Off The Hook - 2010-09-29

[00:00.000 --> 00:02.940]  [SPEAKER_00]: As always, we'll need your support as volunteers.
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[00:26.860 --> 00:32.620]  [SPEAKER_00]: Volunteers are needed 24-7 during the drive, but especially during the hours from 6 a.m.
[00:32.980 --> 00:33.760]  [SPEAKER_00]: to 10 a.m.
[00:34.180 --> 00:36.000]  [SPEAKER_00]: We look forward to seeing you.
[00:36.800 --> 00:37.540]  [SPEAKER_00]: Cease it with you.
[00:44.800 --> 00:45.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's 7 o'clock.
[00:45.900 --> 00:47.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: You're listening to WBAI New York.
[00:47.620 --> 00:49.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: Time once again for Off The Hook.
[01:00.790 --> 01:02.710]  [SPEAKER_11]: I cut myself while shaving.
[01:03.270 --> 01:05.310]  [SPEAKER_11]: Now I can't make a cough.
[01:06.130 --> 01:08.070]  [SPEAKER_11]: We couldn't get much worse.
[01:10.480 --> 01:13.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: Put on diddly bomb for the best, expect the worst.
[01:14.200 --> 01:16.040]  [SPEAKER_11]: I hope that's understood.
[01:16.240 --> 01:17.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: On diddly bomb!
[02:12.240 --> 02:13.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: And good evening to everybody.
[02:13.340 --> 02:14.500]  [SPEAKER_08]: The program is Off The Hook.
[02:14.550 --> 02:15.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you.
[02:15.990 --> 02:17.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: Joined tonight by Mike.
[02:17.940 --> 02:18.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: Hi.
[02:18.560 --> 02:19.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: Redhack.
[02:19.140 --> 02:19.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hello.
[02:19.670 --> 02:20.080]  [SPEAKER_08]: Dotret.
[02:20.360 --> 02:20.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: Hey.
[02:20.820 --> 02:21.260]  [SPEAKER_08]: Rob T.
[02:21.380 --> 02:21.820]  [SPEAKER_08]: Firefly.
[02:22.000 --> 02:22.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: Good evening.
[02:22.520 --> 02:22.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: Jim.
[02:23.060 --> 02:23.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: Hello.
[02:23.780 --> 02:24.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: And Bernie S.
[02:24.620 --> 02:25.320]  [SPEAKER_08]: down there in Philadelphia.
[02:26.200 --> 02:27.240]  [SPEAKER_05]: Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:27.820 --> 02:29.050]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, we had quite a weekend.
[02:29.680 --> 02:30.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: Most of us were over.
[02:30.720 --> 02:35.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: In fact, everybody in the room except, and on the phone except for Redhack, was down at the Maker Faire over the weekend.
[02:37.050 --> 02:40.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: And do we all want to tell him what an amazing time he missed?
[02:40.220 --> 02:40.580]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[02:40.760 --> 02:40.960]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[02:41.840 --> 02:43.320]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, we all want to rub it in a little bit.
[02:43.380 --> 02:44.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: It was awesome.
[02:44.280 --> 02:45.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: It was so much fun.
[02:45.380 --> 02:52.300]  [SPEAKER_08]: First of all, I hadn't been to that part of the world, that part of Queens, the Old World's Fair stomping grounds, since I was a little kid.
[02:52.920 --> 02:55.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: And it was just a really nice place to be.
[02:56.000 --> 03:01.880]  [SPEAKER_08]: Especially when you crowd it with tens of thousands of people who are all into technology and experimentation and various things like that.
[03:03.380 --> 03:03.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: I don't know.
[03:04.180 --> 03:05.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: Where do we begin?
[03:05.340 --> 03:08.080]  [SPEAKER_08]: We were over there with the 2600 van, met a lot of listeners.
[03:08.180 --> 03:10.880]  [SPEAKER_08]: A lot of people found out about the Maker Faire through the show, which is great.
[03:11.640 --> 03:14.020]  [SPEAKER_08]: A lot of kids walking around, playing with things.
[03:14.900 --> 03:16.920]  [SPEAKER_08]: Darryl, what were some of the things that you remember seeing?
[03:17.460 --> 03:19.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: I remember seeing a lot.
[03:19.800 --> 03:22.420]  [SPEAKER_01]: I was almost overwhelmed by how much I saw.
[03:22.660 --> 03:23.220]  [SPEAKER_08]: A lot of what, though?
[03:23.440 --> 03:26.200]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, for instance, there was a very loud noise, right?
[03:26.400 --> 03:26.440]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, yes.
[03:26.440 --> 03:35.660]  [SPEAKER_01]: And so, on my way to discover what this really loud noise is, I go past some barber with electrified scissors who's playing music while cutting people's hair and passing...
[03:35.660 --> 03:36.380]  [SPEAKER_01]: I didn't understand that.
[03:36.540 --> 03:37.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay, yeah.
[03:37.340 --> 03:37.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: There was...
[03:37.860 --> 03:38.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: What was that?
[03:38.280 --> 03:38.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: Was that a robot?
[03:38.840 --> 03:39.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: Or what was going on there?
[03:39.700 --> 03:40.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, that was a human being.
[03:41.020 --> 03:46.000]  [SPEAKER_01]: And he had scissors that basically were plugged into, you know, with the lectures, plugged into an amp.
[03:46.200 --> 03:48.180]  [SPEAKER_01]: And it had this ominous sound to it.
[03:48.180 --> 03:50.960]  [SPEAKER_01]: And every time he cut a piece of hair, the tone would change.
[03:50.960 --> 03:53.960]  [SPEAKER_01]: And the person was sitting in the chair with, like, tape over their eyes and their mouth.
[03:54.100 --> 03:54.940]  [SPEAKER_01]: It was supposed to be a really creepy looking thing.
[03:54.940 --> 03:57.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: I was wondering why they had tape over their eyes and their mouths.
[03:57.400 --> 03:59.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: That was kind of strange and a little frightening.
[03:59.600 --> 04:00.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: Part of the artistic choice.
[04:00.760 --> 04:01.760]  [SPEAKER_01]: But they seemed very comfortable.
[04:01.880 --> 04:04.860]  [SPEAKER_01]: They looked, like, you know, underneath all that, they were perfectly...
[04:04.860 --> 04:07.460]  [SPEAKER_08]: All kinds of weird vehicles and demonstrations.
[04:07.460 --> 04:08.500]  [SPEAKER_08]: Rob, what do you remember?
[04:08.580 --> 04:09.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: Anything in particular?
[04:09.360 --> 04:11.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, there were some very interesting vehicles.
[04:11.260 --> 04:14.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: There was what was basically a carousel, but rocket-powered.
[04:15.120 --> 04:15.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yes.
[04:15.540 --> 04:16.090]  [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, boy.
[04:16.180 --> 04:18.140]  [SPEAKER_08]: That was the thing that made so much noise.
[04:18.230 --> 04:18.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: You could hear this.
[04:18.940 --> 04:20.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: It sounded like a jet engine.
[04:20.470 --> 04:21.590]  [SPEAKER_08]: I guess it was a jet engine.
[04:21.590 --> 04:22.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: It was two jet engines.
[04:22.500 --> 04:23.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: Each horse had their own.
[04:23.600 --> 04:24.160]  [SPEAKER_08]: So how...
[04:24.160 --> 04:24.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay, how exactly...
[04:24.980 --> 04:28.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: You saw people going around in circles tied to this thing.
[04:28.400 --> 04:29.260]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's kind of hard to describe.
[04:29.260 --> 04:31.970]  [SPEAKER_08]: They were up in the air going really fast in circles.
[04:32.180 --> 04:34.090]  [SPEAKER_08]: But it made the sound of a jet engine.
[04:34.090 --> 04:35.970]  [SPEAKER_08]: And it was really kind of frightening to see.
[04:36.500 --> 04:37.500]  [SPEAKER_08]: What was going on?
[04:37.590 --> 04:38.590]  [SPEAKER_08]: What was the principle involved there?
[04:38.710 --> 04:43.230]  [SPEAKER_07]: The principle was you would get on what was basically a big metal horse with a jet engine in the back.
[04:43.280 --> 04:48.920]  [SPEAKER_07]: And the engines would send the carousel spinning to the point where the centrifugal force would actually...
[04:48.920 --> 04:51.180]  [SPEAKER_07]: These were connected at the top on a hinge.
[04:51.350 --> 04:54.760]  [SPEAKER_07]: And it would actually draw you basically parallel to the ground.
[04:55.650 --> 04:59.660]  [SPEAKER_07]: And you would look down, I guess, and see the outside world spinning around you.
[04:59.660 --> 05:01.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: And it was this great...
[05:01.020 --> 05:02.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: And there was a lot of fire involved, apparently.
[05:03.280 --> 05:04.090]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, when it stopped.
[05:04.100 --> 05:05.540]  [SPEAKER_08]: When it stopped, there was fire involved.
[05:05.740 --> 05:05.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yes.
[05:05.860 --> 05:08.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: When the engines turned off, then you'd see flames coming out the back of these things.
[05:09.210 --> 05:09.540]  [SPEAKER_08]: You'd see jets of flame.
[05:09.730 --> 05:14.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: So this is basically a homemade version of an amusement park ride that...
[05:14.710 --> 05:17.900]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, I've ridden on something like that where it spins around very fast.
[05:18.230 --> 05:21.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: And then, you know, in the version I went on, it kind of went vertical.
[05:21.920 --> 05:24.360]  [SPEAKER_12]: And then you would be upside down because it would be spinning you.
[05:24.540 --> 05:25.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: This one didn't...
[05:25.300 --> 05:27.540]  [SPEAKER_08]: I'll bet the one you went on didn't say, this ride will kill you.
[05:28.220 --> 05:32.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: No, it didn't because probably it had some sort of safety considerations taken into account.
[05:32.640 --> 05:36.180]  [SPEAKER_08]: I'm sure they had safety considerations here, but it was also a bit of fun, too.
[05:36.260 --> 05:38.140]  [SPEAKER_08]: They crossed out the word will and put may instead.
[05:38.580 --> 05:39.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: So, yeah.
[05:39.580 --> 05:42.720]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, I don't think your average carnival ride is on fire when you're riding it.
[05:42.920 --> 05:44.400]  [SPEAKER_08]: No, but fire is so cool.
[05:44.640 --> 05:44.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: It is.
[05:45.360 --> 05:46.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's just...
[05:46.000 --> 05:51.220]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's great to see people just sort of, I don't know, absorbing all this technology and experimentation.
[05:51.300 --> 05:54.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's sort of what the whole maker universe is all about.
[05:54.280 --> 05:57.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: And it connects so well with the hacker universe.
[05:57.480 --> 06:01.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: And it's really a good combination, I think, when that happens.
[06:01.570 --> 06:12.140]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, talking about carnival type things, one of the things I had to pass through on my way over to that, you know, rocket pony thing was the human-sized mousetrap game.
[06:12.280 --> 06:13.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay, you know, I never got to see that.
[06:13.640 --> 06:16.420]  [SPEAKER_08]: What exactly was involved with the human-sized mousetrap?
[06:17.740 --> 06:27.240]  [SPEAKER_01]: Basically, it's an extremely large version of the board game, where you have to go through these various tasks, and there's these traps, and these giant...
[06:27.240 --> 06:28.760]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's really hard to describe.
[06:28.880 --> 06:32.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: If you've never seen it, I'd say just Google mousetrap and look at the layout of the board.
[06:32.840 --> 06:33.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[06:33.840 --> 06:34.340]  [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead, Barney.
[06:34.840 --> 06:51.950]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, as you pointed out, it's a board game using kinetic energy in a sort of Rue Goldberg kind of way, where a ball bearing goes down all these spirals and tubes and down steps, and instead of a ball bearing, in this case, it was a bowling ball.
[06:52.160 --> 06:53.710]  [SPEAKER_05]: And this was a huge contraption.
[06:53.830 --> 06:56.710]  [SPEAKER_05]: This guy spent 15 years building, involved...
[06:56.710 --> 06:58.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: He spent 15 years building this?
[06:58.640 --> 06:59.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: How did he even know there was going to be a Maker Faire?
[06:59.980 --> 07:02.400]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, I mean, it was a project.
[07:02.570 --> 07:05.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: It wasn't designed for Maker Faire, but he brought it to the Maker Faire to demonstrate this thing.
[07:06.080 --> 07:06.600]  [SPEAKER_05]: It was amazing.
[07:06.880 --> 07:14.580]  [SPEAKER_05]: And as a bowling ball goes through all these circles and hoops and triggering things and making things jump up in the air, the final thing is that...
[07:14.580 --> 07:20.220]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, in a mousetrap game, a cage drops on a plastic mouse, and then you won when you caught the mouse.
[07:20.220 --> 07:30.380]  [SPEAKER_05]: In this case, they had like a two or three ton safe that was cranked up like 30 feet up in the air and dropped onto an old New York City taxi cab.
[07:30.480 --> 07:38.300]  [SPEAKER_05]: Now, Dan Kaminsky and I were hand-selected to crank this safe using a winch way up in the air.
[07:38.400 --> 07:42.340]  [SPEAKER_05]: And as we're cranking it, there's smoke coming out of the winch because there's some serious friction going on.
[07:42.450 --> 07:44.450]  [SPEAKER_05]: And then we were shooed out of the safety area.
[07:44.860 --> 07:45.260]  [SPEAKER_05]: Wow.
[07:45.260 --> 07:48.570]  [SPEAKER_05]: And the bowling ball was launched, and it went down through all these circles and arrows and things.
[07:48.620 --> 07:51.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: And then, bang, the safe dropped on the taxi cab.
[07:52.040 --> 07:53.330]  [SPEAKER_05]: And it was really cool.
[07:53.330 --> 07:57.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now, I'm a little concerned that it was a checkered cab that they dropped it on, because I think those should be preserved.
[07:57.900 --> 08:01.420]  [SPEAKER_08]: But you tell me it wasn't one of the real genuine ones.
[08:01.710 --> 08:03.040]  [SPEAKER_05]: No, I would have been upset by that, too.
[08:03.140 --> 08:09.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: It was just a regular, you know, more late-model sedan type with the checkers on it, with the checker company.
[08:09.520 --> 08:12.900]  [SPEAKER_05]: But it wasn't the checker motor company, you know, just checker cab company.
[08:12.950 --> 08:15.880]  [SPEAKER_05]: It would have been cooler to have like an old police car or something, but whatever.
[08:16.000 --> 08:16.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: Or even a new police car.
[08:16.950 --> 08:17.580]  [SPEAKER_08]: No, no, no.
[08:18.460 --> 08:19.160]  [SPEAKER_08]: Although, no.
[08:20.360 --> 08:23.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, it was definitely a lot of fun to be had.
[08:23.800 --> 08:24.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: Mike, you were there, too.
[08:24.460 --> 08:24.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: What do you think?
[08:24.980 --> 08:26.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, there was a lot of stuff there.
[08:26.900 --> 08:34.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: It was just, you'd think you'd explored the whole thing, and then you'd go around a corner or into a building, and there would be a whole floor of people with projects that they'd made.
[08:34.920 --> 08:35.570]  [SPEAKER_02]: Did you go inside?
[08:35.760 --> 08:36.570]  [SPEAKER_02]: I did go inside.
[08:36.620 --> 08:37.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, I went inside.
[08:37.830 --> 08:39.330]  [SPEAKER_08]: I waited until Sunday to go inside.
[08:39.540 --> 08:41.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I found the Architag people.
[08:42.330 --> 08:44.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: These are the people that make music with Tesla coils.
[08:45.380 --> 08:48.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: I think, Rob, you can probably explain the principle behind that better than I can.
[08:49.300 --> 08:50.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's a really cool sounding.
[08:50.500 --> 08:51.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: We played it last week.
[08:51.500 --> 08:52.280]  [SPEAKER_07]: It is very cool.
[08:52.780 --> 08:56.660]  [SPEAKER_07]: Architag, they have these two big homemade... well, more than two.
[08:56.780 --> 08:57.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: I think they had four at this show.
[08:57.800 --> 08:58.180]  [SPEAKER_07]: Four, yeah.
[08:58.480 --> 08:59.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: Two large ones and two smaller ones.
[09:00.000 --> 09:07.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: And Tesla coils basically generate these bolts of plasma that shoot around to wherever you direct them.
[09:07.210 --> 09:17.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: And Architag, as I think we explained a bit last week, their Tesla coils actually vibrate the air and resonate and make different notes and sounds and connect it to their synthesizers.
[09:17.720 --> 09:19.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: So they actually play music with these.
[09:19.840 --> 09:29.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: And while you're listening to the music that this raw plasma shooting through the air is making, you're watching these bolts shoot around these performers who are making it happen.
[09:29.780 --> 09:33.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: And sometimes around other hapless victims that they happen to yank in.
[09:33.960 --> 09:40.580]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, okay, that's interesting because we almost had Joe DiPrima, one of the people that is behind this from Austin, Texas, on the show last week.
[09:40.580 --> 09:51.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: We missed connections, but I tracked him down on Sunday and he had three people with him and I gave them each a Tesla bill because we have Tesla bills from Serbia.
[09:51.300 --> 09:53.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: It all ties together so beautifully, doesn't it?
[09:53.940 --> 09:59.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: Nikola Tesla is, of course, on the 100 dinar note in Serbia today.
[09:59.480 --> 10:03.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: And it's incredibly popular with hackers and makers and technology people.
[10:03.900 --> 10:05.220]  [SPEAKER_08]: So they were thrilled to get this.
[10:05.340 --> 10:10.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: And they said, come back for the show at 4.30 and we'll have a surprise for you of some sort.
[10:10.420 --> 10:17.020]  [SPEAKER_08]: When I walked in, I knew something was up when he, from stage, said, okay, that guy just walked in right now, you come up to the stage.
[10:17.300 --> 10:23.180]  [SPEAKER_08]: So I got put inside the Faraday cage.
[10:23.460 --> 10:33.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: And honestly, I've seen these things in the past, but I never actually knew what would be happening if somebody was actually inside that, if I was the person who was actually inside it.
[10:34.000 --> 10:40.160]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I was a little bit, a little bit, I don't know, kind of uneasy about what might happen.
[10:40.340 --> 10:42.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: I didn't know what I was supposed to do or what I wasn't supposed to do.
[10:42.520 --> 10:47.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: And as they're closing the door to the cage, they say, now, naturally, don't put your finger here.
[10:48.800 --> 10:54.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: I really, you know, I wasn't about to stick my hand out the cage, but still, I'd like to know where should I not put my finger exactly?
[10:54.560 --> 10:57.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: And what's the worst thing that could possibly happen to me if I do?
[10:58.320 --> 11:03.580]  [SPEAKER_08]: Who, who would like to describe what it was that I was subjected to right there on stage while all of this was happening?
[11:03.840 --> 11:05.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, it was the Peter Gunn theme, that much I remember.
[11:06.100 --> 11:07.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay, that was, I could do that.
[11:08.020 --> 11:13.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, and there were basically these bolts of plasma shooting all around this cage that you were haplessly locked inside.
[11:14.020 --> 11:18.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now, when you say bolts of plasma, that sounds rather not dangerous.
[11:18.660 --> 11:22.780]  [SPEAKER_08]: When you say bolts of electricity, though, lightning strikes, that sounds a little bit more...
[11:22.780 --> 11:24.360]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, it's lightning, basically.
[11:24.360 --> 11:27.260]  [SPEAKER_07]: And, yeah, it was very close to you.
[11:27.520 --> 11:27.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh-huh.
[11:28.080 --> 11:29.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, it's all the same thing.
[11:29.400 --> 11:31.220]  [SPEAKER_01]: Lightning, you know, that's what was shooting at him.
[11:31.320 --> 11:34.780]  [SPEAKER_01]: But, you know, what makes lightning visible and glow is plasma.
[11:34.940 --> 11:36.680]  [SPEAKER_01]: The electricity's heating up the air.
[11:36.920 --> 11:41.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: So were these bolts of lightning hitting the cage, or were they just flying around you?
[11:41.240 --> 11:42.300]  [SPEAKER_08]: I think they were hitting the cage.
[11:42.340 --> 11:42.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: You guys tell me.
[11:43.020 --> 11:43.500]  [SPEAKER_08]: You were watching.
[11:43.800 --> 11:47.220]  [SPEAKER_07]: The cage, I think, was wired to actually ground out the lightning, so...
[11:47.220 --> 11:48.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay, that's the purpose of the Faraday cage.
[11:48.680 --> 11:49.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's the purpose of the Faraday cage.
[11:49.800 --> 11:54.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: So the lightning was already attracted to the cage, and you happened to be locked inside it.
[11:55.000 --> 11:57.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: If I had stuck my hand through the cage, what could have happened to me?
[11:58.360 --> 11:59.220]  [SPEAKER_07]: I do not know.
[11:59.340 --> 12:01.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay, this is for all the kids out there playing with Faraday cages right now.
[12:02.520 --> 12:04.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: You know, I'd just like to tell people what they shouldn't do.
[12:05.040 --> 12:07.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, at the very least, your hand would burn.
[12:07.140 --> 12:12.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think the risk is not playing with Faraday cages, but perhaps playing with Tesla coils and Faraday cages.
[12:12.560 --> 12:12.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, yeah.
[12:14.080 --> 12:15.880]  [SPEAKER_12]: Probably you would have been shocked, I would assume.
[12:16.120 --> 12:21.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: And then you would have grounded out the lightning, which would have not been good, because if it goes across your heart, then your heart stops and you die.
[12:22.220 --> 12:22.500]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh-huh.
[12:22.780 --> 12:23.180]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, okay.
[12:23.200 --> 12:24.060]  [SPEAKER_08]: I was trying to avoid that.
[12:24.260 --> 12:25.680]  [SPEAKER_07]: That would have been really rock and roll, though.
[12:25.960 --> 12:26.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[12:26.360 --> 12:27.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: Would have made the papers.
[12:28.940 --> 12:31.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: So, Architect, you can find out more information about them.
[12:32.520 --> 12:32.880]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's...
[12:32.880 --> 12:33.440]  [SPEAKER_08]: A-R-C.
[12:33.560 --> 12:36.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: A-R-C-A-T-T-A-C-K.
[12:37.820 --> 12:39.220]  [SPEAKER_08]: Architect.com or...
[12:39.220 --> 12:39.820]  [SPEAKER_08]: Is it .com?
[12:39.900 --> 12:40.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: I think it's .com.
[12:41.620 --> 12:42.060]  [SPEAKER_08]: Go ahead.
[12:42.160 --> 12:48.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: They're also on YouTube, and if you don't have the chance to see them live, check out their YouTube, because it's cool stuff.
[12:48.620 --> 12:48.760]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[12:48.760 --> 12:49.420]  [SPEAKER_07]: Awesome stuff to see.
[12:49.560 --> 12:50.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: And awesome people to hang out with as well.
[12:50.960 --> 12:51.340]  [SPEAKER_07]: Where are they from?
[12:51.600 --> 12:52.540]  [SPEAKER_08]: They're from Austin, Texas.
[12:52.820 --> 12:55.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: At least a couple of them are from Austin, Texas.
[12:56.160 --> 12:59.300]  [SPEAKER_08]: So, yeah, that was just another one of the really cool things.
[12:59.560 --> 13:07.080]  [SPEAKER_08]: I think basically what the best part about this was just seeing so many people from the area.
[13:08.340 --> 13:09.180]  [SPEAKER_08]: So many kids.
[13:09.280 --> 13:12.420]  [SPEAKER_08]: You know, you've got something good when a lot of kids show up and are enthusiastic about it.
[13:12.480 --> 13:13.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's the future.
[13:13.440 --> 13:25.260]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's when you know that you're on the right track, when there's that kind of enthusiasm, because they're the ones that are going to build more cool things in the future and just keep the enthusiasm level there.
[13:25.320 --> 13:26.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's what the hacker world has.
[13:27.160 --> 13:30.300]  [SPEAKER_08]: And these guys certainly have it at the Maker Faires.
[13:30.440 --> 13:34.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: Even though I wasn't there, it sounds like there was just a lot of creativity there.
[13:34.180 --> 13:45.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: And probably it was nice to see that kind of all concentrated in one place and to know that it's not just a few people that you see, you know, doing these things in various places, but there is really a big community.
[13:46.520 --> 13:48.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, that's what it sounds like anyway.
[13:48.460 --> 13:49.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, definitely.
[13:49.700 --> 13:51.260]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, there were families there.
[13:51.340 --> 13:52.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: It was a real family event, really interactive.
[13:53.120 --> 13:55.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: There were kids learning to solder, kids learning to crochet and knit.
[13:56.740 --> 13:59.740]  [SPEAKER_07]: A friend of mine was teaching his grandmother how to pick handcuffs, which was neat.
[14:00.720 --> 14:01.460]  [SPEAKER_07]: Wait, what?
[14:01.740 --> 14:02.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: Really?
[14:02.640 --> 14:04.140]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, you know, should the need arise.
[14:04.260 --> 14:05.480]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yes, should the need arise.
[14:05.780 --> 14:06.880]  [SPEAKER_08]: Wow, we haven't even pulled that off at Hope.
[14:06.940 --> 14:09.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, we've shown people how to get handcuffs, but not people's grandmothers.
[14:10.360 --> 14:11.080]  [SPEAKER_08]: I don't think.
[14:11.220 --> 14:12.420]  [SPEAKER_07]: And she seemed enthusiastic.
[14:12.440 --> 14:13.320]  [SPEAKER_07]: It was neat.
[14:13.320 --> 14:22.460]  [SPEAKER_08]: I've seen so many cross-generational sharing of enthusiasm with different levels of technology and just building craft-like things.
[14:23.220 --> 14:24.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: And like you said, soldering.
[14:24.480 --> 14:31.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: Our own, not Kevin, was actually the acting Mitch Altman, who was showing kids how to solder and not burn themselves and things like that.
[14:31.380 --> 14:34.780]  [SPEAKER_08]: And that was awfully good to see the torch passed on in that way.
[14:35.020 --> 14:40.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now, Bernie, you came all the way up to this from Philadelphia, so you really must have recognized the value of it.
[14:40.820 --> 14:41.300]  [SPEAKER_05]: Oh, yeah.
[14:41.460 --> 14:44.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, it wasn't that far a trip, but it was definitely worth the trip.
[14:44.740 --> 14:45.980]  [SPEAKER_05]: And I would recommend...
[14:45.980 --> 14:46.620]  [SPEAKER_05]: I don't know.
[14:46.720 --> 14:47.840]  [SPEAKER_05]: Are they going to do this again next year?
[14:47.900 --> 14:48.920]  [SPEAKER_05]: Because I'm in if they do.
[14:49.820 --> 14:52.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, it does say the first annual, so that implies that they will.
[14:52.740 --> 14:57.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: And when you say it wasn't much trouble, well, your car did break down on the BQE and had to be towed.
[14:57.320 --> 14:59.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: So even with all that, do you still think it was worth it?
[14:59.880 --> 15:00.920]  [SPEAKER_05]: It was still worth it.
[15:01.120 --> 15:14.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, it turns out that where I broke down was that when I was towed, I was towed to a service station that was literally right across the expressway from the World's Fairgrounds.
[15:14.080 --> 15:15.040]  [SPEAKER_05]: So it was perfect.
[15:15.220 --> 15:17.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: I still went and visited friends and then came back.
[15:17.280 --> 15:18.260]  [SPEAKER_05]: But I mean, it was very convenient.
[15:18.460 --> 15:21.440]  [SPEAKER_05]: It was literally less than a mile away from where I wanted to go.
[15:21.540 --> 15:22.400]  [SPEAKER_05]: So how about that?
[15:22.500 --> 15:22.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's pretty good.
[15:22.980 --> 15:29.140]  [SPEAKER_08]: And a bunch of us actually on Saturday night explored the Real World's Fairgrounds, which are on the other side of the Grand Central Parkway.
[15:30.800 --> 15:33.880]  [SPEAKER_08]: And basically, I hadn't been there in many, many years.
[15:34.500 --> 15:35.780]  [SPEAKER_08]: There's a huge park there.
[15:36.100 --> 15:40.220]  [SPEAKER_08]: The globe, the little globe with the spiral things around it, that's still lit up.
[15:40.260 --> 15:44.580]  [SPEAKER_08]: But the towers, I forget what they call the towers, they fall into disrepair.
[15:44.580 --> 15:47.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: And it's really a shame if they would only rebuild those, make them look nice.
[15:47.900 --> 15:49.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: It would be such an attractive space.
[15:50.160 --> 15:52.780]  [SPEAKER_08]: So much cool land, a lot of people just hanging out.
[15:53.300 --> 15:54.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: At night.
[15:54.500 --> 15:56.260]  [SPEAKER_08]: And very, very festive atmosphere.
[15:56.360 --> 15:57.180]  [SPEAKER_08]: I'm glad I was a part of it.
[15:57.320 --> 15:59.780]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think the towers don't look too bad themselves.
[15:59.840 --> 16:02.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: But it's like that plaza thing at the base of them.
[16:02.700 --> 16:05.840]  [SPEAKER_01]: Like there's like a movie theater sort of structure in front of them.
[16:05.840 --> 16:06.860]  [SPEAKER_01]: If they only painted them.
[16:07.000 --> 16:09.020]  [SPEAKER_08]: If they painted them or put lights up or something like that.
[16:09.020 --> 16:09.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: It could look so nice.
[16:09.820 --> 16:13.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: What I suggested while we were walking around, let's make this Paris for a week.
[16:14.080 --> 16:15.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: And bring French people in.
[16:15.940 --> 16:16.940]  [SPEAKER_08]: They will make it look beautiful.
[16:16.940 --> 16:17.920]  [SPEAKER_08]: And then we kick them out.
[16:18.040 --> 16:20.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: And we'll have a nice park that will just last forever.
[16:20.840 --> 16:21.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think that would be really kind of cool.
[16:21.900 --> 16:22.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, yeah.
[16:22.420 --> 16:25.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: It would be really nice to see something actually happen with that.
[16:25.220 --> 16:26.960]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because, you know, you have this really nice space.
[16:26.960 --> 16:28.080]  [SPEAKER_01]: And it's all covered with vines.
[16:28.120 --> 16:29.040]  [SPEAKER_01]: And the paint's all chipped.
[16:29.080 --> 16:29.840]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's like really sad.
[16:30.020 --> 16:30.460]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, it is.
[16:30.900 --> 16:31.880]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now, we had a great time.
[16:31.980 --> 16:33.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: We had the 2600 van there.
[16:33.460 --> 16:34.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: And all kinds of people came up and visited.
[16:35.500 --> 16:36.320]  [SPEAKER_08]: Jim was there.
[16:36.320 --> 16:38.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: And meeting all kinds of people.
[16:38.380 --> 16:42.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: And it was just really a good weekend to do this kind of thing.
[16:42.680 --> 16:43.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: And local, too.
[16:43.440 --> 16:44.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: We didn't have to go all the way to Dayton this time.
[16:44.860 --> 16:46.020]  [SPEAKER_08]: It was right in our own backyard.
[16:46.580 --> 16:47.060]  [SPEAKER_08]: So, yeah.
[16:47.180 --> 16:49.400]  [SPEAKER_08]: I hope it happens next year.
[16:49.620 --> 16:52.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: You can find out if there's going to be a Maker Faire, I guess, in your area.
[16:53.500 --> 16:54.140]  [SPEAKER_08]: Makerfaire.com.
[16:54.300 --> 16:57.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: M-A-K-E-R-F-A-I-R-E dot C-O-M.
[16:57.960 --> 17:01.780]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, they have a list of all the official Maker Faires that are going on there.
[17:01.860 --> 17:11.440]  [SPEAKER_01]: And they even have this little calendar somewhere on the main page where you'll actually see, basically schedule other little mini Maker Faires that they've been informed about.
[17:11.960 --> 17:13.820]  [SPEAKER_01]: And so you can actually, yeah.
[17:14.120 --> 17:18.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: What do you see as the relationship between hackers and makers?
[17:19.160 --> 17:25.660]  [SPEAKER_01]: Me, personally, I think it's, to a large extent, are different words for the same thing.
[17:25.660 --> 17:29.840]  [SPEAKER_01]: You have people that are, you know, exploring ways to do things and creating things.
[17:30.010 --> 17:35.920]  [SPEAKER_01]: But the term hacker is usually, historically has been associated with more with technology.
[17:36.270 --> 17:40.620]  [SPEAKER_01]: But the biggest difference is just that, you know, there's a slight bit of a gap in culture.
[17:40.790 --> 17:42.040]  [SPEAKER_01]: But they are so connected.
[17:42.270 --> 17:44.460]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, even at this conference, we had hackerspaces.
[17:44.820 --> 17:50.140]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, Steve Levy actually gave a talk, who was our keynote at The Last Hope in 2008.
[17:50.380 --> 17:52.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: He gave a talk at Maker Faire in Queens.
[17:52.560 --> 17:59.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, you also have the case where, I mean, the two cultures are, like Dotret said, basically overlapping.
[17:59.790 --> 18:06.900]  [SPEAKER_12]: And you have the case in hackerspaces where it's not like if you go to a hackerspace, people are only going to be doing electronics, are only going to be doing software.
[18:07.120 --> 18:13.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, at NYC Resistor, for example, there are people who do, you know, knitted projects and things like that.
[18:13.160 --> 18:16.700]  [SPEAKER_12]: So it's not, there's not really any boundary or definition, really.
[18:16.840 --> 18:19.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, it's just all kind of, you could lump it all together.
[18:19.460 --> 18:22.880]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, I think the communities mesh together really well.
[18:23.080 --> 18:25.540]  [SPEAKER_08]: And it's rare to see that.
[18:25.680 --> 18:27.500]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's rare to see acceptance.
[18:27.980 --> 18:30.160]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I think, you know, not every maker is a hacker.
[18:30.240 --> 18:31.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: Not every hacker is a maker, per se.
[18:31.940 --> 18:34.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: But I think the best ones are combinations of each.
[18:34.420 --> 18:41.300]  [SPEAKER_08]: And people with some technical skill that like to experiment and ask a lot of questions and step outside the boundaries a little bit.
[18:41.640 --> 18:44.820]  [SPEAKER_08]: But at the same time, respecting the technology, respecting the people around you.
[18:44.820 --> 18:49.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: I think these are all values that we, we, we tend to share and we can go very far.
[18:50.620 --> 18:50.940]  [SPEAKER_08]: Emmanuel?
[18:51.470 --> 18:52.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: Rob first and then Bernie.
[18:53.000 --> 18:53.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[18:53.200 --> 18:59.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: And speaking of stepping outside, it was also nice to see these people that I've been seeing at hacker events for the past 10, 15 years, except outside and in the daylight.
[18:59.920 --> 18:59.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[19:00.100 --> 19:01.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: Getting, getting some sun.
[19:01.080 --> 19:01.400]  [SPEAKER_08]: Getting a little sun.
[19:01.620 --> 19:03.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: And, you know, it was, it was great weather too.
[19:03.900 --> 19:04.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: So it was, it was lovely.
[19:04.940 --> 19:05.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: Everyone lucked out there.
[19:05.900 --> 19:06.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: Go ahead, Bernie.
[19:06.800 --> 19:09.260]  [SPEAKER_05]: I just wanted to say there were, there were a lot of kindred spirit.
[19:09.380 --> 19:11.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, everybody there was kind of a kindred spirit.
[19:11.000 --> 19:18.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: And as Rob pointed out, it was great seeing a lot of old friends, people we've been seeing for years and years at the hacker cons, but out in the sunshine.
[19:18.900 --> 19:22.680]  [SPEAKER_05]: And I just loved all the cross-pollination that was going on.
[19:22.790 --> 19:30.680]  [SPEAKER_05]: It was, it was great symbiosis between makers like creative people who are making art and visually interesting stuff.
[19:30.900 --> 19:39.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: And, and hackers who are more maybe technical in nature and, and seeing both of them being exposed to each other's worlds and being influenced and inspired by it.
[19:39.060 --> 19:40.290]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's really a great scene.
[19:41.000 --> 19:44.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: And WBAI listeners too, which was awesome to, to see that cross-pollination as well.
[19:45.380 --> 19:45.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: Mm-hmm.
[19:46.520 --> 19:46.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[19:46.980 --> 19:50.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, that was what we were up to this weekend and it was a, it was a bit of fun.
[19:52.220 --> 19:58.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now today, today we have even more fun because, well, I don't know if you remember, I think people do have memories of, of more than a week.
[19:59.440 --> 20:13.440]  [SPEAKER_08]: Last week we were talking about a little project that a couple of us working on for, called the Google Blacklist, where we were basically listing a bunch of words on a website that Google Instant kind of, um, uh, doesn't respond to.
[20:13.660 --> 20:20.680]  [SPEAKER_08]: Words that, uh, um, somebody somewhere or some machine somewhere, um, flagged as potentially objectionable.
[20:20.720 --> 20:21.290]  [SPEAKER_08]: Who's got the list?
[20:21.360 --> 20:22.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: Who's got the, you've got it, Rob?
[20:22.840 --> 20:25.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: Do you want to read a couple of the ones that we can say on the radio?
[20:25.540 --> 20:29.220]  [SPEAKER_08]: Because, uh, there are certain words we can't say on the radio, but a lot of words there we can say on the radio.
[20:29.220 --> 20:34.320]  [SPEAKER_07]: There, there are some interesting things we can say on the radio without a problem, but apparently you can't say on Google Instant, um...
[20:34.320 --> 20:36.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: You can say it, you just won't get those instant responses.
[20:36.920 --> 20:39.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, like, uh, sultry women is apparently banned, although...
[20:39.860 --> 20:40.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: Sultry women?
[20:40.720 --> 20:43.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, although, um, uh, interestingly, sultry men is not.
[20:43.920 --> 20:48.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now, um, the way that list is, is laid out, it tells you what letter it blanks out at.
[20:48.340 --> 20:50.790]  [SPEAKER_08]: So for sultry women, at what, what point does it blank out?
[20:50.880 --> 20:52.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: It blanks out at the O in women.
[20:52.690 --> 20:53.040]  Okay.
[20:53.320 --> 20:56.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: So sultry W, you're okay, but you type an O and you're, you're out of there.
[20:56.820 --> 21:02.160]  [SPEAKER_08]: The full list can be found at, uh, www.2600.com/googleblacklist.
[21:02.300 --> 21:03.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: Some other, some other highlights?
[21:03.820 --> 21:06.260]  [SPEAKER_07]: Some other, um, smells like teen spirit, apparently.
[21:06.580 --> 21:12.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay, that, that actually, that deserves an asterisk, because it's actually the word teen that, uh, that Google objects to for some reason.
[21:13.200 --> 21:15.160]  [SPEAKER_08]: And so teen spirit gets included with that.
[21:15.460 --> 21:16.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, but you know what?
[21:16.320 --> 21:19.290]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, one we just, uh, found out about recently, Bare Naked Ladies.
[21:19.420 --> 21:20.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: You can't type that.
[21:20.100 --> 21:20.940]  [SPEAKER_08]: And that's the name of a band.
[21:21.200 --> 21:25.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: And they really, they should have known better than to name their band something filthy like that.
[21:26.930 --> 21:27.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: There are a whole bunch.
[21:28.180 --> 21:29.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: And people, here's what happened.
[21:29.920 --> 21:31.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: Today, the story hit the front page of CNN.
[21:32.320 --> 21:35.920]  [SPEAKER_08]: And, uh, what that means is that we've had something like 300,000 hits today.
[21:36.470 --> 21:40.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: And, um, the updates are just flying in way faster than we can update them.
[21:40.460 --> 21:41.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: So we ask people, please be patient.
[21:41.980 --> 21:45.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: If your, if your objectionable word does not show up on the list, it will at some point.
[21:46.080 --> 21:47.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: And, uh, thank you for submitting them.
[21:47.920 --> 21:53.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: And, uh, every school kid in America now apparently is looking at this page to, to get more ammunition for words they can use to, uh, offend people.
[21:54.920 --> 21:57.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: Rapping women is apparently offensive.
[21:57.420 --> 21:59.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now, rapping, that's with a W or with a...
[21:59.480 --> 22:00.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: With an R.
[22:00.200 --> 22:00.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: With an R.
[22:00.820 --> 22:01.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: As in doing rap music.
[22:02.100 --> 22:02.680]  [SPEAKER_07]: Rapping women.
[22:02.980 --> 22:03.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: And rapping men.
[22:04.420 --> 22:05.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, well...
[22:05.060 --> 22:06.180]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't know about rapping men.
[22:06.180 --> 22:10.180]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay, well, let's have the list in front of us before we start, uh, uh, spouting off what's, what's on there.
[22:10.300 --> 22:13.680]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, but anyway, the, the story appeared on, um, on, uh, CNN.
[22:13.840 --> 22:15.220]  [SPEAKER_08]: I just want to read a couple of highlights from it.
[22:15.480 --> 22:26.580]  [SPEAKER_08]: Um, again, some folks at the Hacker Publication 2600 decided to compile a list of words that are restricted by Google Instant, uh, except in extreme and special cases, Google is known for anything but censorship.
[22:27.000 --> 22:32.400]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, but as we've said before, uh, there are some terms the web giant's new instant search feature won't work with.
[22:32.400 --> 22:39.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: This actually comes from, uh, a, a blogger site, um, and, um, uh, Mashable.com, I believe.
[22:40.200 --> 22:42.320]  [SPEAKER_08]: Um, and again, you know, we talked about this last week.
[22:42.400 --> 22:43.400]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's not really censorship.
[22:43.520 --> 22:45.060]  [SPEAKER_08]: I don't think that's the right word for it.
[22:45.140 --> 22:47.460]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's basically just, um, a form of filtering.
[22:47.620 --> 22:49.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: And of course, you can get around it simply by hitting return.
[22:49.780 --> 22:52.940]  [SPEAKER_08]: But it is kind of interesting to see how these things work.
[22:53.020 --> 22:56.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: For example, bisexual, lesbian, those are restricted words.
[22:56.640 --> 22:57.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: You type them into Google.
[22:57.460 --> 22:59.920]  [SPEAKER_08]: The instant search will immediately stop delivering your results.
[22:59.920 --> 23:02.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: You have to hit enter, uh, to confirm.
[23:02.700 --> 23:08.540]  [SPEAKER_08]: And, um, it's just kind of fun to compile these words and see just, uh, just how it all works.
[23:08.720 --> 23:10.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: I just found an interesting one.
[23:10.260 --> 23:10.780]  [SPEAKER_01]: Wet dream.
[23:11.120 --> 23:11.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: Really?
[23:11.620 --> 23:12.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's not in there.
[23:12.360 --> 23:12.620]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[23:12.760 --> 23:15.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: It, it, it, it blanks out right at M in dream.
[23:15.680 --> 23:16.080]  [SPEAKER_01]: Wow.
[23:16.240 --> 23:18.300]  [SPEAKER_08]: So wait, what, what, what could be okay?
[23:18.860 --> 23:20.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: Wet D-R-E-A.
[23:20.220 --> 23:22.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: What else could that possibly, wet dread, I suppose.
[23:22.600 --> 23:24.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: If you have dreadlocks and you want to wash your hair.
[23:24.660 --> 23:25.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: Wet dreadlocks.
[23:25.500 --> 23:25.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[23:25.800 --> 23:26.760]  [SPEAKER_01]: So that's allowed.
[23:26.760 --> 23:31.040]  [SPEAKER_01]: Apparently, um, vibrator also, uh, really?
[23:31.280 --> 23:31.440]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[23:31.800 --> 23:32.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[23:32.620 --> 23:33.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, there's, there's, there's all manner.
[23:33.960 --> 23:38.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: Again, the website, www.2600.com/googleblacklist.
[23:38.340 --> 23:44.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's, uh, the fun we've been up to, which has sort of spiraled out of control and no doubt will take over our lives for the next few weeks.
[23:44.800 --> 23:46.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, speaking of which, next few weeks, we're not going to be here.
[23:47.120 --> 23:49.260]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, we're preempted next week and the week after that.
[23:49.440 --> 23:49.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: Oh no.
[23:49.900 --> 23:50.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[23:50.280 --> 23:52.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, um, uh, we'll be back in three weeks.
[23:52.200 --> 23:56.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: And when we're back in three weeks, uh, we will, uh, be in fundraising mode.
[23:56.280 --> 23:57.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: We'll be in the middle of fundraising mode.
[23:57.740 --> 23:59.260]  [SPEAKER_08]: So get yourselves ready for that, folks.
[23:59.500 --> 24:00.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: So start earning money now.
[24:00.880 --> 24:00.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[24:01.000 --> 24:01.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: Start earning the money now.
[24:02.180 --> 24:06.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, uh, relish the fact that, uh, you'll have two weeks of a break from us.
[24:06.340 --> 24:13.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, but in, uh, in three weeks, three weeks from today, we will be, uh, asking for your support to help keep the station going.
[24:13.800 --> 24:17.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: And, um, those of you who were pledged before, you should be getting your premiums very, very soon.
[24:17.940 --> 24:19.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, especially those of you for the spring.
[24:19.620 --> 24:23.140]  [SPEAKER_08]: I know there's been delays with some people, uh, everybody will get their premiums.
[24:23.220 --> 24:24.680]  [SPEAKER_08]: That is, uh, that is certainly a fact.
[24:24.680 --> 24:30.300]  [SPEAKER_08]: If you have not gotten your premiums for any time before, uh, the spring fundraiser, let us know because that's definitely wrong.
[24:30.460 --> 24:32.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: Everybody else, it's just a sad fact.
[24:32.920 --> 24:35.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: It takes time sometimes to, uh, uh, to gather it all together.
[24:36.060 --> 24:40.320]  [SPEAKER_08]: There are so many, so many people to, uh, to thank by sending out the, uh, the premiums you pledge for.
[24:40.420 --> 24:44.820]  [SPEAKER_08]: So don't let that, uh, um, dissuade you from, uh, from being a part of things in the future.
[24:45.450 --> 24:46.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: Um, okay.
[24:46.640 --> 24:52.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, we have some interesting stories that have hit, um, in the last, um, last week or so.
[24:52.840 --> 24:54.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: This, I guess, is probably the most disturbing.
[24:54.760 --> 24:58.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: I'm just going to read the beginning of it and then, uh, we can, we can launch into what this actually means.
[24:58.560 --> 25:14.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, from the New York Times, federal law enforcement and national security officials are preparing to seek sweeping new regulations for the Internet, arguing that their ability to wiretap criminal and terrorism suspects is going dark as people increasingly communicate online instead of by telephone.
[25:14.620 --> 25:32.220]  [SPEAKER_08]: Essentially, officials want Congress to require all services that enable communications, including encrypted email transmitters like BlackBerry, social networking websites like Facebook, and software that allows direct peer-to-peer messaging like Skype to be technically capable of complying if served with a wiretap order.
[25:32.360 --> 25:37.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: The mandate would include being able to intercept and unscramble encrypted messages.
[25:37.040 --> 25:47.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: The bill, which the Obama administration plans to submit to lawmakers next year, raises fresh questions about how to balance security needs with protecting privacy and fostering innovation.
[25:47.940 --> 25:53.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: And because security services around the world face the same problem, it could set an example that is copied globally.
[25:54.240 --> 25:55.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: Haven't we been here before?
[25:56.040 --> 25:57.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: This sounds so familiar to me.
[25:58.120 --> 26:00.320]  [SPEAKER_08]: It sounds like the days of the clipper chip all over again.
[26:00.460 --> 26:03.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, it just sounds very kind of silly.
[26:03.080 --> 26:07.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't think that by doing this, they're going to actually solve any of their problems.
[26:08.120 --> 26:10.700]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think they're only going to create problems for everybody else.
[26:11.280 --> 26:20.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, basically what you're saying is that, okay, if you're a security provider, or I suppose a service provider, you have to provide us with backdoors so that we can get in and get what we need.
[26:21.820 --> 26:24.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: To some degree, they already have that capability, right?
[26:24.280 --> 26:38.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: If there was some private bit of information on Facebook or one of these services, or maybe on some ISP that they wanted to get the email for, they could have a warrant or whatever was the request that the government makes to get information.
[26:40.660 --> 26:42.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: Is it a warrant or it's a subpoena?
[26:43.120 --> 26:43.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: Maybe it's a subpoena.
[26:43.640 --> 26:44.160]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bernie, help us out here.
[26:44.920 --> 26:45.380]  [SPEAKER_05]: Warrant.
[26:45.560 --> 26:47.080]  [SPEAKER_05]: They would get a warrant.
[26:47.400 --> 26:48.700]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's a search warrant, basically.
[26:48.960 --> 26:50.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: But it's an electronic search warrant.
[26:50.060 --> 26:54.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: And so to get those kinds of communications, it's already possible for them.
[26:54.760 --> 27:04.220]  [SPEAKER_12]: But if they're talking about putting kind of backdoors in encryption software, the real problem I see with that is that, say this is a software that you use on your computer.
[27:04.440 --> 27:04.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know.
[27:04.800 --> 27:06.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's say it's PGP or something.
[27:06.760 --> 27:08.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: And there's a backdoor built into it.
[27:08.780 --> 27:16.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Because it's software that's out there in public, even if it's not, even if the source code is not public, it's not going to be very difficult for someone to find this backdoor.
[27:16.320 --> 27:22.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: And suddenly you've rendered all of these encryption systems useless because there's a backdoor and anyone can access it once they find out how to do it.
[27:23.440 --> 27:24.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's what bothers me.
[27:24.440 --> 27:30.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: Even if it's an algorithmic backdoor, even if they release some kind of, you know, it's kind of sneaky.
[27:30.760 --> 27:35.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: It hides the data somehow in the message, but so that there's a way to open the message.
[27:35.690 --> 27:36.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: Someone will figure it out.
[27:36.940 --> 27:37.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, people aren't stupid.
[27:38.020 --> 27:39.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: And so I think that that's a real big problem.
[27:40.000 --> 27:45.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: On the flip side, you have, you know, there will be open-source and free systems that are written.
[27:45.380 --> 27:49.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: And so can the government mandate that they include backdoors?
[27:49.280 --> 27:52.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: And if there is a backdoor, everyone will see it because it's open-source.
[27:52.120 --> 27:54.880]  [SPEAKER_08]: Here's what happens with these situations like this with the backdoors.
[27:55.160 --> 27:59.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: Somehow hackers get drawn into it and blamed for things that have not even happened.
[27:59.540 --> 28:08.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: From the story, several privacy and technology advocates argued that requiring interception capabilities would create holes that would inevitably be exploited by hackers.
[28:09.100 --> 28:10.440]  [SPEAKER_08]: Hackers are the evil people again.
[28:10.920 --> 28:23.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: Stephen Bellavin, a Columbia University computer science professor, pointed to an episode in Greece In 2005, it was discovered that hackers had taken advantage of a legally mandated wiretap function to spy on top officials' phones, including the prime ministers.
[28:23.840 --> 28:25.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: He says, I think it's a disaster waiting to happen.
[28:25.900 --> 28:28.780]  [SPEAKER_08]: If they start building in all these backdoors, they will be exploited.
[28:28.840 --> 28:29.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: I totally agree.
[28:29.340 --> 28:30.180]  [SPEAKER_08]: They will be exploited.
[28:30.340 --> 28:39.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: But to point the fingers just at hackers, you know, who's going to exploit this are law enforcement people, people who know about the holes, people who work for the companies, all kinds of people.
[28:39.720 --> 28:44.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, the fact of the matter is that fairly strong encryption algorithms are out there.
[28:44.160 --> 28:49.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: They're published, they're peer-reviewed, and so these things, as they stand, don't have backdoors.
[28:49.940 --> 28:55.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: So it's possible for somebody who looks at these academic papers to write a version that doesn't have a backdoor.
[28:56.100 --> 29:05.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: So if you're really, really dedicated to getting your message across the Internet without anyone being able to read it, you're going to be able to do it.
[29:05.240 --> 29:15.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: So really, this is just kind of, I guess, opening a door for the case where you have a stupid criminal who doesn't really know what they're doing, who hasn't done any research, and then maybe they'd be caught in this.
[29:15.600 --> 29:19.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: But for the most part, I think it's actually just going to hurt your regular individual who hasn't done anything.
[29:20.400 --> 29:27.260]  [SPEAKER_07]: And the thing that I'm really worried about is, okay, first, they're going to focus on, as they do now, the large service providers.
[29:27.660 --> 29:30.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: You know, the big telephone companies already have their government backdoors.
[29:31.000 --> 29:36.400]  [SPEAKER_07]: You know, the large providers that they're looking at now are Facebook and Twitter and all these networks that everyone uses.
[29:36.400 --> 29:48.180]  [SPEAKER_07]: But how many hops is it from that to people like me who prefer to roll their own and who are maybe hosting their own email servers and who are going to maybe jump in on diaspora, the decentralized social network and things like that?
[29:48.400 --> 29:52.180]  [SPEAKER_07]: When are they going to start telling me that I have to open up backdoors on my own machinery for them?
[29:52.520 --> 29:52.780]  [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, boy.
[29:53.040 --> 29:55.780]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, yeah, these are some seriously interesting questions.
[29:55.780 --> 30:07.240]  [SPEAKER_01]: And something that Redhack said kind of, you know, popped stuck in my head, which is, you know, the big thing that all of us technical people are thinking is, okay, even if they tried mandating this, this stuff is still already open-sourced, you know,
[30:07.340 --> 30:12.400]  [SPEAKER_01]: there's no way they'd be able to, you know, stop people from using unbacked toward security.
[30:12.680 --> 30:18.260]  [SPEAKER_01]: And then so then I think to myself, does that mean that then privacy in itself online will become a crime?
[30:18.900 --> 30:19.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: Privacy is dead.
[30:19.840 --> 30:20.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: Get over it.
[30:20.880 --> 30:30.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: I think it's interesting that they're not focusing on Facebook because Facebook already, like the government already has someone at Facebook's phone number who they can call up and they'll just like give them whatever they want.
[30:30.820 --> 30:36.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: This is targeted directly at the smaller sites and it's making a mandate.
[30:36.920 --> 30:48.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: One of the issues they talk about in the Times article is that sometimes someone that the government wishes to follow for whatever reason will be using some small website and the small website doesn't have a surveillance function.
[30:48.740 --> 30:57.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: So the engineers at this small website who would much rather be doing almost anything else, I'm sure, have to waste their time building a surveillance site for the government.
[30:57.040 --> 31:04.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: And now it's going to be required, if these bills pass, that these surveillance functions have to be built in from the get-go.
[31:05.140 --> 31:11.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: And anyone who's ever built a website can tell you, like, that's a lot of work to make these extra features that you don't need.
[31:12.780 --> 31:14.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bernie, what do you think about all this?
[31:14.520 --> 31:17.600]  [SPEAKER_05]: I think it's another good example of a security theater.
[31:18.560 --> 31:24.060]  [SPEAKER_05]: Really serious terrorists will find easy ways to circumvent these surveillance measures.
[31:24.060 --> 31:28.560]  [SPEAKER_05]: And this is going to be used to invade the privacy of anyone else the U.S.
[31:28.920 --> 31:39.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: government wants to snoop on without any accountability, just like with CALEA that went into effect in the, I guess that was the early 90s.
[31:39.580 --> 31:40.980]  [SPEAKER_05]: Actually, no, the late 80s.
[31:41.060 --> 31:42.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: Tell the listeners what CALEA is.
[31:42.900 --> 31:46.220]  [SPEAKER_05]: CALEA is the Communications Act for Law Enforcement Assistance.
[31:46.780 --> 31:50.320]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm sorry, the Communications Assistance Law Enforcement Act, one or the other.
[31:50.320 --> 32:15.280]  [SPEAKER_05]: In any case, that was a federal law that mandated built-in surveillance at all telephone switches, all the telephone companies' central office switches would have to have built-in surveillance that would allow the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to remotely access phone lines and phone calls and data and that kind of thing without having to physically take a warrant to,
[32:15.460 --> 32:21.300]  [SPEAKER_05]: from a practical standpoint, not have to physically take a warrant to the phone company and have them hook up the wiretap.
[32:21.440 --> 32:24.040]  [SPEAKER_05]: And that scared the bejeebers out of a lot of us.
[32:24.140 --> 32:35.620]  [SPEAKER_05]: And this is another example of yet another stretch that our surveillance industrial complex wants to have another system where there's no real accountability.
[32:35.920 --> 32:47.900]  [SPEAKER_05]: How will we ever know if the watchers are really following constitutional protections and upholding the law and not invading people's privacy and doing other kinds of nasty things?
[32:47.900 --> 32:53.560]  [SPEAKER_05]: I think this is a really scary step and it makes me think less of the Obama administration that they're behind this.
[32:53.660 --> 32:55.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: But I think every administration is behind this kind of thing.
[32:55.720 --> 32:57.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, this is a point we've raised many times.
[32:57.480 --> 33:00.320]  [SPEAKER_08]: There is no government on earth that does not want to spy on its citizens.
[33:00.360 --> 33:07.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: So you're fooling yourself if you think anybody is going to simply say, yeah, you guys have your privacy.
[33:07.560 --> 33:07.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: We're the government.
[33:08.040 --> 33:08.740]  [SPEAKER_08]: We're going to leave you alone.
[33:08.920 --> 33:10.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: That doesn't work that way, Rob.
[33:10.200 --> 33:20.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: And speaking of administrations, one thing that I think a lot of the officials in our government seem to conveniently forget is that not everyone on the Internet is American or under their jurisdiction.
[33:20.900 --> 33:21.420]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yes.
[33:21.740 --> 33:25.320]  [SPEAKER_07]: There are even service providers in other countries that one might use.
[33:25.520 --> 33:26.560]  [SPEAKER_07]: Other countries, you say?
[33:26.720 --> 33:27.140]  [SPEAKER_07]: Other countries.
[33:27.360 --> 33:28.260]  [SPEAKER_08]: I learned something today.
[33:28.840 --> 33:50.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: I just wanted to point out for our listeners, anyone who's kind of curious about privacy and encryption, just quickly that if you're using a service online and it's not encrypted, so say you're using an HTTP-based service as opposed to HTTPS, anybody between you and that service and on who has access to your packets has access to your information.
[33:50.260 --> 33:55.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: So just because you think you're connecting directly to that website, there are a number of hops in between.
[33:55.840 --> 33:57.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: So that data goes through that.
[33:57.100 --> 33:57.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: Same thing with email.
[33:57.940 --> 34:03.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: When you send an email, it can go through a number of servers before it gets to the destination server.
[34:03.300 --> 34:08.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: If you're using something like HTTPS, that only provides you security between you and that provider.
[34:08.960 --> 34:15.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: So your information is only encrypted between your computer and, say, the mail provider or something.
[34:16.370 --> 34:19.390]  [SPEAKER_12]: And then from then on, it may not be encrypted.
[34:19.390 --> 34:21.020]  [SPEAKER_12]: And so, again, you have the same problem.
[34:21.180 --> 34:31.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: So really, if you're absolutely concerned about your privacy or if you really have to tell something to somebody else and it has to get there securely, you really want to use end-to-end encryption.
[34:31.260 --> 34:41.220]  [SPEAKER_12]: You want to use some sort of encryption software, whether it be GPG or anything like that, to encrypt your message, to get it between you and the other person.
[34:41.680 --> 34:46.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: And make sure, you know, there are people, you know, have GPG keys and things like that.
[34:46.160 --> 34:52.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: You have to make sure that you know that it's the other person's actual key and not just something that's, you know, been falsified.
[34:52.330 --> 34:55.120]  [SPEAKER_02]: But don't lazy people deserve privacy, too?
[34:55.560 --> 34:57.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: No, I'm not saying that this is a good thing.
[34:57.930 --> 35:03.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm just saying that information on the Internet is inherently not secure.
[35:03.790 --> 35:07.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: And so if you're really concerned about your security, you really have to use an end-to-end encryption system.
[35:07.660 --> 35:15.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: Even without an evil government out there trying to learn all your secrets and read all your communications, it's not secure.
[35:15.930 --> 35:17.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: People do need to see...
[35:17.040 --> 35:17.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: And that's sort of what hackers do.
[35:17.980 --> 35:21.350]  [SPEAKER_08]: They show you how things aren't secure, except they get put in prison for doing that.
[35:21.690 --> 35:22.870]  [SPEAKER_08]: Here, the government wants to do it.
[35:22.950 --> 35:27.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's just this kind of impression of security that, oh, well, you know, it's just my computer talking to their computer.
[35:27.950 --> 35:29.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: But in reality, that's not true.
[35:29.430 --> 35:30.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's going through a lot of places.
[35:30.850 --> 35:42.910]  [SPEAKER_02]: I think we should note that if we remember some months ago, there was a story where Google got its computers snuck into by the Chinese government, and that's why they're no longer doing business or not doing as much business in China.
[35:42.910 --> 35:52.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: The system that the Chinese government snuck into was the system that Google had developed to allow other non-Chinese governments to get in and spy on things.
[35:52.690 --> 35:56.450]  [SPEAKER_02]: If they hadn't built this spying system in the first place, there'd be less spying going on.
[35:56.620 --> 36:06.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: So to require every company in the world, some with engineers not as smart as Google, perhaps, to build these spying systems, there's going to be all kinds of spying going on.
[36:06.350 --> 36:10.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Not all of it, the FBI kind even.
[36:10.060 --> 36:13.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: Here's what worries me, and this speaks to something that Rob was saying a little bit earlier.
[36:14.710 --> 36:18.710]  [SPEAKER_08]: Let's say I use GPG or equivalent just to communicate with people.
[36:18.830 --> 36:25.370]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now, from what's said in this article, the mandate would include being able to intercept and unscramble encrypted messages.
[36:25.370 --> 36:26.670]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's at the carrier end.
[36:26.750 --> 36:27.730]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's at the ISP end.
[36:27.890 --> 36:29.390]  [SPEAKER_08]: What about the individual end?
[36:29.450 --> 36:33.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: What if I decide I want to encrypt all my messages with my own personal key?
[36:34.120 --> 36:39.080]  [SPEAKER_08]: Am I required under this to turn over that information to the government upon demand?
[36:39.080 --> 36:40.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: Is that something?
[36:40.170 --> 36:41.290]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think that that's something.
[36:41.430 --> 36:43.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, don't they put people in jail for not giving up encryption keys?
[36:44.040 --> 36:45.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: Have they actually done that yet?
[36:45.890 --> 36:50.330]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, I mean, if you are in possession of some document, you can be subpoenaed for it.
[36:50.730 --> 36:56.370]  [SPEAKER_02]: And if you can't say, oh, I have the key, but I'm not going to tell it to you, because then you're not complying with the subpoena.
[36:58.280 --> 37:04.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: But what the government wants to do is they want to wiretap your communications without telling you, without going through you.
[37:05.830 --> 37:08.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, it's the same with a telephone wiretap.
[37:08.690 --> 37:11.690]  [SPEAKER_02]: Like, they could just ask you, hey, what did you say to your drug dealer?
[37:11.850 --> 37:12.810]  [SPEAKER_02]: And you could tell them.
[37:12.950 --> 37:15.930]  [SPEAKER_02]: But what they want to be able to do is get it directly without asking you.
[37:16.060 --> 37:17.730]  [SPEAKER_08]: So now that's what I'm wondering.
[37:18.210 --> 37:23.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: Do I have to give them the ability to crack my encryption code without my knowing?
[37:23.310 --> 37:24.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: If you're subpoenaed, you already do.
[37:25.140 --> 37:39.210]  [SPEAKER_02]: If you're subpoenaed and you don't have a lawyer, your lawyer can't successfully fight it, whatever, if the subpoena is actually taking place, then you're required to comply with It just seems to me that this is a problem that can be solved with some technology,
[37:39.540 --> 37:41.020]  [SPEAKER_08]: with some ingenuity.
[37:41.330 --> 37:50.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: No, the thing is that basically, if you're using some sort of personal encryption solution, this is not what they're targeting, is what Mike's saying.
[37:50.100 --> 37:52.930]  [SPEAKER_08]: Right, but it becomes a moot point if everybody is using this in the first place.
[37:52.930 --> 37:53.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: If everybody's using it.
[37:53.770 --> 37:56.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: But the fact of the matter is that not everybody's using it.
[37:56.140 --> 37:59.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: And what they're saying is, well, let's say there's this service that's available on the Internet.
[37:59.810 --> 38:03.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: We want to be able to just arbitrarily listen in on random users.
[38:03.430 --> 38:10.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: If you are actually a person of interest, I'm sure they will go to a judge and go through all of the difficulty to get a subpoena to get your data.
[38:10.710 --> 38:14.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: But they just want to be able to do it if they're maybe curious about it.
[38:14.080 --> 38:15.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, I'm not sure how...
[38:15.270 --> 38:17.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: I guess wiretapping, you need a warrant also, Bernie?
[38:18.330 --> 38:18.690]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yes.
[38:20.680 --> 38:24.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: But you can get it without the person knowing that there's a warrant, right?
[38:24.710 --> 38:24.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[38:24.910 --> 38:25.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[38:25.750 --> 38:26.000]  Yes.
[38:26.250 --> 38:26.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[38:26.890 --> 38:27.370]  [SPEAKER_08]: Go ahead, Bernie.
[38:27.870 --> 38:29.710]  [SPEAKER_05]: I just want to point out what Mike said is true.
[38:29.870 --> 38:38.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can't be subpoenaed, even for a grand jury, to force you, to compel you to divulge your passphrase or encryption key.
[38:38.710 --> 38:43.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: And you might think, well, that should not be covered by the Fifth Amendment, the right to against...
[38:46.950 --> 38:47.770]  [SPEAKER_05]: Self-incrimination.
[38:48.120 --> 38:48.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: Right.
[38:48.950 --> 38:49.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, guess what?
[38:50.140 --> 39:03.410]  [SPEAKER_05]: The Justice Department, the United States Department of Justice, has been using this novel argument that's saying your passphrase or your encryption key, in and of itself, does not contain incriminating information.
[39:03.710 --> 39:08.460]  [SPEAKER_05]: Therefore, you have no Fifth Amendment right to hold on to it.
[39:08.580 --> 39:15.190]  [SPEAKER_08]: By that logic, the key to my house doesn't include any incriminating information, so I'd be compelled to give them a copy of that.
[39:15.850 --> 39:17.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: That's the argument they're using.
[39:17.120 --> 39:20.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, you're compelled to let them in your door if they show up with a warrant.
[39:20.830 --> 39:22.430]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, but this is without a warrant, isn't it?
[39:22.540 --> 39:23.430]  [SPEAKER_02]: No, this is with a warrant.
[39:23.580 --> 39:25.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: No, I'm saying to give up your passphrase.
[39:25.560 --> 39:28.580]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bernie, do you need a warrant to demand a passphrase?
[39:29.020 --> 39:46.390]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, in the case that Mike was bringing up where they could issue a subpoena or bring it before a grand jury, and you could say, well, I'm not going to divulge my passphrase or key because that would be self-incrimination, and I'm going to exercise my Fifth Amendment right to not incriminate myself.
[39:46.870 --> 39:53.730]  [SPEAKER_05]: You would be found in... you could be imprisoned for a significant amount of time for contempt of court.
[39:53.850 --> 39:55.810]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay, that's with a warrant, obviously.
[39:55.890 --> 40:00.010]  [SPEAKER_08]: What about at border crossings coming into this country where people are being compelled to give up their passphrases?
[40:00.000 --> 40:01.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: How about situations like that?
[40:02.620 --> 40:03.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: That's a good question.
[40:03.910 --> 40:07.230]  [SPEAKER_05]: That has been tested before, and people...
[40:07.230 --> 40:18.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's one of these gray areas where the law is not black and white, but smart people have just not come across the border with information that could be looked at at the border.
[40:18.640 --> 40:22.450]  [SPEAKER_05]: They'll ship their hard drive ahead of time to themselves from another country or whatever.
[40:22.620 --> 40:35.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: I am so tempted to just keep driving back and forth across the border until I'm challenged just so I could be the test case here, because I feel really strongly about that, that nobody should have to give up all their personal information to some border guard that wants to look through your computers.
[40:35.390 --> 40:41.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's say you're compelled by that argument to give your passphrase, and you give in and don't want to sit in jail.
[40:41.480 --> 40:45.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: If that information then is unlocked, is incriminating, wouldn't that then be...
[40:45.810 --> 40:49.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, could it be thrown out on the basis of the fact that it's...
[40:49.590 --> 40:50.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: you've been forced to incriminate yourself?
[40:51.250 --> 40:53.040]  [SPEAKER_05]: The Department of Justice says no.
[40:53.960 --> 40:54.950]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's in clear sight.
[40:55.140 --> 40:56.430]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's in clear sight on your computer.
[40:56.460 --> 40:57.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: But if you're actually...
[40:57.560 --> 41:04.330]  [SPEAKER_02]: Look, if you're actually aware of an investigation going on against you personally, you should get a lawyer and not take advice off the radio.
[41:04.480 --> 41:05.350]  [SPEAKER_08]: Don't leave your house.
[41:05.540 --> 41:06.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: Don't send emails.
[41:06.620 --> 41:07.540]  [SPEAKER_08]: Don't communicate with people.
[41:07.710 --> 41:09.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's really the best advice we can offer.
[41:09.330 --> 41:25.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: But you know, really the best advice, and I think this is something that people in both the hacker and maker worlds can help to instill in people, is learn how to protect your communications at the source, have encryption at your particular point where you start typing things.
[41:25.430 --> 41:28.690]  [SPEAKER_08]: So that way, at least you know when they're trying to find out things about you.
[41:28.790 --> 41:33.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's not something done surreptitiously, and they have to come to you and demand or request that information.
[41:34.270 --> 41:35.020]  [SPEAKER_08]: At least you know that much.
[41:35.020 --> 41:45.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I think one of the difficulties that we face is the fact that, you know, in order to use like end-to-end encryption, you have to have... you essentially have to... the other person has to support it as well.
[41:45.290 --> 41:46.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: So it's not just you, right?
[41:47.410 --> 41:51.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: And so for that reason, you know, it's not as ubiquitous as some other things.
[41:51.620 --> 42:01.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: And so at least currently these services attempt to provide some security for their users, whether through different policies or through at least protecting it between the user and the endpoint.
[42:01.330 --> 42:08.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: But the fact of the matter is that at some point the information is going to be unencrypted and, you know, unless the service says otherwise.
[42:09.910 --> 42:11.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: But there are other things too.
[42:11.310 --> 42:25.390]  [SPEAKER_08]: For instance, if you connect to a webpage, if you use secure connection, HTTPS instead of HTTP, then there are many points where your data can't be looked at until you get to the destination.
[42:25.710 --> 42:25.730]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[42:25.730 --> 42:26.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's between you...
[42:26.270 --> 42:28.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: So between you and that provider, it's encrypted.
[42:28.770 --> 42:32.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: Once it gets there, obviously it has to be decrypted because otherwise they won't know what to do.
[42:32.810 --> 42:33.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: Exactly.
[42:33.310 --> 42:35.390]  [SPEAKER_08]: But you've eliminated so many possible sources.
[42:35.620 --> 42:38.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: You've eliminated the hops between you and the provider.
[42:38.190 --> 42:38.290]  [SPEAKER_08]: Right.
[42:38.290 --> 42:39.830]  [SPEAKER_08]: Little things like that do make a big difference.
[42:39.850 --> 42:40.190]  [SPEAKER_08]: Not right.
[42:40.370 --> 42:44.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: So yeah, we're like, you know, dancing around all these various things.
[42:44.250 --> 42:48.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: But to me, it seems like what it really just comes down to is the government is saying privacy is bad.
[42:48.690 --> 42:51.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: We need to be able to look at everything you do.
[42:51.910 --> 42:58.000]  [SPEAKER_01]: So ultimately what we're going to have to deal with is, do we want privacy or do we want to let the government look at everything we're doing?
[42:58.000 --> 42:58.330]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[42:58.480 --> 43:04.460]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, actually, that leads into an interesting point because let's just take a step over and be devil's advocates for a moment.
[43:04.460 --> 43:07.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: And you have to be devil's advocates to take the government side here.
[43:07.370 --> 43:08.790]  [SPEAKER_08]: But let's listen to what they have to say.
[43:08.870 --> 43:11.910]  [SPEAKER_08]: They say we're talking about lawfully authorized intercepts.
[43:11.980 --> 43:13.710]  [SPEAKER_08]: We're not talking about expanding authority.
[43:13.870 --> 43:20.670]  [SPEAKER_08]: We're talking about preserving our ability to execute our existing authority in order to protect the public safety and national security.
[43:20.670 --> 43:29.690]  [SPEAKER_08]: What they're saying is that we've evolved from the days of using wire landlines, wired phones, where you could just stick a wiretap on that.
[43:29.750 --> 43:31.750]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now we're using all kinds of other ways.
[43:31.750 --> 43:32.500]  [SPEAKER_08]: We're using Skype.
[43:32.710 --> 43:38.450]  [SPEAKER_08]: We're using all sorts of Internet capabilities that apparently are not as easy to wiretap.
[43:38.450 --> 43:39.870]  [SPEAKER_08]: So how do we respond to that?
[43:40.080 --> 43:50.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I just think that it's kind of a moot point at this point because we're beyond the point where there are major corporations and major companies in charge of how we communicate.
[43:50.100 --> 43:51.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: It just doesn't exist anymore.
[43:51.690 --> 43:53.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, what you have now...
[43:53.560 --> 43:59.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, no, but what I'm saying is that...
[43:59.480 --> 44:01.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: There are more ways to communicate than there were before.
[44:01.920 --> 44:06.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: And the fact of the matter is it's impossible to kind of get control over all of them.
[44:06.560 --> 44:16.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: And so for that reason, I think that they can try and they might be successful at this, but ultimately they're not going to be able to stop someone who really wants to communicate securely.
[44:17.170 --> 44:22.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: You can join this conversation, 212-209-2900.
[44:22.120 --> 44:30.080]  [SPEAKER_08]: We're talking about the new proposal by the Obama administration to make it a lot easier to wiretap the Internet, right?
[44:30.230 --> 44:37.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, on the flip side, they may have cracked some of these encryption algorithms or have the ability to that we don't know about because, you know, the NSA doesn't tell people when they do that.
[44:38.020 --> 44:38.690]  [SPEAKER_08]: They don't do that.
[44:39.720 --> 44:44.290]  [SPEAKER_12]: But hopefully that's not the case because the scientific community hasn't at least figured it out yet.
[44:44.840 --> 44:46.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, I have two responses.
[44:46.800 --> 44:49.230]  [SPEAKER_02]: The quote you read is from the general counsel for the FBI.
[44:49.440 --> 44:49.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right.
[44:49.580 --> 44:58.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: The first response is, first of all, that I don't really care to preserve their existing authority to surveil me, so I'm happy to do anything that makes it harder for them.
[44:59.230 --> 45:11.290]  [SPEAKER_02]: And the second is that it's complete nonsense for them to claim that a new law that requires new work to be done in every Internet company on the planet is not expending their authority.
[45:12.520 --> 45:14.190]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's just not factually true.
[45:14.190 --> 45:20.690]  [SPEAKER_08]: And when you mention on the planet, that brings a point up that this is global.
[45:20.860 --> 45:25.290]  [SPEAKER_08]: This is something that you can easily route messages or phone calls through different countries.
[45:25.860 --> 45:31.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: Unlike in the past, how does their authority enter into different parts of the world?
[45:31.940 --> 45:36.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, so it's a bit difficult to know the details of a bill that hasn't been proposed finally yet.
[45:36.480 --> 45:51.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: But one of the things they want to do is that any foreign company that does business in the United States at all, so if they have like a sales office in the US, then they have to have, also as part of that sales office, an office that is capable of complying with this law.
[45:51.100 --> 46:01.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: So if you have a company that is only overseas and does not like take your money, does not do anything in the US, then they wouldn't be subject to this law.
[46:01.520 --> 46:04.210]  [SPEAKER_02]: But the law is obviously written to be as broad as possible.
[46:05.060 --> 46:15.670]  [SPEAKER_02]: And so similarly, a foreign government is, you know, this is bad enough with just the US government, but foreign governments are going to see this law and say, well, if the US does it, we are going to do it too.
[46:15.670 --> 46:21.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: So soon your communications will be surveillable by any government anywhere in the world.
[46:22.100 --> 46:24.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: And that's even scarier than just the US government.
[46:24.520 --> 46:24.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right.
[46:24.600 --> 46:29.920]  [SPEAKER_08]: And as this New York Times article says, this is something that's going to be copied globally if it works, quote unquote, here.
[46:30.400 --> 46:34.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: And as we've said, any government in the world is going to be interested in this kind of a thing.
[46:34.770 --> 46:38.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, what about the countries that actually have real privacy laws?
[46:38.540 --> 46:57.600]  [SPEAKER_01]: If the US passes this law, what they'll basically be doing then is saying, I mean, you know, if this law goes forward as we're seeing it right now, that companies from these countries where it's illegal to divulge certain private information could then basically not be allowed to do business in the US because it's against their laws to divulge.
[46:57.710 --> 46:59.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: And if they come to the US, they must.
[46:59.710 --> 47:10.800]  [SPEAKER_01]: And then so does that mean that then any country, any company from a country that has real privacy laws won't be allowed to do business in the major country like the US?
[47:10.800 --> 47:12.190]  [SPEAKER_02]: What country is that?
[47:12.290 --> 47:15.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: There are countries with better privacy laws than we have in the US.
[47:15.420 --> 47:17.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: There's Sweden, Iceland, I think those are the examples.
[47:17.270 --> 47:24.230]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, I mean, there are countries with better privacy laws, but there are very few countries or I would say no countries with laws that are really that good.
[47:24.320 --> 47:27.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I think strong arm pressure from the US would make those laws disappear pretty quickly.
[47:28.100 --> 47:28.710]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, that's my point.
[47:28.820 --> 47:30.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: There's an interesting case.
[47:30.400 --> 47:46.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: There's a guy who's a travel writer, Edward Hausbrook, who, he's American, but he knows that there are... when he flies to Europe, there are certain data privacy laws that apply to his flight records, you know, held by KLM, for instance, which is the European carrier.
[47:46.600 --> 47:49.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: So he said, you know, did you give my records to the US government?
[47:50.060 --> 47:52.290]  [SPEAKER_02]: You are required by Dutch law to tell me.
[47:52.540 --> 47:53.600]  [SPEAKER_02]: And they don't know the answer.
[47:53.730 --> 47:54.420]  [SPEAKER_02]: They won't give it to him.
[47:54.500 --> 47:55.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: They can't give it to him.
[47:55.440 --> 47:58.190]  [SPEAKER_02]: So this is going to be the same thing, but even when you don't fly.
[47:58.730 --> 47:59.230]  [SPEAKER_08]: All right.
[47:59.290 --> 48:00.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: Let's take some phone calls.
[48:00.420 --> 48:01.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: Interesting conversation.
[48:01.520 --> 48:02.540]  [SPEAKER_08]: Interesting times we live in.
[48:03.520 --> 48:05.080]  [SPEAKER_08]: 212-209-2900.
[48:05.270 --> 48:06.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: Let's see who's out there.
[48:06.710 --> 48:07.290]  [SPEAKER_08]: Good evening.
[48:07.420 --> 48:08.060]  [SPEAKER_08]: You're on off the hook.
[48:09.500 --> 48:10.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, let me turn my radio down.
[48:11.040 --> 48:11.460]  [SPEAKER_03]: Please do that.
[48:11.840 --> 48:13.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: Got a couple of questions for you.
[48:13.400 --> 48:15.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: You've been speaking across a broad spectrum of stuff.
[48:16.270 --> 48:19.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: I wonder if you guys have heard of the Swiss company Quantique.
[48:21.300 --> 48:22.190]  [SPEAKER_08]: Quantique is a...
[48:22.190 --> 48:23.080]  [SPEAKER_08]: A lot of heads shaking here.
[48:23.080 --> 48:32.190]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's a quantum encryption technology based on electronic light, meaning photon conversion.
[48:32.770 --> 48:33.270]  [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[48:33.400 --> 48:35.790]  [SPEAKER_03]: And your messages are sent in photons.
[48:36.250 --> 48:37.020]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[48:37.020 --> 48:42.460]  [SPEAKER_03]: And this has been experimented with in Switzerland for now probably three to four years.
[48:42.460 --> 48:48.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: They came up with this technology and became the subject of great perusal.
[48:48.840 --> 48:58.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: The whole NSA looked at them very, very closely because they were basically developing an unbreakable encryption technology point-to-point quantum...
[48:58.060 --> 48:59.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[48:59.270 --> 49:01.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: So quantum encryption basically...
[49:01.340 --> 49:01.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: I wouldn't...
[49:01.920 --> 49:02.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well...
[49:02.960 --> 49:08.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: So it works on the principle that you're actually able to tell when somebody is eavesdropping.
[49:08.600 --> 49:09.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: So it's not necessarily that...
[49:09.800 --> 49:13.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: So if someone was trying to eavesdrop, you could know that it's not secure.
[49:13.560 --> 49:13.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: Sure.
[49:13.880 --> 49:15.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: So I wouldn't say that it's...
[49:16.360 --> 49:19.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: I guess it's unbreakable in the fact that somebody...
[49:19.000 --> 49:22.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: You would know if someone was trying to listen and thus would just avoid that kind of interaction.
[49:22.940 --> 49:23.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[49:23.230 --> 49:45.040]  [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, you guys have been talking about sort of the oblique permission, which is the constant, you know, want to just tap and do what we call roving tapping, which is, you know, not having specific information that would lead you to a number, but you would want to rove and tap a number of numbers.
[49:45.040 --> 49:45.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[49:45.600 --> 49:50.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, I mean, the thing is that quantum encryption is great and it does provide end-to-end security.
[49:50.670 --> 49:54.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: And it's great that it actually, you know, works and experimentally can be shown.
[49:54.710 --> 49:57.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: But you're still only, you know, connecting between two points.
[49:57.560 --> 50:10.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: So say you have a quantum encrypted connection between you and point B, if point B is forced to comply with government regulations that give, you know, that reveal your information, then the encryption doesn't matter.
[50:10.560 --> 50:13.440]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, there's also some other serious issues with quantum encryption.
[50:13.440 --> 50:29.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, what they're really, what they're calling encryption anyway, is that, you know, in what we're describing right now, we're talking about polarized light and, you know, if you're using, you know, photons and the biggest problem is you can't use a repeater because as soon as you have,
[50:29.380 --> 50:35.040]  [SPEAKER_01]: deal with the light at all in any way, you mess up the information, you lose the information.
[50:35.290 --> 50:41.440]  [SPEAKER_01]: So we have a problem where we can't have the signal travel any further than however quickly it degrades.
[50:41.670 --> 50:43.940]  [SPEAKER_01]: And the Internet works by having repeaters everywhere.
[50:43.980 --> 50:45.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: Otherwise, the electricity would degrade.
[50:45.230 --> 50:47.020]  [SPEAKER_01]: And we can't do that with this quantum encrypted thing.
[50:47.580 --> 50:47.670]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[50:47.880 --> 50:49.250]  [SPEAKER_03]: Let's bring up a couple of things.
[50:49.580 --> 50:57.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: A number of years ago, a guy called Nachio, N-A-C-C-I-C-O, I believe.
[50:57.860 --> 50:59.300]  [SPEAKER_03]: He was the head of Quest.
[50:59.480 --> 51:02.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: He was the CEO of Quest Corporation in Denver.
[51:02.980 --> 51:05.880]  [SPEAKER_03]: And he was prosecuted for insider trading.
[51:06.420 --> 51:18.750]  [SPEAKER_03]: But reality says that he was prosecuted because he gave away certain information that regarded an NSA system that was going to use dark fiber.
[51:19.040 --> 51:32.500]  [SPEAKER_03]: It was going to light up all this dark fiber that had been put in the ground and was unused for a totally separate POTS system in the United States that could be used by intelligence and other business intelligence functions.
[51:32.960 --> 51:43.670]  [SPEAKER_03]: And he was prosecuted for essentially beefing up stock because he knew that these black programs would boost the value of Quest Corporation.
[51:44.380 --> 51:46.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: And there's a huge legal case around this.
[51:46.770 --> 51:47.460]  [SPEAKER_03]: Right, go ahead.
[51:47.620 --> 51:52.210]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'd like to point out that Quest also refused to comply with the secret NSA...
[51:52.210 --> 51:53.440]  [SPEAKER_05]: That's correct.
[51:53.600 --> 51:54.480]  [SPEAKER_05]: ...sever years ago.
[51:54.600 --> 51:56.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: And that was prior to this guy being prosecuted.
[51:56.520 --> 51:58.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: So there's another angle to this as well.
[51:58.140 --> 51:59.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, that's correct.
[51:59.600 --> 52:06.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: Their lawyer, in fact, was asked the NSA to draft a release letter and they refused to do that.
[52:06.340 --> 52:07.750]  [SPEAKER_03]: So he refused to comply.
[52:08.820 --> 52:11.620]  [SPEAKER_03]: That case should be examined very, very thoroughly.
[52:11.840 --> 52:20.420]  [SPEAKER_03]: I know you guys talk about this stuff a lot, but that is a very, very important case because that fiber is owned by Anschutz.
[52:20.420 --> 52:30.100]  [SPEAKER_03]: And he took all the rights of ways for his railway purchases and he used those railway rights of way to lay cable.
[52:30.380 --> 52:33.400]  [SPEAKER_03]: And that fiber is still in the ground and plenty of it.
[52:33.400 --> 52:33.940]  [SPEAKER_08]: All right.
[52:34.000 --> 52:35.270]  [SPEAKER_08]: Listen, thanks for bringing up these issues.
[52:35.400 --> 52:35.920]  [SPEAKER_08]: They're very important.
[52:36.020 --> 52:37.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: I'm sure our listeners will investigate it further.
[52:38.100 --> 52:40.820]  [SPEAKER_08]: Let's see who else is out there with questions or points to bring up.
[52:40.820 --> 52:41.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: Good evening.
[52:41.520 --> 52:42.230]  [SPEAKER_08]: You're on off the hook.
[52:43.900 --> 52:44.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: Speak up.
[52:44.480 --> 52:45.250]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[52:45.380 --> 52:45.520]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hi.
[52:46.170 --> 52:46.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: Turn down the radio.
[52:47.620 --> 52:47.770]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[52:47.840 --> 52:51.710]  [SPEAKER_04]: That legal stuff is very interesting, but it goes way beyond me.
[52:52.100 --> 52:55.750]  [SPEAKER_04]: What I'm curious about is the mathematical end of this stuff.
[52:55.750 --> 53:06.250]  [SPEAKER_04]: Like, I don't know the name of the encryption method, but it deals with like, you know, a very large, uniquely factorable number.
[53:07.080 --> 53:13.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: And, you know, I don't remember the name of it, but it's like, it's, I think it's believed to be unbreakable.
[53:14.040 --> 53:16.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's no, it's well, so what it is, is it's called RSA.
[53:16.460 --> 53:16.460]  Okay.
[53:17.040 --> 53:20.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: Um, and it, it's a way of, so public, it's public key encryption.
[53:21.100 --> 53:22.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's, it's a way of key exchange.
[53:22.300 --> 53:28.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: So you have, uh, one half, uh, the public key that you publish is the, um, the multiplication of these two prime factors.
[53:28.670 --> 53:36.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: And then, uh, it, when you encrypt stuff with it, um, it uses modulus and one way functions so that given the public key, you can't decrypt it.
[53:36.790 --> 53:42.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, um, knowing the two factors of the public key, uh, you can unlock it.
[53:43.380 --> 53:44.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, that's totally great.
[53:44.710 --> 53:46.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's hard with current technology.
[53:46.690 --> 53:46.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right.
[53:46.820 --> 53:59.730]  [SPEAKER_12]: Um, but it's actually not proven that it is impossible for, uh, for, for the factoring to, to, to, to be, so just nobody's discovered an algorithm to, to be able to do the factoring quickly, but it may exist.
[53:59.840 --> 54:01.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: It hasn't been proven that it doesn't exist.
[54:01.460 --> 54:09.750]  [SPEAKER_12]: So if that is, uh, determined to be possible, then the whole thing would fall apart because you'd be able to, uh, factor these, these large numbers.
[54:09.750 --> 54:22.770]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, the situation is, as it has been for, uh, for at least a few years now, where it is believed to be unbreakable, but, um, effectively unbreakable, but it cannot be proven to be so.
[54:22.980 --> 54:23.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: Right.
[54:23.120 --> 54:37.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, this is fascinating and I don't mean that facetiously, but it's also in a sense completely irrelevant because if I, um, securely transmit my data with something that is in fact unbreakable to Facebook and then the government calls up Facebook and says,
[54:37.460 --> 54:39.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hey, uh, what did Mike tell you?
[54:39.060 --> 54:45.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Uh, then, then the, the wonder, wondrous nature of the encryption used between me and Facebook is totally irrelevant.
[54:45.820 --> 54:47.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: What world are you putting it on Facebook for, Mike?
[54:47.440 --> 54:49.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: If it's something private, you don't want to put it there.
[54:50.440 --> 54:51.210]  [SPEAKER_02]: I might.
[54:51.440 --> 54:51.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: Put it on...
[54:51.820 --> 54:53.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: Look, there, there are dumb criminals out there.
[54:53.730 --> 54:55.060]  [SPEAKER_08]: My space at least, but, uh...
[54:55.060 --> 54:56.080]  [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, I'm off.
[54:56.270 --> 54:56.710]  [SPEAKER_08]: All right.
[54:56.860 --> 55:09.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: The other thing quickly I'd just like to point out about public key encryption is that, uh, that, that part of what you described is only used for, uh, exchanging a key, at which point then you use a faster, uh, shared key algorithm.
[55:09.460 --> 55:11.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: So you're using, then you're not even using that anymore.
[55:11.460 --> 55:13.300]  [SPEAKER_08]: Let's try and take one more, one more phone call.
[55:13.420 --> 55:14.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: We can go on for hours about this.
[55:14.640 --> 55:15.460]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's, uh, certainly true.
[55:15.560 --> 55:15.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: Good evening.
[55:16.060 --> 55:16.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: You're on off the hook.
[55:18.940 --> 55:19.790]  [SPEAKER_08]: Speak up, please.
[55:20.480 --> 55:20.920]  [SPEAKER_06]: Hello?
[55:21.140 --> 55:21.400]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yes.
[55:21.580 --> 55:22.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: What's on your mind?
[55:22.960 --> 55:23.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: Hi.
[55:23.440 --> 55:28.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: Um, earlier you mentioned these end-to-end software-based encryption tools like AGP.
[55:28.540 --> 55:33.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: To the best of your understanding, under this proposed law, would that be illegal also?
[55:34.840 --> 55:36.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, no.
[55:36.080 --> 55:37.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: Would it be illegal to use PGP?
[55:38.580 --> 55:38.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: No.
[55:39.230 --> 55:41.670]  [SPEAKER_02]: Not according to this Times article.
[55:41.980 --> 55:45.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: Um, but, again, that's pretty, not everyone is doing that.
[55:45.940 --> 55:50.730]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, I mean, should, should we believe the people that are saying Obama administration is trying to make encryption illegal?
[55:50.880 --> 55:52.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: Is that, is that a bit of a stretch?
[55:52.730 --> 55:55.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: Or is it simply they, they, they want to be able to have all the passwords?
[55:56.270 --> 55:56.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: The latter.
[55:57.230 --> 55:57.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[55:57.480 --> 55:59.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, that's almost, almost as bad as far as I'm concerned.
[55:59.690 --> 55:59.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: Not right.
[55:59.840 --> 56:03.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I think if, even if it's not, what we're dealing with is a whole slippery slope thing.
[56:03.290 --> 56:10.020]  [SPEAKER_01]: If they say that all providers must give us back doors and then everyone uses end-to-end communication, that's only a matter of time before the end-to-end starts becoming illegal.
[56:10.040 --> 56:10.360]  [SPEAKER_07]: Rob, last word.
[56:10.600 --> 56:10.730]  Yeah.
[56:11.300 --> 56:14.560]  [SPEAKER_07]: And, uh, they're, they're not trying to make PGP illegal, but, uh, they're trying to make it irrelevant.
[56:14.880 --> 56:19.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: And, um, with any encryption, whether it's PGP or whatever comes up next, it's always an arms race.
[56:19.080 --> 56:20.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: You don't know what's going to be broken until it's broken.
[56:21.840 --> 56:22.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: Absolutely.
[56:22.980 --> 56:23.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: All right.
[56:23.460 --> 56:24.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, 2600 meetings this Friday.
[56:24.640 --> 56:26.750]  [SPEAKER_08]: Remember, we're not on for the next, uh, two weeks.
[56:26.860 --> 56:28.190]  [SPEAKER_08]: We'll be back in, in, in three weeks.