Off The Hook - 2010-12-15

[00:01.410 --> 00:08.130]  [SPEAKER_00]: Hi, this is Iggy Pop, and you're listening to WBAI in New York, the voice of truth.
[00:09.370 --> 00:17.510]  [SPEAKER_00]: I took a pound in from the radio today.
[00:17.990 --> 00:22.250]  [SPEAKER_00]: I heard the radio say it over and over.
[00:25.770 --> 00:28.150]  [SPEAKER_00]: And there was no escape.
[00:30.410 --> 00:35.770]  [SPEAKER_00]: This is WBAI 99.5 FM in New York, and this is Iggy Pop.
[00:40.190 --> 00:44.310]  [SPEAKER_14]: And you're listening to 99.5 FM, WBAI New York.
[00:44.490 --> 00:47.390]  [SPEAKER_14]: The time is 7pm, time for Off The Hook.
[01:04.720 --> 01:05.360]  Much worse
[01:08.560 --> 01:10.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: if I'm for the best, it's made for worst.
[01:11.660 --> 01:14.360]  [SPEAKER_06]: I hope that's understood one minute, no!
[01:33.100 --> 01:34.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: And good evening.
[01:34.200 --> 01:35.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: The program is Off The Hook.
[01:35.700 --> 01:38.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: This is Red Hacked here, filling in for Emmanuel in the studio.
[01:38.800 --> 01:40.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm joined tonight by Mike.
[01:40.560 --> 01:40.960]  [SPEAKER_11]: Hi there.
[01:41.500 --> 01:42.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Dot Ret.
[01:42.220 --> 01:42.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: Hello.
[01:42.800 --> 01:43.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: Rob T.
[01:43.620 --> 01:44.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: Firefly.
[01:44.220 --> 01:44.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: Good evening.
[01:45.540 --> 01:47.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: And in the corner, we have Jim.
[01:47.840 --> 01:48.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: Hi.
[01:49.100 --> 01:52.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: And on the phone, I believe, I've been told, we have Emmanuel.
[01:54.260 --> 01:54.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yes, you do.
[01:55.080 --> 01:57.780]  [SPEAKER_05]: Emmanuel here, joined by Kyle.
[01:58.280 --> 02:00.840]  [SPEAKER_05]: And we're both in Frumso, Norway.
[02:01.520 --> 02:02.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: And that was my next question.
[02:03.300 --> 02:05.760]  [SPEAKER_11]: You should also say that we have Bernie S.
[02:05.840 --> 02:06.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: on the phone.
[02:06.280 --> 02:06.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, right.
[02:06.660 --> 02:07.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: We have Bernie.
[02:07.100 --> 02:07.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: Of course.
[02:07.660 --> 02:08.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: And Bernie S.
[02:08.220 --> 02:08.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: down in Philadelphia.
[02:08.620 --> 02:09.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: I actually forgot.
[02:09.340 --> 02:09.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: Sorry, Bernie.
[02:10.180 --> 02:11.440]  [SPEAKER_05]: All the way from Philadelphia.
[02:13.600 --> 02:16.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, now, we're in Frumso, Norway.
[02:16.880 --> 02:19.460]  [SPEAKER_05]: And for those who don't know, that's in the northern part of the country.
[02:20.080 --> 02:25.420]  [SPEAKER_05]: Frumso is home to the northernmost university in the world.
[02:25.660 --> 02:30.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's home to the northernmost functioning theater in Europe.
[02:30.780 --> 02:34.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: And all kinds of other interesting things.
[02:34.340 --> 02:37.320]  [SPEAKER_05]: Right now, though, it's in the middle of darkness.
[02:37.860 --> 02:40.460]  [SPEAKER_05]: The sun set in, I believe, November.
[02:40.680 --> 02:41.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: It has not been seen since.
[02:41.780 --> 02:43.740]  [SPEAKER_05]: It won't come back up again until January.
[02:43.740 --> 02:47.400]  [SPEAKER_05]: So it makes a very interesting day here, where it's completely pitch black dark.
[02:47.660 --> 02:54.060]  [SPEAKER_05]: And then you get a few hours in the daytime of, like, dusk, where it's kind of dim out.
[02:54.260 --> 03:00.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: But surprisingly, people are walking around and having full days, active lives, and things like that.
[03:00.640 --> 03:01.940]  [SPEAKER_05]: But it is very, very strange.
[03:02.540 --> 03:07.340]  [SPEAKER_05]: And Kyle and I are here on our way to the CCC Congress in a couple of weeks in Berlin.
[03:07.740 --> 03:10.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: It probably would have been nicer to visit Norway in the summer.
[03:11.960 --> 03:14.120]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, I have visited this very place in the summer.
[03:14.240 --> 03:14.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: Oh, okay.
[03:15.340 --> 03:18.120]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's kind of weird, too, because then you have the sun that doesn't set.
[03:19.880 --> 03:22.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: And there's all kinds of other challenges as well.
[03:22.660 --> 03:27.860]  [SPEAKER_05]: But I'd like to actually just touch upon, for a brief moment, some of the things that we went through on the way over here.
[03:28.000 --> 03:32.840]  [SPEAKER_05]: Because, of course, we had to go through TSA security going out of JFK Airport.
[03:32.840 --> 03:41.620]  [SPEAKER_05]: And we went through no less than three different security checkpoints on the way up here, the three different flights that we had to take.
[03:41.700 --> 03:49.740]  [SPEAKER_05]: But each one, for inexplicable reasons, we had to actually leave, go out, come back in, and go through all kinds of challenges.
[03:49.980 --> 03:58.160]  [SPEAKER_05]: And Kyle, as you know, is a photographer and has a very special situation that he has to go through each and every time.
[03:58.340 --> 04:02.080]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'll let him get into this just a little bit, because it's an ongoing saga.
[04:03.620 --> 04:08.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, we had a little bit of a challenge coming through.
[04:08.620 --> 04:15.180]  [SPEAKER_04]: We had to check into customs, and we went right back out when we landed in Oslo.
[04:15.600 --> 04:22.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: And, of course, there was a transfer we made in Iceland, of all places, which was another security screening.
[04:22.700 --> 04:25.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: And that was actually the first one.
[04:25.160 --> 04:40.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: And I had a little bit of difficulty and actually had to ask for a supervisor, because they were almost afraid to run my film through the x-ray machine because I was maintaining my position that I didn't want it x-rayed.
[04:41.260 --> 04:44.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: But after I spoke with the supervisor, I was able to have him hand-inspected.
[04:45.260 --> 04:47.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: And it got better from there.
[04:47.840 --> 04:51.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: The flight from Oslo to Tromsø was very, very smooth.
[04:52.180 --> 04:57.140]  [SPEAKER_04]: It was a very beautiful, simple Scandinavian airport.
[04:57.760 --> 04:59.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: The architecture and everything was gorgeous.
[04:59.620 --> 05:07.560]  [SPEAKER_04]: And that rang true even with the security screening area that I believe was run by a subcontracted company.
[05:07.780 --> 05:10.040]  [SPEAKER_04]: And they had all this equipment and tools.
[05:10.040 --> 05:11.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: It was just really well designed.
[05:11.500 --> 05:16.140]  [SPEAKER_04]: And as soon as I showed them the film, they handed it from one person to the other.
[05:16.340 --> 05:19.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: They swiped it with the swabbing machine.
[05:19.340 --> 05:20.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: And it was a done deal.
[05:20.840 --> 05:22.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: So that was very, very simple.
[05:23.140 --> 05:25.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, that's how it used to be here prior to 9-11.
[05:25.980 --> 05:26.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: There was no TSA.
[05:27.040 --> 05:31.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: So you had each airport hired security companies to do it.
[05:31.740 --> 05:34.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: And each one has, I guess, their own policies.
[05:35.760 --> 05:36.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: Right.
[05:36.900 --> 05:45.200]  [SPEAKER_04]: Another thing we noticed particularly was the body scanners in New York at JFK, where we left from.
[05:45.400 --> 05:47.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: And it was interesting.
[05:47.120 --> 05:49.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: They had, like, three major lines.
[05:49.880 --> 05:57.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: And the only one that was seemingly being used for the x-ray machines was, like, the middle line.
[05:57.500 --> 06:01.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: And we sort of instinctively went to the left of it.
[06:01.200 --> 06:04.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: And they were not...
[06:05.120 --> 06:07.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: The x-ray machine, in fact, the guy...
[06:08.680 --> 06:10.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: Are you outside?
[06:10.740 --> 06:12.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: We keep hearing this breathing noise.
[06:13.180 --> 06:14.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: Is there breathing?
[06:14.620 --> 06:15.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: Or wind.
[06:15.140 --> 06:16.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: Maybe it's somebody else that's on the line.
[06:17.180 --> 06:27.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: At any rate, the guy that did the metal scanning just sort of put his hands on my stomach and said, there, it was that quick.
[06:27.800 --> 06:34.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: And that was as much of a pat-down as he was going to give me, but did not ask anybody that I saw, really, to go through an x-ray machine.
[06:36.020 --> 06:48.200]  [SPEAKER_04]: But as we sort of got up on the landing and looked back at the security area, we did see people going through the middle x-ray device, which seemed like the only one that was being used.
[06:48.400 --> 06:51.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: And we took note of it and then sort of went on our way.
[06:52.760 --> 06:54.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, it's still supposed to be random, I think, right?
[06:54.920 --> 06:55.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: Or is it?
[06:57.500 --> 06:58.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, it should be.
[06:59.060 --> 07:07.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: But it didn't seem like anybody in the one side was really being put through, which was pretty peculiar.
[07:07.480 --> 07:11.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know, it seemed like if you went through the middle one, they were going to try to get you to go through it.
[07:12.360 --> 07:14.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: They didn't seem to be asking anybody.
[07:14.500 --> 07:16.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: So that seems like less than random.
[07:17.000 --> 07:20.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: It seemed like if you chose that line, you would have a better chance.
[07:20.480 --> 07:28.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: And if you went in this line on the left, then you wouldn't even be asked or wouldn't have as likely a chance of being subjected to that.
[07:29.040 --> 07:30.320]  [SPEAKER_04]: It was interesting to note, though.
[07:30.420 --> 07:36.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: I mean, that was very, very, you know, I don't know, different.
[07:36.380 --> 07:40.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: I hadn't ever seen one of these machines being in use personally.
[07:41.200 --> 07:44.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: Now, what would happen if you were asked to go through that machine?
[07:44.500 --> 07:46.360]  [SPEAKER_14]: And your film, what would happen then?
[07:48.060 --> 07:48.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: Oh, wow.
[07:48.820 --> 07:50.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know, I hadn't even considered that.
[07:50.700 --> 07:56.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: I was fully prepared to opt out of the entire thing.
[07:58.420 --> 08:00.800]  [SPEAKER_11]: So they would have felt up your film, I guess.
[08:00.960 --> 08:03.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: I didn't even consider if they would put my film through that.
[08:03.400 --> 08:04.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's a great question.
[08:06.220 --> 08:10.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: Absolutely, the film would probably be fogged because I think it's a different form of x-ray.
[08:10.480 --> 08:15.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's not the lower level of x-ray that your bags go through.
[08:16.640 --> 08:18.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: And it's a different way...
[08:18.580 --> 08:20.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: Right, it's not supposed to be dangerous, right?
[08:20.820 --> 08:21.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: Oh, of course.
[08:21.960 --> 08:22.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: So it's different.
[08:22.540 --> 08:23.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: Because if you...
[08:23.120 --> 08:29.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: I remember when we went to What the Hack back in 2005, they had this kind of do-it-yourself security set up there.
[08:29.660 --> 08:31.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: And one of the things I had was an x-ray machine.
[08:31.920 --> 08:36.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: And there's a very big piece of paper taped to it that said, please do not stick any limbs into this machine.
[08:37.520 --> 08:43.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: Because obviously, you know, if you give a bunch of hackers a big airport security x-ray machine, they're going to think, well, I want to see my bones.
[08:43.880 --> 08:45.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: But that would be very bad.
[08:45.960 --> 08:46.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: So...
[08:46.280 --> 08:47.760]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, that's interesting.
[08:47.900 --> 08:49.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know how they compare.
[08:49.740 --> 08:59.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: I know much larger luggage screening ones are a higher amount of x-ray than the baggage ones that maybe carry-ons go through.
[08:59.940 --> 09:02.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: So it would be interesting to find out, like, how they compare.
[09:05.080 --> 09:10.260]  [SPEAKER_11]: Now, I guess Emmanuel told me that he had some comment on the prices over there in Trump, so...
[09:10.260 --> 09:12.260]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm sorry, it was crashing the phone over to me.
[09:12.440 --> 09:13.320]  [SPEAKER_11]: You were telling...
[09:13.320 --> 09:15.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: You were saying that you had some comment on the prices?
[09:16.200 --> 09:16.500]  [SPEAKER_11]: Prices?
[09:16.720 --> 09:22.880]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, well, it's interesting because here in Norway, I hadn't realized it.
[09:22.960 --> 09:24.280]  [SPEAKER_05]: I've been here before a couple of times.
[09:24.520 --> 09:27.240]  [SPEAKER_05]: And maybe it's different, or maybe I just didn't notice it back then.
[09:27.460 --> 09:29.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: But, boy, things are expensive here.
[09:30.120 --> 09:32.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: Expensive almost to the point of absurdity.
[09:32.600 --> 09:36.020]  [SPEAKER_05]: If you want to buy a hamburger, for instance, it'll cost you about $20.
[09:37.140 --> 09:43.320]  [SPEAKER_05]: If you want to stay in even a cheap place, it'll cost you upwards of $150 a night.
[09:45.180 --> 09:47.800]  [SPEAKER_05]: Bus rides can be $6, the local ones.
[09:48.260 --> 09:50.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's like it's a different universe here.
[09:50.440 --> 09:53.780]  [SPEAKER_05]: And it's very difficult to figure out ways to just get by.
[09:54.300 --> 09:59.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: I imagine people here make enough money to be able to survive at these prices.
[09:59.800 --> 10:01.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: But, again, I don't think people go out very much.
[10:02.220 --> 10:04.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: I was just pretty stunned by that.
[10:04.180 --> 10:08.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: So we've had to sort of be a little bit savvy as to how we get through the day.
[10:08.740 --> 10:19.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: We went to a supermarket and bought all kinds of food there so that we could simply get by and not break the bank and spending money getting food outside all the time.
[10:19.720 --> 10:28.620]  [SPEAKER_05]: And, in fact, right now we're making tea inside an apartment that we rented because, well, that's a lot better than going out and paying something like five U.S.
[10:28.620 --> 10:29.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: dollars for a cup of tea.
[10:31.120 --> 10:32.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: Is the food... I'm curious.
[10:32.660 --> 10:33.100]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's a culture shock.
[10:33.240 --> 10:33.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm curious.
[10:33.680 --> 10:35.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: Is the food there in the grocery stores better than here?
[10:35.800 --> 10:40.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: Because I was struck when Junce and I went to Scotland at how much kind of better...
[10:40.960 --> 10:47.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, we went, you know, for example, to the butcher and we got, you know, some lamb that had been roaming the hills probably a few days earlier.
[10:47.000 --> 10:52.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: And I'm curious if you have kind of similar food in the grocery stores there.
[10:52.220 --> 10:53.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: Is it a European thing?
[10:53.860 --> 11:07.940]  [SPEAKER_05]: We haven't sampled all of the different things that they sell here, but we did notice a huge variety of meats and various other products such as produce and vegetables, fruits, that kind of thing.
[11:08.060 --> 11:13.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: But, yeah, you know, they really have a lot of local things.
[11:13.180 --> 11:13.460]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[11:15.200 --> 11:18.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: Manuel, what grows in Tromso in December?
[11:18.760 --> 11:20.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, they have a brewery.
[11:20.540 --> 11:21.100]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'll say that.
[11:21.240 --> 11:22.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: They make beer here.
[11:22.300 --> 11:22.880]  [SPEAKER_05]: They grow beer.
[11:23.120 --> 11:23.300]  [SPEAKER_11]: All right.
[11:23.340 --> 11:24.240]  [SPEAKER_11]: That wasn't my question.
[11:27.840 --> 11:28.320]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[11:28.320 --> 11:34.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: They don't seem to have a lot of, like, agriculture as far as, like, vineyards.
[11:34.380 --> 11:37.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: There's no possible way, obviously, to grow wine.
[11:38.000 --> 11:39.780]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's one example of agriculture.
[11:39.780 --> 11:40.240]  [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[11:40.340 --> 11:41.080]  [SPEAKER_11]: What about food?
[11:41.080 --> 11:43.720]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, beer, wine, we love them both.
[11:43.820 --> 11:44.500]  [SPEAKER_11]: But what about food?
[11:46.380 --> 11:53.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, yeah, I mean, that reigns true with, you know, vegetables and, like, growing that kind of stuff.
[11:54.600 --> 11:58.240]  [SPEAKER_04]: So I don't think it's actually available as local.
[11:58.420 --> 11:59.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: And I don't know.
[11:59.060 --> 12:05.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: We talked to someone local who was talking about how the older ways, like some of the villages, are dying out.
[12:05.540 --> 12:09.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: And they used to have, you know, livestock and, you know, smaller villages.
[12:10.140 --> 12:16.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know, each family would specialize in a different form of either livestock or...
[12:16.020 --> 12:18.520]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm not sure about plants.
[12:18.700 --> 12:19.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't...
[12:19.100 --> 12:20.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: I didn't hear much about that.
[12:20.120 --> 12:22.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't think it's as easy to do that up here.
[12:23.020 --> 12:23.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, probably in the summer.
[12:24.360 --> 12:33.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: But, yeah, but a lot of the younger people, younger generations, it's, you know, these towns are diminishing, getting smaller and smaller, like, you know, going down to, like, you know, 26 people.
[12:33.280 --> 12:50.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: And then the younger people aren't carrying on that tradition, and they're moving to, you know, urban environments and kind of going with what, you know, the rest of the world is doing as far as globalizing and that whole thing, which is really interesting,
[12:50.400 --> 13:00.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: because I think in really progressive or, like, urban places, you see this throwback to sustainability and local farming movements and stuff.
[13:00.620 --> 13:07.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: And in the places where that has been the case for centuries, you're still seeing it dwindle a little bit.
[13:08.000 --> 13:09.880]  [SPEAKER_04]: So that's about as much as I could say about that.
[13:11.620 --> 13:18.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: Now, we've been perusing the Norwegian airwaves a bit, listening to radio and watching TV.
[13:19.120 --> 13:27.340]  [SPEAKER_05]: And actually, we saw something last night, very late last night, about 3 in the morning on Swedish TV, which is piped in here as well, a documentary on our friend Julian Assange.
[13:27.480 --> 13:31.940]  [SPEAKER_05]: And WikiLeaks, it's big news here and everywhere around the world, of course.
[13:32.560 --> 13:35.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: This is, if you look this up on YouTube, you should be able to find it.
[13:35.740 --> 13:37.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's on a network called SVT.
[13:37.700 --> 13:52.800]  [SPEAKER_05]: And it came out a couple of days ago, and it goes into WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, the charges against him, the other leaking sites, such as OpenLeaks, that have just begun operations as well.
[13:52.800 --> 13:58.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: So, do you guys have any updates on what's going on with WikiLeaks or Julian Assange?
[13:59.020 --> 14:00.360]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, he's still in jail.
[14:00.640 --> 14:08.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: I guess the British judge said that he could have bail, and then the Swedish people appealed, and somehow he's still in there.
[14:09.480 --> 14:10.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: I guess pending the appeal.
[14:11.660 --> 14:18.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: We heard the same thing, and either way, it looks like he won't be able to leave the UK until sometime in January, at the earliest.
[14:20.140 --> 14:25.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, I mean, I would assume that that would be because he'd be extradited somewhere else and not of his own volition, right?
[14:26.880 --> 14:34.900]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, well, there is going to be a hearing on the extradition, I believe, in, I think, January 11th is the date I heard.
[14:35.080 --> 14:43.700]  [SPEAKER_05]: But if he's granted bail, he was granted bail, but he's allowed to actually take that offer up, it'll be decided tomorrow, on Thursday, is what I've been told.
[14:44.040 --> 14:47.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm still waiting to see the trick that they're going to pull to get him into this country.
[14:47.300 --> 14:48.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm sure it's coming.
[14:49.200 --> 14:54.260]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, it's probably rewriting the Constitution or whatever it is that they do in situations like this.
[14:55.180 --> 15:02.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: But, yeah, certainly, certainly it's something that is of great interest to people here, as well as in the States.
[15:03.160 --> 15:07.920]  [SPEAKER_05]: As far as new developments, what has happened since last week?
[15:08.020 --> 15:09.800]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, Julian had been arrested last week.
[15:10.360 --> 15:16.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: I believe the denial of service attacks began after the show last week.
[15:16.660 --> 15:17.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: Was that correct?
[15:18.600 --> 15:22.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's been such a whirlwind, it's hard to remember exactly the timing of everything.
[15:22.140 --> 15:23.140]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, there was a lot.
[15:24.200 --> 15:25.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, there certainly was.
[15:25.900 --> 15:33.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Did you see that Iceland was talking about kicking out MasterCard and Visa because they refused to give donations through to WikiLeaks?
[15:34.400 --> 15:37.060]  [SPEAKER_05]: I did not hear that, but that would be awesome if that were true.
[15:37.280 --> 15:39.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm going to double-check that, but I definitely saw that.
[15:41.040 --> 15:49.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: There was one interesting story that I just glanced upon that I thought was pretty, well, sort of humorous as well.
[15:50.060 --> 15:57.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: Probably not to the people involved, but basically media in Pakistan published a fake WikiLeaks cable that attacked India.
[15:58.100 --> 16:08.240]  [SPEAKER_05]: In other words, this has gotten to the point where various people or entities are publishing stories, saying horrible things, and then saying, well, we saw it on WikiLeaks, so it must be true.
[16:09.360 --> 16:12.880]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, I have that report here, actually, and it's pretty entertaining.
[16:13.320 --> 16:27.600]  [SPEAKER_10]: According to the reports, the fake reports, which were published in a couple of Pakistani newspapers purported to be WikiLeaks material, according to these reports, American diplomats issued withering portrayals of top Indian generals because, of course,
[16:27.720 --> 16:29.820]  [SPEAKER_10]: Pakistan has a rivalry going with India.
[16:30.720 --> 16:48.060]  [SPEAKER_10]: And these American diplomats called an Indian general self-obsessed, petulant, and idiosyncratic while heaping praise upon Pakistan's generals and exonerating the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency of any involvement in some attacks that happened in Mumbai in 2008.
[16:49.040 --> 17:00.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, what I just think is interesting is how they thought they could even possibly get away with this, because immediately you had news organizations going through the reams of cables leaked by WikiLeaks, and they're like, well, we can't find these.
[17:01.660 --> 17:03.660]  [SPEAKER_07]: Pakistanis are maybe making things up.
[17:03.780 --> 17:10.780]  [SPEAKER_10]: I think they're sort of depending on the fact that most people, the average people, have not read the actual leaks, and they're just depending on what they see in the media about them.
[17:10.900 --> 17:15.160]  [SPEAKER_10]: And they're willing to take things at face value, especially if it's what they want to hear.
[17:15.380 --> 17:18.660]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, you know who can't read the actual leaks is everyone in the Air Force.
[17:18.880 --> 17:19.040]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah.
[17:20.280 --> 17:24.500]  [SPEAKER_11]: The Air Force just... and it got relatively little publicity, the story.
[17:24.600 --> 17:26.440]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think it's probably the biggest story of the whole thing.
[17:26.720 --> 17:40.500]  [SPEAKER_11]: The Air Force has blocked access not only to WikiLeaks itself, but to the New York Times, to the Guardian, to the Spiegel, Le Monde, El Pais, and like 20 other websites that are actual... there's no question that these are media organizations.
[17:40.960 --> 17:43.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: But if you work for the Air Force, you can't visit these websites.
[17:43.780 --> 17:45.480]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think that's really quite frightening.
[17:45.760 --> 17:46.000]  [SPEAKER_10]: Wow.
[17:46.000 --> 17:47.180]  [SPEAKER_10]: It's incredible, actually.
[17:47.180 --> 17:59.600]  [SPEAKER_10]: I can bring up the New York Times website right now or just walk around the corner and pick up the New York Times at a newsstand, and I'll be reading material that United States Air Force individuals are not allowed to read.
[17:59.800 --> 18:07.720]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's not clear what happens if a person who works for the Air Force buys a copy of the New York Times and takes it to work with them, if that's still allowed or not.
[18:07.860 --> 18:09.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: But they can't visit it on their work computers.
[18:10.100 --> 18:15.600]  [SPEAKER_10]: Maybe they can bring it to work and give it to their superior officers to get it redacted and classified and then read what's left.
[18:15.980 --> 18:28.740]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, it's incredible to me that people who are in the Air Force aren't able to read websites from the media of the country they're supposedly protecting.
[18:29.400 --> 18:31.760]  [SPEAKER_05]: And they can't, of course, go to WikiLeaks.
[18:31.760 --> 18:33.480]  [SPEAKER_05]: They can't look at the documents themselves.
[18:33.780 --> 18:34.880]  [SPEAKER_05]: Everybody else in the world can do this.
[18:35.000 --> 18:35.940]  [SPEAKER_05]: Everybody can look at WikiLeaks.
[18:36.020 --> 18:38.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: Everybody can look at Western media.
[18:39.160 --> 18:43.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: And people in the Air Force have all these restrictions.
[18:43.740 --> 18:48.820]  [SPEAKER_05]: Shouldn't they know as much as anybody else as to the facts involving the country that they're from?
[18:50.200 --> 18:50.680]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[18:51.060 --> 18:59.260]  [SPEAKER_10]: Given that they're basically in a position to directly influence international events, I think they should know at least as much as I do about things.
[19:00.460 --> 19:03.820]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, that's why you don't get to run things, holding opinions like that.
[19:07.510 --> 19:14.010]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think it's really fascinating that they think this will actually work.
[19:14.230 --> 19:23.410]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, people can go home and read the times, but it's really, it's really, you know, the beginning of the end, at least possibly.
[19:23.410 --> 19:36.130]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, you know, while we're talking about the government, uh, doing strange things, what about the, uh, uh, reports that OpenBSD has, uh, back doors in it from the FBI?
[19:36.450 --> 19:37.510]  [SPEAKER_11]: Why don't you tell us more?
[19:38.190 --> 19:38.810]  [SPEAKER_11]: Please do.
[19:39.070 --> 19:39.510]  [SPEAKER_07]: All right.
[19:39.650 --> 19:48.510]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, uh, recently some emails came out about, um, from some guy who claimed to work for, I forget the name of the, uh, ex, uh, government security contractor.
[19:48.510 --> 19:52.850]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh, let's see, uh, network security technologies.
[19:53.250 --> 20:03.610]  [SPEAKER_07]: And, uh, supposedly they've been working to put, uh, back doors into the, uh, very well-known and supposedly very secure OpenBSD operating system.
[20:04.750 --> 20:05.230]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah.
[20:05.470 --> 20:06.310]  [SPEAKER_11]: So what would that mean?
[20:07.430 --> 20:12.250]  [SPEAKER_10]: It would mean that, uh, apparently this was, according to the, uh, reports, allegedly this was 10 years ago.
[20:12.590 --> 20:17.970]  [SPEAKER_10]: And, uh, the FBI individual's, uh, non-disclosure agreement about the, uh, matter just expired.
[20:18.130 --> 20:19.350]  [SPEAKER_10]: So we just came out with this information.
[20:19.950 --> 20:30.310]  [SPEAKER_10]: And, um, if so, it would mean that, uh, if, if this exists, it would mean that there's been a back door in OpenBSD for 10 years, which, uh, is kind of an interesting prospect given how widespread use of the OS is.
[20:30.810 --> 20:31.030]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[20:31.130 --> 20:39.270]  [SPEAKER_07]: I've, I've actually had people tell me how they thought it was the most secure operating system in the world and be very interesting if these back doors really do exist and it's not just a hoax.
[20:39.410 --> 20:44.210]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, also you have to take into consideration that, you know, the code does change over 10 years.
[20:44.210 --> 20:50.150]  [SPEAKER_14]: And if there was some back door or some hole that was purposely installed, it may have been removed in a revision at some point.
[20:50.390 --> 21:00.110]  [SPEAKER_07]: So now that that's, that's what I really would find interesting if there really was a back door in this for, especially for so long is the fact that it's open-source, you know, how, how could something like that maintain for so long?
[21:00.270 --> 21:00.530]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[21:00.750 --> 21:11.510]  [SPEAKER_10]: A former, uh, sorry, a former FBI agent, uh, named EJ Hilbert, um, had posted to his Twitter that, uh, the OpenBSD quote unquote experiment happened, but was, was ultimately unsuccessful.
[21:12.610 --> 21:22.350]  [SPEAKER_10]: But, uh, either way, it's, it's, it's always been kind of an open secret that, uh, I think, um, governmental agencies would really like to have back doors and, uh, in popular things like OpenBSD.
[21:22.570 --> 21:28.470]  [SPEAKER_10]: And, you know, it's just, it's just nice to, it would be nice to kind of have, uh, confirmation, um, one way or the other.
[21:28.670 --> 21:39.870]  [SPEAKER_11]: So one thing we conclude, can conclude is that if they were able to get this into OpenBSD, which is run by a Canadian guy and is open-source, and we can see the code, then it's surely in Microsoft and Apple products.
[21:40.450 --> 21:41.050]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yes, indeed.
[21:41.450 --> 21:44.910]  [SPEAKER_10]: And, uh, OpenBSD I think also had ties to DARPA at one point.
[21:45.030 --> 21:46.130]  [SPEAKER_10]: I think they were partially funded by them.
[21:46.310 --> 21:46.550]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[21:46.550 --> 21:59.550]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, now, you just brought up, uh, Microsoft's, uh, Windows and, uh, um, and, uh, uh, OSX and, and all that stuff is, well, the great thing about this is that now you have people calling for an audit of the source code, and this is open-source.
[21:59.770 --> 22:02.110]  [SPEAKER_07]: People can do that if they really want to.
[22:02.490 --> 22:05.150]  [SPEAKER_07]: And we can actually see for ourselves, and we don't have to wonder.
[22:05.150 --> 22:05.170]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[22:07.570 --> 22:22.310]  [SPEAKER_10]: Speaking of source code, there was another sort of interesting event that, uh, happened, I think, the other day, where, uh, a popular network of websites, um, Gawker, it was, uh, was, uh, was, uh, broken into, and there, some databases of their username,
[22:22.570 --> 22:31.150]  [SPEAKER_10]: of their users, usernames, and passwords, and emails, and emails, as well as the source code to, uh, the systems that run their websites were posted publicly.
[22:32.010 --> 22:32.810]  [SPEAKER_10]: And, uh...
[22:32.810 --> 22:43.690]  [SPEAKER_14]: I think the funny thing was, uh, people took that, I mean, the passwords were hashed, but I guess using probably a common hashing algorithm or something, you know, that wasn't too difficult to reverse.
[22:43.890 --> 22:56.710]  [SPEAKER_14]: And so, they were, people were able to figure out with this database what, like, the 50 most common passwords, uh, or insecure passwords or something on the Gawker website were, which included, you know, password and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and things like that.
[22:56.890 --> 22:57.250]  [SPEAKER_14]: They were allowed to do that?
[22:58.030 --> 22:58.390]  Um...
[22:58.390 --> 23:04.410]  [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, I have so many websites, just websites that I go to, they're like, no, you can't do this, and it'll be checked before it's even sent.
[23:04.530 --> 23:16.470]  [SPEAKER_14]: The other interesting thing is if you are able to figure out, you know, if you have a database containing someone's email address and their password, um, chances are they probably use the same password for that website, as well as their email address,
[23:16.570 --> 23:18.030]  [SPEAKER_14]: or at least a number of those people do.
[23:18.430 --> 23:25.050]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, that's a, you know, if you want to get people's email addresses, set up a fake service and, uh, ask them to sign up with their email address and a password of their choosing.
[23:25.270 --> 23:29.890]  [SPEAKER_14]: And I'm sure a number of those users will give you access to their, you know, email.
[23:30.130 --> 23:31.930]  [SPEAKER_10]: And in fact, we've had a proof of... Sorry.
[23:32.230 --> 23:33.490]  [SPEAKER_05]: Can I take a quick poll here?
[23:33.910 --> 23:38.690]  [SPEAKER_05]: How many people in the studio use the same password for more than one thing?
[23:39.990 --> 23:45.210]  [SPEAKER_14]: I use the same password for all the sites I don't care about, but not for my email or any critical things.
[23:45.370 --> 23:47.310]  [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, my passwords are 12345.
[23:47.730 --> 23:53.890]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, I know that, you know, just like RedHack, I have some passwords I use for multiple things.
[23:54.250 --> 23:56.090]  [SPEAKER_07]: But, you know, I have a sort of tiered approach.
[23:56.250 --> 23:58.270]  [SPEAKER_07]: The most important accounts get their own passwords.
[23:59.530 --> 24:06.670]  [SPEAKER_05]: RedHack, can I just ask you, if you start caring about a system, do you then change the password to something different than the other systems that you don't care about?
[24:07.090 --> 24:12.670]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, most of the things I don't care about are things that I probably have only ever signed into once anyway, because they made me sign up.
[24:14.870 --> 24:16.070]  [SPEAKER_14]: But, no, I mean, I suppose...
[24:16.070 --> 24:22.030]  [SPEAKER_05]: I don't mean when you're buying a book from a website and they make you create an account.
[24:22.030 --> 24:23.070]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm not talking about that.
[24:23.170 --> 24:24.690]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm talking about things you use on a regular basis.
[24:25.090 --> 24:27.070]  [SPEAKER_14]: No, I have different passwords for all of those things.
[24:27.510 --> 24:29.790]  [SPEAKER_11]: For everything you use in a week?
[24:31.050 --> 24:31.450]  [SPEAKER_11]: Good.
[24:31.610 --> 24:32.870]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, it's not that hard, really.
[24:33.090 --> 24:36.510]  [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, if you have six or seven different things, you can memorize...
[24:36.510 --> 24:38.150]  [SPEAKER_11]: How do people manage to only...
[24:38.150 --> 24:40.150]  [SPEAKER_11]: Do you know, actually, yeah.
[24:40.410 --> 24:42.630]  [SPEAKER_11]: How do you manage to only sign into seven things in a week?
[24:44.250 --> 24:45.110]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, I'm just saying.
[24:45.170 --> 24:46.530]  [SPEAKER_05]: That's an average number, I think.
[24:46.630 --> 24:47.450]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, it's not...
[24:47.450 --> 24:59.570]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, the thing about it is, you know, it's kind of hard to memorize different passwords, but you can always, you know, have some core password or group of passwords and then make variations on it based on the service in some way that's easy to remember.
[24:59.730 --> 25:08.910]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, you know, if you come up with your own kind of password generation algorithm that's not necessarily something straightforward, you know, you could have different passwords for different services.
[25:10.030 --> 25:12.210]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, you know, there's always that, right?
[25:12.330 --> 25:15.010]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, I do that for one of my lower-tier applications.
[25:15.210 --> 25:20.550]  [SPEAKER_07]: The most important stuff would just get randomized, but, like, no way to memorize it besides from, I mean...
[25:20.550 --> 25:21.710]  [SPEAKER_14]: Except for memorizing it.
[25:21.730 --> 25:21.830]  [SPEAKER_07]: Right, right.
[25:22.030 --> 25:25.950]  [SPEAKER_07]: But beneath that, I do have that, like, you know, that's very useful.
[25:26.070 --> 25:31.070]  [SPEAKER_07]: Sometimes I've forgotten the password, and I'll have to work through the algorithm and go through different possibilities until I find the password again.
[25:31.070 --> 25:31.790]  [SPEAKER_07]: I've actually done that.
[25:32.070 --> 25:33.370]  [SPEAKER_07]: An interesting thing is...
[25:33.370 --> 25:35.990]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's not a part of people seem to think to memorize passwords.
[25:35.990 --> 25:45.230]  [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, people memorize sports statistics, they memorize types of guns and aircraft and all kinds of other things that you wonder how they keep that in their head.
[25:45.390 --> 25:46.810]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's just a question of importance.
[25:46.970 --> 25:49.030]  [SPEAKER_05]: If you think something is important enough, you'll remember it.
[25:49.090 --> 25:50.710]  [SPEAKER_05]: People used to remember phone numbers all the time.
[25:50.890 --> 25:54.290]  [SPEAKER_05]: Now nobody remembers phone numbers anymore, so there's all this extra space in your head.
[25:55.210 --> 26:03.110]  [SPEAKER_14]: The problem, of course, comes from when you use something a lot, and then you don't for a little while, and then you go back and you have no idea anymore how to get in.
[26:05.990 --> 26:22.930]  [SPEAKER_10]: I think that's the concept of this whole thing, because very soon after the Gawker database was made public, there was a flood of spam on Twitter advertising acai berries, I think, which is allegedly because all these accounts had the same usernames and passwords as their Gawker accounts.
[26:23.150 --> 26:24.550]  [SPEAKER_05]: Now it's interesting, Rob T.
[26:24.630 --> 26:28.470]  [SPEAKER_05]: Firefly, you say that this information on Gawker was quote-unquote made public.
[26:28.710 --> 26:33.490]  [SPEAKER_05]: Now if you were a member of the mass media, you would invariably have said that information was hacked.
[26:33.850 --> 26:53.990]  [SPEAKER_05]: I want to commend you, first of all, for not saying that word, but I also want to berate the mass media for their continued misuse of it, both in this case and in the recent denial-of-service attacks against Visa and MasterCard and PayPal and all kinds of other sites from people angry at the whole WikiLeaks incident.
[26:54.830 --> 26:55.950]  [SPEAKER_05]: This is not hacking.
[26:56.250 --> 27:06.810]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's a form of expression, I suppose, or it's perhaps criminal activity if someone's simply getting in and copying credit card numbers off of a bank or something like that.
[27:07.610 --> 27:09.730]  [SPEAKER_05]: Does anybody want to explain why it's not hacking?
[27:10.510 --> 27:15.910]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, I mean, I've always maintained that for some reason it's the mainstream media's
[27:19.630 --> 27:26.370]  [SPEAKER_10]: belief that whenever anything destructive is done with a computer, there is a tool that it's hacking, and it's not.
[27:26.750 --> 27:31.530]  [SPEAKER_10]: You know, whenever somebody drives over somebody with an automobile, the media does not refer to them as a mechanic.
[27:31.870 --> 27:34.490]  [SPEAKER_10]: If someone hauls off and shoots somebody, that person is not a gunsmith.
[27:34.650 --> 27:35.050]  [SPEAKER_10]: They're a killer.
[27:35.910 --> 27:38.730]  [SPEAKER_10]: But if you do something with a computer for some reason, you're a hacker.
[27:39.770 --> 27:41.130]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, we do have different words.
[27:41.310 --> 27:42.090]  [SPEAKER_05]: We do have different words now.
[27:42.310 --> 27:47.070]  [SPEAKER_11]: Isn't it possible that there could be more than one definition to the word hacker?
[27:48.310 --> 27:50.050]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think there's also a golf definition.
[27:50.950 --> 27:51.750]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, well, there's that.
[27:51.750 --> 27:57.770]  [SPEAKER_05]: There are different things that hackers get into, but I think there are some common themes.
[27:58.310 --> 28:10.890]  [SPEAKER_05]: Exploration, rebelliousness, sharing information, and being open to alternatives, none of which are the case where people simply break into systems, copy things, sell them, or vandalize.
[28:11.070 --> 28:13.430]  [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, those are just destructive acts.
[28:14.150 --> 28:15.370]  [SPEAKER_11]: Or government acts.
[28:15.850 --> 28:20.190]  [SPEAKER_11]: So we're open to all sorts of alternatives, except for alternative definitions of the word hacker.
[28:20.370 --> 28:20.470]  [SPEAKER_11]: Okay.
[28:20.690 --> 28:22.250]  [SPEAKER_14]: Can I bring up something interesting, though?
[28:22.550 --> 28:39.670]  [SPEAKER_14]: We kind of mentioned last week that in the attacks on MasterCard and Visa and whomever else, there was this software tool used called, I think it was Low Orbit Ion Cannon, which basically, you know, somebody could download and, you know, they just put in the target and then they hit a button and that was the attack,
[28:39.770 --> 28:39.870]  [SPEAKER_14]: right?
[28:40.170 --> 28:52.010]  [SPEAKER_14]: But what's interesting about this, you know, generally when you hear about distributed denial of service attacks, what it is is some one person has, you know, gained access to a number of compromised machines, you know, whether they've been infected with a virus or something,
[28:52.010 --> 29:00.230]  [SPEAKER_14]: and they have control over them and then they say, okay, this one person says, let me point my 1,000 or 2,000 or 100,000 machines at my target and attack it.
[29:00.770 --> 29:10.110]  [SPEAKER_14]: In this case, for this attack, it was actually individuals, each individually downloading this bit of software and willingly joining this attack.
[29:10.190 --> 29:18.170]  [SPEAKER_14]: So it was more of a kind of a grassroots denial of service attack than previously where it's one person who's compromised a bunch of machines.
[29:18.170 --> 29:31.790]  [SPEAKER_14]: So that was kind of an interesting twist on it that we didn't really talk about, even though it wasn't hacking, just the fact that, you know, enough people were mad enough about this to want to do this so that they take their individual computer and make it part of this,
[29:31.910 --> 29:33.230]  [SPEAKER_14]: I thought it was interesting.
[29:33.570 --> 29:34.770]  [SPEAKER_10]: Another very interesting...
[29:34.770 --> 29:35.870]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm fascinated by the way it works.
[29:35.970 --> 29:42.450]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm fascinated by the way it all ties together and the vulnerabilities that it exposes in the various targets that are defined.
[29:42.750 --> 29:50.050]  [SPEAKER_05]: But let's not be foolish here and equate it to something like the Civil Rights Movement, or activism of any kind.
[29:50.230 --> 29:54.770]  [SPEAKER_05]: Any activist in the world should be annoyed as hell that this is being called some kind of net activist.
[29:54.930 --> 30:00.110]  [SPEAKER_05]: When you're an activist, you stand up, you put yourself in the line of fire, and you stand up for your beliefs.
[30:00.210 --> 30:11.230]  [SPEAKER_05]: You don't hide behind some anonymous block of people and simply cause destruction, which is the same kind of destruction that can be caused against you at a moment's notice by some other anonymous person in a different part of the world.
[30:11.230 --> 30:12.810]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, so ironically with this...
[30:12.810 --> 30:16.630]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's mindless mass mentality here.
[30:16.850 --> 30:22.730]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, ironically with this, normally with a denial of service attack, you could probably claim plausible deniability.
[30:22.830 --> 30:23.330]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, I didn't know.
[30:23.410 --> 30:24.230]  [SPEAKER_14]: My computer was infected.
[30:24.370 --> 30:26.490]  [SPEAKER_14]: But here you are actively joining this attack.
[30:26.690 --> 30:32.110]  [SPEAKER_14]: And thus, you know, if they were to trace your IP address to you, they could say, well, you participated in this.
[30:32.190 --> 30:32.890]  [SPEAKER_14]: So you're not actually...
[30:32.890 --> 30:34.830]  [SPEAKER_14]: The people who did this weren't actually anonymous.
[30:34.830 --> 30:40.550]  [SPEAKER_14]: They were using their computers, which were identifying themselves by way of their IP address to do this.
[30:41.550 --> 30:41.990]  [SPEAKER_14]: So...
[30:41.990 --> 30:47.890]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, now that opens up like another question is like, you know, does the software just run in the background all the time?
[30:47.910 --> 30:50.210]  [SPEAKER_07]: So if someone just puts this on, do they forget about it?
[30:50.310 --> 30:53.550]  [SPEAKER_07]: And then maybe this system goes on to attack other targets and they just...
[30:53.550 --> 30:58.350]  [SPEAKER_14]: I think you actually put in the URL of your target into it and then hit the button and then it went.
[30:58.510 --> 31:00.030]  [SPEAKER_14]: So you would be attacking that target.
[31:00.170 --> 31:01.830]  [SPEAKER_14]: And it wasn't receiving commands from anyone.
[31:01.830 --> 31:08.510]  [SPEAKER_14]: It was the anonymous folks were, I think, posting on Twitter or something, here's our target and then everyone would attack it or something like that.
[31:08.630 --> 31:08.890]  [SPEAKER_14]: Right?
[31:09.070 --> 31:10.330]  [SPEAKER_14]: Am I shaking his head?
[31:10.870 --> 31:12.490]  [SPEAKER_11]: I'm shaking my head at something else.
[31:12.670 --> 31:14.330]  [SPEAKER_11]: But yeah, that's the way it works.
[31:14.330 --> 31:15.030]  [SPEAKER_11]: There's a box.
[31:15.250 --> 31:17.310]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I'm pulling up a screenshot.
[31:17.750 --> 31:30.870]  [SPEAKER_13]: I wanted to point out that this type of denial of service attack where people are willingly participating in being the attackers en masse.
[31:31.190 --> 31:34.530]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's not unlike decades of...
[31:35.370 --> 31:49.550]  [SPEAKER_13]: A decades-old practice that activists use called phone bombing or fax bombing where everybody just calls the number of some government agency or company and are open to tie up their phone lines or their fax lines.
[31:49.730 --> 31:56.650]  [SPEAKER_13]: So I'm wondering who here in the group here thinks this is any different or worse than that.
[31:56.650 --> 31:57.150]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, it's funny.
[31:57.230 --> 32:03.910]  [SPEAKER_14]: That was actually referenced in, I think, XKCD today, the whole phone bombing of, I think it was maybe the Nixon White House or something like that.
[32:04.430 --> 32:07.270]  [SPEAKER_14]: So actually, I didn't know about that before this morning, but I'm glad you brought it up.
[32:07.390 --> 32:13.750]  [SPEAKER_07]: No, I personally, to answer Bernie's question, I don't think it's really any different than some of these other practices.
[32:13.750 --> 32:16.730]  [SPEAKER_07]: It does fit into what people have called activists in the past.
[32:16.810 --> 32:17.970]  [SPEAKER_07]: Only difference is the medium.
[32:18.190 --> 32:21.530]  [SPEAKER_07]: However, the morality of what they're doing, that's a completely different matter.
[32:22.450 --> 32:29.390]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, I mean, it's still illegal, but it's funny that, you know, it's run by a group called Anonymous, but in reality, the people who are participating are not anonymous.
[32:29.450 --> 32:32.590]  [SPEAKER_11]: Lots of things are both illegal and ethical.
[32:32.910 --> 32:37.550]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think it's really not cut and dried, the ethics of this situation.
[32:37.890 --> 32:38.130]  [SPEAKER_10]: Right.
[32:38.570 --> 32:43.230]  [SPEAKER_10]: And I think it's worth pointing out that Anonymous is not a group of any kind.
[32:43.410 --> 32:47.530]  [SPEAKER_10]: It's a banner under which anybody anonymously can start something and then others can join in on it.
[32:47.990 --> 32:54.410]  [SPEAKER_10]: But the tendency of the mass media is to report as though Anonymous is some organized sort of entity, and it isn't.
[32:54.510 --> 32:55.090]  [SPEAKER_10]: It's just a banner.
[32:55.210 --> 32:56.190]  [SPEAKER_10]: And anyone can pick it up.
[32:56.290 --> 33:00.370]  [SPEAKER_07]: A few days ago, I saw even worse than just looking at Anonymous as a single organized group.
[33:00.370 --> 33:03.030]  [SPEAKER_07]: They said that 4chan was the one waging the attack.
[33:03.190 --> 33:04.270]  [SPEAKER_07]: I forget who it was.
[33:05.090 --> 33:11.970]  [SPEAKER_07]: But, you know, you're having this reporting on these stories, but they don't fully understand what they're reporting on.
[33:12.350 --> 33:13.310]  [SPEAKER_07]: And it's unfortunate.
[33:13.430 --> 33:18.130]  [SPEAKER_04]: I think this whole thing takes away from a lot of the positive things that have come out of hacking in the past couple of years.
[33:18.890 --> 33:26.750]  [SPEAKER_04]: And, you know, it's interesting, the tactics, but as I think has been said already, it's not really hacking.
[33:27.030 --> 33:29.690]  [SPEAKER_04]: And again, there's so many positive things that have been going on.
[33:29.790 --> 33:44.390]  [SPEAKER_04]: And it just makes me think of, you know, the fact that the important part is the leaks and what's going on diplomatically, and that we should elevate this conversation, the dialogue of what's going on and what governments are doing.
[33:44.930 --> 33:53.330]  [SPEAKER_04]: And there's this saying, I don't know where I heard it ever, but it's, you know, the moment I take away your right to speech, I take away my own.
[33:53.810 --> 33:55.430]  [SPEAKER_04]: So that's all I had to say about this.
[33:56.790 --> 33:57.710]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, it's true.
[33:58.210 --> 34:04.910]  [SPEAKER_07]: You know, people say, I don't want to hear what you have to say, but you know, it's fine to listen to what I have to say.
[34:04.990 --> 34:09.970]  [SPEAKER_07]: But as soon as you put that, make that precedent, then all of a sudden, that can be applied to everyone else.
[34:10.150 --> 34:26.410]  [SPEAKER_07]: And we're, that's what I think is one of the scary things about seeing this happen, what's happening to WikiLeaks right now, is that if this goes through, and these crazy legislature, legislative people like Lieberman, you know, get, like, Julian Assange prosecuted,
[34:26.550 --> 34:29.530]  [SPEAKER_07]: then what happens to the New York Times being blocked by more than just the Air Force?
[34:29.590 --> 34:32.470]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, I think the question at hand is kind of what constitutes journalism.
[34:32.730 --> 34:40.570]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, you know, that'll, I guess, shake out in Congress or wherever they're going to debate it over the next few months.
[34:40.810 --> 34:54.810]  [SPEAKER_14]: But hopefully, it'll shake out in the favor of, you know, WikiLeaks and other groups like it, because I don't see how they're any different from a mass media publisher, except that maybe they're willing to take more risks and protect their sources better or something.
[34:55.070 --> 35:04.950]  [SPEAKER_10]: I think we're living in a very interesting time regarding that, because basically, we're in totally new territory, new paths are being charted, and new ways around things, and new ways of doing things.
[35:05.110 --> 35:08.190]  [SPEAKER_10]: And I think, really, nobody's quite sure how this is going to pan out.
[35:08.410 --> 35:10.930]  [SPEAKER_10]: But however it does pan out, it's going to be terribly important.
[35:11.550 --> 35:12.330]  [SPEAKER_07]: It will be...
[35:12.330 --> 35:17.950]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, I sure hope, for one, that they're very different from the mass media, as the mass media has defined itself.
[35:18.450 --> 35:20.070]  [SPEAKER_05]: And that can only be an improvement.
[35:21.130 --> 35:25.570]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, then it really does come down to if the government is allowed to define what journalism is.
[35:25.670 --> 35:29.670]  [SPEAKER_07]: If they just look at what the mass media has defined themselves as, then we might be in some big trouble.
[35:29.810 --> 35:31.630]  [SPEAKER_07]: WikiLeaks wouldn't fit that definition.
[35:31.630 --> 35:51.630]  [SPEAKER_13]: I wanted to ask our listeners if they think it's okay for political advertisements to encourage people en masse to call some government agency or call some elected representatives' phone number and effectively phone bomb them.
[35:52.470 --> 36:06.030]  [SPEAKER_13]: How does that differ from people using this sort of denial of service attack against the websites of Visa, MasterCard, PayPal, which is run by eBay?
[36:06.030 --> 36:24.130]  [SPEAKER_13]: When I think Julian Assange has correctly identified this past week in a public statement he made where he says that now Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal, and Amazon.com have shown themselves to be instruments of U.S.
[36:24.210 --> 36:24.970]  [SPEAKER_13]: foreign policy.
[36:25.670 --> 36:34.590]  [SPEAKER_13]: And we have this gray area now where there's no well-defined line between corporations and U.S.
[36:34.950 --> 36:35.470]  [SPEAKER_13]: policy.
[36:36.590 --> 36:44.530]  [SPEAKER_13]: How does that differ when you call a government agency to complain about something or to try to call their phone number to disrupt their operations?
[36:44.770 --> 36:46.390]  [SPEAKER_13]: How does this act differ?
[36:46.550 --> 36:47.670]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's just food for thought.
[36:47.870 --> 36:48.230]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's interesting.
[36:49.070 --> 36:59.590]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, I think when someone is urged to call a politician's office to express an opinion, presumably they're calling to express the opinion not to shut down the office.
[37:00.330 --> 37:05.930]  [SPEAKER_05]: Whereas if you're calling to disrupt something, it's a different motive behind all of that.
[37:06.030 --> 37:07.010]  [SPEAKER_05]: That's how I see it.
[37:07.350 --> 37:14.250]  [SPEAKER_11]: But there's a long tradition in this country and elsewhere of shutting down things as a form of political action.
[37:14.410 --> 37:15.930]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's usually called a strike.
[37:16.170 --> 37:18.450]  [SPEAKER_11]: It can be called a sit-in or something else.
[37:19.270 --> 37:23.390]  [SPEAKER_11]: And there's clearly differences between these actions and the Internet actions.
[37:23.410 --> 37:27.490]  [SPEAKER_11]: But I really don't think it's so cut and dried as you're making it out to be.
[37:27.650 --> 37:31.010]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, it's a good example to bring up strikes.
[37:31.270 --> 37:33.510]  [SPEAKER_07]: The difference here is that they're not people from the inside.
[37:33.630 --> 37:34.330]  [SPEAKER_07]: They're people from the outside.
[37:34.570 --> 37:35.750]  [SPEAKER_07]: But the result is the same.
[37:35.890 --> 37:38.210]  [SPEAKER_07]: The business in question is no longer allowed to function.
[37:38.610 --> 37:52.430]  [SPEAKER_07]: I think one reason, though, some of us might be, you know, want to condemn this right away is just simply because of the fact that we do get these kind of negative attention in the media, defining hacking as being something negative.
[37:52.430 --> 37:57.630]  [SPEAKER_07]: And these kinds of people are only, you could say, are only helping to further that misunderstanding.
[37:58.310 --> 38:08.410]  [SPEAKER_05]: The other difference that I see is that when you have a strike, when you have a protest, or when you have a sit-in, or anything like that, 99 times out of 100 people doing that want a dialogue.
[38:08.690 --> 38:10.990]  [SPEAKER_05]: They want to be able to get their side out there.
[38:11.330 --> 38:17.090]  [SPEAKER_05]: And what you see in denial of service attacks, you want people to go away and to shut up and to not be there anymore.
[38:17.290 --> 38:19.530]  [SPEAKER_05]: And I just have trouble signing on to something like that.
[38:19.550 --> 38:20.950]  [SPEAKER_05]: I want the dialogue to be there.
[38:20.950 --> 38:22.250]  [SPEAKER_05]: I want the debate to be there.
[38:22.370 --> 38:28.850]  [SPEAKER_05]: And I think you get that by bringing the issues to the forefront and arguing with the people and making that happen.
[38:29.210 --> 38:33.850]  [SPEAKER_05]: And by doing it this way, you simply put all the sympathy on their side.
[38:34.030 --> 38:35.430]  [SPEAKER_05]: You turn them into the victim.
[38:35.830 --> 38:37.730]  [SPEAKER_05]: And this doesn't feel right.
[38:39.130 --> 38:40.530]  [SPEAKER_10]: I'm inclined to agree.
[38:40.650 --> 38:45.750]  [SPEAKER_10]: I don't think censoring anyone's speech is an acceptable weapon for the quote-unquote good guys.
[38:46.570 --> 39:04.970]  [SPEAKER_10]: But I also think that we've had... speaking of the definition of hackers, we've seen a lot of entities, 2600 and some hackerspaces and so on, have had to the post statements now condemning these attacks and trying to inform the public that this is not what hackers are actually about.
[39:05.270 --> 39:11.930]  [SPEAKER_10]: And it's basically, I'm afraid we're being set back a little as to the public's perception of hackers and the hacker community.
[39:12.990 --> 39:15.610]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, we've had a lot of good conversations with people in the media.
[39:15.750 --> 39:18.870]  [SPEAKER_05]: I talked to somebody at the BBC today and Al Jazeera last week.
[39:19.610 --> 39:20.870]  [SPEAKER_05]: And they seem to get it.
[39:20.970 --> 39:33.850]  [SPEAKER_05]: They ask the right questions and they are aware that there is this difference of opinion and that people who say they're hackers aren't necessarily hackers and that it's a complex chain of events that are going on here.
[39:34.010 --> 39:36.290]  [SPEAKER_05]: So maybe this dialogue has to happen too.
[39:36.450 --> 39:42.250]  [SPEAKER_05]: Maybe this is something that we need to process in order to redefine who we are and what we stand for, what's right, what's not right.
[39:42.570 --> 39:46.330]  [SPEAKER_05]: One thing I would like to do, though, we did call for differing opinions.
[39:46.330 --> 39:48.870]  [SPEAKER_05]: We don't want to just be saying the same thing over and over again.
[39:48.890 --> 39:51.690]  [SPEAKER_05]: We want to hear the opposing opinions as well.
[39:52.330 --> 39:54.190]  [SPEAKER_05]: Hopefully we'll have time to take some phone calls tonight.
[39:54.190 --> 39:57.710]  [SPEAKER_05]: But I did want to read a letter that we got from somebody who does take a different approach.
[39:58.110 --> 40:00.710]  [SPEAKER_05]: He says, I've been listening to tonight's show.
[40:01.310 --> 40:03.210]  [SPEAKER_05]: Unfortunately, I wasn't able to get through by phone.
[40:03.550 --> 40:07.710]  [SPEAKER_05]: Right now, you offer an opposing viewpoint that you tried in vain to solicit on the air.
[40:07.790 --> 40:12.390]  [SPEAKER_05]: The problem was too many people agreed with us and they all got through and the people who didn't agree with us didn't get through.
[40:12.590 --> 40:13.570]  [SPEAKER_05]: It happens sometimes.
[40:14.030 --> 40:19.270]  [SPEAKER_05]: In my view, the most recent releases suffer from a chronic lack of judgment over what should be released.
[40:19.490 --> 40:29.610]  [SPEAKER_05]: The attitude appears to have been, we have this material, so it should be released, rather than considering each and every cable and asking whether the public interest is served by the release of that individual document.
[40:29.890 --> 40:32.610]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm going to get cables a little more than a tittle-tattle.
[40:32.830 --> 40:39.910]  [SPEAKER_05]: That may cause embarrassment for the individual's concern, but raise no issues of conduct in public office or the policies or actions of government.
[40:40.850 --> 40:41.490]  [SPEAKER_05]: Hang on.
[40:41.690 --> 40:42.850]  [SPEAKER_05]: I went off the page there.
[40:42.990 --> 40:43.030]  [SPEAKER_05]: Okay.
[40:43.250 --> 40:48.270]  [SPEAKER_05]: Other documents may impact upon those areas, but there is another public interest argument against release.
[40:48.410 --> 40:52.370]  [SPEAKER_05]: The case of the Arab states urging military action against Iran is a good example of this.
[40:52.470 --> 40:57.990]  [SPEAKER_05]: In publishing the data in the manner that they have, they make the current public pretense untenable.
[40:58.330 --> 41:01.110]  [SPEAKER_05]: Releasing those documents makes war more likely, not less.
[41:01.450 --> 41:09.950]  [SPEAKER_05]: If war is the eventual outcome, in part because of the release of these cables, then Assange and company must accept their share of responsibility for the lives that would be lost.
[41:10.190 --> 41:12.710]  [SPEAKER_05]: This isn't simply hackers sticking it to demand.
[41:12.750 --> 41:14.750]  [SPEAKER_05]: It is a real issue with consequences.
[41:15.230 --> 41:24.910]  [SPEAKER_05]: As WikiLeaks has raised its profile and passed an extensive amount of confidential material from various sources, and in the process has become a powerful entity in its own right.
[41:25.230 --> 41:33.690]  [SPEAKER_05]: As a consequence, it has the duty to exercise that power with the same level of responsibility that it seeks of the government and other organizations that it exposes to public scrutiny.
[41:34.790 --> 41:39.050]  [SPEAKER_05]: That is signed by Andrew, and I think Andrew raises some very interesting points.
[41:39.170 --> 41:40.830]  [SPEAKER_05]: You guys in the studio want to tackle any of them?
[41:41.430 --> 41:46.870]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think we should, but I think we should also give it our phone number, which is 212-209-2900.
[41:48.210 --> 41:53.930]  [SPEAKER_11]: And you can agree with us or disagree with us or whatever you want to do, and we'll take some phone calls in a few minutes.
[41:55.750 --> 41:59.570]  [SPEAKER_11]: But I think one of the issues that his name is Andrew?
[42:00.490 --> 42:00.890]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yes.
[42:01.090 --> 42:05.490]  [SPEAKER_11]: He raises is this sort of balance of power between WikiLeaks and the U.S.
[42:05.570 --> 42:05.850]  [SPEAKER_11]: government.
[42:06.030 --> 42:09.470]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think it's sort of laughable at this time to compare them.
[42:10.030 --> 42:15.510]  [SPEAKER_11]: One has a website and the other has a military that goes around the world and shoots things.
[42:17.330 --> 42:24.670]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think it would be great for there to be any mechanism of controlling what the U.S.
[42:24.790 --> 42:24.990]  [SPEAKER_11]: does.
[42:25.970 --> 42:33.130]  [SPEAKER_11]: But it's really, you know, there's yet to be a single death attributed to WikiLeaks, and there are many, many deaths attributable to the U.S.
[42:33.570 --> 42:33.590]  [SPEAKER_11]: military.
[42:34.510 --> 42:36.290]  [SPEAKER_05]: The hypothetical situation was raised.
[42:36.490 --> 42:46.010]  [SPEAKER_05]: What if a war starts as a result of that particular bit of information being leaked and Iran getting really angry at some other country and some real miscommunications happening?
[42:46.170 --> 42:53.330]  [SPEAKER_14]: I don't think in general it's a good foreign policy attack to be embarrassed or annoyed at what somebody else said and then start a war over it.
[42:53.390 --> 43:01.350]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm sure that there are crazy people who do do that, but I think in general that's not really the way governments like to handle things.
[43:01.730 --> 43:11.750]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's not also something we could even really look at and say one way or the other, because if you have this one government getting angry and another government saying, well, this has just stopped listening to each other and they go to war.
[43:11.850 --> 43:14.090]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, chances are they weren't on good terms to begin with.
[43:14.190 --> 43:15.950]  [SPEAKER_07]: And we can't say whether that wouldn't have happened anyway.
[43:16.290 --> 43:25.210]  [SPEAKER_10]: The thing is that I think any day of the week, I would much rather be worried that I'm not safe because of the truth than think I'm safe because of a lie.
[43:25.590 --> 43:36.970]  [SPEAKER_10]: I would just rather the information be out there and then we then we ostensibly could trust our various governments and officials to deal with the information in a constructive way rather than starting fights with each other.
[43:37.150 --> 43:44.570]  [SPEAKER_14]: I think also you have to understand that WikiLeaks is not something where I don't think they're trying to take any one particular country's interest in mind.
[43:44.770 --> 43:57.990]  [SPEAKER_14]: So you have the case, for example, where you've had people within certain countries' governments who have been outed essentially as feeding information to the US government and they've had to step down as a result of these kinds of exposures.
[43:58.950 --> 44:04.750]  [SPEAKER_14]: And so, you know, you could say, well, now the US won't get that information and that's worse for us.
[44:04.870 --> 44:10.490]  [SPEAKER_14]: But, you know, is it then better for the other country that was being essentially spied on by their own politicians?
[44:10.490 --> 44:20.550]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, you know, you can't really... I don't think there's any way for WikiLeaks to look at a cable and say, well, now who's this going to benefit or, you know, who's this going to hurt?
[44:20.970 --> 44:22.310]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's kind of difficult to do.
[44:22.450 --> 44:36.510]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can try to take steps like they're doing to redact bits of information that maybe, you know, a certain individual could be put into jeopardy as a result of, and I mean physical jeopardy, not, you know, their career if they're doing something, you know,
[44:36.630 --> 44:36.990]  [SPEAKER_14]: strange.
[44:37.210 --> 44:42.170]  [SPEAKER_14]: But, you know, you have to... you can't just look at it from a US-centric perspective.
[44:42.170 --> 44:42.610]  [SPEAKER_07]: Right.
[44:42.750 --> 44:53.450]  [SPEAKER_07]: The whole point of an organization like that is to be above the dispute, to simply, you know, if they see information that's being held secret and they get a hold of it, to put it out there.
[44:53.550 --> 44:59.090]  [SPEAKER_07]: And unless they're going to risk someone's life directly, then maybe you cop out their name.
[44:59.190 --> 44:59.970]  [SPEAKER_07]: But otherwise...
[44:59.970 --> 45:06.650]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, and if you want to muse about things too, you know, you could say, well, maybe now Iran has heard that everyone, you know, is out to get them.
[45:06.770 --> 45:11.350]  [SPEAKER_14]: And so they're going to be more cautious because they're aware that, you know, they don't have as many friends as they thought they did.
[45:11.510 --> 45:20.210]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, you can... you can theorize about it all you want, but you're not going to know... there's no way for a person or an organization to judge what's the best thing.
[45:21.590 --> 45:32.770]  [SPEAKER_10]: And also, if my... if my country's diplomats are out there conducting shady deals and doing things in an underhanded manner, that's not why I or whoever else put them in power put them there.
[45:32.930 --> 45:35.790]  [SPEAKER_10]: And I would much rather they get caught and possibly lose their jobs.
[45:35.890 --> 45:36.470]  [SPEAKER_10]: So sad for them.
[45:36.570 --> 45:45.110]  [SPEAKER_10]: But maybe someone else, maybe the next person to be put in would realize that if they're... if they're doing things that they shouldn't be doing, there's always the possibility that they'll be caught for it.
[45:45.790 --> 45:45.970]  [SPEAKER_10]: All right.
[45:45.970 --> 45:49.690]  [SPEAKER_13]: And there's countless... there's countless examples of the U.S.
[45:50.610 --> 46:01.870]  [SPEAKER_13]: lying down with dogs and waking up with fleas, you know, witness 9-11 and are arming the... some... some factions in Afghanistan, which came back to bite us.
[46:01.950 --> 46:06.870]  [SPEAKER_13]: So this, you know, it's important that we see what our government is doing because it has real consequences in the future.
[46:06.870 --> 46:07.810]  [SPEAKER_11]: All right.
[46:07.850 --> 46:08.970]  [SPEAKER_11]: There's a lot to speculate about.
[46:09.030 --> 46:12.410]  [SPEAKER_11]: Let's... but let's let our listeners do some of the speculation as well.
[46:13.110 --> 46:15.130]  [SPEAKER_11]: And we have... hello, you're on the air.
[46:16.690 --> 46:17.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes.
[46:17.170 --> 46:18.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let me just turn my radio down.
[46:19.270 --> 46:19.430]  [SPEAKER_11]: Great.
[46:19.610 --> 46:19.730]  [SPEAKER_11]: Thanks.
[46:20.050 --> 46:20.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hello, you're on the air.
[46:20.970 --> 46:28.390]  [SPEAKER_12]: I agree with you in terms of having the information available for everyone.
[46:28.590 --> 46:44.410]  [SPEAKER_12]: But on the other hand, I heard on a program, it was on WBAI, that WikiLeaks was planning on divulging a lot of vulnerable sites around the world that would put people at risk for attack.
[46:44.690 --> 46:46.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I can't see the value of that.
[46:47.150 --> 46:59.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: I wish that there were more of a consciousness about what the value of the information that they're giving out would be.
[46:59.250 --> 47:20.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: Because just to put out information that's not protective of the general public and put out gossip or whatever that would embarrass someone makes no real sense to me when we have such limited means to provide cogent information that could be helpful.
[47:20.930 --> 47:28.910]  [SPEAKER_14]: So the information I think you're referring to was a list of sites that the US government deemed important to its national security, I believe.
[47:29.010 --> 47:30.210]  [SPEAKER_14]: And it was released.
[47:30.990 --> 47:35.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think that was a site, but I think there was more than that too.
[47:35.790 --> 47:38.110]  [SPEAKER_12]: And again, I think that the...
[47:38.110 --> 47:41.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, it's like they're playing God because they have all this information.
[47:41.450 --> 47:51.150]  [SPEAKER_12]: But I still think that it should be some responsibility and not just anything that comes up they should put out, especially if it, again, it endangers people.
[47:51.150 --> 47:52.230]  [SPEAKER_05]: If I can just jump in here.
[47:52.790 --> 48:04.270]  [SPEAKER_05]: Someone had to have said and gotten your attention that these are sensitive sites and that someone was probably the government saying these sites are sensitive and should not be released to the public.
[48:04.430 --> 48:07.550]  [SPEAKER_05]: And that makes the public say, why are they releasing these sensitive sites?
[48:07.750 --> 48:14.610]  [SPEAKER_05]: The government will say that a shopping mall is a sensitive site, that any power station in the world is a sensitive site.
[48:15.570 --> 48:22.010]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's basically their definition of something which we're accepting at face value.
[48:22.010 --> 48:23.410]  [SPEAKER_05]: And it's not necessarily true.
[48:23.850 --> 48:30.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, I hear what you're saying, but the sites that I heard mentioned to me personally, it wasn't the government.
[48:30.970 --> 48:34.730]  [SPEAKER_12]: It was just someone reporting on the information they had and what they were going to release.
[48:35.050 --> 48:39.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: And so just me thinking about, gee, why would they want to release that?
[48:39.610 --> 48:40.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: What value is that?
[48:42.410 --> 48:46.450]  [SPEAKER_05]: Why did they make a list and send it an email in the first place?
[48:46.610 --> 48:47.570]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think that's kind of... Locations.
[48:47.830 --> 48:48.910]  [SPEAKER_12]: Specific locations.
[48:50.190 --> 48:51.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's like they're inviting trouble.
[48:52.090 --> 49:02.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I could see that if one of these things were attacked, for example, God forbid, that it would give the government a reason to, quote-unquote, shut down the Internet.
[49:03.310 --> 49:05.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that is a concern of mine.
[49:06.010 --> 49:07.150]  [SPEAKER_05]: But do you see the foolishness...
[49:07.150 --> 49:08.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's used in a way... I'm sorry?
[49:08.870 --> 49:20.850]  [SPEAKER_05]: Do you see the foolishness of creating a list like that and making it available to millions of people within a particular organization and saying, here's a list of the most sensitive sites that we believe we can come up with.
[49:20.990 --> 49:23.370]  [SPEAKER_05]: Here are their addresses and their latitude and longitude.
[49:23.590 --> 49:27.050]  [SPEAKER_05]: It just seems like that is where the mistake was made, if there was a mistake here.
[49:27.810 --> 49:28.650]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's my point.
[49:29.090 --> 49:29.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's a mistake.
[49:30.090 --> 49:31.950]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's what I'm talking about specifically.
[49:33.070 --> 49:38.430]  [SPEAKER_12]: That, you know, if they're going to release that kind of information, I don't think it's a good idea.
[49:38.430 --> 49:47.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: And there's so much more that they could do to help people prevent things from happening than focusing on something that would be a target for people who don't mean anybody well.
[49:48.390 --> 49:48.790]  [SPEAKER_09]: Right.
[49:48.870 --> 49:52.530]  [SPEAKER_05]: But I'm saying the blame should not be placed on WikiLeaks for releasing that information.
[49:52.630 --> 49:57.650]  [SPEAKER_05]: The blame should be placed on the people for creating a list like that in the first place and having it fall into the wrong hands.
[49:57.830 --> 50:05.250]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I agree with you there, but I'm just talking about in terms of using some kind of whatever to determine whether or not...
[50:05.250 --> 50:07.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: There's so much I'm sure that they have.
[50:07.570 --> 50:10.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: Why release that when they could release other things?
[50:11.370 --> 50:11.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: Just...
[50:11.770 --> 50:12.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, thank you.
[50:12.550 --> 50:13.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: My personal opinion.
[50:13.650 --> 50:14.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're welcome.
[50:14.470 --> 50:15.270]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, bye now.
[50:15.510 --> 50:15.850]  [SPEAKER_11]: Thanks.
[50:16.150 --> 50:18.150]  [SPEAKER_11]: And let's take this one.
[50:18.150 --> 50:18.730]  [SPEAKER_11]: You're on the air.
[50:19.010 --> 50:19.590]  [SPEAKER_11]: You're welcome.
[50:19.730 --> 50:19.990]  [SPEAKER_11]: Hello.
[50:20.310 --> 50:20.510]  [SPEAKER_11]: Hi.
[50:20.810 --> 50:22.330]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, I kind of got...
[50:22.330 --> 50:24.050]  [SPEAKER_08]: I'm a little depressed in a way.
[50:24.050 --> 50:28.630]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I think that what you all seem to be doing is looking for a cause.
[50:28.750 --> 50:35.610]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I think it's a result of not having served your country or, in the case of our leadership, being former upheads.
[50:35.870 --> 50:41.930]  [SPEAKER_08]: The thing is that everything is going wrong, but all you guys are worried about is playing with toys and talking about free speech.
[50:42.270 --> 50:44.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: What do you like about this nation?
[50:44.710 --> 50:46.950]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, none of you have paid any dues.
[50:47.190 --> 50:50.410]  [SPEAKER_08]: So, I mean, it seems foolish for you to sit there and pontificate.
[50:50.410 --> 50:51.470]  [SPEAKER_08]: Please, comment.
[50:52.150 --> 50:54.570]  [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, well, the individual who...
[50:54.570 --> 50:54.670]  [SPEAKER_10]: I can't do.
[50:54.950 --> 50:55.490]  [SPEAKER_10]: I'm sorry.
[50:55.850 --> 51:00.830]  [SPEAKER_10]: The individual who allegedly released this information to WikiLeaks was serving his country at the time.
[51:01.170 --> 51:02.670]  [SPEAKER_10]: And he made that judgment call himself.
[51:02.670 --> 51:04.390]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, but you're applauding his act.
[51:04.530 --> 51:06.090]  [SPEAKER_08]: Not each and every one.
[51:06.210 --> 51:11.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: But all I hear on the news is a bunch of punks sitting there talking about, oh, God, he's doing a great thing.
[51:11.250 --> 51:18.410]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's the kind of thing when I used to get beat up by a bully and all the sissies and sit on the side and say, wow, he really kicked his ass.
[51:18.530 --> 51:19.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: You dig where I'm coming from?
[51:19.530 --> 51:21.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: Why don't you get out and do something positive?
[51:21.550 --> 51:31.290]  [SPEAKER_08]: You got a city, a nation full of illegal aliens and undocumented aliens who are looking up to you guys to find out what the American way is all about.
[51:31.290 --> 51:35.790]  [SPEAKER_08]: And all you're hearing is disgruntled, a bunch of half-fags, half-whatever.
[51:35.950 --> 51:36.470]  [SPEAKER_08]: Thank you.
[51:37.710 --> 51:41.610]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, thanks for showing us what it means not to be disgruntled.
[51:42.090 --> 51:43.290]  [SPEAKER_14]: He sounded very angry.
[51:43.370 --> 51:43.550]  [SPEAKER_05]: Wow.
[51:44.090 --> 51:45.650]  [SPEAKER_05]: I don't know if we can comment on that.
[51:45.690 --> 51:46.890]  [SPEAKER_05]: I think he spoke for himself.
[51:47.070 --> 51:51.030]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, I would just like to throw in a quick comment is, you know, someone's...
[51:51.030 --> 51:57.230]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's just the sound of somebody who is upset, you know, but he's talking to us and telling us what we should or shouldn't be doing.
[51:57.350 --> 51:59.950]  [SPEAKER_07]: He doesn't know what any of us are doing.
[51:59.950 --> 52:09.590]  [SPEAKER_07]: And hopefully, I'm hoping, that several people in this room are doing things that they feel are right to do, given the situation, and not just looking in and saying, ooh, that's good or bad.
[52:09.590 --> 52:11.030]  [SPEAKER_05]: Can I just make one point here?
[52:11.450 --> 52:16.690]  [SPEAKER_05]: Isn't it so much better to hear the other side sometimes than to just silence them and not hear them?
[52:16.850 --> 52:18.410]  [SPEAKER_05]: I think this is a good example of that.
[52:18.550 --> 52:19.150]  [SPEAKER_10]: Very much so.
[52:19.850 --> 52:22.370]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yes, and let's hear from you.
[52:22.610 --> 52:23.110]  [SPEAKER_11]: You're on the air.
[52:23.410 --> 52:23.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hi.
[52:24.050 --> 52:26.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: I have two points to make.
[52:26.450 --> 52:33.270]  [SPEAKER_01]: One being that transparency does indeed help prevent wars.
[52:33.690 --> 52:41.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because every time there's a war, there's at least two sides, both of them thinking they're going to win, and one of them's wrong.
[52:41.310 --> 52:48.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: If they had more information, then that would discourage people from starting the wars.
[52:49.790 --> 52:50.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: Good point.
[52:51.330 --> 52:51.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[52:52.810 --> 52:54.250]  [SPEAKER_11]: And your second point?
[52:54.470 --> 53:11.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: My second point is that it might be an interesting hack to find out how to undo what the credit cards and PayPal have done so that they will accept funds.
[53:11.610 --> 53:18.510]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, I think there are still other places out there where you can donate to WikiLeaks through other credit cards.
[53:18.510 --> 53:27.570]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, you can still send a wire transfer to the Valhaaland Foundation, which successfully got its money out of PayPal just yesterday.
[53:27.770 --> 53:34.190]  [SPEAKER_11]: The money was locked in PayPal, and they can't accept any more money, but at least they got the money that had already been donated.
[53:34.190 --> 53:36.190]  [SPEAKER_11]: They probably have to send them a license photo or something.
[53:36.430 --> 53:36.830]  [SPEAKER_11]: Probably.
[53:38.330 --> 53:39.410]  [SPEAKER_11]: But it's harder.
[53:39.410 --> 53:42.710]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's harder to send a bank transfer to Europe than it is to use PayPal.
[53:43.290 --> 53:46.910]  [SPEAKER_10]: Money in general is very powerful stuff, and it usually finds a way to get where it wants to go.
[53:47.130 --> 53:53.690]  [SPEAKER_10]: So keep an eye on WikiLeaks and related sites, and I'm sure things will be posted as they come about.
[53:54.250 --> 53:54.650]  [SPEAKER_05]: Okay.
[53:55.170 --> 53:58.210]  [SPEAKER_05]: Let's not let one company be the only way to do this.
[53:58.310 --> 54:02.510]  [SPEAKER_05]: There should be all kinds of alternatives to PayPal that are easy to use and install.
[54:04.370 --> 54:10.670]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, the real hack would be getting people together to start alternatives.
[54:10.910 --> 54:14.550]  [SPEAKER_07]: That way we can use them and not just depend on one single source.
[54:15.130 --> 54:16.830]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's a big project.
[54:16.830 --> 54:21.310]  [SPEAKER_11]: But we have just a little bit of time left, so let's try and take this call.
[54:21.590 --> 54:21.810]  [SPEAKER_11]: Hello?
[54:22.130 --> 54:22.650]  [SPEAKER_11]: Hello.
[54:23.070 --> 54:23.350]  [SPEAKER_11]: Hi.
[54:23.870 --> 54:24.150]  [SPEAKER_03]: Hi.
[54:24.310 --> 54:25.670]  [SPEAKER_03]: Are you taking a call, or, then?
[54:26.130 --> 54:27.170]  [SPEAKER_11]: We're taking you.
[54:27.210 --> 54:27.450]  [SPEAKER_11]: You're on the air.
[54:27.450 --> 54:29.310]  [SPEAKER_11]: But we have only a minute or so left.
[54:29.770 --> 54:30.350]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, okay.
[54:30.870 --> 54:31.230]  Okay.
[54:31.490 --> 54:34.290]  [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, if I could take another call, then I could wait, or...
[54:34.290 --> 54:34.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: No, no.
[54:35.030 --> 54:35.410]  [SPEAKER_03]: Tell us.
[54:35.770 --> 54:36.870]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, yeah.
[54:37.030 --> 54:39.030]  [SPEAKER_03]: No, I just wanted to make a comment about the WikiLeaks, then.
[54:39.270 --> 54:39.450]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah.
[54:39.650 --> 54:40.130]  [SPEAKER_11]: Go ahead.
[54:41.050 --> 54:41.550]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, okay.
[54:42.310 --> 54:42.970]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, I...
[54:42.970 --> 54:48.070]  [SPEAKER_03]: The other callers before are saying that they're responsible to release these documents, but I think, to me, it depends on...
[54:48.430 --> 54:52.350]  [SPEAKER_03]: If it's about government transparency, yeah, then I think they should be released.
[54:52.850 --> 54:56.130]  [SPEAKER_03]: If there's a lot of corruption going on, you know, the public has a right to know.
[54:56.310 --> 54:58.750]  [SPEAKER_03]: So I think it's a good thing that all these things are coming out.
[54:59.130 --> 55:00.870]  [SPEAKER_03]: That's basically my comment.
[55:01.530 --> 55:01.750]  [SPEAKER_11]: Okay.
[55:02.070 --> 55:02.810]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, thanks for it.
[55:03.930 --> 55:04.310]  [SPEAKER_11]: Thank you.
[55:04.310 --> 55:05.590]  [SPEAKER_11]: Should we try and take another one?
[55:06.270 --> 55:06.650]  [SPEAKER_11]: Sure.
[55:06.650 --> 55:07.670]  [SPEAKER_14]: I would have to be really quick.
[55:08.470 --> 55:08.950]  [SPEAKER_11]: All right.
[55:09.830 --> 55:11.030]  [SPEAKER_11]: Can you be really quick?
[55:11.310 --> 55:12.010]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, real quick.
[55:12.010 --> 55:15.590]  [SPEAKER_02]: I got 50 bucks that I want to donate to bail this guy out.
[55:16.530 --> 55:17.130]  [SPEAKER_02]: How's that?
[55:17.450 --> 55:18.330]  [SPEAKER_02]: Can we do this?
[55:18.570 --> 55:21.010]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, the bail is set at a lot higher than that.
[55:21.330 --> 55:21.650]  [SPEAKER_02]: I know.
[55:21.770 --> 55:24.150]  [SPEAKER_02]: But my 50 bucks and someone else's 50 bucks...
[55:24.850 --> 55:25.910]  [SPEAKER_02]: Bernie, you good for it?
[55:26.970 --> 55:27.490]  [SPEAKER_02]: I'm in.
[55:27.710 --> 55:28.110]  [SPEAKER_02]: I'm in.
[55:28.470 --> 55:29.210]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know what?
[55:29.290 --> 55:30.330]  [SPEAKER_02]: I was incarcerated.
[55:30.470 --> 55:33.650]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mailed out for bail money, and it ended up working.
[55:33.890 --> 55:34.610]  [SPEAKER_02]: And you know what?
[55:34.650 --> 55:37.170]  [SPEAKER_02]: There could be a bail fund, and 50 bucks isn't going to kill me.
[55:37.270 --> 55:40.270]  [SPEAKER_02]: I haven't had income for a long time, but I got 50 bucks for that man.
[55:40.270 --> 55:44.850]  [SPEAKER_10]: I think your heart is in the right place, but actually it's not the money in this particular case that's the problem.
[55:45.390 --> 55:49.730]  [SPEAKER_10]: His bail has actually been covered by some high-profile individuals with lots of it.
[55:50.070 --> 55:56.510]  [SPEAKER_10]: It's just a matter now of getting them to grant him the bail that he's entitled to rather than keeping hold of them.
[55:56.510 --> 55:58.650]  [SPEAKER_02]: I didn't know that, but it was from my heart.
[55:59.130 --> 55:59.610]  [SPEAKER_10]: All right.
[55:59.750 --> 56:00.350]  [SPEAKER_02]: Thanks very much.
[56:00.630 --> 56:01.470]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's for Peter King.
[56:01.770 --> 56:02.150]  [SPEAKER_14]: All right.
[56:02.410 --> 56:02.770]  [SPEAKER_14]: Thank you.
[56:02.930 --> 56:05.990]  [SPEAKER_14]: And I think with that, that's going to have to be it for tonight.
[56:06.030 --> 56:09.330]  [SPEAKER_14]: And so we'll be here same time, same place next week.
[56:09.330 --> 56:10.190]  [SPEAKER_14]: Good night.
[56:10.850 --> 56:11.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: Night.
[56:11.630 --> 56:12.490]  [SPEAKER_06]: On a regular basis.
[56:12.730 --> 56:13.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'm going to make him an open camera.
[56:14.230 --> 56:14.710]  [SPEAKER_06]: Shut
[56:23.790 --> 56:24.030]  up.
[56:24.250 --> 56:25.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: You've got to believe me.
[56:25.610 --> 56:27.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: If I did everything, I wouldn't leave me.
[56:27.350 --> 56:28.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: A beautiful chocolate.
[56:28.390 --> 56:29.290]  [SPEAKER_05]: Candy is dandy.
[56:29.550 --> 56:30.870]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's a nice candy.
[56:31.190 --> 56:32.670]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can count on slippery feet.
[56:32.950 --> 56:34.530]  [SPEAKER_00]: Suicide will be nice, isn't it?
[56:34.810 --> 56:36.430]  [SPEAKER_00]: I didn't build the Panama Canal.
[56:36.710 --> 56:37.990]  [SPEAKER_00]: Open the five bay doors, please.
[56:38.210 --> 56:40.190]  [SPEAKER_00]: These aren't the droids you're looking for.
[56:40.290 --> 56:41.530]  [SPEAKER_00]: These aren't the droids we're looking
[56:45.420 --> 56:45.660]  for.
[56:46.160 --> 56:47.400]  [SPEAKER_00]: To the idiot-mobile.
[56:47.400 --> 56:48.440]  [SPEAKER_00]: Right away, Michael.
[56:48.580 --> 56:52.820]  [SPEAKER_00]: I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, leaked, deepened, or numbered.
[56:53.060 --> 56:54.980]  [SPEAKER_06]: We came, we saw, we kicked it down.
[56:55.080 --> 56:56.920]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't understand, I could've had class.
[56:57.060 --> 56:58.060]  [SPEAKER_06]: Round and fifty-five.
[56:58.820 --> 57:00.520]  [SPEAKER_00]: Who's getting into what you've done?
[57:00.720 --> 57:02.400]  [SPEAKER_00]: Finally cast off those lines.
[57:02.580 --> 57:04.020]  [SPEAKER_09]: Oh, I've been nervous once this time.
[57:04.120 --> 57:07.930]  [SPEAKER_09]: It rocks as money.
[57:07.930 --> 57:09.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: We came, we saw, we kicked it down.
[57:09.990 --> 57:11.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: Writing checks your body can't cash.
[57:11.690 --> 57:13.270]  [SPEAKER_11]: I was elected to leave a free.
[57:13.370 --> 57:15.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: I feel the need for neighbor fish.
[57:15.330 --> 57:16.110]  [SPEAKER_06]: Watch out for snakes.
[57:16.270 --> 57:17.110]  [SPEAKER_06]: A good man lover.
[57:17.310 --> 57:18.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: Excuse me, my hat looks like a muffin.
[57:18.790 --> 57:18.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: Over.
[57:19.590 --> 57:20.550]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's full of snakes.
[57:20.610 --> 57:22.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: There was no driver in the car.
[57:23.210 --> 57:23.410]  The
[57:35.500 --> 57:36.120]  car away, Michael.
[57:36.340 --> 57:37.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: Boy, is he on the car?
[57:37.680 --> 57:39.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: There were two things I love in this world.
[57:40.220 --> 57:41.700]  [SPEAKER_06]: Everybody and television.
[57:45.140 --> 57:46.920]  [SPEAKER_06]: You must be shrooming.
[57:47.290 --> 57:48.520]  Wait for me, Luma!
[57:48.680 --> 57:50.710]  [SPEAKER_06]: Trust Live to meet the host of that show, Meat Boy.
[57:50.860 --> 57:52.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: I want to go to there.
[57:52.290 --> 57:52.640]  We came.
[57:57.840 --> 57:58.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I don't give up.
[57:58.780 --> 57:59.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's a show, you know.
[57:59.700 --> 58:00.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: Where is me lost for?
[58:00.620 --> 58:01.300]  [SPEAKER_06]: Don't get me cut.
[58:01.820 --> 58:03.160]  [SPEAKER_06]: You're going to need a bigger boat.
[58:03.380 --> 58:04.000]  [SPEAKER_06]: What'd you say?
[58:04.220 --> 58:05.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think she bought it.
[58:05.220 --> 58:06.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: Suck it, monkeys!
[58:06.300 --> 58:07.500]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'm going hard for my...
[58:07.940 --> 58:08.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: I drive.
[58:09.080 --> 58:10.580]  [SPEAKER_00]: Number five is alive.
[58:10.800 --> 58:11.420]  [SPEAKER_00]: Serving along.
[58:11.780 --> 58:12.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: No altar.
[58:12.740 --> 58:13.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: Pick those French fries.
[58:13.900 --> 58:14.280]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yum, yum, yum.
[58:14.560 --> 58:15.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: Bueller.
[58:15.500 --> 58:15.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: Bueller.
[58:16.460 --> 58:16.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: Bueller.
[58:18.020 --> 58:20.820]  [SPEAKER_06]: The light that burns twice as bright burns half as long.
[58:20.840 --> 58:21.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: Six words in the whole world.
[58:29.380 --> 58:30.940]  [SPEAKER_00]: Bueller number six.
[58:31.460 --> 58:32.480]  [SPEAKER_00]: Bueller number six.
[58:38.220 --> 58:40.160]  [SPEAKER_08]: Give me my 20,000 cans.
[58:40.300 --> 58:42.080]  We came, we saw, we kicked it down.
[58:42.230 --> 58:43.820]  I think you woke up the dead with that blast.
[58:44.020 --> 58:45.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: We came, we saw, we kicked it down.
[58:45.960 --> 58:47.400]  [SPEAKER_09]: I think fast, I thought fast.
[58:47.660 --> 58:49.500]  [SPEAKER_06]: We came, we saw, we kicked it down.
[58:49.620 --> 58:50.750]  Boys, this is not my Batman.