[00:00.000 --> 00:01.240] [SPEAKER_01]: ...woman in this tale.
[00:01.480 --> 00:06.300] [SPEAKER_01]: It'll play again at the Commons on Sunday, September 16th at 3 o'clock.
[00:06.460 --> 00:10.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Tickets are $20 a person, a benefit for listeners-sponsored WBAI.
[00:11.520 --> 00:17.800] [SPEAKER_01]: WBAI will continue to be in on the start of this one-of-a-kind raconteur's newest and most vivid offering.
[00:17.800 --> 00:22.000] [SPEAKER_01]: Richard Holler's E, Sunday, September 16th at 3 p.m.
[00:22.180 --> 00:27.260] [SPEAKER_01]: here, right below our Crystal Studios at 388 Atlantic Avenue, Brooklyn.
[00:27.540 --> 00:31.500] [SPEAKER_01]: For ticket information, you can go to our website, wbai.org.
[00:31.700 --> 00:32.740] [SPEAKER_01]: See you at the Commons.
[00:36.470 --> 00:39.170] [SPEAKER_05]: And you're listening to Radio Station WBAI New York.
[00:39.350 --> 00:40.230] [SPEAKER_05]: It's 8 o'clock.
[00:40.350 --> 00:42.330] [SPEAKER_05]: Time for another edition of Off The Hook.
[00:53.550 --> 00:55.030] [SPEAKER_08]: I cut myself while shaving.
[00:55.550 --> 00:57.530] [SPEAKER_08]: Now I can't make a cough.
[00:58.290 --> 01:00.330] [SPEAKER_08]: We couldn't get much worse.
[01:02.430 --> 01:02.910] [SPEAKER_08]: We would.
[01:03.170 --> 01:05.810] [SPEAKER_08]: Bum-dilly-bump, but the best is back the worst.
[01:06.490 --> 01:08.290] [SPEAKER_08]: I hope that's understood.
[01:08.510 --> 01:09.390] [SPEAKER_08]: Bum-dilly-bump!
[02:16.850 --> 02:18.550] [SPEAKER_05]: And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:18.590 --> 02:20.330] [SPEAKER_05]: The program is Off The Hook.
[02:20.650 --> 02:23.150] [SPEAKER_05]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:23.710 --> 02:25.430] [SPEAKER_05]: Joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:26.150 --> 02:27.810] [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, um, yeah, that's me.
[02:27.950 --> 02:28.410] [SPEAKER_07]: I'm here.
[02:28.670 --> 02:28.870] [SPEAKER_07]: Alex.
[02:29.190 --> 02:29.330] [SPEAKER_07]: And, uh, hi.
[02:29.810 --> 02:30.570] [SPEAKER_07]: Good evening.
[02:30.830 --> 02:31.250] [SPEAKER_07]: And Voltaire.
[02:31.330 --> 02:31.770] [SPEAKER_07]: Greetings.
[02:32.410 --> 02:32.550] [SPEAKER_07]: Wow.
[02:32.850 --> 02:35.930] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, so here we are, um, on this, uh, Wednesday evening.
[02:36.010 --> 02:37.030] [SPEAKER_05]: Put the book down, Kyle.
[02:37.610 --> 02:38.410] [SPEAKER_05]: Put the book down.
[02:38.870 --> 02:40.010] [SPEAKER_07]: Um, no, I'm just, uh...
[02:40.010 --> 02:41.190] [SPEAKER_05]: We've got the Bob Woodward book.
[02:41.470 --> 02:45.570] [SPEAKER_05]: Can't, haven't had a conversation in two days now because everyone's reading this book.
[02:46.030 --> 02:47.490] [SPEAKER_07]: I gotta get through Chapter 40.
[02:47.650 --> 02:52.050] [SPEAKER_07]: It's my, uh, my third cup of coffee and, uh, I'm just, I've been reading straight through.
[02:52.190 --> 02:52.730] [SPEAKER_07]: It's good stuff.
[02:52.830 --> 02:54.390] [SPEAKER_05]: No, it's, it's, it's, it's riveting.
[02:54.490 --> 02:55.470] [SPEAKER_05]: I'll, I'll say that.
[02:55.630 --> 02:55.830] [SPEAKER_07]: Yes.
[02:55.930 --> 02:57.110] [SPEAKER_05]: But, uh, we do have a show to do.
[02:57.210 --> 03:00.610] [SPEAKER_05]: We do have some, uh, some things to take care of and, uh, hopefully we'll take some phone calls.
[03:00.610 --> 03:02.510] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, the phone number to take note of.
[03:02.630 --> 03:04.710] [SPEAKER_05]: Three, four, seven, three, three, five, zero, eight, one, eight.
[03:04.710 --> 03:06.370] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, we'd love to hear from you.
[03:06.490 --> 03:07.370] [SPEAKER_05]: And you can also write to us.
[03:07.570 --> 03:10.790] [SPEAKER_05]: oth@2600.com
[03:11.090 --> 03:15.730] [SPEAKER_05]: Hey, um, an update to a story that, um, uh, we reported on last week.
[03:16.210 --> 03:24.390] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, uh, a disturbing story concerning, uh, a missing, uh, person in the hacker community, uh, named Arjun Kempfris.
[03:24.390 --> 03:26.790] [SPEAKER_05]: It's, uh, again, I'm probably pronouncing that wrong.
[03:26.990 --> 03:31.870] [SPEAKER_05]: So, uh, a, a Dutch hacker, uh, has been to Hope, uh, is, is well-known in the community.
[03:31.990 --> 03:40.990] [SPEAKER_05]: It has been missing since August 20th out of, um, a city known as Bodo in Norway, another place that, uh, I've been to, uh, you've been to as well, Kyle.
[03:41.450 --> 03:43.690] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, it's, uh, it's a place with an airport.
[03:43.910 --> 03:47.030] [SPEAKER_05]: It's a place that's, uh, fairly near, uh, the sea.
[03:47.650 --> 03:51.150] [SPEAKER_05]: And, uh, that is the last place anyone has, uh, seen this guy.
[03:51.270 --> 03:56.170] [SPEAKER_05]: Now, there have been some developments in that, um, a signal was received on his cell phone.
[03:56.390 --> 03:57.330] [SPEAKER_05]: This is interesting.
[03:57.450 --> 04:09.110] [SPEAKER_05]: The signal was received on his cell phone in the southern part of the country, a place called, um, uh, uh, Vekesa, I believe is how you pronounce it.
[04:09.610 --> 04:13.250] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, it's, um, about 50 kilometers south of Stavanger.
[04:13.770 --> 04:24.190] [SPEAKER_05]: Now, what's interesting about this, uh, is that, um, Um, Arjun was supposed to get on a train, uh, in Bodo, uh, heading to Trondheim, which is to the south.
[04:24.790 --> 04:39.410] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, now, if you were to take a train, uh, to Trondheim and then continue from Trondheim to Oslo and then continue from Oslo to the last stop, you would wind up in Stavanger, which is near where this cell phone was turned on.
[04:39.770 --> 04:43.650] [SPEAKER_05]: There's, I don't believe there is one train that does the whole thing.
[04:43.650 --> 04:48.150] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, you would have to take the train to Trondheim, then a train to Oslo, then a train to Stavanger.
[04:48.990 --> 04:50.510] [SPEAKER_05]: But conceivably, it's possible.
[04:50.630 --> 04:56.150] [SPEAKER_05]: It does seem to be a route that a train could go on that would go all the way down there.
[04:56.750 --> 05:03.270] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, again, you know, I'm just, uh, spitballing here as far as, uh, uh, throwing out theories and ideas as to what might have happened.
[05:03.570 --> 05:12.570] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, now, the, um, his phone was turned on, uh, in that, in that, um, small place, uh, Vikesa, which is about 50 kilometers south of Stavanger.
[05:14.010 --> 05:17.970] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, but a German SIM card was inserted after the phone was on for 20 minutes.
[05:18.050 --> 05:21.030] [SPEAKER_05]: I was getting conflicting reports as to whether or not his PIN was entered.
[05:21.470 --> 05:24.390] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, the consensus right now seems to be that it was not.
[05:24.610 --> 05:25.690] [SPEAKER_05]: Some people were saying that it was.
[05:25.810 --> 05:39.830] [SPEAKER_05]: Of course, if his PIN was entered, that would, uh, indicate that, uh, uh, that was in fact him, but if it was not entered, and the phone was on for 20 minutes, and then a German SIM card was put into it, kind of leans towards maybe somebody finding the phone and putting a SIM card into it,
[05:39.850 --> 05:41.430] [SPEAKER_05]: or maybe something else.
[05:41.550 --> 05:41.870] [SPEAKER_05]: Who knows?
[05:42.410 --> 05:49.090] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, very little information is, is being given to the public, so it's kind of hard to, uh, do anything but speculate.
[05:49.550 --> 05:54.950] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, now, yesterday, um, something, uh, a bit more disturbing was, uh, discovered.
[05:54.950 --> 06:00.310] [SPEAKER_05]: They found, um, his, um, uh, a bunch of his missing property.
[06:00.650 --> 06:11.290] [SPEAKER_05]: A fisherman, uh, found, uh, uh, found, uh, some of his, um, belongings, uh, and that was, um, that was near, near, uh, Bodo.
[06:11.750 --> 06:17.870] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, they're found in the sea between the towns of Fosk and Rognan in Nordland country.
[06:18.350 --> 06:39.370] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, they, um, didn't reveal what the belongings were, uh, but, um, he was traveling with a portable kayak, so it is possible that he set out from that area, uh, and, um, and his, uh, belongings were found, um, uh, fairly nearby where that might have, uh,
[06:39.510 --> 06:40.090] [SPEAKER_05]: taken place.
[06:40.530 --> 06:47.110] [SPEAKER_05]: But, you know, this, it's, it's very frustrating because, um, we're just getting bits and pieces, and the authorities, you know, didn't seem to be taking it all that seriously.
[06:47.270 --> 06:55.070] [SPEAKER_05]: In fact, I heard a lot of speculation that perhaps he's doing this deliberately, that he's trying to stay off the radar, uh, and he knows how to do that.
[06:55.210 --> 06:57.910] [SPEAKER_05]: But, um, there's too many disturbing things here.
[06:58.430 --> 07:00.890] [SPEAKER_05]: Not the least of which, here, I'm going to hand you this story.
[07:01.750 --> 07:03.630] [SPEAKER_05]: This is just typical of the stories that are coming out.
[07:04.470 --> 07:05.890] [SPEAKER_05]: Alex, I'm probably looking at that story.
[07:06.010 --> 07:07.510] [SPEAKER_05]: What, what do you see that's wrong with it?
[07:08.730 --> 07:11.810] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, well, it has Julian Assange on the front cover.
[07:11.950 --> 07:15.090] [SPEAKER_05]: Not only one picture, it has two pictures of Julian Assange.
[07:15.750 --> 07:18.170] [SPEAKER_05]: And no pictures of the guy who's missing.
[07:18.330 --> 07:19.530] [SPEAKER_06]: And they're almost the same picture.
[07:19.530 --> 07:26.190] [SPEAKER_05]: And every single story I read just kind of lapses into Julian Assange's story about how he's being holed up in the embassy.
[07:26.190 --> 07:28.490] [SPEAKER_05]: And that's an interesting story, and we've been following it for years.
[07:28.550 --> 07:30.790] [SPEAKER_05]: But for God's sake, this is a story about this guy.
[07:31.330 --> 07:43.650] [SPEAKER_05]: And, you know, if you, if you look at the headlines, it's, it's basically, you know, Assange comes first, this guy comes second, or here's a strange disappearance of WikiLeaks associate, you know, and that is not the story.
[07:43.670 --> 07:45.910] [SPEAKER_05]: It is a story, but it's not that story.
[07:46.030 --> 07:47.530] [SPEAKER_05]: We need to focus on this guy.
[07:47.530 --> 07:52.750] [SPEAKER_05]: And it's just, you know, being eclipsed constantly by, uh, by something else.
[07:53.110 --> 07:54.030] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, so I...
[07:54.030 --> 07:55.150] [SPEAKER_06]: Can I ask you a question about that, Storm?
[07:55.470 --> 07:59.850] [SPEAKER_06]: That, the belongings that were found by a fisherman, they were found in the water.
[08:00.310 --> 08:01.230] [SPEAKER_06]: That's my understanding.
[08:01.530 --> 08:01.770] [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[08:01.890 --> 08:13.310] [SPEAKER_06]: If that understanding is correct, and let's say there was some kind of capsizing of his kayak, that does not necessarily jive at all with the idea of a cell phone turning up near Stavinga.
[08:13.310 --> 08:14.250] [SPEAKER_05]: That's exactly true.
[08:14.550 --> 08:21.790] [SPEAKER_05]: How does a cell phone get from, uh, from not the northern part of Norway, but, but pretty far up, all the way down to the southern part of Norway?
[08:22.170 --> 08:23.290] [SPEAKER_05]: And here's something else.
[08:23.390 --> 08:26.050] [SPEAKER_05]: I did a little research on it, and this is something that they, they could be telling us.
[08:26.250 --> 08:29.110] [SPEAKER_05]: The currents flow upward over there.
[08:29.350 --> 08:35.070] [SPEAKER_05]: So, you know, even if somehow, uh, something floated, uh, all the way down, well, it doesn't happen that way.
[08:35.130 --> 08:39.110] [SPEAKER_05]: The currents go northerly at that particular point, from what I've been able to understand.
[08:40.130 --> 08:45.270] [SPEAKER_05]: So, yeah, there, there is, there is something, there is more going on here, uh, but we don't know what it is.
[08:45.790 --> 08:55.930] [SPEAKER_05]: And unfortunately, it's being eclipsed by all this, uh, conspiracy talk about how they want to get Julian, and, uh, this, this guy was, you know, somebody who, I don't even know how close he was to him.
[08:56.250 --> 09:01.470] [SPEAKER_05]: You know, he, he may have met him just a couple of times, or he may have, you know, done something for WikiLeaks, but I don't think that's the story.
[09:01.550 --> 09:12.030] [SPEAKER_05]: The story is this guy is missing, uh, is he hiding, is, is, uh, you know, was he abducted for some other reason, is he, is he lost someplace, um, you know, that is what we have to be focusing on.
[09:12.150 --> 09:21.810] [SPEAKER_05]: And unfortunately, uh, I'm not seeing enough of that, and as a result, not enough information is getting out where, you know, the hacker mindset could prove helpful here, uh, the, the, the cell phone alone.
[09:22.370 --> 09:28.970] [SPEAKER_05]: If we knew more about how, uh, that was detected exactly, uh, what happened, was the, was the PIN code entered?
[09:29.090 --> 09:34.230] [SPEAKER_05]: You know, not being able to get a straight answer on that, uh, is frustrating because that, that reveals all kinds of information.
[09:34.230 --> 09:39.750] [SPEAKER_05]: And if the PIN code was turned on, it could explain why the authorities aren't pursuing this as strongly as, as they should.
[09:40.270 --> 09:47.470] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, you know, if you look up his name, there's only a handful of stories about this, most of which, uh, have been, have been, uh, provoked by people in the hacker community.
[09:47.630 --> 09:56.610] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, more important than the WikiLeaks connection here, I mean, is the fact that Arjun authored the tome, Information Security for Journalists.
[09:56.810 --> 09:57.050] [SPEAKER_06]: Yes.
[09:57.230 --> 10:02.130] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, that means that he's probably in intimate contact with journalists, perhaps of working on some interesting stories.
[10:02.130 --> 10:06.990] [SPEAKER_06]: That has more relevance to me than, uh, a tangential link to WikiLeaks.
[10:07.430 --> 10:09.870] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, I think that's far more important than this.
[10:09.950 --> 10:19.150] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, we, I don't, I don't see any indication in this story, and I haven't read the entirety of it, of what his last contact or, or meaningful contact was with WikiLeaks.
[10:19.170 --> 10:19.810] [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, how about this?
[10:20.070 --> 10:21.130] [SPEAKER_05]: Why, why Bodo?
[10:21.290 --> 10:22.150] [SPEAKER_05]: Why was he there?
[10:22.370 --> 10:26.410] [SPEAKER_05]: Was he, was he, I mean, it's, it's a nice place, but I wouldn't, you know, take a vacation there.
[10:26.410 --> 10:32.650] [SPEAKER_05]: There, it's, it's basically, um, a midway point to other places, but maybe there was something there that, that attracted him.
[10:32.710 --> 10:33.430] [SPEAKER_05]: But what was it?
[10:33.550 --> 10:36.730] [SPEAKER_05]: You know, the fact that he was supposed to get on a train the day he went missing.
[10:37.150 --> 10:39.390] [SPEAKER_05]: Okay, surveillance cameras, did, they're everywhere.
[10:39.630 --> 10:41.370] [SPEAKER_05]: So, did he get to the train station or not?
[10:41.370 --> 10:43.210] [SPEAKER_05]: I haven't seen any clear answer to that.
[10:43.210 --> 10:50.610] [SPEAKER_05]: But, uh, there's all kinds of things that could be looked into here, and, um, you know, knowing, knowing the information would be extremely helpful.
[10:50.810 --> 10:54.430] [SPEAKER_06]: I've, I've heard, as well, that Europe does have a lot of CCTV.
[10:55.330 --> 10:56.470] [SPEAKER_06]: They absolutely do, yes.
[10:56.510 --> 11:03.890] [SPEAKER_07]: I'm really curious if, um, if the phone is being examined any further, um, than what you were initially, uh, saying is coming out.
[11:04.150 --> 11:20.710] [SPEAKER_07]: Uh, as far as just media in general, or where he left off as far as using it, there's probably, yeah, um, sure, layers and layers of, uh, security and difficulty there, but maybe media cards or just anything, any kind of clue as to what exactly, um, he was doing right before,
[11:20.710 --> 11:23.850] [SPEAKER_07]: um, he was, uh, separated from that device.
[11:24.070 --> 11:26.570] [SPEAKER_07]: And, uh, the, that goes for the other belongings too.
[11:26.750 --> 11:27.970] [SPEAKER_07]: You, you weren't able to list them.
[11:28.210 --> 11:41.330] [SPEAKER_07]: Um, but I'm, I'm really curious what other stuff, um, electronics or otherwise might be kind of an indicator as to what was going on or, um, you know, how it came to be that, uh, he was separated from those.
[11:41.610 --> 11:42.790] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, I can't tell you anything about the belongings.
[11:42.890 --> 11:44.890] [SPEAKER_05]: I can tell you how long Julian was in the embassy for.
[11:45.010 --> 11:59.270] [SPEAKER_05]: The story goes into that, but, uh, it doesn't give you information on the belongings that were found, uh, which, uh, you know, and, and the other thing is, uh, the belongings would include his cell phone most likely if they, they, you know, that's something that you would,
[11:59.270 --> 12:02.610] [SPEAKER_05]: um, uh, generally have on you if you were going on a kayak.
[12:02.610 --> 12:07.190] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, he may have had more, more than one, uh, you know, there, there could be a lot of different scenarios there.
[12:07.410 --> 12:09.550] [SPEAKER_05]: It's yeah, a lot doesn't add up here.
[12:09.650 --> 12:14.430] [SPEAKER_05]: How does his phone get to the Southern part of the country and his other belongings wind up in the water in the Northern part?
[12:15.390 --> 12:23.490] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, we, we, we, we need answers here and we'll, we'll continue, uh, following it and, uh, hopefully, uh, um, you know, come, come to some kind of a conclusion here.
[12:23.630 --> 12:34.070] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, if you want to follow the story, his, his name is, um, Arjen, uh, Kampris, and I'm sorry again for pronouncing it wrong, A-R-J-E-N-K-A-M-P-H-U-I-S.
[12:34.410 --> 12:40.470] [SPEAKER_05]: And, um, yeah, it's just, uh, another thing that, uh, we are paying attention to here.
[12:41.010 --> 12:43.470] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, but other things are going on as well.
[12:43.710 --> 12:48.370] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, some, some rather, um, disturbing news today, uh, not more disturbing news out of Europe.
[12:48.850 --> 12:54.970] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, we mentioned this, uh, copyright directive that was, um, on, on the table.
[12:54.970 --> 13:01.970] [SPEAKER_05]: Well, the EU has approved the controversial copyright directive, which, um, includes an Internet link tax and upload filter.
[13:02.690 --> 13:11.130] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, the, um, basically, uh, it was a controversial piece of legislation intended to update online copyright laws for the Internet age.
[13:11.130 --> 13:15.290] [SPEAKER_05]: And usually when you have a phrase like that, it doesn't go in a very good direction.
[13:15.610 --> 13:32.010] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, this, um, director was originally rejected by MEPs in July, uh, following criticism of two key provisions, articles 11 and 13, which were dubbed the link tax and the upload filter by critics, um, in, in parliament, an updated version of the directive was improved,
[13:32.210 --> 13:36.910] [SPEAKER_05]: uh, approved rather, along with amended versions of articles 12, I'm sorry, 11 and 13.
[13:37.510 --> 13:43.670] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, and the vote was 438 in favor, 226 against, wasn't exactly close.
[13:44.390 --> 13:50.950] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, they say the fight is far from finished, but you know, I'm hearing that a lot and, um, um, it's, it's getting rather depressing.
[13:51.350 --> 13:53.830] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, the fallout will be far reaching.
[13:54.010 --> 13:55.170] [SPEAKER_05]: It'll take quite a while to settle.
[13:55.430 --> 14:03.310] [SPEAKER_05]: The, uh, directive itself, uh, still faces a final vote in January 2019, although it's very unlikely to be rejected at that point.
[14:05.090 --> 14:15.770] [SPEAKER_05]: After, after that, it'll, uh, need to be implemented by individual EU member states who could very well, um, vary significantly in how they choose to interpret the text.
[14:15.770 --> 14:20.710] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, but anyway, the, the most important parts, as I mentioned, are articles 11 and 13.
[14:20.850 --> 14:33.510] [SPEAKER_05]: Article 11 is intended to give publishers and, um, and papers a way to make money when companies like Google link to their stories, uh, allowing them to demand paid licenses.
[14:33.830 --> 14:41.350] [SPEAKER_05]: And article 13 requires certain platforms like YouTube and Facebook to stop users sharing unlicensed copyrighted material.
[14:41.750 --> 14:48.150] [SPEAKER_05]: Now, you know, already YouTube is, is a massive pain as far as that goes, uh, because they overdo it.
[14:48.310 --> 14:49.270] [SPEAKER_05]: They overdo it so much.
[14:49.550 --> 14:59.270] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, there, there, there are people, you know, worried about, um, uh, hearing a snippet of a song in a passing car when they're making a documentary that they're uploading to YouTube.
[14:59.770 --> 15:13.330] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, and, you know, these, I, I, I've heard stories of, um, of people who are covering revolutions, uprisings, uh, and, you know, they're filming all kinds of things, but the thing that stops them is, is a clip of a, of, of a song going by in a car and,
[15:13.370 --> 15:17.570] [SPEAKER_05]: and they have to either reshoot something or delete it because of that.
[15:17.930 --> 15:18.810] [SPEAKER_05]: It's insane.
[15:19.030 --> 15:23.050] [SPEAKER_05]: It's, it, it goes against everything that, uh, copyright is supposed to stand for.
[15:23.270 --> 15:26.390] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, and it's, uh, it's yet another example of the abuse.
[15:26.570 --> 15:30.790] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, now critics of the copyright directive say these provisions are disastrous.
[15:30.810 --> 15:41.150] [SPEAKER_05]: In the case of article 11, they note, um, that attempts to tax platforms like Google news for sharing articles have repeatedly failed and that the system would be ripe to abuse by copyright trolls.
[15:41.370 --> 15:43.430] [SPEAKER_05]: Article 13, of course, is even worse.
[15:43.670 --> 15:50.570] [SPEAKER_05]: The legislation requires that platforms proactively work with rights holders to stop users uploading copyrighted content.
[15:50.710 --> 15:56.090] [SPEAKER_05]: The only way to do so would be to scan all data being uploaded to sites like YouTube and Facebook.
[15:56.590 --> 16:01.950] [SPEAKER_05]: And, uh, that would create an incredible burden for small platforms and could be used as a mechanism for widespread censorship.
[16:02.470 --> 16:10.450] [SPEAKER_05]: And, uh, that's why figures like Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales, worldwide web inventor Tim Berners-Lee came out so strongly against the directive.
[16:10.530 --> 16:15.630] [SPEAKER_05]: And, you know, really just listen to those guys because they're the ones who invented all this.
[16:15.910 --> 16:19.550] [SPEAKER_05]: Why don't you listen to them and, and, and, you know, take their opinion a little bit more seriously.
[16:19.790 --> 16:22.550] [SPEAKER_05]: If they say it's going to break the net, it's probably going to break the net.
[16:24.270 --> 16:32.510] [SPEAKER_05]: Well, of course the, um, people backing these provisions say, uh, the arguments above are the result of scaremongering by big U.S.
[16:32.610 --> 16:35.930] [SPEAKER_05]: tech companies eager to keep control of the web's biggest platforms.
[16:35.930 --> 16:40.690] [SPEAKER_05]: They point to existing laws and amendments to the directive as proof that it won't be abused in this way.
[16:41.130 --> 16:51.130] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, and these include exemptions for sites like GitHub and Wikipedia from article 13, exceptions to the link tax that allow for the sharing of mere hyperlinks and individual words describing articles without constraint.
[16:51.810 --> 16:56.370] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, but, uh, I don't think many of us are, are, are, are buying that.
[16:56.370 --> 17:08.770] [SPEAKER_05]: It's yet another, um, example of control being exercised over the things that we take for granted and making the net a whole lot more unpleasant and, uh, difficult to work with.
[17:08.850 --> 17:09.030] [SPEAKER_05]: Walter?
[17:09.290 --> 17:09.430] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[17:09.550 --> 17:22.550] [SPEAKER_02]: And even, even with the new additions, like when, uh, when it comes time for the member states to implement these laws, they're going to be overly broad and not, um, and then they'll be just a part of the reason why this passes because, uh, the recording and,
[17:22.550 --> 17:25.370] [SPEAKER_02]: uh, motion picture industry spent so much money on lobbying.
[17:25.370 --> 17:31.410] [SPEAKER_02]: Um, like on the front page of all the major newspapers across Europe, where it adds for this, uh, to pass these, these bills.
[17:31.650 --> 17:40.250] [SPEAKER_02]: So now when the same thing is going to happen when it comes to the member states, they're going to spend millions of dollars lobbying the member states to, uh, implement it in the most harsh way.
[17:41.730 --> 17:42.130] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[17:42.310 --> 17:52.450] [SPEAKER_06]: And, you know, with respect to implementation, when really what happens with these European union directives is this is essentially a statement from the European union that says you need now to enact national legislation.
[17:52.450 --> 17:56.890] [SPEAKER_06]: It's called transposing legislation, and each one is going to do it with a different wrinkle.
[17:57.310 --> 18:00.910] [SPEAKER_06]: And some states, you know, may balk at this as well.
[18:01.130 --> 18:09.170] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, and the idea here is really to harmonize laws within the European union, but it never really works out that way.
[18:09.310 --> 18:27.570] [SPEAKER_06]: And it's these kinds of overarching directives that come from the European union that then require some kind of legislation to be ramrodded down the throats of these national legislatures, that the people of these countries may not agree with, that gave rise to the notion of Brexit,
[18:27.770 --> 18:35.090] [SPEAKER_06]: and rise to the notion that the European union is taking away our sovereignty and the right to make our own laws in our own country.
[18:35.370 --> 18:44.670] [SPEAKER_06]: This is a very good example of the kind of idiocy that we see from these Eurocrats constantly making rules that they shouldn't, uh, in areas where they shouldn't be entering.
[18:45.410 --> 18:46.490] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, Eurocrats?
[18:46.850 --> 18:47.370] [SPEAKER_06]: Eurocrats.
[18:47.390 --> 18:48.030] [SPEAKER_06]: I like that word.
[18:48.090 --> 18:48.590] [SPEAKER_06]: You like that word?
[18:48.590 --> 18:50.030] [SPEAKER_06]: I can use it again and again and again.
[18:50.230 --> 18:51.490] [SPEAKER_05]: Did you make it up, or...?
[18:51.490 --> 18:53.730] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, no, this is in common parlance.
[18:53.950 --> 18:54.070] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh-huh.
[18:54.070 --> 18:57.470] [SPEAKER_06]: You can probably look it up, actually, you know, it's basically anybody that lives in Brussels.
[18:58.250 --> 19:02.050] [SPEAKER_06]: But, um, in any event, I mean, there's just so much wrong with this.
[19:02.110 --> 19:10.350] [SPEAKER_06]: When we covered this a couple of months ago, I remember thinking that this couldn't pass today because it's so idiotic.
[19:10.630 --> 19:13.510] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, it's so unworkable in so many ways, too.
[19:13.510 --> 19:20.090] [SPEAKER_06]: And there's so much wrong with this, there's so much potential for misuse, for fraud, for abuse.
[19:20.210 --> 19:25.910] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, copyrights are inherently tricky things because they don't last forever, number one.
[19:26.130 --> 19:28.750] [SPEAKER_06]: So how do you determine when a copyright expires?
[19:29.230 --> 19:35.970] [SPEAKER_06]: Are these mechanisms that are filtering content going to determine, you know, the date on which a copyright was issued, the date that it expires?
[19:36.070 --> 19:37.170] [SPEAKER_06]: Is it going to look for all these things?
[19:37.170 --> 19:54.610] [SPEAKER_06]: And what about the idea that, you know, let's say we are criticizing a particular newspaper or a particular book, and we're using an excerpt of it, and that's a, that's perfectly fine under copyright law in the European Union and in the United States with respect to the fair use doctrine.
[19:54.870 --> 20:00.730] [SPEAKER_06]: So how are these algorithms going to determine whether or not something is a fair use?
[20:00.730 --> 20:12.230] [SPEAKER_06]: The only way they can do it is the, the way that YouTube is doing this now, which is to shift the burden onto the user to make an argument that the fair use doctrine applies.
[20:12.550 --> 20:16.330] [SPEAKER_06]: And, and that's unfortunately not really fair to the user.
[20:16.330 --> 20:24.730] [SPEAKER_06]: It will have a deleterious effect on the debate that we have in dialogue that we have on the Internet.
[20:24.730 --> 20:36.270] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and frankly, I don't really understand how smaller companies are going to be implementing this unless they're going to be beholden to larger entities that are doing this.
[20:36.430 --> 20:45.090] [SPEAKER_06]: At which point, all the information that is going back and forth between users and websites is also going to be passing through a third-party.
[20:45.450 --> 20:49.710] [SPEAKER_06]: And that's really not great for freedom of speech and dialogue as well.
[20:52.230 --> 20:55.250] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, I can keep going on this if you want me to.
[20:55.370 --> 21:05.830] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, you know, one other issue is, um, with respect to the usage of, of these types of filtering mechanisms, one of the things that you, you think they're going to be doing is creating a hash, right?
[21:05.950 --> 21:13.330] [SPEAKER_06]: Of a copyrighted work, creating, um, you know, using MD5 or whatever, you know, algorithm you want to do to create some kind of hash of a work.
[21:13.710 --> 21:22.370] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, but though, if they're using hashing, like companies do to detect child pornography, all you have to do is shift one bit and an entire hash changes.
[21:22.610 --> 21:29.370] [SPEAKER_06]: So, um, you know, from a technical standpoint, I could see this with respect to copyright being really difficult to implement.
[21:29.610 --> 21:40.870] [SPEAKER_05]: Well, on the subject of, uh, child pornography, I happen to have a story here, um, concerning stamping out the spread of child sexual abuse material, which apparently is known as CSAM, C-S-A-M.
[21:41.010 --> 21:41.610] [SPEAKER_05]: I didn't know that.
[21:41.930 --> 21:43.970] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, it's a priority for big Internet companies.
[21:43.970 --> 21:47.290] [SPEAKER_05]: It's also a difficult and harrowing job for those on the front line.
[21:47.290 --> 21:51.350] [SPEAKER_05]: Human moderators who, uh, have to identify and remove abusive content.
[21:51.570 --> 22:00.610] [SPEAKER_05]: So Google, um, as of last week, released free AI software designed to help those individuals and hopefully the, uh, children being abused.
[22:00.770 --> 22:09.130] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, most tech solutions in this domain work by checking images and videos against a catalog of previously identified abusive material.
[22:09.390 --> 22:12.330] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, this sort of software is known as a crawler.
[22:12.330 --> 22:17.110] [SPEAKER_05]: It's an effective way to stop people sharing known previously identified CSAM.
[22:17.610 --> 22:18.010] [SPEAKER_05]: Really?
[22:18.110 --> 22:18.850] [SPEAKER_05]: I never heard that before.
[22:19.050 --> 22:23.190] [SPEAKER_05]: It can't catch material that hasn't already been marked as illegal for that.
[22:23.350 --> 22:26.070] [SPEAKER_05]: Human moderators have to step in and reveal content themselves.
[22:26.390 --> 22:35.590] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, Google's AI tool triages flag material, helping moderators work faster and, uh, using the company's expertise and machine vision.
[22:35.590 --> 22:46.730] [SPEAKER_05]: It assists moderators by sorting flagged images and videos and prioritizing the most likely CSAM content for review, uh, should allow for a much quicker reviewing process.
[22:46.870 --> 22:56.310] [SPEAKER_05]: And one trial, uh, says Google, the AI tool helped the moderator take action on 700% more CSAM content over the same time period.
[22:56.810 --> 23:10.790] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, it's, um, you know, this is a hard thing to argue, but it's also fairly easy to expand this into other, um, uh, realms, other domains where, uh, images might be objectionable.
[23:10.850 --> 23:13.990] [SPEAKER_05]: Let's say, um, oh, I don't know, because it's a good example, Tiananmen Square.
[23:14.130 --> 23:27.990] [SPEAKER_05]: Let's say images of that, uh, of, uh, the pro-democracy movement, or maybe, you know, the Arab Spring or all kinds of things that, uh, can be considered controversial that the authorities would prefer that you not spread around.
[23:27.990 --> 23:42.090] [SPEAKER_05]: Well, using a tool like this, uh, it would be very trivial to just go out and, um, find all the images, maybe track down the people who posted those images, but make sure that the images themselves do not spread.
[23:42.790 --> 23:55.950] [SPEAKER_05]: And, uh, you know, while always the first, um, uh, example of this is something that we can all agree on, uh, the ones that follow, those are the ones that you have to worry about and they're inevitable.
[23:55.950 --> 24:04.870] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, this makes me think of the, um, the conversation, uh, about war crimes and, um, uh, the instance where, uh, collateral murder was released.
[24:04.890 --> 24:20.050] [SPEAKER_07]: Imagine, um, any kind of military footage or footage from, um, from, uh, operations, uh, in the Mideast or, or anywhere, um, somehow being something that, uh, a private entity steps in and filters on behalf of the U.S. government.
[24:20.050 --> 24:36.990] [SPEAKER_07]: So then all of a sudden anybody posting or reposting, um, you know, video of reporters being killed by our soldiers, maybe the audio or whatever it is, uh, it gets flagged, then you immediately, um, stifle the ability, uh, for people to show what has been going on overseas.
[24:38.090 --> 24:43.050] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, I, I think the danger of what you're talking about already exists, Emmanuel.
[24:43.690 --> 24:52.130] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, if you think about the current way that, that child pornography is flagged right now, and I, I haven't called it CSAM or whatever you called it.
[24:52.270 --> 24:53.190] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, I never heard that before.
[24:53.370 --> 24:53.690] [SPEAKER_06]: No, not at all.
[24:53.730 --> 24:56.330] [SPEAKER_06]: We always call it CP, child pornography.
[24:56.750 --> 24:57.190] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[24:57.310 --> 24:57.650] [SPEAKER_05]: Okay.
[24:57.650 --> 24:59.070] [SPEAKER_05]: I don't know why we need initials for these.
[24:59.290 --> 24:59.550] [SPEAKER_05]: I don't know.
[24:59.610 --> 25:03.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Because it's, it's, it's, it's like, you know, George Washington Bridge being called GWB.
[25:03.750 --> 25:04.730] [SPEAKER_06]: It's the same amount of syllables.
[25:04.970 --> 25:05.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, that makes sense.
[25:05.990 --> 25:06.410] [SPEAKER_06]: No, it's not.
[25:06.550 --> 25:07.790] [SPEAKER_06]: It doesn't GWB.
[25:07.930 --> 25:10.490] [SPEAKER_06]: There's W is a letter with three syllables.
[25:10.670 --> 25:12.230] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, but it may, I don't know why it may, it just does.
[25:12.410 --> 25:12.810] [SPEAKER_06]: You think so?
[25:12.950 --> 25:14.610] [SPEAKER_06]: George Washington Bridge is just as fast as say.
[25:14.810 --> 25:17.110] [SPEAKER_06]: Anyhow, to get back to, uh, BQE.
[25:17.610 --> 25:17.890] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[25:17.970 --> 25:18.050] [SPEAKER_05]: Okay.
[25:18.290 --> 25:18.450] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[25:19.230 --> 25:22.150] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, NICMIC is another acronym here.
[25:22.610 --> 25:28.950] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, NICMIC stands for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and they, uh, track child pornography.
[25:28.950 --> 25:34.270] [SPEAKER_06]: They have the largest repository of child pornography, hopefully on the earth.
[25:34.450 --> 25:40.550] [SPEAKER_06]: And the way in which they track this is, uh, child pornography, once it's flagged, is sent over to NICMIC, they create a hash of this.
[25:40.830 --> 25:56.350] [SPEAKER_06]: Anything that's uploaded, uh, whether it's to, to Facebook, to Google, to YouTube, Instagram, whatever the hell it is, even things like Google Drive, uh, and these cloud-based, uh, storage providers, is usually scanned.
[25:56.630 --> 25:58.130] [SPEAKER_06]: A hash is created of the files.
[25:58.350 --> 26:01.510] [SPEAKER_06]: That hash is then compared to the hash of child pornography.
[26:01.770 --> 26:05.390] [SPEAKER_06]: If there is a match, then a notification is sent over to NICMIC.
[26:05.470 --> 26:10.050] [SPEAKER_06]: NICMIC then will send a notification over to either FBI or to state or local law enforcement.
[26:10.190 --> 26:17.650] [SPEAKER_06]: They investigate the matter, uh, especially if there are a lot of matches to these hashes because they've got this gigantic database of child pornography.
[26:17.650 --> 26:21.750] [SPEAKER_06]: So this system for monitoring images and things already exists.
[26:22.070 --> 26:28.490] [SPEAKER_06]: I think this innovation from Google is generally a good thing if it doesn't overflag.
[26:29.030 --> 26:35.130] [SPEAKER_06]: And overflagging child pornography can have disastrous consequences for people's lives.
[26:35.330 --> 26:46.530] [SPEAKER_06]: Think about what could happen if it's, if something is erroneously flagged and it goes over to NICMIC and then an FBI investigation is launched and then they show up at your house and they take your computers and they take them for months and you're arrested.
[26:46.710 --> 26:57.790] [SPEAKER_06]: And then all of a sudden, you're, you're, you've, you're two or three hundred thousand dollars in legal fees in the hole trying to prove that this flag through this algorithm was erroneous.
[26:58.130 --> 27:07.030] [SPEAKER_06]: On the other hand, um, you know, my wife, uh, works in the prosecution of sex crimes and, and in particular crimes against children.
[27:07.210 --> 27:08.530] [SPEAKER_06]: She has to look at these things.
[27:08.670 --> 27:09.210] [SPEAKER_06]: It's very traumatic.
[27:09.370 --> 27:26.990] [SPEAKER_06]: And when I was a law clerk at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the armed forces, we dealt with a lot of appeals of child pornography convictions and we had to look at child pornography because one of the big issues then was whether or not the pornography was real or if it was rendered by a machine.
[27:27.150 --> 27:32.650] [SPEAKER_06]: Because if it was rendered by a machine, you couldn't be convicted for the possession of child pornography.
[27:32.650 --> 27:37.090] [SPEAKER_06]: There was no actual child in there, even if it was an image that looked like a child.
[27:37.270 --> 27:40.290] [SPEAKER_06]: And all of this is, is really draining when you have to look at this.
[27:40.370 --> 27:43.830] [SPEAKER_06]: It's very, uh, emotionally disturbing.
[27:43.830 --> 27:51.930] [SPEAKER_06]: And when you do this day in and day out, um, it has a real, uh, deleterious, I'll use that word again, effect on your personality.
[27:52.370 --> 27:58.410] [SPEAKER_06]: And within these institutions where people have to do this on a daily basis, there really aren't support programs to help you out.
[27:59.450 --> 28:02.010] [SPEAKER_05]: What about people who want to do that on a daily basis?
[28:02.030 --> 28:06.230] [SPEAKER_05]: You have to get a, you know, a fair number of those kinds of people applying for the job in the first place.
[28:06.230 --> 28:07.010] [SPEAKER_06]: That's a good point.
[28:07.290 --> 28:08.270] [SPEAKER_06]: That is a good point.
[28:08.430 --> 28:14.990] [SPEAKER_05]: But, you know, my other, my other, uh, you know, rather non-serious, uh, uh, you know, contribution to this.
[28:15.190 --> 28:18.550] [SPEAKER_05]: Nick Mick, that's not exactly a name that puts fear into your heart.
[28:18.590 --> 28:19.810] [SPEAKER_05]: You're being investigated by Nick Mick.
[28:20.190 --> 28:22.530] [SPEAKER_05]: Well, you know, it's, you need, you need something better than that.
[28:22.710 --> 28:24.030] [SPEAKER_06]: They're doing the hash matching, right?
[28:24.330 --> 28:28.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, yeah, national, or a lot of people call it the National Center, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.
[28:29.150 --> 28:30.390] [SPEAKER_06]: They do a lot of really good work.
[28:30.510 --> 28:34.210] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, child pornography is a vicious, horrible, heinous crime.
[28:34.370 --> 28:43.030] [SPEAKER_06]: It needs to be stamped out, but I think that it's really dangerous territory if we are going to rely on algorithms and not human validation to make these calls.
[28:43.230 --> 28:51.990] [SPEAKER_05]: But the other thing, though, that I think needs to be addressed is that people are not aware that when they use Google Drive, their images are being scanned or their text is being scanned.
[28:52.170 --> 28:53.590] [SPEAKER_05]: It's being monitored and sent to authorities.
[28:53.790 --> 28:54.130] [SPEAKER_05]: Absolutely.
[28:54.170 --> 28:58.310] [SPEAKER_05]: That's something that needs to be, uh, I, you know, yeah, child pornography is bad.
[28:58.430 --> 29:03.210] [SPEAKER_05]: I get it, but that is also something that is extremely troubling and dangerous.
[29:03.230 --> 29:16.410] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I'll tell you, we dealt with a case in the defense of somebody who was investigated for the possession of child pornography, and he was not, um, he was not solely in charge of this particular computer.
[29:16.830 --> 29:23.890] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, this computer was in a doctor's office where tons of people were coming and going, and then there was a hard drive that was taken in and out.
[29:24.210 --> 29:33.950] [SPEAKER_06]: And, you know, it becomes a really, really tricky issue here, um, because misclassification of child pornography can ruin someone's life.
[29:34.030 --> 29:34.370] [SPEAKER_06]: Of course.
[29:34.710 --> 29:49.050] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, you know, what we, to go back to what we were dealing with at the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, a lot of what we were seeing there was back in the days when, um, people were trading around CD-ROMs, and these CD-ROMs had, uh, images burned onto them,
[29:49.190 --> 29:50.730] [SPEAKER_06]: their ROMs, read-only memory, right?
[29:51.190 --> 30:00.390] [SPEAKER_06]: So soldiers, uh, who were out to sea, didn't have an Internet connection, uh, wanted some kind of, uh, self-enjoyment, is one way of putting it.
[30:00.630 --> 30:11.110] [SPEAKER_06]: So they would burn these CDs, trade them around, and sometimes on these discs, out of the 10,000 images that were there, there were one or two that looked like they could have been child pornography.
[30:11.550 --> 30:16.150] [SPEAKER_06]: And you essentially waive your Fourth Amendment rights when you become a service member.
[30:16.170 --> 30:24.770] [SPEAKER_06]: So you don't have the normal expectations of privacy, and anybody can come inspect your room, inspect your barracks, look in your computer, especially if folders are open, and discs are out.
[30:24.990 --> 30:31.010] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, they would look at these discs, they would find these files, they would arrest the soldiers, charge them, court-martial them, and appeal it.
[30:31.250 --> 30:35.850] [SPEAKER_06]: But the sad thing is, they didn't want to be in possession of this child pornography.
[30:35.930 --> 30:37.790] [SPEAKER_06]: It's a strict liability offense.
[30:38.250 --> 30:52.590] [SPEAKER_06]: And now, they were, what would ultimately happen is they would be convicted, they would be sent, sentenced to confinement in prison, uh, dishonorably discharged from the military, uh, 19, 20 years old, and branded a sex offender for the rest of their lives.
[30:52.590 --> 30:54.690] [SPEAKER_05]: Because somebody gave them a CD-ROM with an image on it.
[30:54.730 --> 30:55.470] [SPEAKER_05]: That's exactly right.
[30:56.130 --> 31:01.630] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, you know, at some point, I think we have to, you know, let sanity take over and say, that's not the same thing as abuse.
[31:01.790 --> 31:05.110] [SPEAKER_05]: That's different, that's something that you easily could have no control over.
[31:05.630 --> 31:09.250] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, and the hysteria, you know, sometimes that little fact is lost.
[31:09.510 --> 31:10.350] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, I don't know.
[31:10.510 --> 31:15.230] [SPEAKER_07]: I, I don't really subscribe to the idea that, I mean, I think this is a lot of feel-good stuff.
[31:15.450 --> 31:21.910] [SPEAKER_07]: It makes people feel better, but I don't think there's really a panacea for, like, electronically, like, managing this.
[31:22.050 --> 31:23.910] [SPEAKER_07]: Uh, I think it's something that's always going to be there.
[31:24.070 --> 31:25.570] [SPEAKER_07]: It's, it's like any taboos.
[31:25.810 --> 31:42.130] [SPEAKER_07]: Um, you know, the, the more you, um, compartmentalize it and, and say this is bad and you can't do this, there, people, um, uh, will find ways and they'll find, uh, uh, alternate methods, like you said, burning discs or something, you know, whether it's inadvertent or not.
[31:42.270 --> 31:43.330] [SPEAKER_07]: Um, I don't know.
[31:43.390 --> 31:47.510] [SPEAKER_07]: I just, I'm, I'm a little critical, and especially when it's ruining people's lives.
[31:47.710 --> 31:57.150] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, child pornography's a trigger word that can just, um, you know, just wreak havoc, um, just by the perception.
[31:57.490 --> 31:59.670] [SPEAKER_07]: And, um, I don't know.
[31:59.830 --> 32:18.950] [SPEAKER_07]: I, I've, I've really, really mixed feelings, especially as an artist and, um, just in general, I think that, um, you know, the, the fallout of having everyone's files so, um, rifled through, it just is, it doesn't feel like, uh, um, you, you have control over your artifacts,
[32:18.950 --> 32:24.510] [SPEAKER_07]: which is, um, sort of, uh, the opposite, the antithesis of, uh, the Fourth Amendment.
[32:24.870 --> 32:25.230] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[32:25.310 --> 32:28.270] [SPEAKER_02]: And it's worth putting out, people actually care about, like, helping child abuse.
[32:28.630 --> 32:35.310] [SPEAKER_02]: The vast, vast majority of child abuse happens not from, like, strangers, but from, uh, like, uh, parents and, uh, members of the same household.
[32:35.730 --> 32:42.730] [SPEAKER_02]: And the same people that are, like, so, uh, the most, like, gung-ho about fighting child pornography are the same people that are cutting welfare services.
[32:43.030 --> 32:44.050] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, exactly.
[32:44.370 --> 32:58.690] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, I, this, I, we could go on, this, this could be, like, a two-hour show, but, I mean, you look at, like, the Catholic Church right now, they have some serious issues, and they have done nothing but, um, ensure the sanctity of the family and lobbied for,
[32:59.170 --> 33:10.250] [SPEAKER_07]: um, you know, uh, initiatives that destroy, um, uh, the rights of, of people, like, uh, that don't necessarily fit that model and, and aren't a part of that.
[33:10.370 --> 33:25.690] [SPEAKER_07]: And, and they've closed off an entire segment of the community and, uh, and created an unhealthy environment where, um, power and, and, uh, authority sort of, um, can, can, uh, be used to, uh, exploit actual vulnerable children.
[33:25.930 --> 33:28.590] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, and if you want to, if you want to fight this, attack it at the source.
[33:28.850 --> 33:30.090] [SPEAKER_05]: Attack it where it's happening.
[33:30.470 --> 33:34.530] [SPEAKER_05]: And there are plenty of, uh, you know, of ways of finding out where that's happening.
[33:34.670 --> 33:37.330] [SPEAKER_05]: And when you see cover-ups, that is, that is a true enemy.
[33:37.550 --> 33:39.810] [SPEAKER_05]: That is what you have to, uh, keep from happening.
[33:40.270 --> 33:44.510] [SPEAKER_05]: And yeah, you know, images whenever possible, uh, you know, get rid of those.
[33:44.630 --> 33:52.170] [SPEAKER_05]: But, you know, also have to ask yourself, uh, the technology that we're introducing, how can that be misused for everything else?
[33:52.350 --> 34:00.730] [SPEAKER_05]: And I just see so much potential here for, for these AI tools to be used to control us, to monitor us, uh, to put the fear of the Lord into us.
[34:00.910 --> 34:03.190] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, that's, that's something we said, uh, before.
[34:03.390 --> 34:19.630] [SPEAKER_07]: And I, I just want to reiterate that, that it's like, it is these taboos, these things that have a visceral connotation that, um, make people feel like, you know, this is the right, you know, we, we should do this and not think about, uh, necessarily we deem edge or,
[34:19.670 --> 34:28.690] [SPEAKER_07]: or, um, other sorts of fallout, like, uh, edge cases or, um, you know, the consequences, uh, and, and, and just, um, have this massive cleanse.
[34:28.710 --> 34:33.490] [SPEAKER_07]: But, you know, do we ever get to a full clean, uh, Internet?
[34:33.790 --> 34:45.130] [SPEAKER_07]: And, and, and once we get there, as I said, you know, are we ready for the ways that people, uh, find around that now cleansed platform, whether it's Google or anyone, right?
[34:45.370 --> 34:51.170] [SPEAKER_07]: You know, and, and then, and yeah, as, as you said, Voltaire, are we really looking, are we addressing the issues in society?
[34:51.390 --> 34:57.430] [SPEAKER_07]: And again, if, if we're only going to have nuclear families, look how that, look how that worked for the Catholic church.
[34:57.690 --> 34:58.790] [SPEAKER_07]: Look where that gets you.
[34:58.910 --> 35:00.330] [SPEAKER_07]: You create a sickness.
[35:00.550 --> 35:16.450] [SPEAKER_07]: You create a, an environment where people, where it's okay to abuse, uh, people that, that like, uh, uh, uh, that are like same sex, um, oriented or otherwise, you know, transgender, all of these different things that have changed and something that, you know,
[35:16.610 --> 35:25.890] [SPEAKER_07]: a lot of the world has accepted, at least the West and in a lot of cases become sort of, uh, uh, complete, uh, uh, complete relegation.
[35:26.370 --> 35:29.290] [SPEAKER_07]: And, uh, and then are, are closed down.
[35:29.450 --> 35:30.430] [SPEAKER_07]: People don't have resources.
[35:30.670 --> 35:31.730] [SPEAKER_07]: They don't get to talk to people.
[35:31.850 --> 35:33.150] [SPEAKER_07]: They don't get to express themselves.
[35:33.290 --> 35:34.530] [SPEAKER_07]: They don't get to be themselves.
[35:34.650 --> 35:37.670] [SPEAKER_07]: They just sit around and are at the effect of hegemony.
[35:37.790 --> 35:54.570] [SPEAKER_07]: And then you act shocked and surprised when people have manifestations of, of, uh, um, their kinks and so on coming out, um, because you're taking away anything that's, uh, that's, um, even closely considered, you know, God help you if you have a diaper kink or something.
[35:55.530 --> 35:55.890] [SPEAKER_05]: Wow.
[35:56.070 --> 35:58.870] [SPEAKER_05]: Well, that's quite a note to, uh, to examine.
[35:59.350 --> 36:10.610] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, but, uh, yeah, it's, it's, it's definitely, uh, uh, an issue that I think is going to be affecting far more than, uh, the intended target and, uh, one that we as hackers need to, uh, need to focus on.
[36:10.750 --> 36:15.950] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, but you know, keeping with the topic of, uh, of Google, how is, how has Google intruded upon your life this week?
[36:15.970 --> 36:17.730] [SPEAKER_05]: I think that could be a weekly feature.
[36:18.090 --> 36:24.890] [SPEAKER_05]: And, you know, one thing I noticed, um, uh, this week I have, um, I have, uh, um, basically, okay.
[36:24.970 --> 36:25.310] [SPEAKER_05]: And you know what?
[36:25.310 --> 36:27.910] [SPEAKER_05]: I'm not going to say what I have because I believe in privacy.
[36:27.910 --> 36:37.930] [SPEAKER_05]: I believe in, uh, in, in, in keeping certain things to myself, but I'm going to come up with substitutes and, uh, uh, you know, achieve the same effect that way.
[36:38.750 --> 36:45.090] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, I have a Mercedes and my Mercedes has hubcaps and I hire somebody to occasionally polish the hubcaps.
[36:46.010 --> 36:46.910] [SPEAKER_05]: That's believable, right?
[36:47.130 --> 36:47.470] [SPEAKER_05]: Okay.
[36:47.470 --> 36:52.190] [SPEAKER_05]: So, um, I, I have not had my hubcaps polished in a good, uh, couple of years.
[36:52.550 --> 36:58.030] [SPEAKER_05]: So I asked the person who last polished my hubcaps, are you still in the business of polishing hubcaps?
[36:58.130 --> 36:58.990] [SPEAKER_05]: Could you do that for me?
[36:59.450 --> 37:02.430] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, you know, I'm still, uh, reachable in the same, same way.
[37:02.870 --> 37:05.650] [SPEAKER_05]: And the person wrote back saying, Oh no, I'm sorry.
[37:05.650 --> 37:06.590] [SPEAKER_05]: I have a full schedule.
[37:06.590 --> 37:09.410] [SPEAKER_05]: I can no longer, uh, help you out with your hubcaps.
[37:09.510 --> 37:10.690] [SPEAKER_05]: You'll have to find somebody else.
[37:11.130 --> 37:14.270] [SPEAKER_05]: Now I used my, one of my Gmail accounts, uh, for this.
[37:14.270 --> 37:16.330] [SPEAKER_05]: I know by law you only allowed one, but I have several.
[37:16.730 --> 37:19.190] [SPEAKER_05]: Um, no, that's not true, but it will be someday, I'll bet.
[37:19.430 --> 37:24.450] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, so I, I, I basically, uh, communicated, uh, using that particular account.
[37:24.930 --> 37:32.390] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, and I, I read the reply and then what, what surprised me was seeing what was under the reply, uh, the reply from this person.
[37:32.930 --> 37:47.750] [SPEAKER_05]: And the basic, um, uh, uh, gist of it is that there were three choices and they were suggested responses to what he had said to me, such as sorry to hear that, or thanks for answering.
[37:48.010 --> 37:49.150] [SPEAKER_05]: I'll find somebody else.
[37:49.350 --> 37:50.050] [SPEAKER_05]: Things like that.
[37:50.350 --> 37:57.750] [SPEAKER_05]: Basically it read my damn email and not only did it read it, it interpreted what it was saying to me and how I might respond.
[37:58.550 --> 38:03.490] [SPEAKER_05]: And I just, you know, I didn't see this one coming, but apparently this is the new normal now.
[38:03.630 --> 38:05.030] [SPEAKER_05]: And I don't know how long this has been going on for.
[38:05.150 --> 38:08.850] [SPEAKER_05]: I don't really use Gmail all that much, but, uh, have you guys noticed this?
[38:09.310 --> 38:09.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[38:09.910 --> 38:13.570] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, I think that their natural language processing has gotten really, really good.
[38:13.950 --> 38:22.210] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, what's interesting is that they, they have made a decision to stop scanning the content of emails for targeted advertising.
[38:22.210 --> 38:24.390] [SPEAKER_05]: I think they, they did scan the content to do this.
[38:24.390 --> 38:32.650] [SPEAKER_06]: For, for advertising purposes, for targeted advertising purposes, but they're obviously still scanning the content for natural language processing and giving you these types of recommendations.
[38:33.270 --> 38:40.650] [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, I remember... Is that supposed to make me feel better that they're not scanning it for advertising, they're just scanning it to be Yes, I think it is supposed to make you feel better.
[38:41.130 --> 38:42.510] [SPEAKER_06]: It obviously isn't.
[38:42.650 --> 38:44.830] [SPEAKER_06]: I think you should send a complaint to the complaint line.
[38:44.990 --> 38:49.570] [SPEAKER_07]: What leapt out for me was the connection to the assistant.
[38:50.110 --> 38:52.270] [SPEAKER_07]: In other words, the sort of AI thing.
[38:52.650 --> 38:54.270] [SPEAKER_07]: We reported on this a couple of months ago.
[38:54.410 --> 39:01.710] [SPEAKER_07]: Basically, it was a thing that had made calls and would schedule appointments on your behalf, sort of like a personal assistant would.
[39:01.970 --> 39:06.130] [SPEAKER_07]: But this version was in software and is sort of attached to that platform.
[39:06.130 --> 39:08.290] [SPEAKER_07]: And I'm just kind of curious.
[39:08.430 --> 39:15.130] [SPEAKER_07]: It seemed to me when I looked at it, that it was like the manifestation of that, that just sort of pushed to Gmail.
[39:15.330 --> 39:24.530] [SPEAKER_07]: A lot of the answers were short and very glib and terse and not very informative or friendly or anything like you, me.
[39:24.710 --> 39:27.270] [SPEAKER_07]: I noticed this as well in an account that I have access to.
[39:27.270 --> 39:31.070] [SPEAKER_07]: So, it just seems a little kind of early.
[39:31.430 --> 39:37.430] [SPEAKER_07]: But by having it integrated with Gmail, assume that's on your phone and you're managing it there.
[39:38.750 --> 39:54.750] [SPEAKER_07]: And the assistant is something you can activate and speak to while you're on the go, you could potentially be doing sort of response and then that could easily be flipped into something that's doing that for you, maybe when you set some hours.
[39:54.750 --> 39:59.590] [SPEAKER_07]: Like, you know, I'm away, have my assistant queue tasks or something.
[39:59.750 --> 40:01.490] [SPEAKER_07]: It just seems like the early steps of that.
[40:01.490 --> 40:06.770] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, because what you just described sounds like one of the early away messages, but this is a step beyond that.
[40:06.890 --> 40:08.610] [SPEAKER_05]: And like you said, it's the early stages.
[40:08.950 --> 40:12.790] [SPEAKER_05]: What's this going to look like, you know, a bit down the road and, you know, a few years?
[40:13.250 --> 40:15.650] [SPEAKER_05]: Are we going to be communicating with anybody anymore?
[40:15.650 --> 40:19.110] [SPEAKER_05]: Or are we just going to have our accounts answering questions for us?
[40:19.230 --> 40:19.410] [SPEAKER_05]: Voltaire?
[40:19.770 --> 40:19.910] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[40:20.290 --> 40:26.670] [SPEAKER_02]: Even though, like, as Alex said, they're not using the... or at least they claim they're not scanning emails for the cell advertisement.
[40:26.850 --> 40:30.610] [SPEAKER_02]: It doesn't mean they're not using your data for commercial purposes.
[40:30.610 --> 40:38.510] [SPEAKER_02]: Because by collecting all this data about your email, their, like, AI services are based on having a ton of data collected.
[40:38.510 --> 40:48.810] [SPEAKER_02]: And they're selling those AI services back to governments, like in their smart city initiatives and surveillance projects, where you need a ton of AI data.
[40:49.250 --> 40:53.070] [SPEAKER_02]: So basically, like, AI is... or data is kind of like the new oil.
[40:53.270 --> 40:56.810] [SPEAKER_02]: And when they have a monopoly on that, they can charge you serious rights on governments.
[40:57.450 --> 40:57.850] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[40:58.050 --> 41:07.170] [SPEAKER_06]: And building... building on that point that you made, you know, this is a marked shift, I think, in terms of the type of data that's valuable, too.
[41:07.290 --> 41:14.150] [SPEAKER_06]: Because what they were looking for before was content about you and your life and what your preferences were.
[41:14.450 --> 41:18.990] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think what we're seeing now is a shift from content, because they've already got enough content.
[41:19.150 --> 41:24.870] [SPEAKER_06]: Everybody has seen what we're doing for many years, seen what we're doing, our instant messages, our emails, et cetera, et cetera.
[41:24.870 --> 41:28.710] [SPEAKER_06]: And they're shifting more towards behavioral analytics.
[41:28.990 --> 41:31.150] [SPEAKER_06]: So this is data about your behavior.
[41:31.270 --> 41:33.590] [SPEAKER_06]: How do you respond to this person when he asks you this question?
[41:33.790 --> 41:39.530] [SPEAKER_06]: That, in the aggregate, over, you know, a billion people becomes very, very valuable information about human behavior.
[41:40.570 --> 41:45.790] [SPEAKER_06]: But on the subject of human behavior, and talking about Gmail in particular, years ago, this is sort of a funny story.
[41:46.630 --> 41:54.070] [SPEAKER_06]: When I was using PGP to communicate through a Gmail account, obviously, the content was encrypted.
[41:54.070 --> 41:57.450] [SPEAKER_06]: So Gmail couldn't read it, but I was still getting targeted advertisements.
[41:57.690 --> 42:02.630] [SPEAKER_06]: And I thought that the targeted advertisements were, on the one hand, kind of brilliant.
[42:02.850 --> 42:06.650] [SPEAKER_06]: On the other hand, a really horrible stereotype of people that use encryption.
[42:06.650 --> 42:10.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Because the advertisements I were getting were for home cleaning services.
[42:11.070 --> 42:21.830] [SPEAKER_06]: So, you know, if you were using PGP in a Gmail and sending encrypted email, I think there was an implicit assumption that you were some kind of slob who needed your home to be cleaned by a professional.
[42:22.050 --> 42:23.070] [SPEAKER_06]: It was hilarious.
[42:23.090 --> 42:25.790] [SPEAKER_06]: I was constantly getting home cleaning services.
[42:25.790 --> 42:30.550] [SPEAKER_06]: I would never put that in any content, but encrypted messages, for some reason, triggered home cleaning services.
[42:30.550 --> 42:31.570] [SPEAKER_07]: This is about hubcaps, okay?
[42:31.570 --> 42:32.830] [SPEAKER_07]: I just, I want to stay with you.
[42:32.830 --> 42:32.970] [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, right.
[42:33.630 --> 42:35.290] [SPEAKER_05]: Again, I don't own a Mercedes.
[42:35.470 --> 42:38.110] [SPEAKER_05]: I don't think I even have hubcaps on anything I own.
[42:38.890 --> 42:42.390] [SPEAKER_05]: But the point is, you know, in your particular case, Alex, I don't know.
[42:42.490 --> 42:45.410] [SPEAKER_05]: Maybe home cleaning is just the generic thing they send out to everybody.
[42:45.630 --> 42:49.810] [SPEAKER_05]: Because everybody, you know, has a dirty place at some point and needs to clean it.
[42:50.050 --> 42:50.250] [SPEAKER_05]: Perhaps.
[42:50.290 --> 42:50.630] [SPEAKER_05]: I don't know.
[42:50.690 --> 42:54.530] [SPEAKER_05]: But I'd like to hear if other people, you know, maybe got things like that.
[42:54.650 --> 42:57.810] [SPEAKER_05]: But what I'd like to do, maybe we could engage in some kind of experiment here.
[42:57.890 --> 42:59.450] [SPEAKER_05]: Because we both have access to Gmail.
[43:00.090 --> 43:01.590] [SPEAKER_05]: You know, that's a big thing.
[43:01.730 --> 43:01.850] [SPEAKER_05]: Wow.
[43:01.950 --> 43:03.650] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, we, we're in the elite club.
[43:03.790 --> 43:04.510] [SPEAKER_05]: We have access to Gmail.
[43:05.090 --> 43:10.470] [SPEAKER_05]: What if we came up with some of the most bizarre messages back and forth?
[43:10.710 --> 43:14.510] [SPEAKER_05]: Just to see, you know, if we can blow Gmail's mind.
[43:14.730 --> 43:19.390] [SPEAKER_05]: And have it suggest all kinds of things to us on how we should respond to that.
[43:19.810 --> 43:23.890] [SPEAKER_05]: You know, just pick the most outrageous scenario you can imagine.
[43:23.890 --> 43:27.070] [SPEAKER_06]: Like, do you still sell sarin nerve gas?
[43:27.250 --> 43:28.410] [SPEAKER_05]: Okay, there's that.
[43:28.570 --> 43:29.510] [SPEAKER_05]: That brings up other issues.
[43:29.630 --> 43:33.310] [SPEAKER_05]: But, you know, I was thinking more like I'm, I'm going to be launching into space tomorrow.
[43:33.750 --> 43:38.010] [SPEAKER_05]: And I was just wondering if there's anything that you'd like from, from Mars before I come back.
[43:38.170 --> 43:38.430] [SPEAKER_05]: I don't know.
[43:38.590 --> 43:40.790] [SPEAKER_05]: Just to see what, what, what Google suggests.
[43:41.330 --> 43:44.030] [SPEAKER_05]: But, you know, your sarin gas thing is also a good idea.
[43:44.030 --> 43:53.090] [SPEAKER_05]: But I wonder, with, with something like that, would we, in fact, be triggering other, other features that might alert authorities?
[43:53.370 --> 43:53.670] [SPEAKER_05]: Perhaps.
[43:53.910 --> 44:01.090] [SPEAKER_05]: Now, you know, all kinds of, of, of plots and schemes that are being discussed between two people, Gmail to Gmail.
[44:02.270 --> 44:06.150] [SPEAKER_05]: You know, take it to its logical conclusion and come up with something really horrible.
[44:06.670 --> 44:08.030] [SPEAKER_05]: Would, would you get a visit?
[44:08.210 --> 44:09.430] [SPEAKER_05]: Would you be put on a list?
[44:09.650 --> 44:10.990] [SPEAKER_05]: As, as a lawyer, what do you think?
[44:11.170 --> 44:12.870] [SPEAKER_06]: I think it's quite possible.
[44:12.870 --> 44:13.730] [SPEAKER_06]: I do.
[44:13.850 --> 44:14.710] [SPEAKER_06]: I think it's quite possible.
[44:14.710 --> 44:26.030] [SPEAKER_06]: If you have these kinds of, uh, communications where you're talking about things that could reasonably lead to some kind of terrorist activity, that, uh, yes, I think it could lead to further scrutiny.
[44:26.490 --> 44:27.790] [SPEAKER_06]: At the very least.
[44:28.130 --> 44:32.250] [SPEAKER_05]: Keep in mind that people have the perception, when they're using Gmail, that it's secure.
[44:32.390 --> 44:35.630] [SPEAKER_05]: That only they and the people they're sending to can read the mail.
[44:36.290 --> 44:37.450] [SPEAKER_05]: But that's not the case, is it?
[44:37.730 --> 44:38.550] [SPEAKER_06]: No, it's not the case.
[44:38.550 --> 44:43.370] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, there's plenty of people that can read the mail, especially email, when it's sent unencrypted over the Internet.
[44:43.610 --> 44:46.030] [SPEAKER_05]: And that's, that's the case with most email providers, absolutely.
[44:46.230 --> 44:46.430] [SPEAKER_05]: That's right.
[44:46.590 --> 44:51.730] [SPEAKER_05]: But it's just, you know, in their particular case, they, they, uh, you know, they're kind of big on, on pushing privacy.
[44:52.230 --> 44:59.110] [SPEAKER_05]: And to see this used in this particular way, where your words are being analyzed, uh, I just think people need to know that that's what's happening.
[44:59.290 --> 44:59.450] [SPEAKER_06]: That's true.
[44:59.550 --> 45:09.250] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, and this is something I've been saying for a while, that if, if, if Google wanted to encrypt email worldwide, uh, this is really something that they could probably implement really easily.
[45:09.250 --> 45:18.010] [SPEAKER_06]: At least Gmail to Gmail, they could implement some kind of certificate based encryption system where everybody has each other's certificates, or you can look it up based on the email system.
[45:18.190 --> 45:19.470] [SPEAKER_06]: And then you automatically encrypt.
[45:19.590 --> 45:23.850] [SPEAKER_06]: It would, however, defeat the business model that they have created.
[45:24.170 --> 45:24.670] [SPEAKER_05]: Absolutely.
[45:24.670 --> 45:26.510] [SPEAKER_05]: And, and you are getting something for nothing.
[45:27.030 --> 45:29.150] [SPEAKER_05]: So, uh, you know, that, there's that to consider.
[45:29.210 --> 45:29.930] [SPEAKER_05]: There's always a price.
[45:30.130 --> 45:33.150] [SPEAKER_05]: Let me ask you about the phone number so people can join the conversation in the time we have left.
[45:34.790 --> 45:36.650] [SPEAKER_05]: 347-335-0818.
[45:37.250 --> 45:37.870] [SPEAKER_05]: Area code.
[45:38.990 --> 45:40.750] [SPEAKER_05]: 347-335-0818.
[45:40.950 --> 45:41.350] [SPEAKER_05]: Give us a call.
[45:41.450 --> 45:42.490] [SPEAKER_05]: Let us know what's on your mind.
[45:42.830 --> 45:46.830] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, it can be about the topics we've discussed, or it can be about something completely different.
[45:47.070 --> 45:48.670] [SPEAKER_05]: Again, 347-335-0818.
[45:49.390 --> 45:49.590] [SPEAKER_05]: Voltaire.
[45:49.590 --> 46:01.130] [SPEAKER_02]: To Alex's point about, uh, Gmail could easily implement, like, a P2P-based system and secure millions of people's emails, um, they actually, Google went out of their way to stop the system from developing.
[46:01.330 --> 46:08.510] [SPEAKER_02]: They announced, uh, uh, a project like that and then immediately put it on the back burner and, uh, basically turned it into vaporware.
[46:08.550 --> 46:13.130] [SPEAKER_02]: But because it's announced that there's less development on it, because people were assuming that this was already a solved problem.
[46:13.410 --> 46:16.710] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, like, like, oh, we'll wait for Google to do it for us.
[46:16.890 --> 46:17.090] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, exactly.
[46:17.250 --> 46:17.950] [SPEAKER_07]: That kind of thing, yeah.
[46:17.950 --> 46:18.370] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, yeah.
[46:19.150 --> 46:20.090] [SPEAKER_05]: Because we're all so helpless.
[46:20.470 --> 46:21.710] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, we, we, we need to help.
[46:22.050 --> 46:23.010] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, okay, we have a phone call.
[46:23.090 --> 46:23.370] [SPEAKER_05]: Good evening.
[46:23.510 --> 46:24.010] [SPEAKER_05]: You're on Off The Hook.
[46:24.030 --> 46:24.310] [SPEAKER_05]: Go ahead.
[46:24.910 --> 46:25.730] [SPEAKER_04]: Hey, how you doing, guys?
[46:25.910 --> 46:26.330] [SPEAKER_05]: What's up?
[46:27.850 --> 46:33.070] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, um, from my perspective, I think, I think Google, Google is wonderful, man.
[46:33.150 --> 46:36.790] [SPEAKER_04]: You know, um, I remember, because I'm probably like a little younger than you.
[46:36.830 --> 46:41.150] [SPEAKER_04]: I'm like 40, so I remember when I was in college, like 20 years ago, Yahoo was the big thing.
[46:41.250 --> 46:49.290] [SPEAKER_04]: And then AOL came in, and 2006, YouTube came out, you know, Google came out at that time, and it just, it just took over, man.
[46:50.050 --> 46:50.570] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, yeah, they did.
[46:50.570 --> 47:00.310] [SPEAKER_04]: But I love Google, because, and you know, you have Google Chrome, which actually alleviated the, um, you know, I guess, um, the lag time for like the regular Google, as far as web browsing.
[47:00.310 --> 47:06.030] [SPEAKER_04]: So, you know, they had Google Chrome now, and, um, I've been using that ever since.
[47:06.330 --> 47:12.050] [SPEAKER_04]: Every phone I've had, um, even going on the computer, or it's the library, or the infant cafe, no one uses it.
[47:12.430 --> 47:13.090] [SPEAKER_04]: I eat no more.
[47:13.850 --> 47:15.350] [SPEAKER_04]: You know, everything's Google.
[47:15.610 --> 47:20.290] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, uh, Firefox still, uh, you know, still is, is giving them a run for their money.
[47:20.610 --> 47:21.630] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, have a good day, man.
[47:21.790 --> 47:23.270] [SPEAKER_05]: All right, thanks, uh, thanks for calling.
[47:23.410 --> 47:26.930] [SPEAKER_05]: That's a lot of praise there for Google, and you'll see that a lot in the, in the tech community.
[47:27.090 --> 47:29.310] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, you know, he brings up an interesting point, too.
[47:29.510 --> 47:33.290] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, Google came in, I think, around 2004 or so, when they created Gmail.
[47:33.650 --> 47:36.590] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, I think an interesting point to make here is that back...
[47:36.590 --> 47:37.610] [SPEAKER_05]: Well, they were around before that.
[47:38.090 --> 47:43.490] [SPEAKER_06]: That's true, but Gmail, I think, came out around 2004 when you needed, remember, you needed an invite to get a Gmail account?
[47:43.630 --> 47:44.070] [SPEAKER_06]: That's right.
[47:44.170 --> 47:47.810] [SPEAKER_06]: But here's the thing that was really interesting about Gmail is that you actually got something.
[47:48.210 --> 47:49.350] [SPEAKER_06]: You got a bargain, right?
[47:49.350 --> 47:52.050] [SPEAKER_06]: You knew that they were reading your emails, but you got space.
[47:52.050 --> 47:56.710] [SPEAKER_06]: You got, you know, storage space, which was actually quite valuable back in 2004.
[47:57.010 --> 47:57.090] [SPEAKER_06]: True.
[47:57.190 --> 47:59.610] [SPEAKER_06]: So you were getting something for that exchange.
[47:59.770 --> 48:02.890] [SPEAKER_06]: There was an exchange of your privacy for space.
[48:03.170 --> 48:10.890] [SPEAKER_06]: Now, with space being virtually limitless, it's incredibly cheap, we are definitely getting less of a bargain when we're giving away our privacy like this.
[48:11.010 --> 48:11.930] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, but we're used to it.
[48:12.470 --> 48:13.250] [SPEAKER_05]: We have another phone call.
[48:13.330 --> 48:13.590] [SPEAKER_05]: Good evening.
[48:13.690 --> 48:14.410] [SPEAKER_05]: You're on off the hook.
[48:14.490 --> 48:14.710] [SPEAKER_05]: Go ahead.
[48:15.470 --> 48:15.870] [SPEAKER_03]: Hi.
[48:16.170 --> 48:16.450] [SPEAKER_05]: Hi.
[48:16.530 --> 48:17.010] [SPEAKER_05]: What's on your mind?
[48:18.050 --> 48:34.570] [SPEAKER_03]: So going back to the... talking earlier about, like, the content ID stuff on YouTube and all that stuff, I know we've talked a lot about the issues regarding just whether that system should be in place in the first place, you know, because it obviously hinders a lot of,
[48:34.610 --> 48:39.890] [SPEAKER_03]: you know, charging for links and stuff is crazy, and all that oversight is too much.
[48:39.950 --> 48:45.970] [SPEAKER_03]: But one of the big problems, too, is just the system itself doesn't actually work that well, and there's almost no human oversight.
[48:46.710 --> 48:57.210] [SPEAKER_03]: So, for example, you know, years back, I had some music that I put online, completely original, but YouTube's content ID system, for some reason, you know, it's a heuristic system.
[48:57.330 --> 49:07.210] [SPEAKER_03]: It saw something that it thought was copyright information, and it flagged my original music, original recordings with no copyright material in them at all.
[49:08.510 --> 49:19.870] [SPEAKER_03]: And so, yeah, and because there's no human oversight, it took two or three weeks before I could get through to a human to actually say, oh, yes, this is yours, and put my videos back online.
[49:20.170 --> 49:20.470] [SPEAKER_03]: Wow.
[49:21.510 --> 49:22.390] [SPEAKER_05]: That's terrible.
[49:22.610 --> 49:23.830] [SPEAKER_03]: I think that's something that happens to a lot of people.
[49:24.010 --> 49:25.050] [SPEAKER_03]: I don't think that's...
[49:25.050 --> 49:34.530] [SPEAKER_03]: You know, if you do a Google search of content ID, it's, you know, dozens or hundreds of reports of this kind of thing happening of...
[49:34.530 --> 49:37.710] [SPEAKER_03]: For even if you have the license, it can often be an issue.
[49:37.830 --> 49:41.690] [SPEAKER_03]: I've had colleagues who have legally licensed music.
[49:41.810 --> 49:43.170] [SPEAKER_03]: They are paying their royalties.
[49:43.250 --> 49:43.990] [SPEAKER_03]: They've got the license.
[49:44.230 --> 49:46.430] [SPEAKER_03]: They've got their sync license and their master license.
[49:46.850 --> 49:50.510] [SPEAKER_03]: And if they put it on YouTube, YouTube's content ID system just goes off.
[49:51.210 --> 49:53.570] [SPEAKER_03]: And it says, hey, submit the right paperwork.
[49:53.810 --> 49:59.050] [SPEAKER_03]: But by the time your video is back online, you know, if it's two weeks, that's...
[49:59.050 --> 50:01.310] [SPEAKER_03]: For a lot of content creators, that's a big problem.
[50:01.510 --> 50:03.130] [SPEAKER_03]: Because that's two weeks that you're not monetized.
[50:04.030 --> 50:04.790] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, it's a big deal.
[50:04.990 --> 50:10.850] [SPEAKER_07]: Because any scheme, like we described and discussed tonight, any scheme is going to be automated from their perspective.
[50:10.850 --> 50:11.450] [SPEAKER_07]: They just...
[50:11.450 --> 50:19.910] [SPEAKER_07]: They can't have the overhead as much as I sort of agree with Alex that there should be some human involvement for different cases.
[50:20.510 --> 50:23.790] [SPEAKER_07]: I really highly doubt that's in the business model.
[50:24.030 --> 50:27.770] [SPEAKER_07]: And YouTube specifically is growing so fast.
[50:27.970 --> 50:34.830] [SPEAKER_07]: And our bandwidth, our ability to get content there is growing exponentially all the time.
[50:35.030 --> 50:39.110] [SPEAKER_07]: That there's really no way they could build something that was even really a hybrid.
[50:39.370 --> 50:43.970] [SPEAKER_07]: Everything has to be automated from their business perspective alone.
[50:43.970 --> 50:51.590] [SPEAKER_07]: So that's absolutely a frustration and an attribute of a lot of these entities that you just...
[50:51.590 --> 50:52.630] [SPEAKER_07]: You have to know someone.
[50:52.630 --> 50:56.770] [SPEAKER_07]: You have to have a friend that works there, basically, to get any of these companies' attention.
[50:56.770 --> 50:57.790] [SPEAKER_07]: In a lot of ways.
[50:58.050 --> 51:00.670] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, the caller brings up a really excellent point here.
[51:00.850 --> 51:03.990] [SPEAKER_06]: Something I didn't think about when I was reading that article earlier today.
[51:04.130 --> 51:05.530] [SPEAKER_06]: But yeah, absolutely right.
[51:05.530 --> 51:07.710] [SPEAKER_06]: Copyright can be licensed.
[51:08.010 --> 51:14.630] [SPEAKER_06]: And how are any of these filters going to determine whether or not you're a licensed, authorized user of this particular copyright?
[51:14.950 --> 51:19.830] [SPEAKER_06]: And people spend a lot of time negotiating rights to music or to film or to images.
[51:20.290 --> 51:22.630] [SPEAKER_06]: And it will absolutely be flagged.
[51:22.690 --> 51:32.910] [SPEAKER_06]: There's no way for any of these filtering systems to account for independent, private, legal agreements between two entities or two people for their use of copyrighted material.
[51:33.510 --> 51:35.750] [SPEAKER_06]: It's going to be a complete disaster if this is implemented.
[51:36.270 --> 51:38.410] [SPEAKER_07]: In other words, it's not really an active system.
[51:38.570 --> 51:45.710] [SPEAKER_07]: It's once implemented, it's sort of there, and it's in an opaque filter and an unattended one at that.
[51:46.170 --> 51:47.210] [SPEAKER_05]: Well, thanks for the call.
[51:47.290 --> 51:48.250] [SPEAKER_05]: Anything else you wanted to say?
[51:49.370 --> 51:51.670] [SPEAKER_03]: No, that's all I wanted to bring up.
[51:51.750 --> 51:51.950] [SPEAKER_03]: Thanks.
[51:52.170 --> 51:52.410] [SPEAKER_05]: All right.
[51:52.490 --> 51:52.690] [SPEAKER_05]: Thanks.
[51:53.230 --> 52:01.370] [SPEAKER_05]: You know, it brings up a lot of memories, though, because we've had our run-ins with YouTube with just about every company out there.
[52:01.370 --> 52:07.030] [SPEAKER_05]: But I remember one in particular with, you know, our friend Virgil, who gives talks occasionally at our conferences.
[52:07.710 --> 52:14.710] [SPEAKER_05]: He gave a talk at one of the Hope conferences where he was playing an excerpt of a story about him.
[52:14.710 --> 52:15.630] [SPEAKER_05]: He did something.
[52:15.750 --> 52:17.110] [SPEAKER_05]: I forget exactly what it was about.
[52:17.190 --> 52:17.990] [SPEAKER_05]: I think it involved Wikipedia.
[52:19.090 --> 52:21.810] [SPEAKER_05]: And he played an excerpt from the Colbert Report.
[52:22.670 --> 52:27.770] [SPEAKER_05]: And it got flagged immediately when it was put up on YouTube for people to see his talk.
[52:28.210 --> 52:35.510] [SPEAKER_05]: In fact, our account got suspended because we dared to violate Viacom's copyright.
[52:35.950 --> 52:38.290] [SPEAKER_05]: But the story was about him.
[52:38.290 --> 52:39.750] [SPEAKER_05]: It was his story.
[52:39.750 --> 52:41.070] [SPEAKER_05]: He was showing it to people.
[52:41.590 --> 52:44.570] [SPEAKER_05]: Yet somehow, it didn't belong to him.
[52:44.770 --> 52:48.850] [SPEAKER_05]: And we had to blank it out in order for people to...
[52:48.850 --> 52:56.090] [SPEAKER_05]: But then the talk didn't make sense because he was referring to something that he did because somebody else talked about it and they had a license.
[52:56.330 --> 52:57.230] [SPEAKER_05]: We were forbidden.
[52:57.390 --> 53:01.830] [SPEAKER_05]: And the ultimate irony is that Viacom didn't make that available anywhere else.
[53:02.250 --> 53:03.250] [SPEAKER_05]: They just had...
[53:03.250 --> 53:04.610] [SPEAKER_05]: They had it logged.
[53:05.930 --> 53:08.090] [SPEAKER_05]: And things like that happen all the time.
[53:08.170 --> 53:12.350] [SPEAKER_05]: Another thing I'm involved in right now is archiving of old videotapes.
[53:12.750 --> 53:20.550] [SPEAKER_05]: I've been kind of manic about this since the 1980s, recording historical things on television or old episodes of TV shows.
[53:20.550 --> 53:31.210] [SPEAKER_05]: And what I'd like to do, because I've inadvertently captured a lot of history, including commercials of all sorts, things that I might even have the only copy of, I would like for people to crowdsource that.
[53:31.830 --> 53:35.610] [SPEAKER_05]: You know, look at each video and say, hey, that's me in that commercial there.
[53:35.790 --> 53:39.670] [SPEAKER_05]: And we can, you know, make clips and have a kind of archive.
[53:39.810 --> 53:40.630] [SPEAKER_05]: You can't upload it.
[53:40.730 --> 53:52.190] [SPEAKER_05]: As soon as you upload it, it's flagged because, you know, somebody thinks that, you know, you're going to be taking advantage of copyright by watching a 30-year-old episode of St. Elsewhere on a copy of a videotape.
[53:52.290 --> 53:53.690] [SPEAKER_05]: It doesn't make any sense.
[53:53.850 --> 53:59.870] [SPEAKER_05]: There need to be outlets for creativity, for archiving, for historical study.
[54:00.210 --> 54:01.630] [SPEAKER_05]: And they don't exist right now.
[54:01.830 --> 54:12.870] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, the best places, I think, are like archive or even like museums do a better job of allowing content like this to exist and be curated.
[54:13.150 --> 54:15.470] [SPEAKER_07]: But again, it's, you know, it's behind a paywall.
[54:15.630 --> 54:16.910] [SPEAKER_07]: It's behind a foundation.
[54:17.190 --> 54:23.890] [SPEAKER_07]: It's the only protected way it can exist as a digital recording.
[54:23.890 --> 54:32.890] [SPEAKER_07]: And it's really a shame because there's so much in culture and in, you know, ads about just seeing how companies and brands have changed over the years.
[54:32.990 --> 54:38.090] [SPEAKER_07]: And you really have an amazing, an amazing treasure trove of stuff.
[54:38.270 --> 54:46.070] [SPEAKER_07]: But it's a real problem finding where you can share it, where you can allow people to see it and work on it.
[54:46.070 --> 54:54.670] [SPEAKER_07]: But, you know, for them to do that in a legal way and in a public way, all of the current platforms are just terrible for that.
[54:54.870 --> 55:09.050] [SPEAKER_07]: They will completely obliterate any aspiration to use people's knowledge and enthusiasm to really capture and find out what's there and, you know, and then talk about it.
[55:09.050 --> 55:10.610] [SPEAKER_07]: There could be all kinds of things in it.
[55:10.710 --> 55:19.990] [SPEAKER_05]: You mentioned archive.org and thank God for the Internet Archive because if that weren't around, there'd be so much that would be lost permanently.
[55:20.570 --> 55:22.170] [SPEAKER_05]: The thing is, it's the exception.
[55:22.330 --> 55:23.090] [SPEAKER_05]: It should be the rule.
[55:23.270 --> 55:34.750] [SPEAKER_05]: Internet Archive should be something that we all take an interest in because just, you know, BBSs from the past, which is, you know, how Jason Scott got involved, textfiles.com.
[55:36.070 --> 55:38.350] [SPEAKER_05]: Preserving all that is such a valuable service.
[55:38.350 --> 55:41.710] [SPEAKER_05]: It's something that if we don't do it, it'll be lost forever.
[55:42.130 --> 55:49.410] [SPEAKER_05]: And, okay, you may protect your copyright, but you lose history like, you know, you've never done before.
[55:49.410 --> 55:51.550] [SPEAKER_05]: And who gains from that?
[55:51.670 --> 56:09.470] [SPEAKER_07]: But if you designed your own platform, if you really invested in making it specifically the way you want to share it and leverage community interests the way you intend, it should not be that you need the backing of archive.org and a lot of people to protect you in doing that.
[56:09.750 --> 56:28.170] [SPEAKER_07]: Say you're just a student or you put together a small site and you're building this whole thing yourself, and then you're told by outside entities that you need to do filtering or that you need to not host something or your site's seized just because a couple conglomerates decide you ought not exist or they don't want to talk about their past.
[56:28.170 --> 56:29.670] [SPEAKER_07]: You know, and there you are.
[56:29.810 --> 56:32.810] [SPEAKER_07]: You really can only find refuge in these organizations.
[56:32.810 --> 56:50.030] [SPEAKER_07]: And that's really bad because they, I think Jason and archive.org would admit they have their work cut out for them, you know, and people should be free to share and create and do the archiving that needs to be done so that it's sort of ready for curation when it gets to archive.org.
[56:50.030 --> 57:01.570] [SPEAKER_05]: You know, just, just, you know, a thought here with all the money these companies make with their copyright and, and control the Internet, a percentage should go to Internet archive to preserve and, and, and maintain.
[57:01.790 --> 57:05.050] [SPEAKER_05]: I just, I just came up with that idea, but I think that should be, that should be mandated.
[57:05.230 --> 57:06.110] [SPEAKER_05]: And fight their lawyers.
[57:06.850 --> 57:15.910] [SPEAKER_06]: Building on this issue that, that Carlos brought up with regard to sharing a real foreseeable, but unintentional consequence of, of this content filtering law.
[57:15.910 --> 57:30.970] [SPEAKER_06]: If it's passed at a plenary vote at the EU and it's transposed into national legislation, what we're already seeing with GDPR to an extent is this further balkanization of the Internet, where because of these burdensome rules is certain sites and, and dialogue and,
[57:31.090 --> 57:35.270] [SPEAKER_06]: and content are not available to people in the EU because of these restrictions.
[57:35.410 --> 57:39.030] [SPEAKER_06]: We're going to see that in California with the California Consumer Privacy Act.
[57:39.210 --> 57:50.910] [SPEAKER_06]: And what I fear would happen is certain forums, certain sites where content is exchanged and discussed will be prevented from being displayed in the EU because of these particular rules.
[57:51.090 --> 57:56.630] [SPEAKER_06]: That balkanization is not good for free speech, not good for dialogue, not good for the Internet at all.
[57:56.930 --> 58:15.350] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, and I think the RIA and the MPAA, the organizations that are, that say that these filters are mandatory, are huge hypocrites because they, they claim that if you don't have a strict copyright, so we won't have incentives to create more culture, when in fact they're the ones that their filters are destroying that vast piece of culture,
[58:15.550 --> 58:16.610] [SPEAKER_02]: we're going to be them who are getting out.
[58:16.870 --> 58:18.090] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, let's, let's give it a try.
[58:18.090 --> 58:20.810] [SPEAKER_05]: See if, see if it really does stifle creativity.
[58:21.250 --> 58:22.730] [SPEAKER_05]: I wager it doesn't.
[58:23.290 --> 58:24.670] [SPEAKER_05]: All right, that's going to have to be the last word.
[58:24.990 --> 58:28.390] [SPEAKER_05]: Write to us, oth@2600.com.
[58:28.670 --> 58:29.570] [SPEAKER_05]: We'd love to hear from you.
[58:29.710 --> 58:35.890] [SPEAKER_05]: In the meantime, stay awake and send us your feedback and challenge the system and all that good stuff.
[58:36.010 --> 58:36.550] [SPEAKER_05]: We'll see you next time.
[58:36.630 --> 58:36.790] [SPEAKER_05]: Good night.