[00:01.830 --> 00:14.530] [SPEAKER_01]: I'm Robert Knight, inviting you to rejoin us on Earthwatch, a live, free-form radio excursion into space, science, news, politics, metaphysics, music, the arts, and more.
[00:20.030 --> 00:31.810] [SPEAKER_01]: That's Earthwatch, trans-terrestrial radio, Wednesdays at midnight, on the new WBAI, 99.5 FM, Pacifica Radio.
[00:32.550 --> 00:37.010] [SPEAKER_01]: For as long as there's life, there's still a day.
[00:42.240 --> 00:46.760] [SPEAKER_10]: And you're listening to WBAI New York, where it's 7 o'clock.
[00:47.100 --> 00:48.360] [SPEAKER_10]: Time once again for Off The Hook.
[01:12.550 --> 01:15.410] [SPEAKER_05]: I hope that's understood one day, let me know!
[02:29.750 --> 02:30.590] [SPEAKER_10]: And good evening to everybody.
[02:30.750 --> 02:31.390] [SPEAKER_10]: The program is Off The Hook.
[02:31.470 --> 02:33.650] [SPEAKER_10]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:34.130 --> 02:36.090] [SPEAKER_10]: Joined tonight by Mike.
[02:36.430 --> 02:36.890] [SPEAKER_10]: Hi.
[02:37.090 --> 02:37.630] [SPEAKER_10]: Dot.ret.
[02:38.090 --> 02:38.310] [SPEAKER_10]: Hello.
[02:38.550 --> 02:38.890] [SPEAKER_10]: Rob T. Firefly.
[02:39.770 --> 02:40.110] [SPEAKER_10]: Good evening.
[02:40.230 --> 02:40.670] [SPEAKER_10]: Voltaire.
[02:40.830 --> 02:40.950] [SPEAKER_10]: Hello.
[02:41.130 --> 02:41.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Gus.
[02:41.710 --> 02:42.770] [SPEAKER_11]: Oh, hi to your face.
[02:43.110 --> 02:43.450] [SPEAKER_10]: RedHackt.
[02:43.730 --> 02:43.890] [SPEAKER_10]: Hello.
[02:44.630 --> 02:45.090] [SPEAKER_10]: Jim.
[02:45.390 --> 02:45.670] [SPEAKER_10]: Hi.
[02:45.950 --> 02:46.710] [SPEAKER_10]: Down in Philadelphia.
[02:47.130 --> 02:47.650] [SPEAKER_10]: Bernie S.
[02:48.210 --> 02:50.990] [SPEAKER_09]: Greetings from Philadelphia, and congratulations, Emmanuel.
[02:51.710 --> 02:52.430] [SPEAKER_10]: What did I do?
[02:54.990 --> 02:58.690] [SPEAKER_09]: You, apparently, are Discovery Channel's fourth favorite hacker.
[02:59.830 --> 03:01.050] [SPEAKER_10]: We'll get into that in a second.
[03:01.750 --> 03:04.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Packrat also is here from either Pennsylvania or Brooklyn.
[03:04.870 --> 03:06.890] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm not sure which it is, but welcome either way.
[03:07.550 --> 03:08.210] [SPEAKER_10]: And I'll leave everybody out.
[03:08.270 --> 03:09.050] [SPEAKER_10]: There's so many people here today.
[03:09.410 --> 03:10.170] [SPEAKER_10]: No, I think we got everybody.
[03:11.270 --> 03:13.890] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, so I don't know what that's all about, Bernie.
[03:13.970 --> 03:20.450] [SPEAKER_10]: Some people emailed me that, and I'm trying to stay off the radar and just take something like this for it to all fall apart.
[03:21.570 --> 03:24.130] [SPEAKER_09]: Well, I guess the Discovery Channel discovered you.
[03:24.330 --> 03:28.050] [SPEAKER_09]: And, Terry, who were the three hackers who were more popular?
[03:28.050 --> 03:33.170] [SPEAKER_09]: There were, like, what, ten hackers they rated as far as their favorites, and you rated number four.
[03:33.330 --> 03:34.730] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, of course, Kevin Mitnick is number one.
[03:35.290 --> 03:36.110] [SPEAKER_10]: That's a given.
[03:36.310 --> 03:38.290] [SPEAKER_10]: I didn't really look at it, to be honest.
[03:38.550 --> 03:39.410] [SPEAKER_10]: I was too embarrassed.
[03:40.090 --> 03:42.550] [SPEAKER_09]: I don't think I ranked at all, so I'm so envious.
[03:42.610 --> 03:44.390] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't think they said very much either, which is good.
[03:44.530 --> 03:46.110] [SPEAKER_10]: It's for the best, right?
[03:46.350 --> 03:46.590] [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[03:46.850 --> 03:48.830] [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah, I remember Kevin Mitnick was first.
[03:49.030 --> 03:50.590] [SPEAKER_13]: Number two was Theodore from Nmap.
[03:50.990 --> 03:53.050] [SPEAKER_13]: And number three was someone at Google, and then it was you.
[03:53.250 --> 03:59.270] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, you know, I don't really rank with these guys, because I'm not developing things like that, you know?
[03:59.810 --> 04:02.510] [SPEAKER_10]: They're developing the scary Orwellian technology of the future.
[04:02.650 --> 04:03.650] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm sitting back and complaining about it.
[04:03.650 --> 04:06.010] [SPEAKER_14]: So you're telling them that they don't know who their favorites are?
[04:07.110 --> 04:09.610] [SPEAKER_10]: You know, who's to say how taste works?
[04:09.790 --> 04:11.030] [SPEAKER_10]: I have no idea.
[04:11.030 --> 04:11.910] [SPEAKER_10]: I can never understand that.
[04:11.910 --> 04:14.490] [SPEAKER_12]: But then again, how many hackers have a comic book about them?
[04:15.450 --> 04:16.810] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, actually, a bunch of us in this room do.
[04:17.290 --> 04:18.210] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, all right.
[04:18.430 --> 04:19.050] [SPEAKER_10]: Because we're all in it.
[04:19.290 --> 04:19.630] [SPEAKER_10]: That's true.
[04:19.630 --> 04:20.270] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[04:20.670 --> 04:20.790] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[04:20.950 --> 04:22.590] [SPEAKER_10]: Now, but getting serious now.
[04:22.830 --> 04:25.590] [SPEAKER_10]: Getting really serious, because this is pretty serious.
[04:26.810 --> 04:30.370] [SPEAKER_10]: This is what I was kind of afraid was going to happen at some point.
[04:30.550 --> 04:31.650] [SPEAKER_10]: And now it seems to be happening.
[04:31.830 --> 04:36.070] [SPEAKER_10]: And of course, it involves the G word, you know, the Google word.
[04:36.790 --> 04:41.270] [SPEAKER_10]: But they're now, they're now developing, I guess they've been developing this for a while.
[04:41.430 --> 04:54.090] [SPEAKER_10]: But, you know, instead of simply typing text into a web page, now Google wants the ability, and they apparently have at least part of the ability, to perform an Internet search simply by looking at a photograph.
[04:54.370 --> 05:02.890] [SPEAKER_10]: So you basically take a picture of something, and they're going to tell you where it is, what it is, what it did, what it's going to do, things like that.
[05:03.110 --> 05:05.550] [SPEAKER_10]: That's called a search by site feature.
[05:05.550 --> 05:06.990] [SPEAKER_10]: It's called, ready for this?
[05:07.090 --> 05:07.810] [SPEAKER_10]: Google Goggles.
[05:08.070 --> 05:16.730] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, Google Goggles has a database of billions of images that informs its analysis of what's been uploaded.
[05:16.950 --> 05:18.630] [SPEAKER_10]: Informs its analysis of what's been uploaded.
[05:19.450 --> 05:25.790] [SPEAKER_10]: And basically, it can recognize books, album covers, artwork, landmarks, places, logos, and more.
[05:26.050 --> 05:27.030] [SPEAKER_10]: It is our goal.
[05:27.330 --> 05:29.930] [SPEAKER_10]: It is our goal to be able to identify any image.
[05:30.050 --> 05:32.970] [SPEAKER_10]: It represents our earliest efforts in the field of computer vision.
[05:33.270 --> 05:35.030] [SPEAKER_10]: You can take a picture of an item.
[05:35.030 --> 05:39.790] [SPEAKER_10]: Use that item, or use that picture, rather, of whatever you take as the query.
[05:40.790 --> 05:48.170] [SPEAKER_10]: The feature is still in Google Labs to deal with the nature of computer vision and with the services' present shortcomings.
[05:48.470 --> 05:52.810] [SPEAKER_10]: Google Goggles works well on certain types of objects in certain categories.
[05:53.490 --> 05:54.250] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't know.
[05:54.750 --> 05:55.990] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, I saw this coming.
[05:55.990 --> 05:56.910] [SPEAKER_10]: This is science fiction.
[05:57.130 --> 06:01.910] [SPEAKER_10]: And one day, I imagine you won't be able to hide anywhere because any photograph will be able to give you away.
[06:01.910 --> 06:04.870] [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I mean, it's interesting if you think about the future applications of this.
[06:04.970 --> 06:08.590] [SPEAKER_12]: One of the hot topics these days is, you know, where you can overlay something.
[06:09.830 --> 06:11.130] [SPEAKER_12]: The term is...
[06:11.130 --> 06:11.970] [SPEAKER_12]: I'm not remembering.
[06:12.210 --> 06:12.410] [SPEAKER_12]: Augmented reality.
[06:12.510 --> 06:12.770] [SPEAKER_12]: Thank you.
[06:12.870 --> 06:13.510] [SPEAKER_12]: Augmented reality.
[06:13.930 --> 06:18.830] [SPEAKER_12]: Where you can basically, you know, have, say, your phone and you point it at something and it overlays what's there.
[06:18.890 --> 06:27.390] [SPEAKER_12]: So, you know, using GPS and such and a compass feature, they have now where, okay, if I point my phone in a certain direction, it shows me where this restaurant is, that restaurant is, et cetera.
[06:27.590 --> 06:36.390] [SPEAKER_12]: And so this kind of is the same idea, except that rather than using your location as a reference, it's looking at some image and giving you information about what you're seeing.
[06:36.810 --> 06:42.010] [SPEAKER_16]: All the cool and fancy applications aside, I still think this has been coming for a long time.
[06:42.130 --> 06:50.090] [SPEAKER_16]: We've been basically trying to deal with the ability to not be able to search through images for a long time, just simply supplementing it with text.
[06:50.090 --> 07:05.310] [SPEAKER_16]: You know, it's only now that finally companies like Google are finally getting the processing power and the inventory of images to go through that, you know, it was going to come whether we have the cool augmented reality or not.
[07:05.510 --> 07:09.030] [SPEAKER_11]: Does it say anything about what resources they're using to match things against?
[07:09.110 --> 07:11.970] [SPEAKER_11]: Is it like the database of images they already have cached?
[07:12.030 --> 07:12.690] [SPEAKER_11]: What are they using?
[07:13.530 --> 07:14.290] [SPEAKER_10]: You got me.
[07:14.410 --> 07:15.130] [SPEAKER_10]: You're asking the wrong person.
[07:15.270 --> 07:23.330] [SPEAKER_11]: So, I mean, probably it could be proprietary for all we know, but what do you want to bet that the MPAA and the RIAA and them are really excited about this, because now you can start prosecuting about Alarmark.
[07:23.470 --> 07:23.610] [SPEAKER_11]: Yay!
[07:26.190 --> 07:29.250] [SPEAKER_15]: The program itself is really under development.
[07:29.970 --> 07:40.030] [SPEAKER_15]: Google is known for releasing, like, very early-stage stuff to the public, and this hasn't even been released to the public yet, so that just shows that it's months, if not years, off from being released.
[07:40.210 --> 07:44.710] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, but I mean, I've known this was coming for a while, because I know how Google works.
[07:44.730 --> 07:45.830] [SPEAKER_15]: I know how they think.
[07:46.010 --> 07:47.310] [SPEAKER_15]: It's not necessarily a bad thing.
[07:47.310 --> 07:50.190] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, nothing is necessarily a bad thing if implemented properly.
[07:50.430 --> 07:50.670] [SPEAKER_15]: Exactly.
[07:50.910 --> 07:53.030] [SPEAKER_15]: It's Google that's implementing it.
[07:53.050 --> 08:01.490] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, I'd rather they be implementing it than, say, Microsoft or Yahoo or somebody like that, but the question is, how do we want this to be implemented?
[08:01.730 --> 08:03.530] [SPEAKER_12]: This also isn't entirely new.
[08:03.650 --> 08:17.050] [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, you've had the ability to search for book covers for a while through other services, so this isn't something completely new, but I thought that recognizing landmarks and such was pretty interesting, although I think that you have to still give your location for the image for them to figure out landmarks.
[08:17.050 --> 08:17.770] [SPEAKER_12]: Well, they have billions.
[08:17.890 --> 08:18.650] [SPEAKER_10]: They say they have billions.
[08:18.930 --> 08:20.710] [SPEAKER_10]: How have they been collecting these billions of images?
[08:20.890 --> 08:21.470] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, I mean, you have...
[08:21.470 --> 08:22.110] [SPEAKER_10]: Google Street View images.
[08:22.410 --> 08:23.450] [SPEAKER_10]: Is that where they're getting it all from?
[08:23.650 --> 08:25.710] [SPEAKER_11]: I imagine that'll be part of it if they're talking about location.
[08:25.790 --> 08:36.610] [SPEAKER_12]: Or, I mean, you can also think about people tag things on, say, Flickr, so you could leverage something like that, you know, a bunch of Flickr images of the Golden Gate Bridge, and then if you recognize something that's similar to the...
[08:36.610 --> 08:42.370] [SPEAKER_10]: But what if you take a picture of the Queensborough Bridge and you call it the Golden Gate Bridge on your Flickr account and get a lot of people to do this over and over again?
[08:42.630 --> 08:44.010] [SPEAKER_11]: It's a new form of culture jamming.
[08:44.010 --> 08:44.490] [SPEAKER_11]: That's awesome.
[08:44.550 --> 08:44.890] [SPEAKER_11]: Let's go.
[08:45.050 --> 08:46.770] [SPEAKER_10]: I think we should lie about all kinds of things.
[08:46.870 --> 08:49.950] [SPEAKER_10]: Take a picture of Richard Nixon's face and say, you know, this is a dog or something.
[08:49.970 --> 08:53.890] [SPEAKER_12]: We don't know where they're sourcing their images from, but if they were, say, using something that's, you know, public upload.
[08:53.890 --> 08:55.850] [SPEAKER_12]: That's not nice, Voltaire, making fun of Richard Nixon like that.
[08:56.030 --> 08:56.530] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm sorry.
[08:56.850 --> 08:58.570] [SPEAKER_14]: I don't understand why any of us care.
[08:59.770 --> 09:01.250] [SPEAKER_14]: Like, Google's released a new product.
[09:01.330 --> 09:04.550] [SPEAKER_14]: They have an excellent PR team because we always talk about it every time they release a new product.
[09:04.550 --> 09:09.470] [SPEAKER_10]: You know, people like you, we would never talk about anything because it has the G word attached to it.
[09:09.470 --> 09:10.070] [SPEAKER_10]: No, but I want...
[09:10.470 --> 09:13.790] [SPEAKER_10]: We'd be blindsided by all these technological developments.
[09:13.990 --> 09:14.210] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, what?
[09:14.250 --> 09:16.230] [SPEAKER_10]: We're not supposed to talk about it because they're big and powerful?
[09:16.410 --> 09:17.130] [SPEAKER_14]: No, I just want to...
[09:17.130 --> 09:21.210] [SPEAKER_14]: You seem to think this is really fascinating, and I want to understand what's really fascinating about it.
[09:21.510 --> 09:31.630] [SPEAKER_10]: Being able to identify any image simply by looking at it on a computer, by holding up a photograph and scanning it and having somebody say, that's this person standing on this street corner at this particular time or whatever.
[09:32.150 --> 09:34.110] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, I think that's kind of significant.
[09:34.370 --> 09:34.610] [SPEAKER_10]: Packrat.
[09:34.730 --> 09:35.370] [SPEAKER_04]: I have a concern.
[09:35.830 --> 09:36.990] [SPEAKER_10]: Bernie has a concern with Packrat.
[09:37.130 --> 09:37.910] [SPEAKER_10]: I want to hear what you have to say first.
[09:37.910 --> 09:39.850] [SPEAKER_00]: I actually, I think it might be kind of fun.
[09:39.950 --> 09:44.030] [SPEAKER_00]: You could be walking through a field, see a giant metal box, take a picture of it and say, I wonder what this is.
[09:44.430 --> 09:45.250] [SPEAKER_00]: Verizon co-location.
[09:45.270 --> 09:45.550] [SPEAKER_00]: Oh, yeah.
[09:45.670 --> 09:47.050] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, that's part of the good thing.
[09:47.270 --> 09:51.250] [SPEAKER_10]: We could use it against the powers that be as well to say, what is this building?
[09:51.390 --> 09:52.490] [SPEAKER_10]: What is this prison over here?
[09:52.970 --> 09:53.690] [SPEAKER_10]: Who's running this?
[09:54.210 --> 09:58.590] [SPEAKER_10]: And we could do this ourselves, too, if we all got together and combined resources.
[09:58.590 --> 10:03.010] [SPEAKER_10]: So it's a fascinating idea, but it's just, it can be very Orwellian as well.
[10:03.110 --> 10:03.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes, Bernie.
[10:04.130 --> 10:05.170] [SPEAKER_09]: Well, I have a concern.
[10:05.410 --> 10:12.450] [SPEAKER_09]: Once this technology matures and you extrapolate what seems logical, but that's not always how the future pans out.
[10:12.570 --> 10:29.090] [SPEAKER_09]: But in any case, one fearful vision I have is lots of video cameras, basically webcams all over the place that are remotely controlled, and the location of them is known.
[10:29.770 --> 10:50.490] [SPEAKER_09]: And if people's facial images are stored and recognized, then anyone passing through a particular, the technology could exist in the future so that anyone passing past one of these cameras could have their face recognized and their position logged at this location and time.
[10:50.490 --> 10:56.850] [SPEAKER_09]: Now, I'm sure law enforcement has been working on this for a while, and in fact, I know they have been working on this for a while, but the fact that...
[10:56.850 --> 11:03.590] [SPEAKER_11]: Bernie, Bernie, but remember what we know about surveillance cameras, which is that they don't work because there's so much stuff and you have to watch it after the fact.
[11:03.690 --> 11:07.130] [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, like, this for me reminds me, once again, it's going to be hiding in plain sight.
[11:07.270 --> 11:13.690] [SPEAKER_11]: There's going to be such an incredible stream of data that we're just not even going to know, you know, what we're looking at or know what's important to look at.
[11:13.730 --> 11:14.170] [SPEAKER_09]: What do you mean they don't work?
[11:14.670 --> 11:18.930] [SPEAKER_09]: Some of the facial recognition stuff does work, and the technology is getting better.
[11:18.930 --> 11:25.190] [SPEAKER_09]: I'm not saying I'm afraid of this happening tomorrow, but, you know, ten years from now, that seems plausible.
[11:25.190 --> 11:36.690] [SPEAKER_09]: So, you know, you have to be forward-thinking and see, you know, when you want to make policies or decide what's best for society, you need to look ahead rather than be reactive after it's already happened.
[11:36.950 --> 11:41.310] [SPEAKER_09]: So, you know, we're just speculating as to various possibilities, and that's one concern I have.
[11:42.450 --> 11:53.450] [SPEAKER_16]: Well, first of all, what Bernie was saying, you know, wouldn't just be something that'd be after the fact if you're using computers to catalog it, but I don't really see how that's any different from what we already have now with carrying cell phones.
[11:53.450 --> 11:58.630] [SPEAKER_16]: If we all carry cell phones around, our locations are very easily cataloged already.
[11:58.770 --> 12:04.910] [SPEAKER_16]: You know, I don't really see that particular application taking away any privacy we've already given up.
[12:05.750 --> 12:09.250] [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah, I'm just wondering about some of the privacy issues.
[12:09.370 --> 12:13.930] [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, if I don't want Google indexing my website, I can stick a robot's text file on my site and leave it at that.
[12:13.990 --> 12:16.850] [SPEAKER_13]: Who do I talk to about making Google not index my face?
[12:17.010 --> 12:19.130] [SPEAKER_13]: Well, I think you can talk to them.
[12:19.130 --> 12:23.990] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, no, you can talk to them because they blur people's faces out in Street View all the time.
[12:24.010 --> 12:28.150] [SPEAKER_10]: So I imagine there's going to be something similar when they implement this particular technology.
[12:29.530 --> 12:32.710] [SPEAKER_00]: Actually, interestingly enough, there is a place in the contiguous U.S.
[12:32.710 --> 12:38.030] [SPEAKER_00]: where they do have a monitoring center where there's cameras all over the place that are just watching people all day long.
[12:38.090 --> 12:39.970] [SPEAKER_00]: And it's in Lancaster City, Pennsylvania.
[12:40.670 --> 12:41.490] [SPEAKER_00]: Bernie, have you heard of this?
[12:42.050 --> 12:43.210] [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah, I've been to Lancaster.
[12:43.210 --> 12:44.250] [SPEAKER_09]: Sure, I've seen some of those cameras.
[12:44.390 --> 12:54.110] [SPEAKER_09]: But to answer Rob's question, there is a visual photographic firewall technology you could put over your head called a paper bag.
[12:55.330 --> 12:56.230] [SPEAKER_10]: No, that's not legal.
[12:56.350 --> 12:58.530] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't think you can walk around with a paper bag anymore because that's considered a mask.
[12:58.530 --> 12:58.630] [SPEAKER_10]: That's right.
[12:58.770 --> 12:59.570] [SPEAKER_12]: It's outlawed some places.
[12:59.810 --> 13:06.150] [SPEAKER_12]: Or also, you know, you could point certain LEDs at your face, like infrared LEDs that would blur out your face to any camera.
[13:06.410 --> 13:09.230] [SPEAKER_14]: The New York City mask law only prohibits groups of three or more.
[13:09.330 --> 13:12.490] [SPEAKER_14]: So if you're a lone paranoid person, you can walk around with a paper bag.
[13:12.490 --> 13:15.170] [SPEAKER_14]: But if you have two friends, you can't do it.
[13:15.410 --> 13:26.010] [SPEAKER_11]: We did prove when some of you folks came by my office a little while ago that, you know, some of it's pretty easy to fool just by sticking stickers on your face, making you look like you have high eyebrows to show your surprise, making you frown by having things go down your face.
[13:26.110 --> 13:27.570] [SPEAKER_11]: So, you know, that's not perfect.
[13:27.750 --> 13:32.010] [SPEAKER_12]: Although that would be suspicious to anybody you walk past if you were wearing stickers on your face.
[13:32.390 --> 13:34.750] [SPEAKER_11]: Well, like I said, you could just get robots.txt tattooed across your forehead.
[13:34.810 --> 13:39.870] [SPEAKER_11]: And then you also get benefits because you don't have to work anymore because, you know, you can't be employable once you have a tattoo on your forehead.
[13:40.150 --> 13:40.710] [SPEAKER_16]: Face paint.
[13:41.290 --> 13:41.530] [SPEAKER_10]: Uh-huh.
[13:41.530 --> 13:42.310] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, you know...
[13:42.310 --> 13:44.110] [SPEAKER_11]: We can all walk around like the insane clown posse.
[13:44.210 --> 13:44.830] [SPEAKER_11]: That's going to be awesome.
[13:44.830 --> 13:48.250] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, we're not really dealing with the issue, though.
[13:48.390 --> 13:49.310] [SPEAKER_10]: And I don't know.
[13:49.410 --> 13:53.210] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm not sure how things are going to fan out in the future.
[13:53.330 --> 13:54.470] [SPEAKER_14]: We could all move to Switzerland.
[13:54.710 --> 13:55.590] [SPEAKER_14]: They have privacy laws.
[13:55.970 --> 13:56.930] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, but no minarets.
[13:57.370 --> 13:57.910] [SPEAKER_14]: No minarets.
[13:57.930 --> 13:58.610] [SPEAKER_14]: It's a trade-off.
[13:58.610 --> 13:59.130] [SPEAKER_12]: It's a trade-off.
[13:59.250 --> 13:59.330] [SPEAKER_12]: True.
[13:59.590 --> 14:07.810] [SPEAKER_12]: At the same time, I mean, privacy considerations aside, it is a cool technology and it is something that we're trying to move towards to identify things, not just people, but things in general.
[14:07.810 --> 14:10.550] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, I share their enthusiasm because I want to be able to identify everything, too.
[14:10.750 --> 14:10.870] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[14:10.870 --> 14:15.690] [SPEAKER_10]: You know, it's good to be able to know what is this and, you know, where does that go and where does this come from and things like that.
[14:15.690 --> 14:22.750] [SPEAKER_12]: And whether or not Google is trying to spearhead it, the technology has been, you know, in the works in research universities for a long time.
[14:22.750 --> 14:24.150] [SPEAKER_12]: So what's left after this?
[14:24.230 --> 14:27.890] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, seriously, we can catalog songs.
[14:28.090 --> 14:29.950] [SPEAKER_10]: We can, you know, see every street.
[14:30.150 --> 14:32.570] [SPEAKER_10]: We can take pictures of images and find out what they are.
[14:32.710 --> 14:33.610] [SPEAKER_10]: We can identify all of ours.
[14:33.710 --> 14:34.270] [SPEAKER_10]: What's left?
[14:34.410 --> 14:34.590] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[14:35.090 --> 14:36.010] [SPEAKER_10]: Interstellar travel, I think.
[14:36.150 --> 14:36.670] [SPEAKER_10]: That's really what we have to do.
[14:36.670 --> 14:38.930] [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, you know, there's always something surprising around the corner.
[14:38.950 --> 14:43.850] [SPEAKER_12]: If you think about any of, you know, what we have today, it probably would have been mind-boggling, you know, 15, 20 years ago.
[14:44.030 --> 14:44.290] [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[14:44.770 --> 14:55.970] [SPEAKER_11]: One of the things that's a little bit concerning, and I don't know if this is what you're about to bring up, but the recent comment made by somebody on staff at Google that why should anybody worry about their privacy as long as they're doing things is by the CEO that,
[14:56.150 --> 14:56.970] [SPEAKER_11]: you know, why should you worry?
[14:57.010 --> 14:57.250] [SPEAKER_11]: What was the comment?
[14:58.170 --> 15:01.450] [SPEAKER_11]: As long as you're, you know, you're not doing anything illicit, why should you care?
[15:01.870 --> 15:02.850] [SPEAKER_11]: That's not what he said.
[15:03.290 --> 15:03.670] [SPEAKER_11]: How did it go?
[15:03.670 --> 15:11.490] [SPEAKER_16]: He said that if people are doing something and they don't want others to know about them, maybe they shouldn't be doing it on, searching it on Google anyway.
[15:11.670 --> 15:11.910] [SPEAKER_16]: It's the same thing, basically.
[15:13.670 --> 15:17.410] [SPEAKER_16]: But it's just specifically they're saying, you know, if you don't want anyone to know, then don't use Google for it.
[15:17.930 --> 15:23.970] [SPEAKER_11]: It's a little bit worrisome that, you know, that you have somebody thinking that way there When there's many things that are acceptable in one place and not in others.
[15:24.110 --> 15:26.690] [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, if you want to be in Iran and look up certain things about democracy.
[15:26.690 --> 15:31.190] [SPEAKER_11]: If you want to be in some place that's homophobic and you want to look up things about homosexuality.
[15:31.190 --> 15:32.370] [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah, but is that what he was talking about?
[15:32.370 --> 15:36.030] [SPEAKER_16]: See, I don't really think of that as necessarily a bad thing in the case of Google.
[15:36.390 --> 15:38.150] [SPEAKER_16]: I mean, anyone can do indexing.
[15:38.910 --> 15:47.070] [SPEAKER_16]: One of the big selling points for Google is the fact that they put all this information together that you can use in a more meaningful way than just a simple basic search.
[15:47.070 --> 15:58.490] [SPEAKER_16]: Now, if that's really a problem for somebody, I mean, we are supposed to be in a capitalist society where you can simply choose another company that provides the same service that is more anonymous.
[15:58.770 --> 15:59.910] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, I found the actual quote here.
[16:00.170 --> 16:05.430] [SPEAKER_10]: If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place.
[16:05.890 --> 16:10.210] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, that's not very nice saying it because that's got nothing to do with Google.
[16:10.350 --> 16:17.930] [SPEAKER_10]: That's basically a value judgment saying that, you know, anonymous acts or implying that anonymous acts simply shouldn't be done if you don't want people to know about it.
[16:18.590 --> 16:27.350] [SPEAKER_10]: But as far as, you know, if you want to take that a little further, so many people are doing stupid things and posting them online and then howling in complaint when they get caught for them.
[16:27.450 --> 16:30.050] [SPEAKER_10]: Like, for instance, underage drinking on Facebook.
[16:30.050 --> 16:31.370] [SPEAKER_10]: That just came out this week.
[16:32.070 --> 16:41.390] [SPEAKER_10]: These idiots are going around taking pictures of themselves at parties, and then they're surprised as hell when their teachers and parents see their pictures and say, what are you doing doing this?
[16:41.490 --> 16:43.570] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, it's really kind of funny.
[16:43.570 --> 16:57.550] [SPEAKER_12]: This is actually a step further because the local law enforcement to that town made a fake account and then, you know, attempted to become friends with people and then used that access that they were then given to look at their photos and call them in for questioning.
[16:57.750 --> 16:58.950] [SPEAKER_11]: That's a very smart law enforcement.
[16:58.950 --> 17:03.070] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, you know, I honestly don't have much of a problem with that because they're preying on stupidity.
[17:03.190 --> 17:06.630] [SPEAKER_10]: If people want to do stupid things, then they're going to do themselves in.
[17:06.750 --> 17:10.210] [SPEAKER_10]: And better they do it early than later when they really could get hurt or something.
[17:10.210 --> 17:13.830] [SPEAKER_14]: I would say this law enforcement agency, though, clearly has, like, too much time on their hands.
[17:13.910 --> 17:15.730] [SPEAKER_14]: They need either more crime or fewer officers.
[17:15.730 --> 17:18.030] [SPEAKER_10]: Maybe they just care too much, you know?
[17:18.130 --> 17:18.770] [SPEAKER_14]: About, like...
[17:18.770 --> 17:19.450] [SPEAKER_14]: They care about the children.
[17:19.450 --> 17:20.870] [SPEAKER_10]: About 19-year-olds at parties?
[17:21.090 --> 17:21.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Who cares?
[17:21.550 --> 17:22.030] [SPEAKER_10]: Are they 19?
[17:22.270 --> 17:22.330] [SPEAKER_10]: Really?
[17:22.450 --> 17:22.850] [SPEAKER_10]: I thought they were, like...
[17:22.850 --> 17:23.490] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, they're in college.
[17:23.650 --> 17:24.390] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, 19 or two in college.
[17:24.390 --> 17:25.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, I thought they were, like, 12 or so.
[17:25.410 --> 17:25.770] [SPEAKER_10]: No, no.
[17:25.910 --> 17:26.150] [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, no.
[17:26.230 --> 17:26.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[17:27.250 --> 17:35.310] [SPEAKER_16]: But if we have no problem with the law enforcement looking over these things, then why are they doing it, you know, clandestinely, creating a fake account?
[17:35.410 --> 17:39.910] [SPEAKER_16]: Why aren't they just simply being given access to look over people's accounts no matter how private they are?
[17:39.970 --> 17:40.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, that would be...
[17:40.770 --> 17:42.970] [SPEAKER_10]: What do you mean, have access to look over people's accounts?
[17:43.010 --> 17:48.070] [SPEAKER_16]: Well, you're saying that they're going based on their stupidity, but...
[17:48.070 --> 17:50.690] [SPEAKER_10]: They're making up a person that doesn't exist, you know, an attractive woman.
[17:50.890 --> 17:52.690] [SPEAKER_10]: And these people are saying, oh, sure, I know this person.
[17:52.790 --> 17:53.390] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm going to be their friend.
[17:53.390 --> 17:54.550] [SPEAKER_10]: And then they find out all this information.
[17:54.930 --> 17:56.730] [SPEAKER_16]: Why are they going through this clandestine method?
[17:56.910 --> 18:02.210] [SPEAKER_16]: If they are entitled to do this, why don't they simply talk over with Facebook and get the access?
[18:02.510 --> 18:04.050] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, that's a bit more nefarious, isn't it?
[18:04.250 --> 18:06.890] [SPEAKER_16]: But this is, in my opinion, more nefarious.
[18:06.990 --> 18:09.490] [SPEAKER_16]: They're lying, pretending to be someone they're not getting access to.
[18:09.490 --> 18:09.510] [SPEAKER_16]: Again, with the lying.
[18:09.650 --> 18:10.950] [SPEAKER_10]: Lying is such a crime all of a sudden.
[18:11.070 --> 18:11.570] [SPEAKER_10]: Everyone's always...
[18:11.970 --> 18:13.210] [SPEAKER_12]: Cops lie all the time.
[18:13.230 --> 18:14.090] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, that's what they do.
[18:14.250 --> 18:17.250] [SPEAKER_10]: That's their whole premise is lying to, you know, to people they want to catch.
[18:17.250 --> 18:26.390] [SPEAKER_12]: And it's much easier to create a fake account and try to befriend people at the local college than it is to try to get a subpoena to actually go and then go after Facebook and have them give you access.
[18:26.570 --> 18:28.750] [SPEAKER_12]: It's much easier to just cry on stupidity.
[18:29.090 --> 18:30.070] [SPEAKER_16]: This seems like a bit of a double standard.
[18:30.190 --> 18:35.530] [SPEAKER_16]: People don't care about them creating a fake account, but they care about them getting, being given access.
[18:35.730 --> 18:45.030] [SPEAKER_10]: I'd much rather create a fake account than have access to private information that, you know, I'm giving them my information if I friend somebody I don't know.
[18:45.310 --> 18:50.110] [SPEAKER_10]: You know, and it's my own fault if that person turns out to be something that I don't expect.
[18:51.010 --> 18:57.750] [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah, I'm really of two minds about this because on the one hand, I've always told people, anything you post to the Internet, act like everyone in your life will be able to access that.
[18:57.870 --> 18:58.250] [SPEAKER_13]: Exactly.
[18:58.510 --> 18:59.470] [SPEAKER_13]: Because it's possibly true.
[18:59.610 --> 19:00.530] [SPEAKER_10]: And that's exactly what happens.
[19:00.550 --> 19:09.610] [SPEAKER_13]: But on the other hand, if my wasted youth had not been before the days that videos and images were commonplace online, I think I would have more to answer for these days.
[19:09.850 --> 19:12.610] [SPEAKER_10]: And this is something that so many people I see make this mistake.
[19:12.770 --> 19:13.750] [SPEAKER_10]: They boast about it.
[19:13.770 --> 19:16.670] [SPEAKER_10]: They say, you'll never find anything about me because I'm completely anonymous.
[19:16.670 --> 19:20.910] [SPEAKER_10]: And it's just, it's like a red flag, you know, it's, it's, it's a challenge.
[19:21.170 --> 19:24.290] [SPEAKER_10]: And it's so easy to find any kind of information about anybody.
[19:24.530 --> 19:36.250] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't want to sound like Steve Rambam here, but it's, it's, you know, we leave our, our droppings all over the net and it's not hard to, to find little bits of it and piece it together and figure out various things that you didn't think you, you had out there.
[19:36.330 --> 19:47.870] [SPEAKER_12]: What was interesting though, is they really had to convince the people that they were in trouble because anyone, according to the article anyway, these people, their friends who didn't actually go down to the police station, didn't respond to whatever email it was,
[19:48.050 --> 19:48.870] [SPEAKER_12]: didn't get in trouble.
[19:48.990 --> 19:53.630] [SPEAKER_12]: And I assume because they weren't called in and they weren't made to admit to whatever it was that they had photos of.
[19:54.490 --> 20:01.250] [SPEAKER_12]: But the people who did actually follow through and go there to their police station, they were the ones who got ticketed and had to go to court and pay a fine and all that.
[20:02.070 --> 20:02.910] [SPEAKER_12]: So I don't know.
[20:03.150 --> 20:04.130] [SPEAKER_12]: It's kind of interesting.
[20:04.370 --> 20:11.410] [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, the, you know, the question is, do they have, if they had not got, you know, if they just had the photos, would they be able to do anything with that?
[20:11.410 --> 20:15.950] [SPEAKER_12]: Or did they require the person to come in and admit to whatever it was that they were at fault of?
[20:16.090 --> 20:16.430] [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[20:16.430 --> 20:16.750] [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know.
[20:17.830 --> 20:18.210] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[20:18.290 --> 20:20.650] [SPEAKER_10]: Moving on though, we have other things to discuss.
[20:21.090 --> 20:24.810] [SPEAKER_10]: And this, one of our other favorite entities, is this okay, Mike?
[20:24.970 --> 20:26.390] [SPEAKER_10]: Transportation Security Administration?
[20:26.890 --> 20:27.510] [SPEAKER_10]: They're big.
[20:27.670 --> 20:28.070] [SPEAKER_10]: They're powerful.
[20:28.230 --> 20:30.770] [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, did they do something other than issue a press release?
[20:31.470 --> 20:34.710] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, they always issue press releases, but they did something really silly.
[20:34.890 --> 20:39.390] [SPEAKER_10]: They released a document that they weren't supposed to release.
[20:40.130 --> 20:47.270] [SPEAKER_10]: It's an unintentional release, they call this, an unintentional release of a document which they later claimed was outdated, unclassified, and unimplemented.
[20:48.230 --> 20:59.630] [SPEAKER_10]: And they basically are still taking the incident of releasing it very seriously, and they've taken swift action to do various things, none of which brought the document back because we have copies of it.
[20:59.870 --> 21:01.790] [SPEAKER_10]: And it's interesting.
[21:02.570 --> 21:06.570] [SPEAKER_10]: Bernie, did you have a chance to look this over, the document they accidentally released?
[21:07.810 --> 21:08.290] [SPEAKER_10]: Bernie?
[21:09.430 --> 21:09.950] [SPEAKER_10]: Hello, Bernie.
[21:10.570 --> 21:11.510] [SPEAKER_14]: Red light's still on.
[21:12.330 --> 21:13.330] [SPEAKER_10]: Bernie, we know you're there.
[21:13.490 --> 21:14.050] [SPEAKER_10]: Your red light is on.
[21:14.090 --> 21:15.690] [SPEAKER_09]: Oh, I had my cough button on.
[21:15.750 --> 21:18.130] [SPEAKER_09]: I was coughing, and I had muted myself.
[21:18.250 --> 21:18.710] [SPEAKER_09]: No, I'm not.
[21:18.850 --> 21:19.570] [SPEAKER_10]: One hell of a cough.
[21:19.710 --> 21:21.790] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, well, did you get a chance to look at the document?
[21:22.170 --> 21:22.630] [SPEAKER_09]: I did.
[21:22.750 --> 21:23.210] [SPEAKER_09]: I looked at it.
[21:23.250 --> 21:24.590] [SPEAKER_09]: It seemed pretty innocuous to me.
[21:24.590 --> 21:52.210] [SPEAKER_09]: I mean, it just basically, with the standard operating procedures for the Transportation Security Agency officers, presumably at airports, should be what their procedures are, which, you know, ostensibly a bad person could read through the lines and craft their entry through those checkpoints in a way that they might not be discovered.
[21:52.210 --> 22:03.850] [SPEAKER_09]: But the funny thing is, and Mike can elaborate on this, is how they had released this document, I think, in a redacted format so that, you know, people couldn't read the sensitive stuff in there, which...
[22:03.850 --> 22:04.790] [SPEAKER_10]: They blacked it out, in other words.
[22:05.150 --> 22:05.510] [SPEAKER_09]: Right, right.
[22:05.510 --> 22:09.650] [SPEAKER_09]: They basically, they used an electronic magic marker to black out areas.
[22:09.810 --> 22:18.070] [SPEAKER_09]: And there's a famous document, Mike can elaborate on, that the NSA has released for government agencies on how to do this.
[22:18.070 --> 22:19.770] [SPEAKER_09]: And they didn't do a very good job, did they, Mike?
[22:20.210 --> 22:20.470] [SPEAKER_14]: No.
[22:20.590 --> 22:33.750] [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, what they did is basically they issued the document with big black electronic rectangles on it, but they didn't know that you can just go in and remove those big black electronic rectangles and see the document underneath.
[22:34.270 --> 22:37.690] [SPEAKER_14]: So Cryptome and some other people did, you can go get the document.
[22:38.270 --> 22:53.850] [SPEAKER_14]: If you work for the government and you have something that you don't want me to know, you know, this makes me sad, of course, but you should go read the NSA guide called Redacting with Confidence, and it tells you how to make a document that actually the information is not there,
[22:54.030 --> 22:54.610] [SPEAKER_14]: in fact.
[22:54.710 --> 22:56.030] [SPEAKER_10]: The NSA wrote this document.
[22:56.070 --> 22:56.170] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[22:56.390 --> 22:57.610] [SPEAKER_10]: Redacting with confidence.
[22:57.710 --> 22:59.910] [SPEAKER_14]: So if you're the government, you can trust the NSA.
[23:00.110 --> 23:02.350] [SPEAKER_14]: If you're not the government, of course, you can't trust the NSA.
[23:03.210 --> 23:06.970] [SPEAKER_14]: But you can go read this document, and it'll tell how to take things out of documents.
[23:07.310 --> 23:09.670] [SPEAKER_12]: Which is, you know, this isn't the first time we've heard about this.
[23:09.750 --> 23:19.570] [SPEAKER_12]: We've heard about this time and time again, where some agency, US or foreign even, releases a document, and they just highlight the text in whatever editor they have, and, you know, say, cover it with black.
[23:19.810 --> 23:19.950] [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[23:19.950 --> 23:22.370] [SPEAKER_12]: You know, you highlight the document, and the text is still there.
[23:22.670 --> 23:26.210] [SPEAKER_12]: And you'd think they'd learn, but they don't.
[23:26.250 --> 23:27.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, it's not a question of them learning.
[23:27.870 --> 23:31.350] [SPEAKER_10]: It's a question of so many people doing the same thing, and not everybody knowing the same thing.
[23:31.890 --> 23:32.930] [SPEAKER_10]: Mistakes happen all the time.
[23:33.170 --> 23:35.630] [SPEAKER_10]: Now, let's delve into a little bit of what is in this document.
[23:35.770 --> 23:39.150] [SPEAKER_10]: As Bernie said, it's not that fascinating, but there are some interesting things here.
[23:39.250 --> 23:43.190] [SPEAKER_10]: This is some of the stuff that was not blacked out.
[23:43.970 --> 23:49.730] [SPEAKER_10]: Basically, talking about baggage and accessible property handling and lifting.
[23:50.330 --> 23:56.090] [SPEAKER_10]: Lifting items that are too heavy or too awkward or using improper lifting techniques may cause the TSOs...
[23:56.610 --> 23:57.750] [SPEAKER_10]: Does anybody know what TSO stands for?
[23:58.250 --> 23:59.790] [SPEAKER_09]: Transportation Security Officer.
[24:00.050 --> 24:00.530] [SPEAKER_10]: Thank you, Bernie.
[24:01.130 --> 24:04.410] [SPEAKER_10]: It may cause the TSO to develop hernias and back strains.
[24:04.570 --> 24:11.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Hernias are a condition where a portion of the intestine pushes through a muscle wall, usually as a result of heavy exertion.
[24:11.790 --> 24:21.030] [SPEAKER_10]: Back strains result from overstretching certain muscles and can be caused by lifting even the lightest... Okay, so that goes into some details to what hernias are all about, which, obviously, they didn't want that to get out.
[24:21.330 --> 24:37.590] [SPEAKER_10]: But in addition to that, if you wander around this document, which, by the way, you can find on Krypton.org, our good friends over there, C-R-Y-P-T-O-M-E.org, you'll see examples of what Federal Air Marshal badges and credentials look like, where everything goes on the badge,
[24:37.670 --> 24:38.770] [SPEAKER_10]: where everything goes on the credentials.
[24:39.450 --> 24:41.930] [SPEAKER_10]: Central Intelligence Agency sample credential.
[24:42.210 --> 24:43.550] [SPEAKER_10]: Those look really easy to forge.
[24:43.630 --> 24:46.310] [SPEAKER_10]: They really are easy to forge, from what I've heard.
[24:47.710 --> 24:54.050] [SPEAKER_10]: But yeah, with a red or blue border, alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives sample badge and credential.
[24:54.110 --> 24:55.170] [SPEAKER_10]: Wait, did they add a department?
[24:55.490 --> 24:57.290] [SPEAKER_10]: Alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives?
[24:58.290 --> 25:00.210] [SPEAKER_10]: It used to be just alcohol, tobacco, and firearms.
[25:00.430 --> 25:01.190] [SPEAKER_10]: Bernie, do you know about this?
[25:01.270 --> 25:01.910] [SPEAKER_10]: They added something?
[25:02.130 --> 25:03.150] [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah, a long time ago.
[25:03.310 --> 25:03.650] [SPEAKER_10]: Really?
[25:03.990 --> 25:05.750] [SPEAKER_10]: So it's now the ATF and E?
[25:06.390 --> 25:07.250] [SPEAKER_10]: Is that what they call it?
[25:07.410 --> 25:08.670] [SPEAKER_10]: They're not ATF agents anymore.
[25:08.750 --> 25:09.630] [SPEAKER_10]: They're ATFE agents.
[25:10.370 --> 25:11.230] [SPEAKER_10]: I didn't know this.
[25:11.290 --> 25:12.690] [SPEAKER_11]: It's a good anagram for fate.
[25:12.810 --> 25:13.690] [SPEAKER_11]: They should just go with fate.
[25:13.690 --> 25:14.210] [SPEAKER_10]: It is.
[25:14.310 --> 25:14.750] [SPEAKER_10]: It is.
[25:14.890 --> 25:15.110] [SPEAKER_10]: Wow.
[25:15.110 --> 25:18.090] [SPEAKER_10]: Now, United States Congress identification.
[25:18.190 --> 25:20.130] [SPEAKER_10]: There's actually a picture of a U.S.
[25:20.210 --> 25:20.950] [SPEAKER_10]: House of Representative.
[25:21.570 --> 25:25.630] [SPEAKER_14]: And they blur out her last name, but there's only so many Congress people with her first...
[25:25.630 --> 25:25.630] No, they don't.
[25:25.670 --> 25:29.210] [SPEAKER_10]: It's Maria Mc... I can't really... My eyes are going, but it's Maria...
[25:29.210 --> 25:31.690] [SPEAKER_10]: It begins with an M, the last name, McSomething.
[25:32.950 --> 25:37.030] [SPEAKER_10]: And she's with the 110th Congress, January 2007 to 2009.
[25:37.090 --> 25:38.410] [SPEAKER_10]: So she's on her way out.
[25:39.390 --> 25:46.230] [SPEAKER_10]: And also, let's see, we have some other redacted bits of information, which I find always interesting.
[25:46.930 --> 25:48.810] [SPEAKER_10]: Let's see, what would be interesting to...
[25:48.810 --> 25:55.790] [SPEAKER_14]: There's the list of countries that if you present a passport from such a country, you automatically get the extra special screen.
[25:55.790 --> 26:15.570] [SPEAKER_10]: If the individual's photo ID is a passport issued by the government of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, or Algeria, refer the individual for a Selecti screening unless the individual has been exempted from Selecti screening by the FSD or aircraft operator.
[26:16.030 --> 26:16.590] [SPEAKER_10]: Interesting.
[26:16.670 --> 26:20.930] [SPEAKER_10]: I wasn't aware Algeria and Lebanon were on the list of suspect countries.
[26:20.930 --> 26:24.870] [SPEAKER_10]: I guess because, you know, they've got a lot of Muslims in there or something like that.
[26:25.030 --> 26:27.750] [SPEAKER_12]: Well, doesn't Lebanon have Hamas in charge of the country?
[26:27.870 --> 26:28.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, yeah, but they were voted in, you know.
[26:28.810 --> 26:35.250] [SPEAKER_10]: But Algeria, Algeria, you know, they voted in people we didn't like, but they negated the election.
[26:35.250 --> 26:36.950] [SPEAKER_10]: So there you go, you know.
[26:37.150 --> 26:38.250] [SPEAKER_10]: And they're also in the World Cup.
[26:38.250 --> 26:39.590] [SPEAKER_10]: So that gives them some legitimacy.
[26:39.810 --> 26:43.630] [SPEAKER_12]: I think there's also settings in there for the x-ray machines and the detectors.
[26:43.970 --> 26:45.070] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't have the whole document here.
[26:45.230 --> 26:46.670] [SPEAKER_10]: I have some of it.
[26:46.670 --> 26:58.770] [SPEAKER_10]: They also say if the ID lacks a required federal, state, or local government, airport, or aircraft operator, ultraviolet, or microprinting security features, contains inkjet dots, or appears to be tampered with, the ID is suspect.
[26:58.930 --> 27:02.430] [SPEAKER_10]: So if you have a fake ID, that might make some eyes go up.
[27:02.530 --> 27:06.530] [SPEAKER_14]: The other thing is, if you're from one of those countries, but you live in the U.S., then you might have a U.S.
[27:06.610 --> 27:10.490] [SPEAKER_14]: driver's license and you can get around the special screening.
[27:10.490 --> 27:11.530] [SPEAKER_14]: It doesn't seem that useful.
[27:11.690 --> 27:11.950] [SPEAKER_14]: Voltaire.
[27:12.430 --> 27:14.530] [SPEAKER_15]: And I was just wondering what they had against Eritrea.
[27:15.930 --> 27:16.290] [SPEAKER_10]: Eritrea?
[27:16.290 --> 27:16.370] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[27:16.570 --> 27:17.290] [SPEAKER_10]: They're not in there.
[27:17.530 --> 27:17.930] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't know.
[27:18.030 --> 27:18.410] [SPEAKER_10]: It's not fair.
[27:18.530 --> 27:19.310] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, that is not fair.
[27:19.330 --> 27:19.590] [SPEAKER_10]: You're right.
[27:19.670 --> 27:22.630] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, I'm sure you can apply to have your country included in the suspect ones.
[27:23.770 --> 27:24.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Here's some...
[27:24.410 --> 27:24.890] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes, Bernie, go ahead.
[27:25.210 --> 27:26.650] [SPEAKER_09]: There was one thing I noted in there.
[27:26.670 --> 27:45.570] [SPEAKER_09]: I think I saw this, that it confirmed that you are allowed to take photographs of the screening areas as long as you don't take pictures of the x-ray screen, you know, video monitors kind of stuff, which I have been asked to, in the past, by TSA officials to not take the pictures.
[27:45.950 --> 27:48.350] [SPEAKER_09]: And they even had someone ask me to erase some pictures.
[27:48.690 --> 27:51.570] [SPEAKER_09]: And I went through the motions and they thought I erased them and I hadn't.
[27:51.730 --> 27:55.750] [SPEAKER_09]: But in fact, you are allowed to take pictures according to this document.
[27:55.950 --> 27:57.150] [SPEAKER_09]: So, so there.
[27:57.150 --> 28:03.450] [SPEAKER_12]: So, so basically, we should print out the document and bring it with us next time we fly and show it to them after we take pictures.
[28:03.670 --> 28:04.570] [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, that'll, that'll ensure all kinds of...
[28:04.570 --> 28:06.110] [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, you tell us how it happens, how it goes.
[28:06.390 --> 28:10.030] [SPEAKER_10]: There's, there's a section here, which I thought was kind of interesting, called special situations.
[28:10.030 --> 28:15.210] [SPEAKER_10]: TDCs may be faced with a variety of special situations outside of the scope of normal checkpoint screening operations.
[28:15.210 --> 28:21.290] [SPEAKER_10]: And they include a bunch of things, anything from late arriving passengers to people that don't have the right travel documents.
[28:21.390 --> 28:22.790] [SPEAKER_10]: But there's a couple interesting ones here.
[28:24.030 --> 28:29.290] [SPEAKER_10]: Individuals who wish to voluntarily relinquish prohibited items prior to entering the screening checkpoint.
[28:29.830 --> 28:40.530] [SPEAKER_10]: Advise the individual that TDCs cannot accept prohibited items and that the individual should dispose of the items before entering the screening checkpoint to include disposal in designated amnesty bins.
[28:40.990 --> 28:41.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Amnesty bins.
[28:41.790 --> 28:44.310] [SPEAKER_10]: Now we know what they're called, called amnesty bins.
[28:44.410 --> 28:44.950] [SPEAKER_10]: Isn't that great?
[28:45.330 --> 28:46.510] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, but what's a TDC?
[28:46.710 --> 28:47.750] [SPEAKER_10]: I thought we, Bernie, what's a TDC?
[28:49.190 --> 28:50.270] [SPEAKER_09]: Oh, you got me.
[28:50.470 --> 28:50.690] [SPEAKER_10]: Really?
[28:50.910 --> 28:52.810] [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, a travel document checker, I think.
[28:53.130 --> 28:55.430] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, because they talk about travel document checking.
[28:55.630 --> 28:57.250] [SPEAKER_10]: So that must be what a TDC is, someone who does that.
[28:57.270 --> 29:00.330] [SPEAKER_11]: Those must be the people who meet you at the front of the line before you actually hit the screening point.
[29:00.470 --> 29:00.810] [SPEAKER_10]: Could be.
[29:00.990 --> 29:02.650] [SPEAKER_10]: And so they don't want my knives.
[29:03.230 --> 29:06.010] [SPEAKER_10]: No, and the amnesty box does.
[29:06.990 --> 29:08.730] [SPEAKER_10]: Unruly passengers they have to deal with.
[29:08.810 --> 29:13.710] [SPEAKER_10]: The TDC should attempt to resolve these behaviors using good customer service techniques.
[29:14.010 --> 29:18.610] [SPEAKER_10]: If the individual does not heed the TDC's direction, then, you know what happens?
[29:18.710 --> 29:24.130] [SPEAKER_10]: The TDC must notify the STSO slash LTSO for resolution.
[29:24.490 --> 29:29.990] [SPEAKER_10]: So if you see an STSO slash LTSO waddling down the aisle, you know you're in for it.
[29:30.070 --> 29:32.850] [SPEAKER_14]: That's the senior and lead security people.
[29:32.950 --> 29:33.410] [SPEAKER_14]: Tell me they listed.
[29:33.410 --> 29:34.150] [SPEAKER_14]: You know this for a fact.
[29:34.330 --> 29:36.850] [SPEAKER_11]: Tell me they listed what good customer service techniques are.
[29:36.910 --> 29:37.430] [SPEAKER_11]: I really want to know.
[29:37.430 --> 29:38.150] [SPEAKER_11]: No, you're supposed to know that.
[29:38.270 --> 29:38.730] [SPEAKER_11]: You're supposed to know that.
[29:38.730 --> 29:39.730] [SPEAKER_16]: That's exactly what I want to know.
[29:39.770 --> 29:43.370] [SPEAKER_16]: Because, I mean, what if they consider beating somebody good customer service, you know?
[29:43.610 --> 29:44.470] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, it's possible they do.
[29:44.890 --> 29:54.390] [SPEAKER_14]: Does this imply that I am... If I fly, does this mean I'm a customer of the TSA and if I don't like their service, I can, like, get a new vendor or something?
[29:54.490 --> 29:58.910] [SPEAKER_10]: I think they're referring to the customer service techniques of the airlines, but who knows?
[29:59.770 --> 30:04.390] [SPEAKER_10]: And finally, the other special situation they might face.
[30:04.590 --> 30:09.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Individuals who exhibit suspicious behaviors slash appearances during the TDC engagement.
[30:09.690 --> 30:10.890] [SPEAKER_10]: TDC engagement.
[30:11.110 --> 30:33.790] [SPEAKER_10]: If the TDC believes the individual is exhibiting such behaviors slash appearances, notify the STSO directly, not the LTSO, the STSO, or where proximity to an STSO prevents direct notification through a local travel document marking system as described in section 2a-2.c.1.c.1,
[30:33.830 --> 30:36.550] [SPEAKER_10]: which I neglected to print out.
[30:36.650 --> 30:37.090] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm sorry.
[30:37.310 --> 30:41.070] [SPEAKER_10]: But I'm sure going to look at that when I get back and find out what they say about that.
[30:41.310 --> 30:42.490] [SPEAKER_10]: Now, that was not redacted.
[30:42.550 --> 30:46.490] [SPEAKER_10]: That was all, I guess, not considered all that sensitive.
[30:46.590 --> 30:50.350] [SPEAKER_10]: What was redacted is this part under alternative travel document checking procedures.
[30:51.030 --> 30:52.990] [SPEAKER_10]: This part was not crossed out.
[30:53.110 --> 31:04.310] [SPEAKER_10]: During peak travel periods, the FSD or his or her designee may authorize alternative travel document checking procedures at screening checkpoints equipped with ultraviolet lights and magnifying loops.
[31:04.770 --> 31:05.170] [SPEAKER_10]: Loops?
[31:05.350 --> 31:06.410] [SPEAKER_10]: L-L-U-P-E-S?
[31:06.490 --> 31:08.950] [SPEAKER_11]: That's like when you use a jewelers thing to look at things.
[31:09.090 --> 31:09.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Tell us about this, Barney.
[31:10.370 --> 31:11.010] [SPEAKER_09]: That's how you say it.
[31:11.010 --> 31:11.270] [SPEAKER_09]: Loops.
[31:11.350 --> 31:14.830] [SPEAKER_09]: It's like a very tiny magnifying glass, usually with multiple lenses.
[31:14.850 --> 31:15.250] [SPEAKER_09]: Oh, really?
[31:15.550 --> 31:15.690] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[31:16.490 --> 31:19.110] [SPEAKER_09]: Jewelers, as Gus pointed out, jewelers use it.
[31:19.110 --> 31:20.090] [SPEAKER_09]: It's called a jewelers loop.
[31:20.090 --> 31:21.170] [SPEAKER_10]: I've seen jewelers use it.
[31:21.190 --> 31:23.830] [SPEAKER_10]: I haven't seen TSA people use them, but okay.
[31:23.890 --> 31:26.470] [SPEAKER_09]: You can look at very, you know, look at the documents.
[31:26.910 --> 31:33.970] [SPEAKER_09]: If you use a small magnifying glass that has a lot of magnification on a dollar bill, you can see all the microprinting and credit cards.
[31:34.070 --> 31:34.810] [SPEAKER_09]: It's kind of fun.
[31:34.910 --> 31:35.050] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[31:35.170 --> 31:37.870] [SPEAKER_10]: Now, that was the part that was not crossed out.
[31:37.950 --> 31:39.150] [SPEAKER_10]: This is the part that is crossed out.
[31:39.150 --> 31:40.050] [SPEAKER_10]: This is the last thing I'm going to read.
[31:40.690 --> 31:51.410] [SPEAKER_10]: The use of black lights slash loops may be reduced from 100% of individuals processing through the screening checkpoint to no less than 25%.
[31:51.410 --> 32:02.150] [SPEAKER_10]: And this alternative procedure must not be used for more than 30 minutes at a time and may be used no more than three times during an eight-hour shift unless authorized by the FSD due to exigent circumstances.
[32:03.050 --> 32:04.610] [SPEAKER_10]: So, yeah, that's...
[32:04.610 --> 32:05.690] [SPEAKER_09]: You can wait them out.
[32:05.870 --> 32:06.190] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[32:06.350 --> 32:08.090] [SPEAKER_10]: Now you know what they can do and what they can't do.
[32:08.330 --> 32:13.150] [SPEAKER_10]: So, again, Cryptome.org has the whole document which was accidentally released by the TSA.
[32:13.290 --> 32:14.010] [SPEAKER_10]: Nice going, guys.
[32:14.550 --> 32:18.170] [SPEAKER_10]: I imagine there's all kinds of other documents out there that accidentally get released.
[32:18.170 --> 32:19.910] [SPEAKER_14]: Cryptome's actually had a really good week.
[32:20.730 --> 32:26.790] [SPEAKER_14]: We mentioned last week the spying policies of a bunch of telecom companies and they got a whole bunch more on Cryptome.
[32:26.930 --> 32:30.570] [SPEAKER_14]: And there's always good stuff there, but this week has been a particularly good week for them.
[32:30.570 --> 32:33.070] [SPEAKER_10]: We had some feedback to what we talked about last week.
[32:33.170 --> 32:40.710] [SPEAKER_10]: You're talking about the whole Sprint thing that we talked about, the eight million GPS pings, I guess, or requests, or whatever they are.
[32:41.550 --> 32:47.790] [SPEAKER_10]: Jacob writes in to say that, I'm sure by now you all have found the website for getting GPS locations from Sprint, which we didn't.
[32:47.890 --> 32:50.370] [SPEAKER_10]: So thank you, Jacob, for I think, sending us this.
[32:50.970 --> 32:53.170] [SPEAKER_10]: And the off chance you didn't, enclosed, is a link.
[32:53.790 --> 33:00.650] [SPEAKER_10]: The link is HTTPS colon slash slash FTS2001.Sprint.com.
[33:01.250 --> 33:01.970] [SPEAKER_09]: It's an old link.
[33:02.090 --> 33:02.690] [SPEAKER_10]: That's an old link.
[33:02.770 --> 33:03.390] [SPEAKER_10]: But it does work.
[33:03.590 --> 33:04.310] [SPEAKER_10]: It does work.
[33:04.730 --> 33:05.010] [SPEAKER_09]: It's old.
[33:05.110 --> 33:06.550] [SPEAKER_09]: That's not the system you're talking about.
[33:06.590 --> 33:08.590] [SPEAKER_09]: This is an older system, I think, it's referring to.
[33:08.710 --> 33:09.870] [SPEAKER_09]: But anyhow, it's still fun to look at.
[33:10.010 --> 33:10.870] [SPEAKER_10]: It is fun to look at.
[33:10.890 --> 33:11.790] [SPEAKER_10]: There's all kinds of things there.
[33:11.870 --> 33:13.150] [SPEAKER_10]: Maybe that'll lead us to something else.
[33:15.090 --> 33:19.830] [SPEAKER_10]: Actually going to the system where you request GPS location on customers.
[33:20.050 --> 33:20.470] [SPEAKER_09]: I don't think so.
[33:20.550 --> 33:25.290] [SPEAKER_09]: I think it's an older mission site for surveillance stuff to Sprint.
[33:25.510 --> 33:31.030] [SPEAKER_09]: So Sprint has a long and proud history of providing surveillance tools to law enforcement.
[33:31.250 --> 33:31.610] [SPEAKER_09]: It has.
[33:31.690 --> 33:33.270] [SPEAKER_10]: And it should be recognized as such, for sure.
[33:33.970 --> 33:35.690] [SPEAKER_10]: As do all the telecom carriers.
[33:36.090 --> 33:37.730] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, but Sprint has that toll-free number.
[33:37.990 --> 33:39.770] [SPEAKER_10]: And they have, I don't know, this...
[33:39.770 --> 33:42.710] [SPEAKER_14]: What, you think Verizon makes the law enforcement agencies pay?
[33:42.870 --> 33:44.490] [SPEAKER_14]: Like, what does long-distance cost these days?
[33:44.570 --> 33:45.370] [SPEAKER_14]: A couple cents a minute.
[33:45.590 --> 33:45.890] [SPEAKER_10]: All right.
[33:46.090 --> 33:47.150] [SPEAKER_10]: Someone proved me wrong.
[33:47.250 --> 33:49.490] [SPEAKER_10]: Send us the 800 number for Verizon, and we'll call that as well.
[33:50.430 --> 33:50.830] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[33:51.010 --> 34:02.530] [SPEAKER_10]: Speaking of leaked documents and scandals and things like that, we've all heard this in the news in the last couple of weeks about the quote-unquote hacked emails involving global warming.
[34:02.970 --> 34:04.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Anyone have thoughts on this?
[34:04.950 --> 34:17.550] [SPEAKER_10]: This allegedly, according to all the email I'm getting, proves that global warming is a farce and that everything is being covered up by the scientific elite of the world and that they're trying to control our brains and do all kinds of other things.
[34:17.730 --> 34:26.750] [SPEAKER_10]: And it's just incredible to me how quickly control of a situation can be gotten by people who have no idea what they're talking about and have absolutely nothing on their side.
[34:26.890 --> 34:38.630] [SPEAKER_10]: But yet, somehow, by just talking loudly and frequently, they're able to get this talked about on every single major news program that exists as if there's any truth to it whatsoever.
[34:38.650 --> 34:40.070] [SPEAKER_10]: Gus, I think you had your hand up first.
[34:40.250 --> 34:45.430] [SPEAKER_11]: This is why it bothers me that there is also this headline where Google is starting to do...
[34:45.430 --> 34:49.450] [SPEAKER_11]: Bing and Google are both doing real-time search of things like Twitter because that's...
[34:49.450 --> 34:54.990] [SPEAKER_11]: When you index things that people are sort of spouting and retweeting all the time, the people who are allowed win.
[34:55.110 --> 34:56.330] [SPEAKER_11]: And that's not cool.
[34:56.590 --> 34:56.750] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[34:56.910 --> 34:58.990] [SPEAKER_10]: And that's what I don't like about all the forums that...
[34:58.990 --> 35:02.010] [SPEAKER_10]: CNN just introduced forums on just about every story.
[35:02.370 --> 35:11.610] [SPEAKER_10]: And that means that people who are loud and stupid and like to repeat themselves get the same basic readership as the person who did the research and wrote the story in the first place.
[35:11.630 --> 35:13.410] [SPEAKER_11]: If you read through the comments, which a lot of people don't.
[35:13.490 --> 35:16.350] [SPEAKER_11]: A lot of people just like, eh, forget, you know, the forums.
[35:16.630 --> 35:19.450] [SPEAKER_10]: I get disgusted after the first two, usually, so I stop reading them.
[35:19.570 --> 35:20.070] [SPEAKER_10]: But yeah...
[35:20.070 --> 35:21.170] [SPEAKER_11]: This is why Slashdot is awesome.
[35:21.510 --> 35:25.470] [SPEAKER_11]: Slashdot has taken years to work up a modding system where the worst people get...
[35:25.470 --> 35:26.630] [SPEAKER_10]: But Slashdot is a forum.
[35:26.790 --> 35:27.610] [SPEAKER_10]: It starts as a forum.
[35:27.730 --> 35:29.750] [SPEAKER_10]: It's not a newspaper.
[35:30.090 --> 35:31.090] [SPEAKER_10]: It's not a journalist.
[35:31.410 --> 35:34.230] [SPEAKER_10]: It's basically a place where people exchange ideas.
[35:34.630 --> 35:38.810] [SPEAKER_10]: But the New York Times, CNN, all these other places, they're places where you go to read news.
[35:38.930 --> 35:39.330] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm sorry.
[35:39.470 --> 35:43.490] [SPEAKER_14]: I hate to interrupt, but Gus, did you just say that Slashdot is a place where you can find...
[35:43.490 --> 35:43.890] [SPEAKER_14]: You want a piece of me?
[35:44.530 --> 35:45.970] [SPEAKER_14]: Like, insightful commentary?
[35:46.310 --> 35:48.470] [SPEAKER_11]: No, I'm just saying that they did a better job of modding down the people who really are terrible.
[35:48.470 --> 35:48.470] You can.
[35:48.590 --> 35:49.330] [SPEAKER_11]: It's number five.
[35:49.610 --> 35:49.930] [SPEAKER_11]: Insightful.
[35:50.170 --> 35:51.130] [SPEAKER_10]: That's how you find it.
[35:51.350 --> 35:52.410] [SPEAKER_10]: You look for number five.
[35:52.590 --> 35:52.850] [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, no.
[35:53.030 --> 35:53.950] [SPEAKER_11]: I'm just saying that they...
[35:53.950 --> 35:58.470] [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, having compared a number of different systems for moderating discussion, I think Slashdot is kind of...
[35:58.470 --> 35:59.530] [SPEAKER_10]: No, I think it works.
[35:59.590 --> 36:00.210] [SPEAKER_10]: I definitely think it works.
[36:00.230 --> 36:01.730] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't read it every day, certainly, but...
[36:01.730 --> 36:02.330] [SPEAKER_11]: It's time-tested.
[36:02.470 --> 36:03.990] [SPEAKER_11]: It's something that they've developed over a number of years.
[36:04.050 --> 36:06.830] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, but anyway, so we're veering way off the subject here.
[36:06.950 --> 36:15.150] [SPEAKER_10]: So basically, what we have is these leaked emails, which I object to the word hacked because really, what was done to get these emails in the first place?
[36:15.230 --> 36:15.650] [SPEAKER_10]: Does anybody know?
[36:15.730 --> 36:18.750] [SPEAKER_10]: Anybody know how the emails were actually obtained from the East Anglia University?
[36:19.190 --> 36:20.490] [SPEAKER_10]: I believe someone...
[36:20.490 --> 36:20.890] [SPEAKER_10]: Guess passwords.
[36:21.230 --> 36:21.690] [SPEAKER_10]: Guess passwords?
[36:21.750 --> 36:22.230] [SPEAKER_10]: Is that what it was?
[36:22.390 --> 36:23.030] [SPEAKER_10]: Most likely.
[36:23.350 --> 36:23.510] [SPEAKER_10]: No?
[36:23.990 --> 36:26.150] [SPEAKER_10]: Jim pointed out to us and we'll find out.
[36:26.250 --> 36:31.090] [SPEAKER_10]: But basically, there is no smoking gun here as far as I can see.
[36:31.090 --> 36:32.150] [SPEAKER_10]: Someone tell me if I'm wrong.
[36:32.370 --> 36:36.710] [SPEAKER_15]: It's hugely cherry-picked information and even the cherry-picked is pretty, like, innocuous.
[36:36.870 --> 36:47.090] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, they find people's personal communication, scientists that basically are saying nasty things about the people who don't agree with them and using that as evidence that their whole premise is wrong.
[36:47.190 --> 36:58.830] [SPEAKER_15]: They had thousands of pages that they had, quote-unquote, hacked into and that they had access to and the ones that are being quoted the most, the ones that they say are the most damning are really just, like, not that innocuous at all.
[36:58.830 --> 37:00.290] [SPEAKER_15]: Like, they don't really...
[37:00.290 --> 37:05.090] [SPEAKER_10]: If you look at anybody's personal email, you're going to find something in there that makes them not look very good.
[37:05.230 --> 37:07.910] [SPEAKER_15]: The recent case where the government was...
[37:07.910 --> 37:11.390] [SPEAKER_15]: The Fed just lost a lawsuit against the...
[37:11.890 --> 37:14.510] [SPEAKER_15]: One of the bankers, I think it was the heads of...
[37:15.130 --> 37:17.430] [SPEAKER_15]: Freddie May or Fannie Mac, one of the two.
[37:17.850 --> 37:27.770] [SPEAKER_15]: And they basically lost the case because their case resided entirely on emails and, like, one sentence from a three-page email and it had...
[37:27.770 --> 37:31.330] [SPEAKER_15]: that it turned out that if you read it in context, it didn't, like, blame them.
[37:31.570 --> 37:34.950] [SPEAKER_15]: But it's just another example of it being taken out of context.
[37:35.250 --> 37:35.670] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[37:35.870 --> 37:40.850] [SPEAKER_10]: And basically, also, a lack of understanding of the whole scientific process.
[37:40.850 --> 37:42.610] [SPEAKER_10]: I believe we were talking about that earlier, Dot, right?
[37:42.770 --> 37:44.290] [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah, we were talking about that earlier.
[37:44.550 --> 37:50.670] [SPEAKER_16]: a lot of people hear, you know, theory of whatever and they take that to mean that they're...
[37:50.670 --> 37:55.390] [SPEAKER_16]: that the grounding is on is shaky, which is not necessarily true.
[37:55.390 --> 37:58.390] [SPEAKER_16]: It's taken on somewhat of a different meaning in the scientific community.
[37:58.630 --> 37:59.850] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, that's a good example.
[37:59.930 --> 38:01.430] [SPEAKER_10]: A theory of evolution, for instance.
[38:01.610 --> 38:07.130] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't want to get way off the track here, but, you know, some people latch onto that and say that means that it's not fact.
[38:07.450 --> 38:07.630] [SPEAKER_10]: No.
[38:07.630 --> 38:09.290] [SPEAKER_10]: And that's not how science...
[38:09.290 --> 38:11.510] [SPEAKER_10]: Does anybody want to explain how science actually...
[38:11.510 --> 38:13.850] [SPEAKER_10]: you know, a second or two, how science works, Red Hecht?
[38:14.290 --> 38:21.590] [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, a theory would be basically something that you can't necessarily prove completely, but it's the best thing that fits the data that you have.
[38:21.730 --> 38:21.910] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[38:21.910 --> 38:27.210] [SPEAKER_12]: So, given the data that you've collected, theory best fits that model.
[38:27.370 --> 38:32.650] [SPEAKER_12]: So, for example, you've got relativity, which is the best guess for now, but, you know, then you've got things like string theory.
[38:32.650 --> 38:32.930] [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, but you said guess.
[38:33.070 --> 38:33.790] [SPEAKER_12]: So, you're guessing.
[38:33.890 --> 38:35.010] [SPEAKER_10]: You're guessing, which means you don't know.
[38:35.210 --> 38:37.910] [SPEAKER_12]: No, but based on the data that you've seen.
[38:38.090 --> 38:39.330] [SPEAKER_12]: And it fits, you know.
[38:39.750 --> 38:42.290] [SPEAKER_12]: The model fits the data.
[38:42.450 --> 38:42.730] [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[38:42.870 --> 38:43.770] [SPEAKER_12]: And so...
[38:43.770 --> 38:46.590] [SPEAKER_12]: But it's not provable that it's exactly correct.
[38:46.710 --> 38:46.830] [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[38:47.350 --> 38:48.930] [SPEAKER_12]: Technically, gravity is still a theory.
[38:49.110 --> 38:49.250] [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[38:49.410 --> 38:51.330] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, it is still a theory, but it seems to work around me.
[38:51.330 --> 38:52.190] [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, here.
[38:52.370 --> 39:01.570] [SPEAKER_16]: The United States National Academy of Science says that some explanations are so well established that no new evidence is likely to alter them.
[39:01.850 --> 39:04.110] [SPEAKER_16]: That is what they consider to be a theory.
[39:04.330 --> 39:08.870] [SPEAKER_16]: You know, probably the reason why we call it a theory is just because of technical nitpicking.
[39:09.070 --> 39:14.830] [SPEAKER_16]: Unless you infinitely test something, you know, an infinite number of times, you're never going to be infinitely sure it's true.
[39:14.850 --> 39:19.090] [SPEAKER_16]: So, there's always that tiny, tiny, tiny, tiny, tiny little chance that you're wrong.
[39:19.090 --> 39:20.490] [SPEAKER_16]: But, um...
[39:20.490 --> 39:21.690] [SPEAKER_10]: So you admit evolution could be wrong.
[39:22.150 --> 39:22.590] [SPEAKER_16]: There's...
[39:22.590 --> 39:23.290] [SPEAKER_16]: Gravity could be wrong.
[39:23.410 --> 39:28.750] [SPEAKER_16]: If you want to speak with the language that the scientific community uses, yes, but...
[39:28.750 --> 39:30.770] [SPEAKER_10]: And sometimes that language is foul language, too.
[39:30.910 --> 39:35.550] [SPEAKER_10]: And this is something that they're latching onto as well, that look how they treat their opponents with disrespect.
[39:35.790 --> 39:36.830] [SPEAKER_10]: It's a private email.
[39:36.970 --> 39:39.430] [SPEAKER_10]: People are allowed to say all kinds of things in private email.
[39:39.690 --> 39:43.970] [SPEAKER_10]: The question is, does the science, is the science being proven wrong?
[39:43.970 --> 39:46.890] [SPEAKER_10]: And there's nothing in there to indicate that at all.
[39:47.370 --> 39:48.050] [SPEAKER_10]: And it's just...
[39:48.050 --> 39:52.890] [SPEAKER_10]: It's incredible to see this used, this quote-unquote hack used as a way of derailing the whole process.
[39:53.030 --> 39:54.990] [SPEAKER_12]: And just one thing back to the wording that we're talking about.
[39:55.170 --> 40:01.670] [SPEAKER_12]: Just because something is a theory and doesn't mean that you can completely prove it doesn't mean that if you make something up that that's any more valid.
[40:02.370 --> 40:02.670] [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[40:02.670 --> 40:09.230] [SPEAKER_12]: So just because you say that, you know, oh, creationism doesn't mean that that's what happened and I would, you know, challenge you to prove to me that that happened.
[40:09.250 --> 40:11.550] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, I just mentioned evolution as an example.
[40:11.550 --> 40:12.230] [SPEAKER_10]: I know, but...
[40:12.230 --> 40:14.950] [SPEAKER_10]: The real story here is the global warming climate change thing.
[40:14.950 --> 40:15.490] [SPEAKER_10]: Same thing here.
[40:15.530 --> 40:20.610] [SPEAKER_12]: You have all the data on warming, you know, taken in Antarctica and so on and so forth.
[40:20.750 --> 40:25.410] [SPEAKER_12]: Just because you say it's not happening doesn't mean that you've taken and analyzed the data and then proved that it's not happening.
[40:25.410 --> 40:34.930] [SPEAKER_10]: If there really was a conspiracy, don't you think in those thousands of pages you'd find a lot more damning evidence than just simply saying let's not emphasize this so much because it might make the other side look better?
[40:35.450 --> 40:38.990] [SPEAKER_10]: You know, wouldn't you see real evidence that there's a global conspiracy?
[40:39.410 --> 40:46.350] [SPEAKER_10]: And, you know, I'm trying to figure out what would be the point of this global conspiracy to make us, like, not pollute more and to make us drive better?
[40:46.630 --> 40:47.090] [SPEAKER_10]: One world government.
[40:47.290 --> 40:47.890] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, communism.
[40:48.350 --> 40:49.170] [SPEAKER_10]: One world government.
[40:49.530 --> 40:50.310] [SPEAKER_15]: You know, this whole...
[40:50.750 --> 41:02.230] [SPEAKER_15]: On the note of conspiracies and also taking issue with the word hacker, another issue I've taken with the whole reporting on this is that they're calling the leakers, they're calling them the global warming skeptics.
[41:02.370 --> 41:11.010] [SPEAKER_15]: And I think that global warming, it's like an insult to the word skeptic because skepticism is all about questioning conspiracy theories and, like, fringe theories.
[41:11.350 --> 41:14.190] [SPEAKER_15]: And, um, the, if anything, the, um...
[41:14.190 --> 41:14.990] [SPEAKER_10]: This is blind faith.
[41:15.150 --> 41:15.490] [SPEAKER_15]: Exactly.
[41:15.670 --> 41:16.330] [SPEAKER_15]: This is...
[41:16.330 --> 41:16.890] [SPEAKER_15]: So it's...
[41:17.350 --> 41:18.290] [SPEAKER_15]: So it's like an insult.
[41:18.510 --> 41:20.630] [SPEAKER_15]: I don't think it's fair to call these people skeptics.
[41:21.090 --> 41:21.490] [SPEAKER_11]: Skeptics...
[41:21.490 --> 41:22.730] [SPEAKER_11]: No, skepticism is part of science.
[41:22.870 --> 41:26.030] [SPEAKER_11]: Skepticism has to be about questioning theories of global warming as well.
[41:26.110 --> 41:26.930] [SPEAKER_11]: You just have to be able to...
[41:26.930 --> 41:27.350] [SPEAKER_11]: And that's...
[41:27.350 --> 41:28.330] [SPEAKER_11]: That's a very good point because...
[41:28.350 --> 41:37.290] [SPEAKER_11]: And the problem is we're not going to have anybody engaging because, frankly, you can't teach science and have it standardized, tested under No Child Left Behind or race to the bottom or whatever we're calling this now.
[41:37.390 --> 41:48.550] [SPEAKER_10]: To get to the stage where something is discussed, it has to go through a whole scientific process where it's put through the ringer and, uh, basically every single question imaginable has already been asked at this point.
[41:48.550 --> 41:50.510] [SPEAKER_11]: And the average human being never gets to see that process.
[41:50.950 --> 41:51.350] [SPEAKER_16]: This...
[41:51.350 --> 41:53.850] [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah, that's actually just what I wanted to bring up.
[41:53.950 --> 41:58.310] [SPEAKER_16]: This, uh, seems to be based on the general public's lack of understanding.
[41:58.690 --> 42:03.850] [SPEAKER_16]: You know, I mean, to say that the scientific community could have some sort of a conspiracy is just...
[42:03.850 --> 42:04.710] [SPEAKER_16]: It's strange.
[42:04.870 --> 42:06.730] [SPEAKER_16]: We're not dealing with some monolithic organization.
[42:06.810 --> 42:08.730] [SPEAKER_16]: You're dealing with a disperse...
[42:08.730 --> 42:10.430] [SPEAKER_16]: But people love to deal with monolithic community.
[42:10.890 --> 42:13.370] [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, how are we to know that we're not dealing with a monolithic organization?
[42:13.370 --> 42:17.330] [SPEAKER_11]: In high school, you get your science textbook, it's given to you, you memorize it, and that's the end of it.
[42:17.350 --> 42:18.710] [SPEAKER_11]: You're not doing scientific inquiry.
[42:18.830 --> 42:20.970] [SPEAKER_11]: We teach science more or less wrong.
[42:21.130 --> 42:23.730] [SPEAKER_11]: I'm not going to blame most science teachers because there's great science teachers out there.
[42:23.830 --> 42:25.910] [SPEAKER_10]: No, I can just believe it because we say so.
[42:26.030 --> 42:27.210] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, that's not the right way to...
[42:27.210 --> 42:28.670] [SPEAKER_10]: You have to question these things.
[42:28.690 --> 42:28.790] [SPEAKER_10]: That's true.
[42:28.910 --> 42:31.510] [SPEAKER_16]: My science teachers did not know...
[42:31.510 --> 42:32.270] [SPEAKER_16]: Oh, boy.
[42:32.650 --> 42:36.210] [SPEAKER_10]: These aren't people who are basically questioning.
[42:36.370 --> 42:39.310] [SPEAKER_10]: They have a position and they're not yielding at all.
[42:39.630 --> 42:40.610] [SPEAKER_12]: But you're also talking about...
[42:40.610 --> 42:42.790] [SPEAKER_12]: These are emails leaked from one research institute.
[42:42.970 --> 42:44.410] [SPEAKER_12]: They're not the only people researching this.
[42:44.490 --> 42:45.990] [SPEAKER_12]: They're not the only people collecting data in the world.
[42:45.990 --> 42:49.810] [SPEAKER_10]: Everybody released their email so we can see what's being said and you'll see that it's really not.
[42:49.930 --> 42:51.170] [SPEAKER_12]: Then it'll be a big global concern.
[42:51.230 --> 42:53.090] [SPEAKER_10]: We want to take phone calls, 212-209-2900.
[42:53.090 --> 42:55.430] [SPEAKER_10]: Please join the conversation because we only have a few minutes left, Rob.
[42:55.570 --> 42:58.310] [SPEAKER_13]: I just have one point I'm not a professional scientist.
[42:58.310 --> 42:59.710] [SPEAKER_13]: I don't have letters after my name.
[42:59.790 --> 42:59.930] [SPEAKER_13]: Really?
[43:00.130 --> 43:01.250] [SPEAKER_13]: But I can encrypt my email.
[43:03.370 --> 43:04.910] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, that's true, too, but do you?
[43:05.010 --> 43:05.310] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[43:06.290 --> 43:07.030] [SPEAKER_10]: How many people...
[43:07.030 --> 43:15.130] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, right now, Scott's honor, how many people have encrypted email that if I was to access your computer right now, I'd be able to not read anything?
[43:16.090 --> 43:17.150] [SPEAKER_10]: Are you raising your hand, Pat?
[43:17.210 --> 43:18.070] [SPEAKER_10]: No, you just told me your ear.
[43:18.070 --> 43:20.550] [SPEAKER_16]: I just don't have any email on my computer, so...
[43:20.550 --> 43:21.270] [SPEAKER_16]: You do so.
[43:21.510 --> 43:22.130] [SPEAKER_10]: Of course you do.
[43:22.310 --> 43:23.290] [SPEAKER_10]: Nobody raised their hand.
[43:23.310 --> 43:24.190] [SPEAKER_10]: I delete things right away.
[43:24.190 --> 43:26.530] [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, not everything, but not everything is sensitive.
[43:26.530 --> 43:28.490] [SPEAKER_12]: Some things are, and those things are...
[43:28.490 --> 43:32.110] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, isn't that a good way to say what's sensitive and what's not sensitive by only encrypting the sensitive stuff?
[43:32.190 --> 43:32.550] [SPEAKER_10]: It's true.
[43:32.750 --> 43:35.010] [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, it makes it a lot easier for the people trying to crack your encryption.
[43:35.150 --> 43:40.690] [SPEAKER_12]: Well, if you trust your encryption, or it also depends on how long it needs to be sensitive for.
[43:40.750 --> 43:45.550] [SPEAKER_12]: If you really want to spend enough time to crack the one or two messages that I have, well, they better be really important.
[43:45.670 --> 43:50.270] [SPEAKER_10]: By default, everything should be encrypted, by default, and that's just not the case now.
[43:50.390 --> 43:50.710] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes, Rob?
[43:51.450 --> 43:55.510] [SPEAKER_13]: I usually don't encrypt my email, but also I'm not working for a major research institute.
[43:55.770 --> 44:02.430] [SPEAKER_10]: But that's exactly why you should encrypt your email, because your private life is just as private as somebody's research.
[44:02.850 --> 44:07.750] [SPEAKER_13]: But if somebody cracked into my inbox right now, what they would find is a bunch of rubbish, because I talk a lot of nonsense.
[44:08.270 --> 44:09.350] [SPEAKER_13]: There's nothing there that's going to...
[44:09.350 --> 44:12.190] [SPEAKER_10]: But think of the time they'd waste trying to track down whatever it is you're up to.
[44:12.310 --> 44:12.730] [SPEAKER_14]: That would be fun.
[44:12.930 --> 44:18.190] [SPEAKER_14]: But these guys work for a major research institute, but what they're doing is ultimately ending up in the public domain.
[44:18.410 --> 44:26.910] [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, yeah, they may or may not care to have their personal barbs read by the people they're made against, but there's no inherent secrets in what they're doing.
[44:27.530 --> 44:32.110] [SPEAKER_13]: That goes back to what I was saying about if you don't believe everyone should see what you're posting to the net, don't.
[44:32.190 --> 44:33.430] [SPEAKER_13]: And an email is a post to the net.
[44:33.530 --> 44:34.670] [SPEAKER_13]: It's not a very secure medium.
[44:34.970 --> 44:36.610] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, then how would you communicate with anybody?
[44:36.890 --> 44:37.730] [SPEAKER_10]: You can't talk on the phone.
[44:38.010 --> 44:39.050] [SPEAKER_13]: PGP is a perfectly secure medium.
[44:39.050 --> 44:41.530] [SPEAKER_13]: If you're at the same institute, go say hi to somebody.
[44:41.590 --> 44:46.210] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, first of all, anything with a password can be broken at some point, especially with humans involved.
[44:46.350 --> 44:48.570] [SPEAKER_10]: So PGP is not the solution.
[44:48.790 --> 44:49.790] [SPEAKER_11]: It stands for pretty good privacy.
[44:49.870 --> 44:50.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, it's not the best.
[44:51.170 --> 44:52.830] [SPEAKER_10]: It's like, you know, okay, right back.
[44:52.970 --> 44:56.690] [SPEAKER_12]: You also have to consider in terms of encrypted email that it's a two-way thing.
[44:56.790 --> 44:58.210] [SPEAKER_12]: The other person has to also have encryption.
[44:58.390 --> 45:09.970] [SPEAKER_12]: So unless you can convince everyone in the world to have public keys that you can then verify is theirs, or at least the people you want to communicate with, it's kind of, you can't put the blame on us for not having everything encrypted.
[45:10.290 --> 45:11.630] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, Pacrat, then we're going to the phones.
[45:12.130 --> 45:17.690] [SPEAKER_00]: Whatever just happened to having a good conversation with somebody, especially when you're talking about something sensitive, don't put it on the net.
[45:17.910 --> 45:18.850] [SPEAKER_00]: It's simple.
[45:19.150 --> 45:19.650] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, yeah.
[45:19.830 --> 45:24.970] [SPEAKER_10]: I think the more of us talking about sensitive things, the better, because that way it makes it all the harder for them to crack down everybody.
[45:25.190 --> 45:26.130] [SPEAKER_10]: That way, them going to the phones.
[45:26.510 --> 45:29.030] [SPEAKER_16]: As we brought up before, this wasn't even really something sensitive.
[45:29.130 --> 45:35.430] [SPEAKER_16]: This was just a personal conversation that's being applied to their work, which is silly.
[45:35.710 --> 45:48.030] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, I'm just saying, people that are hearing about this in the media take everything with a grain of salt, and nothing is that simple, that there's smoking guns all over the place, and things are being disproven because of some massive conspiracy theory.
[45:48.090 --> 45:49.690] [SPEAKER_10]: On TV, that might work, but not in real life.
[45:49.770 --> 45:52.450] [SPEAKER_12]: But sensationalism sells.
[45:52.810 --> 45:53.450] [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, it does.
[45:53.570 --> 45:55.350] [SPEAKER_10]: It certainly does, and we're talking about it quite a lot.
[45:55.350 --> 45:58.470] [SPEAKER_12]: love to have something that they can blow out of proportion, and they get more viewers or readers.
[45:58.570 --> 45:59.170] [SPEAKER_12]: And they have it.
[45:59.290 --> 45:59.810] [SPEAKER_12]: They have it.
[46:00.150 --> 46:01.930] [SPEAKER_10]: All right, 212-209-2900.
[46:02.330 --> 46:02.830] [SPEAKER_10]: Good evening.
[46:02.930 --> 46:03.750] [SPEAKER_10]: You're on Off The Hook.
[46:04.690 --> 46:05.170] [SPEAKER_17]: Hi, guys.
[46:05.430 --> 46:06.090] [SPEAKER_10]: Hi, what's on your mind?
[46:06.450 --> 46:16.370] [SPEAKER_17]: I think you shouldn't poo-poo these emails out of East Anglia so quickly, because there was a lot of stuff that was revealed in them, and that is that records were destroyed.
[46:16.930 --> 46:18.850] [SPEAKER_10]: Name one thing that's why records destroyed, so?
[46:19.070 --> 46:23.730] [SPEAKER_17]: And manipulated data, and yet when you say, well, why would they do this?
[46:23.730 --> 46:27.290] [SPEAKER_17]: Well, there's something going on right now as we speak, called the Copenhagen Conference.
[46:27.510 --> 46:28.250] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, we've heard about it.
[46:28.450 --> 46:37.930] [SPEAKER_17]: Which might turn into Bernie Madoff making him look like a shoplifter, because there's a lot of money and a lot of stake at this, and those people seem to be very, very concerned about this.
[46:38.730 --> 46:43.930] [SPEAKER_17]: So I think this is the case where a whistleblower actually, and again, this is all public data.
[46:43.930 --> 46:45.310] [SPEAKER_17]: I think people should know about this.
[46:45.310 --> 46:46.650] [SPEAKER_17]: I don't know why anything should be hidden.
[46:47.310 --> 46:49.890] [SPEAKER_10]: What is it that people are being hidden from people?
[46:50.450 --> 46:50.890] [SPEAKER_17]: Sorry?
[46:51.090 --> 46:52.150] [SPEAKER_10]: What's being hidden from people?
[46:52.910 --> 47:02.350] [SPEAKER_17]: Well, the fact that a lot of the results they're coming up with were data that they destroyed for some reason, and they don't really have a clear explanation why they did.
[47:02.490 --> 47:04.350] [SPEAKER_17]: Well, I destroy data all the time.
[47:04.510 --> 47:08.630] [SPEAKER_10]: People, scientists, who knows why they're doing things in their own private labs?
[47:08.830 --> 47:19.130] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, basically, you're reading someone's private email and questioning why they do what they do, and I'm sure they can explain it all to us and waste a lot of time, but I don't see a smoking gun here.
[47:19.190 --> 47:21.690] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't see something that proves that global warming is a fantasy.
[47:21.950 --> 47:30.350] [SPEAKER_17]: Well, Manuel, I think we should be inquiring about this, because this will affect us in a big way, and if a lot of it's based on a fraud, then we should know about it.
[47:30.350 --> 47:32.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, but show me the evidence that's actually based on a fraud.
[47:32.890 --> 47:33.770] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't see that anyway.
[47:33.850 --> 47:35.390] [SPEAKER_16]: One thing, who's they?
[47:35.630 --> 47:43.290] [SPEAKER_16]: Are you talking about people from one university, people from another university, the National Institute of Science in the United States?
[47:43.550 --> 47:47.350] [SPEAKER_16]: You know, it's not like there's one single collective they.
[47:47.550 --> 47:56.170] [SPEAKER_16]: You know, who are you talking about, and how is it that everybody else in the scientific community from all the different countries around the world wouldn't notice this, since they're all doing research.
[47:56.370 --> 47:59.430] [SPEAKER_16]: That's what the scientific method is founded on.
[47:59.550 --> 48:04.190] [SPEAKER_17]: But CRU at Efangula was the main hub for a lot of the results that were cut.
[48:04.270 --> 48:06.170] [SPEAKER_17]: This is a very significant place.
[48:06.270 --> 48:06.530] [SPEAKER_17]: How do you know?
[48:06.530 --> 48:07.390] [SPEAKER_17]: Just because it's very remote.
[48:07.630 --> 48:07.770] [SPEAKER_17]: Sorry?
[48:07.890 --> 48:08.570] [SPEAKER_11]: How do you know?
[48:09.610 --> 48:11.630] [SPEAKER_17]: Because a lot of it was based on it.
[48:11.770 --> 48:12.770] [SPEAKER_11]: How do you know?
[48:13.670 --> 48:19.190] [SPEAKER_10]: The point is, you know, whether or not it's a major hub or whatever, the point is we're looking at people's private emails.
[48:19.350 --> 48:29.090] [SPEAKER_10]: People sometimes say things that are immature, or they sometimes take actions that are not necessarily the most professional, even at this radio station sometimes I see behavior like that.
[48:29.250 --> 48:30.810] [SPEAKER_10]: It happens every place.
[48:31.010 --> 48:49.230] [SPEAKER_10]: And you can't simply denounce an entire scientific study that has been going on for decades now and involving millions and millions of people and say that the whole thing is based on some massive conspiracy and fraud and things like that because some people said something that wasn't entirely 100% right.
[48:49.610 --> 48:50.870] [SPEAKER_10]: That's what I'm looking for.
[48:50.870 --> 48:52.350] [SPEAKER_17]: But I'm not saying that at all.
[48:52.470 --> 48:54.110] [SPEAKER_17]: What I'm saying is that there should be more inquiry.
[48:54.270 --> 48:56.450] [SPEAKER_17]: These are people who do not want any more debate.
[48:56.630 --> 48:57.830] [SPEAKER_10]: But there have been debates.
[48:57.990 --> 49:00.470] [SPEAKER_10]: There have been questions and debates for so many years now.
[49:00.690 --> 49:06.470] [SPEAKER_16]: There have literally been hundreds of articles in scientific journals for year after year after year.
[49:06.570 --> 49:10.970] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, what, are we going to go back and question evolution too and simply, you know, every single...
[49:10.970 --> 49:14.250] [SPEAKER_11]: Before you say there's no debates, go and read all that research.
[49:14.430 --> 49:15.730] [SPEAKER_11]: Read reviews of the literature.
[49:15.990 --> 49:16.770] [SPEAKER_11]: That is what's out there.
[49:16.770 --> 49:18.490] [SPEAKER_10]: Maybe the earth isn't really round anymore.
[49:18.930 --> 49:20.330] [SPEAKER_11]: That is where the real information is here.
[49:20.430 --> 49:22.050] [SPEAKER_11]: Do not listen to the journalists at all.
[49:22.110 --> 49:22.530] [SPEAKER_11]: What did Galileo know?
[49:22.690 --> 49:23.370] [SPEAKER_11]: When did he know it?
[49:23.570 --> 49:25.030] [SPEAKER_10]: They're not the ones...
[49:25.030 --> 49:25.310] [SPEAKER_10]: Sorry?
[49:25.690 --> 49:27.050] [SPEAKER_17]: We should not ask any more questions.
[49:27.150 --> 49:28.090] [SPEAKER_11]: No, no, no, no, no, no.
[49:28.230 --> 49:29.430] [SPEAKER_11]: I'm saying go ask your questions.
[49:29.690 --> 49:33.770] [SPEAKER_11]: Ask your questions of the scientific literature because that is where science happens.
[49:34.030 --> 49:35.970] [SPEAKER_11]: Not in journalism, not in politics.
[49:36.230 --> 49:36.710] [SPEAKER_10]: It's all out there.
[49:36.770 --> 49:40.970] [SPEAKER_10]: You just got to read, look at it, and you'll see what has been asked so many, many times.
[49:41.330 --> 49:42.410] [SPEAKER_10]: We've got a moment to have the phone calls.
[49:42.450 --> 49:42.850] [SPEAKER_10]: Go ahead, Derek.
[49:43.450 --> 49:45.210] [SPEAKER_00]: I actually have a friend of mine who studies at Edinburgh.
[49:45.490 --> 49:46.790] [SPEAKER_00]: His name is Matthew Unterman.
[49:46.950 --> 49:49.330] [SPEAKER_00]: He has a book out on climatology studies.
[49:49.550 --> 49:49.910] [SPEAKER_00]: Check it out.
[49:50.310 --> 49:51.170] [SPEAKER_16]: See, that's so true.
[49:51.230 --> 49:58.170] [SPEAKER_16]: A lot of people feel like there's not a lot of discussion going on, but they're getting all their information from these layman news outlets.
[49:58.470 --> 50:02.830] [SPEAKER_16]: Meanwhile, a lot of the information that comes out are on these scientific journals that the general public just doesn't see.
[50:02.910 --> 50:04.950] [SPEAKER_16]: They don't see all this debate that's been going on for so long.
[50:05.030 --> 50:06.530] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, that's all our listeners in on it a little bit more.
[50:06.630 --> 50:06.930] [SPEAKER_10]: Good evening.
[50:07.070 --> 50:07.810] [SPEAKER_10]: You're on Off The Hook.
[50:08.090 --> 50:08.410] [SPEAKER_07]: Hi.
[50:08.590 --> 50:09.250] [SPEAKER_10]: Hi, what's on your mind?
[50:09.990 --> 50:12.490] [SPEAKER_07]: Democracy Now has a nice segment on it.
[50:13.050 --> 50:14.710] [SPEAKER_10]: But we're not We're Off The Hook.
[50:15.650 --> 50:16.170] [SPEAKER_07]: No, no, no.
[50:17.190 --> 50:18.210] [SPEAKER_07]: I know, I know.
[50:18.510 --> 50:18.530] [SPEAKER_07]: Yes.
[50:18.530 --> 50:20.710] [SPEAKER_07]: It has a nice segment on those emails.
[50:21.090 --> 50:21.270] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes.
[50:21.630 --> 50:24.430] [SPEAKER_07]: There's a resident scientist at my house.
[50:25.950 --> 50:27.070] [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, that sounds serious.
[50:27.530 --> 50:29.190] [SPEAKER_07]: And they don't make generalizations.
[50:29.470 --> 50:29.730] [SPEAKER_10]: Uh-huh.
[50:29.990 --> 50:35.730] [SPEAKER_07]: And I think 2,000 UN scientists putting together blah, blah, blah.
[50:36.130 --> 50:37.830] [SPEAKER_10]: That's one hell of a conspiracy, isn't it?
[50:38.090 --> 50:38.170] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[50:38.470 --> 50:47.490] [SPEAKER_07]: I wish to say my concern about that Google image, I think in the in terms of mistaken identity and mistakes.
[50:48.090 --> 50:51.290] [SPEAKER_07]: When I Google my own name, yes, sometimes I do that.
[50:51.470 --> 50:51.690] [SPEAKER_07]: Uh-oh.
[50:51.750 --> 50:58.710] [SPEAKER_07]: And hit images, there's stuff that only vaguely, weirdly, wildly relates.
[50:59.010 --> 51:00.030] [SPEAKER_07]: And I'll listen off here.
[51:00.190 --> 51:00.370] [SPEAKER_10]: Bye.
[51:00.370 --> 51:00.630] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[51:01.170 --> 51:01.790] [SPEAKER_10]: Go ahead, Reddick.
[51:01.830 --> 51:04.250] [SPEAKER_12]: Well, in terms of the image search, we're not actually talking...
[51:04.250 --> 51:08.670] [SPEAKER_12]: That's one thing, you know, searching Google, searching Google image search, you're basically...
[51:08.670 --> 51:14.610] [SPEAKER_12]: what they're doing is looking for the text that you're searching for on pages and finding images that are on those pages.
[51:14.710 --> 51:16.410] [SPEAKER_12]: Also, this is a little different.
[51:16.510 --> 51:20.070] [SPEAKER_12]: This is talking about giving them an image and having them identify the image.
[51:20.110 --> 51:21.130] [SPEAKER_12]: So it's a little bit different.
[51:21.290 --> 51:28.910] [SPEAKER_12]: So it'd be like saying, you know, like we said before, putting a picture of the Golden Gate Bridge into Google and it telling you this is the Golden Gate Bridge.
[51:29.090 --> 51:30.870] [SPEAKER_12]: It is so-and-so high and it is so-and-so, you know.
[51:30.890 --> 51:32.650] [SPEAKER_11]: Can we talk about the technology behind that for a second?
[51:32.670 --> 51:34.810] [SPEAKER_11]: So how does somebody search and match an image?
[51:34.890 --> 51:36.530] [SPEAKER_11]: Because I think a lot of people maybe aren't clear on that.
[51:37.430 --> 51:38.230] [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, like my...
[51:38.230 --> 51:40.630] [SPEAKER_16]: It would have to be processing the image in some way.
[51:40.710 --> 51:43.590] [SPEAKER_16]: They'd have to have some sort of algorithm that's capable of analyzing the image.
[51:43.770 --> 51:45.510] [SPEAKER_11]: They're looking at the numbers that make up each pixel, right?
[51:45.650 --> 51:46.530] [SPEAKER_11]: Each, like, each red...
[51:46.530 --> 51:57.810] [SPEAKER_10]: Could I imagine it's similar to the way that a song is identified just by simply not listening with the speaker but actually putting a CD, like CDDB.
[51:57.950 --> 52:00.310] [SPEAKER_10]: You put a CD into your computer and it looks at it.
[52:00.390 --> 52:05.110] [SPEAKER_10]: It's able to make some kind of algorithm based on the time and the tracks and say that's what this is.
[52:05.110 --> 52:06.450] [SPEAKER_10]: Same basic thing with photographs.
[52:06.630 --> 52:16.130] [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, computer vision is a heavily researched topic but basically you have to find some way to filter down to some set of, I would assume, images that you identify against and then going further into that.
[52:16.230 --> 52:20.130] [SPEAKER_12]: So there's probably some kind of fingerprinting algorithm that gets you close and then, you know...
[52:20.130 --> 52:21.310] [SPEAKER_12]: But it's very...
[52:21.310 --> 52:25.170] [SPEAKER_12]: It's a hard problem and so the fact that they're trying to do it is kind of impressive.
[52:25.290 --> 52:25.930] [SPEAKER_10]: Let's take another phone call.
[52:25.970 --> 52:26.350] [SPEAKER_10]: Good evening.
[52:26.690 --> 52:27.730] [SPEAKER_10]: You are on off the hook.
[52:28.430 --> 52:29.150] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, finally.
[52:29.310 --> 52:29.810] [SPEAKER_06]: Hi, guys.
[52:29.990 --> 52:30.110] [SPEAKER_10]: Hi.
[52:30.130 --> 52:30.570] [SPEAKER_10]: What's on your mind?
[52:31.130 --> 52:33.230] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, it's on Democracy Now tonight.
[52:33.450 --> 52:33.710] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, boy.
[52:33.730 --> 52:43.110] [SPEAKER_06]: There's a document that was leaked from the council, believe it or not, the Danish government exactly where they are having the conference.
[52:43.310 --> 52:45.010] [SPEAKER_10]: This is a different leak I think you're talking about.
[52:45.070 --> 52:45.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, a different leak.
[52:45.870 --> 52:52.550] [SPEAKER_06]: But what I'm saying to you is the secret was that the G8 have planned to lie to the rest of the developed world.
[52:52.550 --> 52:54.230] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, that's a whole other scandal, but...
[52:54.230 --> 52:54.490] [SPEAKER_06]: No, no, no.
[52:54.590 --> 52:55.910] [SPEAKER_06]: But I'm not talking about that.
[52:56.090 --> 53:02.490] [SPEAKER_06]: I'm talking about how easy it is to keep knowledge secret, particularly when it's intellectual.
[53:02.830 --> 53:04.790] [SPEAKER_06]: See, they were talking about intellectual property.
[53:05.010 --> 53:11.210] [SPEAKER_06]: The developing countries have a hold on high technology vis-à-vis global warming.
[53:11.430 --> 53:13.830] [SPEAKER_06]: Global warming was the issue tonight.
[53:14.210 --> 53:14.990] [SPEAKER_06]: If you Google...
[53:14.990 --> 53:15.470] [SPEAKER_06]: Not Google.
[53:15.710 --> 53:27.250] [SPEAKER_06]: If you print out the rest of Democracy Now, you will hear the pan-African people that will walk out in protest if they are behind the man...
[53:27.250 --> 53:28.070] [SPEAKER_06]: And here's the name.
[53:28.070 --> 53:40.090] [SPEAKER_06]: His name is Lumumba Stanislaus D-I-A Ping P-I-N-G This is the man that would walk out.
[53:40.230 --> 53:45.010] [SPEAKER_06]: And the man in America that didn't go to Copenhagen said the whole thing is rigged.
[53:45.070 --> 53:46.030] [SPEAKER_06]: I won't go to it.
[53:46.150 --> 53:49.010] [SPEAKER_06]: So tonight was the proof that Professor...
[53:49.010 --> 53:49.610] [SPEAKER_06]: Excuse me.
[53:49.710 --> 53:51.690] [SPEAKER_06]: The scientist at NASA whose...
[53:51.690 --> 53:54.610] [SPEAKER_06]: All of whose arguments were didact...
[53:54.610 --> 54:01.250] [SPEAKER_06]: You know when they docking out the real scientific documents, this is what is done with the evidence of global warming.
[54:01.510 --> 54:04.810] [SPEAKER_06]: The Bush administration did it and the Obama is continuing it.
[54:05.170 --> 54:06.830] [SPEAKER_06]: So only Hansen...
[54:06.830 --> 54:07.970] [SPEAKER_06]: You know who Hansen was.
[54:08.150 --> 54:11.090] [SPEAKER_06]: He's the fellow that was the whistleblower at NASA.
[54:11.870 --> 54:14.430] [SPEAKER_06]: It's the NASA information that the U.S.
[54:14.810 --> 54:19.030] [SPEAKER_06]: and the other northern countries want to keep priority only in their hands.
[54:19.170 --> 54:24.370] [SPEAKER_06]: And at this late date, nobody wants all that technology in those countries' names.
[54:24.370 --> 54:26.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, we're going to move on to another call.
[54:26.950 --> 54:27.670] [SPEAKER_06]: Thank you for that.
[54:27.790 --> 54:28.590] [SPEAKER_10]: No problem, no problem.
[54:29.470 --> 54:36.290] [SPEAKER_10]: I think it just goes to show that, yeah, we have to ask a lot of questions and look at the facts and look at what other people are saying and things like that.
[54:36.410 --> 54:37.290] [SPEAKER_10]: All kinds of conspiracies.
[54:37.410 --> 54:37.910] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes, Mike, quickly.
[54:37.930 --> 54:46.430] [SPEAKER_14]: She raises a good point that there's these accusations of censoring information that would allegedly prove global warming doesn't exist.
[54:46.830 --> 54:47.490] [SPEAKER_14]: But the U.S.
[54:47.590 --> 54:57.490] [SPEAKER_14]: government for a long time had a policy of preventing its own scientists from speaking out in favor of the notion that global warming does exist.
[54:58.130 --> 55:04.870] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, that's a conspiracy that actually did happen and obviously it was uncovered with evidence, not simply because...
[55:04.870 --> 55:07.090] [SPEAKER_14]: By brave people speaking out against it.
[55:07.230 --> 55:07.390] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[55:08.190 --> 55:14.210] [SPEAKER_14]: And if there were some global conspiracy to forge all the global warming data, it would have to be such a large conspiracy.
[55:14.390 --> 55:17.830] [SPEAKER_14]: Surely one of the conspirators would have got a book deal to...
[55:17.830 --> 55:19.190] [SPEAKER_10]: All right, let's take one more phone call.
[55:19.430 --> 55:19.890] [SPEAKER_10]: And good evening.
[55:20.070 --> 55:20.730] [SPEAKER_10]: You're on Off The Hook.
[55:24.750 --> 55:25.450] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, you know what?
[55:25.450 --> 55:27.610] [SPEAKER_10]: I just don't have the mood for whatever it is you're going to say.
[55:27.670 --> 55:27.890] [SPEAKER_10]: Good evening.
[55:28.230 --> 55:29.110] [SPEAKER_10]: You're on Off The Hook.
[55:29.750 --> 55:30.650] [SPEAKER_08]: Hi, how are you?
[55:30.710 --> 55:31.350] [SPEAKER_10]: Hi, what's on your mind?
[55:31.650 --> 55:31.830] [SPEAKER_10]: Quickly.
[55:32.090 --> 55:32.910] [SPEAKER_08]: Very simple, actually.
[55:33.010 --> 55:34.450] [SPEAKER_08]: I think you guys are dropping the ball on this.
[55:34.650 --> 55:43.190] [SPEAKER_08]: One of the main controversies about leaked emails was the raw data for the modeling was dismissed, was mysteriously disappeared.
[55:43.730 --> 55:45.870] [SPEAKER_08]: Forget about it, or they don't like each other.
[55:46.130 --> 55:48.490] [SPEAKER_08]: The real raw data for the modeling...
[55:48.490 --> 55:52.590] [SPEAKER_10]: For the modeling of all global warming everywhere for one particular experiment?
[55:52.850 --> 55:52.930] [SPEAKER_08]: No, no, no.
[55:52.990 --> 55:53.350] [SPEAKER_08]: I said something.
[55:53.990 --> 55:55.370] [SPEAKER_08]: Global warming exists.
[55:55.910 --> 55:58.590] [SPEAKER_08]: Anthropomorgic, meaning created by it.
[55:59.070 --> 56:05.010] [SPEAKER_08]: If you got rid of the raw data of your own research, you cannot prove it to anybody else.
[56:05.190 --> 56:06.630] [SPEAKER_08]: Nobody else can test your research.
[56:06.630 --> 56:09.670] [SPEAKER_10]: But what was this actual data that they got rid of?
[56:10.130 --> 56:11.270] [SPEAKER_08]: That's why he resigned.
[56:11.550 --> 56:17.510] [SPEAKER_08]: The actual raw data for his modeling at the head of the universe of Anglia, whatever it was.
[56:17.610 --> 56:21.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, but this is just one experiment or all experiments?
[56:21.830 --> 56:23.710] [SPEAKER_08]: No, nobody says cold warming does not exist.
[56:23.890 --> 56:25.110] [SPEAKER_08]: I agree 100%.
[56:25.110 --> 56:27.870] [SPEAKER_10]: So basically, you have a scientist that did something unprofessional.
[56:28.090 --> 56:28.350] [SPEAKER_08]: No, no, no.
[56:28.450 --> 56:30.270] [SPEAKER_08]: We're just talking about specifically that.
[56:30.470 --> 56:32.790] [SPEAKER_08]: His raw data, he refuses to resist.
[56:32.990 --> 56:35.250] [SPEAKER_08]: So all his data should be eliminated.
[56:35.250 --> 56:38.210] [SPEAKER_08]: And he was one of the lead authors of these studies.
[56:38.510 --> 56:40.290] [SPEAKER_08]: You can't just dismiss that.
[56:40.390 --> 56:44.190] [SPEAKER_08]: If you want to know why certain governments want to promote it, it's cap and trade.
[56:44.350 --> 56:50.690] [SPEAKER_10]: What I'm dismissing is simply the conclusions that so many people are reaching that this proves that global warming doesn't exist.
[56:51.330 --> 56:51.970] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, so...
[56:51.970 --> 56:53.550] [SPEAKER_04]: No, no, it definitely exists.
[56:53.730 --> 57:00.850] [SPEAKER_10]: Right, if somebody's experiments are found to be fraudulent based on something that was said, yeah, obviously that's something that you should look at and pay critical attention to.
[57:01.210 --> 57:02.670] [SPEAKER_10]: We're not saying not to do that.
[57:02.670 --> 57:07.790] [SPEAKER_10]: We're saying that that's not conclude that everything is simply not true because of that.
[57:07.810 --> 57:08.170] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, come on.
[57:08.250 --> 57:08.950] [SPEAKER_04]: That's plain silly.
[57:09.530 --> 57:09.890] [SPEAKER_04]: Everybody...
[57:10.470 --> 57:12.370] [SPEAKER_04]: Unfortunately, we're out of time.
[57:12.830 --> 57:13.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, we...
[57:13.410 --> 57:14.650] [SPEAKER_10]: Thank you for calling me.
[57:14.950 --> 57:15.510] [SPEAKER_10]: We're out of time.
[57:15.590 --> 57:17.190] [SPEAKER_10]: We could go on for hours and hours about this.
[57:17.710 --> 57:20.290] [SPEAKER_10]: Write to us, oth@2600.com.
[57:20.430 --> 57:24.870] [SPEAKER_10]: We'd like to hear from you and I'm sure we'll hear all kinds of things about this.
[57:34.090 --> 57:36.430] [SPEAKER_10]: And have a good evening.
[57:36.430 --> 57:37.590] [SPEAKER_10]: We'll see you next week.
[57:37.630 --> 57:39.010] [SPEAKER_10]: oth@2600.com.