Off The Hook - 2014-04-16

[00:00.000 --> 00:04.060]  [SPEAKER_00]: With light food and drinks and a lot of fun and celebration.
[00:04.380 --> 00:04.940]  [SPEAKER_00]: Join us.
[00:05.340 --> 00:07.100]  [SPEAKER_00]: Mumia turns 60 years young.
[00:07.300 --> 00:08.400]  [SPEAKER_00]: You don't want to miss this.
[00:08.800 --> 00:09.820]  [SPEAKER_00]: M1 will perform.
[00:10.080 --> 00:13.180]  [SPEAKER_00]: We will have bus tickets for the April 26 block party.
[00:13.780 --> 00:21.040]  [SPEAKER_00]: Contact us at 866-745-6963 or bringmumiahhome.com.
[00:21.160 --> 00:27.840]  [SPEAKER_00]: That's 866-745-6963 or bringmumiahhome.com.
[00:27.940 --> 00:29.040]  [SPEAKER_00]: Join the celebration.
[00:29.300 --> 00:29.980]  [SPEAKER_00]: Let's have some fun.
[00:34.510 --> 00:38.790]  [SPEAKER_04]: And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:39.170 --> 00:41.830]  [SPEAKER_04]: The time is 7 o'clock.
[00:41.990 --> 00:44.310]  [SPEAKER_04]: Time once again for Off The Hook.
[01:09.500 --> 01:11.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: I hope that's understood.
[01:11.460 --> 01:12.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: But make me move!
[02:45.100 --> 02:46.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:46.800 --> 02:49.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: The program is Off The Hook.
[02:50.760 --> 02:52.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: And for some reason, I think I knocked my headphones out.
[02:55.040 --> 02:56.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: No, I can't hear myself at all.
[03:03.020 --> 03:07.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, it's very disheartening to not be able to hear oneself over the radio.
[03:08.540 --> 03:11.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: Ah, there we are, because this button was not hit.
[03:11.820 --> 03:13.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: So nobody was able to hear me.
[03:13.320 --> 03:14.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: All right, it's a good thing, too.
[03:14.120 --> 03:14.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: I said some bad words.
[03:15.840 --> 03:17.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: This is Off The Hook.
[03:17.240 --> 03:19.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: Emmanuel Goldstein here on this Wednesday evening.
[03:19.840 --> 03:20.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: Joined tonight by Mike.
[03:21.180 --> 03:22.280]  [SPEAKER_09]: You know, I could hear you.
[03:22.400 --> 03:23.160]  [SPEAKER_09]: Bad words and all.
[03:23.480 --> 03:26.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, you know, somebody is really messing up this studio here.
[03:27.120 --> 03:27.760]  [SPEAKER_04]: Go ahead, Mike.
[03:27.860 --> 03:28.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: Try again.
[03:28.100 --> 03:28.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: Is this better?
[03:28.620 --> 03:30.780]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, someone pressed all the buttons to make it not work.
[03:30.920 --> 03:32.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: I sound unusually loud to myself.
[03:32.880 --> 03:33.820]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't know what's up with that.
[03:34.160 --> 03:34.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[03:34.720 --> 03:36.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know, it's just everything's going wrong today.
[03:37.260 --> 03:42.320]  [SPEAKER_04]: The guards wouldn't let us in, and there's cops all over the street blocking things.
[03:42.620 --> 03:43.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: But anyway, so Mike's here.
[03:43.880 --> 03:44.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: Rob T.
[03:44.300 --> 03:44.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: Firefly.
[03:44.920 --> 03:45.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: Good evening.
[03:45.660 --> 03:45.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: Kyle.
[03:47.160 --> 03:47.520]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hello.
[03:48.020 --> 03:48.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: And Bernie S.
[03:49.320 --> 03:50.300]  [SPEAKER_05]: Greetings from Pennsylvania.
[03:50.440 --> 03:51.460]  [SPEAKER_05]: I could hear you the whole time, too.
[03:51.460 --> 03:52.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: Of course, they pressed that button, too, to make that not work.
[03:52.940 --> 03:54.060]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hold on, I've got to figure this out now.
[03:55.580 --> 03:56.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: What button could that be?
[03:56.920 --> 03:57.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: Anybody want to guess?
[03:57.940 --> 03:58.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: This one?
[03:58.420 --> 03:58.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: This one.
[03:58.780 --> 03:59.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: Bernie, keep talking.
[04:00.220 --> 04:01.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: Did you try the blue button?
[04:02.080 --> 04:03.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: This is sabotage here.
[04:03.660 --> 04:06.580]  [SPEAKER_04]: Someone pressed all the wrong buttons, so nothing works.
[04:06.820 --> 04:07.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: How about the green button?
[04:07.760 --> 04:11.140]  [SPEAKER_04]: No, I pressed all the buttons, and I think we're back now.
[04:11.140 --> 04:11.860]  [SPEAKER_05]: Can you hear me now?
[04:12.120 --> 04:12.880]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, we hear you.
[04:12.980 --> 04:13.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: Can you hear me?
[04:13.940 --> 04:15.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, I could hear you the whole time.
[04:15.560 --> 04:16.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, I imagine.
[04:16.640 --> 04:18.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: You couldn't hear me at the beginning, though, with all the silence.
[04:18.480 --> 04:18.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, I could.
[04:19.140 --> 04:19.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: Really?
[04:20.020 --> 04:20.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes.
[04:20.660 --> 04:22.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: That wasn't even registering on the board.
[04:22.560 --> 04:23.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: But I could hear you.
[04:23.680 --> 04:24.200]  [SPEAKER_04]: Wow, you know.
[04:24.260 --> 04:25.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: You're registering with me.
[04:25.300 --> 04:27.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: We don't need NSA, because we can do this ourselves.
[04:28.160 --> 04:29.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: We can sabotage our own efforts.
[04:29.900 --> 04:30.400]  [SPEAKER_05]: What are all the guards doing outside?
[04:30.400 --> 04:31.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: What's going on?
[04:31.760 --> 04:34.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's just every other car is a cop for some reason today.
[04:34.740 --> 04:35.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know why that is.
[04:35.680 --> 04:37.320]  [SPEAKER_04]: I've noticed that all the way in from Long Island.
[04:37.700 --> 04:39.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's National Police Day or something.
[04:39.720 --> 04:45.780]  [SPEAKER_05]: Oh, it's the Boston Marathon security perimeter extended all the way down to New York City?
[04:47.080 --> 04:48.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: I think so.
[04:48.360 --> 04:48.880]  [SPEAKER_04]: I think maybe.
[04:49.420 --> 04:49.760]  [SPEAKER_04]: Wow.
[04:49.860 --> 04:50.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can't be too safe.
[04:51.300 --> 04:51.580]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[04:52.440 --> 04:54.200]  [SPEAKER_04]: We're all freaking out here about various things.
[04:54.520 --> 04:58.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: We had quite an issue coming in, actually, just dealing with computer problems before.
[04:59.580 --> 05:01.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know if anybody else has experiences.
[05:01.640 --> 05:06.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: Does anybody, even just for the fun of it, use Windows XP?
[05:06.980 --> 05:07.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: Nobody?
[05:07.560 --> 05:08.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: We're all too good for that?
[05:08.560 --> 05:08.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: I do.
[05:09.140 --> 05:10.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, I know you were with me when this happened.
[05:12.380 --> 05:13.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: Bernie, you do?
[05:13.480 --> 05:14.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, I've used it.
[05:14.420 --> 05:14.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[05:16.080 --> 05:17.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's the support expires.
[05:17.500 --> 05:18.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, and that's the thing.
[05:18.900 --> 05:23.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's like, this is fascinating because they're kind of trying to get you.
[05:23.640 --> 05:28.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: They're trying to force you to either buy a new computer or go to Windows 8 or something like that.
[05:29.260 --> 05:32.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: And today what happened was all of the...
[05:32.640 --> 05:33.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, Mike?
[05:33.960 --> 05:37.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: I have a message that your microphone is still not going through the air.
[05:37.740 --> 05:39.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: My microphone is still not going through the air?
[05:39.420 --> 05:40.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: How do you like that?
[05:40.340 --> 05:40.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: Really?
[05:41.000 --> 05:42.140]  [SPEAKER_04]: So I can hear me.
[05:42.140 --> 05:49.020]  [SPEAKER_09]: And apparently some people can hear you faintly through these microphones, but that doesn't help enough.
[05:49.160 --> 05:49.740]  [SPEAKER_09]: Doesn't help enough.
[05:49.740 --> 05:50.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: What is going on with this place?
[05:51.000 --> 05:52.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, how am I supposed to fix this?
[05:52.400 --> 05:56.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: If I'm hearing myself, I'm going to press every button imaginable now.
[05:57.720 --> 05:58.820]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh God, not that one.
[05:58.960 --> 06:00.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know what to do.
[06:00.320 --> 06:01.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: All the buttons are...
[06:01.420 --> 06:03.880]  [SPEAKER_04]: Who was in here before us pressing all the wrong buttons?
[06:04.400 --> 06:04.800]  Because...
[06:05.320 --> 06:06.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know how to fix this.
[06:07.080 --> 06:08.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: I hear myself fine.
[06:08.380 --> 06:09.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: People say they can't hear me.
[06:09.980 --> 06:11.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: Then I can't hear me and people say they hear me.
[06:12.600 --> 06:15.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: This is like some kind of a nightmare scenario here.
[06:16.780 --> 06:17.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, okay.
[06:19.340 --> 06:19.740]  [SPEAKER_05]: Anyway...
[06:20.140 --> 06:22.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: All right, I have word that it is fixed.
[06:22.660 --> 06:24.280]  [SPEAKER_09]: Whatever button you pressed was the right button.
[06:24.400 --> 06:25.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: I pressed all the buttons, Mike.
[06:25.780 --> 06:27.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, remember to do that next time.
[06:27.600 --> 06:28.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't know.
[06:30.640 --> 06:32.040]  [SPEAKER_04]: Can we start over again?
[06:32.280 --> 06:34.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: Can I just go back outside and come in here?
[06:34.380 --> 06:35.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: Because this is ridiculous.
[06:36.320 --> 06:39.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: We could, but that would mean getting the band back in here to play the theme again.
[06:39.300 --> 06:39.560]  [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[06:39.640 --> 06:41.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: Let's change the combination on that door.
[06:41.380 --> 06:41.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know what?
[06:41.720 --> 06:43.320]  [SPEAKER_04]: Let's put a combination on that door.
[06:43.460 --> 06:46.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: And then let's change it so that whoever did this doesn't do it again, ever.
[06:47.140 --> 06:48.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: Kyle, maybe you can help me figure this out.
[06:48.600 --> 06:50.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm currently on a browser.
[06:50.100 --> 06:52.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: And I use the maximum number of tabs.
[06:52.180 --> 06:55.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: And I can't get over to the rest.
[06:55.660 --> 06:56.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: Oh, wait a minute.
[06:56.260 --> 06:57.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: Maybe it's over there.
[06:57.000 --> 06:58.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, well, I'm trying to...
[06:58.420 --> 06:58.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, here we go.
[06:59.460 --> 07:01.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm trying to say about Windows XP.
[07:03.140 --> 07:12.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: I looked this up, and apparently this is a big deal today, that Windows itself is attacking its own operating system and making it come to a crawl.
[07:12.880 --> 07:17.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: There's this thing called anti-malware service.
[07:18.600 --> 07:23.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: And since XP is at the end of its life, it's no longer supported, that no longer works.
[07:23.500 --> 07:25.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: But it doesn't keep it from trying to work.
[07:25.720 --> 07:31.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: And what that does, it hogs all the system resources and makes nothing work.
[07:31.160 --> 07:40.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: And the solution, if you click on things to do to fix this, the solution is buy another computer or get another operating system because Windows XP is no longer being supported.
[07:41.180 --> 07:43.200]  [SPEAKER_04]: It really is a way of...
[07:43.200 --> 07:44.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's kind of what's going on here with the board.
[07:45.120 --> 07:49.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: They're sabotaging their own products to make people get something else.
[07:49.660 --> 07:50.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: Now, I found the website.
[07:50.980 --> 07:52.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: Unfortunately, it's not in very good English.
[07:52.580 --> 07:58.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: The headline says, Today on all Windows XP computers stopped working Microsoft anti-malware service.
[07:59.980 --> 08:00.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: What?
[08:00.640 --> 08:01.460]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, that's what it says.
[08:01.500 --> 08:02.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's the headline.
[08:02.340 --> 08:03.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's as good as it gets.
[08:03.440 --> 08:04.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: What website is this?
[08:04.960 --> 08:07.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: This is Microsoft.com, actually.
[08:07.940 --> 08:09.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: Social.technic.microsoft.com.
[08:10.340 --> 08:12.840]  [SPEAKER_09]: They don't have anyone in the entire company who can write in English?
[08:13.260 --> 08:14.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: Just a headline.
[08:14.100 --> 08:15.300]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's not even a whole article.
[08:15.300 --> 08:16.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's the least of it, all right?
[08:16.500 --> 08:18.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's the least of the problems they have right now.
[08:18.400 --> 08:23.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: This person says, We have 400 machines that we are migrating to Windows 7 that report same issue.
[08:23.380 --> 08:25.560]  [SPEAKER_04]: Antivirus stopped and restarted automatically.
[08:27.520 --> 08:29.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: But, as you can see, everybody shares the same language skill.
[08:29.620 --> 08:30.320]  [SPEAKER_04]: So it's a forum.
[08:30.540 --> 08:33.000]  [SPEAKER_09]: So it's not Microsoft's fault, the poor English.
[08:33.120 --> 08:34.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, they're not supervising it.
[08:35.020 --> 08:36.760]  [SPEAKER_04]: But clients are useless during restart.
[08:37.360 --> 08:39.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: Please give us some ideas about resolve the issue.
[08:41.140 --> 08:41.580]  [SPEAKER_05]: Emmanuel.
[08:41.820 --> 08:42.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes.
[08:43.120 --> 08:47.880]  [SPEAKER_05]: I first thought you were talking about Microsoft Security Essentials, which is the antivirus software.
[08:47.980 --> 08:48.380]  [SPEAKER_05]: It is.
[08:48.520 --> 08:48.760]  [SPEAKER_05]: It is.
[08:48.880 --> 08:49.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, well...
[08:49.440 --> 08:55.060]  [SPEAKER_04]: And by de-installing that, and this is really the way to fix it, de-install that and everything will work just fine.
[08:55.460 --> 08:57.040]  [SPEAKER_04]: Except you might get a few viruses.
[08:57.460 --> 09:00.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: I have a computer here that is running Windows XP, and I'm looking at it.
[09:00.780 --> 09:09.300]  [SPEAKER_05]: And Microsoft Security Essentials is not, while it's done, it's updates, it's not going to update any more antivirus signatures for Windows XP.
[09:09.460 --> 09:11.780]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's not hogging any more memory than it usually did.
[09:12.020 --> 09:19.880]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, I've seen nothing but errors saying that this particular program has crashed, sent the error report to Microsoft, that whole deal.
[09:20.260 --> 09:26.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: And while that is happening, and even during the reboot process, everything slows down to a crawl.
[09:26.800 --> 09:29.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: And apparently this is going on in various other places as well.
[09:29.760 --> 09:34.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: This person says, we also have computers with Windows 7, but they are no fault occurred.
[09:34.960 --> 09:38.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: So I think what they're trying to say there is that this doesn't happen to Windows 7.
[09:38.500 --> 09:39.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's only happening on XP.
[09:41.320 --> 09:42.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: So that's just something to keep in mind.
[09:43.440 --> 09:44.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: It was a bit of fun.
[09:44.500 --> 09:46.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: It was just something we were trying to figure out earlier.
[09:47.360 --> 09:52.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: My attitude with this is that basically, once this program is obsolete, you really don't need it.
[09:52.980 --> 10:01.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: Because anything it's done to update or add something to your system to prevent it being vulnerable has been done and updated and installed.
[10:01.780 --> 10:08.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: So I think actually removing the Security Essentials software, you're probably better off just removing it.
[10:08.040 --> 10:16.060]  [SPEAKER_08]: Because the especially annoying thing about this is that it really, really, really slows down your system.
[10:16.900 --> 10:17.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[10:17.640 --> 10:17.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[10:18.140 --> 10:18.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm sorry.
[10:18.880 --> 10:21.140]  [SPEAKER_04]: Your voice, for some reason, isn't going through on the microphone.
[10:21.140 --> 10:22.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: I could not hear Kyle either.
[10:23.080 --> 10:24.180]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's looking...
[10:24.180 --> 10:26.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: You want to say all that again for the purpose?
[10:26.540 --> 10:27.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm sorry.
[10:27.580 --> 10:27.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, yeah.
[10:28.040 --> 10:39.140]  [SPEAKER_08]: I was just going to say that Microsoft Security Essentials, being now not supported, isn't going to download or provide any patches or protection against new vulnerabilities.
[10:39.600 --> 10:45.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: So having it on your system, thinking it's doing things that are useful, it's really...
[10:45.900 --> 10:47.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: You're kind of on your own anyway.
[10:48.300 --> 10:49.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: So having it there...
[10:49.720 --> 11:09.020]  [SPEAKER_08]: And that in conjunction with the fact that this warning takes up a lot of processing cycles and memory and really incapacitates the machine, it's kind of almost better to just get rid of it and, yeah, deal with this brave new world of no Microsoft security software.
[11:09.640 --> 11:11.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, there's other security software you can use to replace it.
[11:11.980 --> 11:12.600]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, you don't have to run that.
[11:12.740 --> 11:13.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: You could run...
[11:13.180 --> 11:20.220]  [SPEAKER_05]: There's plenty of other free antivirus software, like Avast and things like that, that you can still run under XP without a lot of problems.
[11:20.240 --> 11:27.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: The thing is, one of the options to fix the problems that you're having is never uninstall this particular program that's telling you this.
[11:28.600 --> 11:32.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: And it's basically, replace your hardware, replace your software, buy more things from us.
[11:32.940 --> 11:38.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: And unfortunately, most people won't know to do something else other than that.
[11:39.240 --> 11:39.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[11:39.840 --> 11:42.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, we don't want to talk about our problems all day, do we?
[11:42.420 --> 11:44.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: Although we seem to have more than our share.
[11:45.020 --> 11:48.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: We do want to talk about some other things that have been going on in the world.
[11:49.100 --> 11:52.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: Bernie, I understand the whole Weave case has been, what, thrown out?
[11:53.760 --> 11:54.240]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[11:55.040 --> 11:58.220]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, we've, I don't think we've ever had him on the show.
[11:58.220 --> 12:00.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm quite sure we haven't ever had him on the show.
[12:02.580 --> 12:25.860]  [SPEAKER_05]: We spoke about it on the show last week or two weeks ago with our guest from the EFF about, it was a Computer Fraud and Abuse, a Computer Fraud and Abuse Act prosecution, or just in a nutshell, he went to an unprotected AT&T website that was available to anybody in the public where AT&T iPhone users,
[12:25.860 --> 12:34.360]  [SPEAKER_05]: this is a few years ago, iPhone users' account information, like their email address and stuff, was completely unprotected by any kind of passwords or anything like that.
[12:34.560 --> 12:39.420]  [SPEAKER_05]: And he discovered this bug and apparently told AT&T about it and they didn't do much.
[12:39.420 --> 12:52.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: And so then he told a news media organization called Gawker about it and sent them about 100,000, or many thousands of customers' info, which Gawker then published all the redacted.
[12:52.580 --> 13:02.100]  [SPEAKER_05]: But it took people like Mayor Bloomberg, Rahm Emmanuel, who at the time was the White House Chief of Staff, other really important people who got really annoyed by this.
[13:02.340 --> 13:07.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: And AT&T got their pound of flesh by having the Department of Justice prosecute Weave.
[13:08.320 --> 13:10.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: Now, it was a really bogus prosecution.
[13:11.620 --> 13:15.920]  [SPEAKER_05]: And this Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is really unconstitutionally vague.
[13:15.920 --> 13:19.800]  [SPEAKER_05]: It doesn't even define what unauthorized access means in the statutory language.
[13:20.160 --> 13:28.920]  [SPEAKER_05]: But the Third Circuit, which in Philadelphia, where his appeal was heard a couple weeks ago, refused to hear any of those arguments.
[13:28.920 --> 13:31.120]  [SPEAKER_05]: But they would hear arguments about a venue.
[13:31.860 --> 13:38.780]  [SPEAKER_05]: And so his attorney said, Well, you know, this case shouldn't have ever been tried in New Jersey, because Weave was not in New Jersey.
[13:39.280 --> 13:41.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: The servers he allegedly accessed were not in New Jersey.
[13:42.120 --> 13:43.260]  [SPEAKER_05]: Nothing was in New Jersey.
[13:44.360 --> 13:49.340]  [SPEAKER_05]: And believe it or not, the court agreed and said, Yep, this was held in the wrong venue.
[13:49.420 --> 13:54.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: It should have been held either in Arkansas or California or Texas or wherever the servers were, and Weave was in Arkansas.
[13:55.520 --> 14:10.860]  [SPEAKER_05]: And this is an important case, because not from a technical standpoint, but from a legal standpoint, you don't want overzealous prosecutors to charge you to go around what's called forum shopping and find the easiest forum in the land to prosecute your case in.
[14:11.160 --> 14:17.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: Had this case been brought in the Ninth Circuit, where California is, in Silicon Valley, the judges there are a little more savvy.
[14:17.900 --> 14:23.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: The Third Circuit judges, one of them admitted he had really basically no clue of knowledge of how the Internet works.
[14:23.200 --> 14:24.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: He said this.
[14:24.320 --> 14:24.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: I heard him say it.
[14:25.020 --> 14:25.400]  [SPEAKER_05]: I was there.
[14:26.540 --> 14:28.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: So, this case was thrown out.
[14:29.140 --> 14:30.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: He is no longer convicted.
[14:31.060 --> 14:33.720]  [SPEAKER_05]: But the feds can charge him again.
[14:33.720 --> 14:35.340]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's not really a double jeopardy situation.
[14:35.360 --> 14:38.040]  [SPEAKER_05]: They could charge him again, but we'll see.
[14:38.380 --> 14:41.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: Why is this not a double jeopardy situation?
[14:41.740 --> 14:44.320]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, it's a little bit complicated, and I don't understand it completely.
[14:44.680 --> 14:51.380]  [SPEAKER_05]: But, in effect, the prosecution never happened, legally.
[14:51.380 --> 15:01.980]  [SPEAKER_05]: Even though he spent more than a year in federal prison for this completely bogus prosecution, it's kind of considered harmless error.
[15:02.620 --> 15:03.400]  [SPEAKER_05]: I know.
[15:03.460 --> 15:03.800]  [SPEAKER_05]: I know.
[15:03.880 --> 15:04.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: It makes no sense.
[15:04.540 --> 15:07.240]  [SPEAKER_05]: But the law has nothing to do with logic or common sense.
[15:07.240 --> 15:07.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's the law.
[15:08.640 --> 15:19.040]  [SPEAKER_05]: So, the feds could indeed go back and charge him in another circuit, like where one of the servers were, like California or Texas or where he was in Arkansas.
[15:21.540 --> 15:23.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm sure the feds really hate to lose.
[15:23.700 --> 15:25.480]  [SPEAKER_05]: They have, like, a 97% conviction rate.
[15:25.540 --> 15:26.680]  [SPEAKER_05]: So, they would hate to lose this.
[15:27.120 --> 15:27.240]  [SPEAKER_04]: Right.
[15:27.440 --> 15:43.900]  [SPEAKER_05]: But the good thing about this is if they do charge him again, it then does open the opportunity for him to argue again about the unconstitutional vagueness of the Concheter Fraud and Abuse Act, which would be a wonderful thing, because that really needs to be heard for a federal circuit court.
[15:44.300 --> 15:45.800]  [SPEAKER_05]: So, we'll see how this goes.
[15:45.800 --> 15:51.340]  [SPEAKER_05]: The good news for Weave is that he's either out or will be out very soon from federal prison.
[15:51.540 --> 15:53.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: He doesn't get the year of his life back.
[15:53.140 --> 15:54.320]  [SPEAKER_05]: He doesn't even get an apology.
[15:54.620 --> 15:55.820]  [SPEAKER_05]: They don't give apologies.
[15:56.220 --> 15:57.580]  [SPEAKER_05]: They don't give you back wages.
[15:57.740 --> 15:58.440]  [SPEAKER_05]: They give you nothing.
[16:00.460 --> 16:01.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: Very true.
[16:01.600 --> 16:02.060]  [SPEAKER_04]: Very true.
[16:02.980 --> 16:04.880]  [SPEAKER_04]: Bernie, there was also another case, right?
[16:05.020 --> 16:08.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: There was the Ladara Levison case on LavaBit.
[16:09.120 --> 16:09.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: Ladara.
[16:09.560 --> 16:09.780]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[16:09.780 --> 16:10.880]  [SPEAKER_04]: What's going on with that?
[16:11.220 --> 16:11.800]  [SPEAKER_05]: Wow.
[16:12.120 --> 16:18.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: He's the guy that ran LavaBit, which some of us know is a pretty good secure email provider.
[16:19.160 --> 16:19.840]  [SPEAKER_05]: Everything's encrypted.
[16:20.680 --> 16:25.240]  [SPEAKER_05]: And none other than Edward Snowden had an account on LavaBit.
[16:25.240 --> 16:40.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: And after those documents that he allegedly leaked to media outlets from the NSA, the NSA or the feds took a keen interest in LavaBit because Ed Snowden had a account there.
[16:40.240 --> 16:41.980]  [SPEAKER_05]: So, they knocked on his door, effectively.
[16:42.340 --> 16:45.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: The FBI did and said, hey, this is a national security letter.
[16:46.320 --> 16:50.800]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm paraphrasing here because it would be a felony for me to reveal anything that was in a national security letter.
[16:51.000 --> 16:52.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, how would you know it was in a national security letter?
[16:53.380 --> 16:54.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yes, a national security letter.
[16:54.640 --> 16:55.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: But how would you know?
[16:55.980 --> 16:56.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: You can't reveal it.
[16:57.040 --> 17:12.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: These are news media reports, and these are things that Ladara had averred in nonspecific language, that he was compelled by the FBI to divulge the SSL keys for his entire... all the servers, everything.
[17:13.220 --> 17:17.820]  [SPEAKER_05]: Not just for this one account, but for everybody that had an account on LavaBit.
[17:17.820 --> 17:24.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: And Ladara actually was conscientious enough to say, no, I'm not going to compromise the security of all my users.
[17:24.980 --> 17:26.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: And he shut down his company.
[17:26.400 --> 17:27.620]  [SPEAKER_05]: He shut down LavaBit.
[17:28.280 --> 17:32.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: And then he kind of didn't make it easy for the feds to have it.
[17:32.300 --> 17:40.320]  [SPEAKER_05]: Like, he printed the key on, like, paper in, like, really, like, two-point tape and handed it in a big stack of paper.
[17:40.480 --> 17:43.400]  [SPEAKER_05]: And the federal judge found him in contempt of court.
[17:43.760 --> 17:44.720]  [SPEAKER_05]: That's a serious charge.
[17:44.820 --> 17:46.880]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can go to federal prison for being in contempt of court.
[17:47.460 --> 17:48.980]  [SPEAKER_05]: But this guy really...
[17:49.880 --> 18:00.440]  [SPEAKER_05]: I admire Ladara Levison for not bending over for the feds and compromising the security of all his customers just so the feds can get information about one user.
[18:01.040 --> 18:02.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: That's insane.
[18:02.800 --> 18:06.920]  [SPEAKER_05]: So this guy could go to federal prisons for just standing up for what he thinks he was right.
[18:07.100 --> 18:08.900]  [SPEAKER_05]: The weird thing is that he had...
[18:08.900 --> 18:10.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: Part of the reason he's...
[18:10.520 --> 18:21.080]  [SPEAKER_05]: The reason this is also complicated is that he wasn't even able to argue before the courts about the unconstitutional vagueness of what he was being asked to do.
[18:21.260 --> 18:22.600]  [SPEAKER_05]: Or the...
[18:22.600 --> 18:31.160]  [SPEAKER_05]: Not the vagueness, but the constitutionality of having to turn over all the keys for all the users to give access to all the users' communications.
[18:31.840 --> 18:41.020]  [SPEAKER_05]: And he wasn't able to argue that because he represented himself pro se because he couldn't go to an attorney and explain what was in this national security letter because it's illegal to do that.
[18:41.080 --> 18:42.760]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's a felony just to reveal that information.
[18:42.880 --> 18:44.560]  [SPEAKER_05]: So he had to represent himself as his lawyer.
[18:44.560 --> 18:46.760]  [SPEAKER_05]: Then he got another lawyer who...
[18:46.760 --> 18:49.360]  [SPEAKER_05]: Then when he moved the case to Washington D.C.
[18:49.440 --> 18:54.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: court, that lawyer wasn't on the bar to represent him there.
[18:54.300 --> 19:09.840]  [SPEAKER_05]: And the bottom line is, as a result of him not being a good lawyer himself or being able to get a good lawyer without committing a felony and exposing the national security letter content, he lost the ability to argue the constitutionality of what he was being asked to do.
[19:10.780 --> 19:12.760]  [SPEAKER_05]: So this is a bad thing for him.
[19:12.860 --> 19:16.020]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's a bad thing for everyone, one of us.
[19:16.720 --> 19:19.280]  [SPEAKER_05]: And we need to follow this case in support with R.
[19:19.380 --> 19:19.680]  [SPEAKER_05]: Levinson.
[19:20.240 --> 19:21.800]  [SPEAKER_05]: Just look up LavaBet online.
[19:21.820 --> 19:23.380]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can find more about this.
[19:23.480 --> 19:24.820]  [SPEAKER_05]: But it's a really interesting case.
[19:25.060 --> 19:27.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: And it could affect all of us one way or another.
[19:28.460 --> 19:29.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: Sounds that way.
[19:29.380 --> 19:37.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: And, wow, so much going on, so much intrigue and interesting developments that are happening.
[19:37.740 --> 19:41.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: But let's focus on something good that happened this past week.
[19:42.140 --> 19:47.320]  [SPEAKER_04]: And that was the awarding of Pulitzer Prizes to various journalists.
[19:47.840 --> 19:56.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: First of all, Washington Post, Guardian U.S., won the Pulitzer Prize on Monday for public service, which, as many of us know, are the most prestigious awards in journalism.
[19:57.080 --> 20:03.580]  [SPEAKER_04]: And this was for the articles based on the NSA leaks that were provided by Edward Snowden.
[20:03.840 --> 20:10.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: Through a series of reports that exposed the NSA's widespread domestic surveillance program, the Post and Guardian U.S.
[20:10.620 --> 20:13.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: set off an international debate on the limits of government surveillance.
[20:13.700 --> 20:21.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: The papers also came under heavy criticism by the American and British governments, with lawmakers accusing them of compromising national security.
[20:21.000 --> 20:31.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: The Pulitzer board said it gave the award for the authoritative and insightful reports that helped the public understand how the disclosures fit into the larger framework of national security.
[20:31.960 --> 20:42.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: David Remnick, the editor of The New Yorker, who was not a Pulitzer judge, said that the story was the epitome of important reporting and the epitome of what public service in journalism is all about.
[20:42.620 --> 20:45.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: When you use epitome twice in a single sentence, you know it's big.
[20:46.080 --> 20:49.760]  [SPEAKER_04]: The Boston Globe won the Breaking News Prize for its coverage of the Boston Marathon bombing.
[20:50.600 --> 20:53.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: So, it gives you an idea of the competition it was up against.
[20:53.860 --> 21:00.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: But also, our friend Laura Poitras won the 2014 Pulitzer Prize, also for NSA coverage.
[21:01.940 --> 21:02.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: So, um...
[21:02.980 --> 21:10.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: Some of which, Emmanuel, I would point out, was documented at the most recent HOPE conference.
[21:10.640 --> 21:11.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's true.
[21:11.520 --> 21:11.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's true.
[21:12.820 --> 21:17.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: So, yeah, we have all kinds of good news there as well.
[21:17.380 --> 21:17.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know.
[21:17.900 --> 21:19.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: Was anybody surprised by this?
[21:20.060 --> 21:21.680]  [SPEAKER_03]: I was a bit surprised.
[21:22.020 --> 21:27.120]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's nice to see the mainstream recognizing the value of what happened.
[21:27.860 --> 21:28.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, it does happen.
[21:28.900 --> 21:29.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: Mike?
[21:29.400 --> 21:30.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: I saw an interesting question.
[21:30.720 --> 21:35.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, Laura was credited as a byline in all kinds of the other outlet stories.
[21:35.340 --> 21:36.640]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, did she win two Pulitzers?
[21:37.400 --> 21:39.140]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, I don't know if she won two.
[21:39.220 --> 21:40.460]  [SPEAKER_04]: I think she only won one.
[21:40.660 --> 21:43.240]  [SPEAKER_09]: It was only officially, but she might... she shares in the other.
[21:43.440 --> 21:44.380]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, good for her.
[21:44.880 --> 21:47.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: So, yeah, we, um, uh, we have some good news to report as far as that goes.
[21:47.980 --> 21:53.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: An interesting thing is that, uh, both she and Glenn Greenwald are in the United States for the first time in quite a while.
[21:53.980 --> 21:55.980]  [SPEAKER_09]: And, uh, they flew in without any incident.
[21:56.180 --> 21:57.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, that's good news.
[21:57.500 --> 21:59.180]  [SPEAKER_04]: Because nobody knew they were coming, Mike.
[21:59.240 --> 22:00.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: And now you've just blown it.
[22:00.380 --> 22:01.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: It was pretty well publicized.
[22:02.180 --> 22:02.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, okay.
[22:03.880 --> 22:06.280]  [SPEAKER_09]: It, it, it's scary that both of them are U.S.
[22:06.400 --> 22:06.660]  [SPEAKER_09]: citizens.
[22:06.860 --> 22:10.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: They did not know whether they would be allowed to return to their own country without incident.
[22:10.880 --> 22:14.280]  [SPEAKER_09]: They could, uh, be harassed next time either of them tries to come in.
[22:14.440 --> 22:18.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: But at least, uh, the good news is that this time they just sort of walked through.
[22:18.980 --> 22:19.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[22:19.560 --> 22:22.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, congratulations to them both and to everybody else involved in that.
[22:23.040 --> 22:27.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: Maybe one day Edward Snowden will be able to come back to this country and, uh, not face any incidents.
[22:27.360 --> 22:29.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: Although I think that might be, that might be a dream.
[22:29.540 --> 22:31.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: That would be nice, but considerably less likely.
[22:31.660 --> 22:32.060]  [SPEAKER_04]: Go ahead, Bernie.
[22:32.560 --> 22:47.280]  [SPEAKER_05]: Um, do you and Mike or anyone there in the studio think that the fact that Lark Poitras and Glenn Greenwald, uh, just won Pulitzer Prizes for, uh, excellent journalism, do you think that that provided sort of a shield or a talisman for them to, uh, counter the U.S.
[22:47.360 --> 22:50.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: and, and, and fear being arrested less?
[22:50.500 --> 22:52.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, it would look really bad if the U.S.
[22:52.720 --> 22:56.780]  [SPEAKER_05]: government arrested two, uh, two journalists that just came to the U.S.
[22:56.840 --> 23:00.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: to pick up their, their, their, their Pulitzer Prize, wouldn't it?
[23:01.000 --> 23:01.920]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah, I think so.
[23:02.180 --> 23:10.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: They came on Friday before the Pulitzers were announced to pick up a different award, the Polk Award, um, which is also prestigious, but less so.
[23:10.120 --> 23:11.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, so it would have been less bad.
[23:12.040 --> 23:12.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's hard to say.
[23:12.820 --> 23:14.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: I mean, the U.S.
[23:14.320 --> 23:18.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: government is really good at not telling us what it thinks in certain circumstances.
[23:18.680 --> 23:25.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, maybe, maybe they are just waiting six months for some of the, the publicity to die down.
[23:25.660 --> 23:28.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: This was a very well-publicized, um, entry.
[23:28.740 --> 23:31.140]  [SPEAKER_09]: People were tracking the plane as it, as it went.
[23:31.360 --> 23:35.160]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, maybe sometime they'll just sort of sneak in and they'll be arrested then.
[23:35.280 --> 23:36.980]  [SPEAKER_09]: Or maybe they're not charged with any crime.
[23:37.120 --> 23:39.980]  [SPEAKER_09]: Maybe they, they've been cleared by the government's secret processes.
[23:40.680 --> 23:42.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: The, the scary thing is that there's no way to know.
[23:44.320 --> 23:45.320]  [SPEAKER_04]: Until the next time.
[23:45.980 --> 23:52.460]  [SPEAKER_08]: I think this is a really amazing, uh, accomplishment for them to get that kind of acknowledgement and that kind of award.
[23:52.680 --> 24:00.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: Um, as we look back on this further and further out in, in the future, um, this, this will strike us as appropriate.
[24:01.020 --> 24:07.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: And, you know, um, we'll probably be amazed that that's not, that, that, that was the only thing.
[24:07.120 --> 24:16.420]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I sure hope there are other, um, other institutions and, and, um, groups that, you know, feel the importance of what they have done is worthy of, of these kinds of awards.
[24:16.420 --> 24:23.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: Because having that, um, as you suggested, Bernie, is, uh, that's, that's a huge accomplishment.
[24:23.000 --> 24:33.080]  [SPEAKER_08]: And to, to go after people like that, it, it really, you start, um, getting wider and wider amounts of groups that you would disillusion yourself from.
[24:33.080 --> 24:39.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: Um, if you're a government or an authority of some type, um, the Pulitzer has been around forever and ever and ever.
[24:39.220 --> 24:43.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: And they're most, most known for, um, like journalistic photography and stuff.
[24:43.960 --> 24:47.220]  [SPEAKER_08]: So, um, I'm really familiar with it from that angle.
[24:47.380 --> 24:53.920]  [SPEAKER_08]: And, um, I think this is a, uh, I don't know, I might even say like a coup, like absolutely a wonderful development for them.
[24:55.240 --> 24:56.620]  [SPEAKER_05]: I think there are a lot of good reporting.
[24:56.920 --> 25:00.420]  [SPEAKER_05]: Is the Pulitzer, these days, is it, is it kind of akin to the Oscars?
[25:00.660 --> 25:06.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: Or, there's like a lot of good films, but only these really crappy blockbusters typically get, get an Oscar.
[25:06.400 --> 25:11.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: Or is the Pulitzer really have more credibility in being really sort of the creme de la creme of the best journalism?
[25:11.840 --> 25:13.300]  [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, there's so much good journalism out there.
[25:13.420 --> 25:15.080]  [SPEAKER_05]: There's, there's tons of really crappy journalism.
[25:15.320 --> 25:20.360]  [SPEAKER_05]: But of all the good journalism, how do they pick, how do they pick the few winners?
[25:20.360 --> 25:24.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: And political concerns must be part of the equation.
[25:25.180 --> 25:26.620]  [SPEAKER_03]: There's still that element to the Pulitzer.
[25:26.800 --> 25:27.620]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's still very prestigious.
[25:27.820 --> 25:31.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's the most prestigious thing in the field of journalism and photojournalism as well.
[25:32.680 --> 25:33.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's certainly...
[25:33.540 --> 25:35.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: Nobody wins a Pulitzer just because they're popular at the moment.
[25:36.280 --> 25:39.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's all about the work that they did and the value of that work.
[25:39.340 --> 25:45.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: And if you go online and pull up a list of people who have won this prize, it's a very prestigious list.
[25:45.620 --> 25:51.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: These are people who have made history, people who have reported history, people who have been integral to the whole process of journalism as we know it.
[25:52.520 --> 25:54.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, yeah, history will remember.
[25:55.280 --> 25:58.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: Now these two have joined those ranks.
[25:58.880 --> 25:59.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yep.
[25:59.520 --> 26:03.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bernie, you raise a good point, but it's just... it's simply not that shallow.
[26:03.880 --> 26:06.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: Like, it's a very serious award, I think.
[26:06.240 --> 26:07.060]  [SPEAKER_05]: I wasn't suggesting it was.
[26:07.060 --> 26:08.080]  [SPEAKER_05]: I was just asking if it was.
[26:08.160 --> 26:14.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: We had a Pulitzer Prize-winning photojournalist come to the Beyond Hope Conference back in 1997.
[26:14.460 --> 26:15.360]  [SPEAKER_05]: Diff Pran.
[26:15.540 --> 26:20.460]  [SPEAKER_05]: Diff Pran, the guy who was... the movie The Killing Fields was about.
[26:21.060 --> 26:29.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: And he came and took some great photos of the Beyond Hope Conference, which ended up on the front page of the New York Times Sunday edition, Above the Fold.
[26:29.560 --> 26:30.900]  [SPEAKER_05]: And that was really awesome.
[26:33.100 --> 26:33.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[26:33.560 --> 26:34.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, absolutely.
[26:34.580 --> 26:36.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: And it's just a totally different league, though.
[26:36.800 --> 26:41.180]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I think to compare them to the Oscars would be really kind of a sad comparison.
[26:42.340 --> 26:42.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[26:43.060 --> 26:44.020]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well... It's real life.
[26:44.280 --> 26:45.520]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, it certainly is.
[26:46.080 --> 26:47.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know what else is real life?
[26:47.560 --> 26:47.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: Google.
[26:48.060 --> 26:50.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: Google's pretty real and pretty scary sometimes.
[26:50.500 --> 26:55.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: And this is something that, you know, the very first day that Google Glass was announced is a question that I raised.
[26:56.080 --> 26:58.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: And apparently now, people are starting to figure it out.
[26:58.900 --> 27:05.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, they've patented a smart contact lens system with a camera built in.
[27:05.920 --> 27:07.760]  [SPEAKER_04]: So people can be walking around with Google Glass on.
[27:07.820 --> 27:08.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: You won't even know it.
[27:08.660 --> 27:09.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: You won't be able to see them.
[27:09.920 --> 27:11.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: The lens has the camera built in.
[27:12.040 --> 27:14.560]  [SPEAKER_04]: It could be developed to help the blind see and give them guidance.
[27:14.720 --> 27:16.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's all fine and good.
[27:16.100 --> 27:20.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: But there are also other disadvantages that it will be bringing in.
[27:20.660 --> 27:24.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: It can shrink Google Glass to fit on a pair of lenses.
[27:25.260 --> 27:29.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: They're already developing lenses with a screen and medical sensors built in.
[27:29.920 --> 27:33.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: And that project was developed in the secretive Google X Lab.
[27:34.460 --> 27:34.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes.
[27:35.020 --> 27:36.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: Do you know about Google X Lab?
[27:36.640 --> 27:37.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[27:37.420 --> 27:38.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: Just like Hope X.
[27:38.720 --> 27:38.760]  [SPEAKER_04]: Alex.
[27:39.180 --> 27:40.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: But more on that later.
[27:41.100 --> 27:41.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: A bit different.
[27:42.180 --> 27:43.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: A bit different.
[27:43.300 --> 27:43.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: Maybe.
[27:43.840 --> 27:44.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: More evil.
[27:44.780 --> 27:45.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[27:45.540 --> 27:46.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: We're trying to be evil.
[27:47.080 --> 27:47.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's hard.
[27:47.880 --> 27:48.200]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, Rob?
[27:48.280 --> 27:48.660]  [SPEAKER_03]: We try.
[27:48.760 --> 27:54.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: But I'll be more excited about the field of smart contact lenses when that starts happening in real life.
[27:55.080 --> 27:58.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: As a lot of people know, the patent system is pretty much a shambles still.
[27:59.140 --> 28:04.020]  [SPEAKER_03]: And you can get a patent in there for most any wacky thing that you come up with.
[28:04.320 --> 28:08.020]  [SPEAKER_03]: As long as you file the right paperwork, you can at least start that whole process.
[28:08.200 --> 28:10.500]  [SPEAKER_03]: So once this starts getting done, we'll see what happens.
[28:11.180 --> 28:18.440]  [SPEAKER_03]: But elsewhere in Glass News, you can now, as a regular citizen, go out and buy Google Glass if you want to.
[28:19.080 --> 28:21.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: They were only in a sort of early beta.
[28:21.540 --> 28:23.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: Only approved people got them staged for a while.
[28:24.060 --> 28:27.420]  [SPEAKER_03]: But now, apparently, they're available to the general public.
[28:27.580 --> 28:28.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, it's amazing to me.
[28:28.540 --> 28:29.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: They're very good at this.
[28:29.520 --> 28:34.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: They're very good at making their products desirable by making them scarce.
[28:35.220 --> 28:43.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: To this day, people still think Gmail is something that they really have to jump at and grab before it goes away.
[28:43.800 --> 28:48.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: Google Glass, yeah, please give me the opportunity to spend $1,500 on something that might not even work properly.
[28:49.020 --> 28:52.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: But now, apparently, everybody can get one.
[28:53.540 --> 28:54.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's still in development, though.
[28:54.820 --> 28:58.760]  [SPEAKER_04]: There's still a lot that needs to be fixed for it to do what they say it's going to do.
[28:58.840 --> 29:05.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: But, you know, there were the 10 Google Glass myths that were distributed by Google a few weeks ago.
[29:05.800 --> 29:06.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: You guys see this?
[29:06.780 --> 29:15.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: This is something that was spread around because a lot of people are criticizing what these particular things are able to do.
[29:16.260 --> 29:21.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: And I guess they're concerned with the public image as to how people might view it.
[29:22.620 --> 29:26.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: Myth number one, glass is the ultimate distraction from the real world.
[29:26.920 --> 29:32.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: Instead of looking down at your computer, phone, or tablet while life happens around you, glass allows you to look up and engage with the world.
[29:33.100 --> 29:39.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: Big moments in life, concerts, your kids' performances, an amazing view shouldn't be experienced through the screen you're trying to capture them on.
[29:39.320 --> 29:43.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's why glass is off by default and only on when you want it to be.
[29:43.140 --> 29:49.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's designed to get you a bit of what you need just when you need it and then get you back to the people and things in life you care about.
[29:49.760 --> 29:50.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, do we believe this?
[29:52.180 --> 29:58.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: Has anyone actually worn one of these things so that they can try to get back to life as quickly as possible?
[29:59.040 --> 30:01.740]  [SPEAKER_09]: I'm pretty good at ignoring life without Google Glass.
[30:02.700 --> 30:03.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: Here's myth number two.
[30:03.720 --> 30:06.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: Google Glass is... I'm just going to refer to it like they do as glass from now on.
[30:06.920 --> 30:09.560]  [SPEAKER_04]: Myth number two, glass is always on and recording everything.
[30:10.020 --> 30:13.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, just like your cell phone, the glass screen is off by default.
[30:13.560 --> 30:16.180]  [SPEAKER_04]: Video recording on glass is set to last 10 seconds.
[30:16.560 --> 30:21.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: People can record for longer, but glass isn't designed for or even capable of always on recording.
[30:21.840 --> 30:24.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: The battery won't last longer than 45 minutes before it needs to be charged.
[30:25.380 --> 30:30.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: So next time you're tempted to ask an explorer, those are the people who are wearing the things and testing them out.
[30:31.380 --> 30:36.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: Next time you're tempted to ask an explorer if he's recording you, ask yourself if you'd be doing the same with your phone.
[30:36.880 --> 30:38.520]  [SPEAKER_04]: Chances are your answers will be the same.
[30:38.620 --> 30:43.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: I got to take exception to this because if you're holding up a phone to somebody, it's pretty obvious that you're recording them.
[30:44.000 --> 30:45.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's not surreptitious at all.
[30:45.620 --> 30:48.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: If you're wearing something on your head, you could be pressing a button and recording something.
[30:49.020 --> 30:50.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: Only records 10 seconds.
[30:50.320 --> 30:51.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hey, I think that can be adjusted.
[30:51.780 --> 30:53.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: I think maybe they can extend that.
[30:54.060 --> 30:55.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: The battery only lasts 45 minutes.
[30:55.760 --> 30:57.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hey, you can put another battery in.
[30:57.280 --> 31:00.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's not so difficult and technology only gets more and more advanced.
[31:00.940 --> 31:08.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: So yeah, it's entirely possible that people can walk around all day long with Google Glass or with the new contact lenses and record everything they see.
[31:08.700 --> 31:09.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: It is possible.
[31:09.400 --> 31:15.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: I gave a five-minute talk once and someone with Glass recorded the whole thing without me knowing about it and posted on the Internet.
[31:15.880 --> 31:17.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: And in that case, it was a public talk.
[31:17.420 --> 31:18.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't mind at all.
[31:18.240 --> 31:21.540]  [SPEAKER_09]: But in general, if I had minded, I never would have known.
[31:22.100 --> 31:24.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: And certainly longer than 10 seconds.
[31:24.520 --> 31:30.100]  [SPEAKER_03]: The thing I'm always banging on about about the camera in Google Glass is it's a very crappy camera as these things go.
[31:30.460 --> 31:37.600]  [SPEAKER_03]: We all remember the first blurry camera phones that had a very small camera that took very crappy pictures on our old flip phones and things.
[31:38.020 --> 31:40.760]  [SPEAKER_03]: That's because the camera was shoved in there as sort of an afterthought.
[31:40.980 --> 31:43.580]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the camera on Glass right now is at that same stage.
[31:44.300 --> 31:46.760]  [SPEAKER_03]: It can only record the 10 second clips by default.
[31:46.960 --> 31:55.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: Or if you're constantly recording, I think it's the longest you can record on a full charge is 10 minutes of straight video recording before your battery dies.
[31:55.740 --> 31:56.600]  [SPEAKER_03]: And so...
[31:57.880 --> 31:58.500]  [SPEAKER_03]: Excuse me.
[31:58.920 --> 32:05.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: So given that, I mean, it's not... they're not the sort of magical future camera glasses that are being portrayed in the media and stuff.
[32:05.840 --> 32:10.000]  [SPEAKER_03]: They're just... they're an eyeball display for your phone or your computer that you hook it to.
[32:10.220 --> 32:13.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the camera is not the reason for it being.
[32:13.560 --> 32:15.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it's not even a very good reason to get Google Glass.
[32:15.600 --> 32:22.200]  [SPEAKER_03]: Because if you want a secret pair of camera glasses, you can get ones that are actually better cameras for a lot less than you would spend on Glass right now.
[32:24.180 --> 32:34.080]  [SPEAKER_08]: One interesting possibility or dangerous part of this like contact thing is what happens if something fails or like the screen part of it is...
[32:35.260 --> 32:35.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: Sorry.
[32:35.740 --> 32:35.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: Sorry.
[32:36.400 --> 32:36.680]  [SPEAKER_08]: Go ahead.
[32:37.340 --> 32:38.440]  [SPEAKER_08]: No, you should take that.
[32:38.540 --> 32:39.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: No, I'm dealing with it.
[32:39.720 --> 32:39.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: Go ahead.
[32:39.960 --> 32:40.320]  [SPEAKER_04]: Is it important?
[32:40.400 --> 32:40.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: Go ahead.
[32:40.680 --> 32:42.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, it's a memo from somebody in authority.
[32:42.700 --> 32:47.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: Anyway, my point is like if you're wearing glasses and it messes up, you can tear them off your face very quickly.
[32:47.380 --> 32:54.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: If you have to go dipping into each eyeball or even one eyeball to like get... has anybody ever worn contact... I don't have contact lens.
[32:55.080 --> 32:55.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: I have pretty good vision.
[32:55.780 --> 32:58.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: But like it's an involved process.
[32:58.480 --> 32:59.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: You need a solution.
[33:00.420 --> 33:01.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: You have to touch your eyeball.
[33:01.640 --> 33:02.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: It stings.
[33:02.560 --> 33:05.260]  [SPEAKER_08]: You tear up a little bit.
[33:05.260 --> 33:06.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: You might get irritation.
[33:06.680 --> 33:10.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: What if you get pollen and an eyelash comes off because you're messing with your eye.
[33:10.340 --> 33:11.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: Then you get an eyelash caught in your eye.
[33:12.080 --> 33:22.460]  [SPEAKER_08]: Say you're operating a large crane on top of a building in New York City and your glass messes up and you're trying to get this out and you like knock over three buildings in the process or something.
[33:22.640 --> 33:26.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, it could be a lot harder to remove the glass, literally.
[33:27.340 --> 33:27.780]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[33:28.060 --> 33:29.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm sorry about that interruption.
[33:29.360 --> 33:40.240]  [SPEAKER_04]: I was informed that we are being a bit one-sided here and that we should have some kind of opposing viewpoint in addition to all the Google propaganda that we're putting out, right?
[33:40.320 --> 33:44.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: I mean, yeah, we're saying it now, but we're not saying it nearly as well as a list can say it.
[33:44.500 --> 33:57.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: So while we're presenting the top 10 Google Glass myths, we should also present the top 10 ways not to be what's known as a glass hole that Consumer Watchdog has published.
[33:57.740 --> 34:03.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: And just to give you a couple of them, because we've read two of the Google Glass myths, let's look at number 10 of this.
[34:04.020 --> 34:07.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: You cannot drive with a television set on your head.
[34:08.360 --> 34:11.240]  [SPEAKER_04]: And I guess that's probably true, right?
[34:11.300 --> 34:12.200]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's not a good idea.
[34:13.120 --> 34:17.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: Why pay $1,500 to let a corporation hack your eyes?
[34:18.920 --> 34:20.200]  [SPEAKER_04]: Two things to think about, right?
[34:20.500 --> 34:23.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, they should pay me to use this silly product, right?
[34:24.120 --> 34:26.700]  [SPEAKER_09]: How much free publicity are we giving this product anyway?
[34:27.320 --> 34:28.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, which list do you want that on?
[34:28.760 --> 34:30.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: I mean... Is that the pro or the anti?
[34:30.440 --> 34:31.960]  [SPEAKER_09]: You know, we're giving this product.
[34:32.140 --> 34:32.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't think you should buy it.
[34:32.880 --> 34:33.000]  [SPEAKER_09]: Come on, Mike.
[34:33.120 --> 34:34.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: Don't you think you're a little late?
[34:34.640 --> 34:34.940]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[34:35.440 --> 34:36.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, let's go back to the myths.
[34:37.360 --> 34:40.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: Glass explorers are technology worshipping geeks.
[34:40.420 --> 34:41.800]  [SPEAKER_09]: That's true in my experience.
[34:42.000 --> 34:42.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: All right.
[34:42.200 --> 34:43.860]  [SPEAKER_09]: Everyone I've ever met that wore one.
[34:44.040 --> 34:46.660]  [SPEAKER_09]: I mean, maybe it's not true in general, but everyone I've ever met.
[34:46.840 --> 34:49.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, Mike, our explorers come from all walks of life.
[34:49.720 --> 34:53.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: They include parents, firefighters, pickpockets?
[34:53.580 --> 34:54.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: No way I read that wrong.
[34:54.720 --> 34:55.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: But probably does.
[34:55.700 --> 34:56.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: Zookeepers.
[34:56.400 --> 34:58.040]  [SPEAKER_04]: How do they get pickpockets out of zookeepers?
[34:58.860 --> 35:00.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: And why are they mentioning zookeepers?
[35:00.900 --> 35:04.260]  [SPEAKER_04]: Of all people, brewmasters, film students, reporters, doctors.
[35:04.660 --> 35:17.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: I mean, to be fair, most people I meet are technology-loving geeks, but... The one thing they have in common is that they see the potential for people to use technology in a way that helps them engage more with the world around them, rather than distract them from it.
[35:17.320 --> 35:24.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: In fact, many explorers say because of glass, they use technology less because they're using it much more efficiently.
[35:24.900 --> 35:26.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: We know what you're thinking.
[35:26.380 --> 35:28.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm not distracted by technology.
[35:28.440 --> 35:34.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: But the next time you're on the subway, or sitting on a bench, or in a coffee shop, just look at the people around you.
[35:34.980 --> 35:37.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: You might be surprised at what you see.
[35:37.700 --> 35:38.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, that's not condescending.
[35:39.000 --> 35:39.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know what is.
[35:40.160 --> 35:40.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: Wow.
[35:41.420 --> 35:46.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: All right, let's go back to the consumer watchdog and match that with something else.
[35:46.340 --> 35:48.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: Say goodbye to using public bathrooms.
[35:49.300 --> 35:49.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: Wow.
[35:50.620 --> 35:51.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, think about that.
[35:53.340 --> 35:54.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't want to think about that.
[35:54.800 --> 35:55.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's pretty scary.
[35:56.500 --> 35:57.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: I think we've kind of made the point.
[35:58.040 --> 35:59.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: We could read this for hours.
[35:59.560 --> 36:01.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: And I've never used Google Glass.
[36:01.800 --> 36:02.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm kind of curious.
[36:02.640 --> 36:06.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: We're going to try and do something for hope where people can play around and experiment and maybe break it.
[36:06.940 --> 36:08.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know, because that's what hackers do.
[36:08.320 --> 36:08.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: We experiment.
[36:09.520 --> 36:14.780]  [SPEAKER_04]: But this whole self-surveillance society we're building kind of scares me sometimes.
[36:14.800 --> 36:15.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: What do you think, Bernie?
[36:16.660 --> 36:17.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: I agree with you.
[36:17.600 --> 36:18.060]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's scary.
[36:18.220 --> 36:31.900]  [SPEAKER_05]: And it's also amusing that around this, also very recently, Bill Gates or Microsoft, I'm not sure it was personally or Microsoft in general, just got a patent to detect and respond to any cameras in the vicinity.
[36:32.320 --> 36:34.100]  [SPEAKER_05]: Some device, I'm not sure how it works.
[36:34.200 --> 36:35.020]  [SPEAKER_05]: I haven't looked into it yet.
[36:35.180 --> 36:42.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: But it's a pending patent to thwart video snooping, apparently as a touché to Google's Glass.
[36:43.000 --> 36:49.760]  [SPEAKER_05]: So it's kind of amusing that they're both issuing competing patents along these lines.
[36:50.420 --> 36:53.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: Or issuing or getting competing patents, rather.
[36:53.000 --> 36:53.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: Right, right.
[36:54.140 --> 37:02.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: Now, I'm also looking at another story that came in earlier, that apparently Google may have known about Heartbleed and didn't tell the government.
[37:02.860 --> 37:03.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: Have you seen this story?
[37:04.180 --> 37:08.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: Google knew about a critical flaw in Internet security, but it didn't alert anyone in the government.
[37:09.160 --> 37:18.780]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's Neil Mehta, a Google engineer, first discovered Heartbleed, which is a bug that undermines the widely used encryption technology, OpenSSL.
[37:19.200 --> 37:20.760]  [SPEAKER_04]: I discovered it sometime in March.
[37:20.760 --> 37:26.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: A team at the Finnish security firm, Codenomicon, discovered the flaw around the same time.
[37:26.900 --> 37:34.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: Google was able to patch most of its services, such as email, search, YouTube, before the companies publicized the bug on April 7th.
[37:35.560 --> 37:40.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: Researchers also notified a handful of other companies about the bug before going public.
[37:41.400 --> 37:45.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: Security firm Cloudflare, for example, said it fixed the flaw on March 31st.
[37:45.480 --> 37:50.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: But the White House said on Friday that no one in the federal government knew about the problem until April.
[37:50.740 --> 37:59.260]  [SPEAKER_04]: The administration made the statement to deny an earlier Bloomberg report that the national security agency had been exploring Heartbleed for years.
[37:59.380 --> 38:00.520]  [SPEAKER_04]: So there's that going on.
[38:00.680 --> 38:06.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: There are people that are saying that NSA has known about it and has been exploiting it for years now.
[38:06.760 --> 38:09.880]  [SPEAKER_04]: And now there are people saying that, well, Google knew about it and didn't tell anybody.
[38:10.000 --> 38:11.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: And then the NSA didn't know about it at all.
[38:12.700 --> 38:13.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: Who do you believe?
[38:14.300 --> 38:17.060]  [SPEAKER_09]: So I find the Google angle not very interesting.
[38:17.220 --> 38:18.800]  [SPEAKER_09]: Someone at Google discovered the bug.
[38:18.900 --> 38:20.840]  [SPEAKER_09]: Of course, he knew about it before he publicized it.
[38:21.180 --> 38:23.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: The suggestion is that it was the order of weeks.
[38:23.740 --> 38:24.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't really care.
[38:24.480 --> 38:26.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's more than one person, I think, is what they're saying.
[38:26.720 --> 38:27.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: Whatever.
[38:27.300 --> 38:28.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: I mean, he told some of his co-workers.
[38:29.080 --> 38:39.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: But I think this question, the Bloomberg story, did the NSA know about Heartbleed and use it to get people's data before it was publicized is very interesting.
[38:39.240 --> 38:40.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: It was a very weird story.
[38:40.820 --> 38:47.160]  [SPEAKER_09]: They have all kinds of quotes from all kinds of people that are all sourced, but they're all information that was in the public domain anyway.
[38:47.420 --> 38:50.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: And then the news of the story was completely unsourced.
[38:50.560 --> 38:52.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: They don't say where they got it, who it's from, anything about it.
[38:52.900 --> 39:02.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: So my question is, if the government will open up an investigation into who leaked the sources and methods to Bloomberg, I have a guess as to the answer.
[39:02.780 --> 39:04.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: But it's really interesting.
[39:05.000 --> 39:06.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't know if the story is true or not.
[39:06.520 --> 39:11.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: The NSA denied it, which makes me think that it probably is true, because anything the NSA says is a lie.
[39:11.400 --> 39:13.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: But other than that, it's a really weird story.
[39:13.640 --> 39:14.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't know what to believe.
[39:14.620 --> 39:30.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, I think the principal technologist for ACLU says it, Christopher Saghoyne, pretty much says the US government only has itself to blame if tech companies like Google don't trust it to handle sensitive security information.
[39:30.420 --> 39:40.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: He said, because government agencies often share information with each other, there's no way for a company to be sure the NSA won't get information shared with another agency and use it to hack into private communications.
[39:40.420 --> 39:47.780]  [SPEAKER_04]: I suspect that over the past eight months, many companies have taken a real hard look at their existing policies about tipping off the US government.
[39:47.960 --> 39:52.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's the price you pay when you're acting like an out-of-control offensive adversary.
[39:52.520 --> 39:52.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: Wow.
[39:53.560 --> 40:02.500]  [SPEAKER_03]: And that's what makes this so interesting from a perspective of the security industry, because security research researchers would tell you about the idea of responsible disclosure.
[40:02.840 --> 40:15.100]  [SPEAKER_03]: And if you find a bug in something, the responsible thing to do is try and inform the people who would be affected by that, you know, in a manner that can get it fixed before the quote unquote bad guys can do a lot with it.
[40:15.100 --> 40:22.320]  [SPEAKER_03]: But also, if you find a bug, you're generally assuming that somebody else somewhere has found it too, or will very soon find it.
[40:22.420 --> 40:23.780]  [SPEAKER_03]: So you want to get these things fixed.
[40:23.860 --> 40:24.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: You want to get the info out there.
[40:25.080 --> 40:35.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the idea that anyone, any security, you know, workers were sitting on this sort of thing when it affects really the entire Internet as we know it, that's kind of scary.
[40:37.180 --> 40:38.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'll stop the guy, Mike.
[40:38.180 --> 40:41.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: So the government statement denying they know about Harpleet has two parts.
[40:41.780 --> 40:43.300]  [SPEAKER_09]: The first part, I don't know if it's true or not.
[40:43.380 --> 40:46.940]  [SPEAKER_09]: But the second part was, if we had known about Harpleet, we would have disclosed it.
[40:47.140 --> 40:48.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: That is certainly a lie.
[40:48.580 --> 40:56.860]  [SPEAKER_09]: The NSA has, you know, a large team of people who are dedicated to finding these sorts of bugs and exploiting them for the US government's interests.
[40:57.080 --> 40:58.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: That's well known.
[40:58.580 --> 41:07.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: And I would like to hear from our audience, if any of them run a software product, if anyone has ever been notified by the NSA, hey, we found a bug in your thing, you should fix it.
[41:08.060 --> 41:09.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't think it's ever happened.
[41:09.480 --> 41:11.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: And we know we have people looking for these bugs.
[41:12.580 --> 41:14.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: So draw your own conclusions.
[41:15.200 --> 41:20.180]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, moving on to a segment, I think we should label dumbass of the week.
[41:20.860 --> 41:29.260]  [SPEAKER_04]: This is the story of a Dutch teenager who decided to take to Twitter and tweet directly to American Airlines.
[41:29.400 --> 41:31.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hello, my name's Ibrahim, and I'm from Afghanistan.
[41:31.940 --> 41:33.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm part of Al Qaeda.
[41:33.240 --> 41:35.260]  [SPEAKER_04]: And on June 1, I'm going to do something really big.
[41:35.640 --> 41:35.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: Bye.
[41:36.940 --> 41:45.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: That resulted in a response from American Airlines to Queen Dimitriex, which is the username being used.
[41:45.780 --> 41:48.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: Sarah, apparently they looked up her real name.
[41:48.720 --> 41:50.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: Sarah, we take these threats very seriously.
[41:51.040 --> 41:55.200]  [SPEAKER_04]: Your IP address and details will be forwarded to security and the FBI.
[41:55.580 --> 42:00.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, after the teenager saw that message, she continued to tweet throughout the entire day.
[42:00.440 --> 42:04.580]  [SPEAKER_04]: They started with messages of regret, OMFG.
[42:04.720 --> 42:05.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: I was kidding.
[42:05.740 --> 42:06.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm so sorry.
[42:07.000 --> 42:07.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm scared now.
[42:07.840 --> 42:09.460]  [SPEAKER_04]: I was joking and it was my friend, not me.
[42:09.600 --> 42:11.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: Take her IP address, not mine.
[42:11.220 --> 42:12.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: I was kidding, please.
[42:12.800 --> 42:14.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm just a girl, please.
[42:14.480 --> 42:15.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm not from Afghanistan.
[42:16.000 --> 42:20.420]  [SPEAKER_04]: I never did anything wrong in my love, which I imagine probably was life.
[42:21.200 --> 42:25.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: And please save my live, which I think she meant life.
[42:25.600 --> 42:31.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, and later she reflected on how popular her account had made her gaining tens of thousands of new followers.
[42:32.200 --> 42:46.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, what's particularly interesting though, I'm looking at the, um, uh, the image of, of the original tweet for, uh, to American, uh, airlines, 2,267 retweets, 2,267 people decided to resend the message threatening American airlines.
[42:47.400 --> 42:58.040]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, anyway, um, she was arrested in the Netherlands, uh, and, um, the spokesman for the Dutch police says we're not in a state that we can communicate any, um, any state of charges at this point.
[42:58.100 --> 43:02.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: We just thought it was necessary to bring this out mostly because of the fact that it caused a great deal of interest on the Internet.
[43:03.100 --> 43:09.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: And a followup to that story from the Washington Post, um, one dumb teenager is easily excused.
[43:09.840 --> 43:15.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm not sure about that, but the host of Twitter users currently tweeting bomb threats at major airlines is another story entirely.
[43:16.740 --> 43:21.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, dozens of teenagers now tweeting bomb jokes to American airlines specifically.
[43:22.400 --> 43:26.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, for instance, uh, Alden Fernandez says, I have a bomb under the next plane to take off.
[43:26.920 --> 43:30.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: Um, army jacket says, I'm going to bomb your 737 jet.
[43:31.400 --> 43:35.560]  [SPEAKER_04]: Demi, uh, tweets, you really seem to not care that I'm about to bomb your plane.
[43:35.660 --> 43:36.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's headed to Paris.
[43:36.520 --> 43:39.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: By the way, my name is Ahmed, uh, et cetera, et cetera.
[43:39.760 --> 43:41.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: It just goes on and on.
[43:41.480 --> 43:43.080]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, this is unreal.
[43:43.440 --> 43:48.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: I guess the, the, the column or the feature should be called dumb asses of the week because, wow, there's certainly a whole lot of them.
[43:49.080 --> 43:53.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: Who would, I mean, do people really think that they can tweet anonymously and, and, and, and not have somebody trace them back?
[43:54.140 --> 43:59.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: I do wonder exactly how this girl was traced though, because she's in the Netherlands as we know.
[43:59.880 --> 44:05.380]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, and American airlines should not have access to the IP address that she was tweeting from.
[44:05.520 --> 44:08.000]  [SPEAKER_09]: That's not how IP addresses work.
[44:08.160 --> 44:09.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's not how Twitter works.
[44:09.400 --> 44:18.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, uh, while this, this girl may have committed a crime, it's really amazing that they were able to track it down so quickly, so internationally and with so much Internet.
[44:18.580 --> 44:20.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: So I have some concerns.
[44:20.920 --> 44:23.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: How are you reading that, uh, American airlines is the one that had the IP address?
[44:24.180 --> 44:27.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: American airlines says in their first response to her, we have your IP address.
[44:27.760 --> 44:28.540]  [SPEAKER_09]: I think it's not true.
[44:28.660 --> 44:31.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: They say your IP address and details will be forwarded to security and the FBI.
[44:31.560 --> 44:34.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: I imagine they probably contacted Twitter and said, Hey, we've got an al-Qaeda threat here.
[44:35.200 --> 44:39.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: Do you mind when you have a chance forwarding that information to the FBI?
[44:39.580 --> 44:42.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: And it's, I, I imagine that's the kind of thing that, that Twitter would do.
[44:43.540 --> 44:44.800]  [SPEAKER_09]: I, I'd just like to know more.
[44:44.920 --> 44:50.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: I'm not certain that anything, uh, that I would disagree with was done, but it, it went awfully quickly and I would like to know more about the process.
[44:51.240 --> 44:53.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: Bernie, any, any thoughts on, on these offensive tweets?
[44:54.280 --> 44:58.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: Well, I don't know who would find them necessarily offensive, but they were kind of stupid.
[44:58.340 --> 45:02.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: But at what point do the, how many people does it take?
[45:02.140 --> 45:08.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: Oh, well, all these, first of all, everybody who retweeted the original threat and the other threats, won't they be equally legally culpable?
[45:09.180 --> 45:14.020]  [SPEAKER_05]: And all the other teenagers that said, me too, uh, I'm going to do this crazy.
[45:14.220 --> 45:18.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm a, I'm a, I'm a al-Qaeda operative and I'm going to, there's a bomb in your plane.
[45:19.520 --> 45:20.920]  [SPEAKER_05]: Are they all get arrested?
[45:21.140 --> 45:32.280]  [SPEAKER_05]: At what point do so many people say, put jokes on the Internet, bad jokes admittedly on the Internet where then the government has to just give up and say, okay, this is all just stupid.
[45:32.280 --> 45:33.940]  [SPEAKER_05]: We're not going to arrest anybody.
[45:35.140 --> 45:35.620]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[45:37.580 --> 45:38.320]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know.
[45:38.480 --> 45:54.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: The, the, uh, the way people, uh, treat these, um, these particular services always mystifies me and, and thinking that you're anonymous is really, um, the number one offense, as far as I'm concerned, because it's so obvious that you're not, whether you're posting on Facebook,
[45:54.440 --> 46:00.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: you're posting on Twitter, um, saying anything in a public forum on a website, your IP can be logged.
[46:01.140 --> 46:07.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, it's like, it's like making, making, uh, uh, a threatening phone call and not blocking your caller ID, even though that's not enough.
[46:07.840 --> 46:11.880]  [SPEAKER_04]: People need to know that, yeah, uh, you're going to, um, you're going to be traced.
[46:12.260 --> 46:17.780]  [SPEAKER_04]: And that's part of the, uh, that's part of the threat for people who are, um, uh, who aren't threatening airlines.
[46:18.200 --> 46:18.560]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[46:18.600 --> 46:25.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, uh, since it's an airline, I imagine that, uh, it's not only, it's not only like the NSA, but, uh, the TSA would be involved with this somehow.
[46:25.800 --> 46:31.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: And, uh, you know, that's, that's, uh, they've, they've pretty much got instant access to whatever they want these days, it seems.
[46:31.560 --> 46:33.400]  [SPEAKER_03]: And, uh, I don't think there's much we can do about that.
[46:33.480 --> 46:39.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, personally, from my, from my perspective, I tell a lot of jokes on Twitter, that bomb, and, um, I'm now I'm a bit afraid.
[46:39.940 --> 46:40.180]  [SPEAKER_04]: Wow.
[46:40.500 --> 46:42.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: Especially using that particular, uh, metaphor there.
[46:43.240 --> 46:43.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[46:43.620 --> 46:45.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, 212-209-2900 is our telephone number.
[46:45.880 --> 46:48.200]  [SPEAKER_04]: We'd like to hear from our listeners if anything is, is going on.
[46:48.300 --> 46:53.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: And, uh, in your world, any questions that, uh, that you might have, we'd sure, uh, like to hear from you.
[46:53.680 --> 46:57.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, again, 212-209-2900.
[46:58.180 --> 46:59.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, that is our telephone number.
[46:59.960 --> 47:07.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, Jan from Belgium writes to us, uh, well, he wanted to know what the, um, what the closing tune on, uh, the off the hook episode of April 2nd was.
[47:07.220 --> 47:10.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, I know we wrote back to him, but do you remember what it was, Kyle off the top of your head?
[47:11.040 --> 47:16.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: I don't know the name of the song, but the artist was, uh, Fotec and the album was Form and Function.
[47:16.480 --> 47:19.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: And that was from around 1998 or earlier.
[47:19.840 --> 47:20.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's pretty specific information.
[47:20.960 --> 47:25.060]  [SPEAKER_04]: So hopefully that, uh, that's enough for people to run out and, and, and get their own copies.
[47:25.660 --> 47:29.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, Jan also continues, I'm surprised that rotary phones still work in the U.S.
[47:30.000 --> 47:36.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: In Belgium, where I'm from, they discontinued rotary phone support on the network at least 15 years ago.
[47:36.620 --> 47:37.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm surprised by this.
[47:37.880 --> 47:43.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: Does anybody else, uh, think that other countries had completely discontinued rotary phone use?
[47:44.140 --> 47:44.920]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm surprised.
[47:45.200 --> 47:45.580]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[47:45.820 --> 47:47.180]  [SPEAKER_04]: I, I, I'm, I'm very surprised by that.
[47:47.260 --> 47:51.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: I always thought that would be something that, uh, would just always be there, but I guess, uh, I guess that's a fantasy.
[47:52.660 --> 47:53.060]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[47:53.240 --> 47:54.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: Let's, uh, we have a full switchboard.
[47:54.980 --> 47:56.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: So shall we take some phone calls?
[47:56.280 --> 47:58.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hopefully the phones work properly.
[47:58.400 --> 48:01.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: Everything else seems to have been broken today, but let's try this.
[48:01.440 --> 48:01.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: Good evening.
[48:02.220 --> 48:02.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: You're on off the hook.
[48:04.040 --> 48:04.240]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[48:04.320 --> 48:05.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hi, my name is Dave.
[48:05.960 --> 48:06.560]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hello, Dave.
[48:06.740 --> 48:09.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: I have a question about domain names and web hosting.
[48:09.960 --> 48:11.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, uh, ask away and we'll see if we can help.
[48:12.520 --> 48:12.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[48:13.000 --> 48:13.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: Talk about privacy.
[48:14.280 --> 48:20.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: Um, I was wondering, um, I registered for a, uh, domain registering company.
[48:20.360 --> 48:21.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: I won't mention the name.
[48:22.260 --> 48:43.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: Uh, there are a lot of them that, uh, claim that you pay them additional money and you, uh, get privacy, but I've experienced, uh, unfortunately, um, that, uh, you know, someone just files a subpoena without any intent on my part or actually doing anything illegal except listing facts.
[48:43.680 --> 48:48.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: And they, uh, subpoena the company and they just turn over my information.
[48:48.880 --> 49:00.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: So I was wondering if there's any way that I could, um, uh, basically, uh, you know, register a domain name and, uh, in private and keep it private.
[49:00.180 --> 49:04.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: And are there any companies that are, you know, honest as far as keeping their word.
[49:05.020 --> 49:16.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: And again, um, the domain name is something that I use to put up, you know, hosting and state facts, no libel, no nothing, nothing illegal activity.
[49:17.160 --> 49:22.700]  [SPEAKER_03]: The thing about domain names is they're, uh, associated with every domain that's registered is something called a who is info.
[49:23.120 --> 49:31.220]  [SPEAKER_03]: And, uh, that, uh, by, um, ostensibly is supposed to be the full name and address and telephone numbers and email of the person who owns it.
[49:31.740 --> 49:40.660]  [SPEAKER_03]: Now, um, when, when, uh, domain names, uh, started becoming a thing, um, it was generally okay to put your real info in there, um, if you didn't mind people having that information.
[49:40.660 --> 49:56.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: But in the time since, um, and up to now, there are, um, most domain, uh, registrars will have something along the lines of a who is guard or who is a substitute of some sort where they'll put in randomly generated information and their own address, um,
[49:57.020 --> 49:59.580]  [SPEAKER_03]: and a randomly generated email address that will go back to you.
[49:59.760 --> 50:02.420]  [SPEAKER_03]: The thing is the registrar will still have your information.
[50:02.520 --> 50:17.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: And even if you enter fake information in there, which you're not technically allowed to do, but, uh, if you, if you choose to do such a thing, there, there, not only would that probably be against the terms of use of the registrar, but it's also not much of a defense because the registrar,
[50:17.500 --> 50:19.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: at some point you're going to need to pay for the domain.
[50:19.820 --> 50:26.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: And when you pay for it, you're giving them your credit card or some other sort of info, which is pretty easy to trace back to you in most cases.
[50:26.840 --> 50:31.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, um, it's always going to be, um, when you get to things like subpoenas, I mean, who is, is publicly available.
[50:31.980 --> 50:34.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: That's so anyone can look at the information.
[50:34.280 --> 50:41.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: But when you get to the subject of a subpoena, the company in question is probably always going to just comply with it because that's what they do.
[50:41.880 --> 50:56.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, um, if you're, if you're doing something that you think might, uh, attract that sort of attention, um, attract that sort of subpoena, you, um, it's, you know, keep in mind that the company is probably not going to go out on a limb to, uh, defend you from such things if they get a,
[50:56.300 --> 50:58.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: if they get a piece of legal letter, letterhead with a subpoena on it.
[50:58.520 --> 51:02.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: I would just add to what Rob is saying, which is absolutely true.
[51:03.420 --> 51:06.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: As much as you could do is hold on to your data.
[51:06.540 --> 51:12.540]  [SPEAKER_08]: Don't give them as much information as they want.
[51:12.680 --> 51:16.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: Be as conservative with what you get them as long as possible.
[51:16.540 --> 51:20.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: Keep it out of their hands if it's simply a feature that they're offering.
[51:20.960 --> 51:23.020]  [SPEAKER_08]: In terms of that feature could change.
[51:23.020 --> 51:34.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: And if you've already given them the information, as Rob said, it's already kind of on their systems and they can do with it what they feel they have to in one of those circumstances.
[51:34.240 --> 51:49.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: And my only suggestion as far as obfuscating it would be to create maybe an LLC or a company that could represent what your site is in so far as management and operations.
[51:50.080 --> 51:57.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: Perhaps put some initials for your contact, your point of contact for that company, and check out prepaid credit cards.
[51:59.500 --> 52:01.460]  [SPEAKER_04]: 212-209-2900 is our telephone.
[52:01.560 --> 52:03.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: We just had a bunch of calls all disappear at once.
[52:03.400 --> 52:07.140]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know where they all went to, but you might have been transferred someplace unpleasant.
[52:07.280 --> 52:07.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: So please call us back.
[52:07.960 --> 52:09.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: We do have a couple of minutes left.
[52:09.700 --> 52:17.860]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, you know, I remember fondly the days where you could just do a who is and always find out who owned a particular domain or at least what fake name they used and figure it out from there.
[52:17.860 --> 52:22.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: And now it seems the default is to just simply hide all that information.
[52:22.760 --> 52:26.060]  [SPEAKER_04]: And it's kind of a useless tool now.
[52:26.220 --> 52:31.120]  [SPEAKER_04]: I also remember when it used to be totally free to register any domain name you wanted.
[52:31.120 --> 52:32.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: It didn't cost a penny.
[52:32.560 --> 52:38.040]  [SPEAKER_04]: And people... this was back when the Internet was first starting and not every website was taken.
[52:38.040 --> 52:43.940]  [SPEAKER_04]: So you could grab famous names and companies or phrases, whatever you wanted, and it wasn't a big deal.
[52:43.940 --> 52:46.300]  [SPEAKER_04]: And those people who did probably are making out pretty well now.
[52:46.300 --> 52:49.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: Right, and now we're having more, like, top-level domains and stuff.
[52:49.900 --> 52:52.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: And with IPv6, we're having more addresses than ever.
[52:52.620 --> 52:53.020]  [SPEAKER_08]: But guess what?
[52:53.040 --> 52:54.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's not getting freer.
[52:54.460 --> 52:55.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: No, no.
[52:55.380 --> 52:56.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: And someone's making a lot of money off this.
[52:57.240 --> 52:57.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: Let's take a phone call.
[52:57.780 --> 52:58.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: Good evening.
[52:58.020 --> 52:58.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: You're on Off The Hook.
[53:00.220 --> 53:00.820]  [SPEAKER_04]: Speak up.
[53:02.220 --> 53:02.960]  [SPEAKER_04]: Or don't.
[53:03.020 --> 53:04.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: If you don't speak up, we have to hang up.
[53:05.080 --> 53:05.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: Good evening.
[53:05.480 --> 53:06.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: You're on Off The Hook.
[53:08.580 --> 53:09.240]  [SPEAKER_04]: Anybody there?
[53:09.480 --> 53:09.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: Go ahead.
[53:10.660 --> 53:12.560]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I'm calling with a complaint.
[53:12.800 --> 53:13.360]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, go ahead.
[53:14.140 --> 53:19.560]  [SPEAKER_01]: I am not a fan of digital telephone technology.
[53:21.020 --> 53:22.820]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm a user of a certain age.
[53:22.940 --> 53:25.420]  [SPEAKER_01]: I grew up primarily in the late 60s and 70s.
[53:25.520 --> 53:28.440]  [SPEAKER_01]: And my first phone in the household was a rotary phone.
[53:28.780 --> 53:33.920]  [SPEAKER_01]: And then when, like, the Touch-Tone phone, when my parents upgraded, we went to that.
[53:34.140 --> 53:36.180]  [SPEAKER_01]: The clarity is what I'm talking about.
[53:36.540 --> 53:39.880]  [SPEAKER_01]: Back then, you could make long-distance calls coast-to-coast.
[53:39.880 --> 53:53.360]  [SPEAKER_01]: And even when I listen to the show and someone calls up on a cell phone, you always invariably hear that, I guess it would be voice digital artifacting or calls fading in and out.
[53:53.660 --> 53:56.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: The clarity, I mean, it's just not there.
[53:56.520 --> 53:57.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, can I say something, sir?
[53:57.820 --> 54:00.240]  [SPEAKER_04]: It sounds to me like you're very clear.
[54:00.400 --> 54:02.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: Are you, by chance, calling from a landline?
[54:02.020 --> 54:03.680]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, here's the thing.
[54:04.500 --> 54:07.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm at my home and I'm calling from a landline.
[54:08.460 --> 54:20.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: My phone service provider, the biggest one in the New York metro area, without mentioning any names, called me up about six months ago and said, oh, we're moving away from copper wires to home landlines.
[54:20.060 --> 54:24.540]  [SPEAKER_01]: And we're bringing in this new, I guess, fiber optic technology.
[54:24.760 --> 54:28.340]  [SPEAKER_01]: So I got a spaceship sitting in my living room that they installed.
[54:29.600 --> 54:33.400]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's a box about 18 inches tall by about 10 inches wide.
[54:33.400 --> 54:35.520]  [SPEAKER_01]: And there's a green light and it's staring at me right now.
[54:35.900 --> 54:41.740]  [SPEAKER_01]: And I told the guy, he says, well, the phone in the bedroom has always been a hardwired landline.
[54:42.280 --> 54:43.800]  [SPEAKER_01]: Can I hook up to it?
[54:43.940 --> 54:48.000]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because I'm actually on a cordless base station phone that I'm talking to you on.
[54:48.580 --> 54:50.000]  [SPEAKER_01]: Do you know if it's possible?
[54:50.220 --> 54:56.160]  [SPEAKER_01]: Can I jerry-rig the old Touch-Tone hard-lined phone into that box?
[54:56.560 --> 54:57.080]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yes.
[54:57.540 --> 54:57.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah?
[54:58.340 --> 54:58.760]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[54:58.900 --> 55:06.860]  [SPEAKER_05]: But if you don't like digital phone technology, it's almost a certainty that the phone you're using is a digital cordless phone.
[55:07.060 --> 55:16.060]  [SPEAKER_05]: So your voice is already being digitized and, you know, made a mere approximation of your actual waveforms.
[55:16.160 --> 55:27.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: And even if you had all analog phone service with a copper line to the central office, as soon as you get to the central office a few miles from your house or maybe even closer, it becomes digital at that point.
[55:27.000 --> 55:42.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: So it's getting closer to you every day and there's no way to have a complete analog phone conversation from point A to point B anymore because it's going to be converted to digital somewhere along the line sooner than you think.
[55:42.200 --> 55:46.940]  [SPEAKER_05]: Like the phone you're holding in your hand right now almost certainly is a digital device.
[55:47.180 --> 55:54.220]  [SPEAKER_08]: I would just add the likelihood is they want to sell you stuff, so it's in their interest to dissuade you from continuing to use copper.
[55:54.220 --> 56:01.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: And if you want to, you might be able to use Sealex, Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, if they're still around even.
[56:01.260 --> 56:08.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: But try to find carriers that will use that company's infrastructure but bill you out through their service.
[56:08.220 --> 56:16.420]  [SPEAKER_08]: And then you'll have less conversations with that provider about all the excuses why you can't continue to have traditional pot service.
[56:16.420 --> 56:24.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: They'll actually be working with another business who you actually work with directly to have competitive access.
[56:24.840 --> 56:39.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: Because I gather if those smaller companies are still around, they still have a right to provide that service on the older ways, regardless of the fact that the upstream owner of the infrastructure is trying to move you towards fiber optics.
[56:39.760 --> 56:49.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I will also say something about Fios is that it doesn't have the same fail-safes insofar as disaster and having a powered line.
[56:49.980 --> 56:58.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: Again, this is a bit more technical, but a lot of the Fios boxes have batteries in them themselves to support emergency connections and stuff like that.
[56:58.940 --> 57:08.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: If the system goes out, because it's using light for the fiber optics, it takes a little bit of power, so those boxes have to be powered.
[57:08.740 --> 57:16.160]  [SPEAKER_08]: And if they can't provide it from your home to keep one end of the signal up, then you have to provide it with a battery and then you have a limited use.
[57:16.160 --> 57:26.920]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now, people could hack it, they could put a generator onto their Fios box, whatever, but the point is you can't beat the huge generators and large amounts of diesel at a central office.
[57:27.300 --> 57:30.460]  [SPEAKER_04]: Now, I think that there's good digital and there's bad digital.
[57:30.700 --> 57:35.580]  [SPEAKER_04]: You can do anything well, you can do anything poorly, and yeah, you know, you have to mix the two.
[57:35.700 --> 57:39.140]  [SPEAKER_04]: You have to mix the new with the old, but do a good job when you do this.
[57:39.260 --> 57:39.880]  [SPEAKER_04]: We're out of time.
[57:40.020 --> 57:44.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'd love to discuss this more and talk about all kinds of other developments, but we have to go.
[57:44.980 --> 57:45.740]  [SPEAKER_04]: We'll be back next week.
[57:45.820 --> 57:47.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hopefully, things will be working a little bit better.
[57:48.180 --> 57:50.460]  [SPEAKER_04]: Write to us, oth@2600.com.
[57:50.580 --> 57:59.440]  [SPEAKER_04]: And another reminder, we're doing a benefit for the Electronic Frontier Foundation with every ticket sold to the Hackers on Planet Earth Conference this July.
[57:59.940 --> 58:09.560]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hope.net has full information on that, and we have a percentage going to the EFF who fight for our digital rights.
[58:09.560 --> 58:10.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's so important.
[58:10.780 --> 58:13.700]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's so important to stay involved and stay informed on that.
[58:14.300 --> 58:15.400]  [SPEAKER_04]: This is Emmanuel for Off The Hook.
[58:15.520 --> 58:16.580]  [SPEAKER_04]: Stay tuned for The Personal Computer Show.
[58:16.720 --> 58:17.240]  [SPEAKER_04]: We'll see you next week.
[58:17.340 --> 58:17.460]  [SPEAKER_04]: Good night.