Off The Hook - 2017-04-19

[00:17.440 --> 00:22.320]  [SPEAKER_07]: And you are listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:22.580 --> 00:30.320]  [SPEAKER_07]: The time is 8 o'clock, and it's a Wednesday night, so those two things together mean it's time for Off The Hook.
[00:35.580 --> 00:40.080]  [SPEAKER_05]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:41.020 --> 00:45.580]  [SPEAKER_05]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[00:46.260 --> 00:48.360]  [SPEAKER_05]: We couldn't get much worse.
[00:49.080 --> 00:50.900]  [SPEAKER_05]: But if they could, they would.
[00:51.160 --> 00:53.800]  [SPEAKER_05]: Bon dilly-bom for the best, expect the worst.
[00:54.500 --> 00:56.300]  [SPEAKER_05]: I hope that's understood.
[00:56.520 --> 00:57.360]  [SPEAKER_05]: Bon dilly-bom!
[01:54.680 --> 01:57.240]  [SPEAKER_07]: And the very good and paired by the program is Off The Hook.
[01:57.360 --> 01:59.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:00.320 --> 02:01.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: Hi there.
[02:01.320 --> 02:02.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: And Voltaire, welcome.
[02:02.650 --> 02:03.040]  [SPEAKER_00]: Good evening.
[02:05.400 --> 02:09.270]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's another interesting spring evening here in Brooklyn.
[02:10.120 --> 02:16.270]  [SPEAKER_07]: And we have a lot of things to cover tonight, even though we have a somewhat skeletal staff for various reasons.
[02:17.400 --> 02:22.610]  [SPEAKER_07]: We will make up for that with a lot to talk about, and hopefully we'll be able to take some listener phone calls a little bit later on.
[02:23.470 --> 02:31.740]  [SPEAKER_07]: But, you know, I wanted to start with something that I thought was particularly interesting, because this story came out yesterday, and wow, it sure hits home.
[02:31.740 --> 02:36.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: It hits home in a number of ways, because it's hitting a lot of us in our homes.
[02:36.460 --> 02:42.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: But basically, it's this amazing story that was on a motherboard, which is part of vice.com.
[02:42.360 --> 02:43.680]  [SPEAKER_07]: If you haven't read it, you really should.
[02:43.800 --> 02:45.960]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's entitled, Surveillance Starts at Home.
[02:46.360 --> 02:50.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: I'm just going to read you a few pieces of this article.
[02:51.100 --> 03:00.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's basically the story of a guy named John, who tapped out a simple text message to his wife in January of 2016 that said, I love you.
[03:00.290 --> 03:02.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: But that wasn't the only message that she saw.
[03:03.080 --> 03:06.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: Unbeknownst to John, his wife had bugged his smartphone.
[03:07.100 --> 03:07.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's right.
[03:08.040 --> 03:16.680]  [SPEAKER_07]: She was spying on John, eavesdropping on all of his text and multimedia messages, and tracking his every move through the device's GPS.
[03:16.700 --> 03:19.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: She was also stealing all of John's photos.
[03:19.900 --> 03:30.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: In one slightly blurred picture, John, who happens to be a police officer in a small town in the southwestern United States, is knelt over a subject who is face down on the curb.
[03:30.860 --> 03:34.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: And in another photograph, John is taking a selfie, wearing a dress shirt and a black tie.
[03:35.080 --> 03:42.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: A third picture shows an email exchange with Facebook's law enforcement help team, revealing that John was requesting data on a target of an investigation.
[03:42.860 --> 03:44.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: All of this, his wife was able to see.
[03:44.200 --> 03:56.920]  [SPEAKER_07]: These messages and pictures, including some of the couple's more intimate moments, were taken directly from John's cell phone by his wife, using a piece of consumer surveillance software made by an American company known as Retina X.
[03:57.380 --> 03:58.170]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's right.
[03:58.300 --> 03:59.350]  [SPEAKER_07]: Retina X.
[04:00.140 --> 04:04.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: And in a somewhat ironic twist, that software is called Phone Sheriff.
[04:04.580 --> 04:12.970]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, it seems no small number of people are willing to use this kind of technology on their partners, spouses, or even children.
[04:12.970 --> 04:13.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[04:14.320 --> 04:15.260]  [SPEAKER_07]: Spy on your kids.
[04:15.540 --> 04:19.480]  [SPEAKER_07]: In fact, they have something called Teen Shield.
[04:19.970 --> 04:20.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: They have Phone Sheriff.
[04:21.100 --> 04:24.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: Retina X also makes sniper, spy, teen shield.
[04:25.640 --> 04:26.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's unbelievable.
[04:27.040 --> 04:35.230]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, this all came to light thanks to the actions of a hacker, who was kind of fed up with all this.
[04:35.240 --> 04:42.700]  [SPEAKER_07]: This hacker calling themselves Leopard Boy, which, of course, is a reference to the 1995 cult film Hackers.
[04:42.700 --> 04:43.850]  [SPEAKER_07]: Did you know it was a cult film?
[04:43.980 --> 04:45.140]  [SPEAKER_07]: Hackers is a cult film.
[04:45.300 --> 04:48.600]  [SPEAKER_06]: No, I wasn't really aware that it had become a cult film.
[04:48.700 --> 04:50.260]  [SPEAKER_06]: When did it reach cult status?
[04:50.260 --> 04:50.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know.
[04:50.740 --> 04:51.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: No one informed me.
[04:51.500 --> 04:52.820]  [SPEAKER_06]: When we became a cult, that's when.
[04:53.170 --> 04:54.730]  [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, no, no, that makes sense.
[04:55.140 --> 04:55.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: That makes sense.
[04:56.140 --> 05:06.760]  [SPEAKER_07]: But regardless, okay, so what this Leopard Boy did was basically leak a lot of information about a couple of these companies.
[05:07.800 --> 05:14.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: Tens of thousands of accounts were provided to Motherboard.
[05:14.520 --> 05:18.260]  [SPEAKER_07]: Of course, it only represents a small slice of the consumer spyware market.
[05:19.620 --> 05:22.970]  [SPEAKER_07]: But, wow, that is simply an incredible story.
[05:23.300 --> 05:31.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: And joining us, joining us on the telephone right now is Lorenzo Franceschi Bighiari, which I hope I'm pronouncing right, the co-author of this piece.
[05:31.920 --> 05:33.260]  [SPEAKER_07]: Lorenzo, welcome to Off The Hook.
[05:34.340 --> 05:34.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hi, everyone.
[05:35.040 --> 05:35.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: Thanks for having me.
[05:35.620 --> 05:53.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: Wow, this is an incredible story because it tells such an interesting tale of something that I think we're all affected by, whether we know it or not, and that is surveillance by other individuals, or in many cases, I suppose, surveillance by ourselves towards other individuals.
[05:54.780 --> 05:57.000]  [SPEAKER_07]: Tell us how you got involved with this.
[05:57.940 --> 06:15.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, so the long story short is that two different hackers approached us, Asset Motherboard, me and my colleague, Joseph Cox, with data from two separate companies that essentially sell the same product, or actually several products.
[06:15.380 --> 06:24.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: The companies have different kind of products, but they all do the same, essentially, which is still, you know, siphon data off of your devices to someone else.
[06:25.100 --> 06:26.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: It could be your parents.
[06:26.920 --> 06:28.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: It could be your spouse.
[06:28.820 --> 06:31.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: But, you know, at the technological level, it's the same thing.
[06:31.120 --> 06:31.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's spyware.
[06:32.960 --> 06:45.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, yeah, so these two hackers broke into the servers of the two companies in an attempt to essentially expose what they think is, like, an unethical and despicable industry.
[06:46.660 --> 06:52.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: It really is, because people are reared into this by these companies.
[06:53.160 --> 06:59.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: They have certain marketing ploys to get people to feel paranoid and to buy these products, don't they?
[07:00.960 --> 07:05.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, we're going to have more about this in the next few days, because it's an ongoing series.
[07:05.160 --> 07:23.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: But basically, yeah, like, for example, Flexispy, one of the two companies that was breached, has long been known to have, like, some sort of, like, aggressive marketing campaigns, and even, like, tricks to increase their SEO in Google.
[07:23.950 --> 07:28.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, they try, as you said, like, they try to basically feel people paranoid.
[07:28.580 --> 07:31.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: They really, like, itch...
[07:32.100 --> 07:38.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: They really, like, try to get people, you know, to their worst instincts.
[07:38.820 --> 07:48.600]  [SPEAKER_02]: Like, they have an ad talking about the fact that your spouse could be cheating on you right now, and the only way to know is to essentially, like, know everything that's going on on their cell phone.
[07:48.600 --> 07:54.340]  [SPEAKER_07]: So, where do they play these ads or print these ads?
[07:54.960 --> 07:56.920]  [SPEAKER_07]: I'd like to know how they're getting people to do this.
[07:57.180 --> 08:04.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't remember exactly where Flexispy prints these ads, but, like, there's, you know, there's, like, thousands of these kind of companies.
[08:04.900 --> 08:13.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: One of them famously had an ad on their website that was basically, like, a picture of a woman with bruises on her face.
[08:13.800 --> 08:16.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: And so, it was, like, really, really gross.
[08:17.260 --> 08:17.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: And...
[08:17.900 --> 08:18.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: Wow.
[08:18.740 --> 08:19.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[08:19.960 --> 08:28.440]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, it sounds like they certainly are successful in catering to our worst fears and suspicions.
[08:29.100 --> 08:33.240]  [SPEAKER_07]: Can you give us an example of how pervasive this is?
[08:33.430 --> 08:40.710]  [SPEAKER_07]: How much information about somebody could be obtained by somebody else if they subscribe to one of these services?
[08:42.050 --> 08:53.430]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, well, I mean, if you get this installed on somebody's cell phone, like, for example, Retina X, Phone Share, the part that you mentioned earlier, it basically siphons...
[08:53.430 --> 08:56.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: You can siphon off all kinds of information for your cell phone.
[08:56.120 --> 09:05.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, we're talking about text messages, messages exchanged with iMessage, which is encrypted end-to-end, WhatsApp, same thing, supposedly encrypted end-to-end.
[09:05.450 --> 09:09.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: But, obviously, if you see the messages on the phone, that doesn't matter.
[09:09.160 --> 09:18.780]  [SPEAKER_07]: So, okay, so what you're saying is you can use something that claims it's encrypted and is encrypted, but if they're accessing your phone, obviously, they see it before it gets encrypted.
[09:18.780 --> 09:20.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: So, that doesn't do any good at all.
[09:21.020 --> 09:21.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, exactly.
[09:22.120 --> 09:43.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: And then, you know, email, email that you exchange through the app on your cell phone, call logs, you can intercept phone calls, so listen in on, you know, your partners or your children, phone calls, browsing history, basically everything, you know, everything you can imagine that you do on your cell phone these days,
[09:43.830 --> 09:47.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: which, you know, most people do, at this point, do everything on their cell phone.
[09:47.860 --> 09:49.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: You can type on up through these apps.
[09:49.920 --> 09:57.830]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, you know, one of the hackers that revealed this information says, it's impossible to know that you're the only one looking.
[09:58.040 --> 10:01.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: I want parents to think twice about unleashing this kind of stuff on their kids.
[10:01.840 --> 10:08.830]  [SPEAKER_07]: I want it to damage those spying mechanisms because I think it's almost entirely a bad category of software.
[10:09.860 --> 10:18.760]  [SPEAKER_07]: He basically, what Leopard Boy said, what Flexispy allows people to do is effing seedy and skin-crawlingly revolting.
[10:18.980 --> 10:26.220]  [SPEAKER_07]: I just want to applaud that sentiment because I can't think of a more descriptive way of categorizing that.
[10:26.340 --> 10:30.420]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's a horrible intrusion and something that so many people aren't aware of.
[10:30.420 --> 10:36.000]  [SPEAKER_07]: Is there any way that someone can tell if they have one of these applications running on their phones?
[10:36.960 --> 10:41.660]  [SPEAKER_02]: I think it depends what phone you have and what applications we're talking about.
[10:41.860 --> 10:45.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: But there are some ways that you can sort of protect yourself.
[10:46.280 --> 10:49.120]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, you could review like the apps that are installed on your phone.
[10:50.540 --> 11:11.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: If you're on Android, maybe, you know, maybe installing an antivirus app could help, although that's not, you know, so it's, you know, this is not like people shouldn't be paranoid because of this, but you should just be aware of the fact that if you're a partner or if someone basically has physical access to your cell phone,
[11:11.760 --> 11:13.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: they could install this.
[11:15.020 --> 11:15.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: Wow.
[11:15.680 --> 11:16.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, yeah.
[11:16.960 --> 11:30.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: Any kind of maybe behavioral differences that people could engage in as far as how they use their phones, for instance, maybe not texting everything that they're doing or communicating solely through one particular device?
[11:32.040 --> 11:43.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, that could help because if you, yeah, that's a good way to sort of confuse whoever is talking to you, for example, and potentially, like, cut some of the data that they get access to.
[11:45.260 --> 11:50.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, I mean, that's sort of, like, common sense or common OPSEC, operational security.
[11:50.480 --> 12:07.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, if you're, like, going to, like, an important meeting, maybe leave your cell phone behind or, you know, if, like, let's say that you are a victim of domestic abuse and you think that your partner who's abusing you is using this stuff on you and you're going to meet,
[12:07.420 --> 12:14.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: let's say, your lawyer, maybe turn off your cell phone or even, you know, don't leave it, don't take it to the room.
[12:16.500 --> 12:18.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: Stuff like that can help.
[12:19.780 --> 12:22.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's probably a good way to avoid some kind of surveillance.
[12:24.580 --> 12:25.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: Wow.
[12:25.300 --> 12:38.660]  [SPEAKER_07]: What would you say to people that feel they have to have this software in order to keep track of their kids to make sure they're not in danger or just to check up on somebody who they might not totally believe is telling the truth?
[12:39.720 --> 12:54.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, that's hard question to answer because I'm not a parent and, you know, I think the natural answer to that is that I grew up, you know, without having a cell phone for most of my childhood and I was fine and my parents were mostly fine.
[12:55.200 --> 13:00.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: So I think that, you know, the old-fashioned ways of checking on children can still work.
[13:00.440 --> 13:03.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: I understand that this is, you know, it's very tempting, right?
[13:03.580 --> 13:12.600]  [SPEAKER_02]: Like, now these children bring basically tracking devices on themselves all the time, so it's much easier than finding more creative ways to keep track on them.
[13:13.580 --> 13:31.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: But the point that the hacker made in that quote that you just read about when he said, like, you never know if you are the only one looking or listening in was that when you're using these apps and this kind of spyware, you're basically giving your children's data to somebody else,
[13:31.820 --> 13:37.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: you know, in this case, a company that might be or might not be trustworthy.
[13:37.020 --> 13:43.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, you should think about that before, you know, putting it down to your children.
[13:43.640 --> 13:53.720]  [SPEAKER_07]: And also, you know, it's kind of a wake-up call for people that might not realize just how much information about themselves is able to be gleaned from that device.
[13:53.720 --> 14:10.160]  [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, it should be pretty obvious since you're doing so much on this phone that if you have access to the actual phone, yeah, you can learn quite a bit about somebody, but it's possible people don't really think it through and they just assume it's a convenient thing to have with them at all times,
[14:10.180 --> 14:13.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: not realizing the potential negative implications of it.
[14:13.200 --> 14:26.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: But for now, what we know based on this, on these tools that are installed, stalkerware it's called, you need to have physical access to the phone at some point in order to install them.
[14:26.780 --> 14:31.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: Have you come across any examples of cases where you might not have to have physical access?
[14:32.600 --> 14:56.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, sorry, well, for this kind of stalkerware, so consumer spyware, we haven't seen that yet, but if there are like similar software that's sold to governments and intelligence agencies around the world, that is essentially the same thing, it's like basically a remote access tool that you install on somebody's device,
[14:56.060 --> 15:02.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: and those do use like exploits and more sophisticated ways to get into people's phones.
[15:03.040 --> 15:04.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: But, you know, those are more rare.
[15:04.820 --> 15:18.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: Those are supposed to be used against only like criminals and terrorists, so those are not like, probably are not on your phone, just because they're like, they don't get sold to random people, ordinary people.
[15:19.240 --> 15:31.780]  [SPEAKER_07]: But as these things become easier and easier to use and install, I'm worried that by default they will just be out there and you know, press a button and something can be added to your phone and you would never know it was out there.
[15:32.280 --> 15:38.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: What I think we're seeing here is a wake-up call to how much privacy can be lost just by one or two apps.
[15:40.220 --> 15:40.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, definitely.
[15:41.200 --> 15:51.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: I think that we should, as you said, we should be aware of the fact that the cell phones we use every day are essentially like hold the key to our entire existence and our entire self.
[15:52.920 --> 16:02.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: so we should be aware of the risks and without being paranoid but just be aware of what can be done and what we can do to avoid being spied on.
[16:03.180 --> 16:06.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: Lorenzo, have you talked to anybody who actually uses this software?
[16:07.900 --> 16:10.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, we spoke briefly to some of the customers.
[16:11.440 --> 16:29.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: We contacted them to verify the data and also like to try to understand what they use it and it was actually kind of surprising because a couple of them were like, oh yeah, I used it to monitor my boyfriend or girlfriend and one of them said it's normal and the other one said something like it works,
[16:29.260 --> 16:46.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: it was great and it was jarring because in the US it's illegal to do something like that so it's not just if we forget about the ethical issues it's just it's a crime to actually install this kind of app on your partner.
[16:46.680 --> 17:15.640]  [SPEAKER_06]: It sounds it almost goes back to the sorts of advertising and preying on people's anxieties as a selling point because these people that say it works or that they enjoyed it you know it was great and normal wow it's normal of course in the same breath they're sort of rationalizing someone looking at their own private information in other words it's it's these people would probably be really aghast
[17:15.640 --> 17:25.470]  [SPEAKER_06]: if someone Someone was revealed they'd invaded their privacy, but yet they're doing the same thing because it's presented in a very comfortable way, you know?
[17:25.580 --> 17:26.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's different.
[17:26.060 --> 17:28.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's different if you're doing it, if someone else is doing it to you.
[17:28.640 --> 17:30.060]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, we somehow rationalize.
[17:30.490 --> 17:42.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: If we think we have a right to know, given it's a partner, someone you've invested emotionally a lot of your time and your life in, you somehow are judge, jury, and executioner.
[17:42.900 --> 17:57.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: And it is the ease of use that allows you, in your certainty, in your mind, to take that next step and violate someone you care about, probably, violate their privacy in ways that are not loving.
[17:59.150 --> 17:59.710]  [SPEAKER_07]: Voltaire?
[17:59.710 --> 18:05.160]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think stories like this kind of validate very locked-down OSes, especially iOS.
[18:05.540 --> 18:15.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: A lot of people, when Microsoft introduced the trusted computing methods, people were complaining that it was like a Trojan horse to take away your privacy and your rights.
[18:15.710 --> 18:24.640]  [SPEAKER_00]: But I think that this kind of validates it because, like, even if you have local access, you should still have, be protected, like, privacy-wise.
[18:24.820 --> 18:29.180]  [SPEAKER_00]: And that's why I feel like more locked-down OSes will be better protected from this.
[18:29.600 --> 18:32.400]  [SPEAKER_07]: Lorenzo, what kind of response have you gotten to this story so far?
[18:34.180 --> 18:40.790]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, we've gotten a lot of, a lot of readers, like, the story's gotten a lot of attention.
[18:43.100 --> 18:50.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: Curiously or finally, the companies still haven't gotten back to us, which I think speaks a lot about...
[18:50.540 --> 18:50.790]  [SPEAKER_02]: Wow.
[18:51.270 --> 18:53.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: They haven't responded at all?
[18:53.880 --> 18:55.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: No, no response at all.
[18:56.640 --> 19:04.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, I mean, I think that, I mean, that's really strange because even, like, you know, even if you don't think that these companies...
[19:04.380 --> 19:11.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Even if you think that these companies should exist, like, they, you know, I guess they owe a response to their customers because they lost their data.
[19:12.100 --> 19:15.660]  [SPEAKER_02]: And for now, they haven't even, they haven't even said anything.
[19:15.660 --> 19:25.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: In fact, today, I was just talking to a customer support from Flexispy, and I asked them, what's up with the, you know, what's up with the service?
[19:25.840 --> 19:26.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Why is it not working?
[19:27.250 --> 19:29.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: And he said that, oh, we're just doing maintenance.
[19:29.600 --> 19:31.600]  [SPEAKER_02]: And I said, well, I heard that you guys were hacked.
[19:31.640 --> 19:33.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: And I was like, oh, no, that's only false news.
[19:34.140 --> 19:34.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: Fake news.
[19:34.790 --> 19:35.030]  [SPEAKER_07]: Wow.
[19:35.290 --> 19:35.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[19:36.100 --> 19:37.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's the answer to everything these days.
[19:37.820 --> 19:39.770]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, how many companies are there?
[19:39.840 --> 19:41.180]  [SPEAKER_07]: There are two companies we're talking about here?
[19:41.820 --> 19:54.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, here we're talking about two companies, but, like, there's no, as far as I know, there's no sense of, like, how many of these companies are out there, because it would be actually pretty easy to put, to, like, market one of these software.
[19:54.270 --> 20:01.530]  [SPEAKER_02]: You can just probably find some RAT remote access tools online and, you know, rebrand them and start selling them.
[20:01.840 --> 20:05.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, as far as you know, are these companies based in the United States or elsewhere?
[20:05.940 --> 20:06.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[20:06.540 --> 20:08.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: Retina X is based in the United States.
[20:08.820 --> 20:11.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: And to their credit, they don't market it.
[20:12.160 --> 20:15.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: They don't market their stuff to Jello spouses.
[20:15.640 --> 20:18.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: They, on their website, they only say that it is for parents.
[20:18.820 --> 20:23.290]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, in that case, you know, parents have a legal right to monitor their kids or for employers.
[20:23.580 --> 20:25.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: And same thing with employees.
[20:26.580 --> 20:30.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: There's, like, legally, there's, like, basically permission to do it.
[20:31.430 --> 20:33.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: But Flexispy is based in Thailand.
[20:33.700 --> 20:34.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, U.S.
[20:34.500 --> 20:35.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: laws don't apply to the company.
[20:36.000 --> 20:38.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, we wrote...
[20:38.480 --> 20:41.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: My colleague, Joseph Cox, wrote about another company that was based in Poland.
[20:42.300 --> 20:43.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, there's, like...
[20:43.580 --> 20:52.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, the fact that they are in one country or the other doesn't really matter at the end, because, like, I can buy them from anywhere and I can use them from anywhere.
[20:53.580 --> 20:54.140]  [SPEAKER_07]: Voltaire, go ahead.
[20:54.700 --> 21:02.040]  [SPEAKER_00]: I'm going to make a prediction that, within a year, these companies will have shut down but have opened up with the same employees with just using a different name.
[21:02.500 --> 21:04.340]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, it doesn't sound difficult to do that.
[21:04.460 --> 21:06.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, is that a common practice in this industry?
[21:06.560 --> 21:19.620]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, we saw that with Hacker Team and, like, some other, like, vulnerabilities, vendors to governments, that when they got hacked and had bad PR, they would just close that and then open up with a different name.
[21:21.120 --> 21:23.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, it's possible that that could happen, unfortunately.
[21:24.600 --> 21:31.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: No, Lorenzo, you have to head out pretty soon, but just a question concerning the legality of leaking all the information.
[21:32.140 --> 21:42.140]  [SPEAKER_07]: Are the hackers that did that, are they facing legal problems as a result of revealing this information about these companies that sell spying equipment to all the people?
[21:43.060 --> 22:01.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, I mean, the fact that they revealed it, I don't know if that's, like, by itself a crime, but the way that they obtained it is definitely, you know, it could definitely be framed as, you know, a violation of the Computer Foreign Abuse Act, so it's definitely,
[22:01.940 --> 22:08.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: like, you know, obviously you can't just break into somebody's servers and steal data, even if it's a company that you believe is doing something wrong.
[22:08.760 --> 22:11.700]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, have they revealed how they were able to get all this information?
[22:12.540 --> 22:14.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, they told us a little bit about it.
[22:14.700 --> 22:19.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: They didn't go too much into details, but it seemed like it was relatively easy.
[22:19.900 --> 22:22.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: They got into some server.
[22:22.080 --> 22:34.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, with Retinax, it was actually, like, they reverse engineered the APK, the Android app, and that way found some credentials and slowly, like, moved laterally and found other credentials.
[22:34.360 --> 22:42.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, the classic, they didn't use anything like zero days or any fancy technique, as far as we know.
[22:42.220 --> 22:56.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, as far as I'm concerned, this is one of the best hacks that I've been aware of in years, because not only did they target a company and get critical information, but they did it for a good reason.
[22:56.300 --> 23:02.480]  [SPEAKER_07]: They have something to say that's intelligent, and we have all learned a lot from their actions.
[23:02.480 --> 23:07.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: We've learned how vulnerable we are to spying by other people just like us.
[23:07.200 --> 23:14.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I hope that message isn't lost when the wrath of justice is turned upon one way or another.
[23:14.800 --> 23:18.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, Lorenzo, where are you going next with the story?
[23:18.380 --> 23:19.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: Are there any new developments?
[23:21.400 --> 23:24.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, we still have to go through some of the data.
[23:24.640 --> 23:28.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, we looked at most of it, but there's still some stories that will probably come out of it.
[23:29.040 --> 23:32.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: So we'll have some stories in the next few days, so stay tuned.
[23:33.360 --> 23:36.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay, we've been speaking with Lorenzo Franceschi Bighieri.
[23:37.320 --> 23:40.660]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I want to thank you so much for speaking with us.
[23:40.740 --> 23:43.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: And he writes for Motherboard Vice.
[23:43.740 --> 23:45.740]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I hope to read more about this.
[23:45.880 --> 23:46.660]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's a fascinating story.
[23:47.720 --> 23:48.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: Thank you.
[23:48.100 --> 23:49.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: Thanks for reading, and thanks for having me.
[23:49.500 --> 23:50.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: All right, take care.
[23:51.100 --> 23:56.440]  [SPEAKER_07]: And you can find that story by searching for Inside the Stalkerware Surveillance Market.
[23:57.540 --> 24:00.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: And that story is on motherboard.vice.com.
[24:01.460 --> 24:02.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't know.
[24:02.140 --> 24:04.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: Have any of us ever been victims of this?
[24:05.160 --> 24:06.240]  [SPEAKER_06]: Not that I know of.
[24:06.380 --> 24:07.340]  [SPEAKER_06]: Users of this?
[24:07.560 --> 24:08.020]  [SPEAKER_06]: No.
[24:09.040 --> 24:15.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, okay, you have to physically have access to a phone for this particular style of surveillance.
[24:15.100 --> 24:22.360]  [SPEAKER_07]: But I just find it's kind of a sad thing when you don't trust somebody enough where you have to do that.
[24:22.360 --> 24:26.780]  [SPEAKER_07]: Even if they are 100% innocent of anything you believe them to be doing.
[24:26.780 --> 24:32.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: Having an affair or, you know, running some kind of conspiracy racket or something.
[24:33.060 --> 24:34.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: And you've spied on them.
[24:34.800 --> 24:36.240]  [SPEAKER_07]: And you realize they haven't done anything.
[24:36.320 --> 24:37.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: You've read their mail and they're innocent.
[24:38.540 --> 24:41.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: What does that say for the trust level in the relationship?
[24:41.760 --> 24:44.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: I think already the damage has been done regardless of what you find.
[24:45.060 --> 24:50.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: And doesn't that give you a platform to just continue to watch until they trip up?
[24:50.040 --> 24:52.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: Until something does happen and you can say, aha!
[24:52.820 --> 24:54.660]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, because they're covering up, obviously.
[24:54.900 --> 24:57.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: They're hiding something and we're gonna find them one way or another.
[24:57.260 --> 24:59.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: And you just keep intensifying the search.
[24:59.340 --> 25:00.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's really, really unhealthy.
[25:00.580 --> 25:08.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: If you're thinking of installing this on your significant other, on your kids, whatever, think twice.
[25:09.020 --> 25:09.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: Think twice about that.
[25:10.040 --> 25:15.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: As Lorenzo said, there are old-fashioned ways of raising kids and keeping track of them.
[25:15.800 --> 25:20.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: You don't have to monitor their every movement and spy on them and invade their privacy.
[25:20.820 --> 25:22.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: Because they have privacy too.
[25:22.300 --> 25:29.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: And it's an unhealthy thing to show people in the beginning part of their life.
[25:29.200 --> 25:29.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: This is how...
[25:30.560 --> 25:32.440]  [SPEAKER_07]: This is normal, as one user said.
[25:32.500 --> 25:33.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's not normal.
[25:33.300 --> 25:33.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's wrong.
[25:33.820 --> 25:37.700]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, I mean, you should grow up to have some autonomy.
[25:37.800 --> 25:51.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's so surprising how normal every kid is becoming like sort of a walking lojack, you know, just in case the eventuality that little Bobby's gonna get jacked on the street or something.
[25:51.780 --> 26:04.640]  [SPEAKER_06]: We have to have all this tech in their pocket, look at everything they ever browse on their smartphone or whatever, all in your overbearing, in the name of your overbearing safety as a parent.
[26:04.800 --> 26:11.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: Granted, you do have an obligation to look out for your children's best interest, but there's other ways of doing it, especially the spouse stuff.
[26:11.440 --> 26:12.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: Have a conversation.
[26:12.560 --> 26:12.760]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yes.
[26:12.760 --> 26:16.440]  [SPEAKER_06]: If you are having trouble in your relationship, I don't think an app is gonna solve it.
[26:16.620 --> 26:18.500]  [SPEAKER_06]: And those things get lost in this stuff.
[26:18.500 --> 26:31.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: And every time you do something like this, every time you have monitoring devices on your kid or you're spying on your spouse, you're not doing something else, which could serve the same purpose of establishing trust and confirming suspicions and things like that.
[26:31.840 --> 26:42.700]  [SPEAKER_07]: You know, if you rely on a cell phone to make sure your kid is safe, then you're not relying on actual real-world examples of keeping your kid safe.
[26:42.700 --> 26:45.280]  [SPEAKER_07]: You're assuming the technology is going to step in and do it for you.
[26:45.480 --> 26:52.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: And not only is that wrong, it's unhealthy as far as actual relationship and conversation and things like that.
[26:52.620 --> 26:55.440]  [SPEAKER_07]: So it's a bad precedent to set.
[26:55.620 --> 27:00.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: You really need to think twice before doing something like this because it always has a price.
[27:00.800 --> 27:05.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: It always comes back and does something in return that you're not expecting.
[27:05.760 --> 27:06.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: Voltaire.
[27:06.140 --> 27:10.700]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think people need autonomy, especially children, to be able to make mistakes on their own.
[27:10.700 --> 27:11.200]  [SPEAKER_00]: Absolutely.
[27:11.680 --> 27:18.920]  [SPEAKER_00]: When you're under the fear of constantly being monitored, you're not going to be as creative or adventurous as anything that stifles a child's development.
[27:19.060 --> 27:36.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: Or if you're given a false sense of security with that and you're not in turn taught real things like street smarts and some of that knowledge that parents really are most well-equipped to pass on to their children, both the children and the parents, I think,
[27:36.860 --> 27:40.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: are at a disadvantage as a result of relying too heavily on this.
[27:40.580 --> 27:58.340]  [SPEAKER_07]: But what I really like about this story is it showed what hackers can do when they target something that is unfair and basically they brought this conversation to the mainstream and hurt these companies too, which deserve to be hurt because what they're doing is not right.
[27:58.340 --> 28:05.260]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I kind of liken this to what other hackers have done over the years, targeting things that are unfair.
[28:06.500 --> 28:11.440]  [SPEAKER_07]: We're getting a fair amount of flack for trying to get the Trump tax returns.
[28:12.140 --> 28:18.220]  [SPEAKER_07]: But that's another example of getting information to people who deserve to see that information.
[28:18.220 --> 28:21.460]  [SPEAKER_07]: Whether or not it's legal, that's another issue.
[28:21.800 --> 28:35.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: But to be able to use your desire for knowledge, your desire for truth, and your skills in getting that information in a positive way, that's something we should never discount.
[28:35.500 --> 28:37.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's something the hacker community is very, very good at.
[28:37.920 --> 28:39.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I think this is a shining example of it.
[28:39.880 --> 28:40.280]  [SPEAKER_07]: Voltaire?
[28:40.480 --> 28:56.620]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think another thing hackers or computer security experts can do is get involved with your local crypto party and try to reach out to battered women's shelters and places where they'll have abused spouses and they might not even know that they had this spyware on there.
[28:56.800 --> 28:56.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[28:57.740 --> 29:03.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: Abused spouses are definitely victims in these kinds of cases.
[29:03.680 --> 29:09.180]  [SPEAKER_07]: Many times the abuser is monitoring where his victim is going.
[29:09.180 --> 29:11.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: And they're not able to hide.
[29:11.300 --> 29:13.740]  [SPEAKER_07]: And they have no idea how this guy is always able to find them.
[29:13.840 --> 29:17.400]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, it's this spyware on the phone that was installed there.
[29:17.880 --> 29:23.440]  [SPEAKER_07]: And who knows what other kinds of features exist that we don't know about yet.
[29:23.440 --> 29:27.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: So it's very important that we understand how it works and that we expose it when we learn.
[29:27.460 --> 29:27.700]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[29:27.900 --> 29:32.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: And by sharing that, we can illustrate just that the information is there.
[29:33.280 --> 29:37.240]  [SPEAKER_06]: A little glimpse in how operationally it comes to be.
[29:37.240 --> 29:37.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: Mm-hmm.
[29:37.640 --> 29:39.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: Because there's a system that creates that stuff.
[29:39.980 --> 29:41.140]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's why it's stored.
[29:41.940 --> 29:56.280]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's why when we see it brought to light like this, it can be so instructive as to the actions of an entire, as we're finding out, industry that has matured in the last decade and beyond.
[29:56.280 --> 30:00.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, there's something kind of similar to this I'd also like to focus on this week.
[30:00.600 --> 30:03.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: And that's the story of the Shadow Brokers.
[30:03.760 --> 30:05.240]  [SPEAKER_07]: This story comes from the Intercept.
[30:05.820 --> 30:14.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, the Shadow Brokers were an entity previously confirmed by the Interceptor of leaked authentic malware that was used by the NSA to attack computers around the world.
[30:14.940 --> 30:24.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: They have released another cache of what appears to be extremely potent and previously unknown software capable of breaking into systems running Windows.
[30:24.540 --> 30:32.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: The software could give nearly anyone with sufficient technical knowledge the ability to wreak havoc on millions of Microsoft users.
[30:32.900 --> 30:52.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: The leak includes a litany of typically codenamed software implants with names like Odd Job, Zippy Beer, and Esty Modit, capable of breaking into, in some cases, seizing control of computers, running versions of the Windows operating system earlier than the most recent Windows 10.
[30:53.220 --> 30:59.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: And if you're running Windows 10, you know that there's a whole bunch of problems that that brings to the table that make it worth taking your chances on this.
[30:59.820 --> 31:06.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: The vulnerable Windows versions ran more than 65% of desktop computers surfing the web last month.
[31:06.140 --> 31:10.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's 65% of computers surfing the web run Windows of one sort or another.
[31:10.760 --> 31:20.700]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, the crown jewel of the implant collection appears to be a program named Fuzz Bunch, which essentially automates the deployment of NSA malware.
[31:21.360 --> 31:23.220]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, the NSA is behind all this.
[31:23.400 --> 31:36.460]  [SPEAKER_07]: They would allow a member of the agency's Tailored Access Operations Group, that is part of them, tailored access operations to more easily infect a target from their desk.
[31:36.840 --> 31:40.700]  [SPEAKER_06]: That group is the elite US hackers, I believe.
[31:41.200 --> 31:41.540]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[31:41.600 --> 31:43.260]  [SPEAKER_06]: Or at least that's a good place to start looking.
[31:43.460 --> 31:44.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: It doesn't get more elite than that.
[31:44.540 --> 31:45.620]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think that's what they call it, though.
[31:45.620 --> 32:00.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: According to security researcher and hacker Matthew Hickey, co-founder of HackerHouse, the significance of what's now publicly available, including zero-day attacks on previously undisclosed vulnerabilities, cannot be overstated.
[32:00.640 --> 32:08.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't think I've ever seen so many exploits and zero-day exploits released at one time in my entire life, he said via Twitter.
[32:09.320 --> 32:12.440]  [SPEAKER_07]: I have been involved in computer hacking and security for 20 years.
[32:13.420 --> 32:22.660]  [SPEAKER_07]: Affected computers will remain vulnerable until Microsoft releases patches for the zero-day vulnerabilities, and more crucially, until their owners then apply these patches.
[32:22.720 --> 32:24.240]  [SPEAKER_07]: We have an update on that, actually.
[32:24.760 --> 32:27.720]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, this is as big as it gets, says Hickey.
[32:27.820 --> 32:31.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: Nation-state attack tools are now in the hands of anyone who cares to download them.
[32:31.500 --> 32:34.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's literally a cyber weapon for hacking into computers.
[32:34.720 --> 32:37.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: People will be using these attacks for years to come.
[32:39.260 --> 32:57.240]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, basically, as of Saturday, April 15th, we're told that Microsoft has published a statement saying it had determined that most of the vulnerabilities were patched in a series of Windows updates released in March.
[32:57.320 --> 32:58.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, why is this interesting?
[32:58.100 --> 33:06.340]  [SPEAKER_07]: These updates that basically the security researchers who analyze the NSA tools apparently didn't install themselves.
[33:06.500 --> 33:17.560]  [SPEAKER_07]: But that means the exploits in question weren't actual zero-days, and that anyone running the most recent updates on software still supported by Microsoft is safe from the shadow brokers arsenal.
[33:17.840 --> 33:20.680]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's the timing of the patch in question that's interesting.
[33:20.680 --> 33:34.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: If Microsoft truly did not receive any help from the NSA, as it claims, the fact that it fixed a litany of holes vulnerable to secret NSA tools exactly a month before those tools were made public is an amazingly fortunate coincidence.
[33:35.060 --> 33:44.680]  [SPEAKER_07]: And also, Microsoft skipped the usual acknowledgments section with the patch, which typically nods to how they were informed of the threats fixed in a given update.
[33:44.680 --> 33:52.480]  [SPEAKER_07]: So, it's good news for users, but kind of strange how that came about in the first place.
[33:52.980 --> 34:00.840]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, adding to the intrigue is that Microsoft in February delayed their patch, and people were wondering about that, and now it looks like we have an answer.
[34:01.410 --> 34:03.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, I mean, you know, the evidence is there.
[34:04.100 --> 34:06.280]  [SPEAKER_07]: They must have been in communication about this.
[34:06.440 --> 34:19.740]  [SPEAKER_00]: If you look at, if you read Microsoft, I don't have the wording right in front of me, but their statement about it, it's sufficiently opaque that you could assume that even technically they weren't told, like, oh, the bug is such and such.
[34:20.390 --> 34:28.220]  [SPEAKER_00]: The NSA could have wrote to them and said, like, oh, you might want to double check, like, line 67 of your code or something, and, like, hinted at where they found it.
[34:28.600 --> 34:33.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: There's so many, also, so many caveats to what you just read.
[34:33.640 --> 34:45.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: Just the statement of all systems that were patched or whatever that jargon, however they worded it goes, it was, you know, under the...
[34:45.580 --> 34:52.270]  [SPEAKER_06]: You have to assume that those systems are still supported, and there's a lot of previous Windows systems that are just no longer supported.
[34:52.270 --> 34:56.020]  [SPEAKER_06]: And there's just a lot of attributes to the way Microsoft works.
[34:56.200 --> 35:00.560]  [SPEAKER_06]: Again, not, if you know the history, at all unfamiliar.
[35:01.080 --> 35:07.140]  [SPEAKER_06]: Perhaps even people who've used Windows in the past and been urged to go from one system to the other.
[35:07.140 --> 35:10.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: There's plenty of things to be desired, and it is...
[35:10.910 --> 35:22.740]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's unfortunate that they don't have any kind of support or enthusiast groups that are maintaining and finishing their work.
[35:22.850 --> 35:33.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: And as a result, a lot of Microsoft's operating systems just end up kind of unfinished, and they really just want to continue to sell newer stuff, whether it's that good or not.
[35:33.290 --> 35:36.540]  [SPEAKER_06]: And it's just, it's kind of disappointing coming from Seattle.
[35:36.750 --> 35:41.430]  [SPEAKER_07]: But you know the old saying, an operating system is never actually finished, only abandoned.
[35:42.190 --> 35:43.290]  [SPEAKER_07]: I thought that was art.
[35:43.750 --> 35:44.410]  [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, is it art?
[35:44.450 --> 35:45.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: I always mix the two up.
[35:47.120 --> 35:48.330]  [SPEAKER_07]: I'm sorry about that.
[35:48.390 --> 35:52.480]  [SPEAKER_07]: But we have some other things we want to get to, and I also want to get to listen to phone calls.
[35:52.750 --> 35:59.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: But here's an update from Kenneth, who wrote to us, or actually called us last week.
[35:59.080 --> 36:10.370]  [SPEAKER_07]: We spoke briefly about how FedEx has incorporated surveillance cameras into their line of deceit and betrayal to their employees, contractors, vendors, and anyone under their umbrella of business.
[36:10.370 --> 36:11.830]  [SPEAKER_07]: We know how he feels about this.
[36:12.450 --> 36:18.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I happen to be under this umbrella and find it unfair to work under this added stress.
[36:18.330 --> 36:25.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: Besides the everyday stress that comes with being a professional driver, there was little to no notice that this tyrannical order was in progress.
[36:25.040 --> 36:27.690]  [SPEAKER_07]: I now see I have to seek employment elsewhere because of this.
[36:27.890 --> 36:32.190]  [SPEAKER_07]: For the meantime, is there anything that can combat this new trying situation?
[36:32.560 --> 36:37.210]  [SPEAKER_07]: And what he's done is he's attached some pictures, which obviously we can't show you over the air.
[36:37.230 --> 36:40.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: I'm going to pass it around, though, to you guys.
[36:40.520 --> 36:44.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's called... the system is called the L-Y-T-X.
[36:44.060 --> 36:44.710]  [SPEAKER_07]: How do you pronounce that?
[36:45.040 --> 36:46.350]  [SPEAKER_07]: How do you pronounce that word?
[36:46.690 --> 36:47.890]  [SPEAKER_07]: L-Y-T-X.
[36:48.870 --> 36:52.150]  [SPEAKER_07]: DriveCam ER-SV2 Event Recorder.
[36:52.150 --> 36:54.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's what's put on the windshield.
[36:54.790 --> 37:00.690]  [SPEAKER_07]: And it basically monitors what the driver is doing.
[37:00.960 --> 37:04.350]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, their website says, Our goal is simple.
[37:04.650 --> 37:05.890]  [SPEAKER_07]: Saving lives.
[37:06.390 --> 37:07.410]  [SPEAKER_07]: I can argue with that.
[37:07.540 --> 37:15.650]  [SPEAKER_07]: DriveCam safety programs combine video-based coaching with predictive analytics to help you take action before a collision happens.
[37:15.810 --> 37:20.870]  [SPEAKER_07]: Our programs are proven to change driver behavior and driver rapid ROI.
[37:20.870 --> 37:21.250]  [SPEAKER_07]: ROI.
[37:21.600 --> 37:24.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: I'm not sure off the top of my head what ROI is.
[37:24.960 --> 37:26.230]  [SPEAKER_06]: Return on investment.
[37:26.480 --> 37:27.190]  [SPEAKER_07]: Is that what that is?
[37:27.370 --> 37:28.650]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't speak corporate.
[37:28.650 --> 37:35.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, that means like you can move so many packages per trip and you're returning the investment of whatever.
[37:35.290 --> 37:35.540]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know.
[37:35.560 --> 37:38.250]  [SPEAKER_07]: Saving you time, money, and most importantly, lives.
[37:38.250 --> 37:44.330]  [SPEAKER_07]: When you invest in your drivers, you'll be rewarded with sustained changes that can help lower your fleet's risk and improve productivity.
[37:44.330 --> 37:54.750]  [SPEAKER_07]: I can see how FedEx bought right into this, but I'm going to pass the picture around if you guys want to look at that, maybe analyze ways that it can be messed with by anybody or defeated.
[37:55.000 --> 37:59.250]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't really think there's much you can do here to prevent it.
[37:59.350 --> 38:01.770]  [SPEAKER_07]: Because obviously, if you tamper with it, they're going to know you're doing that.
[38:03.060 --> 38:08.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: As far as how much information it's capturing, that's something we can help with.
[38:08.120 --> 38:13.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: We can look into this particular model, ask our listeners, and find out.
[38:13.410 --> 38:17.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: Honestly, how long before these drivers are all replaced with machines?
[38:17.810 --> 38:19.810]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, talking about driverless trucks.
[38:20.190 --> 38:29.770]  [SPEAKER_07]: Driverless cars, that's scary enough, but to see an 18-wheel rig going down the highway 55 miles an hour with nobody driving, that's going to be a change in reality.
[38:30.240 --> 38:31.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: It really will be.
[38:31.500 --> 38:50.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I only got to that because I thought to myself, yeah, be better drivers, and then you won't have anything on the tape, but that's kind of a glib way to put it for somebody who's kind of at the mercy of this, and maybe they've been a fantastic driver and haven't had any incidents or anything.
[38:50.650 --> 38:52.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: Why then should they be subject to this?
[38:52.350 --> 38:53.560]  [SPEAKER_07]: But you have nothing to hide then, Kyle.
[38:53.730 --> 38:55.310]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's like the surveillance of your phone.
[38:55.310 --> 39:03.370]  [SPEAKER_07]: If you're not up to anything, if you're not doing anything wrong, why are you so resistant to being graded, being watched, being monitored?
[39:03.810 --> 39:05.270]  [SPEAKER_07]: Walter, did you have an answer for that?
[39:05.410 --> 39:11.190]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, because like the mobile phone spying story, this is a violation of dignity.
[39:11.410 --> 39:19.290]  [SPEAKER_00]: And I feel like it might be hard for an individual trucker to fight back against this, but I think this speaks to the importance of unions and collective action for stopping these.
[39:19.290 --> 39:20.690]  [SPEAKER_07]: And you better believe, truckers have dignity.
[39:21.100 --> 39:27.770]  [SPEAKER_07]: Not only do they know the rules of the road, they know their rights, they know their individual value.
[39:28.370 --> 39:31.790]  [SPEAKER_07]: And yeah, this is a slap in the face in many ways.
[39:32.190 --> 39:41.480]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I'm curious if there's any overhead for the installation and the monitoring or any of the systems connecting to the trucks.
[39:41.480 --> 39:52.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: Perhaps not, but you know, and maybe that's a worthy costs from a liability standpoint versus trucks going without and not being able to settle cases and so on.
[39:52.480 --> 39:53.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: Also, we'll keep in mind...
[39:53.750 --> 39:54.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: With evidence from a video.
[39:54.910 --> 39:59.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: We are going to be seeing more of this, not just in FedEx trucks, but in our own passenger cars.
[40:00.210 --> 40:07.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: Any time that you take the wheel of a vehicle, it's likely that you'll be monitored and judged and surveilled.
[40:07.250 --> 40:11.670]  [SPEAKER_07]: And there are a lot of people who will say, that's a good thing because we want to be able to prevent accidents.
[40:11.810 --> 40:13.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: But you know, there's a line.
[40:13.620 --> 40:22.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: There's a line that's crossed between staying safe and sacrificing some of your privacy and some of your rights.
[40:23.430 --> 40:27.270]  [SPEAKER_07]: And you know, I increasingly see that line being blurred.
[40:27.910 --> 40:35.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: So one day we will be finding ourselves driving down the road and every action will be recorded some place.
[40:36.020 --> 40:38.330]  [SPEAKER_07]: And it kind of makes you nervous.
[40:38.390 --> 40:43.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: And that nervousness can make you do things that you wouldn't do if you weren't nervous as well.
[40:43.270 --> 40:44.170]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's interesting too.
[40:44.250 --> 40:53.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't know if you've noticed this, but if you watch commercials on television, lately for some reason, accidents, car accidents have become funny.
[40:53.980 --> 41:00.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: All the insurance companies have these ads where you get back into a car and say, oh, I wasn't paying attention.
[41:00.600 --> 41:01.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: I had a drink.
[41:01.670 --> 41:02.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: I spilled coffee on me.
[41:02.580 --> 41:07.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: And you know, it's not, it's not a life threatening, horrible, negative thing.
[41:07.370 --> 41:08.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's funny.
[41:08.190 --> 41:09.000]  [SPEAKER_07]: It makes you laugh.
[41:09.150 --> 41:20.190]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I just find that's disturbing and it must be leading us into this environment where we feel we have to have technology step in and take care of us because we are so incompetent and we can't do it ourselves.
[41:20.390 --> 41:20.960]  [SPEAKER_06]: Think of the humor.
[41:21.120 --> 41:29.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's almost like poking fun at people who don't have assisted braking, which is an emerging technology that's pretty standard on a lot of new cars.
[41:29.290 --> 41:34.060]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, this is a system where it would notice something in front of your car and automatically break.
[41:34.250 --> 41:37.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: Um, also like lane position, all these kinds of new sensors.
[41:37.890 --> 41:40.370]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't mean to be difficult here, but sometimes you need to hit something.
[41:40.500 --> 41:47.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: Let's say you need to push a car out of the way because before it hits another car and you, you know, I know it doesn't happen often.
[41:47.120 --> 41:47.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's so true.
[41:47.580 --> 41:55.620]  [SPEAKER_06]: The Facebook killer, uh, the police had to ram him and you know, if the car had stopped the police car from ramming him, we would have a Facebook killer on the loose.
[41:55.750 --> 41:56.190]  [SPEAKER_06]: It was crazy.
[41:56.370 --> 41:56.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: Wow.
[41:56.580 --> 41:57.350]  [SPEAKER_07]: I didn't even know about that one.
[41:57.350 --> 41:57.690]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay.
[41:57.870 --> 41:58.060]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'm so worried.
[41:58.210 --> 41:59.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, no, it's terrifying.
[41:59.500 --> 42:00.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: Really not being sarcastic.
[42:01.020 --> 42:02.350]  [SPEAKER_07]: Don't get me started on the Facebook killer.
[42:02.450 --> 42:06.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: The only reason people cared about the Facebook killer was because he put it on Facebook.
[42:06.370 --> 42:10.810]  [SPEAKER_07]: If it had been just another random shooting in Ohio, nobody would have cared.
[42:10.810 --> 42:12.290]  [SPEAKER_07]: And that's, that's the real tragedy.
[42:12.480 --> 42:12.790]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay.
[42:12.930 --> 42:14.890]  [SPEAKER_07]: We could easily go on for hours about this.
[42:15.040 --> 42:17.950]  [SPEAKER_07]: Let's get into some listener mail and a listener phone calls.
[42:18.080 --> 42:23.710]  [SPEAKER_07]: Our phone number three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[42:23.930 --> 42:30.270]  [SPEAKER_07]: I can't memorize that number for some reason, but I have to keep looking at the, at the, at the wall three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[42:30.410 --> 42:32.850]  [SPEAKER_07]: We'll try to alternate between letters and phone calls.
[42:33.220 --> 42:34.190]  [SPEAKER_07]: Um, okay.
[42:34.350 --> 42:36.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: So, um, let's see what we have here.
[42:36.810 --> 42:38.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh, okay.
[42:38.580 --> 42:44.790]  [SPEAKER_07]: We had a lot of feedback, actually, for potential names of the next HOPE conference, which is our 12th conference.
[42:44.790 --> 42:46.350]  [SPEAKER_07]: We'll be taking place in 2018.
[42:47.910 --> 42:54.460]  [SPEAKER_07]: And we have this suggestion from XCVB.
[42:54.870 --> 42:58.230]  [SPEAKER_07]: I'm not sure if that's a name, but it's a good handle anyway.
[42:58.480 --> 42:58.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: Hi, guys.
[42:59.100 --> 42:59.750]  [SPEAKER_07]: Like your show.
[42:59.960 --> 43:01.390]  [SPEAKER_07]: I listen on the net in Florida.
[43:01.670 --> 43:06.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: Maybe HOPE 12 should be HOPE High Noon, like the Western movie, High Noon.
[43:06.850 --> 43:08.450]  [SPEAKER_07]: And it's 12 o'clock, 12 noon.
[43:08.580 --> 43:12.330]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, you know, HOPE, Noon HOPE.
[43:12.430 --> 43:12.850]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't know.
[43:13.310 --> 43:14.310]  [SPEAKER_07]: 12 is an interesting number.
[43:14.480 --> 43:15.810]  [SPEAKER_07]: It is a very interesting number.
[43:16.910 --> 43:17.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: Here's another.
[43:17.870 --> 43:20.950]  [SPEAKER_07]: I've just listened to last week's radio show.
[43:21.020 --> 43:22.710]  [SPEAKER_07]: I have a couple of ideas for the HOPE conference name.
[43:23.000 --> 43:27.150]  [SPEAKER_07]: I started thinking about hexadecimal and base 12, duodecimal.
[43:27.580 --> 43:28.350]  [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, boy.
[43:28.600 --> 43:32.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: But it turns out duodecimal is 12th in Latin.
[43:33.100 --> 43:36.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's T-W-E-L-V-T-H, which I think sounds better.
[43:37.810 --> 43:41.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: HOPE, duodecimal, or perhaps duodeca-HOPE.
[43:43.210 --> 43:44.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: But back to...
[43:44.860 --> 43:45.690]  [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, boy.
[43:45.800 --> 43:47.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: But back to hex.
[43:48.020 --> 43:50.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: How about HOPE 0X 0C?
[43:51.190 --> 43:53.230]  [SPEAKER_07]: Or this one, which is probably my favorite.
[43:53.460 --> 43:54.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: HOPE pound C.
[43:55.660 --> 43:56.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: Or just HOPE C.
[43:57.060 --> 43:58.560]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, the problem with HOPE C...
[43:58.560 --> 44:01.000]  [SPEAKER_07]: C means 100 in Roman numerals.
[44:01.000 --> 44:02.360]  [SPEAKER_07]: So, everyone's going to think it's the 100th conference.
[44:02.360 --> 44:05.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Because we did recently do some stuff with Roman numerals.
[44:05.190 --> 44:05.360]  [SPEAKER_06]: We did.
[44:05.710 --> 44:06.300]  [SPEAKER_06]: HOPE X.
[44:06.540 --> 44:11.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, and we continue to use that for at least our subdomain for the HOPE site.
[44:11.190 --> 44:15.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: But that doesn't necessarily have to be part of the theme or the title this year.
[44:15.540 --> 44:16.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay, but these are ideas.
[44:17.140 --> 44:19.020]  [SPEAKER_06]: Wouldn't dodeca... wouldn't it be dodeca, like dodecahedron?
[44:19.710 --> 44:20.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: It'd be dodeca-HOPE?
[44:20.620 --> 44:21.420]  [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, you're asking me.
[44:21.600 --> 44:21.980]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know.
[44:22.080 --> 44:24.170]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't know, but it rolls off the tongue.
[44:24.320 --> 44:26.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think it's the same root for those words.
[44:26.790 --> 44:31.290]  [SPEAKER_07]: There are probably many other variants that could be inspired by these initial suggestions.
[44:31.540 --> 44:31.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: So, absolutely.
[44:32.210 --> 44:32.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: These are good ideas.
[44:33.060 --> 44:34.210]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, no bad ideas.
[44:34.440 --> 44:36.190]  [SPEAKER_06]: All viable, and we really appreciate them.
[44:36.320 --> 44:38.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: Please send more, oth@2600.com.
[44:38.920 --> 44:39.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: Love the show.
[44:39.750 --> 44:41.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: It just gets better and better over the years.
[44:41.800 --> 44:42.190]  [SPEAKER_07]: Keep it up.
[44:42.340 --> 44:44.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: And thank you, Simon, from near London, UK.
[44:45.150 --> 44:46.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: And it is a problem.
[44:46.080 --> 44:47.250]  [SPEAKER_07]: We just keep getting better.
[44:47.300 --> 44:50.690]  [SPEAKER_07]: And the problem with that is that, you know, more is expected of us.
[44:50.770 --> 44:52.790]  [SPEAKER_07]: We need to sort of have a downward turn for a while.
[44:53.480 --> 44:56.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: So that we can just, you know, take it a little bit more easy.
[44:57.780 --> 45:01.730]  [SPEAKER_06]: Honestly, I'm not going to comment, because I can tend to be a bit self-deprecating.
[45:01.980 --> 45:06.800]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'm still learning, and I would say I'm no expert at all.
[45:06.960 --> 45:08.250]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay, we have a phone call here.
[45:08.340 --> 45:09.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: So let's take this phone call.
[45:10.020 --> 45:10.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: Good evening.
[45:10.500 --> 45:11.190]  [SPEAKER_07]: You're on Off The Hook.
[45:12.520 --> 45:13.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, hi.
[45:13.670 --> 45:14.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: This is Mike.
[45:15.060 --> 45:21.340]  [SPEAKER_01]: I work in the telematics industry, and I can share some insight on Lytics cameras.
[45:21.880 --> 45:23.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, that's how you say it, Lytics.
[45:24.060 --> 45:24.290]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay.
[45:24.670 --> 45:26.840]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, that's a camera company.
[45:27.020 --> 45:40.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, FedEx, what you'll eventually find out is that FedEx requires all the contractors to install and operate the cameras and submit all the data.
[45:40.300 --> 45:50.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: I just read one of the features in this, comprehensive coaching, real-time, in-vehicle, visual and audio alerts prompt drivers to notice and correct their behavior.
[45:50.770 --> 45:56.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: You're going to have a computer harassing you, not giving you instructions on where to go, like navigation, literally telling you you're a bad driver.
[45:56.900 --> 45:57.710]  [SPEAKER_07]: Sit up straight.
[45:58.190 --> 45:59.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: Keep your ass in the run.
[45:59.440 --> 45:59.960]  [SPEAKER_06]: No slouching.
[45:59.960 --> 46:14.440]  [SPEAKER_01]: And Lytics, as a value-added service, with tongue firmly planted in cheek, provides hourly coaching for fleet managers so that they can control their employees better.
[46:14.600 --> 46:19.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: How does the hourly coaching work?
[46:19.840 --> 46:28.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, no, what they do is they basically review all the video on a 24-7 basis.
[46:28.690 --> 46:32.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: And they decide what to let the fleet managers know has to be corrected.
[46:33.340 --> 46:33.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: Interesting.
[46:33.860 --> 46:40.420]  [SPEAKER_06]: So it's like this is a place for backseat drivers to capitalize on their hobby.
[46:40.920 --> 46:42.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's more windshield drivers, really.
[46:42.960 --> 46:44.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, the people that are critiquing it.
[46:44.380 --> 47:00.960]  [SPEAKER_06]: But they actually provide this as like a service or a consultancy outside of the managers for the entity who's hired them or bought this product, outside of their insight as to what they think their driver's behavior should be.
[47:01.120 --> 47:04.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's this company determining that based on their best practices.
[47:04.790 --> 47:05.800]  [SPEAKER_06]: Very interesting insight.
[47:06.420 --> 47:14.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, and the rub is that to keep your FedEx contractor agreement, you must install the cameras.
[47:14.380 --> 47:15.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: I'm a little confused.
[47:15.840 --> 47:16.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: Who is saying this?
[47:17.040 --> 47:17.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: FedEx is saying this?
[47:17.960 --> 47:19.290]  [SPEAKER_07]: Or someone is saying this to FedEx?
[47:20.020 --> 47:20.400]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, no.
[47:20.560 --> 47:27.000]  [SPEAKER_01]: FedEx contractors are required now to have these camera systems installed, which FedEx pays for it, you know, to be fair.
[47:27.460 --> 47:31.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: However, they get all the data feed, you know, 24-7.
[47:31.400 --> 47:43.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: So you're allowing them to see inside your contractor's truck and, you know, from the windshield out because it's really a liability play, you know, and they're trying to drive those insurance costs down the best they can.
[47:43.320 --> 47:45.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay, I guess I just wasn't aware FedEx has contractors.
[47:46.020 --> 47:47.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: I thought they were all FedEx employees to start with.
[47:48.250 --> 47:50.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, no, the vast majority are contractors.
[47:50.460 --> 47:53.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, this is like FedEx home delivery and stuff, too.
[47:53.230 --> 47:56.600]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think there's all these different products within FedEx.
[47:56.710 --> 48:00.560]  [SPEAKER_06]: And of course, they may have contractors as a third-party.
[48:00.650 --> 48:01.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: But that's interesting.
[48:01.210 --> 48:04.230]  [SPEAKER_06]: Does it send signal through the mobile network?
[48:04.440 --> 48:06.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: Is that how these things work functionally?
[48:06.620 --> 48:10.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: Or is it stored and then retrieved at a later time physically, maybe?
[48:10.040 --> 48:28.340]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, it's all transmitted directly to Letix's back end where they can view it and then give feedback to the fleets and, you know, and sell them different programs based on, you know, the accident level and some of the severity when you were talking before about lane departure.
[48:28.340 --> 48:42.940]  [SPEAKER_01]: So that's certainly those part of the value added services, because what they want to do is drive more behavior based training based on the video, you know, to the fleets, because it's the profit margin side.
[48:43.080 --> 48:43.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: Right, right, right.
[48:43.790 --> 48:44.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: Absolutely.
[48:44.360 --> 48:45.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: As a part of their business model.
[48:45.840 --> 48:52.960]  [SPEAKER_06]: But it's very interesting functionally, because that actually was one of our main questions when a listener wrote in about this.
[48:53.540 --> 49:11.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: And in fact, if that device is out of range, or otherwise unable to get signal, you know, because of the jammer that's on your dashboard, or whatever you're doing to disrupt cellular communications, that would potentially eliminate this thing from communicating with that company.
[49:11.100 --> 49:23.480]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, the reason why FedEx switched to a contractor model is to make it harder for unions to organize and they're saying, like, oh, well, we're not your employer, you're employed to these contractors, so you can't unionize against us.
[49:23.600 --> 49:32.920]  [SPEAKER_00]: But I think the fact that they're able to say, and require these cameras, like, shows that they are, in fact, their employers, just like an obfuscation method.
[49:33.340 --> 49:34.880]  [SPEAKER_00]: And we see the same thing with Uber.
[49:35.480 --> 49:38.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, yeah, in reality, that's exactly where it goes.
[49:38.290 --> 49:41.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: And just about two days ago, the U.S.
[49:41.300 --> 49:55.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: Postal Service requires all of their contractors to install one specific 24-7 trailer tracking system, and they have to sign off that they give up all their rights to the data.
[49:55.320 --> 49:55.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: Wow.
[49:56.150 --> 49:57.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's really interesting.
[49:57.460 --> 49:58.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: Thanks so much for your insight on this.
[49:59.820 --> 50:00.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: Anytime.
[50:00.440 --> 50:01.250]  [SPEAKER_07]: All right, take care.
[50:01.650 --> 50:06.290]  [SPEAKER_07]: And hopefully we can get in a couple more phone calls, 347-335-0818.
[50:06.290 --> 50:10.730]  [SPEAKER_07]: We have more suggestions on names for the next conference.
[50:10.730 --> 50:15.340]  [SPEAKER_07]: I was listening the other day to Off The Hook, heard you guys were looking for some suggestions for the next Hope Conference.
[50:15.440 --> 50:18.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: My name suggestion is, get ready, In Hope We Trust.
[50:19.580 --> 50:20.230]  [SPEAKER_07]: I like it.
[50:20.480 --> 50:20.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay.
[50:21.060 --> 50:21.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: In Hope We Trust.
[50:21.960 --> 50:22.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's a phrase.
[50:23.000 --> 50:27.150]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's not really a name, but we have to think outside the box.
[50:27.820 --> 50:37.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: I came up with this name because we are all hackers who live on this planet, and will speak for yourself, and come together to fight for the ones without a voice or to amplify their voice.
[50:37.520 --> 50:43.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: Every two years, we get together in the summer to present ideas or make others aware of what is happening in a different part of the world.
[50:43.940 --> 50:47.770]  [SPEAKER_07]: I attended my first Hope Conference in 2016, the most recent one.
[50:48.060 --> 50:56.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: And while it was a very hot weekend, I thoroughly enjoyed seeing the items for sale, workshops, and a community accepting of everyone, regardless of skill set.
[50:57.060 --> 51:00.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: Thank you for all your hard work in allowing everyone's voice to be heard.
[51:00.080 --> 51:00.790]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's signed, Reva.
[51:00.940 --> 51:02.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: Reva, thank you so much for that great letter.
[51:03.020 --> 51:05.190]  [SPEAKER_07]: And we will definitely take that into consideration.
[51:05.580 --> 51:07.150]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's a good idea, In Hope We Trust.
[51:07.620 --> 51:08.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: Let's take another phone call.
[51:08.650 --> 51:08.920]  [SPEAKER_07]: Good evening.
[51:09.020 --> 51:09.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: You're on Off The Hook.
[51:09.770 --> 51:10.300]  [SPEAKER_03]: Good evening.
[51:10.380 --> 51:11.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: I have a question about Fios.
[51:12.150 --> 51:12.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: Maybe you can help me?
[51:13.120 --> 51:14.600]  [SPEAKER_06]: We can try, but not experts.
[51:14.880 --> 51:16.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, and I don't think we have very much experience.
[51:16.520 --> 51:17.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: Maybe you can tell us how it's going for you.
[51:18.100 --> 51:22.770]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, I have a family member that just has a regular phone in the house, and they get a threatening...
[51:22.770 --> 51:23.300]  [SPEAKER_03]: Not threatening.
[51:23.400 --> 51:30.210]  [SPEAKER_03]: They say Verizon's threatening that the service will be cut off at the end of May, if they don't change to Fios.
[51:31.100 --> 51:31.750]  [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, yes.
[51:31.840 --> 51:46.710]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, I know Verizon is trying to get people to drop their copper lines and sign on to Fios, which is, in my opinion, is not nearly as resilient to storms and power outages and things like that.
[51:46.940 --> 51:52.730]  [SPEAKER_07]: They are putting pressure on, but I don't think they can force you to switch over.
[51:52.840 --> 51:53.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: Is that what they're implying?
[51:53.600 --> 51:54.170]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yes.
[51:54.400 --> 52:06.500]  [SPEAKER_03]: After May 31st of 2017, if you don't do Fios, your phone service could be interrupted, and the only phone call you'd be able to make on your copper line is 911-004 operator.
[52:06.620 --> 52:09.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, I say call their bluff, because they're saying it could be.
[52:09.790 --> 52:11.290]  [SPEAKER_07]: It could be interrupted.
[52:11.400 --> 52:19.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: What they're basically saying is that, well, we might just take our sweet-ass time getting over there to fix it, and you might be inconvenient.
[52:19.940 --> 52:22.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: You know, the old leaning on somebody to get them to do what you want.
[52:23.040 --> 52:24.400]  [SPEAKER_07]: I would not fall for it.
[52:24.460 --> 52:27.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: I would hold on to that copper line, because there is a lot of good in that.
[52:28.000 --> 52:28.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: Right, right.
[52:28.560 --> 52:28.770]  [SPEAKER_03]: I know.
[52:29.040 --> 52:35.500]  [SPEAKER_03]: Then my neighbor switched, and they sent them a battery pack with 12D batteries for a backup system.
[52:35.670 --> 52:36.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: Right.
[52:37.540 --> 52:38.230]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's terrible.
[52:38.500 --> 52:42.540]  [SPEAKER_06]: And it's really interesting to note that this is much cheaper for them to operate.
[52:42.750 --> 53:01.540]  [SPEAKER_06]: It is in their interest to not invest in the copper system, because it's much costlier to maintain than some of the current technologies that is powering it, hiring people to work on it, versus what you can fit through modern communication mediums like fiber optics.
[53:01.670 --> 53:05.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's interesting that battery pack, that is your backup for when you lose power.
[53:06.170 --> 53:08.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: When that runs out, you run out.
[53:08.210 --> 53:15.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: You don't have the ability to make phone calls anymore, whereas now the massive battery backup is located in your central office.
[53:15.580 --> 53:27.420]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, if you know where the central office in question is, I suggest going down and visiting them and saying, hey, do you have any plans to take the switch out so that the battery back up?
[53:27.480 --> 53:28.710]  [SPEAKER_07]: Are you guys going to be losing that?
[53:28.920 --> 53:35.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: If they say, yeah, we're going to demolish the building tomorrow, and it's not even going to be here, then okay, maybe what they're saying makes a bit of sense.
[53:35.120 --> 53:42.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: But if it's still going to be there, and I believe it will be, then that copper line is still going to have backup power when you lose power.
[53:42.900 --> 53:49.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: You used to give out a number years ago to call up to see where your, I don't know, the phone company is locally?
[53:49.710 --> 53:50.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yes.
[53:50.580 --> 53:54.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: Basically, the suffix of 9901 usually works in the New York area.
[53:54.800 --> 53:58.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: So if you dial your exchange, for instance, our exchange is 335.
[53:58.980 --> 54:03.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: You have to dial the area code now, so we'd have to dial 347-335-9901.
[54:04.080 --> 54:05.210]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, I'm not sure that works.
[54:05.480 --> 54:09.730]  [SPEAKER_07]: Newer exchanges, they actually sometimes assign those numbers to customers, which is a stupid thing to do.
[54:09.900 --> 54:20.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: But many times what you'll hear is you'll hear a switchman who made a recording in the central office saying, hey, this is the 335 exchange serving this part of Brooklyn, et cetera, et cetera.
[54:20.560 --> 54:23.960]  [SPEAKER_07]: They're really humorous to listen to, and they'll tell you what kind of switch is being used.
[54:24.270 --> 54:24.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: Very good.
[54:24.920 --> 54:43.560]  [SPEAKER_06]: One other thing to keep in mind about that wording is that it is that threshold of individuals that keep the costs to maintain that switch at least at zero or not losing too much money.
[54:43.730 --> 54:52.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: So by insinuating it's going to go away when, in fact, it won't if people still use it, they can move people slowly.
[54:52.040 --> 55:01.920]  [SPEAKER_06]: And that kind of goes into what Emmanuel was saying about, yeah, we're going to take our time because it's in their interest to get as few people running it as possible so they can just shut it down and no one will complain.
[55:02.480 --> 55:02.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yes.
[55:02.710 --> 55:03.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, Terry, do you have a final comment on this?
[55:03.880 --> 55:07.250]  [SPEAKER_00]: Does that number work for cell phones or just landline?
[55:07.360 --> 55:09.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: That number does not, as far as I know, does not work for cell phones.
[55:10.730 --> 55:11.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: It would be nice if it did.
[55:11.960 --> 55:22.290]  [SPEAKER_07]: They tell you what... but the thing is with portability, cell phone exchange no longer defines the company that owns, that runs... any company can have any exchange now, basically.
[55:23.340 --> 55:24.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: Sir, does that answer all your questions?
[55:25.320 --> 55:29.170]  [SPEAKER_03]: If you switch to a different phone company, does it go through Fires or the Kappa line?
[55:29.170 --> 55:34.710]  [SPEAKER_07]: If you switch to a different company, well, it depends because there are companies that use Verizon's Kappa lines.
[55:34.960 --> 55:39.290]  [SPEAKER_07]: But if you say switch to your cable company, obviously they'd be using the cable line.
[55:39.500 --> 55:44.190]  [SPEAKER_03]: I see these other companies that advertise, you know, cheaper phone service per month.
[55:44.520 --> 55:44.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh-huh.
[55:45.290 --> 55:50.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: Sometimes it's beneficial, sometimes you... but you won't be able to call Verizon Repair directly.
[55:50.860 --> 55:56.730]  [SPEAKER_07]: You know, I've experimented with this myself and you become one step removed from them.
[55:56.860 --> 55:57.960]  [SPEAKER_07]: Somebody else has to call them.
[55:58.100 --> 56:01.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: You can't speak to them directly, even though they still use the same exact infrastructure.
[56:02.020 --> 56:08.320]  [SPEAKER_07]: But my advice is hold on to, um, uh, to that particular wire for as long as, as it's around.
[56:08.790 --> 56:13.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh, and, uh, you know, the only time they can take it away is if it's physically doesn't exist anymore.
[56:13.940 --> 56:16.320]  [SPEAKER_07]: Like on Fire Island, they, they were trying to do that.
[56:16.440 --> 56:17.650]  [SPEAKER_07]: I'm not sure if they actually succeeded.
[56:17.840 --> 56:20.230]  [SPEAKER_03]: Uh, they... They want cell phones on Fire Island, I thought.
[56:20.600 --> 56:22.360]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh, did they, did they actually do that?
[56:22.460 --> 56:23.480]  [SPEAKER_06]: Did they get rid of landlines?
[56:23.860 --> 56:25.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: We're not 100% sure.
[56:25.250 --> 56:29.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: In fact, if someone on Fire Island could update us, write in, oth@2600.com.
[56:29.820 --> 56:31.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: But... Thanks so much for your call.
[56:31.210 --> 56:31.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: Thank you.
[56:31.560 --> 56:31.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: Have a good night.
[56:31.920 --> 56:32.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: Take care.
[56:32.400 --> 56:34.320]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think they should donate all the copper to hackers.
[56:34.790 --> 56:35.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, okay, fine.
[56:35.600 --> 56:36.460]  [SPEAKER_07]: We'll run our own network.
[56:36.730 --> 56:37.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: Why not?
[56:37.320 --> 56:39.790]  [SPEAKER_07]: You know, it's... the thing is, I love new technology.
[56:39.790 --> 56:40.290]  [SPEAKER_07]: I really do.
[56:40.620 --> 56:42.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: But I also love old technology.
[56:42.520 --> 56:46.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I think the, the, the perfect thing to have is a mix of the two.
[56:46.320 --> 56:47.420]  [SPEAKER_07]: Don't get rid of payphones.
[56:47.670 --> 56:49.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: You know, don't get rid of copper lines.
[56:49.290 --> 56:52.650]  [SPEAKER_07]: Use them, use them in tangent with the new things.
[56:52.800 --> 56:55.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: Because eventually something is going to fail.
[56:55.480 --> 56:56.540]  [SPEAKER_07]: Something's going to stop working.
[56:56.710 --> 56:59.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: Or something will be compromised in one way or another.
[56:59.770 --> 57:01.150]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's good to have a backup system.
[57:01.290 --> 57:03.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: Whether it's an old system, a new system, whatever.
[57:03.540 --> 57:08.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh, it's also good to, uh, to learn how these technologies work and apply the principles to other things.
[57:09.150 --> 57:11.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: And we're really at an advantage here in the U.S.
[57:11.980 --> 57:14.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: Um, in, in one regard.
[57:14.040 --> 57:21.800]  [SPEAKER_06]: And that is the sheer variety of mediums, uh, for transporting information and getting access to these services.
[57:22.120 --> 57:28.840]  [SPEAKER_06]: Other countries just went with one or the other, um, Ethernet or, or whatever it is, ISDN, um, in those days.
[57:28.860 --> 57:35.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: But, uh, here we have a lot of options and it's, um, it's really about being imaginative in the market you're given.
[57:35.580 --> 57:35.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: Absolutely.
[57:36.400 --> 57:37.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: That's a, that's a good note to end on.
[57:38.340 --> 57:40.560]  [SPEAKER_07]: And, um, we're going to end on that note, I think.
[57:40.940 --> 57:41.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: Thanks, uh, Voltaire.
[57:42.020 --> 57:42.480]  [SPEAKER_07]: Thanks, Kyle.
[57:42.900 --> 57:44.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: Thanks to Lorenzo for speaking with us earlier.
[57:45.300 --> 57:47.150]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh, please write to us here at Off The Hook.
[57:47.320 --> 57:49.340]  [SPEAKER_07]: oth@2600.com.
[57:49.480 --> 57:50.150]  [SPEAKER_07]: We'd love to hear from you.
[57:50.250 --> 57:55.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: If you have an idea for the next HOPE Conference name taking place in 2018, it's our 12th conference.
[57:55.710 --> 57:56.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: We'd like to work that in somehow.
[57:57.560 --> 57:59.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh, send your suggestions.
[57:59.400 --> 58:01.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: Add to the, uh, to the list we already have.
[58:01.800 --> 58:03.670]  [SPEAKER_07]: oth@2600.com.
[58:04.170 --> 58:06.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: Stay tuned for the personal computer show here on WBAI.
[58:06.560 --> 58:07.650]  [SPEAKER_07]: This is Emmanuel for Off The Hook.
[58:07.980 --> 58:08.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: Have a good night.