[00:00.000 --> 00:03.420] [SPEAKER_03]: ...of Reclaim Chicago and Chicago Progress.
[00:03.680 --> 00:03.780] [SPEAKER_03]: Yep.
[00:04.100 --> 00:04.300] [SPEAKER_03]: Thanks.
[00:04.600 --> 00:06.840] [SPEAKER_03]: And I'll be posting longer versions of these interviews.
[00:07.140 --> 00:13.140] [SPEAKER_03]: To find those, just go to facebook.com slash the Katie Helper Show, and I'll be posting the links later this week.
[00:13.320 --> 00:14.020] [SPEAKER_03]: Thanks so much.
[00:14.180 --> 00:15.600] [SPEAKER_03]: See you guys next week.
[00:15.760 --> 00:19.020] [SPEAKER_03]: You can always find the Katie Helper Show every Wednesday, 7 p.m.
[00:19.020 --> 00:19.940] [SPEAKER_03]: on WBAI.
[00:41.780 --> 00:43.520] [SPEAKER_00]: Thank you very much, Katie.
[00:50.900 --> 00:52.360] [SPEAKER_00]: Thank you, Katie Helper.
[00:52.680 --> 00:57.420] [SPEAKER_00]: And you are listening to WBAI Radio.
[00:57.420 --> 01:01.220] [SPEAKER_00]: That's 99.5 FM right here in New York.
[01:01.940 --> 01:04.300] [SPEAKER_00]: The time is just about 8 p.m.
[01:04.700 --> 01:06.120] [SPEAKER_00]: on this Wednesday evening.
[01:07.140 --> 01:13.640] [SPEAKER_00]: That means it's time for another exciting edition of Off The Hook.
[01:59.740 --> 02:02.400] [SPEAKER_00]: And a very, very good evening to you.
[02:03.020 --> 02:04.680] [SPEAKER_00]: The program is Off The Hook.
[02:06.500 --> 02:07.140] [SPEAKER_00]: Rob T.
[02:07.260 --> 02:09.520] [SPEAKER_00]: Firefly here with you in the WBAI studios.
[02:10.240 --> 02:12.300] [SPEAKER_00]: I am joined here by Voltaire.
[02:12.480 --> 02:12.880] [SPEAKER_00]: Hello.
[02:13.780 --> 02:14.660] [SPEAKER_00]: And by Alex.
[02:15.140 --> 02:15.540] [SPEAKER_00]: Good evening.
[02:18.260 --> 02:23.280] [SPEAKER_00]: And today, as I'm sure everyone who's listening is aware, is the summer solstice.
[02:24.480 --> 02:26.380] [SPEAKER_00]: And I've got to tell you guys, it's been a long day.
[02:27.980 --> 02:28.540] [SPEAKER_00]: All right.
[02:28.600 --> 02:29.180] [SPEAKER_00]: I'm sorry.
[02:29.340 --> 02:29.780] [SPEAKER_00]: I apologize.
[02:31.120 --> 02:33.360] [SPEAKER_00]: But yes, it is the longest day of the year.
[02:33.360 --> 02:35.920] [SPEAKER_00]: And in some ways, it feels like it.
[02:36.280 --> 02:37.680] [SPEAKER_00]: There's certainly a lot going on.
[02:38.020 --> 02:43.220] [SPEAKER_00]: Our correspondents, Emmanuel and Kyle, remain on assignment in Reykjavik, Iceland.
[02:43.500 --> 02:49.860] [SPEAKER_00]: They're getting up to all sorts of hijinks and adventures there, about which we'll be interrogating them next week upon their return.
[02:51.100 --> 02:53.060] [SPEAKER_00]: But until then, it's just us.
[02:53.180 --> 02:55.440] [SPEAKER_00]: And we'll have a guest joining us a little bit later.
[02:55.760 --> 03:00.500] [SPEAKER_00]: But for now, let's catch up on a little bit of what's going on in the world.
[03:02.720 --> 03:03.240] [SPEAKER_00]: Let's see.
[03:04.500 --> 03:06.160] [SPEAKER_00]: What's going on that interests you today, Alex?
[03:06.320 --> 03:09.520] [SPEAKER_01]: I heard it was the summer solstice.
[03:10.580 --> 03:11.360] [SPEAKER_01]: You did.
[03:11.360 --> 03:15.360] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I don't remember where, but I did hear that.
[03:16.080 --> 03:19.260] [SPEAKER_01]: There's actually been quite a lot, I think, going on today.
[03:19.760 --> 03:32.560] [SPEAKER_01]: I'm excited to have our special guest on because what's going on over in the UK and in the EU in particular is, I think, going to be a very enlightening discussion.
[03:33.400 --> 03:39.800] [SPEAKER_01]: But I think in terms of general news, there's just, you know, a huge amount of things going on.
[03:40.680 --> 03:41.000] [SPEAKER_01]: Huge?
[03:41.000 --> 03:42.360] [SPEAKER_01]: Huge, huge.
[03:42.580 --> 03:45.340] [SPEAKER_01]: And I say that sort of as a pun, too.
[03:45.840 --> 03:59.120] [SPEAKER_01]: I'm talking specifically about this strange, you couldn't really call it a data breach, but maybe like a data revelation with 198 million voter records being exposed to the world.
[03:59.720 --> 04:06.860] [SPEAKER_01]: Data that related specifically to the GOP's analyses on behalf of the Trump organization.
[04:07.040 --> 04:10.440] [SPEAKER_01]: I'm sorry, the Trump campaign during the election cycle.
[04:10.440 --> 04:14.140] [SPEAKER_01]: I often get the two of them confused, the Trump organization and the Trump campaign.
[04:14.140 --> 04:16.960] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, they're all rather Trumpy.
[04:17.060 --> 04:24.000] [SPEAKER_00]: But yeah, it's kind of a data waterfall, a data eruption story here on Gizmodo.
[04:24.220 --> 04:27.200] [SPEAKER_00]: Political data gathered on more than 198 million U.S.
[04:27.640 --> 04:35.660] [SPEAKER_00]: citizens was exposed this month after a marketing firm contracted by the Republican National Committee stored internal documents on a publicly accessible Amazon server.
[04:36.120 --> 04:40.360] [SPEAKER_00]: It goes on to mention that this works out to about 61% of the U.S.
[04:40.480 --> 04:40.880] [SPEAKER_00]: population.
[04:41.920 --> 04:43.160] [SPEAKER_01]: That's pretty incredible.
[04:44.140 --> 04:57.300] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, Voltaire and I were talking ahead of the show, and really there's just so much confluence of subjects between all of the stories that we will be covering a little bit later today and that we are covering now.
[04:57.300 --> 05:15.320] [SPEAKER_01]: And in particular, you know, what I think is very interesting about this story is the absolute lack of repercussions that are applicable to a campaign organization for a breach of something of this magnitude or, you know, the negligent handling of data of this particular magnitude.
[05:15.320 --> 05:16.820] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, it's extraordinary.
[05:17.880 --> 05:35.060] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, what came out of this article and what came out of, I think, various news stories is that the campaigns generally operate as these very low-budget, shoestring, fly-by-night type organizations that put security and privacy not second, but, you know,
[05:35.120 --> 05:42.680] [SPEAKER_01]: maybe penultimate or, you know, last itself in terms of priorities because they just don't have budgets for security.
[05:42.680 --> 06:00.620] [SPEAKER_01]: So they mishandle, mistreat information, and yet at the same time, they're amassing massive amounts of user data, I'm sorry, voter data, and combining it with data from various other sources to be able to make predictive analyses about key states and key counties,
[06:01.020 --> 06:07.720] [SPEAKER_01]: and in particular about whether certain voters in certain counties will swing one way or another.
[06:07.720 --> 06:26.280] [SPEAKER_01]: So this data is extremely valuable and extremely interesting for campaigns in that it allows them to predict turnout and voting potential on key issues like gun control, oil and gas drilling, you know, a whole host of issues.
[06:27.880 --> 06:43.720] [SPEAKER_01]: It's incredibly important, too, because it could swing an election one way or the other, on the basis of very few votes, because, you know, if we're talking about swing states and we're talking about maybe something like 77,000 votes, this data is arguably priceless.
[06:43.720 --> 07:03.840] [SPEAKER_01]: Yet it's mistreated, it's mishandled, it's left out for the public to view, and when you combine voter registration data, which is something that is generally publicly available, as 2600 pointed out in the last issue, once you combine that data with other data points,
[07:04.020 --> 07:22.620] [SPEAKER_01]: you can begin to amass a really accurate picture of people's preferences and what campaigns are very interested in doing, and this was, I think, really a revelation from the story, is matching voter registration data with social media profiles.
[07:24.180 --> 07:26.640] [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, that's what's really interesting about this data.
[07:26.800 --> 07:32.400] [SPEAKER_00]: You would think of data at one organization somewhere just being one set of data collected one way.
[07:32.520 --> 07:33.380] [SPEAKER_00]: That's not what this is.
[07:33.460 --> 07:53.400] [SPEAKER_00]: This is basically huge amounts of data from sources all over the place, whether they be your standard sort of political information collecting entities, combined with data gotten from social media, online posts, from things like Reddit, and all these things that they're pulling together in this massive database to to not only work out,
[07:53.440 --> 08:07.240] [SPEAKER_00]: you know, your vital statistics, name, address, whatever, but where you are politically, where you are religiously, all sorts of information about you and your lifestyle, and whether you might be a good target for political advertising in some way or another.
[08:07.880 --> 08:13.760] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, and the sources from which they acquire this data are, you know, really shown to be quite questionable.
[08:14.020 --> 08:24.500] [SPEAKER_01]: Some of them have really questionable provenance, and yet it's being combined and utilized in this particular manner, and it's really transient, because the data itself will become quite stale after a number of months.
[08:25.080 --> 08:34.340] [SPEAKER_01]: And I go back to this again, I think this idea of combining voter registration data with social media information is something that is really telling.
[08:35.020 --> 08:41.520] [SPEAKER_01]: And it gets to the root of a real issue here, which is how much data we're really giving away.
[08:42.060 --> 08:57.440] [SPEAKER_01]: When we access social media, when we post on it, you know, we don't reasonably expect that that data is going to be mined and combined, with voter registration profiles to predict where we are going to stand in one way or another on particularly contentious issues.
[08:58.120 --> 09:08.500] [SPEAKER_01]: And then you combine that perhaps with purchasing data, maybe from something like, you know, Duane Reade, you know, the data that you give every time you go and swipe your Duane Reade card.
[09:08.640 --> 09:13.300] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, all of this can put together an incredibly accurate profile about a particular person.
[09:13.300 --> 09:17.900] [SPEAKER_01]: And we really have no regulations restricting that in the United States.
[09:18.960 --> 09:35.340] [SPEAKER_01]: It's something I think we will get into a little bit later on in the program as to, you know, what Europe is doing with particular types of data mining and the restrictions on that and the security safeguards that have to be put in place proactively when you mine and combine that type of data as a quote-unquote data controller.
[09:35.340 --> 09:44.440] [SPEAKER_01]: But in the United States, it's really something that is just, you know, left out into the open and left out into the ether, so to speak.
[09:44.660 --> 09:50.820] [SPEAKER_01]: And when this type of data is left out in the open, I don't really think that we're going to see major repercussions here.
[09:51.060 --> 09:58.120] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, we may see some public backlash about this, but, you know, this story, I think, should have gotten a lot more attention than it did.
[09:58.120 --> 10:01.380] [SPEAKER_01]: But the news cycle, being what it is, changes quite frequently lately.
[10:02.120 --> 10:02.340] [SPEAKER_00]: Absolutely.
[10:02.520 --> 10:11.020] [SPEAKER_00]: Repercussions are really something to think about regarding this because not only is this sort of thing not really regulated in any meaningful sense, but there is no accountability.
[10:11.020 --> 10:21.100] [SPEAKER_00]: It's not like sort of organizations that store your medical data have to contend with things like HIPAA, which is the regulations that ostensibly protect the privacy of such things.
[10:21.680 --> 10:33.080] [SPEAKER_00]: There's really nothing, correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't believe there's really anything governing an organization like this and what they can do with this, like, incredibly powerful data that they glean from all over the place.
[10:33.420 --> 10:35.040] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, that's quite true.
[10:35.160 --> 10:48.960] [SPEAKER_01]: And in, you know, in this particular context, I think it's also important to point out, for the sake of accuracy, that there does not really appear to have been a breach of this particular server that was left publicly accessible on AWS, but it was just open.
[10:49.380 --> 10:56.880] [SPEAKER_01]: And I believe a forensic analysis, at least at the time of writing of this story, indicated that nobody had breached that server and nobody had accessed it.
[10:57.140 --> 11:00.900] [SPEAKER_01]: So, you know, there are state data breach notification laws.
[11:01.020 --> 11:13.560] [SPEAKER_01]: I think that 39 states now have state data breach notification laws, and that could arguably come into play given the amount of personally identifying information that was available on this particular server.
[11:13.560 --> 11:24.080] [SPEAKER_01]: And if you can imagine the cost of having to notify, what was it, 198 million Americans of a particular breach, I mean, that would be really, really crippling.
[11:24.880 --> 11:33.400] [SPEAKER_01]: So, you know, here we're in the United States, these state data breach notification laws arguably do not apply to this particular situation.
[11:33.460 --> 11:42.720] [SPEAKER_01]: But even if they did, what an organization would probably do is simply dissolve itself so that it wouldn't have to comply with this particular law.
[11:44.540 --> 12:04.000] [SPEAKER_01]: And when we are looking backwards and trying to impose a penalty, that is a hell of a lot different than forward-looking types of security regulations that are designed to force you to think about information security from the outset, as opposed to after it proverbially hits the fan.
[12:06.060 --> 12:07.720] [SPEAKER_00]: All right, really something to think about.
[12:08.340 --> 12:18.900] [SPEAKER_00]: And on this sort of topic, but regarding our friends across the pond in the UK, we should have joining us Jim Killick from the Open Rights Group.
[12:19.040 --> 12:19.620] [SPEAKER_00]: Jim, are you with us?
[12:20.600 --> 12:21.160] [SPEAKER_00]: I am indeed.
[12:22.500 --> 12:26.100] [SPEAKER_00]: Thank you very much for letting us keep you up late and joining us on Off The Hook.
[12:27.180 --> 12:31.600] [SPEAKER_00]: Now, Jim, for those unfamiliar, could you explain a little bit about Open Rights Group and what they do?
[12:31.600 --> 12:35.220] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, so we're a digital rights organization.
[12:35.800 --> 12:45.900] [SPEAKER_06]: We work on privacy, free speech online, all of those sorts of issues, very similar to sort of work of groups like EFF in the United States.
[12:46.500 --> 12:48.240] [SPEAKER_06]: That same sort of agenda.
[12:48.680 --> 12:50.340] [SPEAKER_06]: We've been going for 10 years.
[12:50.340 --> 12:56.860] [SPEAKER_06]: We have around 3,000 people supporting us and helping our campaigns.
[12:56.860 --> 12:58.240] [SPEAKER_06]: We're mostly member-funded.
[12:58.500 --> 13:15.040] [SPEAKER_06]: And we've been working on data protection, surveillance, post-Snowden, as well as things like copyright and rights for hosting, you know, people to be able to host things that, you know, attracting huge legal penalties and so on.
[13:15.180 --> 13:19.860] [SPEAKER_06]: So, right, all the way through to net neutrality issues and things like that as well.
[13:20.580 --> 13:22.340] [SPEAKER_01]: So, Jim, this is Alex here.
[13:22.500 --> 13:24.980] [SPEAKER_01]: How long have you been involved in the Open Rights Group?
[13:25.920 --> 13:27.740] [SPEAKER_06]: About six or seven years now.
[13:27.980 --> 13:28.460] [SPEAKER_06]: Yes.
[13:28.620 --> 13:29.560] [SPEAKER_06]: Quite a long time.
[13:29.800 --> 13:30.200] [SPEAKER_01]: Fantastic.
[13:31.120 --> 13:38.700] [SPEAKER_06]: It gets busier and it certainly seems, you know, probably even more serious now, I think, than when I started.
[13:38.980 --> 13:47.620] [SPEAKER_01]: So, when you started with the Open Rights Group six years ago, what was it about the group and the issues that it was addressing that led you to the group?
[13:48.940 --> 13:54.520] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, I think it was very obvious that privacy issues were going to get more and more serious.
[13:55.260 --> 13:55.420] [SPEAKER_06]: Yes.
[13:56.240 --> 14:10.060] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't think I supposed then that we would be in such trouble as we are now, but it certainly seemed that, you know, there was a lot of potential for problems and there was a need to kind of think about this in a wider way.
[14:10.060 --> 14:31.560] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think also really sort of thought about the way that things like openness had, you know, given us opportunities and that this sort of kind of hadn't really been translated into political understanding that ten years ago is still a problem there.
[14:31.560 --> 14:46.380] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, politicians are not... they kind of know the Internet's changed things, but they don't necessarily understand the benefits versus the problems, how to balance those things, and quite how critical this is to the sort of society we'll become.
[14:46.380 --> 14:54.620] [SPEAKER_06]: They tend to still be a bit fixated on particular social issues and headlines generated around it.
[14:55.160 --> 15:01.700] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, you bring up a rather interesting point because today was quite a busy day in the United Kingdom.
[15:03.100 --> 15:13.600] [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, having lived there three times now, I always know that, you know, whenever a new government is formed, there is something that is particularly peculiar to this monarchy.
[15:14.040 --> 15:20.560] [SPEAKER_01]: And I was wondering if you could go into and give us a little bit of background about this thing, this peculiar thing called the Queen's Speech.
[15:20.560 --> 15:21.380] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[15:21.880 --> 15:24.900] [SPEAKER_06]: So it's a bit of nonsense on one level.
[15:25.160 --> 15:34.920] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, the Queen gets dressed up, turns up with other royals, and parades around with lots of people in, you know, regalia.
[15:35.900 --> 15:39.200] [SPEAKER_06]: And there's a whole load of ceremony around this.
[15:39.660 --> 15:44.840] [SPEAKER_06]: But the purpose of it is for her to say what the government is going to put into legislation.
[15:45.120 --> 15:49.440] [SPEAKER_06]: So she reads a speech that's not actually hers, it's written by the Prime Minister.
[15:49.900 --> 15:54.940] [SPEAKER_06]: And she reads out what the government intends to do for the next one or two years.
[15:55.220 --> 15:56.920] [SPEAKER_06]: And that's essentially what's happened today.
[15:58.420 --> 16:05.420] [SPEAKER_06]: And you then, you know, you get all the briefing notes afterwards, of course, and you start to understand what the government's up to.
[16:05.420 --> 16:09.640] [SPEAKER_06]: And what we have seen, I mean, is quite a change because the...
[16:10.380 --> 16:24.080] [SPEAKER_06]: Before the election, when the Conservative Party were expecting to sweep the board, get a big majority and be able to pass whatever legislation they wanted, they were talking about a very, very kind of hard line clamp down on the Internet.
[16:25.440 --> 16:43.080] [SPEAKER_06]: They still are, but they've watered it down to a little bit more around voluntary proposals for censorship, kind of, you know, getting companies to do more to censor things online, as opposed to sort of really, really tough legislation to make them do these things.
[16:43.080 --> 16:53.920] [SPEAKER_01]: So essentially, you're saying, and correct me if I'm wrong, that these aren't necessarily the Queen's words, but they are Theresa May's words, and the Queen is Theresa May's sock puppet.
[16:55.200 --> 16:56.620] [SPEAKER_01]: Yep, that's right.
[16:57.880 --> 16:59.640] [SPEAKER_01]: That's one way of putting it, I guess.
[17:01.840 --> 17:07.440] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, she's whoever's sock puppet is actually in charge.
[17:08.320 --> 17:10.960] [SPEAKER_06]: It must be a slightly demeaning thing, you'd think.
[17:10.960 --> 17:15.540] [SPEAKER_06]: But, you know, given that her political opinions appear to change every election.
[17:16.020 --> 17:16.180] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[17:16.820 --> 17:22.380] [SPEAKER_06]: But there it is, so this is her role.
[17:22.680 --> 17:25.800] [SPEAKER_01]: So there were a couple of interesting things that came out of this today.
[17:27.080 --> 17:30.980] [SPEAKER_01]: Perhaps you could talk a little bit about this digital charter that was referenced.
[17:31.600 --> 17:33.980] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, I mean, this is a really peculiar thing.
[17:34.160 --> 17:36.180] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, you know, it seems to...
[17:36.180 --> 17:50.400] [SPEAKER_06]: They say they want a digital charter, and that they want this to sort of make Britain a really safe place to go online and to make sure that children don't see inappropriate things and all the rest of it.
[17:50.860 --> 17:56.700] [SPEAKER_06]: But they then failed to explain what the real mechanism behind this is, because it's not a piece of legislation.
[17:56.700 --> 18:05.910] [SPEAKER_06]: So it looks like some kind of voluntary agreement where they get all the companies to sign up and say, you know, we'll remove stuff within 24 hours.
[18:05.910 --> 18:18.910] [SPEAKER_06]: We'll, if we get a complaint, you know, we'll investigate, we'll check, you know, we'll do things to protect children, whatever those things are, but it not be backed by legislation as such.
[18:19.010 --> 18:21.030] [SPEAKER_06]: That seems to be the way they're going.
[18:21.310 --> 18:28.310] [SPEAKER_06]: Of course, that means that they're pushing companies to make more and more judgments about the legality of material, of course.
[18:28.310 --> 18:35.250] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, companies want to do that in a sense, they don't want bad material, upsetting material on their websites.
[18:36.530 --> 18:45.550] [SPEAKER_06]: But, you know, the way that the governments do this, they, in the UK, we have something called the counter-terrorism Internet referral unit.
[18:45.550 --> 18:55.850] [SPEAKER_06]: And it refers, it looks for material they believe has been published by extremists or is expounding extremist views.
[18:56.170 --> 18:59.930] [SPEAKER_06]: Of course, nobody wants that, but these, this is just the police, remember.
[19:00.210 --> 19:10.610] [SPEAKER_06]: They find these links and content, they report them directly to Facebook and Google, who then check whether they're breaking terms and conditions and remove it.
[19:10.610 --> 19:25.670] [SPEAKER_06]: And, you know, that really, that really is kind of, on one level, that is the police acting without any sense of there being a judge involved and getting material censored in bulk.
[19:26.590 --> 19:32.850] [SPEAKER_06]: And, you know, while we can all understand why they want to do this, you know, that's not very accountable.
[19:32.850 --> 19:41.610] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, and last week we discussed how sometimes when you export the, the role of censorship to these companies, it's even worse than when it's the government censoring.
[19:41.890 --> 19:48.090] [SPEAKER_02]: Because you have, at least with the government doing it, you have no democratic, you have democratic recourse to stop them from doing it.
[19:48.510 --> 19:56.110] [SPEAKER_02]: But if it's up to the company's judgment, it's like, based on their bottom line, and they don't want to upset the government, so they're going to censor more than they normally would.
[19:57.270 --> 20:04.910] [SPEAKER_02]: We, like, for example, we see that, like, with, in China, with, where they export stuff to WeChat and the censorship role.
[20:05.230 --> 20:14.970] [SPEAKER_02]: And YouTube, where they actually, where they take down a lot of stuff that would arguably be fair use, but their, have their own policies as opposed to government runs.
[20:14.970 --> 20:24.550] [SPEAKER_02]: So, with, with, with corporations having, being, getting to play the role of censoring, you have even more censorship than if it is government.
[20:25.730 --> 20:40.130] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, I think, I think that's natural, because, particularly if the, if the company sees, you know, financial or other downsides, whether that's the goodwill of the government or the opprobrium of their customers.
[20:40.130 --> 20:51.590] [SPEAKER_06]: If they, if they feel that there are downsides to not censoring material, and those are worse than the downsides of occasionally getting it wrong, then they will censor.
[20:51.890 --> 20:54.310] [SPEAKER_06]: And they will not worry about the mistakes so much.
[20:55.050 --> 20:58.230] [SPEAKER_06]: And, of course, mistakes are, are always less visible.
[20:58.530 --> 21:00.030] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, they're, they're much less visible.
[21:00.330 --> 21:05.130] [SPEAKER_06]: And it's, you know, people accept it as, quote, mistakes, unquote, a lot of the time.
[21:05.130 --> 21:09.870] [SPEAKER_06]: So, you know, I, I think they are naturally going to be more cautious.
[21:10.090 --> 21:28.030] [SPEAKER_06]: And the, the problem with the, that we have a new right now is that Germany, France and Britain, and at least until this, until today, had very concrete plans to impose fines on companies if they weren't taking down material fast enough.
[21:28.630 --> 21:38.650] [SPEAKER_06]: And, of course, if you're doing that, if you're fining companies for not censoring things quickly enough, that, then you've got, you know, you've got all those problems in, in, in spades.
[21:38.770 --> 21:49.650] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, you, you're going to have huge amounts of material being censored because it's, you know, you, you're avoiding a fine, essentially.
[21:49.650 --> 22:03.630] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, and this, I think, naturally leads us to another topic that came up in the Queen's speech today as well, which is this commission for countering extremism, which sounds somewhat amorphous to me.
[22:03.630 --> 22:04.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[22:04.350 --> 22:13.820] [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, I think as Open Rights Group had mentioned, you know, it's, it could be somewhat positive in that this could be a forum to generate ideas.
[22:14.460 --> 22:23.580] [SPEAKER_01]: But I think given the tenor of what Theresa May's proposals have been in the past, that we, we should naturally be a little bit skeptical about this particular proposal.
[22:24.900 --> 22:32.920] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, as if we're talking about, you know, countering extremism with our own propaganda, well, that doesn't sound so great.
[22:33.040 --> 22:46.460] [SPEAKER_01]: But if we're talking about countering it with teaching people how to think, with education, with utilizing rhetoric and, and arguing against these types of extreme extremisms, that sounds like it would be eminently reasonable to me.
[22:46.460 --> 22:54.440] [SPEAKER_01]: But, you know, a commission for countering extremism sounds like it could veer pretty quickly into the realm of censorship.
[22:54.740 --> 23:05.800] [SPEAKER_01]: And then we have the very same issues that, that you had just described, you know, I'd love to get your thoughts on, on what this sort of amorphous commission for countering extremism is likely to, to be or produce.
[23:06.500 --> 23:09.640] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, I, I, I have literally no idea at this point.
[23:09.940 --> 23:11.120] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, nobody does.
[23:11.120 --> 23:13.700] [SPEAKER_06]: It's just like, it sort of appeared.
[23:14.220 --> 23:20.500] [SPEAKER_06]: And, you know, it, I mean, on the one hand, it could be a way to collect ideas and understand the problem more.
[23:20.760 --> 23:22.380] [SPEAKER_06]: So the same, quite a good idea.
[23:22.840 --> 23:26.360] [SPEAKER_06]: It's not clear if this is a permanent thing or a sort of temporary thing.
[23:26.440 --> 23:31.820] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, is it a commission like a, we used to have royal commissions where people produce a report and recommendations?
[23:32.420 --> 23:38.960] [SPEAKER_06]: Or is it something that's on a rolling basis going to try to direct, you know, counter extremism?
[23:38.960 --> 23:45.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, from my perspective, it sounds like it could be something that could really run UKIP and the BNP into the ground.
[23:46.060 --> 23:46.960] [SPEAKER_01]: Don't you, don't you think?
[23:47.160 --> 23:51.000] [SPEAKER_01]: If we're talking about countering extremism, it might be somewhat counterproductive.
[23:51.280 --> 23:56.300] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, maybe you could, if you could briefly describe for our, for our users, what, what those political parties are.
[23:57.900 --> 24:03.900] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, so we have, uh, we have the conservatives who are the sort of, uh, equivalent to the Republicans in the States.
[24:04.100 --> 24:18.780] [SPEAKER_06]: They are, um, maybe a little bit towards the center to, you know, than the Republicans, but they're essentially the party that has people from very socially conservative backgrounds through to free marketeers.
[24:18.780 --> 24:26.940] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, it's that kind of grouping, uh, that, that, that, that's trying to generally tries to be pro business and lower tax.
[24:27.180 --> 24:37.800] [SPEAKER_06]: Then we have the Labour Party who are, again, sort of left of the Democrats, probably a little bit, um, you know, a little bit more towards Bernie Sanders, particularly at the moment.
[24:39.140 --> 24:42.900] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and they, they, they're, they're the sort of social conscience, if you like.
[24:43.120 --> 24:48.980] [SPEAKER_06]: Then you have the Liberal Democrats, a smaller party in the middle between the two who are essentially liberals.
[24:49.360 --> 24:56.380] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, so classically liberal, um, fairly pro market, uh, but also very good on civil liberties.
[24:56.480 --> 24:58.140] [SPEAKER_06]: Those are the sort of three main parties.
[24:58.240 --> 25:01.600] [SPEAKER_06]: Then you also have parties in Scotland and Wales as well.
[25:01.720 --> 25:05.180] [SPEAKER_06]: And the Scottish nationalists are being quite influential at the moment.
[25:05.180 --> 25:08.900] [SPEAKER_06]: So it's a quite a mixed bag, despite the fact we're first past the post.
[25:09.320 --> 25:14.260] [SPEAKER_06]: And, you know, that has a sort of majoritarian aspect that you have in the States too.
[25:14.540 --> 25:18.120] [SPEAKER_06]: Despite that, we've got quite a mix of parties at the moment.
[25:18.400 --> 25:23.060] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, although a lot of them are small and that's making it quite hard for the parties to get majorities.
[25:23.340 --> 25:31.200] [SPEAKER_06]: And that's what's led to this sort of, uh, slightly more amorphous set of policy suggestions today from the government.
[25:31.200 --> 25:40.660] [SPEAKER_06]: So they don't have an overall majority and they're kind of, they, they don't really know, uh, you know, what they can get away with at this point.
[25:41.200 --> 25:57.680] [SPEAKER_02]: It wasn't one of the oddities of the election with the minority government that it, that they have to be going to a de facto coalition with the, um, the Ulster Democratic Party, which is like this, um, evangelical far right Christian party that, um, and they like,
[25:58.960 --> 26:08.060] [SPEAKER_02]: you know, you were saying that, uh, they had to water down, uh, because they got a whomping in the election that they watered down a lot of the, uh, draconian, uh, censorship measures in their speech.
[26:08.060 --> 26:17.720] [SPEAKER_02]: But it, it, it seems like be going to coalition with such a, a socially conservative group might want, make them want to put more like, uh, censorship, uh, things on the table.
[26:20.620 --> 26:28.820] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, I think, I think the reason is that the, they don't know how much they can rely on the, on, on the DUP.
[26:28.820 --> 26:31.860] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and also the majority is still very tiny.
[26:32.020 --> 26:39.940] [SPEAKER_06]: So you, you, if you had sort of 15 conservatives rebelling saying, uh, this is too much, they could suffer defeats.
[26:40.260 --> 26:52.440] [SPEAKER_06]: So it just, it's just not a good idea to push things that might be too controversial until you've kind of tested the water and understand, uh, how it's going to pan out.
[26:52.440 --> 26:56.380] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and labor, I think are a lot more determined now to defeat the government.
[26:56.380 --> 27:04.280] [SPEAKER_06]: So where they were quite, um, you know, they were pretty rebellious and going in different directions themselves a few months ago.
[27:04.420 --> 27:05.540] [SPEAKER_06]: That's less the case now.
[27:05.660 --> 27:11.880] [SPEAKER_06]: So you could, you could have some of these things result in, in disputes that they, they, the government can't win.
[27:11.880 --> 27:23.240] [SPEAKER_06]: One interesting little thing about the DUP, uh, as you say, there's, they, they, I mean, they're really, they're, they're a kind of very, they're an oddity because they're based in Northern Ireland.
[27:23.460 --> 27:27.420] [SPEAKER_06]: So they're kind of like the part of Ireland that wants to be in the UK.
[27:28.060 --> 27:31.820] [SPEAKER_06]: And that's really the only reason that party exists.
[27:32.380 --> 27:38.140] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, but they, they are also, uh, from the Protestant tradition and evangelical, as you say.
[27:38.140 --> 27:57.260] [SPEAKER_06]: And one of the things that we've noticed that's just disappeared from the, from the government's, uh, list of things to do is, is sexual education, sex and relationships, education, uh, for children, you know, to, to make it compulsory in the UK that people get this kind of education.
[27:57.260 --> 28:12.060] [SPEAKER_06]: And there was consensus before the election from all of the main parties that they needed to do this, not least because they were getting very, very wound up about, uh, children accessing pornography on the Internet, about potentials for bullying on the Internet,
[28:12.260 --> 28:14.640] [SPEAKER_06]: lots of these kinds of social issues.
[28:14.640 --> 28:33.840] [SPEAKER_06]: And while they were trying to answer these things with quite, quite, quite bad ideas from our perspective, like, uh, pushing Internet filtering and things like that, uh, they, the, the one thing we did think they should do is to get better education for kids.
[28:33.840 --> 28:39.700] [SPEAKER_06]: And so they were better prepared for the sort of things they might encounter online and could understand it a bit better.
[28:39.840 --> 28:40.940] [SPEAKER_06]: And that's been dropped.
[28:40.960 --> 28:44.760] [SPEAKER_06]: And I do wonder if that's because of this alliance with the DUP.
[28:45.640 --> 28:46.120] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[28:46.260 --> 28:55.280] [SPEAKER_02]: You mentioned also, you mentioned how, um, Jeremy Corbyn had been taking the government, uh, kind of like in a Sanders type, very progressive direction on economic policies.
[28:55.280 --> 29:04.320] [SPEAKER_02]: But when it comes to technology issues, how, how, how has the labor government been, especially under Corbyn's labor, uh, the labor opposition been under Corbyn's leadership?
[29:05.000 --> 29:06.800] [SPEAKER_06]: Really confused, to be honest.
[29:07.020 --> 29:13.400] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, the thing is that they, you know, they, they're, they're old school socialists.
[29:13.880 --> 29:30.980] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, so a lot of them are not really, they're kind of not really there with the impacts of technology, which, you know, there is definitely an agenda for the left, uh, thinking about the consequences of automation, you know, as well as the possibilities for,
[29:30.980 --> 29:34.000] [SPEAKER_06]: or sort of social change that come from technology.
[29:34.160 --> 29:41.260] [SPEAKER_06]: There's, there's definitely a kind of set of things for them to think about, but they haven't, they haven't really, uh, fully understand all of that, I would say.
[29:41.640 --> 29:44.400] [SPEAKER_06]: I think their main thing has been a sort of gut reaction.
[29:44.500 --> 29:45.940] [SPEAKER_06]: They don't like surveillance.
[29:46.240 --> 29:47.760] [SPEAKER_06]: They don't like the secret state.
[29:47.760 --> 29:55.500] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, they, they're, they are, um, skeptical about security measures that are heavy handed.
[29:55.740 --> 29:59.540] [SPEAKER_06]: So that's a good starting place for us, you know, that they have that.
[29:59.760 --> 30:16.700] [SPEAKER_06]: But labor has been split between a sort of authoritarian, uh, nanny state sort of socialists who, who want to kind of, you know, have a database of everybody in order to work out what problems they've got, that kind of people.
[30:16.700 --> 30:24.860] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, versus the, the, the, the, the, the, the ones who are sort of a bit more civil libertarian, but also more left.
[30:25.120 --> 30:30.920] [SPEAKER_06]: So they, they tried, tried to be reconciling those positions and it's been very hard.
[30:31.220 --> 30:42.760] [SPEAKER_06]: So in the debates we had about the Investigatory Powers Act, um, a year ago, they had a traditional centrist, quite authoritarian character.
[30:42.760 --> 30:48.880] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, who really couldn't see the problem with gathering everybody's metadata for the police to use in the future.
[30:49.100 --> 30:49.900] [SPEAKER_06]: It couldn't see a problem.
[30:50.860 --> 30:54.880] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, as long as it was authorized, okay, what, what, why were we complaining?
[30:55.200 --> 30:57.340] [SPEAKER_02]: This was the so-called Snoopers Charter.
[30:57.860 --> 30:58.860] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, that's right.
[30:59.080 --> 31:10.800] [SPEAKER_06]: And I mean, you know, they, they're all, they were already gathering masses of metadata for, uh, you know, GCHQ and the NSA to share, um, for purposes of terrorism and national security.
[31:10.800 --> 31:27.960] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, but they wanted the same thing for the police, uh, you know, they, they, they wanted to have the police to be able to access a machine to interrogate metadata from ISPs in order to tell them who might be useful to, uh, you know, investigate.
[31:27.960 --> 31:38.180] [SPEAKER_06]: So it was kind of like, you know, you've got these massive superpowers for, you know, national security, and that's bad enough.
[31:38.700 --> 31:42.560] [SPEAKER_06]: Now you want to give this to ordinary police without a warrant?
[31:43.120 --> 31:53.820] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, it does seem really, you know, just beyond the pale, crazy, frankly, you know, to, to allow, you know, law enforcement to have that kind of access to data.
[31:53.820 --> 32:03.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, you know, here in the United States, we've recently rolled back the restrictions that Internet service providers have with respect to the monetization of users activity.
[32:04.560 --> 32:22.940] [SPEAKER_01]: And that was one of the things that frankly concerned a lot of people, which is, you know, your web browsing habits, your activities, you know, if all of that can be monetized and sold to, let's say a third-party data broker or an advertiser, who's to say that law enforcement then couldn't purchase it and mine it themselves.
[32:22.940 --> 32:39.540] [SPEAKER_01]: But it seems like under the Investigatory Powers Act, which actually did, in fact, pass into law, you know, the police would just, you know, have access to a database to do exactly that without even having to, you know, deal with a shady middleman data broker to obtain the information.
[32:39.540 --> 32:40.280] [SPEAKER_01]: Right.
[32:40.280 --> 32:42.660] [SPEAKER_01]: So, you know, it seems, it seems totally, totally nuts.
[32:43.300 --> 32:54.660] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, you know, and to, to roll back for a second, you know, you talked a little bit about, you know, things that were missing from the Queen's speech, arguably because of the compromises that had to be made in order to form a government.
[32:55.400 --> 33:04.060] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, Theresa May talked a hell of a lot about regulating the Internet in terms of encryption, in terms of pornography, uh, filtering and whatnot.
[33:04.060 --> 33:07.380] [SPEAKER_01]: There was none of that, it seemed like, in the speech today.
[33:07.620 --> 33:11.860] [SPEAKER_01]: But I'm wondering, was there any mention of encryption or its regulation at all?
[33:12.700 --> 33:13.680] [SPEAKER_06]: No, there wasn't.
[33:13.780 --> 33:15.700] [SPEAKER_06]: And we were, we were expecting them to mention it.
[33:15.800 --> 33:18.080] [SPEAKER_06]: But the thing is, they don't actually have to.
[33:18.080 --> 33:30.320] [SPEAKER_06]: So, we thought they might, more from the point of view of, uh, kind of publicity, um, the reason being that they, they have powers on the books to deal with this.
[33:30.880 --> 33:41.980] [SPEAKER_06]: They have, um, they have something called, unless in the stupid charts, they have something called technical capability notices, um, which aren't active yet.
[33:41.980 --> 33:56.420] [SPEAKER_06]: They need to be activated by what they call secondary legislation, which is basically like tidy up notes, you know, for how it's going to work in practice, uh, where they know that parliament isn't going to be that bothered about the detail.
[33:56.420 --> 34:05.160] [SPEAKER_06]: So, they, they put it into these, this sort of secondary legislation, where it kind of goes through on the nod, uh, more or less, sometimes not even with a vote.
[34:06.920 --> 34:17.520] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and the technical capability notices allow them, among other things, to order the removal of, quote, electronic protection, unquote, which, which means encryption.
[34:17.520 --> 34:38.360] [SPEAKER_06]: So, they have the power already to just not activated to instruct companies to remove the ability of the customers to encrypt or to alter the way that the encryption works in some way, whether that's changes to the algorithm or perhaps more likely, uh,
[34:38.360 --> 34:46.160] [SPEAKER_06]: in terms of engineering, um, back doors of some kind into the content, you know, within the software.
[34:46.160 --> 34:54.860] [SPEAKER_06]: So, you know, you can imagine, uh, you know, you've got an end-to-end encryption software that maybe you kind of add in a further end, so to speak.
[34:55.360 --> 34:58.120] [SPEAKER_06]: But that's the kind of thing we imagine them trying to do.
[34:58.500 --> 35:05.640] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, but if you are a company with more than 10,000 users in the UK, they claim the power to instruct you to do this stuff.
[35:05.820 --> 35:17.060] [SPEAKER_06]: And of course, that means actually, uh, every American company that operates in the, in the UK, as far as our government's concerned, they have the powers to order them to re-engineer their software.
[35:17.460 --> 35:19.900] [SPEAKER_06]: Now, you might kind of think, well, that's ridiculous.
[35:20.200 --> 35:21.660] [SPEAKER_06]: I'd like to see them try.
[35:22.000 --> 35:23.880] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and of course, that's a good point, right?
[35:24.000 --> 35:28.080] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, why should anybody, uh, you know, listen to that?
[35:28.080 --> 35:32.660] [SPEAKER_06]: And I, I suspect most companies would, uh, contest that.
[35:33.200 --> 35:49.840] [SPEAKER_06]: But, uh, you see, you see, I think what's, what's really happening is that because the most, you know, lots of countries are seeing this as a, uh, they see it as an international problem, but more specifically a problem with US companies.
[35:50.340 --> 36:00.200] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and the US law enforcement similarly sees it as a problem with US companies not cooperating with them, you know, particularly the FBI and so on.
[36:00.380 --> 36:22.520] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and I think, so I think what is, uh, happening here is that each country is starting to advocate for change in the US in order to bring pressure on the companies to make changes, whether that's through law or through sort of being more cooperative,
[36:22.520 --> 36:24.900] [SPEAKER_06]: so to speak, with law enforcement.
[36:25.220 --> 36:32.980] [SPEAKER_06]: And you see that with the statements in the G7 recently, but also the Five Eyes met in Australia and made the same comments.
[36:33.180 --> 36:41.520] [SPEAKER_06]: So there's, there's clearly this kind of movement of governments to change the way that technology companies work with them.
[36:41.760 --> 36:44.200] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, that, that's a real ambition here.
[36:44.360 --> 37:04.360] [SPEAKER_01]: I think, you know, it, it brings up an interesting point to me because, you know, with the, the technical capability notices, you know, are you aware of these requests being made on a particular showing of something like probable cause or reasonable suspicion of committing a crime or engaging an act of terrorism?
[37:04.580 --> 37:08.040] [SPEAKER_01]: Or is it simply, you know, just because we want the data?
[37:08.220 --> 37:15.720] [SPEAKER_01]: Is there some sort of threshold showing that needs to be met in order for, uh, one of these technical capability notices to issue?
[37:16.400 --> 37:27.640] [SPEAKER_06]: So there's only two thresholds really, which are, you serve 10,000 UK users and it's practical for you to implement what we're asking.
[37:28.100 --> 37:30.820] [SPEAKER_06]: But those, those are the only thresholds.
[37:31.000 --> 37:38.100] [SPEAKER_06]: So, um, in terms of accessing, but it's, it's a kind of, it's on a sort of two layers to be fair to them.
[37:38.240 --> 37:46.760] [SPEAKER_06]: So there's a, the technical capability is one layer and then to actually access the content requires then a warrant.
[37:47.220 --> 38:02.000] [SPEAKER_06]: So, um, the, the, the, the kind of arguments about actual suspicion, uh, you know, probable cause, uh, those sorts of arguments are for the warrants, uh, to access specific individuals' data.
[38:02.700 --> 38:04.160] [SPEAKER_06]: So that's the way they see it.
[38:04.280 --> 38:09.020] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think, you know, you think of this as a sort of arrangement with a traditional telecoms company.
[38:09.540 --> 38:11.340] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, you, you can kind of see it.
[38:11.440 --> 38:13.960] [SPEAKER_06]: It's like, well, we need to be able to put in the taps.
[38:14.400 --> 38:19.660] [SPEAKER_06]: So technical capability notice effectively is the capability to tap.
[38:20.020 --> 38:30.020] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and then the actual taps on specific individuals, that's a bit that gets, uh, more sophisticated, more tested warrants.
[38:30.540 --> 38:36.900] [SPEAKER_00]: And this, this is all made, uh, much more interesting, um, by all the other angles that, uh, that are affected and affect this.
[38:37.160 --> 38:52.120] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, there was a story that came out, um, on Friday as reported in the Telegraph about the Europe, the, the, uh, European parliament, um, which is, um, working toward protection, um, against breaking, uh, breaking encryption and putting back doors in.
[38:52.120 --> 39:03.620] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, the, the story, uh, the story reports, uh, MEPs have tabled laws that would forbid countries in the EU from breaking the electronic protection that prevents security services from reading messages sent via, um, things like WhatsApp.
[39:04.020 --> 39:09.800] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, the plans would also impose obligations on tech companies that don't currently apply encryption to messages to do so.
[39:10.280 --> 39:19.700] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, this of course goes right against any, anything that, uh, Theresa May was saying about, um, putting in back doors and creating no safe spaces and, and so on.
[39:19.900 --> 39:29.240] [SPEAKER_00]: So, um, um, and this, this seems all very interesting and also kind of weird because no one seems sure what this means for the UK with the whole, uh, Brexit situation.
[39:29.460 --> 39:30.480] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, are you familiar with this?
[39:30.620 --> 39:30.760] [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[39:31.740 --> 39:32.180] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[39:32.340 --> 39:42.800] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, I think, I mean, the new privacy directive moving now towards a regulation is, is, is, is a very interesting, um, um, bit of law.
[39:43.460 --> 39:51.620] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and you know, the, the, its aim is essentially to make sure that people's communications are private in transit.
[39:51.900 --> 39:53.100] [SPEAKER_06]: That's the idea of it.
[39:53.220 --> 40:02.260] [SPEAKER_06]: So it's all about, you know, essentially not, uh, sort of reading people's electronic mail, not sending them electronic mail without consent.
[40:02.380 --> 40:04.000] [SPEAKER_06]: It's all those sorts of things.
[40:04.240 --> 40:15.780] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, you know, that basically communication should be, uh, trustworthy and you shouldn't, you know, you shouldn't be expected to be tracked and, and, and, and so on.
[40:15.900 --> 40:19.740] [SPEAKER_06]: So it also deals with things like, uh, setting of cookies and so on.
[40:19.920 --> 40:39.280] [SPEAKER_06]: But yeah, so the European parliament are trying to say, well, look, you know, in the modern age, if you're, uh, if we're trying to make sure that people's, that we have integrity of communications and that they are secure and private, then we shouldn't just take the word of the network operators for that.
[40:39.520 --> 40:46.820] [SPEAKER_06]: Actually, the companies who are transiting these messages should have a duty to do it properly and encrypt.
[40:46.920 --> 40:49.460] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think that's a perfectly reasonable suggestion.
[40:49.860 --> 41:08.040] [SPEAKER_06]: I suspect, um, in a sense, what the European parliament is proposing is slightly narrower than it looks at first glance, because if you're talking about, um, encryption in transit, um, that doesn't tell you too much about what, what happens at the other end.
[41:08.240 --> 41:21.220] [SPEAKER_06]: So, you know, uh, Facebook can transmit its communications between users in encrypted form, um, between Facebook and your web browser or app.
[41:22.560 --> 41:28.240] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, that doesn't mean that those communications are not visible to Facebook.
[41:28.560 --> 41:34.600] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, of course, it does if they implement it as they have done in, in, you know, in, in chats and so on.
[41:34.880 --> 41:38.280] [SPEAKER_06]: But most of the time, companies are not trying to do that.
[41:38.520 --> 41:43.180] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, it's a relative, you know, it's a relatively small number of cases where people are doing it.
[41:43.640 --> 41:49.900] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, it would, of course, make it very hard for governments to argue for back doors into this.
[41:50.080 --> 42:00.800] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, if the product were built in such a way as to make that hard, um, but most of the time, it wouldn't have the effect of kind of locking law enforcement out completely, I don't think.
[42:01.020 --> 42:02.620] [SPEAKER_06]: No, I don't think that's the intention of it.
[42:02.740 --> 42:11.600] [SPEAKER_06]: It's more about saying, look, if people should engineer their products how they want, and people should have the right to privacy to the extent that they want it.
[42:12.220 --> 42:12.360] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[42:13.220 --> 42:22.320] [SPEAKER_02]: I think something that's interesting here is, uh, like we were talking about a lot of times when people think about censorship or surveillance, we usually think of the government, um, doing it.
[42:22.440 --> 42:38.060] [SPEAKER_02]: But here we have an example of the government, um, them banning, stopping governments from, uh, surveilling through back doors, but also use it, having the government like prevent, uh, surveillance with things like, um, requiring intent encryption and,
[42:38.140 --> 42:40.020] [SPEAKER_02]: uh, banning selling of readers history.
[42:40.220 --> 42:49.460] [SPEAKER_02]: So I think it gets to like, um, like it kind of makes us have to reevaluate our, uh, thoughts about like government's role in, um, surveillance and stuff.
[42:49.660 --> 42:59.880] [SPEAKER_02]: It's like, we have the right hand of government, uh, censoring and surveilling, but we also have the left hand of government, like, uh, stopping corporations from, uh, censoring and surveilling.
[43:00.600 --> 43:01.460] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, yes.
[43:01.640 --> 43:06.600] [SPEAKER_06]: And the thing is as well, though, um, the European Parliament are very pro-citizen.
[43:07.060 --> 43:23.920] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, the European Union as a whole has, you know, certainly not a perfect record on fundamental rights, privacy or the rest is certainly not, but it does have mechanisms to try to make that work, whether it's the data protection supervisor or the charter of fundamental rights.
[43:24.100 --> 43:28.420] [SPEAKER_06]: And the fact you can take, take these laws and challenge them in court.
[43:28.500 --> 43:43.380] [SPEAKER_06]: And then you have the courts who are really keen on high human rights standards because they're just setting out with a set of institutions and they have to convince all of the courts across the European Union that they're doing this properly.
[43:44.200 --> 43:49.400] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, so, you know, you've got a really good environment there for pushing standards up.
[43:49.580 --> 44:01.940] [SPEAKER_06]: And you also to certainly say you don't have the same pressures in the European Union for surveillance and so on because the European Union at this point has less involvement with, uh, law enforcement.
[44:02.160 --> 44:22.380] [SPEAKER_06]: It does exist and it's growing, but it's relatively new and it doesn't certainly doesn't have, you know, massive, uh, organizations and budget with huge budgets like the NSA and GCHQ breathing down their necks saying, don't, don't do that because that's going to screw up our national security strategy.
[44:22.540 --> 44:24.360] [SPEAKER_06]: They don't have those sorts of pressures either.
[44:24.560 --> 44:28.680] [SPEAKER_06]: So, um, at the moment they're quite good for pushing the standards up.
[44:28.840 --> 44:45.880] [SPEAKER_06]: I think the privacy regulations are about, you know, some really, really thorny problems we've got because, you know, people are being, you know, their, their web browsing histories turn out to be really valuable for mobile operators as well as, uh, potentially ISPs.
[44:46.120 --> 44:50.120] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and for advertising companies, they all want a piece of it.
[44:50.500 --> 45:02.080] [SPEAKER_06]: The advertising companies are completely running riot really when you think about it with the way that's, you know, cookie based tracking beacon based tracking, uh, you know, works, you know, nobody's really asked for consent.
[45:02.320 --> 45:03.760] [SPEAKER_06]: It's all a bit of a myth.
[45:04.080 --> 45:16.040] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, nobody really knows what happens to the data, but nevertheless, you know, hundreds of thousands of, you know, hundreds of millions of people are being tracked by these systems more or less without their knowledge.
[45:17.240 --> 45:19.040] [SPEAKER_01]: It's a scary time for sure.
[45:19.320 --> 45:20.480] [SPEAKER_01]: Jim, it sounds like it.
[45:20.700 --> 45:39.000] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, you know, I think it's, it's pretty clear from what you've said that it sounds like the e-privacy directive and the inherent security features that it would like to build into the way in which our networks operate and our products operate seem to be almost directly at loggerheads with the agenda of the Theresa May government and,
[45:39.140 --> 45:48.480] [SPEAKER_01]: or rather the hodgepodge government that's, that, um, was basically the hand, uh, in the queen skirt today operating as her, uh, as the sock puppet.
[45:48.640 --> 45:49.780] [SPEAKER_01]: Thank you for the visual, Alex.
[45:49.780 --> 45:51.320] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, anytime, anytime.
[45:51.740 --> 45:59.360] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, I do want to say you, you mentioned one thing that, um, I think, you know, bears a little bit of mention of, of, of explanation to is mentioned.
[45:59.480 --> 46:00.920] [SPEAKER_01]: This was the e-privacy directive.
[46:00.960 --> 46:04.120] [SPEAKER_01]: I think we should all track this, uh, but it's moving towards a regulation.
[46:04.120 --> 46:15.460] [SPEAKER_01]: And my understanding of the regulations is that these will be immediately implemented in the European Union without any requirement of national legislation to implement them as opposed to a directive.
[46:15.700 --> 46:18.620] [SPEAKER_01]: So directives have to be implemented by national legislation.
[46:19.180 --> 46:21.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Regulations automatically become law in the EU.
[46:22.220 --> 46:34.300] [SPEAKER_01]: And then this gets even more complicated and confounded by the notion of Brexit and whether this will ever ultimately apply if it does pass through the regulatory process and become a regulation, uh, in the UK.
[46:35.060 --> 46:42.500] [SPEAKER_01]: So Theresa May, um, and her hodgepodge may, may in fact get their way if Brexit does in fact, uh, uh, occur.
[46:43.120 --> 46:48.640] [SPEAKER_02]: So aren't the, uh, EU, uh, parliament, isn't there, aren't there resolutions non-binding to begin with?
[46:50.140 --> 46:51.020] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, well, yeah.
[46:51.120 --> 47:02.140] [SPEAKER_06]: So the, the, at this point, the European Union are proposing amendments to legislation and they will have to argue it out with the member states in the European council.
[47:02.220 --> 47:05.220] [SPEAKER_06]: So what happened is that it is complicated.
[47:05.220 --> 47:09.940] [SPEAKER_06]: You end up with the European parliament having one position on the draft legislation.
[47:10.280 --> 47:15.080] [SPEAKER_06]: You have the commission who are like the bureaucrats having their original proposal.
[47:15.480 --> 47:26.180] [SPEAKER_06]: And then you have the member states come up with what they want, which is usually about a hundred miles from what the parliament and the commission want, or certainly from what parliament wants.
[47:26.300 --> 47:27.980] [SPEAKER_01]: It's certainly complicated.
[47:28.200 --> 47:43.760] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, and all the more important, I think for people to support organizations like the open rights group, Jim, could you tell us how we can get in touch with the open rights group and, and how we can support it and track it and, and understand more closely what's going on?
[47:44.960 --> 47:45.460] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, absolutely.
[47:45.720 --> 47:50.860] [SPEAKER_06]: So if you go to open rights group.org, uh, that's where you'll find us.
[47:51.000 --> 47:55.800] [SPEAKER_06]: And you can, from there, you just big button saying, join today, press that.
[47:55.940 --> 48:02.020] [SPEAKER_06]: And if you want to sign up, if you want to support us then please do, uh, you know, more people, the better basically.
[48:02.480 --> 48:13.960] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and you know, and I'm for, I'd also just sort of say, you know, another organization, if you're interested in what is going on in Europe, have a look at European digital rights.
[48:14.160 --> 48:15.840] [SPEAKER_06]: That's E D R I.org.
[48:16.080 --> 48:17.860] [SPEAKER_06]: They're also really good on these issues.
[48:18.020 --> 48:25.260] [SPEAKER_06]: And, you know, if you, particularly if you're into the sort of nuts and bolts of the policy, they're, they're really worth, uh, you know, following as well.
[48:25.260 --> 48:25.960] [SPEAKER_00]: Okay.
[48:26.220 --> 48:29.980] [SPEAKER_00]: Well, um, Jim, we're going to, uh, let you get back to your life, but thank you so much for joining us today.
[48:30.580 --> 48:31.200] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, thank you.
[48:31.500 --> 48:34.360] [SPEAKER_00]: We've been speaking with Jim Killick from the, uh, open rights group.
[48:34.720 --> 48:36.980] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, Jim, thank you very much and have a very good evening.
[48:38.220 --> 48:38.760] [SPEAKER_06]: You too.
[48:39.020 --> 48:39.140] [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[48:39.200 --> 48:39.440] [SPEAKER_06]: Bye now.
[48:40.640 --> 48:42.560] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, that was quite an enlightening conversation.
[48:42.560 --> 48:47.520] [SPEAKER_01]: I have to say, um, you know, they seem to do excellent work, really tracking these issues.
[48:47.780 --> 48:51.220] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, they're the UK equivalent of the electronic frontier foundation.
[48:51.400 --> 48:51.720] [SPEAKER_01]: Absolutely.
[48:52.100 --> 49:00.920] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, and you know, EFF does, uh, a great deal amount of, uh, a great deal of great work, but then the world is a big place.
[49:01.180 --> 49:15.340] [SPEAKER_01]: And I think as Jim has made, you know, a very good argument for, you know, we need more organizations like this that are tracking the issues that are following them closely that, you know, operate locally as well, and really understand the nuances of these particular issues.
[49:15.340 --> 49:15.800] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[49:16.120 --> 49:24.300] [SPEAKER_02]: Uh, front of the show, Corey Doctro actually, uh, explicitly started the, he's one of the co-founders of the ORG and he explicitly built it on the model of the EFF.
[49:25.340 --> 49:25.740] [SPEAKER_00]: Excellent.
[49:25.940 --> 49:27.900] [SPEAKER_00]: And, uh, we'll be keeping an eye on all of this.
[49:28.160 --> 49:33.480] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, some of you, some of you might ask, why are we an American show, uh, paying so much attention to the UK?
[49:33.760 --> 49:48.760] [SPEAKER_00]: And that is of course, because I think in so many ways, the UK has been the model at the forefront of everything that's been going on in sort of the surveillance and, uh, and self surveillance world and, uh, countries like our own tend to follow along with what they're doing to a great extent.
[49:48.980 --> 49:49.920] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, they absolutely do.
[49:50.040 --> 49:53.800] [SPEAKER_01]: And, and to, to an extent we've even gone farther, right?
[49:53.940 --> 50:07.540] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, you don't have yet as I, as far as I know, things like the LinkNYC kiosks over in London, which is a, you know, a centralized database of surveillance primarily built on, uh, with the purpose of advertising in mind.
[50:07.820 --> 50:17.340] [SPEAKER_01]: So, you know, that, that I think we'll, we'll quickly go over there, but this, these types of notions and things of, of surveillance, you know, the UK is very much a surveillance centered society.
[50:18.000 --> 50:21.500] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, you know, there are CCTV cameras everywhere.
[50:22.240 --> 50:32.120] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, it, I mean, when you walk around London late at night, it becomes really difficult to find a place to, to urinate publicly without, without being on CCTV.
[50:32.260 --> 50:39.140] [SPEAKER_01]: I have to say, it's something that comes to, you know, the forefront of everybody's mind when you, you know, when you leave the pubs at either 11 or 12.
[50:39.340 --> 50:39.540] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[50:39.640 --> 50:43.320] [SPEAKER_02]: The London Olympic, uh, mascots look just like CCTV cameras.
[50:43.900 --> 50:44.480] [SPEAKER_01]: That's right.
[50:44.480 --> 50:46.020] [SPEAKER_01]: I do, I, I do remember that.
[50:46.440 --> 50:46.620] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[50:47.000 --> 50:48.180] [SPEAKER_01]: Quite an interesting coincidence.
[50:48.580 --> 50:49.900] [SPEAKER_00]: It's all, uh, pretty amazing.
[50:50.100 --> 50:51.320] [SPEAKER_00]: We've got a little bit of time left.
[50:51.320 --> 50:53.920] [SPEAKER_00]: I think we can maybe fit in a few, uh, listener phone calls.
[50:54.080 --> 51:03.920] [SPEAKER_00]: If you would like to, uh, get in touch with us, uh, give us a call at 347-335-0818 or, uh, send us a note at hacker radio show on Twitter.
[51:04.420 --> 51:06.900] [SPEAKER_00]: And, uh, Voltaire will be keeping an eye on that, uh, for us.
[51:07.000 --> 51:10.140] [SPEAKER_00]: And we'll, uh, we'll see if we can get to your questions and comments.
[51:10.320 --> 51:13.780] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, in the meantime, you know, maybe we can talk about this pirate bay.
[51:14.000 --> 51:14.360] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[51:14.360 --> 51:16.580] [SPEAKER_01]: Main name case, which is, you know, kind of bizarre.
[51:16.880 --> 51:17.240] [SPEAKER_00]: Yes.
[51:17.380 --> 51:22.240] [SPEAKER_00]: The, uh, U.S. embassy is, uh, threatening a Costa Rican domain registry over the pirate bay's domain.
[51:22.900 --> 51:29.100] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, the, uh, basically the pirate bay dot CR is one of the pirate bay's many, many backup domains.
[51:29.140 --> 51:37.060] [SPEAKER_00]: Uh, this one located in Costa Rica and, uh, the registry in Costa Rica says it won't comply without a court order and has written to the ICANN organization.
[51:37.340 --> 51:42.220] [SPEAKER_00]: That's, uh, the, the, basically the parent umbrella organization of all the domain registries out there.
[51:42.480 --> 51:42.480] That's right.
[51:42.480 --> 51:58.280] [SPEAKER_01]: It stands for the Internet corporation for assigned names and numbers, which is actually a California based not for profit corporation that, that operated under, uh, an amorphous document called an affirmation of commitments that had signed with the department of commerce a long time ago.
[51:58.440 --> 52:00.520] [SPEAKER_00]: That just sounds like something in a healthy relationship.
[52:00.780 --> 52:05.140] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, yes, it was certainly an unhealthy relationship that they had, unfortunately.
[52:05.960 --> 52:19.100] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, yes, it's, this is a fascinating case too, because it calls into question, um, the legitimacy of the U.S. influence over other top-level domains on the Internet, namely dot CR.
[52:19.480 --> 52:29.860] [SPEAKER_01]: And something to remember specifically with respect to ICANN is that dot CR is a CCTLD or a country code top-level domain, which isn't necessarily regulated by ICANN.
[52:30.020 --> 52:36.420] [SPEAKER_01]: And what the U.S. government did not do in this particular instance was go to the local courts and get a court order.
[52:36.540 --> 52:44.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Instead, it tried to exert some kind of diplomatic influence over the CCTLD itself, which then caused them to go and complain to ICANN.
[52:45.160 --> 52:57.600] [SPEAKER_01]: And the funny thing about this entire situation is if you want to give the punchline about this, Rob, if you recall it, um, the, the domain name actually didn't even relate to the real pirate bay.
[52:57.980 --> 53:04.920] [SPEAKER_01]: It was some kind of, you know, spoof or a copycat domain name, and nobody really figured that out yet.
[53:04.980 --> 53:15.060] [SPEAKER_01]: There was this diplomatic scuffle, you know, that involved ICANN, the embassies, letters going back and forth, personal accusations and slurs, according to the various articles that I've read about it.
[53:15.560 --> 53:17.440] [SPEAKER_01]: And in fact, it really didn't matter.
[53:17.620 --> 53:21.060] [SPEAKER_00]: So, so the dot CR was not actually run by the pirate bay organization.
[53:21.400 --> 53:33.440] [SPEAKER_00]: It doesn't appear to have been incredible because I assumed it was because they, they've always, they're always burning through domains because, uh, people keep, uh, complaining and to the registrars until they, until they, uh, get rid of the pirate bay.
[53:33.540 --> 53:37.500] [SPEAKER_00]: Of course, the pirate bay.org is, uh, the known main domain of the pirate bay.
[53:37.540 --> 53:38.080] [SPEAKER_01]: That's right.
[53:38.240 --> 53:45.380] [SPEAKER_01]: Which is run by an Internet registry known as the public Internet registry, you know, that operates.org, which is based in the United States.
[53:45.380 --> 53:50.520] [SPEAKER_01]: So it seems like there was a lot of wasted effort and, and, and time.
[53:50.840 --> 53:55.500] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, and arguably credibility has been lost here as well.
[53:56.080 --> 54:09.980] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, you know, another thing that's quite interesting too, is these CCTLDs are often sort of havens for free expression and, and questionable activities as well when it comes to things like copyright infringement, um, or counterfeiting.
[54:10.140 --> 54:30.540] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, .SE or the Sweden top-level domain operated under similar bases as the .CR, meaning that you can't just go over to this registry that is the database of the domain names and ask that they, um, disable a particular domain name without actually going to a local court and getting a local court order.
[54:30.760 --> 54:44.420] [SPEAKER_01]: So if we were really concerned about this, Costa Rica has laws about copyright infringement, we could have brought a local lawsuit, got an order from a judge to remove this website from the registry and simply presented it to the .CR CCTLD.
[54:44.820 --> 54:45.940] [SPEAKER_01]: That's their policy.
[54:46.060 --> 54:46.940] [SPEAKER_01]: That's what it requires.
[54:47.160 --> 54:54.460] [SPEAKER_01]: But we instead tried to exert some sort of arguably undue influence on the registry and they really pushed back.
[54:54.640 --> 55:01.260] [SPEAKER_01]: They pushed back and they complained to ICANN and they complained to, uh, the ambassador to Costa Rica.
[55:01.480 --> 55:04.200] [SPEAKER_01]: And this became, you know, an embarrassing situation.
[55:05.180 --> 55:09.580] [SPEAKER_00]: Embarrassing indeed because it doesn't look like they were expecting to get pushed back at in any, uh, in any respect.
[55:09.960 --> 55:10.760] [SPEAKER_00]: No, not at all.
[55:11.320 --> 55:11.680] [SPEAKER_00]: Wow.
[55:12.160 --> 55:12.360] [SPEAKER_00]: Okay.
[55:12.380 --> 55:13.680] [SPEAKER_00]: Well, we're running really low on time.
[55:13.780 --> 55:15.320] [SPEAKER_00]: So unfortunately, we won't get to those phone calls.
[55:15.700 --> 55:18.320] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, but I, I will put a couple of things out there.
[55:18.520 --> 55:22.220] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, very happy solstice to those of you who have, uh, celebrations going on today.
[55:22.400 --> 55:26.400] [SPEAKER_00]: Very happy Pride this weekend, um, here in New York, a big day on, uh, on Sunday.
[55:27.100 --> 55:33.140] [SPEAKER_00]: And, uh, yeah, just keep, uh, keep sending us email oth@2600.com.
[55:33.360 --> 55:37.400] [SPEAKER_00]: Uh, keep letting us know what you think and, uh, interesting stories you hear about.
[55:37.520 --> 55:44.040] [SPEAKER_00]: And, uh, also music that you might like to, uh, see, uh, hear featured on our, uh, outros are ever changing outros.
[55:44.140 --> 55:49.000] [SPEAKER_00]: If you're a musician and I know there are some of you out there, um, get in touch with us.
[55:49.040 --> 55:50.620] [SPEAKER_00]: oth@2600.com.
[55:50.920 --> 55:54.740] [SPEAKER_00]: We would like to play your music and, uh, tweet at us.
[55:59.720 --> 56:09.480] [SPEAKER_00]: Hacker Off The Hook, for Emmanuel and Kyle in absentia, for Voltaire and Alex right here, for myself, and, uh, for the, for the greater good.
[56:10.280 --> 56:11.480] [SPEAKER_00]: Have a very good night.
[56:12.080 --> 56:13.220] [SPEAKER_00]: Now here's a classic.
[56:22.470 --> 56:26.430] [SPEAKER_04]: I said, hey operator, please give us a hand.
[56:26.670 --> 56:29.650] [SPEAKER_04]: You gotta help us out cause we're the telephone band.
[56:29.990 --> 56:32.750] [SPEAKER_04]: Calling all people that are sitting at home.
[56:32.910 --> 56:35.610] [SPEAKER_04]: Put some rockin' and rollin' on the telephone.
[56:35.850 --> 57:05.790] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, ah, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock,
[57:05.790 --> 57:05.830] [SPEAKER_04]: rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock,
[57:05.830 --> 57:06.670] [SPEAKER_04]: rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, rock, Hello?
[57:07.050 --> 57:07.970] [SPEAKER_04]: Who is this?
[57:08.130 --> 57:11.630] [SPEAKER_04]: What do you mean by calling me up and bothering me like this?
[57:12.150 --> 57:15.050] [SPEAKER_04]: Please, operator, please give us a chance.
[57:15.210 --> 57:18.290] [SPEAKER_04]: The people are waiting, so please dial us this dance.
[57:18.610 --> 57:21.470] [SPEAKER_04]: They want to hear our music, yeah, they want us to sing.
[57:21.830 --> 57:25.510] [SPEAKER_04]: So operator, please make their telephone ring, yeah, yeah.
[57:25.510 --> 57:30.850] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[57:31.090 --> 57:32.950] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock, rock, rock.
[57:33.750 --> 57:35.450] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock.
[57:36.050 --> 57:38.190] [SPEAKER_04]: You know you can't go wrong.
[57:38.630 --> 57:39.530] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock.
[57:40.330 --> 57:41.990] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock.
[57:42.610 --> 57:44.710] [SPEAKER_04]: Come on and dial that phone.
[57:45.290 --> 57:46.110] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock.
[57:46.970 --> 57:48.630] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock.
[57:49.050 --> 57:51.410] [SPEAKER_04]: We'll hold on all night long.
[57:51.870 --> 57:52.750] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock.
[57:53.590 --> 57:55.190] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock.
[57:55.510 --> 58:00.630] [SPEAKER_04]: Listen, if you young scallywrags don't stop bothering me like this, I'm gonna call the police!
[58:01.210 --> 58:07.650] [SPEAKER_04]: Said, hey everybody all across the land, we're here to entertain you with the telephone band.
[58:07.970 --> 58:14.330] [SPEAKER_04]: So take off your shoes, start shaking your feet, and dance like crazy to our telephone beat.
[58:14.570 --> 58:19.970] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, ha!
[58:20.550 --> 58:22.450] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock, rock, rock!
[58:23.390 --> 58:25.030] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock!
[58:25.390 --> 58:27.630] [SPEAKER_04]: People, don't you hear that tone?
[58:28.150 --> 58:29.070] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock!
[58:29.990 --> 58:31.530] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock!
[58:31.830 --> 58:34.470] [SPEAKER_04]: Come on, baby, hold the phone, yeah!
[58:34.810 --> 58:35.730] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock!
[58:36.710 --> 58:38.130] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock!
[58:38.470 --> 58:40.830] [SPEAKER_04]: Let's hear it one more time!
[58:41.430 --> 58:42.310] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock!
[58:43.310 --> 58:44.770] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock!
[58:44.990 --> 58:47.790] [SPEAKER_04]: You know it only costs a dime, yeah!
[58:48.170 --> 58:48.930] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock!
[58:49.150 --> 58:50.310] [SPEAKER_04]: There they are, officer!
[58:50.310 --> 58:53.310] [SPEAKER_04]: Sir, there are the ripper snappers that have been calling me up.
[58:54.510 --> 58:55.730] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock.
[58:56.610 --> 58:58.070] [SPEAKER_04]: Don't you hear that beat?
[58:58.550 --> 58:59.050] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, yeah.
[59:00.030 --> 59:01.130] [SPEAKER_04]: Real life, wow.
[59:01.390 --> 59:02.390] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock.
[59:03.390 --> 59:04.810] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock.
[59:05.530 --> 59:07.090] [SPEAKER_04]: I'm hung up on you, baby.
[59:07.850 --> 59:08.970] [SPEAKER_04]: Oh, rock, rock, rock.
[59:10.030 --> 59:11.470] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock.
[59:11.810 --> 59:14.770] [SPEAKER_04]: You're gonna be the receiver of all my loving.
[59:15.670 --> 59:16.390] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock.
[59:16.810 --> 59:18.150] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone rock.
[59:20.310 --> 59:21.610] [SPEAKER_04]: It's a good connection, baby.
[59:21.890 --> 59:23.190] [SPEAKER_04]: Rock, rock, rock, rock.
[59:23.610 --> 59:24.370] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone.
[59:25.390 --> 59:26.790] [SPEAKER_04]: Hey, put that booth down.
[59:27.270 --> 59:28.550] [SPEAKER_04]: Where you going with this telephone?