Off The Hook - 2008-08-20

[00:36.780 --> 00:39.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:39.860 --> 00:41.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: The time is just about 7 o'clock.
[00:42.060 --> 00:44.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: Time, once again, for Off The Hook.
[02:18.130 --> 02:20.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: And a very good interview by the program is Off The Hook.
[02:20.890 --> 02:23.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:24.170 --> 02:31.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: Last program this month, in fact, because we have the convention coming up next week, the Democratic Convention, and then after that, the Republican Convention.
[02:31.970 --> 02:35.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: Then we're back in September with our series of fundraising shows.
[02:35.950 --> 02:39.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, this might be the last, quote-unquote, normal show we have until October.
[02:40.010 --> 02:41.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, let's make the most of it.
[02:41.230 --> 02:43.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: We have a whole crowd of people here tonight.
[02:43.710 --> 02:44.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, boy.
[02:44.730 --> 02:46.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's start off with Mike over there.
[02:46.790 --> 02:47.010]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hi.
[02:47.830 --> 02:52.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: That looks like A-Team joining us from Florida, but you're going back to Florida now.
[02:53.310 --> 02:54.010]  [SPEAKER_11]: Unfortunately, yeah.
[02:54.130 --> 02:55.290]  [SPEAKER_11]: Friday's my last day here.
[02:55.430 --> 02:58.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, well, hopefully we'll see you before the next Hope.
[02:58.750 --> 02:59.310]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yes, you will.
[02:59.390 --> 02:59.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: In 2010.
[03:01.130 --> 03:03.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that's Dot Red over there in the middle of the room.
[03:03.470 --> 03:03.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hello.
[03:03.830 --> 03:03.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hello.
[03:04.450 --> 03:05.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that looks like Rob T.
[03:05.750 --> 03:06.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: Firefly.
[03:06.330 --> 03:06.890]  [SPEAKER_15]: Good evening.
[03:07.050 --> 03:07.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: Red Hecht.
[03:07.610 --> 03:07.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hello.
[03:08.170 --> 03:08.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: Voltaire.
[03:08.870 --> 03:09.090]  [SPEAKER_15]: Hello.
[03:09.250 --> 03:09.810]  [SPEAKER_15]: I'm out in the corner.
[03:10.070 --> 03:12.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: And all the way over in the far side is not Kevin.
[03:13.110 --> 03:13.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hello.
[03:13.790 --> 03:15.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: Down in Philadelphia, Bernie S.
[03:15.870 --> 03:16.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: Greetings from Philadelphia.
[03:16.810 --> 03:18.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: We have so many people on this show.
[03:18.470 --> 03:20.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think we have more people on the show than we have an audience right now.
[03:20.790 --> 03:24.050]  [SPEAKER_15]: There will be a test for the audience later on exactly who is who.
[03:24.350 --> 03:24.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wow.
[03:24.910 --> 03:28.250]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, well, yeah, I guess it's a bit fitting because it is the last show in a while.
[03:28.250 --> 03:34.010]  [SPEAKER_12]: So hopefully we have lots to fill you in on, and we'll take some phone calls in a little bit as well.
[03:34.710 --> 03:36.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: A breaking story that's taking place.
[03:36.790 --> 03:39.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: We mentioned this actually last night on Off the Wall.
[03:39.750 --> 03:49.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: But somebody who we know, those of us involved in organizing Hope and 2600 and things like that, know James Powderly, co-founder of Graffiti Research Lab.
[03:49.650 --> 03:52.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: Mike, what's Graffiti Research Lab known for at the Hope Conferences?
[03:52.610 --> 03:56.690]  [SPEAKER_15]: At the Hope Conferences, they're known for providing quite a spectacle.
[03:57.690 --> 03:58.670]  [SPEAKER_15]: The LED throwies?
[03:58.690 --> 03:59.550]  [SPEAKER_15]: LED throwies.
[03:59.770 --> 04:05.510]  [SPEAKER_15]: They did in a really big way two years ago and in a nicer way this time.
[04:06.270 --> 04:08.530]  [SPEAKER_15]: And they are also known...
[04:08.530 --> 04:15.130]  [SPEAKER_15]: They're really known for providing tools, especially electronic tools, where people can get their message out.
[04:15.350 --> 04:23.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: So James Powderly was actually involved, apparently, in getting messages out in China during the Olympics.
[04:24.170 --> 04:26.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: And apparently, the Chinese authorities did not go for that.
[04:27.090 --> 04:27.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: He is being held.
[04:27.870 --> 04:29.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: We have no further information.
[04:29.450 --> 04:38.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: We just know he was detained a couple of days ago as he was preparing to use a handheld green laser to project messages on prominent structures in Beijing.
[04:38.850 --> 04:41.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's according to the organization Students for a Free Tibet.
[04:42.070 --> 04:46.730]  [SPEAKER_12]: A little later in the program, we're going to be speaking to James' wife live on the radio.
[04:46.730 --> 04:50.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: So we'll have updates on just where that story has gone.
[04:50.950 --> 04:55.250]  [SPEAKER_12]: But it definitely is a little weird when somebody you know is being detained.
[04:55.870 --> 04:58.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: I can't say I'm all that surprised that they would react in that way.
[04:58.850 --> 05:01.070]  [SPEAKER_15]: They're detaining a lot of people, the Chinese authorities.
[05:01.410 --> 05:06.090]  [SPEAKER_15]: They have these areas in Beijing which are official protest areas.
[05:06.350 --> 05:07.130]  [SPEAKER_15]: They have that here, too!
[05:07.290 --> 05:12.950]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, well, one of the main differences in Beijing is that you have to get a permit and they deny all permits.
[05:13.130 --> 05:14.030]  [SPEAKER_15]: Don't they do that here as well?
[05:14.030 --> 05:18.090]  [SPEAKER_15]: Well, they occasionally screw up here and let someone protest.
[05:18.470 --> 05:23.830]  [SPEAKER_15]: There they are denying all the permits, but they have these official demonstrations areas with no demonstrations in them.
[05:24.310 --> 05:24.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wow.
[05:25.430 --> 05:26.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: Because everybody's happy, I guess, right?
[05:27.170 --> 05:28.030]  [SPEAKER_15]: So they say.
[05:28.430 --> 05:28.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[05:28.890 --> 05:31.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, again, we'll have more on that in just a little bit.
[05:31.070 --> 05:46.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: But over on the other side of the world, in our favorite country of Georgia, apparently the website of the president of Georgia, the small nation that's battling Russian forces over a breakaway enclave, has been moved to a location in the U.S.
[05:46.710 --> 05:47.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: Guess what state it's in?
[05:48.250 --> 05:48.730]  [SPEAKER_15]: Texas.
[05:48.990 --> 05:49.230]  [SPEAKER_15]: Georgia.
[05:50.470 --> 05:51.350]  [SPEAKER_15]: Isn't that brilliant?
[05:51.730 --> 05:53.530]  [SPEAKER_15]: But I thought all websites were in Texas.
[05:53.710 --> 05:54.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, not these.
[05:54.510 --> 05:56.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: I guess they requested American Georgia.
[05:57.110 --> 05:57.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: It might as well.
[05:57.690 --> 05:59.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, there's going to be two American Georgias pretty soon.
[06:00.390 --> 06:05.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: The original servers located in the country of Georgia were flooded and blocked by Russians over the weekend.
[06:05.250 --> 06:08.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: How do you know who's flooding and blocking, you know?
[06:08.630 --> 06:09.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: Might as well just say hackers.
[06:09.610 --> 06:11.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's just as ignorant a statement.
[06:12.330 --> 06:19.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: Anyway, the Georgian-born chief executive of Atlanta-based hosting company Tulip Systems Inc.
[06:20.570 --> 06:37.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: happened to be on vacation in the other Georgia, the one overseas, when fighting broke out a week ago, Friday, and she cold-called the government, cold-called the government to offer her help and transferred president.gov.ge, and it doesn't stand for General Electric,
[06:38.170 --> 06:46.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: yet it stands for Georgia, and R-U-S-T-A-V-I-2.com, which is the website of a prominent Georgian TV station.
[06:46.450 --> 06:49.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: She transferred those to her company's servers on Saturday.
[06:50.410 --> 06:57.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: She said the attacks were traced to Moscow and St. Petersburg, the one in Russia, not the one in Florida, and they're continuing on the U.S.
[06:57.830 --> 06:58.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: servers.
[06:58.790 --> 07:01.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: The president's site was intermittently available midday Monday.
[07:02.630 --> 07:07.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: Route tracing performed by the Associated Press confirmed that the sites were being hosted at Tulip.
[07:08.070 --> 07:09.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, yeah, a little bit of...
[07:09.230 --> 07:12.510]  [SPEAKER_14]: Wait, so what's the point of hosting them somewhere else if they still can't keep them up?
[07:12.570 --> 07:23.150]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, because apparently the American, George, is not being bombed by Russia, so I guess there's less stress involved in trying to keep your site up against denial of service attacks.
[07:23.350 --> 07:23.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: Emmanuel?
[07:24.050 --> 07:24.570]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, go ahead, Bernie.
[07:25.050 --> 07:39.810]  [SPEAKER_06]: I heard that when the story broke a couple weeks ago that Russia had invaded Georgia, that neighboring... that all the Walmarts in neighboring Alabama were immediately sold out of ammunition because the people there were preparing.
[07:41.230 --> 07:42.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, interesting.
[07:43.270 --> 07:44.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good story there.
[07:44.230 --> 07:48.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: Um, here's, uh, here's something else, and this is, uh, a rather interesting story as well.
[07:49.030 --> 07:56.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: The Princeton Review, which is the test preparatory firm, there are people that grade SAT scores and other things like that.
[07:56.350 --> 07:57.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: No, they don't grade.
[07:57.390 --> 08:00.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, don't they, aren't they the ones that, uh, give you the grades?
[08:00.250 --> 08:01.610]  [SPEAKER_14]: No, they just prepare you for the test.
[08:01.630 --> 08:02.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, they prepare you for the test.
[08:02.890 --> 08:03.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, okay.
[08:03.870 --> 08:05.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: Because it comes from Princeton anyway.
[08:05.750 --> 08:07.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: I thought the SATs were, uh...
[08:07.410 --> 08:10.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: I seem to remember Princeton being the place that sent you the scores.
[08:10.030 --> 08:13.630]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yes, the Educational Testing Service may actually be in Princeton.
[08:13.630 --> 08:15.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's kind of weird how they're both in the same city.
[08:15.990 --> 08:19.170]  [SPEAKER_15]: And none of it has anything to do with Princeton University, just to be clear.
[08:19.230 --> 08:19.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's very weird as well.
[08:20.250 --> 08:30.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, anyway, they accidentally published the personal data and standardized test scores of tens of thousands of Florida students on its website, where they were available for seven weeks.
[08:32.410 --> 08:33.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, and somehow we missed this.
[08:33.890 --> 08:45.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: A flaw in configuring the site allowed anyone to type in a relatively simple web address and have unfettered access to hundreds of files on the company's computer network, including educational materials and internal communications.
[08:46.250 --> 08:51.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: Another test preparatory company said it stumbled on the files while doing competitive research.
[08:52.050 --> 08:52.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[08:52.750 --> 09:00.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, now the New York Times looked into this and, um, they were provided with the web address of the internal files on the condition that they not be named.
[09:00.550 --> 09:02.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: See, I would have named them just to, uh, embarrass people.
[09:02.870 --> 09:11.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: The Times then informed the Princeton Review of the problem on Monday, and the company promptly shut off access to that portion of its site.
[09:11.270 --> 09:14.030]  [SPEAKER_15]: I don't know if you can say it's promptly after seven weeks.
[09:14.170 --> 09:16.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, they can say they didn't know about it for seven weeks.
[09:16.370 --> 09:17.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: Isn't that possible?
[09:18.170 --> 09:25.010]  [SPEAKER_14]: I don't understand why companies, like, are hell-bent on posting these files on their web servers, you know?
[09:25.150 --> 09:28.810]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, that's the least secure way you could possibly do it.
[09:28.810 --> 09:32.810]  [SPEAKER_14]: Even, even just putting it behind, you know, an HT access file or something, an HTTP password.
[09:33.490 --> 09:34.390]  [SPEAKER_14]: Right, right.
[09:34.770 --> 09:38.170]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, why would you put it on a public website to begin with?
[09:38.330 --> 09:38.810]  [SPEAKER_14]: So you would...
[09:38.810 --> 09:44.130]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, it should be, if it's private information, if it's company-only information, it should be definitely behind, like, a virtual private network or something.
[09:44.190 --> 09:45.690]  [SPEAKER_14]: It shouldn't just be sitting on a web server.
[09:46.030 --> 09:49.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, RedHack, you would give them a score of zero for this?
[09:49.310 --> 09:51.350]  [SPEAKER_14]: I think the minimum you can get is, what, like, 800?
[09:51.350 --> 09:52.550]  [SPEAKER_14]: 200 for writing down your name.
[09:52.630 --> 09:53.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, it used to be, anyway.
[09:53.490 --> 09:53.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[09:53.790 --> 10:04.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, one file on the site contained information on about 34,000 students in public schools in Sarasota Florida, uh, where the Princeton Review was hired to build an online tool to help the county measure students' academic progress.
[10:05.190 --> 10:17.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that file included the students' birthdays, ethnicities, whether they had learning disabilities, whether English was a second language, and their level of performance on the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test, which was given to students in grades 3 to 11.
[10:17.170 --> 10:18.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: A, team, did you take that test?
[10:18.370 --> 10:20.310]  [SPEAKER_11]: The Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test?
[10:20.430 --> 10:21.750]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yes, I took it several times.
[10:21.890 --> 10:25.030]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's one of the worst standardized tests ever devised by anyone, ever.
[10:25.030 --> 10:36.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Another folder contained dozens of files with names and birthdates for 74,000 students in the school system of Fairfax County, Virginia, and they had hired the Princeton Review to measure and improve student performance.
[10:37.270 --> 10:48.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, the Princeton Review said that student information should have been protected by a password, but that the protection was most likely lost when the company moved its site to a new Internet provider in late June.
[10:48.690 --> 10:49.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's how it happens, folks.
[10:49.830 --> 10:52.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: They move to another provider and just forget the password.
[10:52.550 --> 10:54.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: As if one password is enough to protect...
[10:54.650 --> 10:57.710]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's no excuse to be putting it on a public web server to begin with.
[10:57.770 --> 10:57.930]  [SPEAKER_14]: Absolutely not.
[10:57.930 --> 11:01.310]  [SPEAKER_14]: It really should be on a private network if you're going to have confidential information.
[11:01.510 --> 11:01.610]  [SPEAKER_14]: You don't need that.
[11:01.610 --> 11:02.470]  [SPEAKER_14]: It doesn't make any sense.
[11:02.650 --> 11:08.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, people that are running small businesses have better security than things this massive.
[11:08.110 --> 11:18.850]  [SPEAKER_15]: I'm just curious how it came to be legal that the Sarasota, Florida School Board or whatever even gave 34,000 students information to a private company like this.
[11:18.910 --> 11:21.650]  [SPEAKER_15]: I thought we had data protection laws to protect the children.
[11:21.650 --> 11:27.430]  [SPEAKER_15]: The one thing we protect in this country is the children, and it seems that even they aren't safe from the Princeton Review.
[11:27.730 --> 11:31.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, Mike, you say that they have failed this test.
[11:31.770 --> 11:32.250]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes.
[11:32.370 --> 11:32.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right, then.
[11:32.870 --> 11:39.750]  [SPEAKER_15]: But I say also the Sarasota, Florida School Board needs to be subject to further examinations.
[11:40.050 --> 11:40.370]  [SPEAKER_02]: Dot Red.
[11:40.770 --> 11:43.890]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, I was just going to say that's what terms of service are for.
[11:44.230 --> 11:45.050]  [SPEAKER_02]: Sign away.
[11:45.470 --> 11:45.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh-huh.
[11:46.830 --> 11:49.310]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, terms of service, what would they provide for here?
[11:49.310 --> 11:54.470]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, you sign a little signature, and then all your information can be given to anyone.
[11:54.710 --> 11:56.310]  [SPEAKER_15]: But these are third-grade students.
[11:56.310 --> 11:59.730]  [SPEAKER_02]: They're not capable of evaluating whether or not they should sign.
[11:59.750 --> 12:01.790]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's what the smart parents are for.
[12:02.650 --> 12:16.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: Anyway, in addition to the information on students, the site contained the Princeton Review's educational materials for the LSAT, PSAT, and SAT exams, course schedules, and internal analysis of the effectiveness of the company's instructors, and the entire text of some Princeton Review books,
[12:16.350 --> 12:18.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: like the 2008 edition of Cracking the LSAT.
[12:20.070 --> 12:20.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[12:20.810 --> 12:23.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: And there's all kinds of fun stuff in there.
[12:23.710 --> 12:24.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, wow.
[12:24.630 --> 12:24.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes.
[12:25.650 --> 12:28.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yet another lesson learned about how not to do things.
[12:28.690 --> 12:29.510]  [SPEAKER_14]: But nothing will happen.
[12:29.710 --> 12:30.550]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know nothing will happen.
[12:30.670 --> 12:31.490]  [SPEAKER_14]: Nothing ever happens.
[12:31.710 --> 12:31.890]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's true.
[12:32.090 --> 12:32.770]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, they probably didn't learn it all.
[12:33.050 --> 12:35.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, we'll talk about it for a little bit, and then, yes, you're right.
[12:35.130 --> 12:36.150]  [SPEAKER_14]: They say, oops, we're sorry.
[12:36.490 --> 12:37.350]  [SPEAKER_14]: We took it down.
[12:37.550 --> 12:40.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: Did you guys see the front-page story on CNN a couple of days ago?
[12:41.230 --> 12:42.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is literally the front page.
[12:42.710 --> 12:43.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: Experts, U.S.
[12:43.750 --> 12:45.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: at risk for cyber attacks.
[12:45.610 --> 12:50.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: And if you look at this image, you see, like, this sort of collage of world leaders.
[12:51.190 --> 12:52.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's Hitler there, isn't it?
[12:52.770 --> 12:53.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: And Donald Trump is next to him.
[12:53.990 --> 12:55.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: Donald Trump is next to Hitler?
[12:55.570 --> 12:57.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't understand what they're trying to say there.
[12:57.630 --> 13:03.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's just all these people, and we're at risk for some kind of cyber.
[13:03.530 --> 13:08.050]  [SPEAKER_15]: You know, Hitler did a lot of bad things, of course, but I don't think cyber attacks were really on his...
[13:08.050 --> 13:12.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: He never attacked this country's infrastructure via the Internet.
[13:12.850 --> 13:15.530]  [SPEAKER_14]: I think Hitler liked to use missiles, not computers.
[13:16.010 --> 13:24.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, the next large-scale military or terrorist attack on the United States, if and when it happens, may not involve airplanes or bombs or even intruders breaching American borders.
[13:24.670 --> 13:38.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: So basically, they're saying that carrying this on, in other words, by shadowy hackers half a world away, carrying on such an assault on cyberspace, that is equivalent to a large-scale military or terrorist attack in real life.
[13:39.230 --> 13:42.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: Internet security experts believe that it could be just as devastating to the U.S.
[13:42.930 --> 13:44.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: economy and infrastructure as a deadly bombing.
[13:45.290 --> 13:46.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: Just as devastating.
[13:46.470 --> 13:46.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[13:47.210 --> 13:50.250]  [SPEAKER_12]: Nobody dies, but it's just as devastating because...
[13:50.250 --> 13:51.650]  [SPEAKER_14]: Maybe your credit card doesn't work for it, right?
[13:51.650 --> 13:53.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, maybe you can't order something on Amazon.
[13:54.270 --> 14:02.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: Experts say last week's attack on the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, in which a Russian military offensive was preceded by an Internet assault that overwhelmed Georgian government websites...
[14:02.990 --> 14:03.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wait, can we be clear?
[14:03.870 --> 14:04.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes.
[14:04.290 --> 14:08.370]  [SPEAKER_15]: The deaths were caused by the bombing, not the cyber attack that preceded it.
[14:08.770 --> 14:10.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, let's make sure about that.
[14:10.750 --> 14:10.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[14:11.030 --> 14:16.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: They say that signals a new kind of cyber war, one for which the United States is not fully prepared.
[14:16.590 --> 14:23.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: Nobody's come up with a way to prevent this from happening, even here in the U.S., said Tom Berling, acting chief executive of, guess what, Tulip Systems.
[14:25.230 --> 14:27.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: You see how it all comes around again.
[14:27.090 --> 14:29.570]  [SPEAKER_15]: And we know the story behind the story.
[14:29.710 --> 14:34.290]  [SPEAKER_15]: We know why he's the acting chief executive, because the other chief executive is in Georgia, the country.
[14:34.970 --> 14:41.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know what's interesting about this story, though, is that there's nothing about moving the Georgian website to that particular company.
[14:41.950 --> 14:45.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: This story came out before that, and for some reason, Tulip is being mentioned.
[14:45.930 --> 14:47.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's kind of weird, isn't it?
[14:47.170 --> 14:50.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: It all sort of wraps around itself.
[14:50.870 --> 14:58.150]  [SPEAKER_12]: Anyway, hackers mounted coordinated assaults on Georgian government, media, banking, and transportation sites in the weeks before Russian troops invaded.
[14:58.530 --> 14:59.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: Did you know about that?
[14:59.610 --> 15:00.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: I didn't hear any stories about that.
[15:00.990 --> 15:01.870]  [SPEAKER_15]: Only after the fact.
[15:02.030 --> 15:02.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[15:02.490 --> 15:04.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's known as distributed denial of service.
[15:04.190 --> 15:11.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: The attacks employ multiple computers to flood networks with millions of simultaneous requests, overwhelming servers, and crippling websites.
[15:12.930 --> 15:14.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, yeah, it's all about hackers.
[15:14.950 --> 15:15.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: Go ahead, Rob.
[15:15.510 --> 15:23.130]  [SPEAKER_13]: You know, I can only speak from my own experience, but I've had my websites go down many times over the years, and I somehow managed not to physically die as a result.
[15:23.670 --> 15:25.950]  [SPEAKER_13]: So, do I know something maybe that other people don't know?
[15:25.950 --> 15:26.390]  [SPEAKER_12]: You've been lucky.
[15:26.570 --> 15:27.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: You've been very lucky so far.
[15:28.230 --> 15:29.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: How long is this luck going to hold out?
[15:29.810 --> 15:33.390]  [SPEAKER_14]: A question about this photo, actually, to go back to it, the one with Hitler in it.
[15:34.030 --> 15:35.170]  [SPEAKER_14]: I don't know who's next to him.
[15:35.270 --> 15:41.770]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's not Donald Trump, but they have their hands in the exact same pose, and I'm wondering what kind of parallel CNN's trying to make here.
[15:41.890 --> 15:44.110]  [SPEAKER_14]: I wish I knew who it was so I could get a better picture.
[15:44.830 --> 15:46.670]  [SPEAKER_14]: Like, Hitler has his hands, like, held up.
[15:46.910 --> 15:48.430]  [SPEAKER_14]: Obviously, the radio audience can't see.
[15:48.610 --> 15:50.250]  [SPEAKER_14]: And so does the person next to him.
[15:50.590 --> 15:51.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: Mike, did you see this picture?
[15:51.910 --> 15:52.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's a lot of fun.
[15:53.130 --> 15:53.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: But I don't know who it is.
[15:54.090 --> 15:57.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, I don't think there's any way for our listeners to see it, because it's no longer on the front page.
[15:58.070 --> 15:58.290]  [SPEAKER_12]: A-Team.
[15:58.550 --> 16:00.810]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, well, Firefly, you mentioned your websites have gone down.
[16:00.870 --> 16:02.210]  [SPEAKER_11]: You've never managed to die from it.
[16:02.310 --> 16:09.730]  [SPEAKER_11]: But you have to remember, that's the whole nature of the war on terror, making hard criminals out of otherwise either non-criminals or just, you know, mild criminals.
[16:10.310 --> 16:10.630]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah.
[16:10.870 --> 16:11.310]  [SPEAKER_11]: Very true.
[16:11.770 --> 16:12.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[16:12.450 --> 16:13.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: Mike, do you have any insight on that picture?
[16:13.970 --> 16:14.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's kind of funny, isn't it?
[16:14.890 --> 16:15.550]  [SPEAKER_14]: No, it's some white guy.
[16:16.850 --> 16:17.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, so is it.
[16:17.370 --> 16:18.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's a bunch of white guys.
[16:19.130 --> 16:21.090]  [SPEAKER_14]: But only two are clearly pictured.
[16:21.090 --> 16:24.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, we have this interesting little bit here.
[16:24.510 --> 16:25.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: Actually, Mike, I'm going to hand you...
[16:25.830 --> 16:26.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: Recognize that phone number?
[16:26.950 --> 16:29.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'd like you to dial that, because we have a demonstration.
[16:30.130 --> 16:31.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't think this is going to work, actually.
[16:31.670 --> 16:33.010]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is something in...
[16:33.550 --> 16:34.710]  [SPEAKER_15]: You can't hear me dial.
[16:35.010 --> 16:35.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I don't want to hear you dial.
[16:36.010 --> 16:36.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh.
[16:37.030 --> 16:39.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is something known as the telemegaphone.
[16:39.770 --> 16:40.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's in Norway.
[16:41.950 --> 16:43.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: And this telemegaphone...
[16:43.310 --> 16:44.230]  [SPEAKER_15]: I'm sorry, I can't read.
[16:44.430 --> 16:45.870]  [SPEAKER_15]: What is this last digit here?
[16:46.010 --> 16:47.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know the number, though, don't you?
[16:47.650 --> 16:48.010]  [SPEAKER_12]: No.
[16:48.170 --> 16:48.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's a five.
[16:48.930 --> 16:49.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[16:49.230 --> 16:50.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's the number we always use.
[16:50.730 --> 16:52.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: See, now they know one digit to that phone number.
[16:52.750 --> 16:55.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: The telemegaphone Dale stands seven meters tall.
[16:55.730 --> 16:56.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: Did you dial it already?
[16:56.450 --> 16:56.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[16:56.750 --> 16:56.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[16:57.410 --> 16:58.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, actually, you dialed it too fast.
[16:59.190 --> 17:00.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: You've got to let me read this first.
[17:02.510 --> 17:03.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: It stands seven meters...
[17:03.950 --> 17:04.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: I didn't know you were going to go that fast.
[17:04.930 --> 17:13.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: It stands seven meters tall on top of Bergsletten Mountain overlooking the idyllic Daljfjord in western Norway.
[17:13.650 --> 17:22.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, when you dial the telemegaphone's phone number, the sound of your voice is projected out across the fjord, the valley, and the village of Dale below.
[17:22.670 --> 17:23.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's true.
[17:25.070 --> 17:26.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: Someone sent this to us.
[17:26.750 --> 17:27.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[17:27.390 --> 17:29.570]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I tried this before and actually it didn't work.
[17:29.730 --> 17:32.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: But maybe that's because everybody in the world is calling this thing now.
[17:33.070 --> 17:37.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, basically, they say if there's no answer, it means that...
[17:37.210 --> 17:39.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, they say it's wind-powered and self-reliant.
[17:40.070 --> 17:46.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: And recently, the weather has been exceptionally calm in Dale and there has been a massive amount of people calling.
[17:47.270 --> 17:50.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, if it doesn't pick up, give it a few hours to recuperate and try again.
[17:51.110 --> 17:51.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[17:51.470 --> 17:52.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's give it a shot.
[17:52.530 --> 17:52.850]  [SPEAKER_14]: All right.
[17:52.950 --> 17:53.170]  [SPEAKER_14]: Go ahead.
[17:53.170 --> 17:55.330]  [SPEAKER_14]: Maybe they also don't let you call in, like, the middle of the night.
[17:55.430 --> 17:56.690]  [SPEAKER_14]: Isn't it 4 or 5 a.m.
[17:56.710 --> 17:56.830]  [SPEAKER_14]: now?
[17:56.830 --> 18:02.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: I imagine that would be kind of annoying to the people in Dale, but maybe they're getting some kind of subsidy for this.
[18:02.050 --> 18:06.570]  [SPEAKER_12]: But if we do get through, we'll say something comforting to the people in the village down there.
[18:06.610 --> 18:07.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's a little lullaby.
[18:07.510 --> 18:07.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[18:07.690 --> 18:08.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's see what we hear.
[18:08.710 --> 18:10.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: Is it a landline or a cell phone?
[18:11.270 --> 18:12.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: We don't know, Bernie.
[18:13.430 --> 18:14.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're listening now.
[18:22.710 --> 18:23.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: You sure you dialed the number?
[18:24.290 --> 18:24.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm pretty sure.
[18:25.250 --> 18:26.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't hear anything.
[18:27.430 --> 18:28.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: We could try again.
[18:29.210 --> 18:29.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[18:29.610 --> 18:31.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: Maybe you should because it's not supposed to take that long.
[18:32.290 --> 18:32.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[18:32.810 --> 18:33.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: Sorry about that, folks.
[18:33.670 --> 18:36.250]  [SPEAKER_12]: Sometimes the phones don't work like they should.
[18:37.050 --> 18:38.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're calling the telemegaphone somewhere.
[18:39.030 --> 18:39.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know why I'm speaking quietly.
[18:40.190 --> 18:43.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's like I'm trying to not wake up the people of Dale, Norway.
[18:43.910 --> 18:47.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: But they say a telemegaphone is a tall loudspeaker.
[18:48.450 --> 18:51.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: A loudspeaker is a sculpture that automatically answers incorrect phone calls.
[18:51.950 --> 18:55.590]  [SPEAKER_00]: Har slått av telefonen eller er ikke tilgjengelig for øyeblikket.
[18:56.050 --> 18:57.170]  [SPEAKER_00]: Prøv igjen senere.
[18:58.990 --> 19:02.870]  [SPEAKER_00]: The subscriber has turned off the phone or is not available at the moment.
[19:03.370 --> 19:04.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: Please try again later.
[19:05.010 --> 19:09.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, that would indicate that this might be some kind of a cell phone service.
[19:10.090 --> 19:11.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's actually the recording I got earlier.
[19:12.430 --> 19:14.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, yeah, maybe at night they do turn it off.
[19:14.610 --> 19:15.570]  [SPEAKER_12]: So we can try in the daytime.
[19:15.770 --> 19:16.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: Unfortunately, we're not on.
[19:16.610 --> 19:25.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: But they say telemegaphone, like I said, are tall loudspeaker sculptures that automatically answer incoming phone calls and project the sound, the caller's voice, into the immediate surroundings.
[19:25.230 --> 19:27.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: They say this like telemegaphones are common.
[19:27.750 --> 19:28.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: They exist all over the world.
[19:29.070 --> 19:31.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: I've never heard of a telemegaphone before this week.
[19:31.330 --> 19:32.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: Has anyone ever experienced this?
[19:33.030 --> 19:33.550]  [SPEAKER_06]: Hey, Emmanuel.
[19:33.730 --> 19:33.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes.
[19:34.550 --> 19:41.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: I just used Google to search for a telemegaphone, and there's a lot of interesting pictures of both this and other telemegaphones around the world.
[19:41.970 --> 19:43.190]  [SPEAKER_06]: And they're pretty interesting photos.
[19:43.530 --> 19:46.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, who runs a telemegaphone and why?
[19:46.910 --> 19:48.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: What kind of people would do this?
[19:48.310 --> 19:56.710]  [SPEAKER_06]: Here it says it's generously supported by Nordic Culture Point, Unsworn Industries, and NKD Nordic Artist Center in Dale.
[19:58.350 --> 20:04.230]  [SPEAKER_06]: And it lists a whole bunch of Nordic names that I can't pronounce.
[20:04.730 --> 20:06.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, you say there are other ones?
[20:06.730 --> 20:07.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, there's a...
[20:07.870 --> 20:09.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, maybe these aren't pictures of...
[20:09.650 --> 20:12.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: Maybe these are all pictures of the same one down there.
[20:12.070 --> 20:15.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: No, actually, these are all pictures of them building it and setting it up.
[20:15.510 --> 20:15.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh-huh.
[20:16.130 --> 20:19.070]  [SPEAKER_06]: If you just use Google to search, or some other search engine...
[20:19.070 --> 20:27.730]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, if you could use Google just to tell us if there's a single other telemegaphone anywhere on the planet, I'd just be kind of curious as to whether this is just something new or something that has existed for a while.
[20:28.730 --> 20:29.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, then...
[20:29.190 --> 20:30.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: Mind you, I don't think it's a bad idea.
[20:30.730 --> 20:32.150]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think it's a fine idea.
[20:32.170 --> 20:37.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'd love to have my voice transmitted into the streets of, say, Queens or something like that, but somehow I don't think that's very realistic.
[20:39.230 --> 20:39.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[20:39.770 --> 20:41.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, let us know if you find something.
[20:41.390 --> 20:42.010]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'll keep looking.
[20:42.090 --> 20:42.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, keep looking.
[20:42.770 --> 20:50.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, I want to tell folks about a special benefit taking place tomorrow here in New York City for the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund.
[20:50.350 --> 20:50.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes.
[20:51.350 --> 20:56.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: Last I heard, there were still some tickets left for the benefit gig in New York City with DJ Spooky.
[20:56.590 --> 21:00.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: All proceeds going to the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund.
[21:00.050 --> 21:06.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: And Cory Doctorow will be appearing there, as well, as I mentioned, DJ Spooky.
[21:07.250 --> 21:11.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: And they'll be benefiting the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund following their respective presentations.
[21:12.090 --> 21:20.010]  [SPEAKER_12]: The two will take the stage together for an open forum discussion about their work and the future present each eloquently addresses across different media.
[21:21.010 --> 21:31.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: Cory Doctorow will read and discuss the issues behind his bestselling young adult novel, Little Brother, addressing Internet and government security, censorship, and civil liberties in a post-9-11 near-future atmosphere.
[21:32.230 --> 21:39.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: Little Brother tackles timely issues while telling a story that's smart, funny, and jam-packed with pop culture nuggets.
[21:40.710 --> 21:44.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, all kinds of fun things will be happening there.
[21:44.510 --> 21:50.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: And the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund sounds like a worthy cause.
[21:50.170 --> 21:52.130]  [SPEAKER_15]: Why do comic books need legal defense?
[21:52.130 --> 21:56.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, they get censored a lot by all kinds of people.
[21:56.870 --> 21:59.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: Governments, school districts, you name it.
[21:59.470 --> 22:02.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: Comic books can be seen as very subversive.
[22:03.690 --> 22:04.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, lots of times.
[22:04.950 --> 22:05.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, Bernie.
[22:05.470 --> 22:07.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: I found some information that you're looking for.
[22:07.770 --> 22:08.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[22:08.250 --> 22:09.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: Actually, let me just finish giving the information for this.
[22:10.070 --> 22:10.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm sorry, go ahead.
[22:10.530 --> 22:13.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: If people are interested, it's taking place at the Helen Mills Theater.
[22:15.790 --> 22:18.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: And it's kind of dark for me to read the actual address of that.
[22:18.770 --> 22:24.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: But if you go to boingboing.net and type in comic book legal defense fund, you'll find all the information about that.
[22:24.850 --> 22:29.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that's taking place tomorrow, 7.30 p.m., Helen Mills Theater here in New York City.
[22:29.450 --> 22:30.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right, go ahead, Bernie.
[22:31.250 --> 22:44.830]  [SPEAKER_06]: According to Public Radio International's radio program, The World, who did a report on the story, they interviewed telemegaphone designer Eric Sunderlein, who says he hopes the idea will catch on.
[22:44.950 --> 22:48.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: And he's quoted as saying, yeah, we're thinking about a lot of different locations.
[22:48.830 --> 22:50.710]  [SPEAKER_06]: Times Square in New York could be interesting.
[22:50.990 --> 22:53.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: Maybe one on the moon, end quote.
[22:53.510 --> 23:01.990]  [SPEAKER_06]: But he says, currently, the only telemegaphone is in Dale, Norway, and it's open for calls days and night, I guess unless the wind isn't blowing.
[23:02.190 --> 23:12.950]  [SPEAKER_06]: It says here that local politicians have called in, as have some late-night drunken revelers, and another caller sang lullabies, and one local farmer says he's considering using the telemegaphone to call in the cows.
[23:14.070 --> 23:15.390]  [SPEAKER_12]: Call in the cows.
[23:15.650 --> 23:18.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: So the cows won't go to his farm, they'll go to the telemegaphone.
[23:19.150 --> 23:19.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[23:19.710 --> 23:23.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, you know, when they suggest putting it on the moon, I have to wonder if they're being serious here.
[23:23.170 --> 23:24.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: Who's going to hear it on the moon?
[23:24.070 --> 23:25.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: There's no air on the moon.
[23:26.370 --> 23:27.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, there's...
[23:27.170 --> 23:29.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, it's going to be very hard to hear something.
[23:30.690 --> 23:31.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: First of all, no people.
[23:31.670 --> 23:32.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: Second of all, no air.
[23:32.610 --> 23:33.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: They'll put it in the ground.
[23:33.570 --> 23:33.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh-huh.
[23:33.830 --> 23:34.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: And you have to put your ear to the ground.
[23:34.970 --> 23:36.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: Why not just aim it into space?
[23:36.410 --> 23:39.130]  [SPEAKER_14]: If you call a telemegaphone in the forest and there's nobody there.
[23:39.390 --> 23:39.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[23:39.790 --> 23:41.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I guess we found that out tonight.
[23:41.670 --> 23:42.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: It didn't even pick up.
[23:42.850 --> 23:43.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[23:43.190 --> 23:47.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: An update on the story of the three Massachusetts Institute of Technology students.
[23:47.410 --> 23:52.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: You might have heard they were barred by a court order from discussing subway card vulnerabilities.
[23:52.890 --> 23:56.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, apparently, they're now free to say what they want.
[23:56.510 --> 24:07.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: In a ruling certain to be cheered by computer researchers, a federal judge here Tuesday, that's here being in Boston, let the 10-day-old gag order expire.
[24:08.790 --> 24:09.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: U.S.
[24:09.470 --> 24:21.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: District Judge George O'Toole Jr. refused to grant a preliminary injunction requested by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority that would have blocked the students from talking about their findings until January 1st, 2009.
[24:22.210 --> 24:32.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: The MBTA's requested injunction would have replaced a temporary restraining order granted during the DEFCON hacker conference, which automatically expires on Tuesday under federal court rules.
[24:32.790 --> 24:42.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: So apparently, they had planned, the MIT students planned to make a presentation at DEFCON on security vulnerabilities in the Massachusetts Transit Authority's electronic card and ticketing system.
[24:43.190 --> 24:48.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, I mean, I've heard things like this so many times about New York City and other places, and it's not a big deal about it.
[24:48.630 --> 24:50.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: But apparently, Boston, they really freaked out about this.
[24:50.730 --> 24:53.050]  [SPEAKER_15]: Boston's the city of freaking out over technology.
[24:53.170 --> 24:55.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: Remember the, yeah, the Aqua Teen Hunger Force thing?
[24:55.730 --> 24:57.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, they really went nuts over that.
[24:57.870 --> 25:04.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: A different federal judge who was on duty that weekend blocked the presentation after MBTA sued the students and MIT.
[25:04.630 --> 25:17.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: So now it's been lifted, but, of course, the conference is over, and the icing on the cake, they say that the students have no intention of releasing the information that will specifically give information on how exactly this vulnerability works.
[25:17.830 --> 25:18.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: Am I reading this right, Bernie?
[25:19.790 --> 25:21.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's what I read as well.
[25:21.590 --> 25:30.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: So apparently, the Boston government's attempt of, or maybe the Mass Transit Agency's attempt at prior restraint was successful.
[25:31.070 --> 25:44.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: Even though a judge ruled it was improper or had no merit, the prior restraint was still successful because the students said they're not going to release the 30-page document now.
[25:44.450 --> 25:46.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, you see, that's the kind of thing I...
[25:46.710 --> 25:53.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's like self-censorship in a way, because you've been kind of cowed into not being too aggressive as far as giving out information.
[25:54.190 --> 25:57.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: If there are security vulnerabilities, the specifics should be known.
[25:57.810 --> 26:00.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: And if you're a nice person, yes, alert the company beforehand.
[26:00.870 --> 26:07.730]  [SPEAKER_12]: But that doesn't mean you should ever silence yourself or, you know, it's basically security through obscurity, and that, we find, never works.
[26:08.170 --> 26:16.170]  [SPEAKER_13]: And, of course, they achieved the one goal they wanted to, which is to not get it revealed at this high-profile conference.
[26:16.430 --> 26:16.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right, right.
[26:17.130 --> 26:18.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: But there's other conferences coming up.
[26:18.890 --> 26:19.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: There's other conferences.
[26:19.870 --> 26:22.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: There's ToorCon coming up in San Diego in late September.
[26:22.990 --> 26:24.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: Maybe they could present it there.
[26:24.930 --> 26:30.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: If they, of course, if they want to send it into the magazine, we'd be happy to print it and get all kinds of people angry.
[26:30.910 --> 26:31.250]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, A-Team.
[26:31.370 --> 26:33.050]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, that presentation's already online.
[26:33.070 --> 26:34.210]  [SPEAKER_11]: I saw the PDF of it.
[26:34.270 --> 26:34.830]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's very interesting.
[26:35.070 --> 26:35.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: The whole presentation?
[26:36.190 --> 26:37.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: I doubt the whole thing is online.
[26:37.650 --> 26:38.290]  [SPEAKER_12]: They had to...
[26:38.290 --> 26:40.850]  [SPEAKER_11]: It was, like, I believe, like something like 30 slides or...
[26:40.850 --> 26:42.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, only the slide presentation was put online.
[26:42.610 --> 26:46.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: The slide presentation, but not the actual specifics as to what the security holes were.
[26:46.790 --> 26:56.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I'd really like to know, and I'm sure it'd be very educational to people to see just how exactly people would take advantage of such a system.
[26:57.750 --> 26:59.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, yeah, that's...
[26:59.050 --> 27:00.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: I guess that's a bit of...
[27:00.470 --> 27:01.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know.
[27:01.530 --> 27:02.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: Would you say good news or bad news?
[27:03.630 --> 27:05.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think it's bad news.
[27:06.490 --> 27:21.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: Because the MTBA, the Mass Transit Authority of Boston, succeeded in prior restraint and apparently scared these students enough through legal action to not release the information they researched.
[27:22.390 --> 27:22.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh-huh.
[27:23.590 --> 27:26.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, hopefully there'll be updates on this.
[27:26.250 --> 27:29.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hopefully the information will get out and we'll learn more information about that.
[27:30.110 --> 27:40.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, now getting back to our lead story tonight, the detaining of the Graffiti Research Lab member, James Powderly.
[27:41.270 --> 27:48.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: We have on the phone with us James' wife, Michelle Kempner, speaking to us, I believe, from Brooklyn.
[27:49.270 --> 27:49.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: Michelle, are you there?
[27:50.470 --> 27:50.710]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[27:50.890 --> 27:51.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hello.
[27:51.570 --> 27:51.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hi.
[27:52.190 --> 27:55.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, first of all, all of our thoughts are with James right now.
[27:55.130 --> 27:59.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: We've all met him at one point or another, and he's done wonderful things for the HOPE conferences over the years.
[28:01.130 --> 28:02.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: What's the latest?
[28:02.250 --> 28:03.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: Have you gotten any kind of update?
[28:04.330 --> 28:24.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, no, actually, I've been making a lot of calls today, um, talking to the State Department and, um, trying to call, you know, my representatives, my senators, and it sounds like, uh, nobody really has any information, including whether China actually acknowledges that they have tamed.
[28:24.570 --> 28:28.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, now, what information do we have to indicate that he has been detained?
[28:28.950 --> 28:37.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think all of the information comes from the text message and the Twitter message that Students for Free Tibet receives.
[28:37.890 --> 28:39.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, and that said what?
[28:40.250 --> 28:45.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, there was a, there was a Twitter message that said, detained since 3 a.m.
[28:45.370 --> 28:54.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, that's what we're setting the time from when, you know, that now we know James has been detained for over 48 hours.
[28:54.270 --> 28:54.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[28:54.850 --> 29:01.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: And then later, I believe there was a text message from somebody else that said, there's eight of us here, we're all okay.
[29:02.230 --> 29:05.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: But that now was probably over 24 hours ago.
[29:06.990 --> 29:10.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: And have, uh, any of those other eight people been heard from since?
[29:11.210 --> 29:11.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[29:12.150 --> 29:12.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[29:12.390 --> 29:17.130]  [SPEAKER_01]: Five of them, uh, were put on a plane and were able to call and say, we're on a plane.
[29:17.610 --> 29:26.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: And apparently, I also, the State Department, I believe, said that, uh, there was an acknowledgement of those five people being deported.
[29:27.590 --> 29:32.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, have any of those people been able to speak about what might have happened to James?
[29:32.270 --> 29:33.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: Did they see him?
[29:33.570 --> 29:35.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: Did they hear any kind of, uh, news?
[29:35.990 --> 29:42.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: As far as I can tell, and it's sort of weird, you know, being his wife and having a like the least information, it feels like.
[29:42.930 --> 29:50.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: But as far as I can tell, um, they never saw him directly, but they may have heard from other people who saw him.
[29:50.530 --> 29:52.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: So it's all really vague and not concrete.
[29:53.270 --> 29:53.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh-huh.
[29:53.870 --> 29:57.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, do you know much about the project that he was involved in over in Beijing?
[29:58.210 --> 30:12.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, well, from what I know, uh, you know, from being familiar with Graffiti Research Lab, they're really, it is their mission statement that they're dedicated to providing open-source tools, you know, for protesters and activists.
[30:12.530 --> 30:16.270]  [SPEAKER_01]: And that's basically what James was doing, the same thing he always does.
[30:16.570 --> 30:28.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: He was providing a tool, which was this new laser stencil, um, and then he went with them to help them use it, um, and they hadn't actually used it yet.
[30:28.590 --> 30:38.250]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, uh, the reports are that he was detained before it was actually turned on, so nothing actually happened, um, but, uh, he was detained all the same.
[30:38.750 --> 30:42.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: Um, now, uh, what, what, what do you plan on doing next?
[30:42.390 --> 30:44.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, you say you've tried to contact your, uh, elected officials.
[30:44.690 --> 30:46.150]  [SPEAKER_12]: Have they been responsive, elected officials?
[30:47.170 --> 30:59.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, so far, um, they've not been that responsive, but I guess I'm learning the ropes, and it's, uh, uh, a little more useful to contact the representatives in their D.C.
[31:00.030 --> 31:00.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: offices.
[31:00.770 --> 31:04.990]  [SPEAKER_01]: So now, Students for Free Tibet have been really helping me with getting in contact.
[31:05.490 --> 31:12.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: But since, by the time I, I got through to anyone, it was the end of the day, uh, I think their offices were already closed.
[31:13.130 --> 31:13.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: I see.
[31:13.930 --> 31:17.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, how long had James planned on staying over in Beijing?
[31:17.470 --> 31:19.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: For the entire Olympics, or beyond that?
[31:19.770 --> 31:21.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, no, it's for the last week of the Olympics.
[31:22.410 --> 31:23.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, one week.
[31:24.070 --> 31:24.390]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[31:25.150 --> 31:41.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, I imagine, uh, that he must have, uh, known that he might be stepping into a touchy situation working with students for Tibet, and, uh, being the, um, the activist that he is, uh, did he, uh, have much concern that he, he might be detained when he went over there?
[31:42.090 --> 31:46.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, I, I'm really not sure how much, you know, what James was worried about.
[31:46.910 --> 31:51.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: I just know that it's really his overarching mission to, to not back down.
[31:51.870 --> 31:56.990]  [SPEAKER_01]: From, you know, providing these tools and helping protesters get their word out.
[31:57.210 --> 31:59.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, so it's hard for me to say.
[31:59.430 --> 32:01.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: I, I just know it's really about that.
[32:01.310 --> 32:12.710]  [SPEAKER_01]: Like, providing the, uh, um, laser stencil to SFT and, uh, allowing them to, to make a splash, you know, with their message in a big way.
[32:14.210 --> 32:23.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, uh, has this story gotten, I know it's, uh, front page on Boing Boing and various other, uh, alternative media outlets, but has this gotten much, uh, in the way of mainstream, uh, press attention?
[32:23.910 --> 32:26.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, well, uh, there was a New York Times article.
[32:26.990 --> 32:30.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think that all the wire services ran an article.
[32:30.390 --> 32:32.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think it's starting to get picked up.
[32:33.030 --> 32:38.130]  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, it is interesting that the, both James and I are very active in the blogosphere.
[32:38.130 --> 32:39.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm a professional blogger.
[32:39.910 --> 32:44.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: So it's kind of funny, like, fighting to get a story out there.
[32:44.110 --> 32:47.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: But I do really appreciate every, uh, news story.
[32:48.470 --> 32:50.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, that, of course, leads to my next question.
[32:50.610 --> 32:52.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: What, what can our listeners do to, uh, to help?
[32:53.930 --> 32:56.270]  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, this is definitely uncharted territory for me.
[32:56.350 --> 33:01.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: But I think the best thing is to get, uh, attention, you know, and get the news.
[33:01.450 --> 33:09.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: And if you know anyone who works for an elected official, you know, an elected official, um, you know, just to spread the word.
[33:09.550 --> 33:11.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: And James isn't the only person.
[33:11.690 --> 33:17.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: I know he's detained with at least two other people who also are in the same boat, who hadn't done anything.
[33:17.830 --> 33:19.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think they're just, like, bloggers.
[33:19.970 --> 33:24.710]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, you know, we need to make sure they release them.
[33:24.950 --> 33:25.290]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[33:25.370 --> 33:28.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, of course, it's not about, uh, uh, actually doing something.
[33:28.570 --> 33:30.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's about what you might be able to do.
[33:30.130 --> 33:34.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's that fear the authorities have of, uh, people that, uh, might be able to inspire others.
[33:35.050 --> 33:44.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: And James certainly has that ability of inspiring people to, uh, get involved and build things and, and just have fun while, uh, expressing a serious message at the same time.
[33:44.510 --> 33:52.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: I remember, uh, in Vienna last year, playing with, uh, uh, the, um, uh, graffiti, the laser graffiti on the side of a building.
[33:52.650 --> 33:54.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: And it was just the coolest thing ever.
[33:54.170 --> 33:55.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: Of course, you know, nobody in Vienna cared.
[33:55.790 --> 34:01.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: But I imagine if you did something like that in Beijing, uh, you'd have plainclothes cops on you, uh, uh, very quickly.
[34:01.930 --> 34:02.510]  [SPEAKER_04]: Mm-hmm.
[34:02.930 --> 34:12.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: But it's just, it's, it's more the, the spirit of, um, of this kind of adventure and activism and, uh, free speech that, um, that JRL and James, they're all about that.
[34:13.030 --> 34:16.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, of course, uh, doesn't necessarily mesh with what's going on in, in China right now.
[34:17.250 --> 34:19.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: Um, well, Michelle, of course, we, we wish you the best.
[34:20.190 --> 34:23.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, is there any kind of, um, website or address or anything you want to give out?
[34:25.030 --> 34:32.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, well, we've been, we started posting updates to one of James' other initiatives called the FATLAB.
[34:32.310 --> 34:37.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: And the address is, the letter F as in Frank, five times dot A-T.
[34:37.430 --> 34:39.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: So F-F-F-F-F dot A-T.
[34:40.210 --> 34:45.990]  [SPEAKER_01]: So we'll probably be using that as a, a platform if we find anything to post information.
[34:47.230 --> 34:47.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[34:48.390 --> 34:50.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's, that's five F's dot A-T?
[34:50.670 --> 34:51.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[34:51.430 --> 34:53.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that sounds like that's in Austria as well.
[34:53.110 --> 34:54.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: So that's, uh, that's, that's kind of cool.
[34:55.230 --> 35:02.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, well, you know, I, I'm sure he'll be fine and I'm sure in a week we'll, we'll have good news and maybe he'll be back home or something like that.
[35:02.450 --> 35:05.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, uh, when you do hear from him, please, uh, give him our best.
[35:05.750 --> 35:08.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we look forward to, uh, to seeing him back here in New York safe and sound.
[35:09.230 --> 35:10.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, sure will.
[35:10.230 --> 35:11.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: I really appreciate it.
[35:11.610 --> 35:11.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[35:12.410 --> 35:14.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: Thanks very much for, for speaking with us.
[35:14.590 --> 35:15.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: Thank you.
[35:15.430 --> 35:30.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, uh, Michelle Kempner, uh, wife of, uh, James Powderly, who, uh, has been detained by Chinese authorities for being involved in the laser stencil art project with students for a free Tibet.
[35:30.770 --> 35:32.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: Boy, pretty, pretty heavy stuff, eh?
[35:33.050 --> 35:33.230]  Yeah.
[35:33.230 --> 35:35.610]  [SPEAKER_15]: And I mean, lots of people are being arrested.
[35:35.870 --> 35:36.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: Chinese people too.
[35:36.750 --> 35:37.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh yeah, definitely.
[35:37.930 --> 35:38.730]  [SPEAKER_12]: All over the place.
[35:39.050 --> 35:43.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, but, uh, you gotta sometimes be in the front row, I guess, to, uh, to get the story out.
[35:44.010 --> 35:49.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, you know, this is, um, this is something I, I think we'll be seeing in this country in the next couple of weeks as well is the convention start again.
[35:49.930 --> 35:52.150]  [SPEAKER_12]: Can you believe it's been four years since the convention in New York?
[35:52.270 --> 35:56.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: My God, that, uh, time has gone by quite, quite fast.
[35:56.870 --> 36:00.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we'll be, uh, hearing similar stories out of Denver and out of, uh, St. Paul as well.
[36:02.110 --> 36:02.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[36:02.830 --> 36:04.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: Um, what else do we have?
[36:04.710 --> 36:07.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're going to be taking phone calls, 212-209-2900 in just a little bit.
[36:08.450 --> 36:17.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, we have that, um, what's the story that's been passed around about all these people on the terror watch list, including airline captains and children and lawyers?
[36:18.490 --> 36:20.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: What's, what's, what's going on there, Mike?
[36:20.330 --> 36:22.370]  [SPEAKER_15]: Well, they're mostly named James Robinson, it seems.
[36:22.530 --> 36:23.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: James Robinson.
[36:23.410 --> 36:24.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: So if your name is James Robinson?
[36:24.810 --> 36:24.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[36:25.090 --> 36:30.650]  [SPEAKER_15]: So there may actually be, may or may not actually be a terrorist called James Robinson, but it's a fairly common name.
[36:30.830 --> 36:35.650]  [SPEAKER_15]: So other people who are James Robinson are getting, uh, trapped up in this thing as well.
[36:35.770 --> 36:39.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: Isn't this a really big tip to James, to real James Robinson, the terrorists that were onto him?
[36:39.830 --> 36:41.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: And maybe he'll change his name?
[36:41.410 --> 36:50.190]  [SPEAKER_15]: Well, I mean, this, this one guy, he's a retired Air National Guard, uh, general, and he's a commercial pilot for a major airline who flies passengers around the country.
[36:50.190 --> 36:51.310]  [SPEAKER_15]: That sounds suspicious to me.
[36:51.310 --> 36:52.590]  [SPEAKER_15]: It is suspicious, but he's on the terrorist.
[36:52.590 --> 36:54.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: Because he has a lot of power, people trust him, you know?
[36:54.670 --> 36:57.790]  [SPEAKER_15]: But, and, and there's another James Robinson who's eight years old.
[36:57.790 --> 37:04.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, all right, don't, don't necessarily dismiss that because, you know, out of the mouths of babes, you know, the children are so innocent.
[37:04.410 --> 37:05.630]  [SPEAKER_14]: He was on the list when he was five.
[37:05.870 --> 37:06.930]  [SPEAKER_14]: He was on the list since he was five.
[37:07.070 --> 37:07.370]  [SPEAKER_15]: Since he was five.
[37:07.390 --> 37:08.490]  [SPEAKER_15]: Must have been a terrible child.
[37:08.590 --> 37:09.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, seriously.
[37:09.110 --> 37:09.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: To get on the list for that long.
[37:10.090 --> 37:10.790]  [SPEAKER_15]: Terrible terrorist.
[37:11.090 --> 37:11.550]  [SPEAKER_15]: It's all the same.
[37:11.690 --> 37:11.890]  [SPEAKER_15]: Wow.
[37:11.970 --> 37:16.870]  [SPEAKER_15]: But, you know, some of these Robinsons have, uh, figured out how to get around the terrorist watch list.
[37:17.190 --> 37:17.470]  [SPEAKER_15]: Apparently...
[37:17.470 --> 37:18.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: I bet the lawyer, I bet the lawyer figured out.
[37:18.790 --> 37:19.810]  [SPEAKER_15]: I don't know about the lawyer.
[37:20.050 --> 37:21.410]  [SPEAKER_15]: The lawyer doesn't...
[37:21.410 --> 37:23.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm trying to think if I've ever known a James Robinson.
[37:23.630 --> 37:25.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: I have to report them if I do.
[37:25.030 --> 37:25.490]  [SPEAKER_15]: Probably.
[37:25.910 --> 37:26.910]  [SPEAKER_15]: That might be the one.
[37:27.030 --> 37:27.710]  [SPEAKER_15]: That might be the one.
[37:27.930 --> 37:29.090]  [SPEAKER_15]: If they haven't done anything suspicious.
[37:29.590 --> 37:36.010]  [SPEAKER_15]: So the eight-year-old, who apparently flies a lot for an eight-year-old, the mother has figured out that if she books the son as J.
[37:36.290 --> 37:39.370]  [SPEAKER_15]: Pierce Robinson, then he can go through.
[37:39.370 --> 37:39.830]  [SPEAKER_15]: You hear that?
[37:39.830 --> 37:43.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: James Robinson, the terrorist, all you have to do, his first initial...
[37:43.710 --> 37:46.030]  [SPEAKER_15]: The captain has come up with an even easier solution.
[37:46.030 --> 37:48.170]  [SPEAKER_15]: He books himself as Jim Robinson.
[37:49.290 --> 37:50.970]  [SPEAKER_15]: You know, he's the captain.
[37:51.250 --> 37:53.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wait, is the captain the guy who actually flies the plane, or is that the pilot?
[37:53.610 --> 37:55.190]  [SPEAKER_15]: They're all... yes.
[37:55.410 --> 37:55.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[37:55.750 --> 37:59.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, when I was on a boat going across the Pacific Ocean, we had a captain.
[37:59.310 --> 38:05.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: But then when we were docking, this guy came on a Coast Guard boat, jumped on board the freighter, and he was the pilot.
[38:05.430 --> 38:08.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: And he's the guy who actually steered the ship into port.
[38:08.270 --> 38:13.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: The captain pretty much just entertained the two passengers and played his music loud.
[38:13.590 --> 38:16.690]  [SPEAKER_15]: Well, on an airplane, there's a lot less jumping aboard mid-voyage.
[38:16.750 --> 38:17.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, I noticed that.
[38:18.710 --> 38:19.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wow.
[38:19.810 --> 38:22.990]  [SPEAKER_15]: But the thing is, this list has 400,000 people on it.
[38:22.990 --> 38:23.890]  [SPEAKER_15]: 400,000 people?
[38:23.910 --> 38:24.910]  [SPEAKER_15]: That's according to the government.
[38:25.030 --> 38:26.330]  [SPEAKER_15]: The ACLU says there's a million.
[38:26.650 --> 38:35.950]  [SPEAKER_15]: But either way, if there were actually 400,000 evildoers in this country, we'd be in a lot more trouble than a watch list could fix.
[38:36.070 --> 38:38.150]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, how do you define evil, and how do you define doing?
[38:38.310 --> 38:44.470]  [SPEAKER_15]: It's apparently totally undefined, and there's no way to know how you got on the list, or even if you're on the list, or how to get off it.
[38:45.490 --> 38:46.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, that's helpful.
[38:52.990 --> 38:54.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's a good way to have fun at the airport.
[38:54.990 --> 38:56.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: Just see what happens, I guess.
[38:57.110 --> 38:58.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: Offer to pay for a trip somewhere for him.
[38:59.050 --> 39:01.330]  [SPEAKER_02]: And don't worry, we're getting one of those in New York, too.
[39:01.750 --> 39:02.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: What, James Robinson?
[39:02.650 --> 39:02.950]  [SPEAKER_02]: No.
[39:03.350 --> 39:04.470]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, one of those, too, maybe.
[39:05.070 --> 39:06.990]  [SPEAKER_02]: No, they want to...
[39:06.990 --> 39:11.770]  [SPEAKER_02]: The police in New York want to start watching, keeping records of all the vehicles that pass through Manhattan.
[39:11.870 --> 39:12.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, the Ring of Steel.
[39:12.990 --> 39:15.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, that's been ongoing for a little while.
[39:15.670 --> 39:19.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: I understand there have been some more trips to London to look at how they do it over there.
[39:20.610 --> 39:24.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: They stare in awe at the surveillance state they have over in the UK.
[39:25.370 --> 39:29.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm starting to see a lot more of the license plate readers in the back of cop cars go around now.
[39:29.370 --> 39:29.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[39:29.630 --> 39:31.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: Especially down in the downtown Wall Street area.
[39:31.930 --> 39:32.150]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh-huh.
[39:32.690 --> 39:41.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: When are they going to incorporate the license plate readers with the Google cameras so that everything's just constantly in a state of surveillance, you know where everybody is at all times, and they just sort of integrate the systems.
[39:41.670 --> 39:45.090]  [SPEAKER_15]: Seriously, if they have to do this, the least they could do is get some money for transit out of it.
[39:45.390 --> 39:46.470]  [SPEAKER_15]: But they canceled that.
[39:46.910 --> 39:47.230]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[39:47.550 --> 39:57.770]  [SPEAKER_15]: I just want the people to notice, the people who oppose the congestion charging on the privacy grounds, to know that their privacy is still not protected and we don't even get any transit.
[39:57.950 --> 40:00.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: They can do congestion charging without the privacy issues.
[40:00.650 --> 40:00.970]  [SPEAKER_15]: They could.
[40:01.110 --> 40:01.250]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[40:01.350 --> 40:01.710]  [SPEAKER_15]: They could.
[40:01.770 --> 40:03.010]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's what we should push for.
[40:03.770 --> 40:04.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[40:04.230 --> 40:09.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: We had a lot of response to, guess what, the topic of postal keys.
[40:10.090 --> 40:11.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we did a little bit more research on this.
[40:12.150 --> 40:17.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: We talked last week, Dot Red and I did a little bit of looking around a few weeks ago.
[40:17.110 --> 40:23.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: We noticed that the mailman, mail lady actually, was getting into all these buildings and we asked her how she was doing it.
[40:23.270 --> 40:26.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: And she has a special key that opens...
[40:26.690 --> 40:31.030]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, basically, we didn't know what the special key did, whether it opened the door, whether it opened something else.
[40:31.350 --> 40:40.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: And what a bunch of people wrote in to tell us was that keys like that, and it's nothing new here actually, they open a box called a key keeper that contained the key to the building.
[40:40.830 --> 40:48.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: The mail carrier then takes out the key in the box, opens the door, drops the mail, and then hopefully returns the key to the box.
[40:48.170 --> 40:49.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: Thanks, Dan, for that information.
[40:51.530 --> 40:52.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's see what we have here.
[40:53.070 --> 40:57.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: Lynn wrote in to say, Milwaukee, there's a door access system called a Knox box, K-N-O-X.
[40:58.430 --> 41:05.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: In that box, about the size of a double fist, is a key to the outside door, or a master key depending on the circumstances.
[41:05.590 --> 41:09.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: The box is black and has a door on the front with its own access keyhole.
[41:09.470 --> 41:12.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: It also has a strip of reflecting tape, red and white on it.
[41:12.210 --> 41:16.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: We have one on my condo apartment and have had so for about 15 years.
[41:16.790 --> 41:18.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: The box is set into the brick wall.
[41:18.750 --> 41:23.390]  [SPEAKER_12]: The Fire Department Emergency Squad has the access key, and so far as I know, has the only access.
[41:23.750 --> 41:27.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: Copies of this Knox box can be seen around here in nearly every large building in the county.
[41:28.350 --> 41:32.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: And again, that's from Lynn in Shorewood, Wisconsin.
[41:33.010 --> 41:35.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: We looked around a little bit, and what did we notice?
[41:35.930 --> 41:37.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: That there are some that look a little bit different than others?
[41:37.930 --> 41:46.310]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, that's one of the interesting things I noticed, is that all these people who write in, they can quite easily describe their system in wherever they live in very concrete terms.
[41:46.330 --> 41:48.070]  [SPEAKER_02]: We had problems with that.
[41:48.190 --> 41:49.030]  [SPEAKER_02]: Some were in boxes.
[41:49.870 --> 41:51.410]  [SPEAKER_02]: Some didn't look like it opened.
[41:51.590 --> 41:53.190]  [SPEAKER_02]: Others were on the doors.
[41:53.650 --> 41:55.390]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, some were just mounted on the bricks.
[41:55.530 --> 41:57.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: Obviously, there wasn't a box behind that.
[41:57.610 --> 41:59.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't think they dug a crater in the brick to just store the key.
[41:59.970 --> 42:01.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: One of them there was.
[42:01.110 --> 42:03.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: One of them there was a box instead of a brick.
[42:03.530 --> 42:03.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[42:03.910 --> 42:10.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: But on some of the other ones, especially the newer buildings, I think it was just integrated into the door buzzer system.
[42:10.810 --> 42:16.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: So you turn the key and the door buzzes open just like it would if somebody pressed a button on the other end.
[42:17.110 --> 42:21.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: Here's another letter regarding your discussion about how postal workers get into buildings to deliver mail.
[42:21.990 --> 42:23.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: I've been curious about this too.
[42:23.530 --> 42:30.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: In my apartment in San Francisco, which was a nice, shiny, renovated building, there was a lock on the wall outside the building that said postal lock.
[42:30.770 --> 42:36.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: When the postal worker puts the key in, it buzzed them in the same way the intercom does with the electromagnetic latch system.
[42:36.970 --> 42:40.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: Here in Boston, my building also has a postal lock on the wall.
[42:40.630 --> 42:44.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: This one is labeled with a USPS barcode and the words managed service point.
[42:45.350 --> 42:48.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: I saw the postal worker one day, so I discovered how this works.
[42:48.490 --> 42:49.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: The lock is just for a little box.
[42:49.930 --> 42:52.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Again, it slides out of the wall and inside is the key to the building.
[42:53.170 --> 42:56.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: Essentially, I guess this means there's one special key for the block.
[42:56.790 --> 42:59.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: Maybe the neighborhood, maybe the city or the entire world.
[42:59.670 --> 43:01.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: It gains you access to many buildings like this.
[43:01.950 --> 43:04.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: Thanks, Lex, for sending in that information.
[43:04.550 --> 43:04.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: Emmanuel?
[43:05.090 --> 43:05.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: Go ahead, Bernie.
[43:06.310 --> 43:23.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: I see a problem with this, and that is anyone could find out who makes these boxes with the universal lock, at least in a particular city, and say that, hey, I have an apartment building or I'm building an apartment building and we need to put one of these on the side of our building.
[43:23.890 --> 43:25.150]  [SPEAKER_06]: How do we buy the box?
[43:25.410 --> 43:37.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: And then you buy the box and then any competent lock hacker can take a lock and impression a key for it or make a blank, machine a blank and then impression it.
[43:37.190 --> 43:42.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: So it would seem to be not terribly difficult to make a key for one of these wherever you are.
[43:43.070 --> 43:50.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, we know many competent people that have an interest in locks, so I'm beginning to even wonder if it's possible, and by the way, let me go out the phone number.
[43:50.810 --> 43:51.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're taking phone calls.
[43:51.510 --> 43:52.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: 212-209-2900.
[43:53.670 --> 44:10.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: If it's possible for maybe somebody that we know to design for educational purposes a key that would actually go into that and thereby somehow incredibly have access to every building in the city at least, or at least we can find out how big an area this stretches for.
[44:10.710 --> 44:12.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's the next question I have.
[44:12.470 --> 44:15.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: Is there a unique key for just every postal carrier?
[44:15.590 --> 44:16.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: Is there one for every block?
[44:16.790 --> 44:18.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: Is there one for the entire city?
[44:18.790 --> 44:19.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: And what happens?
[44:19.850 --> 44:21.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: And it must have happened in the past...
[44:21.130 --> 44:21.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: Zip codes, maybe.
[44:22.050 --> 44:23.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: ...when that key gets compromised?
[44:23.610 --> 44:27.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: Do they just, you know, pretend that maybe it didn't happen?
[44:27.770 --> 44:28.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'd like to know.
[44:28.750 --> 44:32.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Of course, we might get a court order saying we're not allowed to talk about this, but I intend to ask anyway.
[44:33.150 --> 44:34.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: 212-209-2900.
[44:35.330 --> 44:37.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's take some phone calls, see who is out there.
[44:38.390 --> 44:39.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: And good evening.
[44:39.330 --> 44:40.110]  [SPEAKER_04]: 212-2900.
[44:40.350 --> 44:40.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's me.
[44:40.650 --> 44:41.710]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, locks.
[44:42.190 --> 44:53.710]  [SPEAKER_04]: There are some buildings that have these where you, instead of buzzing a buzzer, you enter a number, like a two-digit number, or you better push a button, and they ring their actual telephone.
[44:53.710 --> 44:54.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, that's...
[44:54.510 --> 45:00.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: I know, Rebel, that's a Touch-Tone system, and they're very common in various parts, especially in California, and there are some here in New York.
[45:00.310 --> 45:09.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: You enter a Touch-Tone combination, and sometimes you even hear their phone number being dialed, as in Freedom Dail Time in that famous scene, where you hear their phone number being dialed with Touch-Tones.
[45:09.950 --> 45:17.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: It doesn't matter if the phone number is unlisted, it dials their actual phone number, and their phone rings, and they have to pick, push a certain button that buzzes the door.
[45:17.370 --> 45:24.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: What's fun about that is if you forward your phone to somebody else, you can let people in from anywhere in the country if they call you.
[45:24.450 --> 45:25.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: Thanks for that information, Rebel.
[45:25.990 --> 45:27.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: I know how you always manage to be the first caller.
[45:28.310 --> 45:31.230]  [SPEAKER_15]: Also, if you have a cell phone, which a lot of people do...
[45:31.230 --> 45:31.870]  [SPEAKER_15]: I do have a cell phone.
[45:31.870 --> 45:33.530]  [SPEAKER_15]: ...you can be buzzing people in from anywhere.
[45:33.870 --> 45:34.150]  [SPEAKER_15]: That's true.
[45:34.230 --> 45:35.070]  [SPEAKER_15]: My brother has that.
[45:35.170 --> 45:35.690]  [SPEAKER_15]: You call him.
[45:35.850 --> 45:37.390]  [SPEAKER_15]: It doesn't matter if he's home, he can buzz you in.
[45:37.390 --> 45:41.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: But what if I was to forward your brother's phone to my phone?
[45:41.570 --> 45:44.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: Then I'd have the authority over who gets into his building and who doesn't.
[45:44.790 --> 45:46.970]  [SPEAKER_15]: You could just steal his phone if that's the way you're going to play.
[45:47.110 --> 45:47.250]  [SPEAKER_12]: I could do that.
[45:47.250 --> 45:47.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: I could do that.
[45:47.930 --> 45:56.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: But I'm just saying it's a lot easier to forward somebody's number without any kind of permission just by talking to the phone company and convincing them that you're somebody you're not.
[45:56.990 --> 45:58.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wouldn't it be even easier just to pick the lock?
[45:59.370 --> 45:59.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: That too.
[46:00.170 --> 46:01.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: But maybe you're not in the same city.
[46:01.870 --> 46:02.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know?
[46:02.510 --> 46:05.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's kind of cool to break into a building when you're on the other side of the continent.
[46:06.670 --> 46:07.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's quite possible to do that.
[46:08.410 --> 46:08.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[46:09.030 --> 46:10.290]  [SPEAKER_12]: I once let somebody's...
[46:10.290 --> 46:17.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: I once opened up a door for a UPS man in Philadelphia because somebody lost control of their phone and it got forwarded to me somehow.
[46:17.490 --> 46:18.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: True story.
[46:18.190 --> 46:18.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good evening.
[46:18.590 --> 46:19.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're on Off The Hook.
[46:20.170 --> 46:20.730]  [SPEAKER_05]: Hi there.
[46:20.930 --> 46:21.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hi.
[46:21.330 --> 46:21.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: What's on your mind?
[46:23.230 --> 46:31.970]  [SPEAKER_05]: I called up a couple of weeks ago to let you know that I was filing a public service complaint because of the way I was getting charged every time I try to call WBAI.
[46:32.290 --> 46:36.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, you mean the fact that the phone gets hung up or you have to recall each time?
[46:36.690 --> 46:37.190]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, when you...
[46:37.190 --> 46:37.930]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, when you...
[46:37.930 --> 46:45.210]  [SPEAKER_05]: It turns out with WBAI and only WBAI, this is according to the text at Verizon who I like to refer to as Verizone.
[46:45.470 --> 46:47.970]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm glad you got it after I called the last time.
[46:48.090 --> 46:48.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[46:49.090 --> 46:52.210]  [SPEAKER_05]: They say that it's the problem that WBAI's in.
[46:52.370 --> 46:55.010]  [SPEAKER_05]: So it's yet another way WBAI is screwed up.
[46:55.110 --> 47:05.310]  [SPEAKER_05]: That every time you get timed out when you're calling in and the thing that's insidious about it is if you're calling from the city you don't get an itemized bill so you get all these one-minute charges.
[47:05.450 --> 47:08.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: Are you saying you actually get charged every time you call and it doesn't pick up?
[47:08.290 --> 47:14.310]  [SPEAKER_05]: When you get calling WBAI and you get timed out and you're waiting to be picked up instead of doing like a normal...
[47:14.310 --> 47:18.490]  [SPEAKER_05]: You know, WBAI has its own Centrex or whatever the circuit is that it's using.
[47:18.630 --> 47:21.150]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's defective according to the Public Service Commission.
[47:21.550 --> 47:23.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I don't doubt that.
[47:23.150 --> 47:38.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't doubt our phone system's defective for a number of reasons but let me just point out that if you call any number and it just keeps ringing and ringing and ringing it's not going to ring for more than 20 rings unless maybe you're local to that exchange and maybe you'll get it going on for longer.
[47:38.790 --> 47:39.610]  [SPEAKER_12]: It used to be forever.
[47:40.210 --> 47:42.290]  [SPEAKER_12]: May I ask how is it that you're calling us?
[47:42.390 --> 47:43.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: What company are you using to reach us?
[47:43.830 --> 47:45.710]  [SPEAKER_05]: You're on landline via Verizon long distance.
[47:46.290 --> 47:47.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: What city are you in?
[47:47.510 --> 47:47.910]  [SPEAKER_05]: Woodstock.
[47:48.230 --> 47:48.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: Woodstock.
[47:49.270 --> 47:52.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know if it would be different if you were calling from New York City using Verizon.
[47:52.750 --> 47:57.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know if it would be different if you used a different long distance company but I do know I know that this is something that changed.
[47:58.310 --> 48:05.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think when phone companies started converting to digital, back in the electromechanical days, you were able to just ring a phone.
[48:05.230 --> 48:09.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: You could ring a phone for an entire weekend, and you didn't get charged if nobody picked up.
[48:09.870 --> 48:13.010]  [SPEAKER_12]: But now they say no revenue is being produced after 20 rings disconnect.
[48:13.330 --> 48:19.450]  [SPEAKER_05]: I've tested this with other people in New York City and said, let it ring and let me get timed out.
[48:19.550 --> 48:20.430]  [SPEAKER_05]: I don't get charged.
[48:20.550 --> 48:22.430]  [SPEAKER_05]: It only happens to WBAL.
[48:22.430 --> 48:23.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, you should never get charged.
[48:23.630 --> 48:24.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: That is something that...
[48:24.670 --> 48:29.030]  [SPEAKER_05]: I get a long list of one-minute charges in like one- or two-minute sequences.
[48:29.290 --> 48:30.430]  [SPEAKER_05]: And this is all on a Verizon?
[48:30.650 --> 48:32.170]  [SPEAKER_05]: And the Public Service Commission says it's WBAL.
[48:32.170 --> 48:33.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, this is on a Verizon bill, you're saying?
[48:34.030 --> 48:34.230]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[48:34.910 --> 48:35.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: Interesting.
[48:35.610 --> 48:38.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: And now what happens when you call and it just keeps ringing?
[48:38.570 --> 48:39.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: What happens when it stops ringing?
[48:40.250 --> 48:48.910]  [SPEAKER_05]: It goes to CircuitBusy like everything else, and that's why I filed the Public Service Commission, because since it goes to CircuitBusy, it sounds like the network timing me out.
[48:49.030 --> 48:49.170]  [SPEAKER_07]: Right.
[48:49.170 --> 48:49.830]  [SPEAKER_05]: But it isn't.
[48:49.890 --> 48:52.330]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's something at WBAL that's giving you a certain amount.
[48:52.430 --> 48:54.450]  [SPEAKER_05]: And by the way, that time varies.
[48:54.690 --> 48:56.010]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's not always 20 rings.
[48:56.530 --> 49:02.150]  [SPEAKER_05]: When I tried to call you now, I just got charged 10 cents by getting a glorious one ring.
[49:02.270 --> 49:05.150]  [SPEAKER_05]: I assume that's going into the defective line you've got there.
[49:05.310 --> 49:05.370]  [SPEAKER_05]: Really?
[49:05.530 --> 49:09.750]  [SPEAKER_05]: It rang once, went into what I think is that defective line, and it charged me.
[49:10.070 --> 49:10.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wow.
[49:10.750 --> 49:13.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, well, just add this to the list of things that are wrong with our phone system.
[49:14.770 --> 49:15.990]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, it should be junk.
[49:16.290 --> 49:17.710]  [SPEAKER_05]: Bring back the Edel phone system.
[49:17.710 --> 49:21.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, you know, if anybody has a solution for us, that won't cost an arm and a leg.
[49:21.910 --> 49:29.190]  [SPEAKER_05]: Maybe somebody could go to the junkyard and pull out the Mike L phone system that was thrown away and, you know, thrown in the garbage.
[49:29.570 --> 49:30.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, well...
[49:30.210 --> 49:31.210]  [SPEAKER_05]: It worked so beautifully.
[49:31.670 --> 49:34.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know if beautifully is the right word, but it definitely worked better.
[49:34.590 --> 49:36.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: And a lot of things in the old days worked better.
[49:36.590 --> 49:38.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: But yeah, we definitely are in need of a good system.
[49:38.450 --> 49:42.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: For one thing, what happens, this is something only the hosts at radio shows here know.
[49:42.670 --> 49:44.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: We have all the phones ringing.
[49:44.550 --> 49:46.250]  [SPEAKER_12]: They light up on little buttons, but they move.
[49:46.430 --> 49:49.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: So let's say line 7 is ringing now, and I push line 7.
[49:49.670 --> 49:51.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, line 7 has already hopped over to line 3.
[49:52.090 --> 49:53.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: It doesn't even go in order.
[49:53.230 --> 49:54.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: It goes in random order.
[49:54.350 --> 49:58.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: And if I hit line 7, even though line 7 is still flashing, that call has already moved on.
[49:58.210 --> 49:59.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that's why I get a dial tone sometimes.
[50:00.190 --> 50:02.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: So there's all sorts of problems with this system.
[50:02.890 --> 50:05.150]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I could just go on for another hour about this.
[50:05.150 --> 50:10.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: So yeah, if anybody out there has suggestions on a better system we could have that won't cost an arm and a leg, we'd like to know about it.
[50:10.430 --> 50:12.150]  [SPEAKER_12]: Thanks for that information, though.
[50:13.070 --> 50:13.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[50:13.770 --> 50:14.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: And good evening.
[50:14.690 --> 50:15.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're on Off The Hook.
[50:15.970 --> 50:16.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: Greetings.
[50:16.730 --> 50:16.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hi.
[50:17.330 --> 50:28.230]  [SPEAKER_03]: Just to add to the previous conversation, I was calling from a T-Mobile 443 area code, and it would time out after about 10 seconds, although I wouldn't get a busy signal.
[50:28.330 --> 50:28.910]  [SPEAKER_03]: It would just go dead.
[50:29.130 --> 50:29.530]  [SPEAKER_15]: Wow.
[50:29.970 --> 50:32.110]  [SPEAKER_03]: I would still be connected, so says this phone.
[50:32.110 --> 50:37.050]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I've just called you on this line, which is a 848 area code through Sprint.
[50:37.370 --> 50:37.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh-huh.
[50:38.230 --> 50:39.110]  [SPEAKER_03]: But regardless...
[50:39.750 --> 50:42.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's, yeah, it's gotten really difficult to connect these days.
[50:43.190 --> 50:44.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: So what's on your mind other than that?
[50:44.870 --> 50:50.410]  [SPEAKER_03]: If you'll humor me, I meant to call in last show, but I have two stories about Falkland Island War.
[50:50.990 --> 50:51.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: About what?
[50:52.030 --> 50:53.350]  [SPEAKER_03]: The Falkland Islands War.
[50:53.690 --> 50:55.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: The Falkland Islands War?
[50:55.690 --> 50:56.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: Believe it or not.
[50:56.550 --> 50:59.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're kind of late for that, but okay, go ahead.
[51:00.330 --> 51:06.230]  [SPEAKER_03]: These two stories, along with many others, were in a book that unfortunately is out of print called The Devouring Fungus.
[51:07.250 --> 51:09.910]  [SPEAKER_03]: The title comes from a fungus that was growing on computer.
[51:10.990 --> 51:21.210]  [SPEAKER_03]: But anyway, the two stories are when the British tornadoes went across the equator to fight the war.
[51:22.150 --> 51:23.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: British tornadoes?
[51:23.670 --> 51:24.650]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yes, the planes.
[51:24.910 --> 51:25.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, okay.
[51:25.750 --> 51:36.170]  [SPEAKER_03]: As they crossed over the equator, the navigational software decided, because they were hitting south or for whatever reason, they decided to fly down.
[51:36.810 --> 51:40.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm sorry, I don't think this is our fault, but you're chopping in and out, so I think you're on a cell phone.
[51:41.030 --> 51:41.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[51:41.450 --> 51:43.910]  [SPEAKER_03]: I am on a cell phone, I think I'm getting another call, but regardless...
[51:43.910 --> 51:45.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, it's called waiting, that's what that is.
[51:45.330 --> 51:46.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, could you repeat that sentence?
[51:46.690 --> 51:47.990]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yes, sorry.
[51:48.670 --> 51:58.810]  [SPEAKER_03]: As the British tornadoes were en route to the Falkland Islands, the navigational software saw fit as it crossed the equator to flip the plane upside down.
[51:58.950 --> 51:59.290]  [SPEAKER_12]: Ah.
[52:00.670 --> 52:05.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, that's definitely an interesting and humorous story that I'm sure many people can appreciate.
[52:05.990 --> 52:27.750]  [SPEAKER_03]: The other interesting thing was the whatever British radar detection software, because Argentina had bought Exocet missiles from France, when the Exocet missiles were fired against the British tornadoes, they refused to identify them as a threat, since France is a friend,
[52:27.850 --> 52:31.630]  [SPEAKER_03]: and since it's a French missile, it couldn't be possibly aimed at us.
[52:32.370 --> 52:37.910]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, uh, the tornadoes refused to target the French missiles.
[52:38.750 --> 52:39.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: I see.
[52:40.410 --> 52:43.570]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, uh, the machines, I guess, uh, know better.
[52:44.110 --> 52:46.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right, well, listen, uh, thanks, uh, thanks for that information.
[52:46.490 --> 52:48.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's, uh, it's, uh, very useful to know these things.
[52:49.130 --> 52:51.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, Redhack, you've been doing some research while that call is in progress.
[52:51.950 --> 52:52.470]  [SPEAKER_12]: What did you learn?
[52:52.590 --> 52:55.310]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, uh, I called twice, WBAI.
[52:55.670 --> 52:55.810]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh-huh.
[52:55.810 --> 52:58.090]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, the first time, it rang 21 times.
[52:58.130 --> 52:59.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm actually calling right now.
[52:59.090 --> 53:02.970]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, uh, and then it, uh, just went dead.
[53:03.150 --> 53:03.430]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh-huh.
[53:03.490 --> 53:04.450]  [SPEAKER_14]: And the second time, it rang once.
[53:04.910 --> 53:05.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: It only rang once.
[53:05.810 --> 53:06.730]  [SPEAKER_14]: It rang once, and then went dead.
[53:06.810 --> 53:11.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: As you can hear, my cell phone is currently ringing, uh, the, uh, we have a strange-sounding ring.
[53:11.850 --> 53:12.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: Doesn't this sound weird?
[53:12.850 --> 53:13.590]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's listen carefully.
[53:13.750 --> 53:16.370]  [SPEAKER_14]: I feel like maybe it's connecting to the phone line, and then just...
[53:16.370 --> 53:17.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, this, it's not a normal ring.
[53:17.490 --> 53:19.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's a little shorter, and it's a different cadence.
[53:20.210 --> 53:21.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, and it's a different...
[53:21.490 --> 53:23.690]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's kind of random time that it comes back.
[53:23.810 --> 53:24.290]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's not...
[53:24.290 --> 53:25.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's just listen to the WBAI ring.
[53:25.710 --> 53:27.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: We never get to do this over the radio station.
[53:37.160 --> 53:38.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's one of the most exciting radio you'll ever hear.
[53:39.460 --> 53:42.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, okay, I haven't been counting the number of rings, but it's been going for a little while.
[53:43.120 --> 53:43.460]  [SPEAKER_15]: Should we call...
[53:43.460 --> 53:44.860]  [SPEAKER_15]: We could call ourselves from the phone.
[53:44.860 --> 53:45.460]  [SPEAKER_15]: Well, here's the problem.
[53:45.640 --> 53:46.080]  [SPEAKER_15]: What happens when you do that?
[53:46.080 --> 53:47.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: If I pick up...
[53:47.160 --> 53:49.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm gonna get myself, probably, on one of those lines.
[53:49.620 --> 53:50.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's like Russian roulette.
[53:50.900 --> 53:53.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: If I pick the wrong line, then this experiment has been for naught.
[53:53.940 --> 53:54.360]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, how...
[53:54.360 --> 53:55.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: How long did it go for you?
[53:55.340 --> 53:55.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, it was 21.
[53:56.500 --> 53:56.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: 21.
[53:56.860 --> 53:57.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: How long in time?
[53:58.040 --> 53:58.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: That was, like, a minute or two?
[53:59.180 --> 53:59.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[53:59.640 --> 54:06.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, this has been going for about a minute, so any second now, this is gonna go to, uh, a reorder, so we can hear the exact sound, and we'll be able to tell.
[54:06.760 --> 54:07.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: There won't be a sound.
[54:08.040 --> 54:09.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, there'll be a reorder, Fast Busy.
[54:10.140 --> 54:10.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: No?
[54:10.500 --> 54:10.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: No sound.
[54:11.120 --> 54:12.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: It just disconnects?
[54:12.520 --> 54:12.800]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[54:13.700 --> 54:15.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wow, that's kind of sobering to know that.
[54:16.580 --> 54:20.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: It would be kind of funny, and the joke would be on me, if it never hung up, and we just did this for the rest of the show.
[54:21.500 --> 54:30.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: Um, all right, you see, this is, on Off The Hook, we try to get to the bottom of technological issues, and this is really the only way we can find out what the problem is, or at least start the research.
[54:30.540 --> 54:32.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: But it doesn't sound like a phone company, right?
[54:32.600 --> 54:35.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: It doesn't sound like a phone company ring, that's true, and that's something I complain about.
[54:35.620 --> 54:40.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: I like for rings to sound different, so this, at least in that, our phone sounds a little bit different than others.
[54:41.180 --> 54:41.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh.
[54:41.900 --> 54:42.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[54:43.600 --> 54:44.220]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's nice.
[54:44.400 --> 54:47.880]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, that is nice, but, uh, oh, yeah.
[54:48.220 --> 54:49.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, that's my phone doing that.
[54:49.520 --> 54:51.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm sorry, that's the GSM phone does that.
[54:51.280 --> 54:51.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh.
[54:51.840 --> 54:52.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, yeah.
[54:52.460 --> 54:53.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: We just got our hooks up for nothing.
[54:53.640 --> 55:02.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, it did that because it got disconnected, but that also tells us that when the reorder happened, I wasn't disconnected, because, uh, otherwise I would have gotten that right away.
[55:02.600 --> 55:06.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: I, when I called twice, I just got, try one more time, because I bet you this time I'd loan the ring off.
[55:06.800 --> 55:10.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I think, why don't we try calling something else that we know will ring forever?
[55:10.940 --> 55:11.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: You see, that's the problem.
[55:11.460 --> 55:14.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: How do you find a phone that rings forever without something picking up?
[55:14.380 --> 55:14.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can call my phone.
[55:15.100 --> 55:17.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, your, a voicemail will pick up eventually.
[55:17.740 --> 55:18.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can call the tele-megaphone.
[55:19.300 --> 55:22.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, well, the tele-megaphone picks up with a, a Norwegian recording.
[55:23.180 --> 55:25.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's, it's, it's very difficult to find things that don't pick up.
[55:25.240 --> 55:31.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, the way to really test this is to call other things, see what happens to them, compare them to WBAI, and, uh, I don't know.
[55:31.240 --> 55:32.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hopefully, we'll find a solution.
[55:32.340 --> 55:32.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: Go ahead, Bernie.
[55:33.220 --> 55:33.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: I have a suggestion.
[55:33.940 --> 55:47.280]  [SPEAKER_06]: If you could, uh, somehow obtain the list of the, uh, the numbers on WBAI's incoming hunt group, and then call each of those numbers individually, and see which one just rings once and hangs up, or whatever these people were complaining about.
[55:47.460 --> 55:49.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know if these have, uh, translatable numbers, though.
[55:50.080 --> 55:51.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is a digital switch.
[55:51.620 --> 55:52.900]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm not sure if it works that way.
[55:53.280 --> 55:55.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, you can always ask and find out.
[55:55.600 --> 55:56.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, I'll ask.
[55:56.380 --> 55:57.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: That'll be a way to find out.
[55:57.260 --> 55:59.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: You think somebody here knows the answer to that question?
[55:59.100 --> 55:59.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't think so.
[56:00.020 --> 56:01.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, who maintains that system?
[56:01.380 --> 56:04.320]  [SPEAKER_06]: And perhaps the vendor who provided the system and maintains it would know.
[56:04.420 --> 56:08.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think the vendor who provided that, uh, system is, uh, well on the way to a, uh...
[56:08.760 --> 56:10.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't think anyone maintains it, for sure.
[56:10.140 --> 56:10.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: ...a resort island or something.
[56:11.240 --> 56:12.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: Like laughing all the way to the bank.
[56:12.800 --> 56:13.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[56:13.440 --> 56:15.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, I think they laughed at the bank a long time ago.
[56:15.860 --> 56:16.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, okay.
[56:16.580 --> 56:20.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's, uh, see if we can squeeze in a couple more phone calls, hopefully not complaining about the phone system.
[56:21.060 --> 56:22.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, that's related, I guess.
[56:22.860 --> 56:23.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's take another one.
[56:25.200 --> 56:25.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: And good evening.
[56:26.200 --> 56:26.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're...
[56:27.560 --> 56:28.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[56:28.580 --> 56:30.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is starting to get not funny.
[56:30.060 --> 56:30.360]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good evening.
[56:30.360 --> 56:31.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're on off the hook.
[56:32.080 --> 56:33.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, you can let yourself...
[56:33.360 --> 56:33.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[56:33.640 --> 56:35.020]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, I prefer the dial tone, Rebel.
[56:35.100 --> 56:35.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: I really do.
[56:35.540 --> 56:35.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good evening.
[56:35.860 --> 56:36.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're on off the hook.
[56:37.680 --> 56:38.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: Speak up, please.
[56:39.180 --> 56:39.360]  [SPEAKER_09]: Hi.
[56:39.660 --> 56:44.960]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, I'm calling about, uh, the, uh, the, uh, guy coming aboard the ship to take control.
[56:46.060 --> 56:48.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, the guy coming aboard the ship to take control.
[56:48.760 --> 56:49.220]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, you were talking about the pilot.
[56:49.440 --> 56:49.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: The pilot.
[56:49.860 --> 56:50.020]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[56:50.180 --> 56:50.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[56:50.780 --> 56:51.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: The pilot.
[56:51.380 --> 56:52.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: I forgot about that.
[56:52.980 --> 56:58.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: Former merchant seaman, uh, the ships sail back and forth across the ocean.
[56:58.360 --> 56:58.560]  [SPEAKER_07]: Mm-hmm.
[56:58.700 --> 57:04.780]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, but every, uh, different port will have a harbor pilot who's got knowledge of the local conditions.
[57:05.220 --> 57:13.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: So he comes aboard and takes control, uh, but the captain of the ship, uh, legally still has responsibility.
[57:13.500 --> 57:19.300]  [SPEAKER_09]: So if the, if the harbor pilot puts the ship up on the rocks, the captain should have known better and he's responsible.
[57:19.580 --> 57:19.900]  [SPEAKER_12]: I see.
[57:19.980 --> 57:24.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, can the captain discipline the pilot or can the pilot discipline the captain?
[57:24.200 --> 57:24.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: Who's higher up?
[57:25.940 --> 57:28.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, that is beyond me.
[57:28.860 --> 57:29.000]  [SPEAKER_09]: Okay.
[57:29.160 --> 57:31.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: I just wanted, you know, if the two got into an argument, who would, who would prevail?
[57:32.560 --> 57:34.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, there would be a court of interest.
[57:34.780 --> 57:37.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: Inquiry and, and, uh, Admiralty Law, I guess.
[57:38.800 --> 57:39.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[57:39.400 --> 57:40.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: That's, uh...
[57:40.100 --> 57:41.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: Justice on the high seas.
[57:42.020 --> 57:43.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: Something like that, yeah.
[57:43.440 --> 57:43.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: All right.
[57:43.760 --> 57:51.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: But, uh, yeah, I've, I've seen, I've seen any number of pilots come aboard and, uh, as a matter of fact, steered under a pilot going through the, uh, Panama Canal.
[57:51.740 --> 57:52.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wow.
[57:52.220 --> 57:54.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: That sounds like, uh, an adventure right there.
[57:54.440 --> 57:55.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: It was.
[57:55.460 --> 57:57.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, but, uh, enjoy the show.
[57:57.760 --> 57:59.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: Thanks, uh, thought you'd enjoy.
[57:59.180 --> 57:59.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[57:59.520 --> 58:00.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: Thanks, uh, thanks for the information.
[58:01.240 --> 58:07.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: And further proof that WBAI listeners know everything if you put them all together and, uh, a single place, which I guess this show is the closest thing to.
[58:08.020 --> 58:08.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[58:08.520 --> 58:09.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's it for us.
[58:09.560 --> 58:13.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, uh, we're, um, we're out of here for another, uh, couple of weeks.
[58:13.340 --> 58:15.280]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, we're not gonna be here next week or the week after that.
[58:15.360 --> 58:21.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: What you'll hear instead is alternative coverage of the Democratic Convention and then the Republican Convention.
[58:21.480 --> 58:27.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I recommend listening to Pacifica's coverage over the main networks because you'll hear things you'll never hear there.
[58:27.620 --> 58:30.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: You'll hear all kinds of other people speaking and all kinds of other perspectives.
[58:30.840 --> 58:31.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's what it's all about.
[58:32.060 --> 58:37.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: In the meantime, though, you can write to us at, uh, oth@2600.com.
[58:37.740 --> 58:42.700]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, uh, of course, we also want to hear people's ideas for, uh, closing songs that have to do with telephones.
[58:42.700 --> 58:49.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're going to close tonight with something from Lou Reed from 1972 that probably very few people have ever heard.
[58:49.500 --> 58:51.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: We'll, uh, see you in three weeks.
[58:51.860 --> 58:52.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good night.
[58:53.660 --> 58:58.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: I was sleeping gently napping when I heard the phone.
[58:58.880 --> 59:01.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: Who is on the other end talking?
[59:02.160 --> 59:03.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: Am I even home?
[59:04.400 --> 59:07.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: Did you see what she did to him?
[59:07.700 --> 59:09.320]  [SPEAKER_08]: Did you hear what they said?
[59:09.320 --> 59:44.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: Just a New York conversation Rattling in my head Oh, my, and what shall we wear Oh, my, and who really cares Just a New York conversation Gossip all of the time Did you hear who did what to whom Happens all the time Who has touched and who has dabbled Here in the city of shows Openings,
[59:44.380 --> 01:00:15.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: closings, bed, repartee Everybody knows Oh, how sad And why do we call Oh, I'm glad To hear from you all I am calling Yes, I'm calling Just to speak to you For I know this night Will kill me If I can't be with you If I can't be with you Thank you.