Off The Hook - 2018-04-11

[00:00.340 --> 00:08.260]  [SPEAKER_00]: The Community Advisory Board will hold its monthly meeting on Sunday, April 15th at 1 p.m.
[00:08.680 --> 00:12.340]  [SPEAKER_00]: at the 60 Wall Street Atrium in Lower Manhattan.
[00:12.680 --> 00:15.070]  [SPEAKER_00]: All listeners are invited to attend.
[00:15.360 --> 00:23.260]  [SPEAKER_00]: Once again, the Community Advisory Board will hold its monthly meeting on Sunday, April 15th at 1 p.m.
[00:23.420 --> 00:26.880]  [SPEAKER_00]: at the 60 Wall Street Atrium in Lower Manhattan.
[00:26.880 --> 00:29.320]  [SPEAKER_00]: All listeners are invited to attend.
[00:33.670 --> 00:36.650]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's now 8 am, and it's off the hook.
[00:41.620 --> 00:46.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:47.200 --> 00:51.820]  [SPEAKER_06]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a cough.
[00:52.480 --> 01:00.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: We couldn't get much worse, but the best is back the worst.
[01:00.680 --> 01:03.660]  [SPEAKER_06]: I hope that's understood, but the best is back the worst.
[01:43.100 --> 01:45.440]  [SPEAKER_08]: Привет, друзья, и как дела вдруг?
[02:01.420 --> 02:02.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: What's going on here?
[02:03.040 --> 02:03.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hold on.
[02:03.800 --> 02:07.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: Guys, I thought we were supposed to do this in the original Russian.
[02:08.840 --> 02:09.880]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[02:10.700 --> 02:12.700]  [SPEAKER_12]: I was in the bathroom, okay?
[02:13.580 --> 02:17.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: Right away, we're going to start changing things around here.
[02:17.360 --> 02:17.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: No.
[02:19.540 --> 02:23.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: Guys, wait until we get the signal that we talked about this.
[02:23.980 --> 02:24.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's true.
[02:26.200 --> 02:26.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm sorry.
[02:27.100 --> 02:28.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm sorry, folks, for the confusion.
[02:28.620 --> 02:29.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is off the hook.
[02:31.160 --> 02:32.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: Still the English version.
[02:32.760 --> 02:34.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we're here on this Wednesday evening.
[02:36.260 --> 02:36.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wow.
[02:37.020 --> 02:37.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[02:38.220 --> 02:39.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: I have to get here earlier, apparently.
[02:40.620 --> 02:41.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good evening.
[02:41.420 --> 02:45.020]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is Emmanuel joined by Alex over here.
[02:45.640 --> 02:46.580]  [SPEAKER_12]: Or Alexander.
[02:47.540 --> 02:48.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: Who's your comrade over there?
[02:49.360 --> 02:50.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm DJ Cornflower.
[02:51.060 --> 02:51.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[02:51.580 --> 02:52.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we have Voltaire.
[02:53.080 --> 02:53.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hello.
[02:53.740 --> 02:55.020]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we have Rob T.
[02:55.140 --> 02:55.580]  [SPEAKER_12]: Firefly.
[02:55.840 --> 02:56.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good evening.
[02:56.480 --> 02:57.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: Kyle's on assignment.
[02:58.240 --> 02:59.580]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's probably for the best.
[03:01.080 --> 03:01.700]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[03:01.860 --> 03:02.900]  [SPEAKER_12]: What a day.
[03:03.080 --> 03:08.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, as long as we're talking about countries being taken over and things like that.
[03:08.140 --> 03:08.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wow.
[03:08.440 --> 03:20.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: Alex, as our legal advisor, not our legal advisor technically, but the guy on the radio who advises us about legal matters, how boy, you know, when someone's lawyer gets raided, that's unusual.
[03:20.800 --> 03:22.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: That doesn't happen to you very often, does it?
[03:22.180 --> 03:24.800]  [SPEAKER_11]: No, thankfully, it does not.
[03:25.440 --> 03:30.060]  [SPEAKER_11]: You know, and even Donald Trump has said, you know, attorney client privilege is dead.
[03:30.320 --> 03:30.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's dead.
[03:31.120 --> 03:31.880]  [SPEAKER_12]: So what does that mean?
[03:32.040 --> 03:33.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: There's no more attorney client privilege.
[03:33.700 --> 03:34.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's dead.
[03:34.180 --> 03:35.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: The president said that.
[03:35.180 --> 03:35.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: That means it is dead.
[03:36.060 --> 03:40.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, it's pretty safe to say that when Donald Trump says something, it's very likely not the case.
[03:41.300 --> 03:42.720]  [SPEAKER_11]: Attorney client privilege isn't dead.
[03:43.340 --> 03:47.000]  [SPEAKER_11]: This is an extremely and highly unusual thing to happen.
[03:47.840 --> 03:52.460]  [SPEAKER_11]: However, it is also not really surprising.
[03:53.060 --> 03:57.980]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think that the logistics that went into this particular raid are also really, really interesting.
[03:58.260 --> 04:04.560]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, the fact that... and this is really, as far as I know, never, ever happened in U.S.
[04:04.620 --> 04:09.800]  [SPEAKER_11]: history before, where the president's personal attorney is raided by the FBI.
[04:10.200 --> 04:12.380]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, this is absolutely extraordinary.
[04:12.920 --> 04:19.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: And you have to remember that this was a referral that came from Robert Mueller and the special counsel's office.
[04:20.480 --> 04:24.580]  [SPEAKER_11]: In fact, I think there's an interesting article in the new issue of 2600 about the special counsel.
[04:24.900 --> 04:26.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, you know, if you want... I think you wrote it.
[04:27.440 --> 04:28.700]  [SPEAKER_11]: You might be right about that.
[04:29.540 --> 04:30.060]  [SPEAKER_11]: You're right.
[04:30.260 --> 04:31.660]  [SPEAKER_11]: Now I recall.
[04:31.840 --> 04:33.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: I wasn't supposed to not say it.
[04:33.300 --> 04:34.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, people will figure it out pretty quickly.
[04:34.600 --> 04:34.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: They could.
[04:35.140 --> 04:35.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[04:36.120 --> 04:36.880]  [SPEAKER_11]: I've been busy.
[04:37.440 --> 04:43.060]  [SPEAKER_11]: But anyway, so this came from the special counsel's office, was referred over to the Southern District of New York, which is...
[04:43.060 --> 04:43.900]  [SPEAKER_12]: Can I ask you about that?
[04:43.940 --> 04:44.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: The Southern District?
[04:45.280 --> 04:48.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: So every state has different districts, or is that a district in the country?
[04:49.780 --> 04:53.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: Every state has different districts, if the state warrants different districts.
[04:53.840 --> 04:55.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: So there's a Northern District?
[04:55.640 --> 04:56.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes.
[04:56.160 --> 04:56.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: Where's that?
[04:56.840 --> 04:57.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: In the North.
[04:57.920 --> 04:58.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: How far in the North?
[04:58.900 --> 04:59.960]  [SPEAKER_11]: Just past Winterfell.
[05:00.200 --> 05:00.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[05:00.680 --> 05:00.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right.
[05:01.540 --> 05:04.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: How about... how many are there is what I'm getting at?
[05:04.220 --> 05:04.880]  [SPEAKER_11]: You know what?
[05:04.960 --> 05:11.040]  [SPEAKER_11]: To be honest with you, I don't really know exactly in New York, because the only ones that I really pay attention to are the Southern District and the Eastern District.
[05:11.100 --> 05:14.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, it's almost playoff season, so I'd like to know how many districts there are before the championship begins.
[05:15.080 --> 05:15.620]  [SPEAKER_11]: There's quite a few.
[05:15.740 --> 05:18.080]  [SPEAKER_11]: And some states only have one, some states have others.
[05:18.220 --> 05:19.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's just like area codes.
[05:19.360 --> 05:21.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: The more people you have, the more districts you have, the more U.S.
[05:21.940 --> 05:22.360]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorneys you have.
[05:22.360 --> 05:22.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: Okay.
[05:22.540 --> 05:24.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: And if there's only one, I guess there's a big zero in the middle of it.
[05:25.040 --> 05:25.660]  [SPEAKER_11]: Quite likely.
[05:25.820 --> 05:26.040]  [SPEAKER_11]: All right.
[05:26.180 --> 05:26.680]  [SPEAKER_11]: Quite likely.
[05:26.740 --> 05:27.720]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's a very important point.
[05:27.900 --> 05:28.000]  [SPEAKER_11]: Good.
[05:28.120 --> 05:30.880]  [SPEAKER_11]: And, yeah, little known fact about area codes, right?
[05:30.980 --> 05:33.640]  [SPEAKER_11]: Zero meant it was the code for the entire state.
[05:33.640 --> 05:34.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: The only one in the state.
[05:34.680 --> 05:36.020]  [SPEAKER_12]: 505, New Mexico, you know.
[05:36.640 --> 05:37.000]  [SPEAKER_11]: 907?
[05:37.420 --> 05:38.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: 907, Alaska, 808.
[05:38.820 --> 05:39.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hawaii?
[05:39.180 --> 05:40.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're veering way off topic here.
[05:40.640 --> 05:42.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's get back to the downfall of Trump.
[05:42.740 --> 05:43.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's right.
[05:43.080 --> 05:49.320]  [SPEAKER_11]: So this was referred to the Southern District of New York, which is, for all intents and purposes, the most prestigious and well-known U.S.
[05:49.400 --> 05:50.460]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorney's office in the country.
[05:50.460 --> 05:58.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: And that's because it's located in the southern tip of Manhattan, and Manhattan and New York in particular is the financial center of the world.
[05:58.760 --> 06:02.360]  [SPEAKER_11]: You know, things happen in New York, and in particular, Manhattan.
[06:02.880 --> 06:05.200]  [SPEAKER_11]: Lots of financial crimes, lots of different dealings.
[06:05.200 --> 06:06.820]  [SPEAKER_11]: Plus, he hails from New York, too.
[06:06.920 --> 06:07.940]  [SPEAKER_11]: And he hails from New York.
[06:08.020 --> 06:08.760]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's exactly right.
[06:08.940 --> 06:12.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: And don't forget that Preet Bharara, who was a very well-known U.S.
[06:12.600 --> 06:13.400]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorney, the U.S.
[06:13.680 --> 06:18.240]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorney for the Southern District of New York, was fired unceremoniously by Trump last year.
[06:18.240 --> 06:21.080]  [SPEAKER_11]: When he was told by Trump that he was going to retain his position.
[06:21.240 --> 06:22.480]  [SPEAKER_11]: So is he cackling somewhere?
[06:23.160 --> 06:24.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yes, he definitely is cackling.
[06:24.620 --> 06:24.980]  [SPEAKER_11]: Hattie .com.
[06:25.840 --> 06:26.760]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yes, yes.
[06:26.900 --> 06:28.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: He is definitely cackling.
[06:28.760 --> 06:29.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: So another U.S.
[06:29.940 --> 06:36.760]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorney was placed in charge of the Southern District of New York, who apparently had to recuse himself, and it was the deputy U.S.
[06:36.840 --> 06:39.340]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorney that authorized this particular search.
[06:39.600 --> 06:43.500]  [SPEAKER_11]: However, when you're searching a lawyer's office, there's something called the U.S.
[06:43.760 --> 06:44.220]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorney's manual.
[06:44.220 --> 06:47.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: And this is the manual by which all U.S.
[06:47.340 --> 06:54.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorneys across the country, regardless of whether you're in a district that has an area code with a zero in the middle or one in the middle, they all have to follow the U.S.
[06:54.280 --> 06:54.660]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorney's manual.
[06:54.840 --> 07:03.700]  [SPEAKER_11]: And there are very specific guidelines about searching lawyer's offices because of the sensitivity of obtaining attorney-client-privileged information.
[07:04.540 --> 07:05.680]  [SPEAKER_11]: And the U.S.
[07:06.020 --> 07:11.680]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorney's office obviously thinks that the attorney-client privilege is sacrosanct, just as any other attorney does.
[07:11.800 --> 07:14.120]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's just that their client is the U.S.
[07:14.240 --> 07:14.500]  [SPEAKER_11]: government.
[07:15.280 --> 07:21.380]  [SPEAKER_11]: And in fact, you have to also remember that with respect to the Department of Justice, their client is not just the U.S.
[07:21.480 --> 07:24.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: government, but various agencies of the U.S.
[07:24.560 --> 07:24.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: government.
[07:24.960 --> 07:29.460]  [SPEAKER_11]: Maybe some components of the intelligence agency are clients of the Department of Justice.
[07:29.640 --> 07:32.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: So attorney-client privilege is extremely important to them as well.
[07:33.620 --> 07:34.960]  [SPEAKER_11]: And part of this U.S.
[07:35.200 --> 07:52.900]  [SPEAKER_11]: attorney's manual requires notification to the criminal division that you're about to search a lawyer's office, really specifically and narrowly tailoring the search warrant, making sure that the search as conducted doesn't retain or collect attorney-client-privileged information.
[07:52.920 --> 07:56.920]  [SPEAKER_11]: And you have to have a really, really compelling reason to search a lawyer's office.
[07:56.920 --> 07:58.780]  [SPEAKER_11]: It doesn't happen very frequently.
[07:58.880 --> 08:03.480]  [SPEAKER_11]: And it's never happened, as far as I know, to the president's personal lawyer.
[08:03.600 --> 08:05.160]  [SPEAKER_11]: So this is a huge deal.
[08:05.440 --> 08:06.000]  [SPEAKER_11]: Huge deal.
[08:06.380 --> 08:07.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, it is.
[08:07.380 --> 08:09.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that's what pretty much everybody is talking about.
[08:09.980 --> 08:13.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: And there's all kinds of theories as to what is going to happen next.
[08:13.520 --> 08:26.700]  [SPEAKER_12]: But the general consensus seems to be something's going to happen soon, whether it's Robert Mueller being fired or a bombing campaign against the country of your choice, just something to deflect interest away from this.
[08:27.400 --> 08:30.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's very interesting times ahead.
[08:30.180 --> 08:37.580]  [SPEAKER_12]: But legally, even though this is unprecedented, you don't see anything that is amiss as far as this whole thing?
[08:37.680 --> 08:47.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, it's hard to say because I'm obviously not privy to the paperwork that the Department of Justice had filed with the criminal division or any of the forms that they submitted that detailed the circumstances that justify this particular warrant.
[08:48.040 --> 08:49.720]  [SPEAKER_11]: But a judge had to sign off on it.
[08:50.020 --> 08:56.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I'm pretty confident in the judiciary when it comes to the Southern District of New York as well.
[08:56.300 --> 09:00.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, these are very intelligent, competent judges that have been on the bench for a long time.
[09:01.080 --> 09:03.340]  [SPEAKER_11]: They're not all Democratic appointees.
[09:03.540 --> 09:04.920]  [SPEAKER_11]: You know, they're not political operatives.
[09:05.020 --> 09:10.980]  [SPEAKER_11]: These are people that are appointed for life, independent judicial officers that take this extremely seriously.
[09:11.240 --> 09:16.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's the whole point of having Article III judges under the Constitution is to be divorced from the political process.
[09:16.340 --> 09:23.160]  [SPEAKER_11]: So I think that whatever the circumstances are that justified this particular search, they had to be really, really dire.
[09:23.420 --> 09:29.440]  [SPEAKER_11]: And we see this investigation veering off into areas where we may have not really expected it.
[09:29.560 --> 09:42.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: We know that they were searching for information with respect to the payments to these particular women with whom Donald Trump may have had some sort of extramarital relationships.
[09:43.020 --> 09:49.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: There are other issues that are going to implicate Michael Cohen as well, because Donald Trump seems to have really hung him out to dry.
[09:50.000 --> 09:54.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: Donald Trump, the President of the United States, has said, I didn't know about these payments to Stormy Daniel.
[09:54.980 --> 10:03.920]  [SPEAKER_11]: Which, if that is true, means that on behalf of his client, Michael Cohen sent $130,000 to settle a case without his client's consent.
[10:03.920 --> 10:07.840]  [SPEAKER_11]: And why was there a non-disclosure agreement if he didn't know anything about it?
[10:08.060 --> 10:09.200]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's a very good question.
[10:09.200 --> 10:11.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: You'd have to ask the President when you depose him.
[10:11.980 --> 10:13.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, we have some interesting times ahead.
[10:13.600 --> 10:20.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's just a little bit scary, though, because, you know, I heard this analogy on the way in, that it's kind of like how you go after a mob boss.
[10:21.460 --> 10:29.020]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, and you know, I'm thinking of the various mob bosses I've been acquainted with over the years, and none of them had their finger on nuclear buttons.
[10:29.340 --> 10:33.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: And if they did, I think that, you know, something unfortunate might have happened.
[10:33.940 --> 10:41.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: Here we have a situation where you have somebody, and I don't want you to insult mob bosses by equating Trump with them, because obviously he's not as intelligent.
[10:41.740 --> 10:48.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, you know, somebody of that ilk getting angry and having all this power.
[10:48.680 --> 10:51.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: He has the power to fire the person who's looking into him.
[10:51.960 --> 10:54.020]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that is just insane on its own.
[10:54.020 --> 10:54.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: Sure.
[10:55.080 --> 10:59.580]  [SPEAKER_11]: Let me espouse a strange theory about what may have happened.
[10:59.800 --> 11:06.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: I don't necessarily believe this is to be the case, but it is something I don't think people have really talked about very much, if at all.
[11:06.740 --> 11:09.840]  [SPEAKER_11]: Now, let's say the search was, in fact, conducted illegally.
[11:11.400 --> 11:14.980]  [SPEAKER_11]: A judge signed off on this, which I don't think it's really necessarily the case.
[11:14.980 --> 11:16.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: You described it as breaking in.
[11:17.180 --> 11:17.780]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's true.
[11:18.040 --> 11:25.400]  [SPEAKER_11]: You know, and on the other hand, Michael Cohen was fairly gracious about how this happened, said the FBI was courteous and respectful and, you know, nice.
[11:25.720 --> 11:29.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: I've been part of FBI raids on the receiving end, and they're generally polite.
[11:29.940 --> 11:35.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: They don't always have all the facts, but they, you know, they do say please and thank you, and if they drop something, they pick it up.
[11:36.040 --> 11:40.000]  [SPEAKER_11]: Most FBI agents that I've met have certainly had a proper upbringing, so I agree.
[11:40.000 --> 11:45.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: And so, in any event, so let's assume the worst here.
[11:45.480 --> 11:53.720]  [SPEAKER_11]: Let's assume that this particular operation to search Michael Cohen's office was in fact engineered by the administration itself.
[11:53.820 --> 12:10.440]  [SPEAKER_11]: Because what that would mean, if this was in fact an illegal search, and all this evidence was obtained from Michael Cohen's office, evidence that may implicate the president in payoffs and schemes and scams in financial dealings, money laundering, who knows what is in this lawyer's office,
[12:10.540 --> 12:10.700]  [SPEAKER_11]: right?
[12:11.020 --> 12:19.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: If it was obtained illegally, then technically it would be the fruit of the proverbial poisonous tree, and therefore could not be used against the president.
[12:19.180 --> 12:20.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, wait, I'm trying to keep up with you here.
[12:20.560 --> 12:25.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're saying, okay, the administration arranged for an illegal search...
[12:25.540 --> 12:26.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm not saying that...
[12:26.300 --> 12:28.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: ...in order to make all the evidence be tainted.
[12:28.760 --> 12:30.220]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yes, I'm saying that's a crazy way...
[12:30.220 --> 12:31.080]  [SPEAKER_11]: How would they do that?
[12:31.120 --> 12:31.920]  [SPEAKER_11]: How could they do that?
[12:32.000 --> 12:33.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's a crazy way of thinking about it.
[12:33.560 --> 12:38.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: They'd have to get the FBI to agree to do something illegal, and I don't think they would do that.
[12:38.560 --> 12:40.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, you don't... you never know.
[12:40.740 --> 12:42.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: You know, maybe there's this kind of deep state.
[12:42.400 --> 12:45.640]  [SPEAKER_11]: But this would be... this is a very conspiratorial way of thinking about it.
[12:45.740 --> 12:47.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: I don't think there's any veracity to it.
[12:47.760 --> 12:53.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: I'm just saying, as an alternative theory, there's maybe something to this, right?
[12:53.720 --> 12:57.080]  [SPEAKER_11]: So... or even a sort of unintentional consequence here.
[12:57.080 --> 12:59.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: For God's sake, Fox News just latched onto your theory.
[13:00.340 --> 13:00.880]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're kidding.
[13:00.880 --> 13:01.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: Damn it, Alex.
[13:01.440 --> 13:03.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: No, don't give them any ideas.
[13:03.560 --> 13:05.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now they're going to be running with this all night long.
[13:05.380 --> 13:10.260]  [SPEAKER_11]: But here's the... you know, part of this theory could have some validity in reality.
[13:10.640 --> 13:23.100]  [SPEAKER_11]: Because if some material was seized that shouldn't have been seized, that does implicate the president, if the FBI wasn't extremely careful here, that could be considered the fruit of the poisonous tree, and then not admissible in a court against the president.
[13:23.100 --> 13:26.300]  [SPEAKER_11]: So I think it's an extremely bold move by the U.S.
[13:26.560 --> 13:29.360]  [SPEAKER_11]: Attorney's Office, the Southern District in particular.
[13:30.260 --> 13:31.500]  [SPEAKER_11]: It seems like it was done...
[13:31.500 --> 13:32.580]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're known for our chutzpah here, you know.
[13:32.780 --> 13:33.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yes, that's right.
[13:33.640 --> 13:34.120]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's right.
[13:34.820 --> 13:35.560]  [SPEAKER_11]: Especially here.
[13:36.780 --> 13:40.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: And actually, technically, we're in the Eastern District of New York's U.S.
[13:40.520 --> 13:41.500]  [SPEAKER_11]: Attorney's Office jurisdiction right now.
[13:41.500 --> 13:42.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wait, what do you mean we're in the Eastern?
[13:42.120 --> 13:44.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: You just said it was the Southern District, it was Manhattan.
[13:44.240 --> 13:44.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: Manhattan.
[13:44.520 --> 13:45.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're in Brooklyn.
[13:45.460 --> 13:48.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're saying it's a different district just across the East River?
[13:48.000 --> 13:49.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's a different area code, it's a different district.
[13:50.240 --> 13:54.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: But some states only have one district, and there's two within a couple of miles of each other?
[13:54.360 --> 13:55.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's exactly right.
[13:55.240 --> 13:55.380]  [SPEAKER_11]: Wow.
[13:55.400 --> 13:56.360]  [SPEAKER_11]: There's a lot of people here.
[13:56.360 --> 13:57.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: What district is Queens?
[13:57.740 --> 14:00.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: I believe that's still Eastern District.
[14:01.040 --> 14:01.220]  [SPEAKER_11]: Okay.
[14:01.420 --> 14:02.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: Even Long Island.
[14:02.480 --> 14:04.440]  [SPEAKER_11]: Like, you go all the way out to Central Iceland.
[14:04.520 --> 14:05.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: What about Fishers Island?
[14:05.780 --> 14:06.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, there's one for you.
[14:06.980 --> 14:07.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's a good question.
[14:07.840 --> 14:07.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[14:08.400 --> 14:12.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: All right, well, so, Alex, your prediction, what do you think will happen next?
[14:12.840 --> 14:14.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: I have no idea.
[14:14.440 --> 14:16.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: I can't read the tea leaves on this at all.
[14:16.020 --> 14:17.800]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, none of us have any idea, that's why we're making predictions.
[14:18.000 --> 14:23.040]  [SPEAKER_11]: My prediction is, I think it is very likely that Michael Cohen will be charged with a crime.
[14:23.520 --> 14:29.300]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think the way in which they conducted this particular search warrant is sort of a raid.
[14:29.540 --> 14:32.940]  [SPEAKER_11]: As you mentioned earlier, it seems like they're going after some kind of mob boss.
[14:33.080 --> 14:41.760]  [SPEAKER_11]: They do that only when they think there is an imminent danger of the destruction of evidence, the spoliation of evidence that implicates people in a crime.
[14:41.760 --> 14:48.880]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think that Michael Cohen is going to be facing very severe disciplinary action from the New York State Bar.
[14:49.720 --> 14:54.620]  [SPEAKER_11]: He will probably be disbarred, and I would not be surprised if he was charged with a crime within the next couple of weeks.
[14:54.660 --> 14:55.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: But will he flip?
[14:56.360 --> 14:57.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: I don't think so.
[14:57.280 --> 14:58.220]  [SPEAKER_11]: I like asking that question.
[14:58.220 --> 14:58.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: I don't think so.
[14:58.740 --> 14:59.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: You think we can get him to flip?
[15:00.000 --> 15:00.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: No?
[15:00.280 --> 15:01.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, I agree.
[15:01.100 --> 15:01.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: He's a good soldier.
[15:01.840 --> 15:02.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: He is.
[15:02.700 --> 15:03.460]  [SPEAKER_11]: He's a good soldier.
[15:03.720 --> 15:07.440]  [SPEAKER_11]: And the way in which he became acquainted with the Trump organization is somewhat odd, too.
[15:07.600 --> 15:14.000]  [SPEAKER_11]: Because apparently, the way in which Donald Trump took notice of him was that he bought a whole bunch of apartments in one of his buildings.
[15:14.620 --> 15:18.560]  [SPEAKER_11]: And so, all of a sudden, he became part of this club and then became a Trump acolyte.
[15:19.160 --> 15:20.980]  [SPEAKER_11]: And then, obviously, a Trump supporter.
[15:21.140 --> 15:25.100]  [SPEAKER_11]: And so, yes, he's been a very, very good soldier for a really long time.
[15:25.140 --> 15:26.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wait, what if he was planted?
[15:26.260 --> 15:31.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: What if he did all that so he could get into Trump's good graces and try to implicate...
[15:31.100 --> 15:32.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wait, I'm trying to...
[15:32.100 --> 15:32.880]  [SPEAKER_10]: It's quite possible.
[15:32.920 --> 15:33.500]  [SPEAKER_10]: Get Trump out of this now.
[15:33.740 --> 15:34.360]  [SPEAKER_12]: No, no.
[15:35.720 --> 15:38.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, it's going to be something that will probably play out.
[15:38.900 --> 15:40.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: What kind of timeframe do you think we're looking at?
[15:40.560 --> 15:45.040]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think we're looking at quite possibly a couple of weeks for criminal charges against Michael Cohen.
[15:45.800 --> 15:57.740]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think we're going to see some pretty severe fallout from this in terms of, you know, PR, attacks on the FBI, on the Department of Justice, on career prosecutors in the Southern District of New York.
[15:58.000 --> 16:01.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think, you know, anybody is par for the...
[16:01.020 --> 16:02.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, anybody is fair game here.
[16:03.160 --> 16:06.640]  [SPEAKER_11]: It doesn't matter if you're a political operative or not when it comes to this organization.
[16:06.640 --> 16:12.380]  [SPEAKER_11]: So you're going to see a lot of very good people who have had very dedicated careers to public service.
[16:12.560 --> 16:26.040]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think being targeted and being the targets of smear campaigns and being maimed, I think it's going to be an extremely difficult couple of weeks for people in the Southern District of New York.
[16:26.280 --> 16:41.380]  [SPEAKER_11]: But I think, ultimately, the fruit of this particular investigation will find its way into some form of criminal indictment that will be unsealed, we hope, within, you know, the next couple of weeks or a month.
[16:41.660 --> 16:51.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: And if Trump makes it as far as November, I've been hearing a lot of reports of the I-word being floated around based on presumed election results.
[16:52.680 --> 16:56.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: And Trump could be impeached shortly after the House is retaken by Democrats.
[16:56.660 --> 16:57.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's going to be interesting, too.
[16:57.800 --> 16:58.500]  [SPEAKER_10]: Well, let's hope so.
[16:58.660 --> 17:03.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: And there seems to be a lot of possible subject matter for that.
[17:03.680 --> 17:13.580]  [SPEAKER_12]: But this wasn't the only thing going on politically because we had our friend Mark Zuckerberg up before two different committees in the last couple of days.
[17:14.080 --> 17:15.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yesterday, it was a Senate committee.
[17:15.460 --> 17:17.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: Today, I believe it was a House committee.
[17:17.740 --> 17:19.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: You guys have been watching this?
[17:20.200 --> 17:20.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: Mark who?
[17:22.000 --> 17:23.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: Mark Zuckerberg from Facebook.
[17:23.720 --> 17:24.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: You might have heard of him.
[17:24.540 --> 17:25.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, yes, yes.
[17:25.720 --> 17:26.200]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[17:26.980 --> 17:28.400]  [SPEAKER_01]: Unfortunately, he was...
[17:28.400 --> 17:32.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's such a large committee that normally they get seen by...
[17:32.580 --> 17:36.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: When people are satisfied before Congress, they get seen by like a relatively small committee.
[17:36.480 --> 17:40.160]  [SPEAKER_01]: And that allows for follow-up questions from each person asking.
[17:40.400 --> 17:44.840]  [SPEAKER_01]: But all the senators and Congress people wanted to get their turn in the sunlight.
[17:45.360 --> 17:49.360]  [SPEAKER_01]: And because of that, there's only time for each person to ask one question.
[17:49.360 --> 17:53.960]  [SPEAKER_01]: And that allowed him to like basically dodge and not give like detailed answers.
[17:55.420 --> 17:58.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: Why can't they just keep at it until they're done?
[17:58.500 --> 18:02.840]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because otherwise it would go on for like days at a time.
[18:02.940 --> 18:03.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: What's wrong with that?
[18:03.500 --> 18:05.200]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't see a problem with this.
[18:05.360 --> 18:07.960]  [SPEAKER_01]: They couldn't get him to agree to stay that long.
[18:07.980 --> 18:13.360]  [SPEAKER_12]: Once he's in, you lock the door and you just keep barraging him with questions until he confesses.
[18:14.920 --> 18:15.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: Alex?
[18:15.660 --> 18:18.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, I watched, I think a good portion of this.
[18:18.800 --> 18:32.740]  [SPEAKER_11]: And, you know, I watched, I think the first 20 or so minutes of the live coverage of this, which just involved Mark Zuckerberg staring blankly straight ahead and blinking every five or six seconds or so.
[18:33.500 --> 18:37.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: And that whole situation seemed, you know, very, very strange to me.
[18:37.680 --> 18:40.100]  [SPEAKER_11]: You know, he's just sitting there, this room full of people.
[18:40.100 --> 18:44.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: There's obviously photographers and reporters all around him watching every move that he's been making.
[18:45.160 --> 18:47.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think it's, you know, a little bit unfair.
[18:47.460 --> 18:51.400]  [SPEAKER_11]: Because, you know, we should be somewhat, I think, nice to Zuckerberg every once in a while.
[18:51.700 --> 18:51.960]  [SPEAKER_11]: Why?
[18:52.120 --> 18:52.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, wait, wait, no.
[18:53.020 --> 18:54.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: I just want to explore this.
[18:54.540 --> 18:54.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: Why?
[18:55.480 --> 18:56.800]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, you see, you didn't let me finish.
[18:56.960 --> 18:58.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: But I think it's...
[18:58.020 --> 18:58.640]  [SPEAKER_11]: All the millions of people have...
[18:58.640 --> 18:59.300]  [SPEAKER_11]: It controls all our data.
[18:59.500 --> 19:00.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, exactly.
[19:00.400 --> 19:04.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: All the data is out there being shared all over the world by people who don't know right to it.
[19:04.860 --> 19:07.380]  [SPEAKER_11]: The criticism about that, I think, is completely fair.
[19:07.380 --> 19:10.780]  [SPEAKER_11]: But there's been so much reporting about the fact that he was sitting on a booster seat.
[19:11.260 --> 19:12.740]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's what I think is a little bit unfair.
[19:12.940 --> 19:13.760]  [SPEAKER_11]: The guy is short.
[19:13.880 --> 19:14.360]  [SPEAKER_11]: Leave him alone.
[19:14.460 --> 19:14.580]  [SPEAKER_11]: What?
[19:14.660 --> 19:15.620]  [SPEAKER_11]: Like a car seat, you mean?
[19:15.760 --> 19:20.220]  [SPEAKER_11]: He was sitting on some kind of booster seat to make him a little taller, I think, so he could speak into the microphone.
[19:20.220 --> 19:22.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, this is the most relevant thing we can focus on.
[19:22.940 --> 19:24.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: And the case is not very strong.
[19:24.460 --> 19:28.380]  [SPEAKER_11]: I'm saying I think that there's been too much reporting on it, and I think we're probably adding to that.
[19:28.440 --> 19:30.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: Here's something that I think should be reported on.
[19:30.460 --> 19:41.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's the fact that the contributions that have been made by Facebook to the very people that have been questioning him, that's something that really hasn't been focused upon nearly enough.
[19:41.480 --> 19:49.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: The panel that got the most Facebook contributions is the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and they're the ones that question him today.
[19:50.000 --> 19:58.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: Members of the committee whose jurisdiction gives it regulatory power over Internet companies received nearly $381,000 in contributions tied to Facebook since 2007.
[19:59.020 --> 20:02.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's according to the Center for Responsive Politics.
[20:02.460 --> 20:03.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Sorry.
[20:03.400 --> 20:17.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: The second-highest total, $369,000, went to members of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, which announced later that it would have a joint hearing with the Senate Judiciary Committee to question Zuckerberg yesterday.
[20:18.280 --> 20:22.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: And Judiciary Committee members have received $235,000 in Facebook contributions.
[20:22.360 --> 20:23.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: You see what's going on here.
[20:23.320 --> 20:27.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's just basically they're all friends in this room.
[20:27.320 --> 20:28.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, what's the problem with that?
[20:28.800 --> 20:30.460]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, as long as we know about it.
[20:30.460 --> 20:35.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: With the Senate Committee, he donated to 46 out of the 55 members.
[20:35.760 --> 20:36.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's a majority.
[20:36.900 --> 20:37.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's a big majority.
[20:37.960 --> 20:40.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Maybe somebody else should be questioning him.
[20:40.260 --> 20:41.060]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, quite possibly.
[20:41.240 --> 20:56.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, I think he even donated $100 million to some inner city schools in Newark, which is the jurisdiction of Cory Booker, who questioned him apparently quite vigorously about discriminatory practices with respect to minorities in Facebook.
[20:57.300 --> 21:01.780]  [SPEAKER_11]: And then the New York Times latched onto this to show how quickly the political winds are changing.
[21:02.020 --> 21:05.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: Or the other way of looking at this is it's all just a bunch of theater.
[21:05.140 --> 21:18.400]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, one thing that was really obvious to me when you're watching this is that a lot of the questions that the senators who were questioning Zuckerberg were reading were obviously drafted by their staffers who understood the technology and could draft coherent questions.
[21:18.400 --> 21:24.560]  [SPEAKER_11]: And then when they had to extemporaneously question Zuckerberg, their understanding seemed to dwindle to almost nothing.
[21:24.560 --> 21:27.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: Who is that 85-year-old guy saying that he likes chocolate?
[21:28.040 --> 21:30.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: And now he's getting ads for chocolate and he doesn't want to get ads.
[21:30.900 --> 21:32.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: He wants to just tell people how much he likes.
[21:32.960 --> 21:34.280]  [SPEAKER_12]: I could not believe this.
[21:34.420 --> 21:36.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is the level of discourse that we have.
[21:36.580 --> 21:38.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, it was really incredible.
[21:38.820 --> 21:42.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: And so, you know, that was somewhat, I think, disappointing.
[21:42.020 --> 21:55.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: But, you know, on the other hand, you know, what are we to expect with respect to these political donations after the Citizens United case that allows all these for-profit organizations to make political donations on the basis of the First Amendment?
[21:55.520 --> 21:57.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, this is just par for the course now.
[21:57.140 --> 22:09.880]  [SPEAKER_11]: I remember back when I was in law school and I read this New Yorker article, it must have been like 2002 or 2003, about Google starting up lobbying operations in Washington, D.C.
[22:10.080 --> 22:14.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: And how this was this huge innovation when it came to the shaping of technology policy.
[22:14.860 --> 22:16.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: This is just par for the course now.
[22:17.500 --> 22:22.660]  [SPEAKER_11]: And what's interesting, as Voltaire noted, that, you know, they're spreading around the money here.
[22:22.660 --> 22:28.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: It seems like the money goes more heavily to Democrats and it goes to Republicans, but the money still goes to Republicans, too.
[22:28.260 --> 22:31.880]  [SPEAKER_11]: So they're hedging their bets and hoping for some kind of favorable treatment.
[22:32.220 --> 22:35.620]  [SPEAKER_11]: And, you know, it's disclosed, sure, that's an okay thing.
[22:35.880 --> 22:42.260]  [SPEAKER_11]: But the extent to which the money actually makes a difference when it comes to favorable or unfavorable treatment, we'll never know.
[22:43.360 --> 22:54.340]  [SPEAKER_07]: One running theme through these questions that were being given to Zuckerberg is that he was being asked questions about data in general and responding basically with answers that didn't answer the question.
[22:54.520 --> 23:08.260]  [SPEAKER_07]: Just things like the user owns their data on Facebook, which doesn't address data they have on those of us who aren't Facebook users, but the shadow profiles that we've been mentioning on this program for the last couple of weeks, other information that they have.
[23:08.260 --> 23:17.960]  [SPEAKER_07]: And he basically is able to, because he's being questioned by a lot of people who don't seem to have a great understanding of the technical side of things, they don't have the right questions to ask.
[23:18.060 --> 23:23.300]  [SPEAKER_07]: And even when they do, they are not assuring that he's giving the right answers to them.
[23:24.400 --> 23:27.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: But the whole thing is a weird bit of theater.
[23:27.800 --> 23:31.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: In fact, you might have noticed an actual troll sitting behind him.
[23:32.580 --> 23:35.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: There is an activist named Amanda Werner who...
[23:35.120 --> 23:35.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: Did she get on camera?
[23:35.660 --> 23:39.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: I saw a piece about her not being able to get into the good shot there.
[23:39.900 --> 23:42.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, there are a couple of shots of Amanda there.
[23:43.300 --> 23:44.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: She played the Monopoly man doing it.
[23:44.680 --> 23:47.340]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, Amanda was the Monopoly man at the Equifax hearings.
[23:47.540 --> 23:53.700]  [SPEAKER_07]: And this time, Amanda had a large blue-green wig like the troll dolls and a Russian scarf.
[23:54.460 --> 23:59.680]  [SPEAKER_07]: The idea being this is somebody who's, you know, has no problem with Russian trolls.
[23:59.920 --> 24:00.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: So there's another one for him.
[24:00.980 --> 24:05.220]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, now, on the subject of the shadow profiles, that was brought up.
[24:05.320 --> 24:06.880]  [SPEAKER_12]: And this is what he said today about that.
[24:06.960 --> 24:11.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: In general, we collect data on people who are not signed up for Facebook for security purposes.
[24:12.700 --> 24:19.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, they collect data on people who are not signed up, not even using Facebook for security purposes.
[24:20.840 --> 24:34.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, Representative Ben Luan, a New Mexico Democrat, said, you said everyone controls their data, but you're collecting data on people that are not even Facebook users who have never signed a consent, a privacy agreement.
[24:35.620 --> 24:40.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: Zuckerberg responded to this by saying, we need to know when somebody is trying to repeatedly access our services.
[24:41.960 --> 24:49.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: Facebook builds shadow profiles of people who aren't users by accessing data from inboxes and smartphone contacts of those who are active users.
[24:49.800 --> 24:52.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's according to Gizmodo and some other publications.
[24:52.380 --> 24:56.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, Zuckerberg claimed he wasn't familiar with the term shadow profiles.
[24:56.160 --> 24:57.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm sure he will be soon.
[24:58.900 --> 25:08.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: Basically, a former Facebook employee in the ads department, Antonio Garcia Martinez, said Zuckerberg's description of the data's use was incomplete.
[25:08.640 --> 25:15.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's collected for growth reasons as well, he said, to make sure people have the right friend suggestions when they sign into the service for the first time.
[25:15.760 --> 25:24.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: But this is concerning because, you know, oftentimes I find myself directed to a Facebook page when I'm not signed into Facebook, which is my default state.
[25:25.220 --> 25:30.580]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, okay, so data is being collected about me whenever that happens, whenever I go to a web page.
[25:30.780 --> 25:34.860]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, in fact, any web page that has a like button in it is tracking you.
[25:34.980 --> 25:39.520]  [SPEAKER_01]: Even if you're not a Facebook member, they get your IP, your browser history, they make a profile about you.
[25:39.620 --> 25:42.900]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, that is a violation because I never agreed to any of that.
[25:43.000 --> 25:44.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that's something that needs to be known.
[25:44.880 --> 25:46.980]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, and there's just a general creepiness to it.
[25:47.080 --> 25:50.400]  [SPEAKER_07]: Like, for example, I don't have a Facebook account for myself.
[25:50.400 --> 25:51.140]  [SPEAKER_07]: I never have.
[25:51.140 --> 25:55.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: But sometimes I'll be directed to a Facebook link that I need an account to view.
[25:55.200 --> 25:59.920]  [SPEAKER_07]: So I'll quickly just generate a throwaway email address, sign up for a fake account that I'm never going to use again.
[26:00.020 --> 26:06.800]  [SPEAKER_07]: But I've had it happen where I've signed into a brand new Facebook account with a junk name, not connected to me on any real level.
[26:06.960 --> 26:10.940]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I've signed in and seen people that I actually know being suggested to me as friends.
[26:10.940 --> 26:16.420]  [SPEAKER_07]: And, you know, there's my shadow self, you know, pitching me some curveballs there.
[26:16.540 --> 26:18.320]  [SPEAKER_07]: But I can't do a thing about it.
[26:18.880 --> 26:25.800]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, I do think it is, on one hand, really creepy and very underhanded way to begin collecting data about third parties.
[26:25.960 --> 26:28.260]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, especially when it comes to facial recognition and things.
[26:28.260 --> 26:40.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: So people may be in photos that Facebook users upload without necessarily knowing that the other person does not necessarily want to be on Facebook because Facebook is collecting all this information.
[26:40.320 --> 26:43.760]  [SPEAKER_11]: They may be able to recognize who this person is, their associations, etc.
[26:43.760 --> 26:49.680]  [SPEAKER_11]: And this goes, I think, doubly so when people are encouraged to upload their contact list to Facebook.
[26:49.940 --> 26:54.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: Because at that point, you know, you have an issue about consent.
[26:55.220 --> 27:07.100]  [SPEAKER_11]: When you are uploading the data, personal data, like phone numbers that belong, that are in your contact list, but belong to other people, do you have the right to divulge their contact information?
[27:07.300 --> 27:11.200]  [SPEAKER_11]: According to Facebook, you've consented to do this and therefore it's okay for them to collect it.
[27:11.200 --> 27:20.940]  [SPEAKER_11]: So I think that's somewhat questionable and a bit deceptive if they begin amassing information about these third parties on the basis of the uploading of these particular contacts.
[27:21.160 --> 27:32.360]  [SPEAKER_11]: On the other hand, I think a fair case can be made that if Facebook is collecting massive amounts of data about people from other sources on the Internet, that's up to them to do.
[27:32.540 --> 27:34.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's data that's out there.
[27:34.180 --> 27:44.900]  [SPEAKER_11]: So long as they're not collecting it through these unscrupulous web links and web likes and cookies and things like that, if they're just amassing data by scraping it from various sources, that's up to them.
[27:45.040 --> 27:47.720]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think that they have the right to do that.
[27:47.940 --> 27:50.060]  [SPEAKER_11]: We believe that we have the right to do that.
[27:50.220 --> 27:55.820]  [SPEAKER_11]: Data scraping is something I think that's really important to the hacker community and to open-source intelligence.
[27:56.740 --> 28:03.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think if it's done ethically and it's done well, you know, but, you know, perhaps it's the intent behind all of this that really makes a difference.
[28:04.200 --> 28:14.040]  [SPEAKER_01]: What they're doing with tracking people based on if they have a like button embedded on websites, that's completely different than open-source intelligence scraping and stuff.
[28:14.120 --> 28:14.920]  [SPEAKER_11]: I agree with that.
[28:15.040 --> 28:15.700]  [SPEAKER_11]: I agree with that.
[28:15.860 --> 28:20.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: And that's the distinction I'm trying to make here is I think that's a bit underhanded.
[28:20.360 --> 28:27.820]  [SPEAKER_11]: But scraping data from all these various sources on the Internet about individuals that may or may not be on Facebook, that's up to them to do.
[28:28.060 --> 28:29.580]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, it's their business.
[28:29.600 --> 28:30.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's their operations.
[28:30.520 --> 28:31.660]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's not illegal.
[28:32.400 --> 28:34.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: Either way, though, we have to know about it.
[28:34.960 --> 28:36.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: And it doesn't sound like we knew about it.
[28:37.140 --> 28:40.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, well, frankly, I don't even think we have to know about it.
[28:40.460 --> 28:44.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: If they're collecting information about third parties, that's up to them.
[28:44.060 --> 28:44.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're the third parties.
[28:45.100 --> 28:48.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: We should know when these kinds of things... we should at least know what the risks are.
[28:48.360 --> 28:56.920]  [SPEAKER_11]: We should know that what data of ours is out there, firstly, and what kind of data can be collected about us because that can be collected by Facebook or anybody.
[28:56.920 --> 29:01.300]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think it's just another indication that we have to be extremely careful about putting anything on the Internet.
[29:01.520 --> 29:02.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: DJ Cornflower.
[29:02.220 --> 29:02.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: I got that right, right?
[29:03.160 --> 29:03.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, that's right.
[29:03.780 --> 29:04.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: Cornflower, yes.
[29:04.320 --> 29:11.960]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah, I guess it's safe to assume, it seems like, that whatever data they can get on us, they will.
[29:12.720 --> 29:16.960]  [SPEAKER_09]: And it's also, at least judging by the hearing yesterday... was it yesterday?
[29:17.660 --> 29:18.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yesterday and today.
[29:19.180 --> 29:19.360]  [SPEAKER_09]: Right.
[29:19.520 --> 29:33.000]  [SPEAKER_09]: At least judging by what I saw of it, it's also pretty safe to assume that our, you know, senators aren't gonna... don't have the Internet savvy to really know exactly what to do about it.
[29:33.000 --> 29:38.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, it kind of seems like we've created this monster that's now running amok with our data.
[29:39.560 --> 29:42.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: And I think the real question is, like, what do we do now?
[29:42.660 --> 29:49.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: You know, what kind of Internet can we... what kind of virtual world can we create where we're protected from this?
[29:49.500 --> 29:50.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good question.
[29:50.160 --> 29:51.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: And what I would do now?
[29:51.280 --> 29:52.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: Build something better.
[29:52.380 --> 30:04.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: Build something that we approve of, that we don't feel violates our privacy, that has the same functionality as one of these social networks, and maybe we'll learn from this.
[30:04.260 --> 30:06.220]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, I don't know, what do you guys think of the future of Facebook?
[30:06.340 --> 30:07.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: You think there is one?
[30:08.000 --> 30:08.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, maybe.
[30:09.020 --> 30:10.980]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, I think you're onto something here.
[30:11.080 --> 30:16.920]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's something I've been thinking about quite a bit, too, is this notion of functionality tied to consent.
[30:16.920 --> 30:22.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: And if a social network had, you know....fr strangely, I don't care about targeted ads.
[30:22.780 --> 30:23.660]  [SPEAKER_11]: I don't want targeted ads.
[30:23.780 --> 30:27.040]  [SPEAKER_11]: I don't want anything that has served to be based on any of my personal preferences.
[30:27.280 --> 30:27.880]  [SPEAKER_11]: I don't want ads.
[30:27.880 --> 30:28.120]  [SPEAKER_11]: Period.
[30:28.200 --> 30:28.680]  [SPEAKER_11]: I don't want ads.
[30:28.800 --> 30:32.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, you know, it's sort of a necessary evil if you're on these types of things.
[30:32.620 --> 30:42.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: But, you know, the way in which these ads are generally harvested or targeted is by these networks combining data that they collect about you with third-party data sources.
[30:42.420 --> 31:00.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: If you actually read the terms of service and the privacy policies, which unfortunately I've done many, many times, a lot of them contain boilerplate language that they may take your data and combine it with third-party data and then package that data and sell it to other people or use that third-party data with their own data to better serve you advertisements.
[31:00.420 --> 31:08.580]  [SPEAKER_11]: So, and that data may include things like your credit history, your credit score, your purchases on the Internet, purchases from Amazon, what you've looked at on Facebook.
[31:08.800 --> 31:14.120]  [SPEAKER_11]: All these kinds of things are all part of this underground advertising network that we really don't understand.
[31:14.120 --> 31:30.300]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think this Facebook Cambridge Analytica fiasco is a good indication that we need to know more about what's happening in the advertising industry itself, which as far as I know isn't heavily regulated in terms of its use of personal data and the way data is shared.
[31:30.420 --> 31:45.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: So, if we tie the functionality of the social network to certain tiers of consent, I consent to this, I consent to that, I consent to that, and then the social network hands out or doles out certain functions to you and certain functions may not be available to you.
[31:45.620 --> 31:52.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: You may not be able to use instant messenger if you don't want to share your messages with, you know, third parties or the FBI.
[31:53.080 --> 31:55.700]  [SPEAKER_11]: So, these types of functions may not be available to you.
[31:55.820 --> 31:57.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know if this is just me.
[31:57.500 --> 32:04.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Maybe you guys can weigh in on this, but whenever I see an advertisement somewhere, I don't look at it.
[32:04.220 --> 32:09.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't really pay attention to the... I spend most of my time trying to figure out how to avoid it.
[32:09.560 --> 32:14.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: I use ad blockers and I get the ad blocker blockers and I have to figure out a way around those.
[32:15.000 --> 32:23.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: If I actually buy something and then they want to enter into some kind of social contract with me where they're constantly asking me questions and surveys and things like that.
[32:23.760 --> 32:38.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, I had a domain expire and I got something like 14 emails from the domain provider saying, don't worry, it'll automatically renew and you don't have to do anything except read these stupid emails that keep coming every day.
[32:38.940 --> 32:44.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: And then once it finally happened, once the blessed event was over, I got a survey saying, how easy was that?
[32:44.220 --> 32:45.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: Please rate this.
[32:45.300 --> 32:49.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: How is that easier than me just basically writing a check and doing it manually?
[32:50.160 --> 32:51.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's absurd.
[32:51.200 --> 32:58.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, you know, there are so many instances where you actually buy something on good faith and then you're just harassed for months, years even.
[32:58.920 --> 33:03.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: There are merchants that are still sending me email for some purchase I made 10 years ago.
[33:04.100 --> 33:06.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: It is so incredibly annoying.
[33:06.260 --> 33:13.880]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I don't think advertising has nearly the amount of power that advertisers believe it does.
[33:14.320 --> 33:20.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I think maybe if we came to terms with that particular fact, there'd be less of it.
[33:20.380 --> 33:21.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's what I would hope.
[33:21.260 --> 33:21.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: Voltaire?
[33:21.880 --> 33:31.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I think the fear is not that, like, there'll be these super targeted advertisements and then they'll, like, somehow, because they're so well-targeted, they'll, like, brainwash you into buying stuff you don't need.
[33:31.480 --> 33:47.240]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think the fear is that it's just creepy that they, A, it's creepy that they have all this information on you, and, B, like, when they have such a detailed profile, they can basically, like, if the FBI or something, they obviously, like, anybody that has hold of that can find a reason to dislike you.
[33:48.160 --> 33:48.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: Absolutely, yeah.
[33:49.000 --> 33:51.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's basically you're wearing all this stuff on your sleeves.
[33:52.280 --> 33:56.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, you know, us in the hacker world, we're, you know, always suspicious of these things.
[33:56.560 --> 34:00.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I think that's why a lot of us aren't that surprised by all these revelations.
[34:00.240 --> 34:07.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: But we are dismayed at how it has affected people in a negative way and how seemingly powerless they all are.
[34:08.280 --> 34:16.880]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, and I think what's really quite scary about this, too, is seeing the bridge occur between the digital and the physical worlds here.
[34:17.020 --> 34:21.120]  [SPEAKER_11]: When you think about things like these LinkNYC kiosks that are popping up all over the place...
[34:21.120 --> 34:21.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: Oh, those are great.
[34:21.820 --> 34:22.200]  [SPEAKER_11]: Oh, yeah.
[34:22.320 --> 34:22.640]  [SPEAKER_11]: They're right.
[34:22.780 --> 34:23.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: Free Wi-Fi.
[34:23.420 --> 34:26.320]  [SPEAKER_11]: Just give us all your data and your contacts and all kinds of fun things.
[34:27.240 --> 34:30.880]  [SPEAKER_11]: But these LinkNYC kiosks, you know, they've got cameras on them.
[34:31.040 --> 34:37.700]  [SPEAKER_11]: They can identify you perhaps by your IMEI, subscriber identification number, that's associated with your mobile device.
[34:38.040 --> 34:48.360]  [SPEAKER_11]: So now they could be collecting data from these third-party advertisers, these third-party networks like Facebook that then combine data from other sources, feed it over to LinkNYC.
[34:48.400 --> 34:58.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: And as you're walking down 7th Avenue and you're passing by a kiosk, you may see a targeted advertisement for you, which, if you're a manual, you're going to avoid that particular product like the plague.
[34:58.540 --> 35:01.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: But you're saying it'd be like Neuromancer or something.
[35:01.800 --> 35:02.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm walking down...
[35:02.840 --> 35:03.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: Exactly.
[35:03.400 --> 35:06.360]  [SPEAKER_12]: ...and the thing is actually flashing at me, sending me a message.
[35:06.980 --> 35:07.360]  [SPEAKER_12]: Absolutely.
[35:07.360 --> 35:08.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: But what if the other people are walking down, too?
[35:08.800 --> 35:10.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: Are they all getting different messages?
[35:10.220 --> 35:12.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: Or is it just going very fast, cycling through all these different things?
[35:12.860 --> 35:20.400]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, if I were designing that particular network, I would prioritize perhaps high-net-worth individuals, people that have made purchases in the area, people that live in the area.
[35:20.400 --> 35:27.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: These LinkNYC kiosks, when you read their privacy policies, are allowed to collect what's called, quote-unquote, environmental data.
[35:27.520 --> 35:32.580]  [SPEAKER_11]: Environmental data is data from the cameras surrounding the LinkNYC kiosks.
[35:32.660 --> 35:51.760]  [SPEAKER_11]: You combine that together with your digital identification numbers, like your IMEI or your MAC ID of your particular devices, maybe what you're pinging out looking for when it comes to SSIDs or wireless networks, Bluetooth devices to which you've connected that can be identified by anybody walking past.
[35:51.920 --> 35:55.340]  [SPEAKER_11]: All of this can fingerprint you and then be used to serve you targeted ads.
[35:55.480 --> 36:00.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, I'm kind of torn with this because those LinkNYC kiosks are so much fun to play with.
[36:00.460 --> 36:04.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, boy, have you checked the speed on their connectivity?
[36:04.600 --> 36:05.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's stupid fast.
[36:06.940 --> 36:09.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: Unbelievable connectivity that you would never get in your home.
[36:09.360 --> 36:13.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: And you can just stand on a street corner, basically, and connect to all kinds of things.
[36:13.180 --> 36:14.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, yeah, there's always a price.
[36:14.480 --> 36:21.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, you know, we need to be constantly figuring out ways to use these services without getting victimized by these services, you know.
[36:21.780 --> 36:23.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think that's a very important thing.
[36:23.820 --> 36:24.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes.
[36:25.320 --> 36:40.100]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, I think the future of Facebook is a very interesting question because as for the Facebook product itself, it's kind of maybe nearing the end of its cycle because a lot of the younger people that I know today aren't as into Facebook because it's where their parents are.
[36:40.180 --> 36:40.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: But where are they instead?
[36:40.900 --> 36:42.460]  [SPEAKER_07]: They're on Instagram, which is a Facebook product.
[36:43.180 --> 36:46.720]  [SPEAKER_07]: So, you know, Facebook keeps them in the loop in some way.
[36:46.860 --> 36:51.180]  [SPEAKER_07]: But what we're seeing now with this actual sort of first...
[36:51.180 --> 36:57.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: The world is kind of just realizing now with the Cambridge Analytica fiasco exactly how much Facebook is holding on to.
[36:58.080 --> 37:00.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: Are they going to become accountable for any of this?
[37:00.080 --> 37:05.480]  [SPEAKER_07]: Because we've seen things like the credit industry pop up and then the Equifax thing happened.
[37:05.480 --> 37:12.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: And people were wondering, well, is this company at all accountable for losing control of this really personal information that they have on everyone?
[37:12.820 --> 37:22.660]  [SPEAKER_07]: Is Facebook going to find itself maybe subject to some kind of regulation of how closely it has to guard this information that is its stock in trade?
[37:23.840 --> 37:26.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: And, you know, will other social networks, ad networks?
[37:26.780 --> 37:28.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: Because this business model wasn't around 20 years ago.
[37:28.960 --> 37:30.360]  [SPEAKER_07]: Nobody knows how the heck to regulate it.
[37:30.820 --> 37:34.580]  [SPEAKER_07]: But, Alex, I'm wondering if what you might think about any of that.
[37:34.800 --> 37:37.100]  [SPEAKER_11]: You know, you bring up a lot of interesting questions.
[37:37.240 --> 37:39.200]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think the senators brought up a lot of interesting questions.
[37:39.200 --> 37:44.080]  [SPEAKER_11]: And we've touched on issues of discrimination against minorities, discrimination against conservatives.
[37:44.380 --> 37:48.200]  [SPEAKER_11]: All kinds of questions are asked by these senators on a very broad array of topics.
[37:48.540 --> 37:54.100]  [SPEAKER_11]: And frankly, excuse me, I think I actually think the debate is too wide.
[37:54.260 --> 37:56.080]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think we have to narrow this down.
[37:56.460 --> 38:01.100]  [SPEAKER_11]: Because I think if we don't narrow the debate, we're never going to get at the heart of the real issue here.
[38:01.460 --> 38:20.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I hate to say it, but I think the real issue here is Facebook's data protection policies were so lax that they allowed a third-party to access the personal identifying information and personal data and personal details of 87 million Americans' lives.
[38:20.760 --> 38:21.960]  [SPEAKER_11]: We can't lose fact of that sight.
[38:22.140 --> 38:30.320]  [SPEAKER_11]: And then that data of 87 million Americans was taken and weaponized and used in furtherance of the Donald Trump campaign.
[38:30.460 --> 38:34.060]  [SPEAKER_11]: And we have not even mentioned the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which prompted all of this.
[38:34.220 --> 38:34.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: Exactly.
[38:34.640 --> 38:35.780]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's why I think the debate is too wide.
[38:35.780 --> 38:41.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: And that data that was weaponized had a direct hand in the election of Donald Trump.
[38:41.920 --> 38:47.720]  [SPEAKER_11]: The extent to which that hand played a role, I don't think we're ever really going to know.
[38:48.040 --> 38:52.980]  [SPEAKER_11]: Because that is data and that's information that is solely within the confines of Facebook.
[38:53.160 --> 38:55.800]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I don't think they're ever going to let that information out.
[38:55.900 --> 39:04.020]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, you know, I'm also torn on this because so... I hear everything you're saying, but so much of me also wants to say, you know, we did this to ourselves.
[39:04.980 --> 39:06.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: We believed what we saw on Facebook.
[39:07.060 --> 39:08.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: We didn't question enough.
[39:09.000 --> 39:17.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: And through all that false news that was out there, all that propaganda that we saw that was alleged to be true, we bought into it.
[39:17.340 --> 39:20.280]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, of course, not anyone in this room, but so many of us did.
[39:20.280 --> 39:21.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we buy into other things, probably.
[39:22.680 --> 39:26.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: So we need to be a lot more alert and questioning.
[39:26.580 --> 39:28.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is what we always are trying to push people to do.
[39:28.900 --> 39:29.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: Voltaire.
[39:29.300 --> 39:36.280]  [SPEAKER_01]: I actually believe that the Cambridge Analytica thing, I think it's almost, like, less important than the fact that Facebook has all this private information about you.
[39:36.440 --> 39:37.240]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm actually not...
[39:37.240 --> 39:42.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: I feel like the issue of, like, them being able to change their election results is, like, way overblown.
[39:42.420 --> 39:46.380]  [SPEAKER_01]: Like, when it comes to, like, Russian ad spending, it was actually, like...
[39:46.380 --> 39:53.800]  [SPEAKER_01]: It was, like, only a few hundred thousand dollars compared to, like, the billion dollars, literally, that was spent in the campaign as a whole.
[39:53.980 --> 39:54.680]  [SPEAKER_01]: So I feel like...
[39:54.680 --> 39:58.080]  [SPEAKER_01]: And both parties have been using targeted ads for years.
[39:58.720 --> 40:03.000]  [SPEAKER_01]: So I feel like it's less of a problem...
[40:03.000 --> 40:06.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: of an issue of, like, them giving access to...
[40:07.180 --> 40:08.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: giving personal...
[40:08.060 --> 40:12.200]  [SPEAKER_01]: giving, like, third parties access and for the problem with them having access...
[40:12.200 --> 40:13.940]  [SPEAKER_01]: having all this data on you in the first place.
[40:13.940 --> 40:14.620]  [SPEAKER_01]: And that...
[40:14.620 --> 40:16.920]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think we need laws and regulations to stop that.
[40:17.180 --> 40:18.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, how about just a little bit of common sense?
[40:18.780 --> 40:20.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: How about we know not to do this?
[40:20.840 --> 40:21.760]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, because...
[40:21.760 --> 40:25.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: as the case with Shadow Profile shows, like, basically, you can't do anything.
[40:25.420 --> 40:28.260]  [SPEAKER_01]: Even if you don't have a Facebook account, you're...
[40:28.260 --> 40:29.240]  [SPEAKER_01]: they're still tracking you.
[40:29.520 --> 40:30.680]  [SPEAKER_01]: And, B, if you don't...
[40:30.680 --> 40:32.860]  [SPEAKER_01]: if you abstain from Facebook, you're losing...
[40:32.860 --> 40:38.720]  [SPEAKER_01]: especially in a lot of communities, like, activist organizing communities, like, queer communities, like, those are...
[40:38.720 --> 40:40.080]  [SPEAKER_01]: they only...
[40:40.080 --> 40:40.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: if all...
[40:40.580 --> 40:44.700]  [SPEAKER_01]: a lot of these spaces, all the French activities are on Facebook.
[40:44.960 --> 40:46.660]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, if you're losing...
[40:46.660 --> 40:49.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: how do they communicate with your friends and participate in civil society?
[40:49.600 --> 40:51.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, and people need to know that's a choice they're now making.
[40:51.560 --> 40:55.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: If they're going to use these systems, they are agreeing to give away all this private information.
[40:55.940 --> 40:57.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we need to come up with better tools.
[40:57.540 --> 40:58.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: Simple as that.
[40:58.400 --> 41:01.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: Listen, I want to move on to some other important news, too.
[41:01.040 --> 41:03.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: And also, I'd like to open up to phone calls, if possible.
[41:03.480 --> 41:05.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: We only have a few minutes left.
[41:05.520 --> 41:10.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: There was some follow-up letters to us.
[41:10.320 --> 41:12.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: And you can write to us, oth@2600.com.
[41:12.940 --> 41:18.900]  [SPEAKER_12]: We love to hear our listeners, even when they're going through hell, as this listener named Barry has been going through hell.
[41:19.900 --> 41:22.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: He's been trying to keep his copper line.
[41:22.220 --> 41:23.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: We've talked about this a number of times.
[41:24.580 --> 41:27.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: And my best guess is that...
[41:27.060 --> 41:27.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is what Barry says.
[41:28.160 --> 41:33.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: My best guess is that they cut the wire a few days ago without notice, and gradually my phone stopped working.
[41:33.260 --> 41:34.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: Today, I cannot call out.
[41:34.780 --> 41:35.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: They gave no notice.
[41:36.000 --> 41:36.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: I am elderly.
[41:36.740 --> 41:37.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's unsafe.
[41:37.580 --> 41:39.360]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm not the only elderly person in the building.
[41:39.760 --> 41:44.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: Someone else in their 90s with no Internet or computer or devices.
[41:44.820 --> 41:47.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know what to do because I need the copper landline.
[41:47.240 --> 41:49.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: I tried searching online to see if anyone else is having the same problems.
[41:49.860 --> 41:54.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: Only saw articles from a few years ago about a different area regarding being held hostage with no phone service.
[41:55.020 --> 42:06.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we've talked about this a number of times about how Verizon and other phone companies are basically trying to push people into getting Fios by not maintaining the copper lines anymore or just phasing people out.
[42:06.720 --> 42:12.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: We also got this very interesting post that was not sent to oth@2600.com.
[42:12.280 --> 42:13.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: And in fact, it's quite important.
[42:13.660 --> 42:18.020]  [SPEAKER_12]: It was sent to WBAI, which fortunately forwarded to us tonight.
[42:18.720 --> 42:24.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: Dear Off The Hook, I have more timely information about the Verizon matter that I spoke to Rob and others about at the 2600 meeting.
[42:25.060 --> 42:25.700]  [SPEAKER_12]: Do you remember this, Rob?
[42:26.000 --> 42:26.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, indeed.
[42:26.520 --> 42:26.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[42:28.280 --> 42:29.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: When were you going to bring it up?
[42:29.700 --> 42:30.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: I found out about it.
[42:31.740 --> 42:38.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, basically, this is imperative that Off The Hook air this information on tonight's show, which is exactly what we're going to do.
[42:40.200 --> 42:52.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: There is an opportunity to post public comment about the horrendous inconvenience that has been caused by the loss of the plain old telephone service provided over traditional copper lines in the New York state area.
[42:52.060 --> 43:04.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: The public postings will be considered as part of the review by the Public Service Commission of case number, get your pens out, 16-C-0-122.
[43:04.840 --> 43:07.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: And they have to receive it by April 16th.
[43:07.400 --> 43:17.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, this case was brought against Verizon by the Communications Workers of America, partly because Verizon had instructed the workers to mislead the customers in regards to the needed repair.
[43:17.500 --> 43:28.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, under consideration by the Public Service Commission is the fact that since many areas cannot logistically migrate to fiber optics, the public is left without service if the copper lines are not repaired.
[43:28.420 --> 43:35.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: The quantity as well as the quality of posted public commentary would increase the likelihood that the public will be better served.
[43:35.720 --> 43:38.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that's true in so many cases, so many instances.
[43:38.360 --> 43:48.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: Now, on April 2nd, a judge ruled that the case material and documents, including public commentary, would need to be reviewed before the proceedings reconvene on April 20th.
[43:48.600 --> 43:58.280]  [SPEAKER_12]: The Public Service Commission has advised me that comments should be posted by April 16th to give the commission the opportunity to review them before the court reconvenes.
[43:58.380 --> 43:59.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: April 16th is next Monday.
[43:59.960 --> 44:09.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: The comments will not be considered if they contain personal information such as account numbers or complaint numbers or involve problems outside of New York State.
[44:09.640 --> 44:10.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm going to repeat that.
[44:10.540 --> 44:18.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: The comments will not be considered if they contain personal information like account numbers, complaint numbers, or anything outside of New York State.
[44:18.160 --> 44:19.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: So be sure to filter that out.
[44:19.760 --> 44:24.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: In order to post comments, simply Google Public Service Commission DMM.
[44:24.400 --> 44:27.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's Dave Merry Merry Public Comments.
[44:27.800 --> 44:33.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: Case number 16-C-0-122.
[44:34.360 --> 44:40.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: The more people there are that know how to respond and thus do respond, the more weight the comments will have on the outcome of the case.
[44:41.280 --> 44:44.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm hoping Off The Hook can help get the word out.
[44:44.500 --> 44:46.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that is exactly what we are trying to do.
[44:46.800 --> 44:50.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's signed by, I'm probably pronouncing the name wrong, Sue Ellen.
[44:51.180 --> 44:54.560]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, I spoke with Sue Ellen at the 2600 meeting on Friday.
[44:54.800 --> 44:57.240]  [SPEAKER_07]: And yeah, her story is a lot like a lot.
[44:57.420 --> 45:06.340]  [SPEAKER_07]: Many of the stories we've shared on this program of people who were depending on the copper service and are now left with either bad or no replacement service for it.
[45:06.440 --> 45:11.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: And this looks like it could actually maybe affect the situation for the better.
[45:11.760 --> 45:16.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: Many thanks to Sue Ellen for giving us this information that we can share with our listeners, hopefully make a difference.
[45:16.440 --> 45:19.060]  [SPEAKER_11]: This case, I think, is really, really interesting.
[45:19.060 --> 45:21.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: I'm really glad you brought it up, too, because it brings up an important point.
[45:21.660 --> 45:26.260]  [SPEAKER_11]: You mentioned that this was originally brought by CWA, the Communications Workers of America.
[45:27.240 --> 45:33.880]  [SPEAKER_11]: CWA and IBEW, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, are the two major unions within Verizon.
[45:34.120 --> 45:42.820]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think it's very, very interesting that CWA is fighting Verizon because they are being forced by management to mislead the public.
[45:42.820 --> 45:47.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: This is another indication of where unions fit into today's society.
[45:48.100 --> 45:51.080]  [SPEAKER_11]: You know, back in the day, it was fighting about hours, wages and conditions.
[45:51.280 --> 45:59.740]  [SPEAKER_11]: And the reason why we have these laws busting sweatshops and health and safety laws in the workplace is because they were fought for, died for and bled for on the picket lines.
[45:59.740 --> 46:10.400]  [SPEAKER_11]: And even though those picket lines aren't nearly as violent as they were in the past, the CWA and IBEW are still fighting for not only their own rights, I think, but the rights of the public.
[46:10.400 --> 46:14.640]  [SPEAKER_11]: And this is a really, really good example of unions doing the right thing here and fighting back.
[46:14.640 --> 46:19.240]  [SPEAKER_11]: And I think they should be rightfully lauded for doing so.
[46:19.780 --> 46:22.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm going to go out the phone number because we do want to take some calls.
[46:22.660 --> 46:23.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: 347.
[46:23.180 --> 46:23.900]  [SPEAKER_12]: I see it's already ringing.
[46:25.380 --> 46:26.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: 347-335-0818.
[46:27.440 --> 46:29.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: I can't memorize that number, but other people apparently already have.
[46:29.940 --> 46:32.580]  [SPEAKER_12]: 347-335-0818.
[46:32.740 --> 46:34.900]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's talk to somebody who has memorized it already.
[46:35.040 --> 46:35.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good evening.
[46:35.480 --> 46:36.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're on Off The Hook.
[46:36.420 --> 46:36.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: Go ahead.
[46:37.300 --> 46:37.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay.
[46:37.900 --> 46:42.440]  [SPEAKER_03]: Couple of comments on the Michael Cohen thing and a comment on the Facebook.
[46:42.440 --> 46:58.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: Michael Cohen, I guess he figured he lived in a land that are free, so he didn't see any reason to encrypt his cell phone and his computer the same way Kevin Mitnick did and the San Bernardino shooter did.
[46:59.120 --> 47:01.400]  [SPEAKER_03]: Both of them had their... you remember the Apple thing?
[47:01.560 --> 47:07.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: The feds wanted Apple to crack the shooter's phone and they wouldn't do it.
[47:07.420 --> 47:10.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: So he probably didn't do any of that.
[47:10.520 --> 47:22.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: Secondly, it's funny that you should mention mob bosses because the feds did a similar thing in the 80s to Bruce Cutler, who was the lawyer for John Gotti.
[47:22.440 --> 47:29.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: And they told him that he was part of the crime syndicate and therefore wasn't allowed to represent Gotti.
[47:29.580 --> 47:31.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: So they just removed him.
[47:31.380 --> 47:35.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: And so one of the co-defendants had got, he said, well, you took away my lawyer.
[47:36.180 --> 47:37.660]  [SPEAKER_03]: Now who am I going to get?
[47:37.800 --> 47:39.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: Jacoby and Myers won't come here.
[47:39.860 --> 47:41.140]  [SPEAKER_03]: So what do I do?
[47:41.480 --> 47:45.140]  [SPEAKER_03]: Anyway, of course, they all got... a lot of them got convicted.
[47:45.400 --> 47:54.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: Now moving on to the Facebook thing, Emmanuel, you had mentioned a long time ago that those sites shouldn't have the opt-out thing.
[47:54.180 --> 47:56.000]  [SPEAKER_03]: It should be opt-in.
[47:56.000 --> 47:58.560]  [SPEAKER_03]: You're not in unless you say you're out.
[47:58.560 --> 48:00.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: You should be out unless you say you're in.
[48:00.580 --> 48:01.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: And you were so right about that.
[48:01.940 --> 48:05.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: And a couple of congressmen agreed with you.
[48:05.660 --> 48:09.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: They questioned Zuckerberg on that.
[48:09.480 --> 48:11.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: And so that may come to fruition.
[48:11.800 --> 48:13.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: And you were right on that.
[48:14.060 --> 48:22.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: So anyway, any comments on either the Michael Cohen thing or what I said about him or the other thing with Facebook?
[48:22.520 --> 48:23.620]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, absolutely.
[48:23.800 --> 48:31.460]  [SPEAKER_11]: You bring up a really, really good point with respect to the search of the mob boss's attorney because this is something we neglected to mention earlier.
[48:31.460 --> 48:42.260]  [SPEAKER_11]: But if an attorney is involved in the commission of a crime or acts in furtherance of the commission of a crime, then there is no attorney-client privilege with respect to their communications.
[48:42.260 --> 48:44.820]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's something called the crime fraud exception.
[48:45.020 --> 48:53.820]  [SPEAKER_11]: And it's very narrowly construed, but it may be something that very much comes into play when the Southern District of New York and the U.S.
[48:53.920 --> 48:59.920]  [SPEAKER_11]: Attorney's Office, and maybe even the special counsel's investigation, is investigating the fruits of this particular search.
[48:59.920 --> 49:13.660]  [SPEAKER_11]: If it appears as if Cohen and Donald Trump were acting in concert and that Michael Cohen was helping to perpetrate a crime, there is no attorney-client privilege protection of any of those particular documents that were seized.
[49:14.640 --> 49:17.060]  [SPEAKER_11]: So really, I think, a very important point.
[49:17.880 --> 49:18.520]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[49:18.640 --> 49:23.480]  [SPEAKER_04]: Any comments on the encryption thing or the Facebook thing?
[49:24.280 --> 49:37.520]  [SPEAKER_01]: With Facebook, I think you're right that having an opportunity to opt in and, like, requiring consent of users' data for each and every way that they collect your data is really important.
[49:37.580 --> 49:39.140]  [SPEAKER_01]: We see that happening in Europe, actually, now.
[49:39.300 --> 49:47.700]  [SPEAKER_01]: They have this thing called the GDPR, which requires users to actively consent and have it in, like, plain English, like, every use of their data.
[49:48.720 --> 49:54.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: And actually, some senators have brought that up today, so hopefully we'll see that type of regulation come to the states.
[49:54.600 --> 50:11.300]  [SPEAKER_11]: And on the encryption issue, you know, also another important point, but even if Michael Cohen had his phones encrypted, his hard drive encrypted, all of his data in the cloud encrypted, all of his—every single bit of case data encrypted, everything encrypted.
[50:11.420 --> 50:14.320]  [SPEAKER_11]: Let's just assume that he did everything right and he was extremely cautious.
[50:14.320 --> 50:18.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: Because lawyers still have a tremendous amount of paper in their offices.
[50:18.220 --> 50:18.920]  [SPEAKER_11]: They have printouts.
[50:19.000 --> 50:19.780]  [SPEAKER_11]: We have files.
[50:19.980 --> 50:24.040]  [SPEAKER_11]: We have red wells full of, you know, old case files and things like that.
[50:24.180 --> 50:26.340]  [SPEAKER_11]: And there's no way that you can encrypt a piece of paper.
[50:27.580 --> 50:38.980]  [SPEAKER_11]: So performing a raid on a lawyer's office is going to net a huge amount of documentation, regardless of how well an attorney encrypts all of his communications and all of his files.
[50:39.140 --> 50:40.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: Not to mention, he wasn't at home.
[50:40.720 --> 50:43.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: His home is being renovated, so that's why he's in the hotel.
[50:44.320 --> 50:48.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: So he wasn't at home to dispose of documents that might have been there.
[50:49.260 --> 50:50.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: Anyway, listen, thank you very much for that call.
[50:50.960 --> 50:52.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: And keep listening.
[50:52.800 --> 50:56.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: And our phone number is 347-335-0818.
[50:56.360 --> 51:04.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: So let me ask you, Alex, if Cohen is removed, can Cohen be removed as Trump's attorney if it's found out that he was engaged in criminal activity?
[51:04.540 --> 51:06.120]  [SPEAKER_11]: Oh, absolutely.
[51:06.580 --> 51:07.940]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, I think it is...
[51:08.720 --> 51:12.100]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's going to be really, really difficult for him to continue to act as Trump's attorney.
[51:12.280 --> 51:14.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think he'll continue to be his confidant.
[51:14.460 --> 51:18.120]  [SPEAKER_11]: But these two really should not be speaking at all right now.
[51:18.280 --> 51:18.960]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think he should...
[51:18.960 --> 51:20.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're advising Trump not to speak to his own lawyer.
[51:21.100 --> 51:21.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes.
[51:21.540 --> 51:21.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wow.
[51:22.240 --> 51:25.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: And, of course, his own lawyer also has his lawyer, which is just...
[51:25.400 --> 51:25.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is true.
[51:25.940 --> 51:26.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: How deep does this go?
[51:27.080 --> 51:28.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: This is really kind of crazy.
[51:28.600 --> 51:28.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: Indeed.
[51:29.960 --> 51:31.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: Let's take another phone call.
[51:31.360 --> 51:31.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good evening.
[51:31.760 --> 51:32.280]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're on Off The Hook.
[51:33.480 --> 51:35.140]  [SPEAKER_05]: Am I on the air?
[51:35.140 --> 51:36.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're on the air right now.
[51:37.100 --> 51:37.880]  [SPEAKER_05]: Oh, my God.
[51:37.880 --> 51:39.620]  [SPEAKER_05]: So I just wanted to connect with you guys.
[51:39.780 --> 51:43.820]  [SPEAKER_05]: I have to just tell you what a comfort it is to hear your voices.
[51:45.820 --> 51:47.840]  [SPEAKER_05]: Oh, decades I've been listening to you.
[51:48.320 --> 51:48.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: Wow.
[51:48.940 --> 51:50.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're a strong person, then.
[51:51.480 --> 51:53.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: I'm a strong person, but I, like...
[51:54.720 --> 52:06.900]  [SPEAKER_05]: I moved, and I moved upstate, and I, you know, and I just felt just disconnected from everything, and I heard, and I was just flipping through the dial a couple of weeks ago, and I heard you guys.
[52:07.060 --> 52:14.260]  [SPEAKER_05]: I couldn't believe that I was hearing you, and I was thinking, what is it I want to say to these guys if I ever get on the phone with them?
[52:14.380 --> 52:16.940]  [SPEAKER_05]: I wasn't exactly sure what it was I wanted to say.
[52:17.060 --> 52:18.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: But hopefully you're sure now.
[52:18.720 --> 52:19.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: I am sure.
[52:19.680 --> 52:44.940]  [SPEAKER_05]: I am sure about one thing, to really just thank you and express incredible gratitude at all these years, is how you've been breaking down just the barriers of privacy, breaking issues down, and really laying out the issues for people like me who don't really understand technology but want to understand and spotting the issues and following the people the way you've done who have been imprisoned
[52:44.940 --> 52:49.700]  [SPEAKER_05]: for possessing and using the knowledge they had and on and on.
[52:49.700 --> 52:57.740]  [SPEAKER_05]: And, you know, you took me through all those issues all those years ago, and obviously things are so much worse now than we ever could have imagined.
[52:58.380 --> 53:06.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: But in a way, you guys always sort of knew what was coming in terms of the intrusions that were going to happen to our privacy.
[53:06.620 --> 53:12.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: And, boy, I started listening to you when you guys were still just screwing around with the phones.
[53:12.520 --> 53:14.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, we haven't stopped doing that.
[53:14.700 --> 53:16.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: But thank you so much for those kind words.
[53:16.960 --> 53:29.720]  [SPEAKER_12]: And it's the entire hacker community, though, that has this sense of how things can go wrong and how to get through it as an individual and also how to share the information and teach people.
[53:30.000 --> 53:34.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: So you're hearing our voices, but there are so many other people that are a part of this.
[53:34.780 --> 53:36.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: And hopefully you're a part of it as well.
[53:37.860 --> 53:39.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: There's hackers everywhere.
[53:39.900 --> 53:41.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, I am.
[53:41.620 --> 53:49.020]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's funny how hackers now are thought to be, you know, some sort of, you know, they've been commodified, or at least people that call themselves a hacker.
[53:50.240 --> 53:54.760]  [SPEAKER_05]: What's the real mission of justice that they knew were always on?
[53:55.840 --> 53:59.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: And it's a matter of gratitude, and you guys are warriors.
[53:59.960 --> 54:04.520]  [SPEAKER_05]: And I just wanted to express that gratitude.
[54:05.520 --> 54:06.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: Thank you so much.
[54:06.720 --> 54:07.220]  [SPEAKER_05]: You know what I mean?
[54:07.320 --> 54:08.960]  [SPEAKER_12]: Thank you very much for calling.
[54:09.180 --> 54:11.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: And keep the spirit.
[54:11.500 --> 54:11.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: Keep the spirit.
[54:12.100 --> 54:12.920]  [SPEAKER_12]: Thanks again.
[54:13.600 --> 54:15.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hopefully you'll get better cell phone coverage.
[54:15.560 --> 54:17.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's, you know, saying such nice things about us.
[54:17.260 --> 54:20.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're trying to hear every word, but it's kind of like fading away a little bit.
[54:20.380 --> 54:25.360]  [SPEAKER_12]: But I hear that a lot from people that are very happy at the messages that we put out.
[54:25.460 --> 54:28.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: But it's really, you know, we're not trying that hard.
[54:28.140 --> 54:33.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's basically common sense to us to question things and to just try and find a better way.
[54:34.480 --> 54:40.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, I've lost count of how many times I've had friends or family or whoever ask me, hey, have you seen this latest headline?
[54:40.400 --> 54:44.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I look at it and say, yeah, my colleagues and I were complaining about that on the radio five, six years ago.
[54:45.540 --> 54:46.100]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, absolutely.
[54:46.680 --> 54:51.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: And as far as, you know, the demonization of hackers or the commodification of hackers, that's something...
[54:51.200 --> 54:52.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's not new.
[54:52.280 --> 54:53.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: We might be seeing it a lot now.
[54:53.840 --> 55:00.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: But ever since we first started putting out 2600 in 1984, we've been fighting for the proper use of the word.
[55:01.000 --> 55:02.820]  [SPEAKER_12]: And it's always an uphill battle.
[55:02.960 --> 55:04.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: So that's something I don't think is ever going to change.
[55:04.700 --> 55:05.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: Hey, we have another phone call.
[55:05.460 --> 55:05.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: Good evening.
[55:05.860 --> 55:06.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: You're on Off The Hook.
[55:06.920 --> 55:08.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hey, good evening, guys.
[55:08.420 --> 55:12.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hey, I guess 45 does not realize...
[55:12.040 --> 55:13.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: He must not know history.
[55:13.860 --> 55:16.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: He talks about attorney-client privilege.
[55:16.560 --> 55:18.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: Look at what they did to Portland Stewart.
[55:20.020 --> 55:21.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: Look at what they did to her.
[55:21.600 --> 55:22.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, that's true.
[55:22.500 --> 55:22.880]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's true.
[55:23.000 --> 55:24.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: Cohen is a true criminal.
[55:24.700 --> 55:28.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: Lynn Stewart was a wonderful, wonderful, wonderful human being.
[55:28.820 --> 55:30.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: A lawyer for the poor and oppressed.
[55:31.600 --> 55:33.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: And they railroaded her.
[55:33.240 --> 55:34.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: Off to Cardwell.
[55:34.500 --> 55:36.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, we could spend an hour talking about her case.
[55:36.740 --> 55:37.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: No, you're right.
[55:37.360 --> 55:37.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: You're right.
[55:37.760 --> 55:40.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: But I don't want to hear him crying about attorney-client privilege.
[55:41.480 --> 55:44.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Because these people should be ashamed of themselves.
[55:44.240 --> 55:47.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: They're the biggest bunch of criminals that have ever been assembled in one building.
[55:47.700 --> 55:51.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, now we get to find out just what it is they've been up to over the years.
[55:51.120 --> 55:53.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I'm looking forward to it.
[55:53.040 --> 55:56.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm looking forward to all kinds of perp walks and various things like that.
[55:56.480 --> 55:57.480]  [SPEAKER_12]: You think he'll ever come to that, Alex?
[55:57.560 --> 56:00.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: You think we'll have, you know, trumping put into a car?
[56:01.080 --> 56:02.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: Maybe not watch his head?
[56:02.360 --> 56:04.540]  [SPEAKER_10]: To use another foreign language today?
[56:04.820 --> 56:06.020]  [SPEAKER_10]: Dum spiro spero.
[56:06.380 --> 56:06.880]  [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, boy.
[56:06.960 --> 56:07.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: We're back to that.
[56:07.500 --> 56:07.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[56:07.800 --> 56:13.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, you know, that's a good cue for us to head on out of here and say the Personal Computer Show is up next.
[56:13.520 --> 56:15.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: But in another week, we will be back.
[56:16.080 --> 56:20.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we welcome your cards and letters, digital or otherwise.
[56:21.040 --> 56:26.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: But if it's digital, oth@2600.com is our email address.
[56:27.240 --> 56:30.360]  [SPEAKER_12]: And we look forward to hearing from you.
[56:30.580 --> 56:31.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: Have a good night.
[57:04.300 --> 57:07.100]  [SPEAKER_13]: We'll be right back.
[57:27.780 --> 57:27.900]  We'll be right back.
[57:44.140 --> 58:06.720]  [SPEAKER_13]: I think about the meaning of my life again And I have to sing Louie, Louie again Louie, Louie, oh, baby, I gotta go now Louie, Louie, oh, baby, I really gotta go now
[59:10.110 --> 59:45.530]  [SPEAKER_13]: Oh, man, I don't know, like, man, like, you know I don't know, health insurance and the homeless and world peace and AIDS and education I mean, I'm trying to do right, but, hey Life after Bush and Gorbachev The wall is down, but something is lost Turn down the news It looks like a movie It makes me wanna sing Louie,
[59:45.690 --> 01:00:00.300]  [SPEAKER_13]: Louie Louie, Louie, oh, baby, I gotta go now Louie, Louie, oh, baby, I really gotta go now