Off The Hook - 2016-01-13

[00:00.000 --> 00:01.320]  [SPEAKER_00]: ...or even birth control.
[00:01.620 --> 00:03.020]  [SPEAKER_00]: This must be stopped.
[00:03.440 --> 00:06.500]  [SPEAKER_00]: Forced motherhood is female enslavement.
[00:06.700 --> 00:14.520]  [SPEAKER_00]: My name is Sansara Taylor, and I am calling on you to join me by getting on the bus January 22nd and heading down to D.C.
[00:14.740 --> 00:18.160]  [SPEAKER_00]: to stand up for abortion rights on the anniversary of Roe v.
[00:18.280 --> 00:18.560]  [SPEAKER_00]: Wade.
[00:18.800 --> 00:23.800]  [SPEAKER_00]: Go to StopPatriarchy.org for more details and bus information.
[00:24.140 --> 00:26.660]  [SPEAKER_00]: Be part of defeating the war on women.
[00:32.780 --> 00:38.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: And you are listening to Radio Station WBAI, New York.
[00:39.160 --> 00:43.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: The time is just about 7 p.m., and it's time for Off The Hook.
[01:02.450 --> 01:13.670]  [SPEAKER_10]: We couldn't get much worse Von Dillibom, but the best is back the worst I hope that's understood Von Dillibom!
[01:37.830 --> 01:39.910]  [SPEAKER_09]: A very good evening to you.
[01:43.110 --> 01:45.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I don't know if anyone can hear me.
[01:46.090 --> 01:47.490]  [SPEAKER_09]: A very good evening to you.
[01:47.730 --> 01:48.890]  [SPEAKER_09]: The program is Off The Hook.
[01:48.890 --> 01:52.870]  [SPEAKER_09]: You're listening to Radio Station WBAI, New York, where it is 7 p.m.
[01:53.990 --> 01:57.390]  [SPEAKER_09]: And I am joined in the studio by Mike.
[01:57.690 --> 01:58.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hi there.
[02:00.010 --> 02:01.250]  [SPEAKER_09]: And Bernie S.
[02:01.490 --> 02:02.730]  [SPEAKER_09]: on the radio... on the telephone.
[02:04.870 --> 02:05.710]  [SPEAKER_09]: Bernie, are you there?
[02:07.910 --> 02:08.570]  [SPEAKER_09]: Bernie S.
[02:08.670 --> 02:09.710]  [SPEAKER_09]: might be on a telephone somewhere.
[02:10.210 --> 02:10.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm here.
[02:10.970 --> 02:11.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: Greetings from Philadelphia.
[02:12.190 --> 02:12.590]  [SPEAKER_09]: There you are.
[02:13.110 --> 02:14.850]  [SPEAKER_09]: In the studio, we're also joined by Jim.
[02:15.830 --> 02:16.130]  [SPEAKER_09]: Hello.
[02:16.570 --> 02:17.990]  [SPEAKER_09]: Hey, been away for some time.
[02:18.270 --> 02:18.510]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yep.
[02:18.510 --> 02:22.050]  [SPEAKER_09]: And also, on the telephone, we should have Emmanuel and Kyle.
[02:23.670 --> 02:24.070]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yes.
[02:24.350 --> 02:25.310]  [SPEAKER_15]: Hi, we're here.
[02:25.970 --> 02:26.770]  [SPEAKER_15]: It's Emmanuel.
[02:26.950 --> 02:27.510]  [SPEAKER_15]: Kyle, are you there?
[02:27.970 --> 02:28.790]  [SPEAKER_15]: Oh, yeah, I'm here.
[02:29.050 --> 02:30.230]  [SPEAKER_15]: Barely see you.
[02:30.710 --> 02:32.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: We can barely hear him as well.
[02:33.170 --> 02:34.270]  [SPEAKER_15]: We can barely hear you.
[02:34.370 --> 02:35.230]  [SPEAKER_15]: You're very, very low.
[02:35.430 --> 02:39.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know what... I can try shouting, or Rob's gonna turn some dials now.
[02:39.710 --> 02:40.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: How's that?
[02:40.210 --> 02:42.690]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah, if you adjust some dials, we might be able to hear you better.
[02:43.030 --> 02:43.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: All right.
[02:44.310 --> 02:45.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: Dials have been dialed.
[02:45.850 --> 02:47.430]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay, that is an improvement.
[02:47.630 --> 02:47.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: All right.
[02:48.510 --> 02:53.990]  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I don't know if me louder is a net improvement for the world, but, you know, at least for audio fidelity.
[02:55.490 --> 02:56.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm enjoying it.
[02:57.030 --> 03:06.330]  [SPEAKER_16]: Anyway, I apologize that we couldn't be there in person, but we had to buy lotto tickets, and we've been online now for six hours.
[03:06.430 --> 03:07.630]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's really getting a bit frenetic.
[03:09.670 --> 03:12.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, if you win, I expect you to share the prize with our audience.
[03:13.290 --> 03:13.630]  Well...
[03:13.630 --> 03:14.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: Or at least your colleagues.
[03:15.710 --> 03:17.050]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah, it's only $1.5 billion.
[03:17.430 --> 03:18.910]  [SPEAKER_16]: I'm not sure how much we can spread around.
[03:19.590 --> 03:22.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, you have to consider taxes and all this stuff.
[03:22.350 --> 03:22.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's true.
[03:28.400 --> 03:31.600]  [SPEAKER_01]: We can't hear, I assume, Kyle, really, at all.
[03:33.920 --> 03:35.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: You can't hear him at all?
[03:35.340 --> 03:36.540]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, very, very faint.
[03:36.740 --> 03:37.660]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know what he said.
[03:39.520 --> 03:41.340]  [SPEAKER_16]: We can try a different phone, I suppose.
[03:41.720 --> 03:42.520]  [SPEAKER_16]: How am I coming through?
[03:42.720 --> 03:43.280]  [SPEAKER_01]: You're fine.
[03:43.700 --> 03:44.060]  [SPEAKER_16]: I'm fine.
[03:44.260 --> 03:46.900]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, let me point out, actually, we're lying.
[03:47.000 --> 03:49.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: We're not online at a lot of places.
[03:49.440 --> 03:50.740]  [SPEAKER_16]: We're actually using landlines.
[03:50.960 --> 03:52.340]  [SPEAKER_16]: I'm using a phone from...
[03:52.340 --> 03:53.480]  [SPEAKER_16]: What's this from, Kyle?
[03:53.580 --> 03:54.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: What year about?
[03:56.000 --> 03:56.940]  [SPEAKER_16]: What year is this from?
[03:58.260 --> 03:59.060]  [SPEAKER_16]: About 1937.
[04:00.640 --> 04:01.940]  [SPEAKER_16]: And it still works.
[04:02.100 --> 04:02.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: It works great.
[04:04.180 --> 04:06.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: Kyle's just picked up a phone from, I think, the 1950s.
[04:06.740 --> 04:07.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: Is this better?
[04:08.040 --> 04:08.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: That is better.
[04:09.240 --> 04:09.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay.
[04:09.840 --> 04:12.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: The problem was, you were using a newer phone, Kyle, before.
[04:12.820 --> 04:14.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah, that phone was from the 70s.
[04:14.400 --> 04:16.620]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah, so you have to go back a few decades, at least.
[04:16.940 --> 04:18.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: They didn't know how to make anything in the 70s.
[04:20.520 --> 04:29.960]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, but anyway, as long as we're talking about Lotto, and I really don't want to talk about Lotto, but since you guys brought it up, the jackpot is at $1.5 billion tonight, right?
[04:30.090 --> 04:30.860]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's what I'm told?
[04:31.360 --> 04:31.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[04:32.760 --> 04:33.140]  [SPEAKER_16]: Thank you.
[04:33.140 --> 04:42.800]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, my question, my theory, my idea, it's guaranteed that there's going to be $1.5 billion paid out.
[04:42.960 --> 04:47.120]  [SPEAKER_16]: Now, that is irrespective of how many people buy tickets, correct?
[04:48.980 --> 04:50.180]  [SPEAKER_01]: A total of that.
[04:50.330 --> 04:51.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, it's not guaranteed.
[04:51.920 --> 04:52.560]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know.
[04:52.830 --> 04:53.400]  [SPEAKER_16]: No, you don't know.
[04:53.530 --> 04:54.830]  [SPEAKER_16]: No one understands how it works.
[04:55.140 --> 04:55.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: If one person...
[04:55.940 --> 04:56.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: The total amount is paid.
[04:56.860 --> 04:59.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: If several people pick the number, then it's divided between them.
[04:59.680 --> 05:02.500]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay, but Bernie, my question is this.
[05:02.640 --> 05:12.700]  [SPEAKER_16]: If one person, only one person in the entire country bought a lottery ticket tonight, or this whole period of time, and they won, they would still get the $1.5 billion.
[05:13.060 --> 05:15.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's not dependent on how many people buy tickets this round, correct?
[05:15.820 --> 05:16.040]  [SPEAKER_01]: Right.
[05:16.280 --> 05:16.720]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, no, no.
[05:16.720 --> 05:17.360]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's not true.
[05:17.400 --> 05:19.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: They'd have to pick all the right digits.
[05:19.220 --> 05:23.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: They'd have to pick all the right digits, but we know that the payout's going to be $1.5 billion.
[05:23.680 --> 05:25.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, no, that's not how it works.
[05:25.160 --> 05:25.900]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay, how does it work, then?
[05:25.900 --> 05:29.620]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's a share of the money that comes in.
[05:29.940 --> 05:31.540]  [SPEAKER_01]: So if no one but it...
[05:31.540 --> 05:35.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: The payout is an estimated payout based on how many people they project will buy tickets.
[05:35.760 --> 05:36.720]  [SPEAKER_16]: I've never heard that before.
[05:36.840 --> 05:39.160]  [SPEAKER_16]: So they're guessing how many people are going to buy tickets.
[05:40.020 --> 05:41.920]  [SPEAKER_01]: The lottery people, they're good at math.
[05:42.180 --> 05:43.400]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's the customers, you know.
[05:44.440 --> 05:46.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: Oh, well, then my whole theory is shot the hell.
[05:46.180 --> 05:53.120]  [SPEAKER_16]: Because I was going to say, why don't we just take the $1.5 billion since it's already there somehow and spend it on something cool for all of us.
[05:54.100 --> 05:56.980]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, that's what the rest of the money goes to, you know.
[05:57.140 --> 05:57.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: Passes.
[05:59.780 --> 06:01.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: Emmanuel, I have a better idea.
[06:01.300 --> 06:01.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[06:02.300 --> 06:11.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: If you, the odds, the Powerball lottery people say the odds are $292 million to one to winning, and the tickets cost $2.
[06:12.300 --> 06:21.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: So that's a little less than $600 million to buy every conceivable combination to earn $1.5 billion, assuming you're the only lottery ticket holder.
[06:21.480 --> 06:28.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: So all you've got to do is go around and buy, you know, $292 million tickets, and you're sure to win.
[06:28.960 --> 06:29.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: Are you sure about that?
[06:29.940 --> 06:31.020]  [SPEAKER_12]: Are you sure those numbers add up?
[06:31.440 --> 06:32.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's what they keep saying.
[06:33.540 --> 06:36.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, then Trump could win this, couldn't he?
[06:36.960 --> 06:41.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, but I guess you'd have to stand in line and buy tickets for a long time.
[06:41.940 --> 06:42.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: No, he's not going to do that.
[06:42.940 --> 06:46.160]  [SPEAKER_01]: One hopes that Trump can't win anything from this point forward.
[06:48.520 --> 06:49.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: He doesn't stand in line.
[06:51.080 --> 06:51.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: Hmm.
[06:52.860 --> 06:54.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: Anyway, we probably have better things to talk about.
[06:55.260 --> 06:55.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah.
[06:55.660 --> 06:56.700]  [SPEAKER_16]: We definitely do.
[06:57.600 --> 07:04.320]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, speaking of numbers, I just wanted to throw this story out there, because this is something that hit me like a hammer on the head.
[07:04.500 --> 07:15.720]  [SPEAKER_16]: But do you know that we've been following the demonization of hackers since the very first episode of this program back in 1988, and it's gone on for longer than that.
[07:15.920 --> 07:18.040]  [SPEAKER_16]: And I think it's just getting worse and worse and worse.
[07:18.460 --> 07:27.700]  [SPEAKER_16]: I just saw this story that on Sunday, this 26-year-old hacker was sentenced for the theft and sale of credit card information.
[07:28.220 --> 07:42.480]  [SPEAKER_16]: Now, the thing is, that's not what hacking is all about in the first place, but I'm going to skip over that part for now, just because the sentence that this guy got in Turkey was 334 years in prison.
[07:43.180 --> 07:49.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: You know, I think sending anyone to prison for that kind of a crime in the first place is kind of silly.
[07:49.860 --> 08:04.120]  [SPEAKER_16]: But when you equate hacking to crime, and then you add these incredible number of years to a penalty, you're basically causing irreparable harm.
[08:04.260 --> 08:08.160]  [SPEAKER_16]: People will see hackers and think they're the next worst thing since Charlie Manson.
[08:09.280 --> 08:12.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: 334 years in prison for basically credit card fraud.
[08:13.500 --> 08:14.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: That's good behavior.
[08:14.460 --> 08:15.160]  [SPEAKER_09]: He could be out in 100.
[08:15.460 --> 08:16.740]  [SPEAKER_16]: I don't know about that.
[08:16.740 --> 08:17.880]  [SPEAKER_16]: I'm not really sure.
[08:19.800 --> 08:23.520]  [SPEAKER_16]: But this is what we have to speak out against.
[08:24.080 --> 08:28.480]  [SPEAKER_16]: They say he was part of a dozen strong black hat hacker collective.
[08:28.480 --> 08:30.800]  [SPEAKER_16]: Again, these labels don't serve anybody.
[08:31.020 --> 08:40.040]  [SPEAKER_16]: The group allegedly engaged in a phishing scam, which had at least 43 bank customers filing complaints that their credit card information was copied and stolen.
[08:40.540 --> 08:51.830]  [SPEAKER_16]: The scheme was carried out through expertly designed websites that replicated several banks' websites, enabling him and his group of hackers to obtain crucial login information of targeted banking users.
[08:51.930 --> 08:55.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: Look, it's, you know, this kind of thing, while not hacking, it's definitely a crime.
[08:55.240 --> 08:56.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: There should be some penalty.
[08:57.920 --> 09:14.160]  [SPEAKER_16]: I think, you know, the people that are handing these things out now are basically just so afraid and so ignorant of what it is that's going on that they just want to lock them away for as long as possible, so that they don't cause any more grief and hassle or confusion to them.
[09:14.310 --> 09:15.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's not the answer.
[09:16.710 --> 09:19.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: I thought you had to be Kurdish to get a prison sentence that long in Turkey.
[09:21.670 --> 09:23.160]  [SPEAKER_01]: I can barely hear you.
[09:23.470 --> 09:24.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know what I can do.
[09:25.110 --> 09:27.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: Rob's going to fiddle with some more knobs.
[09:27.260 --> 09:27.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: Is this any better?
[09:28.330 --> 09:29.190]  [SPEAKER_16]: Not really, no.
[09:29.550 --> 09:31.570]  [SPEAKER_16]: You've gotten a lot worse since the last time you said something.
[09:31.710 --> 09:32.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, well.
[09:33.290 --> 09:34.380]  [SPEAKER_01]: I can stop talking.
[09:34.470 --> 09:35.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know what else to do.
[09:35.930 --> 09:36.930]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay, you're better now.
[09:36.930 --> 09:38.610]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, I haven't done a thing.
[09:38.880 --> 09:40.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: But I just said that I thought you had to be...
[09:40.950 --> 09:47.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: This is not such a good joke after so many repetitions, but I thought you had to be Kurdish to get that kind of prison sentence in Turkey.
[09:47.640 --> 09:47.930]  [SPEAKER_16]: Oh, no.
[09:48.040 --> 09:49.090]  [SPEAKER_16]: Anybody can get it in Turkey, man.
[09:49.140 --> 09:49.550]  [SPEAKER_16]: Oh, oh.
[09:49.780 --> 09:49.920]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah.
[09:50.040 --> 09:52.420]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I'm glad to see they're expanding their horizons.
[09:53.880 --> 09:54.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: Always a good thing.
[09:55.790 --> 10:05.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, it's definitely kind of a lazy approach because they're not actually going after their own systems and security practices and so on.
[10:05.540 --> 10:12.970]  [SPEAKER_14]: They're just sort of using a huge astronomical sentence as more or less a scare tactic, but it doesn't really address anything technically.
[10:13.540 --> 10:15.590]  [SPEAKER_14]: And they're not educating themselves, I don't think.
[10:15.730 --> 10:17.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, not with that kind of reaction.
[10:17.280 --> 10:20.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's more to make a statement.
[10:20.400 --> 10:24.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: What do you think, Emmanuel, is the appropriate response to this kind of thing?
[10:25.260 --> 10:26.530]  [SPEAKER_16]: The appropriate response...
[10:27.160 --> 10:36.190]  [SPEAKER_16]: I'm not somebody who's in favor of sending people to prison for things that don't make society any safer.
[10:36.420 --> 10:42.470]  [SPEAKER_16]: You know, somebody who's a mass killer, someone who's violent, yeah, they need to be segregated from society somehow.
[10:43.160 --> 10:53.790]  [SPEAKER_16]: Somebody who engages in some kind of a scheme, you know, obviously they can't pay back everything they stole, but they can certainly spend most of their life trying to do that.
[10:53.790 --> 10:58.540]  [SPEAKER_16]: And I think, you know, somebody who steals needs to make up for that.
[10:58.680 --> 11:03.040]  [SPEAKER_16]: And just sending them away gets them out of our hair, yeah, but it doesn't really address the crime.
[11:03.210 --> 11:05.820]  [SPEAKER_16]: It doesn't do anything to rehabilitate the person.
[11:06.160 --> 11:09.960]  [SPEAKER_16]: I just think there are so many better ways to deal with that kind of a criminal.
[11:10.820 --> 11:12.540]  [SPEAKER_09]: Also a sentence like 300 years.
[11:12.710 --> 11:19.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: I mean, there are very few things you could actually do as a human being that I think actually warrant any 300 years of anything.
[11:19.440 --> 11:22.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: And of course, that's a completely unrealistic thing anyway, because no one would live that long.
[11:22.680 --> 11:26.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, you know, why don't they just say life in prison for hacking?
[11:27.380 --> 11:28.470]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, that's what they're saying.
[11:28.660 --> 11:32.400]  [SPEAKER_16]: And that's what they're trying to get people to believe is normal.
[11:32.660 --> 11:34.140]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's what the real danger is.
[11:34.300 --> 11:39.850]  [SPEAKER_16]: When people think, you know, I remember the day when a hacker going to prison was unheard of.
[11:40.040 --> 11:41.140]  [SPEAKER_16]: That will never happen.
[11:41.210 --> 11:42.000]  [SPEAKER_16]: Why would they do that?
[11:42.790 --> 11:46.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: And now we're thinking lifetime in prison for hacking.
[11:47.040 --> 11:48.110]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay, that's not that unusual.
[11:48.470 --> 11:51.160]  [SPEAKER_16]: And we can't allow that to become normal.
[11:54.860 --> 11:56.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah, I agree with you.
[11:57.240 --> 12:02.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: I just wonder, is maybe an aim of this so when they give the next one 200 years, that one will think, oh, they're being merciful.
[12:03.420 --> 12:04.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, yeah.
[12:04.420 --> 12:08.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: And it's just a shame in general, because you've got some skill.
[12:08.760 --> 12:13.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, I'm sure other crimes people could argue have skill, but there's skill here.
[12:13.460 --> 12:31.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's just, it may be, like with what Emmanuel said, remarking about rehabilitation of some kind, or at least getting people in the right direction, encouraging them to use some of their skill or knowledge in more positive ways in society and get them back on their feet,
[12:31.280 --> 12:38.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: so to speak, instead of this just huge sort of figure to scare everyone.
[12:39.340 --> 12:44.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: I think, I would argue, definitely cycles innovation to a degree.
[12:45.240 --> 12:48.740]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah, there's all kinds of things that happen to us that we get outraged at.
[12:49.000 --> 12:55.820]  [SPEAKER_16]: A couple of weeks ago, we were having a denial-of-service attack, and we weren't able to do a lot of things we wanted to be able to do.
[12:56.740 --> 12:58.060]  [SPEAKER_16]: I don't want blood.
[12:58.300 --> 13:00.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: I don't want somebody to suffer or be imprisoned.
[13:00.800 --> 13:03.660]  [SPEAKER_16]: I want to figure out how to get around it, how to make it not happen again.
[13:03.960 --> 13:08.380]  [SPEAKER_16]: And, you know, if we find out who did it, then, you know, display that information.
[13:09.820 --> 13:13.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: But you have to say to yourself, okay, this happened.
[13:13.900 --> 13:15.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: How much of a big deal is it really?
[13:15.560 --> 13:16.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: Can I recover from it?
[13:16.820 --> 13:20.700]  [SPEAKER_16]: You know, there was a story that came out in the last week about Time Warner.
[13:21.020 --> 13:30.820]  [SPEAKER_16]: Apparently 320,000 customers, and we're so familiar with stories like this, found out that their email and password details were stolen, or a better phrase, is copied.
[13:31.980 --> 13:46.420]  [SPEAKER_16]: Time Warner Cable said there was no evidence of a breach found in the company's systems, but the details might have been obtained by directly targeting customers themselves, probably going through phishing emails or malware, reusing credentials obtained by a data breach of another company.
[13:47.100 --> 13:50.080]  [SPEAKER_16]: Anything but Time Warner is what Time Warner is saying.
[13:51.100 --> 13:52.720]  [SPEAKER_16]: This kind of a thing is common.
[13:52.860 --> 13:53.900]  [SPEAKER_16]: It happens all the time.
[13:53.900 --> 14:11.760]  [SPEAKER_16]: And we need to be able to take steps to protect ourselves by not having easily penetrable accounts via passwords or things like that, and by recognizing companies that don't protect the data that you entrust them with and not using those companies anymore.
[14:12.600 --> 14:16.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: So, you know, it's basically educating ourselves as this technology evolves.
[14:19.200 --> 14:22.220]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I mean, what's your recommendation for people, then?
[14:22.540 --> 14:23.360]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, it depends.
[14:23.560 --> 14:25.140]  [SPEAKER_16]: It depends on the specifics of the case.
[14:25.380 --> 14:29.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: I would say never use the same password for multiple accounts.
[14:29.200 --> 14:42.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: That way, if a weak link in something that you use is compromised, then all of your other accounts aren't also compromised through no fault of your own, other than the fact that you can't keep track of more than one password.
[14:43.800 --> 14:45.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: Don't use companies that have a bad track record.
[14:45.780 --> 14:50.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: Don't use companies that can't seem to ever say, yeah, we can do better.
[14:51.540 --> 14:56.080]  [SPEAKER_16]: There are many, many ways to do this, and, yeah, there are going to be some problems.
[14:56.320 --> 14:58.260]  [SPEAKER_16]: Hey, I'll give you an example of something that happened to me.
[14:58.560 --> 15:00.740]  [SPEAKER_16]: Maybe people can give me ideas on what to do.
[15:01.440 --> 15:05.500]  [SPEAKER_16]: I found out that my credit card had been used for fraud back in January.
[15:05.840 --> 15:21.860]  [SPEAKER_16]: However, since, if you recall, last year, around this time, Kyle and I were over in Eastern Europe and doing all kinds of things, and I was trying to use my credit card as much as possible to avoid having to switch to cash every couple of days.
[15:22.200 --> 15:27.640]  [SPEAKER_16]: And I had, like, a five-page credit card bill, and I didn't have a chance to itemize every single item.
[15:27.640 --> 15:37.600]  [SPEAKER_16]: In the middle of all that, somebody decided they were going to buy a toy train set for some kids someplace through mail order, and it just kind of slipped in there.
[15:37.660 --> 15:40.460]  [SPEAKER_16]: I didn't notice it until I was doing my year-end accounting.
[15:40.980 --> 15:42.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: And there it was, this charge.
[15:43.140 --> 15:44.160]  [SPEAKER_16]: I had no idea what it was.
[15:44.340 --> 15:47.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: I called Chase to ask them, can you tell me what this was?
[15:47.860 --> 15:49.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: They couldn't help me at all.
[15:49.260 --> 15:53.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: They said, the only information we have is what's on your bill, which I know is nonsense.
[15:53.280 --> 15:56.140]  [SPEAKER_16]: I know Chase keeps track of purchases.
[15:57.140 --> 15:58.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: We have an online store.
[15:58.580 --> 15:59.720]  [SPEAKER_16]: We certainly keep track of purchases.
[16:00.180 --> 16:02.080]  [SPEAKER_16]: The thing is, they were covering their asses.
[16:02.140 --> 16:09.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: They just didn't want to help somebody because I might cause some kind of a reversal or a question or something like that.
[16:10.620 --> 16:15.000]  [SPEAKER_16]: You have basically between 60 and 90 days to contest this.
[16:15.120 --> 16:20.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: So I kind of knew I didn't have much on my side, but I still wanted to know who did it.
[16:20.840 --> 16:21.820]  [SPEAKER_16]: They wouldn't help me at all.
[16:22.000 --> 16:23.880]  [SPEAKER_16]: Finally, I called the company.
[16:23.880 --> 16:26.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: I tracked down a phone number for them, and I asked them to look it up.
[16:26.520 --> 16:28.120]  [SPEAKER_16]: And they were most gracious, and they did that.
[16:28.320 --> 16:29.620]  [SPEAKER_16]: And I have the person's name.
[16:29.620 --> 16:30.600]  [SPEAKER_16]: I have the person's address.
[16:30.780 --> 16:31.840]  [SPEAKER_16]: I have the person's phone number.
[16:32.100 --> 16:35.880]  [SPEAKER_16]: And since then, I've been able to get all kinds of information about this person.
[16:36.860 --> 16:39.780]  [SPEAKER_16]: And I guess what I need help with is, well, what do I do now?
[16:40.580 --> 16:41.800]  [SPEAKER_16]: The Chase isn't going to help me.
[16:41.800 --> 16:43.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: They're not going to reverse the charge.
[16:44.000 --> 16:47.720]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's well beyond the period of time to do something like that.
[16:47.960 --> 16:49.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: But I have all this information.
[16:49.900 --> 16:55.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: And, you know, I share a degree of the blame for not catching it in the first place.
[16:56.420 --> 17:03.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: But I am very disappointed in Chase for not helping a customer when something obviously is wrong, and for not detecting it.
[17:03.260 --> 17:08.640]  [SPEAKER_16]: The funny thing is, they had contacted me that very day to say there is evidence of fraud on your account.
[17:08.640 --> 17:14.000]  [SPEAKER_16]: However, the item they pointed to as evidence of fraud was a recurring monthly charge.
[17:14.000 --> 17:18.480]  [SPEAKER_16]: In other words, a charge that appeared every single month on that same credit card for a year.
[17:18.660 --> 17:22.620]  [SPEAKER_16]: They pointed to it, or their computer pointed to that and said, this is evidence of fraud.
[17:22.940 --> 17:24.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: Do you recognize the charge?
[17:24.460 --> 17:26.400]  [SPEAKER_16]: And I said, yes, I do recognize the charge.
[17:26.480 --> 17:30.060]  [SPEAKER_16]: But they didn't tell me about the toy train being sent to somebody.
[17:30.520 --> 17:32.360]  [SPEAKER_16]: That, to them, was completely normal.
[17:32.720 --> 17:38.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: So I'd like to find out where the compromise occurred, because they used my name, they used my billing address, all of that.
[17:38.280 --> 17:42.000]  [SPEAKER_16]: But somewhere, someplace, there was some kind of a compromised system.
[17:42.680 --> 17:46.060]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's something that they should take an interest in, and they have not taken any interest in that.
[17:46.380 --> 17:53.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: And I'd like to know, what should I do with all the information I have for this person that either was the recipient of a fraudulent purchase or the initiator?
[17:54.440 --> 17:57.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: Emmanuel, why don't you simply ask that person how they did it?
[17:57.760 --> 18:03.160]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, do you think they're really just going to say, oh, I'll tell you now, since you called me on the phone, I'm going to give you all the information.
[18:03.300 --> 18:04.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: They're going to deny it, of course.
[18:04.580 --> 18:09.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, to say, hey, listen, I can't hold you accountable anymore, because the window is closed.
[18:10.140 --> 18:13.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, you know, hey, it's worth a try.
[18:13.640 --> 18:14.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: It could be worth entertaining.
[18:15.340 --> 18:18.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: Why, in any situation, would they tell me that?
[18:18.500 --> 18:20.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, how do you know it's even that person anyway?
[18:20.440 --> 18:21.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: It could have just been their gift recipient.
[18:21.680 --> 18:23.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: They sent this gift at your expense to somebody else.
[18:24.040 --> 18:24.880]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's probably who it is.
[18:24.980 --> 18:25.640]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, that's what I said.
[18:25.820 --> 18:28.520]  [SPEAKER_16]: I said this person could have just been the recipient of a fraudulent purchase.
[18:28.520 --> 18:28.760]  [SPEAKER_16]: Right, right.
[18:29.280 --> 18:30.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: I think that's what happened.
[18:30.420 --> 18:31.840]  [SPEAKER_09]: Right, but Emmanuel, you've got...
[18:31.840 --> 18:34.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: She's basically, she's had a hard life, right?
[18:34.240 --> 18:36.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: She's trying to make it on her own.
[18:36.360 --> 18:38.040]  [SPEAKER_16]: I see her job applications.
[18:38.040 --> 18:39.800]  [SPEAKER_16]: I see all kinds of things that she's going for.
[18:39.960 --> 18:41.520]  [SPEAKER_16]: She seems like a nice person.
[18:41.640 --> 18:43.780]  [SPEAKER_16]: And the kid, you know, the kid deserves a train, obviously.
[18:43.800 --> 18:46.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: He's been through some crap in the last year.
[18:46.440 --> 18:51.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: But, you know, I just would like some say before I give somebody a train set.
[18:51.320 --> 18:51.640]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's all.
[18:51.940 --> 18:54.160]  [SPEAKER_09]: Emmanuel, you've got all this information on this person now.
[18:54.620 --> 18:58.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: You're admitting to having all this personal information about somebody who didn't authorize you to.
[18:58.760 --> 19:01.160]  [SPEAKER_09]: Are you trying to get sent to Turkish prison for 300 years?
[19:01.700 --> 19:02.720]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, they're not in Turkey.
[19:02.860 --> 19:03.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: They're in Brooklyn.
[19:03.540 --> 19:04.140]  [SPEAKER_16]: Oh, yeah, I know that.
[19:04.220 --> 19:04.740]  [SPEAKER_16]: I know where they are.
[19:04.820 --> 19:06.380]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's like, you could probably get to them tonight, Rob.
[19:07.200 --> 19:09.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's not fraud to investigate charges on your card.
[19:10.460 --> 19:11.000]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's true.
[19:11.000 --> 19:11.520]  [SPEAKER_16]: You're right.
[19:11.520 --> 19:11.920]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's not.
[19:12.020 --> 19:12.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: Why should it be?
[19:13.460 --> 19:14.620]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's what they want you to think.
[19:15.680 --> 19:22.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, I guess listeners who have ideas for what you can do with this information can send us an email, oth@2600.com.
[19:22.280 --> 19:25.420]  [SPEAKER_16]: And if you're the listener who got the train, let us know that as well.
[19:25.500 --> 19:26.840]  [SPEAKER_16]: Maybe we can have a personal conversation.
[19:27.160 --> 19:27.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[19:27.600 --> 19:28.240]  [SPEAKER_09]: Send us a picture.
[19:31.160 --> 19:32.060]  [SPEAKER_16]: We take it for your child.
[19:34.540 --> 19:36.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: You can repossess the train set.
[19:36.940 --> 19:39.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: You know, I mean, I don't consider that getting hacked.
[19:39.180 --> 19:43.860]  [SPEAKER_16]: I consider that being a victim of a bad system.
[19:44.220 --> 19:50.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: Which, you know, I don't know if that system has gotten any better with the introduction of chip cards on credit cards.
[19:50.980 --> 19:53.920]  [SPEAKER_16]: Because it's fairly easy.
[19:54.160 --> 19:56.940]  [SPEAKER_16]: In fact, there's a letter in the New 2600 about this.
[19:57.280 --> 20:03.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's easy for a card to simply be defined as not having a chip.
[20:03.680 --> 20:07.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: All you have to do is modify something on the mag stripe.
[20:08.060 --> 20:10.940]  [SPEAKER_16]: And it'll say, no chip, you have to use the mag stripe.
[20:11.520 --> 20:14.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: And all of a sudden, you can duplicate the card.
[20:14.380 --> 20:17.800]  [SPEAKER_16]: And that's the whole point of having the chip in the first place.
[20:17.860 --> 20:20.740]  [SPEAKER_16]: So that a duplicated card can't be used over and over again.
[20:21.000 --> 20:28.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: I'm wondering what percentage of credit card fraud still uses an actual physical card anymore anyway, since so many purchases are made with just the info.
[20:28.620 --> 20:29.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: Exactly, yes.
[20:30.060 --> 20:42.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: I wonder, Emmanuel, if the credit card companies on their side have some way of telling this bid that you change in the mag stripe.
[20:43.000 --> 20:47.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: It seems to me that they would have on record whether a card they had recently issued had both or neither.
[20:48.020 --> 20:50.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: But I guess we'll have to look more into that.
[20:50.780 --> 20:52.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: I haven't seen that particular story yet.
[20:52.640 --> 20:53.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: It sounds fascinating, though.
[20:53.420 --> 21:00.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: See, as a hacker, I would want to see this exploited so that we learn what the weakness is.
[21:00.380 --> 21:09.400]  [SPEAKER_16]: So if somebody is able to do that through a credit card, to make a supposedly secure chip credit card completely insecure by modifying something on the mag stripe, they should do that.
[21:09.500 --> 21:12.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: They shouldn't go around ordering trains and sending it to random kids.
[21:12.140 --> 21:15.800]  [SPEAKER_16]: But they should at least do something in practice to demonstrate.
[21:16.020 --> 21:18.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: Maybe at a conference like the upcoming HOPE conference.
[21:18.540 --> 21:20.120]  [SPEAKER_16]: That would be a great way to demonstrate that.
[21:22.200 --> 21:25.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know if you want to be complicit in...
[21:25.060 --> 21:29.540]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, they shouldn't use the modified card on a merchant account that you control.
[21:30.120 --> 21:33.160]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, you need to demonstrate security holes.
[21:33.480 --> 21:33.680]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[21:33.860 --> 21:35.300]  [SPEAKER_16]: And to do that, you cannot be timid.
[21:35.380 --> 21:38.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: You can't say, well, if I do this, I'll be liable, et cetera, et cetera.
[21:38.520 --> 21:43.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: You know, you're doing something in front of a crowd of a few hundred or a thousand people to demonstrate a weakness.
[21:44.700 --> 21:47.480]  [SPEAKER_16]: If somebody comes after you, you're going to have a lot of people on your side.
[21:47.480 --> 21:50.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: Maybe if they duplicate their own card, that seems okay.
[21:51.320 --> 21:51.740]  [SPEAKER_16]: Sorry, Mike.
[21:51.820 --> 21:52.880]  [SPEAKER_16]: There's also thousands of people.
[21:53.260 --> 21:55.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: Perhaps you could get volunteers.
[21:55.900 --> 21:56.300]  [SPEAKER_16]: Sure.
[21:56.680 --> 21:57.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: I mean, there's always that.
[21:58.560 --> 22:01.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: I mean, Steve Rambam has a good time getting people to volunteer their personal information.
[22:02.140 --> 22:06.260]  [SPEAKER_16]: They can get people to volunteer their credit cards and see just how much damage we can do.
[22:06.260 --> 22:16.060]  [SPEAKER_16]: So, um, but, um, speaking of hope, we opened up ticket sales on Monday and, uh, I think we're almost halfway completely sold out.
[22:16.180 --> 22:18.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's how quickly they've, they've been going so far.
[22:18.360 --> 22:30.720]  [SPEAKER_16]: So, uh, it's something to consider if you, uh, want to go to a really interesting hacker conference right here in New York city, July 22nd through 26th of this year, uh, the 11th hope is what we're calling this one.
[22:30.720 --> 22:32.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: And all the details are at hope.net.
[22:33.300 --> 22:47.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, and, uh, you might want to consider hurrying up because, uh, the interest in this kind of thing has, has gone through the roof and it's, it's really awesome to see because we have so many cool people, so many of the amazing folks who travel from around the world,
[22:47.360 --> 22:54.600]  [SPEAKER_16]: uh, to share their ideas and theories and experiments and, and just meet all kinds of other people, uh, right in the middle of New York city.
[22:54.840 --> 22:57.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: So hope.net, uh, is where all the information can be found.
[22:58.100 --> 22:59.860]  [SPEAKER_16]: We've also opened up speaker submissions.
[22:59.860 --> 23:09.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: You'll find information about that, how you can, uh, uh, get started, uh, uh, submitting your ideas for talks or panels and, uh, and workshops as well.
[23:09.300 --> 23:12.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: I know Bernie, you were very involved in, in, uh, workshop coordination last time.
[23:12.840 --> 23:15.000]  [SPEAKER_16]: Can you tell us something about, uh, the sorts of things we get?
[23:15.400 --> 23:18.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, Mitch Altman and I were, uh, were very involved with that last time.
[23:18.520 --> 23:31.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: We found that, uh, over the years of doing hope conferences that, uh, there was interest in, in having workshops too, or, you know, like a hands-on workshop where everybody sits at tables and participates in building something or, or, or creating something.
[23:31.760 --> 23:35.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: And a lot of the talks, I mean, we have like a hundred speakers at these hope conferences over three days.
[23:35.940 --> 23:40.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: A lot of these talks lend themselves very well to a follow-up workshop.
[23:41.280 --> 23:49.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: Like if you're talking about how to hack this particular piece of hardware, or how to build this certain thing, you, you can do, somebody can do a talk about that.
[23:49.680 --> 23:57.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: But then, after the talk, you can all get together in a room and actually do the thing that was just talked about, which is, uh, I think a great combination.
[23:57.540 --> 24:03.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, uh, uh, we did a lot of workshops at, uh, at Hope X, uh, a couple years ago.
[24:04.040 --> 24:05.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that worked out really well.
[24:05.700 --> 24:20.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'd like us to focus even more energy on that this year, because it's just a great, uh, it's just a great confluence where you have people, you have a speaker talking about something, and then you can sit down with that speaker and actually do what they were talking about and learn about it,
[24:20.420 --> 24:21.220]  [SPEAKER_12]: uh, hands-on.
[24:21.380 --> 24:26.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, uh, it's a, it's a very educational and enjoyable process and, um, a lot of fun.
[24:26.640 --> 24:28.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, uh, it just makes the conference way better.
[24:28.800 --> 24:31.480]  [SPEAKER_16]: And, uh, Bernie, uh, I just want to take issue of one thing you said.
[24:31.540 --> 24:33.300]  [SPEAKER_16]: I believe you said we had a hundred, uh, speakers.
[24:33.940 --> 24:36.040]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, that is, is woefully wrong.
[24:36.320 --> 24:36.920]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, we had a hundred talks.
[24:36.920 --> 24:36.920]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[24:37.060 --> 24:37.760]  [SPEAKER_16]: I was probably sure it wasn't.
[24:37.760 --> 24:38.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: We had a hundred talks.
[24:39.360 --> 24:42.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: And some of those talks, well, a hundred scheduled talks.
[24:42.500 --> 24:46.080]  [SPEAKER_16]: And some of those talks had panels of, of three, four, even five people.
[24:46.560 --> 24:49.800]  [SPEAKER_16]: And then, of course, there's the unscheduled, uh, track as well.
[24:50.140 --> 24:52.760]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, so it's probably more like 150, at least.
[24:52.900 --> 24:53.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[24:53.120 --> 24:54.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: I, you know, I, I stand corrected.
[24:55.140 --> 24:57.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, there's just so much information there.
[24:57.360 --> 25:01.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, hope is much more than a passive experience where you're hearing people talking.
[25:01.540 --> 25:04.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: As you said, you get to meet other people and, and collaborate.
[25:04.840 --> 25:06.280]  [SPEAKER_12]: And there's all these workshops.
[25:06.480 --> 25:10.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: There'll be even more this year where you can actually get your hands on and, and work on stuff.
[25:11.020 --> 25:18.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: Whether with a soldering iron or the keyboard or art or whatever, there's a, there's always something to keep you busy at hope.
[25:18.720 --> 25:21.700]  [SPEAKER_12]: And at the 11th hope, there'll be more and more of that.
[25:22.560 --> 25:23.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, I'm sorry.
[25:23.560 --> 25:24.660]  [SPEAKER_16]: I accidentally dialed a six.
[25:25.820 --> 25:28.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: I don't know why I did that, but I love rotary phones.
[25:29.700 --> 25:30.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: As do we.
[25:30.640 --> 25:35.160]  [SPEAKER_01]: You, you are already on line six, Emmanuel, on our device here in the studio.
[25:35.420 --> 25:35.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, that must be why I did it.
[25:35.700 --> 25:35.860]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[25:36.340 --> 25:37.620]  [SPEAKER_01]: But there's no need to dial.
[25:37.760 --> 25:38.600]  [SPEAKER_01]: You're already connected.
[25:38.600 --> 25:45.800]  [SPEAKER_16]: Now, let me just ask you, uh, Mike and Rob and Jim, um, comparing, uh, Bernie, you're on a cell phone, right?
[25:46.280 --> 25:46.780]  [SPEAKER_16]: I am.
[25:46.960 --> 25:47.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay.
[25:47.360 --> 25:48.900]  [SPEAKER_16]: And, and I'm on a landline.
[25:49.020 --> 25:50.820]  [SPEAKER_16]: I'm using a 1937 phone.
[25:51.580 --> 25:51.920]  [SPEAKER_16]: All right.
[25:52.360 --> 25:53.500]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, don't lift it up.
[25:53.560 --> 25:54.300]  [SPEAKER_16]: It might fall apart.
[25:55.180 --> 25:55.540]  [SPEAKER_16]: 1937?
[25:56.700 --> 25:57.060]  Somehow.
[25:57.360 --> 25:57.520]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah.
[25:57.620 --> 25:57.780]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay.
[25:57.960 --> 26:03.300]  [SPEAKER_16]: And, and, and Kyle is on a 1950s phone, somewhere in the fifties.
[26:03.900 --> 26:06.780]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, how does our, how do our voices sound in comparison to each other?
[26:08.240 --> 26:08.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[26:08.940 --> 26:09.300]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[26:09.580 --> 26:10.780]  [SPEAKER_09]: Your, your voices sound good.
[26:11.100 --> 26:16.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, your voices, your voice, Emmanuel, I think sounds better than one would expect from an 80 year old piece of technology.
[26:16.800 --> 26:19.860]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, talking about the phone, I hope I'm talking about the phone.
[26:19.880 --> 26:20.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: Okay.
[26:20.440 --> 26:26.840]  [SPEAKER_09]: But, uh, but yeah, I mean, how many other household appliances keep working for, for that long, just as well as they did, uh, in, in their heyday?
[26:26.840 --> 26:30.960]  [SPEAKER_16]: I mean, even my wall doesn't stay fresh looking for that long.
[26:31.100 --> 26:32.260]  [SPEAKER_16]: You have to paint it every now and then.
[26:34.200 --> 26:34.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[26:34.680 --> 26:38.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: I, I don't stay that fresh looking myself, but, uh, Kyle, you're also sounding pretty good.
[26:38.460 --> 26:41.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, Bernie, you sound like you sound every week.
[26:41.340 --> 26:47.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, I don't, uh, you know, it's probably, I don't sound as well because I don't have a good carbon microphone in my cell phone like those two guys do.
[26:47.600 --> 26:50.400]  [SPEAKER_16]: You know, all you have to do, Bernie, is just bang it on the desk really hard.
[26:50.400 --> 26:50.920]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah, right.
[26:51.120 --> 26:51.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: That'll work better.
[26:52.140 --> 26:56.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wait, what kind of phones are, uh, you and Kyle using?
[26:56.220 --> 26:58.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: Kyle, what, what are these makes and models of these phones?
[26:58.800 --> 27:05.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, um, so this is a 500 that I'm speaking to you on and, um, it actually might be more towards the 60s.
[27:05.540 --> 27:07.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's a Northern Telecom handset.
[27:07.620 --> 27:08.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's got a little sticker on it.
[27:09.280 --> 27:12.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: Contains terrorist regulations governing the connection of customer-provided equipment.
[27:12.240 --> 27:13.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: So this was back when you were leasing them.
[27:13.720 --> 27:15.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: Hey, I remember that phone.
[27:15.280 --> 27:18.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: I bought that phone as a kid, uh, from RadioShack.
[27:18.360 --> 27:21.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: I don't know how I got a Northern Telecom phone in RadioShack, but they did sell them.
[27:21.340 --> 27:28.600]  [SPEAKER_16]: It was a big deal then to plug it in because, uh, people only had one phone and they had to tell the phone company if they got a second phone.
[27:28.940 --> 27:36.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, so when I got this one, uh, I was sort of like, am I going to get arrested now because I bought a second phone and I figured out how to plug it in myself.
[27:37.940 --> 27:38.840]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's very shameful.
[27:39.320 --> 27:42.360]  [SPEAKER_01]: I hope you report yourself to Verizon immediately.
[27:43.040 --> 27:45.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: Strangely, Kyle, your, your voice quality just went down a bit.
[27:45.400 --> 27:49.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: I think, uh, I think your 1960s phone might've lost its cell signal or something.
[27:50.140 --> 27:53.780]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, was that possibly from turning it around and looking at it?
[27:54.040 --> 27:55.500]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah, let's not manhandle the phones too much.
[27:55.820 --> 28:00.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, the, the phones do require talking into them, so...
[28:00.120 --> 28:00.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, sorry.
[28:00.980 --> 28:01.140]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[28:01.520 --> 28:02.940]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now that you're doing it, it's a lot better.
[28:02.940 --> 28:03.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, no.
[28:03.520 --> 28:03.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay.
[28:03.740 --> 28:03.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[28:04.080 --> 28:08.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, I was just looking at, to finish the thought, 302 is what a manual's on.
[28:08.080 --> 28:09.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's a Western electric though.
[28:09.320 --> 28:10.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's, um, much older.
[28:11.180 --> 28:13.000]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah, it's not a Western digital, Western electric.
[28:13.320 --> 28:14.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: I've made that mistake before.
[28:14.500 --> 28:16.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: This phone could be used to kill somebody.
[28:17.080 --> 28:18.160]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's how heavy the handset is.
[28:18.160 --> 28:20.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: The handset is not made of plastic.
[28:20.320 --> 28:20.960]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's made of metal.
[28:21.360 --> 28:25.880]  [SPEAKER_01]: I have to say though, if you want a weapon, the modern cell phone, which shatters on impact, might be better.
[28:26.480 --> 28:29.340]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, if it shatters on impact, it's not going to hurt anybody, is it?
[28:29.340 --> 28:31.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: This phone will not shatter on any impact.
[28:31.460 --> 28:33.400]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, but the glass shards, those are dangerous, man.
[28:35.160 --> 28:39.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: Anyway, listen, we were talking about, about, um, getting hacked and things like that.
[28:39.280 --> 28:51.700]  [SPEAKER_16]: This seems to have been a bad week for people, uh, whose initials are JC, um, because, uh, James Clapper, you might remember him as the, um, former, uh, head of, uh, national, uh, director of national intelligence and liar.
[28:51.960 --> 28:54.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: Remember, he lies in front of Congress.
[28:54.500 --> 28:58.320]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, and also, uh, Jeremy Corbyn, um, over in the UK.
[28:58.320 --> 29:01.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: They both found themselves hacked in, in, in one form or another.
[29:02.380 --> 29:07.900]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, a teenage hacker allegedly got into the email of, um, of, of James Clapper.
[29:08.000 --> 29:09.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: He goes by the nickname of Cracker.
[29:10.260 --> 29:17.760]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, and, uh, basically, uh, he was able to, uh, uh, break into a series of accounts, uh, linked to Clapper.
[29:17.900 --> 29:22.820]  [SPEAKER_16]: They include his home telephone and Internet, his personal email, his wife's Yahoo email account.
[29:23.460 --> 29:26.880]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, I don't know, how, how could somebody have gotten into so many different accounts?
[29:26.880 --> 29:27.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't know.
[29:27.540 --> 29:29.360]  [SPEAKER_09]: This is a fascinating cracker Clapper caper.
[29:32.020 --> 29:33.940]  [SPEAKER_16]: When you say it like that, it certainly is.
[29:34.700 --> 29:34.920]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[29:34.960 --> 29:43.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, either they all use the same password or once they got into the email, uh, account, they just use like the reset password on all the other services.
[29:43.580 --> 29:44.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know.
[29:44.220 --> 30:00.780]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, you know, whoever did this is a clever person because what they did was they changed the settings on Clapper's home telephone number, which, uh, is provided by Verizon Fios so that every call to Clapper would be forwarded to the free Palestine movement.
[30:01.860 --> 30:07.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, that's, um, uh, basically I said they did that, uh, because of opposition to U.S.
[30:07.080 --> 30:10.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: foreign policy and, and support to, uh, to Palestine.
[30:10.820 --> 30:13.380]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, so that's kind of, uh, kind of cool.
[30:14.740 --> 30:17.240]  [SPEAKER_01]: Maybe they just don't like liars, the person, I don't know.
[30:18.380 --> 30:19.360]  [SPEAKER_16]: That might be true as well.
[30:19.520 --> 30:21.480]  [SPEAKER_16]: I think, I think we all have a problem with liars.
[30:21.760 --> 30:28.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: Anyway, uh, as far as Jeremy, Jeremy Corbyn, uh, his, um, his Twitter account, he's, he's a labor leader, by the way, over in the UK.
[30:28.960 --> 30:37.800]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, uh, his, uh, Twitter account began, uh, tweeting a bizarre set of, uh, of, uh, of, of items and, and people realized that it wasn't actually him.
[30:38.660 --> 30:45.080]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, apparently what happened was, um, somebody left a computer locked on.
[30:45.360 --> 30:52.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: And, uh, as a result of that, his Twitter account was accessed and somebody posted all kinds of funny things.
[30:52.160 --> 30:55.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: Again, you know, it's, um, it's just a prank.
[30:55.200 --> 30:56.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's nothing really that serious.
[30:56.580 --> 31:03.740]  [SPEAKER_16]: And it's obvious three bizarre minutes on Sunday night, what they're saying the leader of the opposition's Twitter account was, was compromised.
[31:04.280 --> 31:08.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, you know, you have to look at this with a, with a bit of humor.
[31:08.380 --> 31:09.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, what real harm came from that?
[31:10.480 --> 31:14.460]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, somebody had some weird things said in their name and it was quickly corrected.
[31:15.320 --> 31:16.960]  [SPEAKER_09]: So he got, he got pence-statist.
[31:18.200 --> 31:18.820]  [SPEAKER_16]: Pretty much.
[31:19.120 --> 31:20.720]  [SPEAKER_09]: What were the weird things that were said?
[31:21.240 --> 31:22.620]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, you really want me to read these?
[31:22.800 --> 31:24.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: Because, uh, I do have a list of some of them.
[31:24.620 --> 31:25.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: Can we read them on the radio?
[31:25.900 --> 31:30.060]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, well, it starts with, here we go with exclamation points.
[31:30.760 --> 31:32.460]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, David Cameron is a pie.
[31:33.020 --> 31:34.540]  [SPEAKER_16]: I don't know why you'd say that.
[31:34.720 --> 31:35.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: A pie?
[31:35.820 --> 31:37.620]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's, that might be a British thing.
[31:37.840 --> 31:41.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: And there's a picture of, um, a picture of him with a, with a pie in his face.
[31:42.280 --> 31:42.540]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um.
[31:43.080 --> 31:43.720]  [SPEAKER_01]: All right.
[31:44.540 --> 31:44.980]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[31:45.200 --> 31:45.460]  [SPEAKER_01]: All right.
[31:45.540 --> 31:48.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: If it doesn't get any better, then I think we can stop there.
[31:48.620 --> 31:50.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh, there was, uh, expletive trident.
[31:51.240 --> 31:54.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: I think that's a reference to, uh, nuclear deterrence.
[31:56.000 --> 31:58.340]  [SPEAKER_01]: That could have been the, the labor leader himself though.
[31:58.340 --> 31:59.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah.
[31:59.260 --> 31:59.860]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's possible.
[32:00.060 --> 32:01.080]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, there's no way to know.
[32:01.680 --> 32:05.300]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, there's all kinds of weird things with British words that I don't understand.
[32:05.860 --> 32:18.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, I think if, uh, if people, if people gain accounts, uh, or gain access to accounts of people in a, in a, in a nation state leadership, uh, uh, status, you should really take good advantage of that opportunity.
[32:19.320 --> 32:22.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, uh, like, you know, like the guy that took over James Clapper's account.
[32:22.880 --> 32:24.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: He's the director of national intelligence.
[32:24.760 --> 32:27.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: That was, I think that was brilliant forwarding things to the free Palestine movement.
[32:28.100 --> 32:31.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: It, uh, it made a, it made a doubly good point.
[32:31.480 --> 32:39.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: Um, but I don't, I don't see where this hacking of, uh, Brennan's Twitter account in the UK was, uh, really making any, any useful point.
[32:40.420 --> 32:42.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, sometimes you don't have to make a point.
[32:42.340 --> 32:44.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: You just have to do something silly and ridiculous.
[32:44.920 --> 32:45.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah.
[32:45.440 --> 32:48.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: I think that also, that underlines that it is something silly and ridiculous.
[32:49.440 --> 32:55.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's just, you know, somebody having a prank and, uh, maybe somebody gets embarrassed as a result of that.
[32:55.100 --> 32:55.540]  [SPEAKER_16]: Hey, you know what?
[32:55.580 --> 32:56.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: They'll learn.
[32:56.260 --> 33:00.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: Don't leave a computer logged on in a public place that somebody else can get access to.
[33:00.480 --> 33:02.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: And, and, uh, and we move on.
[33:02.300 --> 33:04.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: We get more intelligent as, as a species.
[33:04.480 --> 33:04.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[33:04.840 --> 33:07.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, the old, the old respected prank in the scene is called pants status.
[33:07.560 --> 33:13.640]  [SPEAKER_09]: And that's, if you see someone, uh, left their Twitter logged in or their Facebook or something else, just post as them, their pants status.
[33:13.640 --> 33:14.640]  [SPEAKER_09]: Is pants status comfortable?
[33:14.900 --> 33:15.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: Pants status?
[33:15.780 --> 33:16.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[33:16.440 --> 33:19.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: And, uh, just know when something is a good idea.
[33:19.400 --> 33:20.380]  [SPEAKER_09]: Stop reaching for my phone, Mike.
[33:20.820 --> 33:25.480]  [SPEAKER_16]: Bernie, you posted something, uh, to our list this week, and you almost, you almost got me here.
[33:25.640 --> 33:27.120]  [SPEAKER_16]: You know, I thought, oh, wow, that's really dumb.
[33:27.420 --> 33:29.320]  [SPEAKER_16]: And I realized, no, no, it could possibly be this dumb.
[33:29.480 --> 33:37.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: But apparently, um, uh, the pranksters who, who wrote this fake news story said that there's something, um, uh, there's a company called First Response.
[33:37.100 --> 33:44.140]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's a pregnancy test company, and they have something new for those who need to know if they're expecting or not, a pregnancy test via Bluetooth.
[33:44.560 --> 33:47.360]  [SPEAKER_16]: A pregnancy test will be similar to one you can buy at any retail store.
[33:47.440 --> 33:50.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: The only difference is you won't see a plus or minus on it.
[33:50.160 --> 33:53.500]  [SPEAKER_16]: Instead, you'll receive the news on your iOS or Android device.
[33:53.500 --> 34:03.400]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh, use of this device is pretty simplistic, as you'll just need to download the First Response Pregnancy Pro app to the device, phone or tablet, and then, uh, well, it goes into some detail there.
[34:03.760 --> 34:05.460]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, yeah, come on, Bernie.
[34:05.680 --> 34:07.760]  [SPEAKER_16]: Who would be dumb enough to do something like this?
[34:07.960 --> 34:10.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hey, it's not April 1st, uh, so this is a real story.
[34:10.840 --> 34:13.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: And this company, First Response, they are a maker.
[34:13.140 --> 34:13.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: I checked the website.
[34:13.980 --> 34:15.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: They really do have this thing.
[34:15.520 --> 34:20.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is one of the things where you, you know, put your, if you're a female, you put your urine on a stick, and it has a plus or minus.
[34:20.600 --> 34:30.700]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, now it has a little Bluetooth transponder, transponder that communicates with the app on your smartphone, and it says, uh, uh, congratulations, pregnant, or not pregnant, or whatever.
[34:30.940 --> 34:39.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: But my concern is that, uh, you know, basically all these companies that write apps, or many of them, I know, uh, Mike knows a lot about this, because he's involved with mobile apps.
[34:40.020 --> 34:43.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: Um, a lot of these apps, they have access to the information that the app uses.
[34:43.860 --> 34:58.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, the, this, this first response company will, uh, presumably know, um, if, who is, who is pregnant or not pregnant, based on their phone information and, and what the app is telling the user.
[34:58.460 --> 35:00.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I think that's really over the top.
[35:00.660 --> 35:01.840]  [SPEAKER_09]: The instructions are unclear.
[35:01.880 --> 35:02.820]  [SPEAKER_09]: I just peed on my phone.
[35:02.820 --> 35:11.100]  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, it's unclear if the data in this case actually ever released the device or not.
[35:11.340 --> 35:19.540]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, it seems to me that this offers no advantage over not hooking it up to your cell phone.
[35:19.700 --> 35:24.880]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, other health metrics that you want to track over a longer term, like, uh,
[35:28.640 --> 35:40.640]  [SPEAKER_01]: a lot of people have a monitor something over time, you know, computerizing that and having it digital so you can analyze it over time.
[35:40.760 --> 35:42.280]  [SPEAKER_01]: That seems useful to me.
[35:42.480 --> 35:46.240]  [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, the privacy implications are real and really need to be considered.
[35:46.420 --> 35:49.960]  [SPEAKER_01]: But at least there's a, a benefit in the cost benefit trade off.
[35:50.120 --> 35:53.440]  [SPEAKER_01]: For this particular device, I really don't see the benefit.
[35:53.440 --> 36:04.820]  [SPEAKER_01]: Maybe if, if some of our users, uh, some of our listeners have used this sort of thing and can enlighten me, I'd love to hear it, uh, oth@2600.com or maybe we'll take calls in a bit.
[36:05.000 --> 36:06.820]  [SPEAKER_01]: But I just don't get it.
[36:07.000 --> 36:09.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: It just seems like it's more expensive and not any better.
[36:09.720 --> 36:09.860]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[36:09.940 --> 36:21.940]  [SPEAKER_09]: It seems like it's adding extra steps to the whole process when for many, many generations now we've had the technology to just have the thing you buy be the thing that tells you the result without looping your phone and some, uh, and some proprietary app into it.
[36:22.600 --> 36:32.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, it's 15 or $20 depending on where you buy it, which is, uh, uh, presumably more expensive than the, than just the little chemical stick that has a plus or minus sign on it.
[36:32.460 --> 36:33.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's not reusable, right?
[36:34.440 --> 36:34.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: No.
[36:35.980 --> 36:36.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: Wow.
[36:37.360 --> 36:48.840]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, but, uh, but you know, what this reminds me of is, okay, when we were, when, when, uh, some of us were younger, um, when you would buy a bottle of soda, sometimes they would have contests and you would look under the cap and it would say you won something.
[36:49.140 --> 36:52.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: But for a long time now, they haven't had that result under the cap.
[36:52.600 --> 37:00.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: They would just have a code number that you have to go put into some website and sign up for a thing to find out if it wins anything and it just adds extra steps to the process and makes it less fun.
[37:00.540 --> 37:03.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: And I think, uh, this is maybe making pregnancy testing less fun.
[37:03.700 --> 37:10.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, that's because a friend of mine figured out how to, how to see under the cap without buying the bottle and was able to find the winners every time in the store.
[37:10.740 --> 37:12.020]  [SPEAKER_09]: This is why we can't have nice things.
[37:12.300 --> 37:12.420]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah.
[37:12.480 --> 37:13.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's why I told him that.
[37:13.920 --> 37:21.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, but speaking of, of, of things though, that, uh, seem like a good idea at the time, but turn out probably not to be that good an idea.
[37:21.020 --> 37:36.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, this is a case that, um, that we recently, um, heard about from the Virginia circuit court judge, uh, last Thursday saying that a person, uh, does not need, uh, to provide a passcode to, uh, to unlock their phone for the police.
[37:36.620 --> 37:44.080]  [SPEAKER_16]: But the court also ruled that demanding a suspect to provide a fingerprint to unlock a phone would be constitutional.
[37:44.080 --> 37:53.520]  [SPEAKER_16]: So all these people that use their fingerprint as their security device, uh, their security, uh, uh, uh, method, because who else would have their fingerprint?
[37:53.920 --> 37:54.720]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, guess what?
[37:55.420 --> 38:02.900]  [SPEAKER_16]: Now that can be used, uh, to, to compromise your security on demand, uh, without violating your rights in any way.
[38:03.100 --> 38:10.140]  [SPEAKER_16]: Now it seems like something that we all could have figured out pretty easily at the beginning, but so many people opt for convenience over security.
[38:10.240 --> 38:11.360]  [SPEAKER_16]: And here's the latest example.
[38:11.360 --> 38:11.760]  [SPEAKER_16]: Right.
[38:11.860 --> 38:14.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: I should, uh, I should point out that, uh, it wasn't last Thursday.
[38:14.700 --> 38:16.640]  [SPEAKER_09]: This story is actually from, uh, the end of October.
[38:16.840 --> 38:21.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: So it would have been Thursday, October 29th, but, uh, the story is just, uh, make, been making the rounds this week.
[38:21.740 --> 38:23.620]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's, that's the story I'm looking at.
[38:23.700 --> 38:26.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: Oh yeah, look, that date is so tiny and faded.
[38:26.320 --> 38:26.840]  [SPEAKER_16]: You're right.
[38:26.960 --> 38:27.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay.
[38:27.380 --> 38:29.920]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's, that's one of the problems with, um, online news.
[38:30.100 --> 38:37.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: Sometimes they, they hide the date or they say this story is relevant and you read something that says a hurricane is coming to New York and it's dated three years ago.
[38:37.780 --> 38:39.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, uh, yeah, but thank you for.
[38:39.620 --> 38:50.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hey, Emmanuel, I, I, I, I read this story and what struck me is that, um, law enforcement and corporations, they're collecting our biometric data increasingly often.
[38:51.180 --> 39:05.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, you know, anyone who would just use their fingerprint or any other biometric information like, like maybe their, their face or their iris, you know, their eyeball picture, using that as a, as a, as a, as a way to protect your private info, it's, it's kind of dumb.
[39:06.160 --> 39:13.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, presumably when the police arrested this guy, I forget what he was arrested for, but it was, uh, you know, something serious, presumably.
[39:13.920 --> 39:18.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: They already got his fingerprints when, you know, when you get arrested, they fingerprint all your fingers.
[39:18.320 --> 39:19.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: So they already had his fingerprint.
[39:20.080 --> 39:27.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: And they're, I, I remember seeing talks at, at various hope, not, no, various hacker conferences around the world about how to take a fingerprint.
[39:27.760 --> 39:37.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: We've read stories about this, how to take a fingerprint and make a fake finger with it and access, uh, a fingerprint, uh, scanner to, to, to bypass it.
[39:38.080 --> 39:43.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: So presumably the police could have already done that if they had a half a clue, but maybe they're just too stupid or ignorant to know that.
[39:43.680 --> 39:51.740]  [SPEAKER_01]: Bernie, I think like a more technically capable police force that's like better at invading people's rights is not really something you should be asking for.
[39:52.700 --> 39:53.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay.
[39:53.100 --> 39:54.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, it's going to happen at some point.
[39:54.360 --> 39:54.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[39:54.700 --> 39:55.280]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, of course.
[39:55.280 --> 40:00.600]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, so I use my finger to unlock my phone so that I could look up the details of this story.
[40:00.820 --> 40:04.660]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, the, the man in question was charged with trying to strangle his girlfriend.
[40:05.120 --> 40:14.620]  [SPEAKER_01]: And, um, one thing that's interesting about my phone is that if you don't, you know, you, you can go no longer than three days between entering your password.
[40:14.820 --> 40:19.180]  [SPEAKER_01]: So if you just unlock it with your phone, with your finger, keep unlocking it with your finger.
[40:19.280 --> 40:20.820]  [SPEAKER_01]: Eventually it'll say you've done that too many times.
[40:20.820 --> 40:21.800]  [SPEAKER_01]: I need the password now.
[40:21.800 --> 40:27.220]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, so I wonder if there was some kind of, uh, rush to get this guy's finger.
[40:28.180 --> 40:34.620]  [SPEAKER_01]: Ah, apparently this, this person's device, uh, has a similar thing.
[40:34.780 --> 40:38.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: If you haven't used the phone for 48 hours, then you have to enter the password.
[40:38.640 --> 40:41.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: So I wonder, I don't know what I think about.
[40:41.480 --> 40:47.860]  [SPEAKER_16]: Can, can you, can you set that time, like say, uh, more than an hour require a password?
[40:48.160 --> 40:48.940]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know.
[40:49.600 --> 40:50.720]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm going to try it.
[40:51.080 --> 40:51.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: Keep talking.
[40:51.540 --> 40:52.700]  [SPEAKER_16]: I mean, that would be a worthwhile thing.
[40:53.260 --> 40:53.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[40:54.140 --> 41:03.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: I guess the moral of the story is if you have a smartphone that allows you to protect your information with more than one thing, uh, you know, it's the old security thing.
[41:03.140 --> 41:12.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's good to have something good to protect your account with something you have and with something that, you know, you have your fingerprint and presumably the police have your fingerprint when they fingerprint you.
[41:13.220 --> 41:15.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: Um, but they don't know what you know.
[41:16.140 --> 41:25.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: So if you could protect, I don't know, Mike, can you, is your smartphone, can you protect, uh, information with both, require both your fingerprint and a passcode or only one or the other?
[41:26.860 --> 41:36.160]  [SPEAKER_01]: You must have on my phone, you must have a password in order to use the fingerprint as a sort of backup thing in case the fingerprint fails, but you only get asked for one at a time.
[41:37.540 --> 41:40.620]  [SPEAKER_16]: I think the password should be what they ask you for every time.
[41:40.740 --> 41:44.840]  [SPEAKER_16]: And then the fingerprint should be, are you really the person that the password belongs to?
[41:45.960 --> 41:49.120]  [SPEAKER_16]: Every, every day or two as, as extra confirmation.
[41:50.700 --> 41:55.180]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, that's not the way mine works, but maybe, uh, maybe someone can make a different phone that works differently.
[41:55.180 --> 41:55.620]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know.
[41:55.780 --> 41:58.260]  [SPEAKER_01]: Maybe once a week, it should take a cheek swab from you and check the DNA.
[41:58.540 --> 42:01.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: I have to say it's super convenient to unlock your phone with your fingerprint.
[42:01.520 --> 42:06.420]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm sort of addicted to it, but it, but it is opening up a whole wide world of questions.
[42:06.620 --> 42:07.020]  [SPEAKER_09]: I agree.
[42:07.040 --> 42:09.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: It is super convenient to unlock my phone with your fingerprint.
[42:09.700 --> 42:17.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, it's, it's apparent at the very least that multiple types of accessing your, your, your devices are probably going to be important.
[42:18.320 --> 42:39.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, and at least, uh, uh, uh, some, uh, good system that, uh, each, each person just from being aware of, of, of how these systems can be exploited, um, will go a long way, um, in the future to, to keeping, um, these little, uh, computers that have so much about us,
[42:39.420 --> 42:46.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: um, stored in them, um, um, protected or at least, um, somewhat, uh, uh, somewhat private.
[42:47.240 --> 43:01.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, I had a story actually going back to the stuff we were talking about regarding things like, uh, this, uh, pregnancy kit that's now on your phone and, uh, all kinds of devices collecting stuff about us.
[43:02.770 --> 43:08.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, there was a story about the, um, I don't know if anybody heard this.
[43:08.480 --> 43:14.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's, it's called V2V, but this relates to cars, um, and autonomous vehicles particularly.
[43:14.900 --> 43:30.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: The Department of Transportation is, um, sort of finalizing some of the standards, um, for, what would equate to, like, a, uh, air traffic control for the roadway that's, um, more or less automated.
[43:31.760 --> 43:34.200]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, um, I'll just read a little bit.
[43:34.220 --> 43:39.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: I believe this, um, can be implemented on any kind of communications protocol.
[43:39.700 --> 43:45.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: They are, um, there is some buying going on for Spectrum, I believe, with, like, 5.9 gigahertz.
[43:45.920 --> 43:58.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, but just to explain what V2V is, it uses technology similar to Wi-Fi, a la 5.8, 5.9 gigahertz, allowing cars in close proximity to share information like speed and direction several times a second.
[43:58.440 --> 44:03.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: This allows the car to warn a driver before changing lanes about a hazard ahead, and so on.
[44:03.560 --> 44:08.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, some cars already come with a blind-spot detection, automatic braking to prevent some of the collisions, and it goes on and on and on.
[44:09.420 --> 44:17.860]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, um, these systems also would be able to communicate with infrastructure, like stoplights, letting drivers know how long until an upcoming light changes, and so on.
[44:18.460 --> 44:37.200]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, and there's a, uh, a quotation here, um, uh, from, uh, Jamie Kitman, the New York Automobile Magazine bureau chief, uh, agrees with life-saving technology, but believes it will be a number of years before issues like security against hacking and privacy are fully addressed.
[44:37.760 --> 44:43.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: Quotes, uh, uh, or says, uh, you are going to be able to be tracked like you've never been tracked before.
[44:43.660 --> 44:47.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: That has good uses, like charting traffic flows, Kitman said.
[44:47.780 --> 44:55.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: And then there's the issue that most of the data will be collected by private corporations, and they will seek to use that for their benefit.
[44:56.000 --> 44:56.520]  [SPEAKER_15]: Wow.
[44:56.520 --> 45:00.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, uh, there, there's some other, um, interesting characterizations.
[45:01.220 --> 45:10.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: Another article I read had, uh, uh, some, some terrible, uh, quotations from, uh, another, uh, CBS reporter, Chris Van Cleave.
[45:10.500 --> 45:14.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: He basically said, uh, there's one major hurdle, that's privacy.
[45:14.660 --> 45:16.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: How do you protect the cars against hacking?
[45:16.800 --> 45:21.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: And what about all the data that's now being collected by our ever smarter cars?
[45:21.140 --> 45:23.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, the hacking part is definitely a concern.
[45:23.480 --> 45:26.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: We don't want ISIS grabbing the wheel and driving us all to the caliphate.
[45:27.100 --> 45:28.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Wait a minute, hold on.
[45:28.340 --> 45:28.740]  [SPEAKER_16]: Why?
[45:28.900 --> 45:30.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: Why in God's name?
[45:30.100 --> 45:33.860]  [SPEAKER_16]: There's always hackers are the threat, and, and hackers are tied to ISIS.
[45:34.220 --> 45:42.920]  [SPEAKER_16]: Why, I mean, for God's sake, these corporations are gathering all this private information, and we're being tracked every foot that we step now, uh, and, and that's the threat that they point to.
[45:43.000 --> 45:46.280]  [SPEAKER_16]: Hackers are the ones that are going to figure it out and tell you where the privacy implications are.
[45:47.220 --> 45:48.380]  [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, police.
[45:49.380 --> 45:55.920]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, okay, Jim, yes, police, uh, uh, will be tracking us all the time and know where we are and how fast we're going.
[45:56.080 --> 46:01.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: And, and if we, if you just, you know, pass the light by like a fraction of a second, they'll have that too.
[46:02.140 --> 46:02.400]  [SPEAKER_05]: Right.
[46:02.580 --> 46:06.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: I don't know if I want to live in a world that's, that's, uh, where every movement is scrutinized like that.
[46:06.640 --> 46:09.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: I mean, I've already lived that world many times in fiction.
[46:09.280 --> 46:10.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: In some ways you already do.
[46:10.600 --> 46:15.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: There's a story in the Washington Post this week about the new way police are surveilling you, which is calculating your threat score.
[46:15.900 --> 46:21.060]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, basically like your credit score would be calculated based on a bunch of, uh, factors that no one will tell you all that much about.
[46:21.060 --> 46:24.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: You're, you now have a threat score if you're in, uh, Fresno, California.
[46:25.080 --> 46:25.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, apparently...
[46:25.680 --> 46:26.540]  [SPEAKER_09]: What is my threat score?
[46:26.720 --> 46:27.380]  [SPEAKER_09]: How do I find out?
[46:27.440 --> 46:28.280]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I wanted to find out too.
[46:28.400 --> 46:31.700]  [SPEAKER_01]: Is there, cause there, you can get your credit report like once a year or something.
[46:31.840 --> 46:33.060]  [SPEAKER_09]: Can I get my threat report?
[46:33.740 --> 46:37.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: Apparently you can't, but, uh, the software being used in Fresno is called Beware.
[46:38.180 --> 46:51.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, and, uh, the, the, the article opens up, while officers raced to a recent 911 call about a man threatening his ex-girlfriend, this is in the Washington Post, a police operator and headquarters consulted software that scoured the suspect's potential for violence the way a bank might run a credit report.
[46:51.700 --> 46:58.960]  [SPEAKER_09]: The program scoured billions of data points, including arrest reports, property records, commercial databases, deep web searches, and the man's social media postings.
[46:58.960 --> 47:03.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: It calculated his threat level as the highest of three color coded scores, a bright red warning.
[47:03.820 --> 47:04.180]  [SPEAKER_07]: Huh.
[47:04.400 --> 47:06.060]  [SPEAKER_09]: And it goes, it goes on like that.
[47:06.220 --> 47:14.840]  [SPEAKER_09]: And, uh, and of course this is, uh, closed software run by some company, uh, not with, without oversight, without, uh, without opening up how, what data they're using or how they're using it.
[47:15.260 --> 47:19.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: But, uh, but this article goes into some frightening detail about how much the police seem to really love it.
[47:20.800 --> 47:22.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: I still want to know my threat score.
[47:22.580 --> 47:23.820]  [SPEAKER_09]: I want to know your threat score too.
[47:23.920 --> 47:24.800]  [SPEAKER_09]: I work with you once a week.
[47:24.880 --> 47:25.020]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[47:25.120 --> 47:26.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: What if I'm a threat and you don't know it?
[47:26.440 --> 47:27.200]  [SPEAKER_15]: Well, we'll find out.
[47:27.760 --> 47:30.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: We'll ask people to tell us what Mike's threat score is.
[47:31.240 --> 47:31.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[47:32.200 --> 47:34.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's, um, it's fascinating.
[47:34.480 --> 47:38.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, with all of this stuff, uh, uh, just being rushed in.
[47:38.740 --> 47:45.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, really, uh, specifically this, uh, vehicle, uh, uh, tracking that is going to be a part of this.
[47:45.460 --> 47:49.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: They're really, really excited about it in, in the context of safety.
[47:49.540 --> 47:54.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: But, um, the rush into it kind of leaves a few questions.
[47:55.000 --> 47:59.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, it is being standardized, uh, through the Department of Transportation.
[47:59.860 --> 48:02.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: And essentially it can run on any kind of network.
[48:02.320 --> 48:08.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, um, it is that double-edged sword with these, these technologies.
[48:08.240 --> 48:14.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: Like, it's exciting to get, uh, new, uh, capabilities and features and all of that.
[48:15.000 --> 48:18.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: But this goes back to the core of something that we, we return to often.
[48:24.820 --> 48:30.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, um, and, uh, allow us to essentially be free.
[48:30.760 --> 48:35.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, um, anyway, it's, it's, uh, uh, something to follow.
[48:36.400 --> 48:36.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, uh...
[48:36.700 --> 48:38.880]  [SPEAKER_16]: V to V probably stands for vehicle to vehicle, right?
[48:39.060 --> 48:39.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: Right.
[48:39.220 --> 48:40.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, that's kind of the, the jargon they're using.
[48:41.120 --> 48:45.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: What it actually is, is, um, a vehicular ad hoc network.
[48:45.920 --> 48:50.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, um, they can be used, uh, on a variety of platforms.
[48:50.260 --> 48:52.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, uh, you know, LTE, WiMAX, all that.
[48:52.440 --> 48:54.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, this is something that we're gonna see.
[48:54.780 --> 49:01.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: And this is sort of building on some of the, the automatic features you're seeing in vehicles now.
[49:01.380 --> 49:10.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: But, uh, it's also sort of integrating the roadways, kind of in preparation for what we've been talking about a lot with these autonomous cars.
[49:10.640 --> 49:13.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: Like, uh, Google Car, we can go on and on.
[49:13.220 --> 49:18.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: There's, there's tons of areas of research, even the DARPA projects for autonomous vehicles way back.
[49:18.540 --> 49:23.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, it's, um, definitely, uh, interesting times, uh, in that realm.
[49:24.300 --> 49:27.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, because, uh, yeah, your car may be spying.
[49:27.880 --> 49:35.340]  [SPEAKER_16]: We're gonna see so many changes in the years ahead with autonomous vehicles driving all over the place, and drones delivering packages and doing God knows what else.
[49:35.720 --> 49:41.460]  [SPEAKER_16]: So, um, I'm glad we're here to, uh, kind of keep an eye on it and analyze it and come up with all the what ifs.
[49:42.160 --> 49:42.940]  [SPEAKER_09]: Oh, we try.
[49:43.200 --> 49:44.540]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, we have a little bit of time left.
[49:44.680 --> 49:46.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, what do you guys think about trying to take some phone calls?
[49:46.480 --> 49:50.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: If you're up for it, that's a lot of phone lines you're juggling, but let's see what happens.
[49:50.660 --> 49:52.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: I'm interested in, uh, trying this out.
[49:52.280 --> 49:58.240]  [SPEAKER_09]: If, uh, if you're listening and you'd like to, uh, tell us something, you can call us at 718-780-8888.
[49:58.800 --> 50:00.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: And, uh, not you.
[50:01.000 --> 50:01.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: Right.
[50:01.040 --> 50:05.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, but while we're, while we're waiting for that to happen, I'll, uh, read a piece of email a listener sent us.
[50:05.240 --> 50:16.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, Bob in Minneapolis writes, uh, define TSA as you will, as we were talking about last week, but all of the, all of the discussion about TSA and the methods, in my opinion, did not mention the most important thing, that is the failure of the TSA to stop certain items,
[50:16.700 --> 50:17.920]  [SPEAKER_09]: contraband, uh, through security.
[50:18.300 --> 50:19.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: In other words, they failed at security.
[50:20.420 --> 50:24.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, I understand this was not entirely the point of the conversation, but it is an interesting fact.
[50:24.080 --> 50:25.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, thank you, Bob, for that.
[50:25.980 --> 50:26.300]  [SPEAKER_09]: All right.
[50:26.340 --> 50:27.960]  [SPEAKER_09]: We have some callers now, so...
[50:27.960 --> 50:28.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: Excellent.
[50:28.520 --> 50:30.540]  [SPEAKER_01]: We'll press that one.
[50:30.700 --> 50:31.020]  [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[50:31.180 --> 50:31.600]  [SPEAKER_01]: You're on the air.
[50:32.800 --> 50:33.360]  [SPEAKER_15]: Hello, Tone.
[50:33.560 --> 50:34.280]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hello, Tone.
[50:34.840 --> 50:37.020]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, maybe this number is not a Tone.
[50:37.160 --> 50:37.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hello.
[50:39.160 --> 50:39.960]  [SPEAKER_11]: Oh, yes.
[50:40.180 --> 50:41.000]  [SPEAKER_11]: Thank you so much.
[50:41.240 --> 50:45.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: And, uh, you guys are always right about North Korea.
[50:45.340 --> 50:47.460]  [SPEAKER_11]: That, that guy, that place is crazy, man.
[50:47.560 --> 50:49.200]  [SPEAKER_11]: They set off that bomb, man.
[50:49.940 --> 50:54.060]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I want to thank you, uh, cause I used to give you a hard time.
[50:54.060 --> 50:54.940]  [SPEAKER_11]: But you're right.
[50:55.320 --> 50:57.320]  [SPEAKER_16]: We always are right about North Korea.
[50:57.680 --> 50:58.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: Thanks for that.
[50:58.240 --> 50:58.820]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's correct.
[50:59.500 --> 50:59.900]  [SPEAKER_11]: We try.
[51:00.000 --> 51:00.380]  [SPEAKER_11]: I admit it.
[51:00.480 --> 51:01.400]  [SPEAKER_11]: I admit it.
[51:01.540 --> 51:04.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: I'm trying to be mad enough to, uh, man up.
[51:04.260 --> 51:04.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: You know what I'm saying?
[51:05.660 --> 51:05.800]  Yeah.
[51:05.900 --> 51:06.880]  [SPEAKER_16]: Consider yourself man up.
[51:07.900 --> 51:08.400]  [SPEAKER_09]: All right.
[51:08.440 --> 51:08.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: Thank you.
[51:08.860 --> 51:09.700]  [SPEAKER_09]: Thank you very much.
[51:09.840 --> 51:10.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: Thank you.
[51:10.460 --> 51:15.280]  [SPEAKER_09]: Of course, by North Korea bomb, I assume he's talking about that film that, uh, came out when Sony got hacked, but...
[51:16.340 --> 51:16.860]  [SPEAKER_09]: All right.
[51:17.040 --> 51:18.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: But, uh, who else is out there?
[51:18.160 --> 51:18.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: All right.
[51:18.760 --> 51:20.520]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, this person is out there.
[51:20.660 --> 51:20.820]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hello.
[51:21.560 --> 51:21.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[51:22.080 --> 51:22.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hello.
[51:22.360 --> 51:22.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hello.
[51:22.580 --> 51:24.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: We're calling from the Bluetooth Wi-Fi.
[51:24.860 --> 51:28.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: I'd like to talk about the new technology about Bluetooth and Wi-Fi.
[51:29.400 --> 51:31.240]  [SPEAKER_02]: Um, we have...
[51:32.160 --> 51:32.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hello?
[51:32.960 --> 51:33.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hello.
[51:33.540 --> 51:34.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: Rebel, is that you?
[51:34.380 --> 51:35.100]  [SPEAKER_04]: Is this Rebel?
[51:36.060 --> 51:36.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yes.
[51:36.680 --> 51:37.000]  [SPEAKER_16]: Hell yeah.
[51:37.160 --> 51:37.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: Where is it, Daniel?
[51:37.980 --> 51:41.640]  [SPEAKER_16]: You know, people have been writing in asking how you are and where you are and what you've been up to.
[51:42.740 --> 51:45.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, I've been, you know, doing things.
[51:45.200 --> 51:49.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: I have, uh, you know, new computers and I, you know, uh, been playing around.
[51:49.280 --> 51:58.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: I got a smartphone and, you know, I call it the everything phone because, you know, you can just do everything with this, you know, with this Android, you know, uh, type of phone.
[51:58.760 --> 52:02.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: Um, you know, I, you know, barcode scanning and they're taking videos.
[52:02.940 --> 52:08.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: I sold all my video cameras and video cameras I have and I only use this phone now.
[52:08.620 --> 52:09.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: Mine can play music.
[52:10.680 --> 52:11.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: But that too.
[52:12.100 --> 52:13.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: But the thing is that it's too integrated.
[52:14.480 --> 52:18.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: So you can't like, do, I mean, everything's in one.
[52:18.340 --> 52:27.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: So you, if you want to record something and, you know, show something, you can't really, you know, that's the thing about everything being in one place.
[52:27.360 --> 52:30.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, you use a remote control and, you know.
[52:30.220 --> 52:35.000]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, well, thank you very much for, uh, for the info rebel.
[52:35.240 --> 52:41.000]  [SPEAKER_09]: And, uh, we'll, yeah, we, we, we always learn a lot, uh, when rebel calls that we do.
[52:41.000 --> 52:43.200]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, maybe we'll also learn from this caller.
[52:43.300 --> 52:43.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hello.
[52:44.760 --> 52:45.040]  [SPEAKER_03]: Hello.
[52:45.360 --> 52:45.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hi.
[52:46.740 --> 52:47.700]  [SPEAKER_03]: Hey, how's it going?
[52:47.940 --> 52:48.460]  [SPEAKER_01]: How are you?
[52:48.560 --> 52:49.180]  [SPEAKER_01]: What's on your mind?
[52:49.780 --> 52:51.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: I got a couple of questions.
[52:51.480 --> 53:00.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: Um, currently, um, in a Linux class and I'd like to kind of run off my Raspberry Pi too.
[53:00.660 --> 53:08.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: Is it possible to load, uh, Fedora, um, putty and then the, uh, VM player on it?
[53:08.080 --> 53:09.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: This sounds like a personal computer question.
[53:10.060 --> 53:10.240]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[53:10.240 --> 53:16.700]  [SPEAKER_09]: You might, you might want to hang out for an hour and, uh, listen to our, actually for about five minutes because our friends at the PC show will be coming in right after us.
[53:17.060 --> 53:23.160]  [SPEAKER_09]: And, uh, this sounds a lot more like a question for them, but, uh, but yeah, congratulations on taking a Linux class and playing with the Raspberry Pi.
[53:23.360 --> 53:25.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: I think both of these are noble pursuits.
[53:26.360 --> 53:26.680]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[53:26.820 --> 53:27.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: No, definitely.
[53:27.440 --> 53:28.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: So awesome.
[53:28.720 --> 53:30.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: Uh, love your guys' show and love the magazine.
[53:30.900 --> 53:31.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: So cool.
[53:31.380 --> 53:31.600]  [SPEAKER_03]: Thank you.
[53:31.760 --> 53:31.980]  [SPEAKER_01]: All right.
[53:32.120 --> 53:32.360]  [SPEAKER_01]: Thanks.
[53:32.580 --> 53:33.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: Sounds like a good project.
[53:33.780 --> 53:34.000]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[53:34.820 --> 53:37.040]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, we have this person on the line.
[53:37.160 --> 53:37.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hello.
[53:37.480 --> 53:37.840]  [SPEAKER_01]: How are you?
[53:40.520 --> 53:41.540]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, silent person.
[53:41.600 --> 53:42.660]  [SPEAKER_16]: Are you asking me how I am?
[53:42.720 --> 53:45.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I, you know, how are I, you can tell us.
[53:45.280 --> 53:45.740]  [SPEAKER_16]: It wasn't clear.
[53:46.000 --> 53:46.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: No.
[53:46.500 --> 53:47.380]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, thanks for asking.
[53:47.480 --> 53:49.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I'm glad to learn that.
[53:49.520 --> 53:49.600]  [SPEAKER_01]: How are you?
[53:49.600 --> 53:53.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, and I, we learned as much as the silent person was going to tell us.
[53:53.620 --> 53:55.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: So let's try maybe this person.
[53:55.800 --> 53:56.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hello.
[53:56.560 --> 53:56.880]  [SPEAKER_13]: How are you?
[53:57.080 --> 53:57.240]  [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah.
[53:57.360 --> 53:57.600]  [SPEAKER_13]: Hello.
[53:57.840 --> 53:58.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: Hi.
[53:58.460 --> 53:58.700]  [SPEAKER_13]: Okay.
[53:58.800 --> 54:02.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: About the telephone with the police trying to get your information.
[54:02.780 --> 54:05.680]  [SPEAKER_13]: Um, use your finger, but don't use the right one.
[54:06.420 --> 54:07.020]  [SPEAKER_13]: Have it set.
[54:07.180 --> 54:15.420]  [SPEAKER_13]: So if you use the wrong one twice, all your information will go up into the cloud and, uh, erase the tracks of putting it in the crowd, in the cloud.
[54:16.540 --> 54:25.920]  [SPEAKER_09]: That's, that's an interesting, there's actually something called a, uh, a duress code that some security systems have where if somebody is forcing you to put in your code, you instead put in a different one that alerts the system that something's wrong.
[54:26.360 --> 54:29.640]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, like I think home security systems and things like that have it.
[54:29.760 --> 54:31.240]  [SPEAKER_09]: So that, that would be an interesting equivalent.
[54:31.400 --> 54:34.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: Of course, the, the police in this town tend to get very angry when you present them the wrong finger.
[54:34.860 --> 54:40.280]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, yeah, so, uh, but you can blame them for breaking your phone.
[54:40.440 --> 54:43.300]  [SPEAKER_13]: You know, you have a fake blue screen of death on it.
[54:43.900 --> 54:50.560]  [SPEAKER_01]: You, yeah, you may want to consult with your lawyer before you, you know, destroy evidence, but, uh, or you may not want to consult with your lawyer.
[54:50.560 --> 54:50.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: You didn't do it, blame them.
[54:51.280 --> 54:51.460]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[54:52.060 --> 54:52.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: Take it easy.
[54:52.960 --> 54:53.980]  [SPEAKER_01]: Alright, thanks for the call.
[54:54.100 --> 54:57.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: And consider the awkward conversation you'll have with the home invader after entering the wrong code, uh, too.
[54:58.160 --> 54:59.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: So, uh, might not be worth it.
[55:00.140 --> 55:00.860]  [SPEAKER_16]: Oh, you know what.
[55:01.840 --> 55:04.740]  [SPEAKER_01]: Alright, uh, looks like we maybe have time for one more call.
[55:04.940 --> 55:06.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: Let's make it, uh, this one.
[55:06.480 --> 55:06.820]  [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[55:08.100 --> 55:08.840]  [SPEAKER_01]: You're on the air.
[55:09.900 --> 55:10.500]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, hello.
[55:10.740 --> 55:11.020]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hi.
[55:12.120 --> 55:13.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: Am I on the air?
[55:13.160 --> 55:13.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: You are.
[55:13.560 --> 55:14.220]  [SPEAKER_01]: What's on your mind?
[55:14.360 --> 55:14.700]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[55:15.220 --> 55:24.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: Just, uh, I wanted to, um, just say something to Emmanuel, um, and offer a little advice about his credit card, uh, the charge.
[55:24.480 --> 55:24.780]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, please.
[55:25.440 --> 55:33.780]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, um, first off, I think that you're on a high threat level right now, just because I, I don't know, you seem a little grumpy tonight, you know?
[55:33.960 --> 55:35.640]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, yeah, you know, it's been a rough week.
[55:35.640 --> 55:38.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's been a rough week, and it wasn't like it was a $2,000 train.
[55:39.580 --> 55:42.840]  [SPEAKER_04]: I mean, it was some kid in Brooklyn who got a train set, so...
[55:42.840 --> 55:46.940]  [SPEAKER_16]: So, you know, I just like to see the look on the kid's face when he got the train, and I was robbed of that.
[55:47.220 --> 55:48.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, how much did it cost?
[55:48.660 --> 55:48.980]  [SPEAKER_04]: Couldn't it be?
[55:49.000 --> 55:50.460]  [SPEAKER_04]: About $250, I think.
[55:50.720 --> 55:51.720]  [SPEAKER_04]: Wow, that's not bad.
[55:51.820 --> 55:52.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: That's a nice train set.
[55:52.540 --> 55:53.180]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's a good train.
[55:53.600 --> 55:55.380]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, and that's a really nice train set.
[55:55.600 --> 55:58.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: So, write that off on your taxes, but you've got to understand something.
[55:58.900 --> 56:00.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: They've got a 90-day window.
[56:00.840 --> 56:05.560]  [SPEAKER_04]: Now, I had a VoIP line that I canceled in August.
[56:06.080 --> 56:09.640]  [SPEAKER_04]: Now, the company, they keep billing me for this.
[56:09.840 --> 56:10.600]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know, $50.
[56:11.180 --> 56:14.540]  [SPEAKER_04]: And so, I went in my credit card statement, and I called up.
[56:15.160 --> 56:15.920]  [SPEAKER_04]: Nice fellow from...
[56:16.540 --> 56:19.700]  [SPEAKER_01]: All right, I think that sound means that's all the time we have.
[56:20.000 --> 56:20.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: Oh, okay.
[56:20.780 --> 56:22.160]  [SPEAKER_04]: Here's the credit card.
[56:22.440 --> 56:26.800]  [SPEAKER_04]: Thanks for the call.
[56:27.200 --> 56:27.740]  [SPEAKER_09]: You're welcome.
[56:29.440 --> 56:33.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: All right, yeah, that is about all the time we have, but this has been a fine episode.
[56:33.960 --> 56:35.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: Thank you, Emmanuel and Kyle.
[56:35.500 --> 56:36.700]  [SPEAKER_09]: Thank you, Emmanuel's rotary phone.
[56:38.140 --> 56:39.780]  [SPEAKER_09]: And that's what you guys send us email.
[56:39.960 --> 56:41.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: oth@2600.com.
[56:42.100 --> 56:44.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: And stay tuned for the personal computer show.
[56:44.900 --> 56:45.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: We're off the hook.
[56:45.660 --> 56:46.780]  [SPEAKER_09]: This is Brought to you by our friends.
[56:46.900 --> 56:47.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: Have a very good night.
[56:47.560 --> 56:51.640]  [SPEAKER_06]: The bright sun, who gave his life to save.
[56:51.860 --> 56:56.460]  [SPEAKER_06]: The slogan, that hovers between the headstone.
[56:56.660 --> 57:00.740]  [SPEAKER_06]: And her eyes, for they penetrate her grieving.
[57:19.950 --> 57:21.950]  [SPEAKER_07]: The new world.
[57:22.550 --> 57:23.190]  [SPEAKER_06]: The new world.
[57:23.190 --> 57:24.630]  [SPEAKER_06]: The boy and girl, that's all key.
[57:24.630 --> 57:26.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: In the U.S.
[57:27.130 --> 57:28.930]  [SPEAKER_06]: that only they can share.
[57:29.490 --> 57:31.470]  [SPEAKER_06]: In the U.S.
[57:31.970 --> 57:34.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: a love so strong it tears their hearts to sleep.
[57:35.370 --> 57:37.270]  [SPEAKER_06]: Through the fleeting hours of mourning.
[57:38.130 --> 57:39.350]  [SPEAKER_06]: A night in the camp.
[57:47.530 --> 57:48.710]  If you didn't care.
[57:51.850 --> 57:53.190]  [SPEAKER_10]: What happened to me?
[58:06.760 --> 58:08.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: Love is careless in it.
[58:09.220 --> 58:10.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: Swinging over, crossing.
[58:11.360 --> 58:13.860]  [SPEAKER_06]: Love descends on those defenseless.
[58:14.060 --> 58:16.260]  [SPEAKER_06]: Idiot love will spark the fusion.
[58:16.860 --> 58:18.260]  [SPEAKER_06]: Inspirations have I none.
[58:18.460 --> 58:20.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: Just a touch the flaming dove.
[58:21.160 --> 58:23.180]  [SPEAKER_06]: All of love is my love of love.
[58:23.400 --> 58:24.740]  [SPEAKER_06]: And love is not loving.
[58:33.600 --> 58:34.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: Loving.
[58:42.820 --> 58:43.640]  Loving.
[58:44.560 --> 58:44.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: Loving.
[58:44.680 --> 58:45.840]  [SPEAKER_06]: So love.
[58:46.260 --> 58:48.420]  [SPEAKER_06]: The priest, the tithes, the burden.
[58:49.020 --> 58:50.800]  [SPEAKER_06]: Told of love, love.
[58:51.180 --> 58:52.820]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now my God, I'm high.
[58:56.160 --> 58:57.800]  [SPEAKER_06]: Edging up my loneliness.
[58:57.840 --> 59:02.060]  [SPEAKER_06]: It falls by the blindness that surrounds him.
[59:08.360 --> 59:09.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: Loving.
[59:17.830 --> 59:18.650]  [SPEAKER_05]: Loving.
[59:38.870 --> 59:39.510]  [SPEAKER_05]: Loving.
[59:48.390 --> 59:49.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: The night is careless.
[59:54.340 --> 59:56.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: Love is careless in its choosing.
[59:57.220 --> 59:58.660]  [SPEAKER_06]: Sweeping over, crossing.
[59:58.880 --> 59:59.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: Baby.
[59:59.420 --> 01:00:01.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: Love descends on those defenseless.
[01:00:01.920 --> 01:00:04.020]  [SPEAKER_06]: Idiot love will spark the fusion.
[01:00:04.920 --> 01:00:06.260]  [SPEAKER_06]: Inspirations have I none.
[01:00:06.600 --> 01:00:08.160]  [SPEAKER_06]: Just a touch the flaming dove.
[01:00:08.160 --> 01:00:10.540]  [SPEAKER_06]: All I have is my love of love.
[01:00:10.680 --> 01:00:11.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: Love is not loving.
[01:00:16.490 --> 01:00:17.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: Love is not loving.
[01:00:25.820 --> 01:00:27.160]  [SPEAKER_06]: Love is not loving.
[01:00:36.300 --> 01:00:37.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: Love is not loving.
[01:00:44.230 --> 01:00:44.870]  [SPEAKER_05]: Loving.
[01:00:50.180 --> 01:00:50.780]  [SPEAKER_05]: Hmmm...
[01:00:50.780 --> 01:00:51.000]  [SPEAKER_05]: No.