameras not working since May 30th.
[11:14.940 --> 11:16.540] [SPEAKER_14]: That's right, hackers and lightning.
[11:16.600 --> 11:17.320] [SPEAKER_14]: Those are the two things.
[11:18.400 --> 11:24.400] [SPEAKER_14]: Now, basically, the story that I'm seeing here claims that residents are not buying the hacker story.
[11:24.540 --> 11:25.840] [SPEAKER_14]: It didn't say anything about the lightning story.
[11:26.500 --> 11:31.460] [SPEAKER_14]: But one of the residents of the community said, why would somebody hack the cameras in Wingfield all of a sudden?
[11:31.780 --> 11:34.080] [SPEAKER_14]: It's just incredible how hackers always get blamed.
[11:34.080 --> 11:42.920] [SPEAKER_14]: But I think what's more interesting about this story is the fact that now people are saying, yeah, surveillance cameras, why aren't they working?
[11:42.920 --> 11:43.980] [SPEAKER_14]: We need them to work.
[11:44.080 --> 11:50.300] [SPEAKER_14]: Whereas a year or two ago, the question would have been, do we really want all these surveillance cameras watching us all the time?
[11:50.420 --> 11:54.040] [SPEAKER_14]: It seems like we've accepted that now, and now we're demanding that they work all the time.
[11:54.040 --> 11:55.080] [SPEAKER_14]: Do you get the same impression?
[11:55.780 --> 11:56.540] [SPEAKER_15]: I do.
[11:56.540 --> 12:00.880] [SPEAKER_15]: I think that might have been fueled by our district attorney's statement.
[12:00.880 --> 12:01.940] [SPEAKER_15]: Her name is Lynn Abraham.
[12:01.940 --> 12:07.260] [SPEAKER_15]: She's also known as America's deadliest DA, because she calls for the death penalty and everything but traffic citations.
[12:08.680 --> 12:12.300] [SPEAKER_15]: She said that there's no acceptable excuse for those cameras not working.
[12:12.480 --> 12:16.560] [SPEAKER_15]: And if they had been working, we would know the identity of the murderer.
[12:16.680 --> 12:18.340] [SPEAKER_15]: That's what the DA is saying.
[12:18.820 --> 12:35.460] [SPEAKER_15]: This Philadelphia Community Development Corporation is really sort of a political organization headed by now City Councilman Curtis Jones, who managed to get over half a million dollars in federal funding from the Justice Department to have these cameras installed several months ago.
[12:35.620 --> 12:37.620] [SPEAKER_15]: And they've been having problems with them ever since.
[12:37.840 --> 12:50.000] [SPEAKER_15]: The local ABC News affiliate here, TV station, Channel 6, found out these cameras were not working months ago and brought it to the Philadelphia Community Development Corporation's attention.
[12:50.300 --> 12:56.160] [SPEAKER_15]: And they didn't even know they weren't working almost three weeks after they went down.
[12:56.160 --> 12:58.980] [SPEAKER_15]: So they've been going down repeatedly for months.
[12:59.320 --> 13:19.620] [SPEAKER_15]: And now when a man gets shot in the head in front of a Chinese grocery store and none of the five cameras right there record the activity, Curtis Jones and the Philadelphia Commercial Development Corporation are blaming hackers and a lightning strike all of a sudden as having caused this problem.
[13:20.220 --> 13:24.560] [SPEAKER_15]: As you pointed out, Emmanuel, the Philadelphia residents are not buying the hacker story.
[13:24.560 --> 13:26.500] [SPEAKER_15]: I doubt they're buying the lightning story either.
[13:26.740 --> 13:33.240] [SPEAKER_15]: And frankly, these cameras are just not managed well, which is, I think, the whole problem with these surveillance cameras.
[13:33.240 --> 13:35.500] [SPEAKER_15]: Because nobody knows how to manage them properly.
[13:35.760 --> 13:38.040] [SPEAKER_15]: Or if they do know how to manage them, they're not doing it properly.
[13:38.160 --> 13:39.740] [SPEAKER_15]: And so here's a good example.
[13:40.680 --> 13:56.420] [SPEAKER_14]: Well, I think this also was underlined by a different story that came out this week, where it turns out that Americans, by a 3-to-1 margin, 3-to-1, now support the increased use of surveillance cameras, which I don't think was true a couple of years ago.
[13:56.640 --> 14:10.740] [SPEAKER_14]: I think after the whole London story of less than a month ago took place where bombs were thwarted and people were identified through the cameras, I think that's doing a lot to convince people that, yes, surveillance cameras are good things to have.
[14:11.640 --> 14:17.880] [SPEAKER_14]: Basically, they see it as a way to help solve crimes, and they're not too concerned about the government intrusion on privacy.
[14:18.080 --> 14:21.000] [SPEAKER_14]: 71% of Americans favor the increased use of surveillance cameras.
[14:21.120 --> 14:23.080] [SPEAKER_14]: Only 25% oppose it.
[14:23.400 --> 14:33.400] [SPEAKER_14]: Now, London Surveillance Network, which is known as the Ring of Steel, is said to have aided in the capture of those suspects, including those that were trying to perform those car bombings in June.
[14:33.600 --> 14:34.960] [SPEAKER_14]: Now, a similar system...
[14:34.960 --> 14:35.760] [SPEAKER_14]: This is kind of interesting.
[14:35.820 --> 14:37.500] [SPEAKER_14]: A similar system is coming to New York City.
[14:37.720 --> 14:45.260] [SPEAKER_14]: They plan 100 new surveillance cameras in downtown Manhattan by the end of the year, and 3,000 public and private by 2010.
[14:45.800 --> 14:49.260] [SPEAKER_14]: Chicago and Baltimore also plan expanded surveillance systems as well.
[14:49.260 --> 15:00.180] [SPEAKER_14]: Now, last week we were talking about how surveillance was a part of the proposed congestion fee that New York mayor wants to have implemented.
[15:00.580 --> 15:05.980] [SPEAKER_14]: And it seems like that's not really essential to the surveillance plan.
[15:06.420 --> 15:10.540] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, the congestion fee would be a nice thing to keep pollution down.
[15:11.040 --> 15:15.560] [SPEAKER_14]: It would be bad if surveillance came in as a result of having to keep track of where everybody is driving.
[15:15.560 --> 15:22.040] [SPEAKER_14]: But if the congestion fee does not happen, it looks like the surveillance cameras are going to come through some other door.
[15:22.380 --> 15:22.700] [SPEAKER_14]: I don't know.
[15:22.800 --> 15:23.900] [SPEAKER_14]: Mike, is that how you see things?
[15:26.790 --> 15:40.230] [SPEAKER_02]: I think it's pretty clear that the interests of the state actors just want to have cameras everywhere all the time, and they're using any excuse they can to get those cameras.
[15:40.230 --> 15:53.410] [SPEAKER_02]: I certainly don't think that the folks who are opposing congestion charging to ensure their privacy will succeed in ensuring their privacy if that's their only tactic.
[15:54.990 --> 16:01.230] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, it's interesting because there's a story that's directly related to this coming out of Oakland, California.
[16:01.450 --> 16:03.410] [SPEAKER_07]: And I'll just read a couple of paragraphs from that.
[16:03.610 --> 16:09.430] [SPEAKER_07]: Privacy advocates have long viewed red-light cameras with the suspicion that the devices were the first step down a path of increased surveillance.
[16:09.430 --> 16:20.430] [SPEAKER_07]: Those fears may come true as the city of Oakland, California has revealed that it is working with state legislature to secure a change in the law that will allow red-light cameras to become a full-scale surveillance camera.
[16:20.970 --> 16:25.330] [SPEAKER_07]: In the memo from the Oakland Police Department dated June 26, Police Chief Wayne G.
[16:25.470 --> 16:30.250] [SPEAKER_07]: Tucker recommended that the city's lobbyist be ordered to advocate the new law in Sacramento.
[16:30.470 --> 16:40.870] [SPEAKER_07]: The legislation would allow the use of those red-light camera images for purposes other than the enforcement of red-light violations, such as reckless driving, assaults, public nuisance activity, drug dealing, etc.
[16:41.130 --> 16:46.750] [SPEAKER_07]: So it's important to remember that it's not just that people are saying, hey, you know, security cameras are a good idea.
[16:46.870 --> 16:49.630] [SPEAKER_07]: We should really have, you know, government surveillance all over the place.
[16:49.790 --> 16:55.770] [SPEAKER_07]: But they're converting cameras that were specifically geared for another purpose into surveillance cameras.
[16:55.790 --> 16:58.650] [SPEAKER_07]: And it's, you know, it's not something that the people originally agreed for.
[17:00.530 --> 17:05.570] [SPEAKER_14]: It seems to me that, regardless, we're getting surveillance cameras.
[17:05.770 --> 17:07.670] [SPEAKER_14]: And it doesn't seem like we're going to be able to stop it.
[17:08.210 --> 17:10.130] [SPEAKER_14]: The government is intent on doing this.
[17:10.190 --> 17:12.130] [SPEAKER_14]: Homeland Security is going to get their way no matter what.
[17:12.270 --> 17:15.370] [SPEAKER_14]: And now, 75% of the people support it.
[17:15.470 --> 17:16.670] [SPEAKER_14]: How do you fight something like that?
[17:18.970 --> 17:29.750] [SPEAKER_15]: It's difficult to make people aware of situations like just happened here in Philadelphia, which proved that these surveillance cameras, one, do not deter crime.
[17:30.010 --> 17:34.930] [SPEAKER_15]: There were five cameras right at that same intersection where this person was shot in the head in front of a grocery store.
[17:35.550 --> 17:39.570] [SPEAKER_15]: Obviously, that was not a deterrent to a violent crime.
[17:40.110 --> 17:53.230] [SPEAKER_15]: And how many times are we actually aware of the fact of when cameras fail to catch a crime in the act?
[17:53.230 --> 18:03.990] [SPEAKER_15]: I mean, I would hazard to guess that it's orders of magnitude of more instances where these cameras really did not do what they've been sold to us of being able to do.
[18:04.290 --> 18:18.210] [SPEAKER_15]: I would assume that's far more common than actually the few isolated incidents where you actually are able to track down and lock up somebody who allegedly committed a murder or some other violent crime.
[18:18.210 --> 18:23.770] [SPEAKER_15]: And I just think it's a wrong-headed approach to crime, frankly.
[18:25.630 --> 18:27.750] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, I think we're going to rue the day.
[18:28.310 --> 18:33.630] [SPEAKER_14]: Now, I know, Mike, you've been looking into some of the congestion systems that are in place.
[18:33.630 --> 18:35.730] [SPEAKER_14]: I think Stockholm has something like that?
[18:38.370 --> 18:45.990] [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, if you still consider today to be Wednesday, which I guess it is in the United States, although it's just past 1 a.m.
[18:45.990 --> 18:47.430] [SPEAKER_02]: here, so it's technically Thursday.
[18:48.010 --> 19:03.530] [SPEAKER_02]: So Wednesday, the 1st of August, was the first day in Stockholm of the congestion charging, with the caveat that last year, for about six months, from January to July, they had a trial period, and they deemed the trial to be a success.
[19:03.710 --> 19:08.630] [SPEAKER_02]: Apparently, they were able to cut down traffic in the city center by 22 percent.
[19:08.970 --> 19:15.210] [SPEAKER_02]: So they decided, again, starting just today, to make the system permanent.
[19:16.030 --> 19:32.610] [SPEAKER_02]: I was able to speak this afternoon with a spokesperson for the congestion pricing division of the road authority, I guess, who's responsible for it, and ask, you know, sort of how the data is maintained.
[19:34.210 --> 19:49.870] [SPEAKER_02]: And basically, the rules here in Sweden are that the data of sort of which toll booth you go under and all this is accessible only to you or to the police with a sort of court order.
[19:50.450 --> 19:55.870] [SPEAKER_02]: However, the legal process is a little bit different, but it seems to be the equivalent of a court order or a warrant.
[19:56.830 --> 20:02.610] [SPEAKER_02]: The police don't have a direct link to the congestion pricing system.
[20:03.050 --> 20:24.710] [SPEAKER_02]: There's one sort of interesting privacy loophole, and that is if you, in order to pay for your tolls, you have to go into either a 7-Eleven, or there's another Swedish chain of sort of similar stores called Presbyron, you have to go into one of those and give your license plate number and the money.
[20:24.930 --> 20:37.230] [SPEAKER_02]: So this produces the interesting side effect that anyone can walk into one of these stores anywhere in the city and say, you know, give a license plate number and find out how much that person owes.
[20:37.690 --> 20:47.390] [SPEAKER_02]: So I'm kind of curious, those of you who drive this, you consider this a privacy violation or not, that this sort of information about how much you owe is publicly accessible.
[20:48.210 --> 20:54.510] [SPEAKER_14]: Before we start the debate on this, I just want to inform people that I'm now walking onto the airplane, so you might not hear my voice for a little while.
[20:54.650 --> 21:01.070] [SPEAKER_14]: But yeah, let's definitely ask some questions about the whole driving versus privacy versus pollution question.
[21:01.590 --> 21:18.530] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, it actually turns out that a lot of the databases, when you have a license plate number, there's a lot of sources that we've found over the years where you can actually access information about the owner and the address that the vehicle is registered to and all sorts of information unintentionally.
[21:18.570 --> 21:23.150] [SPEAKER_07]: And I think the most recent one, Emmanuel, that we ran across was in California.
[21:23.150 --> 21:23.550] [SPEAKER_07]: Is that right?
[21:24.750 --> 21:26.010] [SPEAKER_14]: I think so.
[21:26.170 --> 21:27.350] [SPEAKER_14]: But you'll have to refresh my memory.
[21:27.470 --> 21:35.590] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, it was a site, and I believe it was for emissions control, where you can actually see the emissions history of a vehicle by entering its license plate number.
[21:35.710 --> 21:47.090] [SPEAKER_07]: And not only did it give you the current owner and address, if I remember correctly, this was a number of months ago, but it gave all the past owners as well who have ever had that license plate number.
[21:48.850 --> 21:50.110] [SPEAKER_07]: So it's interesting.
[21:50.290 --> 21:57.650] [SPEAKER_07]: This is just another bit of information from another source that you can get on someone based on some other piece of information that you have on them.
[21:57.810 --> 22:07.410] [SPEAKER_07]: So in terms of social engineering, it's probably nothing new, and you can probably invade someone's privacy much more through other methods and probably even at the DMV.
[22:07.410 --> 22:10.190] [SPEAKER_07]: But, you know, it's something...
[22:10.190 --> 22:15.610] [SPEAKER_07]: You know, it's definitely going down the wrong path in terms of not securing information, just like everything else seems to be doing.
[22:15.990 --> 22:20.910] [SPEAKER_14]: Well, it certainly seems that there's yet another way that the information will be leaked.
[22:22.270 --> 22:29.970] [SPEAKER_14]: But I'm not convinced that that's a reason to not have something as ecologically friendly as congestion pricing.
[22:29.970 --> 22:31.490] [SPEAKER_14]: I just wish it had a bit more teeth in it.
[22:32.650 --> 22:36.590] [SPEAKER_14]: But I guess this is a debate we're going to be seeing for some time to come.
[22:36.950 --> 22:38.770] [SPEAKER_14]: I know we're going to be seeing a lot more surveillance cameras.
[22:40.390 --> 22:41.110] [SPEAKER_14]: Go ahead, Mike.
[22:41.750 --> 22:43.830] [SPEAKER_02]: One thing that I thought was interesting...
[22:43.830 --> 22:50.410] [SPEAKER_02]: One thing that I thought was interesting is that the prices for the congestion charging here are actually pretty low.
[22:50.950 --> 22:51.830] [SPEAKER_02]: You have to pay...
[22:51.830 --> 23:04.130] [SPEAKER_02]: When you enter the central district and when you leave, and the exact price varies between the time of day, but it's between 10 and 20 crowns, which is, you know, at most $3.
[23:04.610 --> 23:08.770] [SPEAKER_02]: It's actually less than the price of a single subway ride.
[23:09.210 --> 23:10.990] [SPEAKER_02]: So it's very little money.
[23:11.270 --> 23:22.610] [SPEAKER_02]: And still, it's able to reduce the traffic by such a large amount that I think your cause for pessimism may be unfounded.
[23:22.610 --> 23:26.090] [SPEAKER_02]: I think the $8 fee may actually be enough in New York.
[23:28.210 --> 23:30.330] [SPEAKER_14]: But changing gears a little bit...
[23:30.330 --> 23:32.370] [SPEAKER_14]: Actually, I'm on the airplane right now.
[23:32.550 --> 23:33.750] [SPEAKER_14]: I just took my seat.
[23:34.110 --> 23:35.270] [SPEAKER_14]: It may have been...
[23:35.270 --> 23:49.750] [SPEAKER_14]: But I understand that we have a clip that we're going to play of an incredibly bizarre and crazy story that appeared on Fox concerning hackers and the threat that they pose, the threat that some of them apparently pose.
[23:50.150 --> 23:53.990] [SPEAKER_14]: This is something that aired on television.
[23:54.110 --> 24:02.130] [SPEAKER_14]: But I think the sound effects and I think the hysteria and the tones will definitely convey the overall mood of the story without the video portion.
[24:02.390 --> 24:04.450] [SPEAKER_14]: Ken, do we have that available to play?
[24:04.750 --> 24:05.350] [SPEAKER_13]: We sure do.
[24:06.030 --> 24:07.090] [SPEAKER_14]: All right, let's take a listen to this.
[24:07.190 --> 24:07.490] [SPEAKER_13]: Here it is.
[24:07.550 --> 24:08.670] [SPEAKER_01]: They call themselves anonymous.
[24:09.050 --> 24:18.670] [SPEAKER_01]: They are hackers on steroids, treating the web like a real-life video game, sacking websites, invading MySpace accounts, disrupting innocent people's lives.
[24:18.710 --> 24:20.790] [SPEAKER_01]: And if you fight back, watch out.
[24:21.270 --> 24:24.810] [SPEAKER_01]: Pushyman tracks down the hacker gangs in this Fox 11 investigation.
[24:28.890 --> 24:31.670] [SPEAKER_12]: Destroy, die, attack.
[24:32.050 --> 24:35.470] [SPEAKER_12]: Threats from a gang of computer hackers calling themselves anonymous.
[24:35.730 --> 24:38.510] [SPEAKER_12]: I've had seven different passwords and they've got them all so far.
[24:38.850 --> 24:42.750] [SPEAKER_12]: They attack innocent people like an Internet hate machine.
[24:43.450 --> 24:44.390] [SPEAKER_09]: We are anonymous.
[24:44.710 --> 24:45.930] [SPEAKER_09]: We are strong.
[24:46.110 --> 24:46.910] [SPEAKER_09]: We do not forgive.
[24:47.130 --> 24:47.810] [SPEAKER_09]: We do not forgive.
[24:48.230 --> 24:51.150] [SPEAKER_12]: Those who fight back face death threats.
[24:53.310 --> 24:56.630] [SPEAKER_12]: Anonymous has even threatened to bomb sports stadiums.
[24:56.710 --> 24:58.570] [SPEAKER_11]: I believe they're domestic terrorists.
[25:00.530 --> 25:03.630] [SPEAKER_12]: Their name comes from their secret websites.
[25:04.010 --> 25:07.810] [SPEAKER_12]: It requires anyone posting on the site to remain anonymous.
[25:08.810 --> 25:11.470] [SPEAKER_12]: MySpace users are among their favorite targets.
[25:11.770 --> 25:12.510] [SPEAKER_12]: People like David.
[25:12.510 --> 25:14.910] [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, the next thing I know, I had a bunch of naked guys on my profile.
[25:15.690 --> 25:19.590] [SPEAKER_12]: Anonymous hacked his site and plastered it with gay sex pictures.
[25:19.990 --> 25:21.650] [SPEAKER_12]: His girlfriend left him.
[25:21.930 --> 25:25.610] [SPEAKER_12]: She thought that that I was cheating on those guys.
[25:25.910 --> 25:33.050] [SPEAKER_12]: They crashed his computer with a virus and used his own email to infect everyone on his friends list.
[25:33.050 --> 25:35.630] [SPEAKER_12]: Out of 90 friends, they killed 32 of my friends' computers.
[25:36.010 --> 25:38.450] [SPEAKER_12]: Now, David was apparently just a random victim.
[25:38.750 --> 25:44.250] [SPEAKER_12]: We found his MySpace password on an underground hacker site linked to Anonymous.
[25:44.510 --> 25:47.950] [SPEAKER_12]: There were literally thousands of stolen passwords on that site.
[25:48.170 --> 25:51.830] [SPEAKER_12]: And victims are left wondering, why is all this happening to me?
[25:52.150 --> 25:57.430] [SPEAKER_09]: They will tell you you want to create chaos and disorder and burn people's lives.
[25:57.610 --> 26:03.930] [SPEAKER_12]: This hacker, who wants us to hide his identity, spent months checking out sites linked to Anonymous.
[26:04.190 --> 26:05.170] [SPEAKER_09]: They get laughs.
[26:05.470 --> 26:07.630] [SPEAKER_09]: They enjoy doing this.
[26:07.970 --> 26:10.470] [SPEAKER_09]: They get what they call lulls.
[26:10.810 --> 26:16.450] [SPEAKER_12]: Lulls is a corruption of L-O-L, which stands for laugh out loud.
[26:16.730 --> 26:20.430] [SPEAKER_12]: Anonymous gets big lulls from pulling random pranks.
[26:20.630 --> 26:25.450] [SPEAKER_12]: For example, messing with online children's games like Habbo Hotel.
[26:25.910 --> 26:31.650] [SPEAKER_12]: The pranks are often anti-Semitic or racist and always posted on the Internet.
[26:32.410 --> 26:39.390] [SPEAKER_12]: But truly epic lulls come from raids and invasions branded on the anonymous websites with an I.
[26:39.630 --> 26:44.110] [SPEAKER_12]: Like their nationwide campaign to spoil the new Harry Potter book ending.
[26:44.590 --> 26:45.870] [SPEAKER_12]: Attention, children!
[26:46.490 --> 26:47.470] [SPEAKER_12]: Multiple kills!
[26:48.330 --> 26:50.430] [SPEAKER_12]: Their most notorious stunt?
[26:50.650 --> 26:55.770] [SPEAKER_12]: A bomb threat against seven football stadiums, which drew national media attention.
[26:56.230 --> 27:00.910] [SPEAKER_08]: The claim is that trucks loaded with radioactive material would be detonated in the stadiums.
[27:00.910 --> 27:05.810] [SPEAKER_12]: One man was arrested last year after posting the threat now thought to be a hoax.
[27:06.010 --> 27:08.590] [SPEAKER_12]: He's pleaded not guilty and awaits trial.
[27:08.950 --> 27:11.230] [SPEAKER_12]: This hacker finally got fed up.
[27:11.490 --> 27:18.790] [SPEAKER_09]: I decided to either shut them down or stop them or simply prevent as many raids as possible.
[27:19.310 --> 27:24.370] [SPEAKER_12]: Anonymous branded him as a lulls killer, accusing him of ruining their fun.
[27:24.550 --> 27:26.770] [SPEAKER_09]: They said they would rape me, they would kill me.
[27:27.130 --> 27:29.290] [SPEAKER_12]: This mother's also fighting Anonymous.
[27:29.530 --> 27:31.870] [SPEAKER_12]: Her whole family has been under attack.
[27:32.290 --> 27:34.230] [SPEAKER_11]: They posted pictures of all of us.
[27:34.750 --> 27:38.110] [SPEAKER_12]: Anonymous also posted their home address and phone numbers.
[27:38.390 --> 27:41.570] [SPEAKER_11]: Pretty much said that you've got the information now.
[27:41.710 --> 27:42.750] [SPEAKER_11]: Do what you need to do.
[27:43.350 --> 27:44.190] [SPEAKER_11]: Go, go, go.
[27:44.490 --> 27:46.270] [SPEAKER_12]: Death threats started pouring in.
[27:46.410 --> 27:48.690] [SPEAKER_12]: They're getting a People, bitch, I'm gonna...
[27:49.790 --> 27:51.150] [SPEAKER_11]: Your heart is breaking.
[27:52.170 --> 27:54.150] [SPEAKER_11]: You need to keep your family safe.
[27:54.450 --> 27:59.250] [SPEAKER_12]: She installed electronic security, a phone tracing system, and bought a dog.
[27:59.770 --> 28:02.990] [SPEAKER_12]: Then she started tracking down Anonymous members.
[28:03.330 --> 28:04.530] [SPEAKER_12]: Called in the FBI.
[28:04.730 --> 28:07.750] [SPEAKER_12]: But fears they won't act until it's too late.
[28:07.950 --> 28:11.330] [SPEAKER_10]: Would you do something about it if one of us ended up dead?
[28:11.790 --> 28:12.330] [SPEAKER_10]: Probably.
[28:12.690 --> 28:17.110] [SPEAKER_12]: Some victims told us they just hope Anonymous will get bored and forget about it.
[28:17.390 --> 28:20.090] [SPEAKER_12]: But insiders say don't count on that.
[28:20.230 --> 28:22.550] [SPEAKER_09]: According to your career, they never forget.
[28:22.970 --> 28:24.850] [SPEAKER_12]: Phil Schumann, Fox 11 News.
[28:26.010 --> 28:27.550] [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, my God.
[28:28.350 --> 28:30.090] [SPEAKER_14]: What do you say to a piece like that?
[28:30.610 --> 28:31.910] [SPEAKER_14]: Bernie, do you have any...
[28:31.910 --> 28:32.550] [SPEAKER_14]: Sorry, go ahead.
[28:33.250 --> 28:44.010] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, I was just gonna comment that this is so amusing that it almost seems like the story itself could be a hack in terms of getting the reporters to believe that this is actually a serious thing.
[28:44.530 --> 28:47.070] [SPEAKER_14]: Well, to say a phrase is like truly epic lulls, I think.
[28:47.890 --> 28:49.250] [SPEAKER_14]: To buy into that a little bit.
[28:50.150 --> 28:51.410] [SPEAKER_14]: Bernie, what do you think about it, so?
[28:52.110 --> 28:53.510] [SPEAKER_15]: I thought it was really hilarious.
[28:54.250 --> 29:00.410] [SPEAKER_15]: You can just tell from the tone of it that this was really sort of contrived.
[29:00.990 --> 29:08.250] [SPEAKER_15]: And, you know, they don't offer any specifics about any facts in the investigation.
[29:08.470 --> 29:09.010] [SPEAKER_15]: It's just...
[29:09.730 --> 29:10.410] [SPEAKER_15]: It's just...
[29:10.410 --> 29:13.710] [SPEAKER_15]: It's a hack job is what it is on hackers is what it...
[29:13.710 --> 29:14.550] [SPEAKER_15]: I think it is.
[29:15.710 --> 29:28.130] [SPEAKER_14]: But I think there's also a more serious side to all this in that people see a story like this, people who are not informed, and they just associate hackers with the worst possible things.
[29:28.890 --> 29:30.210] [SPEAKER_14]: Does somebody have to call over us?
[29:30.670 --> 29:31.010] [SPEAKER_14]: Okay.
[29:31.190 --> 29:32.470] [SPEAKER_14]: I think somebody needs to get to go to the side.
[29:33.910 --> 29:35.630] [SPEAKER_14]: But people see this.
[29:35.630 --> 29:38.690] [SPEAKER_14]: They see words like anonymous associated with...
[29:38.690 --> 29:42.590] [SPEAKER_14]: Well, with the T-word, which I'm not going to say on an airplane, and with hackers.
[29:43.830 --> 29:46.870] [SPEAKER_14]: And, basically, that sticks in their minds.
[29:47.030 --> 29:50.230] [SPEAKER_14]: And the end result is that when somebody...
[29:51.410 --> 29:51.970] [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, okay.
[29:53.530 --> 29:54.290] [SPEAKER_14]: I'll move over there.
[29:54.390 --> 29:55.230] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm in the wrong seat.
[29:57.250 --> 29:57.610] [SPEAKER_14]: Sorry.
[29:59.070 --> 29:59.790] [SPEAKER_14]: So, basically...
[29:59.790 --> 30:01.350] [SPEAKER_14]: If you could grab my bag, too, that would be nice.
[30:02.410 --> 30:02.770] [SPEAKER_14]: Basically...
[30:02.770 --> 30:03.130] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm sorry.
[30:03.230 --> 30:04.190] [SPEAKER_14]: This was bound to happen.
[30:05.870 --> 30:12.150] [SPEAKER_14]: What happened is that people will see a story like this, and they'll think being anonymous is evil.
[30:12.410 --> 30:16.230] [SPEAKER_14]: It's tantamount to making all sorts of threats and terrorizing people.
[30:17.050 --> 30:20.190] [SPEAKER_14]: And, yeah, we have to outlaw anonymity as a result, right?
[30:20.310 --> 30:21.230] [SPEAKER_14]: What other thing could you do?
[30:22.690 --> 30:23.610] [SPEAKER_14]: And hackers, too.
[30:23.690 --> 30:24.430] [SPEAKER_14]: We should outlaw hackers.
[30:25.170 --> 30:27.210] [SPEAKER_14]: It sure seems that way, based on that story.
[30:27.330 --> 30:29.230] [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, it was just incredible how long it went.
[30:29.930 --> 30:34.530] [SPEAKER_14]: But I think the point that a lot of people miss is that this kind of thing has been going on forever.
[30:35.070 --> 30:46.090] [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, back in the old days with BBSs, does anybody remember the whole teletrial thing on the old BBS systems where these people were considered to be out of control because they could do whatever they want and say whatever they want?
[30:46.430 --> 30:54.590] [SPEAKER_14]: People have been engaged in pranks and mischief and stupidity, yes, it's all combined, for a long, long time.
[30:55.030 --> 31:00.110] [SPEAKER_14]: And I think what they're doing here is they're elevating its status to a point where it becomes something it's not.
[31:01.210 --> 31:16.170] [SPEAKER_15]: And Emmanuel, I thought it was noteworthy that Fox News failed to report the claim that hackers had been redirecting and repositioning satellites, government and commercial satellites in outer space.
[31:17.450 --> 31:19.470] [SPEAKER_14]: I don't understand this.
[31:19.610 --> 31:22.470] [SPEAKER_14]: I didn't really delve into the story that deeply.
[31:22.590 --> 31:23.870] [SPEAKER_14]: I was laughing too hard.
[31:24.430 --> 31:26.410] [SPEAKER_14]: But what was the connection...
[31:26.410 --> 31:27.170] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm sorry, Bernie, what?
[31:27.530 --> 31:45.510] [SPEAKER_15]: I was just making a reference to other outlandish claims that were made literally decades ago against hackers, I guess, in the 1980s that they were doing other outrageous things which turned out to be completely untrue, like they're repositioning satellites around orbiting the Earth.
[31:45.510 --> 31:52.310] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, well, that was our own bulletin board system in New Jersey that was accused of being part of a plot to move satellites.
[31:52.410 --> 31:58.010] [SPEAKER_14]: And it was seen as extremely stupid and crazy back in, what, 1985 when that happened.
[31:58.370 --> 32:00.010] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, you have the same basic mentality today.
[32:00.090 --> 32:02.230] [SPEAKER_14]: But what I was wondering was, what is the connection?
[32:02.410 --> 32:04.950] [SPEAKER_14]: I just saw this being passed by very fleetingly.
[32:05.330 --> 32:07.470] [SPEAKER_14]: They were talking about the stadium threat.
[32:07.710 --> 32:11.890] [SPEAKER_14]: Now, how in God's name does that relate to these people or to hackers or to anybody?
[32:14.710 --> 32:15.630] [SPEAKER_07]: I don't know.
[32:15.770 --> 32:19.370] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, I haven't actually seen anonymous associate...
[32:19.370 --> 32:24.570] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, the word anonymous in terms of a group associated with any bomb threats that I can recall.
[32:24.810 --> 32:27.670] [SPEAKER_07]: At least it wasn't made a point in any of the news stories that I saw.
[32:28.770 --> 32:35.010] [SPEAKER_14]: Something that's a little bit related to this, though, is something that came down from the United States Postal Service.
[32:35.210 --> 32:39.070] [SPEAKER_14]: You know, there's a new regulation in effect that took effect on July 30th.
[32:39.310 --> 32:50.510] [SPEAKER_14]: And this new Postal Service rule applies for packages and envelopes that weigh more than 13 ounces if they're being mailed with only stamps as postage at a location other than a post office.
[32:51.550 --> 32:59.910] [SPEAKER_14]: Basically, starting this Monday, customers can use only one of, well, actually, I'm going to phrase it the way they phrase it because it's from a press release.
[33:00.090 --> 33:16.410] [SPEAKER_14]: They can use one of several convenient online postage applications available 24-7 or an automated postal center if they wish to mail items that weigh more than 13 ounces in Postal Service collection boxes or post office lobby mail slots or if they wish to leave the items to pick up by their letter carriers.
[33:17.030 --> 33:34.670] [SPEAKER_14]: If a customer is unable to use one of the above methods to prepare in a fixed postage, items weighing more than 13 ounces must be presented for mailing to an employee at a post office retail service counter, it seems to me like anonymous mailing is slowly becoming illegal.
[33:34.970 --> 33:36.850] [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, am I being paranoid in thinking this?
[33:37.030 --> 33:38.870] [SPEAKER_08]: No, it seems to be quite the case.
[33:39.050 --> 33:42.570] [SPEAKER_08]: They're lowering the poundage involved.
[33:42.570 --> 33:49.550] [SPEAKER_08]: A number of years ago, it used to be that if your item weighed 16 ounces, one pound, you couldn't put it in a postal box.
[33:49.770 --> 33:55.610] [SPEAKER_08]: Now it's down to 13 ounces unless you have one of these e-stamps or something similar on it.
[33:56.990 --> 34:00.790] [SPEAKER_14]: And the people who have the ability to do this are...
[34:00.790 --> 34:01.370] [SPEAKER_08]: Traceable.
[34:01.930 --> 34:16.230] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, and basically if you don't live near a post office, you're just an average person, doesn't have access to a mail meter or anything like that, you cannot mail something that's above 13 ounces if you just put it in a mailbox.
[34:16.470 --> 34:20.610] [SPEAKER_14]: The funny thing is they say if you do this, it will be returned.
[34:20.610 --> 34:25.310] [SPEAKER_14]: And I just wonder what is the logic behind that?
[34:25.690 --> 34:30.810] [SPEAKER_14]: Apparently they want to keep these things out of the system because of some kind of safety threat that they imagine.
[34:31.030 --> 34:35.470] [SPEAKER_14]: But isn't it just as much inside the system if they are returning it to the return address?
[34:35.730 --> 34:55.130] [SPEAKER_08]: Well, even more interesting, what if you're a terrorist and you decide to go to the mailbox down the street from, let's say, Goldman Sachs and you put in your 14-ounce letter bomb and it has regular stamps on it and it gets returned to the crafty address that you've put in the return space,
[34:55.530 --> 34:56.590] [SPEAKER_08]: Goldman Sachs.
[34:56.750 --> 34:57.930] [SPEAKER_08]: I see a flaw here.
[34:58.230 --> 35:01.530] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm glad you're the one using those words and not me here on this airplane.
[35:03.490 --> 35:05.390] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, no, you've raised some very good points there.
[35:05.530 --> 35:09.450] [SPEAKER_14]: By the way, we are scheduled to take off fairly soon, so you might lose me.
[35:19.790 --> 35:23.210] [SPEAKER_14]: but we're still on the ground, so we'll be leaving pretty soon.
[35:23.390 --> 35:24.890] [SPEAKER_14]: Mike joins us from...
[35:24.890 --> 35:25.890] [SPEAKER_14]: You're in Stockholm, Sweden?
[35:28.510 --> 35:29.410] [SPEAKER_02]: I am, yes.
[35:30.190 --> 35:30.390] [SPEAKER_14]: Okay.
[35:30.790 --> 35:32.590] [SPEAKER_14]: Mike is on a very long delay.
[35:33.090 --> 35:35.590] [SPEAKER_14]: It's bouncing over every conceivable satellite, apparently.
[35:36.030 --> 35:39.370] [SPEAKER_14]: Bernie S down there in Philadelphia, really spanning the globe tonight.
[35:40.790 --> 35:48.650] [SPEAKER_14]: And we have Redbird and we have Joe, Redbird and Jim, rather, in the studio, and we have Ken, our faithful engineer, making it all possible.
[35:48.890 --> 35:49.170] [SPEAKER_14]: Thank you, Ken.
[35:50.810 --> 35:53.890] [SPEAKER_14]: Now, we also have stories about Google.
[35:54.010 --> 35:55.830] [SPEAKER_14]: Google's in the news, as they always are.
[35:57.030 --> 36:00.210] [SPEAKER_14]: Now, what's this about them wanting spectrum?
[36:00.470 --> 36:01.850] [SPEAKER_14]: Bernie, I think you've been following this story.
[36:01.950 --> 36:08.530] [SPEAKER_14]: They want to provide something to everybody for a fair price, or what is it that they're up to?
[36:09.430 --> 36:12.050] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, it's an intriguing offer that Google has made.
[36:12.210 --> 36:24.590] [SPEAKER_15]: The federal government, the FCC, is going to basically auction off a large chunk of the radio spectrum in the 700 megahertz band.
[36:24.650 --> 36:35.810] [SPEAKER_15]: These are frequencies that will be left over when the FCC forces all the commercial television stations to turn off their analog transmitters in early 2009, I think it is, about a year and a half.
[36:36.570 --> 36:37.950] [SPEAKER_15]: And 18 months, yeah.
[36:38.550 --> 36:47.350] [SPEAKER_15]: When that happens, the FCC is going to auction off this spectrum to, ostensibly, the cell phone companies who make the most money from it.
[36:47.670 --> 36:50.850] [SPEAKER_15]: And they're hoping to raise several billion dollars.
[36:51.030 --> 36:53.850] [SPEAKER_15]: They're hoping to raise like 15 billion dollars from this auction.
[36:54.470 --> 37:11.170] [SPEAKER_15]: And Google, who has very deep pockets, has said, wait a minute, we'll start the bidding at five, which is more than anybody else has agreed to bid yet, if you FCC make a couple of changes to how this spectrum must be used.
[37:11.470 --> 37:20.750] [SPEAKER_15]: One, we would like the FCC to mandate that the spectrum allow any device to be used.
[37:20.810 --> 37:25.730] [SPEAKER_15]: In other words, if you buy a cell phone from one cell phone company, you should be able to move it to the other cell phone company.
[37:25.830 --> 37:29.230] [SPEAKER_15]: Right now, you can't do that because the handsets are locked, you use a different protocol or whatever.
[37:31.130 --> 37:42.570] [SPEAKER_15]: Another thing the FCC Google would like is to allow any kind of application to run on these devices, not just those that are dictated by Verizon or whatever your wireless carrier happens to be.
[37:42.890 --> 37:57.690] [SPEAKER_15]: And three, to make the spectrum whoever wins the auction for it, to force that company to sell access to this wireless network to third-party wireless providers on a wholesale basis.
[37:57.890 --> 38:01.890] [SPEAKER_15]: And we talked about naked DSL several shows ago.
[38:01.890 --> 38:09.890] [SPEAKER_15]: This is where Verizon would have to resell their DSL service to another company at a discount rate.
[38:10.270 --> 38:16.670] [SPEAKER_15]: That other company could then sell to you or me without having the bundle have to pay for unnecessary phone service and whatever.
[38:17.090 --> 38:24.810] [SPEAKER_15]: So all these things sound like good ideas and it's driving the wireless carriers crazy that Google is saying that this all should be done.
[38:25.470 --> 38:27.390] [SPEAKER_15]: One, because Google has more money than them.
[38:27.530 --> 38:28.330] [SPEAKER_15]: It drives them crazy.
[38:28.490 --> 38:32.790] [SPEAKER_15]: And two, because all of these things are exactly what the wireless phone companies don't want.
[38:32.930 --> 38:34.850] [SPEAKER_15]: They want to control what phone you use.
[38:34.950 --> 38:36.910] [SPEAKER_15]: They want to control what applications you use.
[38:37.010 --> 38:42.210] [SPEAKER_15]: And they don't want any other companies to access their network, even if they sell it at a wholesale basis.
[38:42.490 --> 38:45.110] [SPEAKER_15]: So it's really interesting to see how this is going to happen.
[38:45.250 --> 39:01.190] [SPEAKER_15]: And today I heard the FCC granted all of these wishes, rule change wishes, except for the one that says that the carriers will have to resell, have to make the spectrum re-available to other carriers at a wholesale discount.
[39:01.610 --> 39:05.130] [SPEAKER_15]: So two out of three ain't bad and it's going to be interesting to see how this works out.
[39:05.530 --> 39:10.210] [SPEAKER_07]: What's interesting is that Google wasn't just asking for open access to the network.
[39:10.310 --> 39:27.830] [SPEAKER_07]: They were asking for open access to their services as well, which means that the providers bidding on this spectrum would have to actually sell their services, not just access to the spectrum at wholesale rates, which is really not like any typical business model that any companies really used to,
[39:27.950 --> 39:47.870] [SPEAKER_07]: which just proves that you can have open access, you can have networks and services that are available to the public without them paying a fee if you just shift your business model and Google specifically happens to be relatively privacy invasive in terms of selling advertising data and data mining all of your stuff for their internal use in order to whatever,
[39:48.270 --> 39:55.650] [SPEAKER_07]: in their words, improve services and again, offer advertising to other clients who are actually paying for it.
[39:55.750 --> 40:20.170] [SPEAKER_07]: But one of the big things that people keep touting about the spectrum and I'm not entirely sure about its truth because I've been looking or I've been searching for technical data regarding this and everybody's saying that the 700 megahertz chunk of spectrum is somehow really useful and has all these great building penetration characteristics and I haven't seen any technical data to back that up
[40:20.170 --> 40:20.350] [SPEAKER_07]: yet.
[40:20.530 --> 40:22.110] [SPEAKER_07]: So, Bernie, do you know anything about that?
[40:22.310 --> 40:24.570] [SPEAKER_15]: It's not really that true.
[40:24.770 --> 40:30.530] [SPEAKER_15]: It's no more true than it is for cell phone service as opposed...
[40:30.530 --> 40:32.650] [SPEAKER_15]: There's cellular service and there's PCS service.
[40:33.470 --> 40:46.250] [SPEAKER_15]: There's companies like Sprint PCS and a lot of the GSM carriers like T-Mobile and some of the other I guess singular has some 1900 megahertz frequencies.
[40:46.490 --> 41:12.450] [SPEAKER_15]: There's basically two wireless phone bands 1900 megahertz which is called PCS and then there's the 800 megahertz band which is the old leftover frequencies from the old analog cell phones that Verizon uses AT&T has a bunch of 800 megahertz spectrum and basically all the local phone carriers in whatever area you lived in once had that 800 megahertz spectrum or still do operate it and it doesn't
[41:12.450 --> 41:32.310] [SPEAKER_15]: really penetrate buildings all that well and 1700 at 700 megahertz is just very close to 800 megahertz so no it doesn't have magical powers that are going to punch through buildings much better than your existing cell phone like if your cell phone is Verizon it ain't going to work any better than a Verizon cell phone now because it's very close to that in frequency my question about this This
[41:32.310 --> 41:34.810] [SPEAKER_14]: whole spectrum, this whole part of the spectrum, 700 MHz.
[41:35.010 --> 41:36.070] [SPEAKER_14]: What was on there before?
[41:36.770 --> 41:39.170] [SPEAKER_07]: It was all UHF television stations, yeah.
[41:39.910 --> 41:40.610] [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, I see.
[41:40.890 --> 41:45.110] [SPEAKER_07]: So that's all getting shut down because of the HD broadcasts.
[41:45.210 --> 41:46.950] [SPEAKER_07]: In 2009, I believe, they're shutting it down.
[41:47.350 --> 41:49.850] [SPEAKER_07]: And now they're auctioning it off to corporations.
[41:50.050 --> 41:55.190] [SPEAKER_07]: And they're actually... this specific chunk that they're auctioning off with these rules is only a 22 MHz chunk of that.
[41:55.290 --> 41:59.310] [SPEAKER_07]: They're going to reserve... I think the total was 62 or something like that.
[41:59.310 --> 42:00.430] [SPEAKER_07]: Maybe more.
[42:00.610 --> 42:05.470] [SPEAKER_07]: I don't have that figure in front of me now, but they're only offering this 20...
[42:05.470 --> 42:06.730] [SPEAKER_07]: Okay, so we just lost...
[42:06.730 --> 42:07.090] [SPEAKER_07]: Not me.
[42:08.210 --> 42:10.630] [SPEAKER_07]: Okay, so Mike's not with us anymore.
[42:10.670 --> 42:19.770] [SPEAKER_07]: But they're only auctioning off this 22 MHz portion of the spectrum, which is going to cause the bidders to be in compliance with these rules.
[42:19.890 --> 42:28.170] [SPEAKER_07]: Now, there's going to be portions of the spectrum allocated to emergency management and municipalities and whoever else they decide to issue it to in terms of government.
[42:28.170 --> 42:33.530] [SPEAKER_07]: But they're supposedly wanting to develop some sort of nationwide network.
[42:33.630 --> 42:36.490] [SPEAKER_07]: And it's not really clear on what the details are about that yet.
[42:36.810 --> 42:39.910] [SPEAKER_07]: But another interesting point is that this is just the United States.
[42:39.910 --> 42:45.890] [SPEAKER_07]: This isn't something that's going to allow services to be developed to be used all over the world.
[42:46.030 --> 42:54.370] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, you're going to have the same problems that you have now with the CDMA providers and TDMA and all the other non-universal in terms of global communications providers.
[42:55.470 --> 42:55.870] So...
[42:55.870 --> 42:56.510] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, that's true.
[42:56.730 --> 42:58.370] [SPEAKER_14]: Well, Redbird, I wanted to ask you something.
[42:58.910 --> 42:59.770] [SPEAKER_14]: It's ham radio.
[42:59.910 --> 43:01.310] [SPEAKER_14]: Ham radio people getting involved in this.
[43:01.370 --> 43:03.570] [SPEAKER_14]: Are they going to get a chunk of that spectrum for their own use?
[43:04.130 --> 43:08.190] [SPEAKER_07]: Unfortunately, it doesn't seem like we're ever really going to get all that much more spectrum.
[43:08.190 --> 43:11.430] [SPEAKER_07]: In fact, a lot of it's trying to be taken away from us.
[43:11.990 --> 43:21.210] [SPEAKER_07]: There, you know, the FCC doesn't have as much of a concern as it should against a whole lot of interference problems that are actually... that are using portions of our spectrum.
[43:22.250 --> 43:23.910] [SPEAKER_07]: BPL is a great example of this.
[43:24.030 --> 43:28.770] [SPEAKER_07]: They're using... they're using portions of the amateur radio and the entire HF spectrum, actually.
[43:28.770 --> 43:30.490] [SPEAKER_07]: So this affects shortwave listeners as well.
[43:30.630 --> 43:36.810] [SPEAKER_07]: And they're broadcasting this on their power lines, which are probably the most incredible antennas that anybody can have.
[43:36.970 --> 43:45.590] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, these things span, you know, thousands and thousands of miles and just radiate the crap that they're putting on these lines, which were never designed to carry RF.
[43:45.810 --> 43:52.550] [SPEAKER_07]: And it's just pumping all this crap and digital noise into, you know, into the HF portions of the radio spectrum.
[43:52.710 --> 43:54.870] [SPEAKER_07]: And the FCC doesn't seem very concerned about that.
[43:54.870 --> 44:02.190] [SPEAKER_07]: A number of years ago, they gave away a portion of the 1.25 meter band to corporations, I think specifically UPS.
[44:02.830 --> 44:04.270] [SPEAKER_07]: And we never got that back.
[44:04.410 --> 44:06.530] [SPEAKER_07]: So it doesn't look as though we're going to get any of this.
[44:06.650 --> 44:06.750] [SPEAKER_07]: No.
[44:07.310 --> 44:10.870] [SPEAKER_14]: I've just been handed a copy of the Daily Telegraph from London.
[44:11.170 --> 44:13.430] [SPEAKER_14]: It's Britain's best-selling quality daily, they claim.
[44:14.610 --> 44:21.270] [SPEAKER_14]: And, well, there's absolutely nothing here that I can see that I'd like to read on the air, but let's figure... I'd mention that they're handing out British newspapers.
[44:21.430 --> 44:22.370] [SPEAKER_14]: So, yeah, this is really happening.
[44:22.510 --> 44:23.150] [SPEAKER_14]: We're really going to England.
[44:23.530 --> 44:23.890] [SPEAKER_14]: Emmanuel?
[44:23.890 --> 44:24.650] [SPEAKER_14]: Yes.
[44:25.010 --> 44:40.610] [SPEAKER_15]: I just also wanted to mention that the FCC is touting that these spectrum auctions are really good things for the public because they're going to raise so many billions of tax dollars that aren't going to come out of the taxpayers' pockets.
[44:40.730 --> 44:43.090] [SPEAKER_15]: This is basically free money, they're saying.
[44:43.090 --> 44:50.290] [SPEAKER_15]: We're generating money out of thin air to put into the general funds so you don't have to pay more taxes, which is a complete ruse.
[44:50.550 --> 44:57.310] [SPEAKER_15]: That's a complete falsehood and a shell game that the FCC and the federal government are pulling on us.
[44:57.310 --> 45:01.390] [SPEAKER_15]: This radio spectrum is public property.
[45:01.590 --> 45:07.810] [SPEAKER_15]: These are the public airwaves that the FCC is saying, well, we're just going to sell this to some private company.
[45:07.810 --> 45:17.270] [SPEAKER_15]: And guess where the money that has to pay for the billions or tens of billions of dollars that's going to be spent on this spectrum?
[45:17.490 --> 45:25.190] [SPEAKER_15]: Guess who's going to ultimately pay out of their pockets to use what truly is public property?
[45:25.190 --> 45:37.030] [SPEAKER_15]: That's right, you and me, instead of it coming out of our pockets as tax dollars, it's going to come out even more in the form of higher fees to access a public resource, the radio airwaves.
[45:37.170 --> 45:44.850] [SPEAKER_15]: So this is really a great fraud and a shell game that the FCC is foisting on the American public, and I think we should be upset about that.
[45:45.330 --> 45:51.910] [SPEAKER_14]: Let me just jump in here because I do see a story on the front page of today's Daily Toregraph that might be a little bit interesting.
[45:51.910 --> 45:54.990] [SPEAKER_14]: The headline is, Office Printers Just As Risky As Smoking.
[45:55.250 --> 46:02.330] [SPEAKER_14]: That's right, the office printer causes frustration when it's not working, but it may be posing as big a health risk to staff as smoking a cigarette when it is.
[46:02.530 --> 46:11.850] [SPEAKER_14]: Research published today shows that 17 out of 62 laser printers tested released high amounts of minute toner particles into the air, which are breathed into office workers' lungs.
[46:12.070 --> 46:13.890] [SPEAKER_14]: So now we have something else to worry about.
[46:15.890 --> 46:16.950] [SPEAKER_14]: I don't believe it.
[46:19.720 --> 46:21.260] [SPEAKER_14]: You don't want to believe it, that's true.
[46:21.940 --> 46:31.520] [SPEAKER_15]: If you just go around your printer, if you wipe your finger around your office laser printer to see if there's like a thin layer of black toner powder, it ain't there.
[46:31.700 --> 46:35.020] [SPEAKER_15]: I think this is... I really question the validity of this study.
[46:35.780 --> 46:37.900] [SPEAKER_14]: All right, well, I'll give you the address for the telegraph.
[46:37.980 --> 46:41.300] [SPEAKER_14]: You can write them a letter and complain about that.
[46:41.300 --> 46:46.640] [SPEAKER_14]: But basically what we've just been talking about, I think it boils down to, who do we trust more?
[46:46.740 --> 46:49.780] [SPEAKER_14]: Do we trust the existing wireless phone companies or do we trust Google?
[46:50.140 --> 46:59.800] [SPEAKER_14]: And I got to put my bet with Google at the moment, but it's not really very confident because they do kind of scare me.
[46:59.980 --> 47:04.900] [SPEAKER_14]: But I do think they have better ideas than the old dinosaurs that are out there now running the industry.
[47:04.900 --> 47:20.260] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, I think they have better ideas in terms of equal access to people who wouldn't necessarily be able to afford services in the past, but they don't necessarily have any better ideas than other corporations in terms of benefiting the customer instead of themselves.
[47:20.260 --> 47:33.920] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, they certainly are making a ton of money off of this, and they absolutely will make a ton of money when it comes to advertising and selling the data on wireless access use because right now that's all controlled by a very small number of corporations who own the spectrum.
[47:34.120 --> 47:37.400] [SPEAKER_07]: So it'll be interesting to see what they do with this data.
[47:37.520 --> 47:48.060] [SPEAKER_07]: And if you read their privacy policies, which is something we can bring up again in the future as they acquire more services, and one of their most recent acquisitions is Grand Central.
[47:48.200 --> 47:53.140] [SPEAKER_07]: If you read their privacy policies, you'll see that, you know, it's not consumer-friendly.
[47:53.520 --> 48:06.420] [SPEAKER_07]: They're using your data, and, you know, to some that's probably, you know, a good trade-off in terms of getting the service for free, but they do have a business strategy behind it, and they are ultimately looking out for themselves.
[48:06.880 --> 48:08.060] [SPEAKER_14]: Let me jump in here.
[48:08.140 --> 48:13.360] [SPEAKER_14]: You're a pilot, and we've started moving, so I assume that means I should turn my cell phone off, right?
[48:13.360 --> 48:16.320] [SPEAKER_07]: I have had problems with cell phone interference in the avionics, yes.
[48:16.620 --> 48:23.580] [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, so what I'm going to do is I'm going to leave you guys with a story of Google taking over another company called Postini.
[48:23.620 --> 48:25.180] [SPEAKER_14]: I believe Bernie has some information on that.
[48:25.440 --> 48:32.900] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm going to leave you now because I'm on a commercial airline, and we're about to start taking off, and I don't want to be rude and cause all kinds of mayhem and problems.
[48:33.100 --> 48:38.260] [SPEAKER_14]: I will be on next week from Germany, and stay with the Off The Hook folks for the rest of the hour.
[48:38.700 --> 48:39.740] [SPEAKER_14]: And thanks, everybody.
[48:40.600 --> 48:41.340] [SPEAKER_07]: Have a good flight.
[48:42.360 --> 48:42.820] [SPEAKER_14]: Bye-bye.
[48:42.820 --> 48:43.380] [SPEAKER_07]: Bon voyage.
[48:45.540 --> 48:46.220] [SPEAKER_07]: So, Bernie.
[48:48.580 --> 48:49.360] [SPEAKER_07]: Bernie's still on the phone.
[48:49.500 --> 48:51.000] [SPEAKER_07]: Okay, so we'll get rid of this.
[48:52.020 --> 48:52.500] [SPEAKER_08]: All right.
[48:52.820 --> 48:53.880] [SPEAKER_08]: Bernie, are you still there?
[48:54.120 --> 48:54.800] [SPEAKER_15]: I'm still here.
[48:54.860 --> 48:57.860] [SPEAKER_15]: I heard a French flight attendant just a moment ago.
[48:57.960 --> 48:58.980] [SPEAKER_15]: That was kind of interesting.
[48:59.680 --> 49:00.920] [SPEAKER_15]: Or French speaking, anyway.
[49:01.480 --> 49:13.080] [SPEAKER_15]: Emmanuel just mentioned this story about Google just purchased spending, what was it, I think, $265 million in cash a week or two ago for a company called Postini.
[49:13.340 --> 49:16.780] [SPEAKER_15]: And I've actually been using Postini for several years at the company I work for.
[49:18.820 --> 49:21.820] [SPEAKER_15]: They're basically a spam filtering company.
[49:21.820 --> 49:32.640] [SPEAKER_15]: If you have a company with probably more than 10 employees, I don't know what the minimum is, but if you have more than a handful of employees, you can have all your mail filtered through Postini's servers.
[49:32.640 --> 49:34.540] [SPEAKER_15]: And they do a very, very good job.
[49:34.740 --> 49:49.040] [SPEAKER_15]: They have large teams of people who are very smart at figuring out the techniques that spammers use to get junk mail or mail that has malicious attachments like viruses or worms or worse attached to email.
[49:49.040 --> 49:53.440] [SPEAKER_15]: They're very good at blocking this from getting onto your mail server.
[49:53.620 --> 49:55.240] [SPEAKER_15]: And they have a very low...
[49:55.240 --> 49:58.680] [SPEAKER_15]: I don't own stock in this company, Postini, but they do a very good job.
[49:58.680 --> 50:04.360] [SPEAKER_15]: The point is their technology is so good that Google just bought them for over a quarter million dollars in cash.
[50:04.760 --> 50:08.740] [SPEAKER_15]: And now that raises an interesting privacy question.
[50:08.740 --> 50:11.720] [SPEAKER_15]: Now Google will be reading all these companies' email.
[50:12.320 --> 50:17.600] [SPEAKER_15]: Thousands and thousands of companies across the United States and around the world have their mail filtered through Postini.
[50:17.800 --> 50:20.100] [SPEAKER_15]: And now Google is going to have access to that content.
[50:20.280 --> 50:29.860] [SPEAKER_15]: Now whether Google is really going to actually read and search through all that email and market and use that to make money somehow.
[50:29.860 --> 50:30.440] [SPEAKER_15]: I don't know.
[50:30.560 --> 50:31.600] [SPEAKER_15]: But they have access to all that.
[50:31.660 --> 50:32.840] [SPEAKER_15]: And that's what concerns me a little bit.
[50:33.060 --> 50:46.200] [SPEAKER_07]: And one of the main things about Google as opposed to individual companies that they're acquiring is that not only do they have access now to your email filtering and all the content of your email in order to provide that service, but they have access to your web searches.
[50:46.200 --> 50:52.300] [SPEAKER_07]: They have access, if you're using the new Grand Central thing that they acquire, to everybody you call.
[50:52.480 --> 50:55.560] [SPEAKER_07]: They have access to your personal email if you're using Gmail.
[50:55.800 --> 50:59.420] [SPEAKER_07]: They have access to any queries that you do on the Internet, really.
[50:59.680 --> 51:01.660] [SPEAKER_07]: The majority of them go through Google now.
[51:01.820 --> 51:05.880] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, it's, you know, they have a majority.
[51:06.220 --> 51:10.780] [SPEAKER_07]: And I actually have some quotes here from the Grand Central privacy policy.
[51:10.780 --> 51:17.620] [SPEAKER_07]: And Grand Central is a service they just acquired which allows you to do cool things with your phone and literally route your phone calls through Google in order to...
[51:18.320 --> 51:23.940] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, you can look at their website for the features, and this isn't really necessarily meant to promote that.
[51:24.080 --> 51:29.220] [SPEAKER_07]: But when you use Grand Central, Grand Central servers automatically record certain information about your use of Grand Central.
[51:29.380 --> 51:40.800] [SPEAKER_07]: Similar to other web services, Grand Central records information such as account activity, including storage usage, number of logins, data displayed or clicked on, including UI elements, ads, links, etc.
[51:41.100 --> 51:45.700] [SPEAKER_07]: Other log information including browser type IP address, date and time of access, cookie ID, and refer URL.
[51:46.180 --> 51:53.220] [SPEAKER_07]: And telephony log information including calling party number, forwarding numbers, time and date of calls, duration of calls, and types of calls.
[51:53.680 --> 51:54.500] [SPEAKER_07]: Dot, dot, dot.
[51:54.600 --> 52:03.900] [SPEAKER_07]: We do not sell, rent, or otherwise share your personal information with any third parties except in the limited circumstances described in the Google privacy policy, such as when we believe we are required to do so by law.
[52:04.040 --> 52:08.620] [SPEAKER_07]: Not even necessarily when they are actually required to do so, but only when they believe they are required to do so.
[52:09.020 --> 52:12.500] [SPEAKER_07]: You may terminate your account by contacting support at grandcentral.com.
[52:12.640 --> 52:16.320] [SPEAKER_07]: Such deletions or terminations will take immediate effect in your account view.
[52:16.680 --> 52:24.300] [SPEAKER_07]: Residual copies of deleted messages and accounts may take up to 60 days to be deleted from our active servers and may remain in our offline backup systems.
[52:24.460 --> 52:29.420] [SPEAKER_07]: So, really, they have a record of all your information, you know, everything forever.
[52:29.420 --> 52:37.740] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, they probably have amazing backup facilities just because of the amount of data that they retain and the service that they provide to your users.
[52:37.880 --> 52:46.800] [SPEAKER_07]: So, you can bet that any queries you make in any of the Google services, any of their forwarding services, grandcentral, email filtering, whatever, they've got logs of it.
[52:46.940 --> 52:59.160] [SPEAKER_07]: So, when they have so much information from so many different aspects of the things that you do on the Internet, it's, you know, it really becomes dangerous in terms of violating your privacy and that data getting into the wrong hands.
[52:59.980 --> 53:19.900] [SPEAKER_15]: And it sounds like the level of data mining that they're doing is rivaling the NSA's, National Security Agency's data mining, which apparently is so important to this administration that they'll try to take advantage of a sick man in intensive care to get him to extend the policy,
[53:19.900 --> 53:32.080] [SPEAKER_15]: as has been accused, alleged Attorney General Gonzalez and former White House Chief of Staff Andy Card did a couple years ago.
[53:32.180 --> 53:33.760] [SPEAKER_15]: So, this is really interesting.
[53:33.760 --> 53:37.460] [SPEAKER_15]: All this data mining is not just the federal government spying on you.
[53:37.620 --> 53:44.320] [SPEAKER_15]: It's corporations like Google, who supposedly do no evil, they're data mining your every move as well.
[53:44.320 --> 53:48.220] [SPEAKER_15]: It's fascinating what's going on, and it'll be even more fascinating to see where it goes.
[53:48.940 --> 54:01.780] [SPEAKER_08]: You know, there's just a couple minutes left in the show, and I figured this would be a good time for a couple of announcements, and one of which I've been wanting to make all through the show because it is just such an ironical contrast to just about everything we've mentioned.
[54:02.680 --> 54:14.680] [SPEAKER_08]: Tomorrow evening in New York City, the former founder of PayPal, Peter Thiel, is going to be speaking on how new technologies thwart governments and promote freedom.
[54:14.900 --> 54:19.400] [SPEAKER_08]: Clearly something that we've shown today, as in almost every show, is very useful.
[54:20.440 --> 54:23.780] [SPEAKER_08]: This will be... doors open at 7 p.m.
[54:23.800 --> 54:28.500] [SPEAKER_08]: This is at the General Society Library at 20 West 44th Street.
[54:28.760 --> 54:40.440] [SPEAKER_08]: He is going to discuss how computers, the Internet, and international electronic money transfers have circumvented government power to monitor, tax, or control human activity.
[54:40.900 --> 54:47.340] [SPEAKER_08]: First of all, it should be interesting, and second of all, it should be fascinating because it's ironic even within the talk.
[54:47.680 --> 55:02.000] [SPEAKER_08]: PayPal, if you recall, pretty much acquiesced to the Fed's request to not conduct transactions which were perfectly legal, involving gambling in any way, and a number of other transactions that the government simply opposed.
[55:02.000 --> 55:05.620] [SPEAKER_08]: So, for him to give this speech is kind of fascinating.
[55:05.980 --> 55:13.760] [SPEAKER_08]: Sponsored by an organization called nycjunto, J-U-N-T-O dot com, for more information.
[55:15.160 --> 55:16.120] [SPEAKER_07]: All right, sounds good.
[55:16.160 --> 55:16.980] [SPEAKER_07]: Do you have any other announcements?
[55:17.220 --> 55:17.480] [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, yeah.
[55:17.640 --> 55:24.640] [SPEAKER_08]: This coming Friday is the first Friday of the month, so 2600 meets in various locations around the world.
[55:25.200 --> 55:31.820] [SPEAKER_08]: And one last announcement, which is totally unrelated to anything else, but in New York City, like every summer, there's a blood shortage.
[55:32.060 --> 55:35.060] [SPEAKER_08]: So, please, if you can be a blood donor, be one.
[55:35.160 --> 55:39.400] [SPEAKER_08]: You never know when it might be useful for general people or your friends and relatives.
[55:39.780 --> 55:42.820] [SPEAKER_15]: And, Jim, can you give blood at the 2600 meeting this Friday?
[55:44.000 --> 55:46.540] [SPEAKER_08]: We make you sweat, but we don't make you give blood.
[55:47.140 --> 55:47.540] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay.
[55:48.360 --> 55:50.780] [SPEAKER_07]: All right, and it looks like we're just about out of time right now.
[55:50.780 --> 55:54.400] [SPEAKER_07]: So, I guess this is as good a time as any to say goodnight, and thanks for listening.