Off The Hook - 2019-05-29

[00:00.000 --> 00:03.880]  [SPEAKER_00]: At the Commons, 388 Atlantic Avenue in New York City.
[00:04.080 --> 00:06.640]  [SPEAKER_00]: The $40 ticket will include the event and a book.
[00:06.820 --> 00:08.800]  [SPEAKER_00]: There'll be a Q&A afterwards, so bring your questions.
[00:09.000 --> 00:11.900]  [SPEAKER_00]: Get your tickets at give2wbai.org.
[00:11.920 --> 00:14.380]  [SPEAKER_00]: That's give2wbai.org.
[00:14.400 --> 00:19.600]  [SPEAKER_00]: And you can also call to get tickets at 516-620-3602.
[00:19.740 --> 00:22.180]  [SPEAKER_00]: That's give2wbai.org.
[00:22.300 --> 00:25.740]  [SPEAKER_00]: Or call 516-620-3602.
[00:25.860 --> 00:28.340]  [SPEAKER_00]: I look forward to seeing you there and tag your it.
[00:32.150 --> 00:35.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: And you're listening to radio station WBAI New York.
[00:35.310 --> 00:38.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's 7 o'clock time once again for Off The Hook.
[00:43.320 --> 00:45.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: The telephone keeps ringing.
[00:45.600 --> 00:47.680]  [SPEAKER_05]: So I ripped it off the wall.
[00:48.780 --> 00:50.680]  [SPEAKER_05]: I cut myself while shaving.
[00:51.280 --> 00:53.180]  [SPEAKER_05]: Now I can't make a call.
[00:53.940 --> 00:56.020]  [SPEAKER_05]: We couldn't get much worse.
[00:58.400 --> 01:01.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: But the best is paid for worst.
[01:02.160 --> 01:03.980]  [SPEAKER_05]: I hope that's understood.
[01:04.300 --> 01:05.060]  [SPEAKER_05]: But the little bit more.
[02:18.410 --> 02:20.030]  [SPEAKER_01]: And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:20.130 --> 02:21.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: The program is Off The Hook.
[02:21.670 --> 02:22.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you.
[02:22.730 --> 02:23.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: Joined tonight by Rob T.
[02:24.090 --> 02:24.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: Firefly.
[02:24.390 --> 02:25.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[02:25.530 --> 02:26.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: And Kyle.
[02:26.370 --> 02:26.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: What's up?
[02:27.410 --> 02:28.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, what's up?
[02:28.110 --> 02:29.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's the last week of our fundraiser.
[02:29.670 --> 02:30.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's one thing.
[02:30.310 --> 02:33.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: So we want to thank the people who called in last week and pledged.
[02:33.810 --> 02:34.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: We did quite well.
[02:34.650 --> 02:38.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: And we hope to do even better this week because it's the last week.
[02:38.670 --> 02:40.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: And overall, not bad.
[02:40.790 --> 02:41.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: Not bad at the station.
[02:41.650 --> 02:45.710]  [SPEAKER_01]: We're talking about getting that new studio up and running.
[02:46.210 --> 02:50.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: I believe there's a separate fundraiser going for that.
[02:50.170 --> 02:54.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think we're getting very, very close to the $10,000 needed for that to actually go live.
[02:55.810 --> 03:03.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: So please, if you just want to pledge for that, call 516-620-3602 and say you want to pledge for the new studio.
[03:03.770 --> 03:07.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: But we also have various other premiums that we're going to be offering as well.
[03:07.510 --> 03:09.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: We'll get into details in just a little bit.
[03:09.770 --> 03:22.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: But before we do that, though, I'd like to discuss the various Orwellian things that have been going on in the last couple of weeks or actually a long time.
[03:22.830 --> 03:24.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, basically, this has been set up for quite some time.
[03:25.050 --> 03:28.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: I know, Kyle, we went to a talk once.
[03:28.730 --> 03:37.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think it was at Chaos Communication Congress talking about systems in China where you basically have a social rating.
[03:37.730 --> 03:38.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: Do you remember this?
[03:39.770 --> 03:41.470]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, I think it's called social credit.
[03:41.730 --> 03:41.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[03:42.950 --> 03:45.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: And it seemed so alien to us then.
[03:45.330 --> 03:47.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: And now it's getting really, really familiar.
[03:48.050 --> 03:48.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uber.
[03:48.850 --> 03:49.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uber.
[03:49.350 --> 03:49.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: Remember them?
[03:49.890 --> 03:53.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: They say they will soon be banning passengers with low ratings.
[03:54.110 --> 03:57.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: If you don't have a high rating, you can't get an Uber.
[03:58.050 --> 03:58.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: Imagine that.
[03:58.890 --> 03:59.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: I've never taken...
[03:59.570 --> 04:00.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I've never actually...
[04:00.250 --> 04:02.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: I've been put in Ubers, but I've never taken one myself.
[04:02.990 --> 04:04.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't like the idea.
[04:04.630 --> 04:16.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know how they got away with it in New York when there are so many people who have put their life savings into driving cabs and how cabs can simply be expected to coexist when anybody can be a cab driver.
[04:16.970 --> 04:18.130]  [SPEAKER_01]: It just seems horribly unfair.
[04:18.290 --> 04:19.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: But now they're doing things like this.
[04:19.890 --> 04:21.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: They won't pick you up if you're not popular.
[04:21.950 --> 04:23.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, that's insane to me.
[04:23.670 --> 04:26.430]  [SPEAKER_03]: I've always thought of it as something that people...
[04:26.430 --> 04:31.450]  [SPEAKER_03]: Disruptors in Silicon Valley really like and think everyone else should really like it as well.
[04:31.450 --> 04:34.590]  [SPEAKER_03]: But I don't think it's as cool a thing.
[04:34.750 --> 04:38.050]  [SPEAKER_03]: And then there was always the specter of them automating and removing the drivers altogether.
[04:38.050 --> 04:39.990]  [SPEAKER_03]: So their jobs aren't necessarily secure.
[04:40.150 --> 04:51.250]  [SPEAKER_03]: But as you pointed out, people who've spent a lot of money on the medallions and what it's done to people who are licensed, insured, and have been really sanctioned and professional...
[04:51.250 --> 04:51.290]  [SPEAKER_03]: They're trained.
[04:51.450 --> 04:52.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: They're professionals.
[04:52.170 --> 04:52.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: They know what they're doing.
[04:53.010 --> 04:56.470]  [SPEAKER_03]: All the more reason to get the Curb app, which allows you to hail taxis.
[04:56.770 --> 04:57.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[04:57.170 --> 04:58.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: So they have an app, too.
[04:58.590 --> 05:05.210]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, it's one app that contacts actual taxi drivers instead of these ride-sharing things.
[05:05.350 --> 05:06.210]  [SPEAKER_03]: So there are alternatives.
[05:06.390 --> 05:07.030]  [SPEAKER_03]: So check that out.
[05:07.090 --> 05:07.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: The app is great.
[05:08.050 --> 05:09.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: The app is amazing what it can do.
[05:09.550 --> 05:20.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: But why wasn't that integrated into the taxi system, the people who already are there, the people who do the job, instead of just opening it up to anybody and totally screwing over the cab drivers?
[05:20.650 --> 05:24.390]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, I think a lot of it is because taxis are, in a sense, like franchisees.
[05:25.470 --> 05:26.570]  [SPEAKER_03]: But I'm not sure.
[05:26.810 --> 05:30.650]  [SPEAKER_03]: Actually, I think I thought you were going in a different direction with that.
[05:30.790 --> 05:38.370]  [SPEAKER_03]: But yeah, in a lot of ways, it's difficult for them to have, you know, had a technology arm that would develop something that would work for everyone who is driving a cab.
[05:38.470 --> 05:39.890]  [SPEAKER_03]: And that's why, you know...
[05:39.890 --> 05:40.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: But think of the alternative.
[05:41.050 --> 05:45.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: They develop something that will just work for anybody instead of anybody who's actually qualified.
[05:45.550 --> 05:46.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know.
[05:46.110 --> 05:50.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, in some places, yeah, it works where there's no army of taxi drivers.
[05:50.530 --> 05:55.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: But here in New York, you know, you can't shake a stick without...
[05:55.250 --> 05:56.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: What's the expression?
[05:56.630 --> 05:58.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: You can't shake a stick without seeing a cab driver.
[05:58.930 --> 05:59.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: That doesn't make any sense.
[05:59.850 --> 06:02.030]  [SPEAKER_01]: There's a lot of taxis on the street, is what I'm trying to say.
[06:02.450 --> 06:07.270]  [SPEAKER_01]: So this app should have worked for that instead of causing the chaos.
[06:07.390 --> 06:13.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: Anyway, so now you have a situation where if you're not popular, you won't be able to even use their system.
[06:13.750 --> 06:14.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[06:14.350 --> 06:18.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, drivers have long been expected to meet minimum ratings to continue working on the platform.
[06:18.290 --> 06:23.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: I guess, you know, you want a driver that people don't hate.
[06:24.130 --> 06:29.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: But riders, riders may now lose access if they develop a significantly below average rating.
[06:29.850 --> 06:31.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: For now, it's significantly below average.
[06:31.950 --> 06:34.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: It could just be, you know, average in the future.
[06:35.070 --> 06:36.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: It could be a popularity contest.
[06:37.450 --> 06:40.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: Riders will receive tips on how to improve their ratings.
[06:42.150 --> 06:45.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: Man, we are being talked down to so much in this era.
[06:45.390 --> 06:56.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: But now we will be told by Uber how to be better people, encouraging polite behavior, avoiding leaving trash in the vehicle, avoiding requests for drivers to exceed the speed limit.
[06:57.530 --> 07:03.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: Riders will have several opportunities to improve their rating prior to losing access to the Uber apps.
[07:03.450 --> 07:05.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, it doesn't end there.
[07:05.490 --> 07:11.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: Any app, anything that involves social networking of any sort, this kind of thing can happen.
[07:11.550 --> 07:12.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: This is only the beginning.
[07:13.030 --> 07:19.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think, you know, that talk that we saw in China, that was...
[07:20.110 --> 07:21.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: Or we didn't see it in China.
[07:21.450 --> 07:23.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: We saw it in Germany.
[07:24.190 --> 07:30.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: That was something that is coming home to roost, I guess.
[07:30.650 --> 07:30.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: Rob?
[07:31.650 --> 07:35.650]  [SPEAKER_02]: In this city in particular, it's not just anybody who can be a driver on these things.
[07:35.650 --> 07:37.750]  [SPEAKER_02]: You actually need TLC plates on your car.
[07:38.610 --> 07:45.370]  [SPEAKER_02]: There's a certain amount of lobbying that the entrenched cab industry, which is not a saintly thing.
[07:45.470 --> 07:46.590]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, they have so much to answer for.
[07:46.690 --> 07:50.750]  [SPEAKER_02]: The whole medallion bubble thing, which there have been exposés about recently and that sort of thing.
[07:51.070 --> 07:56.050]  [SPEAKER_02]: But the one thing the traditional cabs did have going for them is they were basically...
[07:56.050 --> 08:02.450]  [SPEAKER_02]: They held this position as sort of a public utility to the point where they were not allowed to just skip over anyone they liked for whatever reason.
[08:02.450 --> 08:11.250]  [SPEAKER_02]: There were outcries in the past when it was perceived that cab drivers were skipping over people due to things like skin color.
[08:11.490 --> 08:11.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[08:11.730 --> 08:16.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: And literally, what you can see through your window, that is how they are judging people's skin color.
[08:16.450 --> 08:18.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: You can't get more black and white than that.
[08:19.470 --> 08:27.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: But now you know the history, the history of the person, their credit report or whatever they're going to add to this profile.
[08:27.390 --> 08:32.710]  [SPEAKER_01]: And now they can be ignorant and judge people based on that instead of just what they see through their window.
[08:32.950 --> 08:54.710]  [SPEAKER_02]: And it is something we're giving up among the many things we're giving up as things shift over to this gig economy, where instead of established entities that have standards they have to uphold and stuff, people are expected to just pass the work along to anybody who installs an app and lose the protections that they might have had had they just taken a damn taxi, for example.
[08:56.090 --> 08:56.610]  [SPEAKER_01]: Wow.
[08:57.130 --> 08:57.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: Wow.
[08:57.150 --> 09:00.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, well, moving on, more Orwellian things.
[09:00.350 --> 09:01.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: How about this?
[09:01.710 --> 09:08.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, in England, you can be fined if you don't show your face to surveillance cameras.
[09:09.370 --> 09:14.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: This guy pulled up his jumper, his, what's the American word for jumper?
[09:14.810 --> 09:18.130]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's sort of a long sleeve t-shirt or sweater type thing.
[09:18.190 --> 09:27.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: He pulled it up over his chin as he walked past the Metropolitan Police officers who were basically running a trial of live facial recognition software in East London.
[09:29.130 --> 09:32.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, BBC cameras are on, everyone's filming everyone over there.
[09:32.610 --> 09:37.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: BBC cameras were filming as the officer swooped in on the man, telling him to wind his neck in.
[09:38.390 --> 09:40.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, if someone told me to do that, I wouldn't know what they were saying.
[09:41.110 --> 09:43.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: So it's a good thing it was a British citizen they told that to.
[09:44.270 --> 09:47.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: Wind his neck in and then handed him a hefty penalty charge.
[09:48.290 --> 09:57.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, a campaigner from Big Brother Watch, who were also there protesting the use of cameras, was also filmed telling an officer, I would have done the same.
[09:57.930 --> 10:00.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: Can you get fined for saying you would have done the same?
[10:00.310 --> 10:00.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: Probably.
[10:00.710 --> 10:02.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: In England, I think you could get fined for that.
[10:02.590 --> 10:06.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, police said they made three arrests thanks to the cameras on the day in question.
[10:07.070 --> 10:11.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: And a total of eight people, including two 14-year-old boys, were arrested during the course of the trial.
[10:12.210 --> 10:15.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, but were they arrested for crimes or for not showing their faces?
[10:15.290 --> 10:17.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's the scary thing.
[10:19.010 --> 10:26.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: In the video, the man who has not been named explains how he was pulled over by an officer who got his back up.
[10:26.730 --> 10:28.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know what that means either.
[10:28.230 --> 10:30.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think maybe that means he got offended or something.
[10:30.590 --> 10:31.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, he got annoyed.
[10:31.490 --> 10:33.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: His heckles or whatever you want to call them.
[10:34.030 --> 10:34.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hackles.
[10:34.490 --> 10:34.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hackles.
[10:35.170 --> 10:36.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: Don't even have that right.
[10:36.750 --> 10:41.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: He told the BBC, I spoke to a man who said there's a facial recognition down there.
[10:41.190 --> 10:42.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: So it's a cold day.
[10:43.070 --> 10:44.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: I've pulled my jumper over my mouth.
[10:45.450 --> 10:46.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: And gone.
[10:47.130 --> 10:49.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, police officers asked me to come over.
[10:49.650 --> 10:50.990]  [SPEAKER_01]: So I've got my back up.
[10:51.530 --> 10:53.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: Wow, this is just a fun...
[10:53.170 --> 10:54.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, this is really poorly written.
[10:54.290 --> 10:55.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: A fun journey into...
[10:55.810 --> 10:58.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, it's from a paper called Metro in the UK.
[10:58.410 --> 11:00.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: So it might be just poorly spoken.
[11:00.490 --> 11:03.110]  [SPEAKER_03]: So my take on this is, I think it's baseless.
[11:03.110 --> 11:18.350]  [SPEAKER_03]: I think, you know, you in most all circumstances should be able to cover your face and, you know, protect your own identity, given how much surveillance and tracking there is between phones and gate recognition and all the other ways they could track you.
[11:18.350 --> 11:30.090]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I think where this is going to end up is something on the lines of like body armor, where, you know, if you do it in the commission of a crime, it could be considered as a part of that prosecution or an additional offense.
[11:30.090 --> 11:35.190]  [SPEAKER_03]: But if you are not committing a crime, you absolutely should have the right to do this.
[11:35.310 --> 11:39.390]  [SPEAKER_03]: And that includes going to a rally, going to a protest or any kind of action like that.
[11:39.510 --> 11:47.290]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I really think people should challenge this and or flout it more often than they are being scared into complying with this kind of stuff.
[11:47.430 --> 11:48.450]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I really am excited.
[11:48.610 --> 12:14.070]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I know we personally have thought about different ways to evolve the kinds of masks and protection and countermeasures for this kind of technology, because it's only getting more sophisticated and more economical for these agencies and individuals and private entities to make use of recognition a la Amazon or or other such platforms that are being proliferated.
[12:14.250 --> 12:16.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: You see, what I wonder is, have we already lost this battle?
[12:16.910 --> 12:19.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because if you think at all, the technology has been introduced.
[12:19.670 --> 12:23.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: When has it ever been turned in the other direction?
[12:24.090 --> 12:27.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: You have fingerprint identification to open up your computer.
[12:27.450 --> 12:30.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: You have all kinds of voice recognition software.
[12:30.750 --> 12:36.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: And here you have something really neat that the authorities can use and that we can have fun with as well.
[12:36.570 --> 12:38.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: Do you really think they might turn back?
[12:39.490 --> 12:39.710]  [SPEAKER_03]: Indeed.
[12:39.930 --> 12:42.230]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it won't be put back in the bottle, as we say.
[12:42.430 --> 13:08.530]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the other point that you're, I think, right on the outer edge of is that the police, police, the authorities, military operatives who wear balaclavas and police who wear body armor that obscure their faces, no badges, no badge numbers, just coded numbers for different teams and groups they're on in rallies or protests.
[13:08.530 --> 13:11.370]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yes, that is a double standard.
[13:11.570 --> 13:11.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: Of course.
[13:12.110 --> 13:13.510]  [SPEAKER_03]: They are never identified.
[13:13.810 --> 13:18.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: They're never identified in incidences of excessive force.
[13:19.090 --> 13:20.130]  [SPEAKER_03]: They protect their identities.
[13:20.630 --> 13:22.110]  [SPEAKER_03]: It is abhorrent.
[13:22.130 --> 13:24.670]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's disgusting, disgraceful.
[13:24.850 --> 13:32.250]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it is a double standard we ought not accept as taxpayers, as the people who fund their very livelihood.
[13:32.250 --> 13:35.550]  [SPEAKER_03]: If they're going to protect us, they need to protect us from them.
[13:36.390 --> 13:37.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well said.
[13:37.270 --> 13:37.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well said.
[13:37.930 --> 13:41.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: On the subject of facial recognition, I don't know if you guys have been following Amazon.
[13:44.190 --> 13:46.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: They were trying...
[13:46.330 --> 13:50.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, actually, there was pressure on Amazon to ban facial recognition.
[13:51.490 --> 13:55.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: And only 2% of their shareholders voted in favor of this.
[13:55.110 --> 13:55.990]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know something about this, right, Rob?
[13:55.990 --> 14:03.950]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, the issue on the table was, should Amazon supply things like entities like governments with access to their facial recognition technology?
[14:04.210 --> 14:17.370]  [SPEAKER_02]: And there was sort of this grassroots effort being attempted to get the Amazon shareholders to vote for that motion at their shareholder meeting.
[14:17.630 --> 14:20.670]  [SPEAKER_02]: Of course, Amazon has untold zillions of shareholders.
[14:21.650 --> 14:24.730]  [SPEAKER_02]: I think Jeff Bezos is something like half of them.
[14:25.190 --> 14:28.970]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know exactly off the top of my head, but he has many, many shares and many, many votes.
[14:29.530 --> 14:37.670]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, ultimately, only about 2% of the shareholders voted in favor of not supplying their facial recognition tech to governments.
[14:39.070 --> 14:41.530]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, yep, they're going to do it.
[14:41.670 --> 14:42.070]  [SPEAKER_02]: Both failed.
[14:42.490 --> 14:43.110]  [SPEAKER_02]: Both failed.
[14:43.210 --> 14:43.590]  [SPEAKER_02]: Both failed.
[14:43.650 --> 14:43.830]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[14:43.990 --> 14:44.470]  [SPEAKER_02]: Pretty dramatically.
[14:44.870 --> 14:47.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: The thing is, you know, the shareholders is one thing.
[14:47.790 --> 14:48.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: Customers are another thing.
[14:49.190 --> 14:53.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: And it's unrealistic for me to say, yeah, it's time for the customers to vote.
[14:53.490 --> 14:54.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because they're not.
[14:54.070 --> 14:55.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: They're not going to stop using Amazon.
[14:55.530 --> 14:56.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: We know that.
[14:56.350 --> 14:59.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, there has to be other ways of applying pressure.
[15:00.110 --> 15:00.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: Indeed.
[15:00.530 --> 15:01.970]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the fact that it failed is one thing.
[15:02.070 --> 15:06.570]  [SPEAKER_03]: But the two initiatives, as I read or as I recall, I think they were fairly toothless.
[15:06.690 --> 15:12.110]  [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, they were a nice gesture, but none of them had any kind of enforcement clause or anything that was binding.
[15:12.550 --> 15:18.570]  [SPEAKER_02]: And ultimately, I think it might have been a pipe dream to expect the shareholders to vote for something that would mean Amazon gets less money.
[15:18.570 --> 15:20.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'd like to know more about their service, though.
[15:20.930 --> 15:22.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because it's designed by Amazon.
[15:22.910 --> 15:27.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's called Recognition, with recognition, of course, spelled wrong, R-E-K-O-G-N-I-T-I-O-N.
[15:28.810 --> 15:29.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'd like to know all about it.
[15:29.970 --> 15:32.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'd like to know how it can be used, abused, et cetera.
[15:32.310 --> 15:33.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think we all should.
[15:33.570 --> 15:33.970]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[15:34.150 --> 15:50.570]  [SPEAKER_02]: And there's also the question of accountability with tech like this, because as is known with facial recognition tech in general, a lot of it does not recognize, does not correctly recognize, say, people with darker skin or, you know, totally identify people with 100 percent confidence.
[15:50.570 --> 16:11.430]  [SPEAKER_02]: And so when somebody, like, say, a police officer on their little computer in the car, pulls up a picture of somebody that's walking around and it says that, oh, this matches with such and such wanted criminal, they're just going to go ahead and respond as though that's the case when the computer might be guessing with reduced dependability.
[16:12.310 --> 16:18.730]  [SPEAKER_02]: And there are a lot of issues that still need to be worked out with how well facial recognition tech actually works.
[16:18.730 --> 16:21.090]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's still not very good in the grand scheme of things.
[16:21.530 --> 16:31.730]  [SPEAKER_02]: But once this is instituted in things like, you know, checkpoint, police checkpoints, airports, things like that, the powers that be are basically going to be treating it as though it's gospel.
[16:31.970 --> 16:35.390]  [SPEAKER_02]: And that raises a lot of questions and a lot of problems, I think, down the line.
[16:36.230 --> 16:36.670]  [SPEAKER_02]: Indeed.
[16:36.930 --> 16:37.030]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[16:37.210 --> 16:41.810]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I'll say just for our listeners and people in general, we're a bit disappointed.
[16:42.030 --> 16:48.350]  [SPEAKER_03]: You know, we'd like a copy of this software or information about how it works.
[16:48.730 --> 16:50.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: Do you want our listeners to send us the software somehow?
[16:51.010 --> 17:01.170]  [SPEAKER_03]: If it's possible, if you've done some research, if you wrote an academic piece or something and you want to share it with the radio program or the magazine, we're always happy to take that.
[17:01.290 --> 17:09.330]  [SPEAKER_03]: We never got any standalone automatic license plate reader software, which we talked about years and years ago.
[17:09.550 --> 17:10.590]  [SPEAKER_03]: And that was disappointing.
[17:10.870 --> 17:17.970]  [SPEAKER_03]: And, you know, to that end, we haven't got the latest machine learning powered Facebook algorithm.
[17:17.970 --> 17:25.470]  [SPEAKER_03]: I know it's carefully protected, but we're always open to having backups and taking care of that for Facebook and other companies.
[17:25.670 --> 17:29.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: We did get one really nifty app that I've been playing with called Cop GPS.
[17:29.870 --> 17:37.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's a GPS app that only tracks cops, tells you where the cops are in your area, what cop number they are, what the neighborhood is.
[17:37.790 --> 17:38.530]  [SPEAKER_03]: That's great.
[17:47.970 --> 17:51.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: Cop GPS is the app that I dreamed of this week.
[17:52.390 --> 17:55.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: Every week I dream of an app that doesn't exist and hope somebody designs it.
[17:55.630 --> 17:59.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: So please, whoever is capable of writing cop GPS, do so.
[17:59.730 --> 18:03.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: I know you got to get the GPS onto the car somehow, the GPS device.
[18:03.430 --> 18:04.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: But, you know, there's got to be a way.
[18:04.930 --> 18:05.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: There's got to be a way to do this.
[18:07.410 --> 18:10.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: Maybe there's another way we can track the car by the license plate number or something.
[18:10.550 --> 18:13.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: It has some kind of property that can be monitored.
[18:13.930 --> 18:14.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know.
[18:14.670 --> 18:16.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: And we'd like your ideas for apps as well.
[18:16.270 --> 18:18.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: oth@2600.com.
[18:18.250 --> 18:20.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because just because it doesn't exist doesn't mean it's not a good idea.
[18:23.030 --> 18:23.610]  [SPEAKER_02]: Quite so.
[18:23.790 --> 18:30.110]  [SPEAKER_02]: And talking of a software we'd like to get hold of, I could quickly mention that 2600 still has a secure drop.
[18:30.710 --> 18:31.750]  [SPEAKER_02]: How does that whole thing work?
[18:31.790 --> 18:32.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, we do.
[18:32.930 --> 18:38.730]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, yeah, you can basically submit things through an anonymizing portal.
[18:38.930 --> 18:40.830]  [SPEAKER_03]: Basically, we don't know who you are unless you say.
[18:41.010 --> 18:41.810]  [SPEAKER_03]: So don't say who you are.
[18:42.010 --> 18:45.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: And then we don't know where it comes from.
[18:46.050 --> 18:57.230]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it basically allows documents and links, pointers, discussions, stuff that maybe you want to tip us off with.
[18:57.430 --> 18:58.270]  [SPEAKER_03]: But protect yourself.
[18:58.270 --> 19:04.370]  [SPEAKER_03]: Of course, nothing is perfect, but it is one of the best ways to submit to journalists.
[19:04.610 --> 19:11.810]  [SPEAKER_03]: And a lot of journalists have and publications have taken on this technology in the wake of other leaks.
[19:11.970 --> 19:26.270]  [SPEAKER_03]: And a lot of the centralized leaking platforms that were popular 10 years ago, we've learned that curating them, having one entity curate all leaks ever is just not as good as each publication taking this on themselves.
[19:26.270 --> 19:31.630]  [SPEAKER_03]: Of course, we've always accepted PGP-encrypted submissions to the magazine.
[19:32.030 --> 19:37.150]  [SPEAKER_03]: So there's just this other way of doing it that allows a bit more anonymity.
[19:37.570 --> 19:41.670]  [SPEAKER_03]: You can also send us stuff in plain text, send us mail, all of those ways.
[19:41.670 --> 19:47.130]  [SPEAKER_03]: So this was a recent edition, and it uses the Tor network and some special software.
[19:47.410 --> 19:55.890]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it basically gives you an account and you can log in and communicate, talk about your submission, upload files, and the like.
[19:55.890 --> 20:00.270]  [SPEAKER_03]: If you want more information, you just go to 2600.com/securedrop.
[20:00.270 --> 20:03.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, and as Kyle said, you need the Tor browser.
[20:03.390 --> 20:06.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: I just opened up the Tor browser on this laptop here.
[20:06.790 --> 20:13.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: And if you have the Tor browser going, all you have to do is go to our website, 2600.com/securedrop.
[20:13.770 --> 20:23.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: And what you'll find there, you'll find all kinds of information on our particular secure drop instance where you can make your submissions.
[20:23.950 --> 20:25.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: You'll see a page explaining it all.
[20:25.890 --> 20:29.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: And what that page will give you is a .onion address.
[20:30.450 --> 20:33.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: .onion address is unique to the Tor network.
[20:33.430 --> 20:35.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: And you must enter that address.
[20:35.870 --> 20:37.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: It does not work on Firefox.
[20:37.690 --> 20:38.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: It does not work on Chrome.
[20:38.970 --> 20:43.030]  [SPEAKER_01]: It does not work on any browser other than the Tor browser.
[20:43.630 --> 20:44.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: Is that right?
[20:44.350 --> 20:45.370]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, that's correct.
[20:45.570 --> 20:48.270]  [SPEAKER_02]: To be completely clear, the Tor browser is technically Firefox.
[20:48.510 --> 20:51.350]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's a very specialized version of Firefox.
[20:51.350 --> 21:03.670]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, it uses the .onion domain structure, which is basically on the outskirts of what normal browsers and Internet protocol use.
[21:03.870 --> 21:07.190]  [SPEAKER_03]: So it's sort of a separate protocol that is only used by that network.
[21:07.650 --> 21:09.430]  [SPEAKER_03]: That's the sort of short version.
[21:09.870 --> 21:11.430]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's really interesting.
[21:11.430 --> 21:12.170]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's been around for a while.
[21:12.190 --> 21:13.530]  [SPEAKER_03]: I'm sure this is redundant.
[21:13.550 --> 21:18.530]  [SPEAKER_03]: But for those of you who don't know, you can find out more at torproject.org.
[21:18.850 --> 21:19.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: And that's where you get the Tor browser.
[21:20.250 --> 21:20.790]  [SPEAKER_03]: Of course.
[21:21.390 --> 21:27.050]  [SPEAKER_03]: And Freedom of the Press Foundation and SecureDrop are great sources for more information as well.
[21:27.190 --> 21:37.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: And I see our address is lxa4rh3xy2s7cvfy.onion.
[21:37.610 --> 21:38.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm sorry, I read that too fast.
[21:39.050 --> 21:39.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'll read it again.
[21:45.970 --> 21:46.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: lxa4rh3xy2s7cvfy.onion.
[21:46.930 --> 21:48.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: That is our SecureDrop address.
[21:48.850 --> 21:54.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: And when you enter that into the Tor browser, you get routed over to our SecureDrop submission site.
[21:54.390 --> 21:55.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: And then that loads up.
[21:55.710 --> 22:00.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: And you have all kinds of basic options here.
[22:00.390 --> 22:03.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: Submit documents is the one that you really should click on.
[22:03.470 --> 22:04.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: And then you submit a document.
[22:04.770 --> 22:08.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: You simply drag it over.
[22:08.530 --> 22:10.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: Drag it over and upload it.
[22:10.530 --> 22:11.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: You get a bunch of words.
[22:11.790 --> 22:15.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: You get a bunch of words that you should keep track of.
[22:15.770 --> 22:17.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because that is how you communicate with us in the future.
[22:17.690 --> 22:20.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: Those words will tell you how to reconnect.
[22:20.850 --> 22:22.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: And you can exchange messages.
[22:22.210 --> 22:23.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: But we don't know who you are.
[22:23.150 --> 22:23.630]  [SPEAKER_03]: That's right.
[22:23.730 --> 22:27.710]  [SPEAKER_03]: And you can rest assured this is only seen by our editorial staff.
[22:27.710 --> 22:35.790]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it is not going to be disclosed how your submission got to us.
[22:35.950 --> 22:38.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: As I said, we have a variety of ways.
[22:38.990 --> 22:41.990]  [SPEAKER_03]: We even pick up mental envelopes behind dumpsters.
[22:42.150 --> 22:46.150]  [SPEAKER_03]: But there's a lot of ways to get content to us.
[22:46.330 --> 22:46.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: And stories.
[22:47.270 --> 22:48.610]  [SPEAKER_03]: And academic work.
[22:48.890 --> 22:50.010]  [SPEAKER_03]: Whatever it is.
[22:51.090 --> 22:52.150]  [SPEAKER_03]: Demos of things.
[22:52.350 --> 22:52.710]  [SPEAKER_03]: Scripts.
[22:52.770 --> 22:53.090]  [SPEAKER_03]: All that.
[22:53.610 --> 22:54.970]  [SPEAKER_03]: And we're not going to sell it.
[22:55.470 --> 22:55.910]  [SPEAKER_03]: No.
[22:56.030 --> 22:57.690]  [SPEAKER_03]: You know, we're not selling exploits here.
[22:57.830 --> 23:01.010]  [SPEAKER_03]: We're not doing anything with private anybody.
[23:02.230 --> 23:04.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: But curating it from an editorial sense.
[23:04.570 --> 23:06.150]  [SPEAKER_03]: So that is our assurance to you.
[23:06.450 --> 23:09.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: Although we would have paid a large sum of money for Donald Trump's tax returns.
[23:09.370 --> 23:10.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: We would have done that.
[23:10.570 --> 23:11.890]  [SPEAKER_03]: That was an exception.
[23:12.010 --> 23:16.350]  [SPEAKER_03]: But by all means, not the norm for us.
[23:16.750 --> 23:22.590]  [SPEAKER_03]: But in any event, it is important to us that you're confident.
[23:22.590 --> 23:26.590]  [SPEAKER_03]: And lastly, we will never, ever give up a source.
[23:26.850 --> 23:28.970]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's very important to us.
[23:29.070 --> 23:32.550]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's been important to us for almost 30, I don't know, 40 years.
[23:32.730 --> 23:33.470]  [SPEAKER_03]: However long.
[23:34.070 --> 23:35.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: As long as we've been around.
[23:35.290 --> 23:36.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's how long it's been important to us.
[23:36.530 --> 23:38.490]  [SPEAKER_03]: We value our own privacy.
[23:38.730 --> 23:43.670]  [SPEAKER_03]: And we treat yours quite like we would want ours.
[23:43.670 --> 23:54.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: But just looking at the text over here on LXA4RH3XY2S7CVFY.onion, you'll see that it says, Welcome.
[23:54.570 --> 23:57.610]  [SPEAKER_01]: Please either write this codename down, keep it in a safe place, or memorize it.
[23:57.750 --> 24:03.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: This codename is what you will use in future visits to receive messages from our journalists in response to what you submit on the next screen.
[24:03.810 --> 24:10.130]  [SPEAKER_01]: Is there any possible security issue with me reading the codename that's displaying on the screen now?
[24:10.130 --> 24:11.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because it's only to me, right?
[24:11.610 --> 24:12.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's not to anybody else.
[24:13.590 --> 24:15.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: Just to give people an idea of the kinds of words that they'll see.
[24:16.190 --> 24:19.030]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, read a couple of the words, maybe not in order or anything like that.
[24:19.150 --> 24:21.390]  [SPEAKER_03]: But ostensibly, these are randomly generated.
[24:21.510 --> 24:26.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: So you've taken that particular organization of words, and it would be an example of it.
[24:27.030 --> 24:28.690]  [SPEAKER_03]: I don't know if you would want to read the whole thing.
[24:29.590 --> 24:30.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: But it's...
[24:30.310 --> 24:31.950]  [SPEAKER_03]: No, it's not really going to affect anything.
[24:32.090 --> 24:43.650]  [SPEAKER_03]: Because every time there's a submission made, which you've began the process through the site, a new random arrangement of those are created for that particular session of submitting.
[24:43.850 --> 24:45.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: Let's assume I'm a hostile actor.
[24:45.570 --> 24:48.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: I would, of course, read these words out loud and display them everywhere.
[24:49.030 --> 24:54.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: But I wouldn't be able to penetrate the security and uncover anything about anyone other than me.
[24:54.710 --> 25:02.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: So the words, droplet, luncheon, crayon, ellipse, pout, carried, and underfoot.
[25:02.110 --> 25:09.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: So I would type those words in that order if I wanted to check on my submission, see if anybody had any questions about it.
[25:10.350 --> 25:21.270]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because we do not track users of our secure drop service in future visits, using this codename will be the only way we have to communicate with you should we have questions or are interested in additional information.
[25:21.390 --> 25:25.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: Unlike passwords, there is no way to retrieve a lost codename.
[25:25.550 --> 25:28.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: Of course, this one will never be lost because everybody knows it.
[25:29.630 --> 25:34.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: And so if I submitted something right now, and I've told everybody the codename, I guess anybody can check it.
[25:34.230 --> 25:35.610]  [SPEAKER_03]: Anybody would be able to go and check it, yeah.
[25:35.610 --> 25:36.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, why don't I do that?
[25:36.730 --> 25:39.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: I could... or maybe somebody...
[25:39.090 --> 25:40.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: Why don't you do that?
[25:40.590 --> 25:45.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: If I submit something now, we can start this big, huge chat with all these different people that...
[25:45.950 --> 25:46.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: No?
[25:46.490 --> 25:47.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's not a good idea?
[25:47.510 --> 25:48.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, well...
[25:48.790 --> 25:51.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: Somebody... look, if I thought of it, somebody else is going to think of it.
[25:51.550 --> 25:53.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: And maybe abuse the system.
[25:54.490 --> 25:59.890]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, I mean, it's... it would be interesting, I think.
[26:00.090 --> 26:05.750]  [SPEAKER_03]: But I think, yeah, not as desirable as people independently contributing.
[26:05.890 --> 26:06.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, yeah, of course.
[26:06.670 --> 26:08.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: But we're not putting the kibosh on that.
[26:09.130 --> 26:11.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: Anyway, so that's a general idea of how SecureDrop works.
[26:11.750 --> 26:16.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: Again, if you just want specific information and you don't have the Tor browser, go to 2600.com/securedrop.
[26:16.710 --> 26:20.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's a great way to submit information to all kinds of journalists all around the world.
[26:20.310 --> 26:26.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: And it's inspirational, the kinds of things that the hacker community is coming up with.
[26:26.730 --> 26:29.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because that's a major part of all this.
[26:30.190 --> 26:34.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, let's give out the phone number so that people call in and start pledging.
[26:34.450 --> 26:39.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because we do need your support in order to keep this radio station, this radio show, on the air.
[26:40.050 --> 26:44.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: The phone number is 516-620-3602.
[26:45.010 --> 26:48.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, tonight, we are offering something very special.
[26:48.870 --> 26:52.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's called the Hacker Portrait for a pledge of $100.
[26:53.510 --> 26:55.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, hacker and artist Rob Vincent...
[26:55.870 --> 26:56.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hey, that's you, Rob T.
[26:56.650 --> 26:57.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: Firefly, isn't it?
[26:57.430 --> 26:58.150]  [SPEAKER_02]: What a ridiculous name.
[26:58.250 --> 26:59.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: Wow, okay.
[26:59.670 --> 27:00.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: I didn't know this was you.
[27:00.730 --> 27:05.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: All right, so hacker and artist Rob Vincent of WBAI's hacker radio show, Off The Hook.
[27:05.530 --> 27:07.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, that should have clued me in right there.
[27:07.090 --> 27:11.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, has painted many different people and things for station supporters in the past.
[27:11.850 --> 27:12.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: You have.
[27:12.350 --> 27:12.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: You have.
[27:13.070 --> 27:17.130]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, and now, it's your turn to tell him who to paint.
[27:17.910 --> 27:18.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm intrigued.
[27:19.390 --> 27:25.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, pledge for this premium, and Rob will contact you to ask for a digital image file.
[27:26.370 --> 27:30.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's basically just a, uh, a picture these days.
[27:30.570 --> 27:30.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: Sure.
[27:31.090 --> 27:37.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, you'll send Rob a photo of yourself, or maybe a photo of someone else that you have permission to use.
[27:38.350 --> 27:46.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, he will interpret your photo in a painting on stretched five by seven inch canvas in an artistic style of his own choosing.
[27:47.490 --> 27:50.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, of course, you, you'll need email to do this.
[27:50.110 --> 27:55.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: You'll need the ability to send the file attachment, a picture from your camera, phone, whatever.
[27:55.870 --> 28:01.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, but, um, you can go to, uh, robvincent.net and see examples of, of what he's talking about.
[28:02.170 --> 28:02.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: Is that right?
[28:02.810 --> 28:03.130]  [SPEAKER_02]: Absolutely.
[28:03.450 --> 28:03.610]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[28:03.790 --> 28:06.650]  [SPEAKER_02]: Um, I've done, uh, I've done sets of portraits, uh, in the past.
[28:06.670 --> 28:09.270]  [SPEAKER_02]: Of, like, for example, notable people from hacker history.
[28:09.750 --> 28:13.510]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, uh, I put those on the front page of robvincent.net, which is my own site.
[28:13.730 --> 28:15.930]  [SPEAKER_02]: R-O-B-V-I-N-C-E-N-T dot net.
[28:16.550 --> 28:29.090]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, uh, you can, you can look at, uh, the, the various styles because I, I painted them in sort of a range of styles, ranging, ranging from, like, uh, realistic, cartoony, a bit surreal, uh, you know, just things that struck my fancy while I was painting these people.
[28:29.770 --> 28:38.910]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, uh, you could get a feel for what, uh, what a portrait of, say, yourself or a loved one or, uh, someone like that might look like if, uh, if I were to paint it.
[28:39.010 --> 28:40.290]  [SPEAKER_02]: And then you could commission me to do that.
[28:40.390 --> 28:41.750]  [SPEAKER_02]: Now, this is something that I don't do a lot.
[28:41.870 --> 28:49.650]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't open up my, uh, commissions all that often because, um, work like this takes a lot of time and, uh, and supplies and things like that.
[28:49.650 --> 29:02.950]  [SPEAKER_02]: And I've only got so many canvases, but, um, I'm doing it, uh, I'm doing it in a limited amount to support the station that has been my radio home for such a long time and has been a source of things that I've loved to listen to for far longer than that.
[29:03.330 --> 29:21.730]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, uh, so if you call 516-620-3602 and ask for the hacker portrait, or if you go to give2wbai.org, that's give, the numeral 2, wbai.org, and, uh, search for the hacker portrait, um, you can pledge, um, $100 or more to, uh, request a hacker portrait for yourself.
[29:21.930 --> 29:23.930]  [SPEAKER_02]: And yes, then I will get in touch with you.
[29:24.070 --> 29:27.970]  [SPEAKER_02]: We'll, uh, we'll arrange which, uh, which photo you're using and I will paint it.
[29:28.110 --> 29:29.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, now I have a question here.
[29:29.470 --> 29:32.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, it says, uh, a photo of someone you have permission to use.
[29:32.750 --> 29:33.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: Is, is that a legal thing?
[29:33.930 --> 29:38.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: Can you not paint somebody that you don't have permission to paint, even if it's a photo of say Nixon or something?
[29:38.890 --> 29:40.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know why I picked that, but.
[29:40.670 --> 29:41.930]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, Nixon's a public figure.
[29:42.050 --> 29:45.290]  [SPEAKER_02]: I'm probably, uh, you know, there's probably nothing wrong with, uh, using a picture of him.
[29:45.290 --> 29:48.570]  [SPEAKER_02]: Um, frankly, I, I am not, uh, I am not a legal professional.
[29:48.890 --> 30:01.350]  [SPEAKER_02]: Our, our legal professional, uh, colleague is not here tonight, but, uh, I, I am just, uh, basically trusting that whatever photo you send me is something that it will not cause problems for either of us if, if I were to paint and send back to you.
[30:01.770 --> 30:05.030]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, um, yeah, that's, uh, that's about the size of that.
[30:05.430 --> 30:05.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[30:06.390 --> 30:14.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, again, the phone number 516-620-3602, the hacker portrait, uh, is, uh, available for a pledge of $100, only available during this fundraiser.
[30:14.730 --> 30:17.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's not going to be, uh, available after that.
[30:17.410 --> 30:21.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, so if this is something that, uh, strikes your fancy, by all means, call in.
[30:21.290 --> 30:25.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: You'll be helping the radio station out, and you'll be getting something really cool and unique, uh, in exchange.
[30:26.090 --> 30:31.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: And, uh, we, we try to, we try to come up with creative ideas, and this, this certainly qualifies as one of them.
[30:31.590 --> 30:31.950]  [SPEAKER_02]: Absolutely.
[30:32.210 --> 30:40.170]  [SPEAKER_02]: Um, in, in my, in my work as a, as a freelance artist, painter, visual artist, whatever you want to call it, um, it's something that I really enjoy doing.
[30:40.170 --> 30:52.750]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's something that, uh, kind of feeds my soul, and now it can feed my radio station as well, because I, I've, uh, I've always appreciated the opportunity to use talents other than the ones that involve me speaking into this microphone here to, uh, help this place out and help,
[30:52.770 --> 30:56.170]  [SPEAKER_02]: uh, keep us doing what we do on this program and on this station.
[30:56.170 --> 31:09.530]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, yeah, call, uh, 516-620-3602, or go to give2wbai.org, and you could get yourself one of a limited quantity of hacker portraits, uh, from me that, uh, that are available.
[31:09.730 --> 31:11.470]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, uh, yeah, keep us going.
[31:11.670 --> 31:25.170]  [SPEAKER_02]: And if, if this isn't your thing, uh, maybe, maybe you're not into paintings, maybe there's no room on your walls, maybe you live in a very tiny apartment, um, we would still appreciate any amount that, uh, you felt you could donate to, uh, keep the station on the air at 516-620-3602.
[31:26.870 --> 31:28.590]  [SPEAKER_02]: Or give2wbai.org.
[31:28.710 --> 31:29.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm, I'm looking at your site right now.
[31:29.830 --> 31:35.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: I see all kinds of, uh, of luminaries, uh, in, in the tech world, Alan Turing, Ada Lovelace.
[31:35.990 --> 31:39.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, it's, uh, really impressive to see what you've done.
[31:39.870 --> 31:40.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: Nikola Tesla, look at that.
[31:41.250 --> 31:46.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, Steve Wozniak, Rick Grace Hopper, uh, and could be you as well.
[31:46.090 --> 31:52.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: You could, you could have your face adorned, um, on, on, uh, canvas, um, thanks to Rob.
[31:52.450 --> 32:01.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: All you have to do is call 516-620-3602, pledge for the Hacker Portrait, $100, and, uh, you'll have something that will live on forever.
[32:01.830 --> 32:07.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: You don't even have to be into, into hacking, into computers for this to be really amazing and fun.
[32:07.390 --> 32:07.810]  [SPEAKER_02]: Absolutely.
[32:07.810 --> 32:09.170]  [SPEAKER_02]: It would make, it would make a nice gift.
[32:09.170 --> 32:12.850]  [SPEAKER_02]: I think, uh, maybe some, you know, people don't get a lot of paintings of themselves anymore these days.
[32:12.870 --> 32:15.290]  [SPEAKER_02]: It used to be the only way you got a picture of anyone.
[32:15.590 --> 32:16.290]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't remember that.
[32:16.350 --> 32:16.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: That was a thing.
[32:17.830 --> 32:24.470]  [SPEAKER_02]: Before, before your time, I think, but, uh, you know, it's, uh, I think it's something that's, you know, a little extra special, handmade, custom.
[32:24.650 --> 32:26.490]  [SPEAKER_02]: You will have the only copy of this thing in existence.
[32:26.490 --> 32:35.310]  [SPEAKER_02]: Like these photos that I've put on my site, uh, they're, they're photographs of, um, pictures that, um, are in other people's collections now, but I won't even do that with these.
[32:35.430 --> 32:36.530]  [SPEAKER_02]: I'm not going to put them on my site.
[32:36.530 --> 32:37.610]  [SPEAKER_02]: I will just send it to you.
[32:37.750 --> 32:39.930]  [SPEAKER_02]: You will be the only custodian and owner of that image.
[32:40.130 --> 32:47.270]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think that is a concern because if somebody wants their picture to be taken, they don't want you to be putting it on billboards or, uh, passing it out and laughing with friends.
[32:47.410 --> 32:47.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: You wouldn't do that.
[32:48.230 --> 32:49.030]  [SPEAKER_02]: No, absolutely.
[32:49.390 --> 32:54.650]  [SPEAKER_02]: Um, in fact, I think we could consider you the, uh, the copyright owner of this image as far as these things go.
[32:55.010 --> 32:57.330]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, uh, you know, I will not be using it for anything else.
[32:57.410 --> 32:58.410]  [SPEAKER_02]: It won't even go in my portfolio.
[32:58.410 --> 33:01.150]  [SPEAKER_02]: It will just go in an envelope and get sent to you.
[33:01.350 --> 33:13.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: What other radio station makes the promise of taking a picture of yours and turning it into a painting and giving you the complete ownership of that painting and sending it to you so that you have complete control over it.
[33:13.290 --> 33:14.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: No other radio station will do that.
[33:15.170 --> 33:26.010]  [SPEAKER_02]: No, I don't know how many radio stations have, uh, given paintings to people, but, um, you know, in the past, uh, lots of people have, uh, pledged to keep the station going for other sets of paintings of, uh, things of my truth of my choosing.
[33:26.430 --> 33:31.530]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, uh, I want to say thank you again to everyone who's, uh, who's pledged for those and the other things that we've offered in the past.
[33:31.530 --> 33:33.690]  [SPEAKER_02]: But this is something a little different.
[33:33.830 --> 33:35.850]  [SPEAKER_02]: This is something a little differently exciting, I think.
[33:36.810 --> 33:37.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: Absolutely.
[33:37.650 --> 33:38.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's what we do.
[33:38.490 --> 33:39.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: Different, exciting things.
[33:39.830 --> 33:46.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, and there are also some of the Hacker Digest lifetime subscriptions available if you want to call and ask for that.
[33:46.550 --> 33:49.130]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know how many are left, but I do know they're running out.
[33:49.470 --> 33:52.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: We offered that last week also for a pledge of $100.
[33:52.570 --> 33:59.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: So if you call 516-620-3602 and just ask for a little assistance, they will help you find the premium that you want.
[33:59.570 --> 34:03.270]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, I want to mention the lower premium pledge level of $50.
[34:03.610 --> 34:06.470]  [SPEAKER_03]: I think the More Than Mike's campaign is also going on here at the station.
[34:06.710 --> 34:11.130]  [SPEAKER_03]: They're a little shy of $10,000 they're trying to raise for studio equipment.
[34:11.910 --> 34:15.150]  [SPEAKER_03]: They're about $2,500 below that goal.
[34:15.250 --> 34:15.710]  [SPEAKER_03]: Is that low?
[34:15.830 --> 34:16.030]  [SPEAKER_03]: Wow.
[34:16.210 --> 34:18.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, so that wouldn't take much.
[34:18.370 --> 34:25.570]  [SPEAKER_03]: And if these are a little bit outside your budget right now, those pledge levels are also something you can inquire about when you call.
[34:26.450 --> 34:30.050]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I also would mention the SMS donation.
[34:30.490 --> 34:31.610]  [SPEAKER_03]: Basically, you get a link.
[34:31.850 --> 34:41.050]  [SPEAKER_03]: If you SMS WBAI to 41444, you'll get a link back and information on how to donate there.
[34:41.670 --> 34:42.610]  [SPEAKER_01]: So many ways.
[34:42.790 --> 34:43.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: So many...
[34:43.290 --> 34:47.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: I remember it used to be people would come by with envelopes to the radio station.
[34:47.370 --> 34:48.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: That was before Internet.
[34:48.450 --> 34:48.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: That was...
[34:48.930 --> 34:52.030]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, we had phones, but some people would just do it that way.
[34:52.030 --> 34:56.490]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, and the important thing is, you know, donate what you can and maybe spread the word.
[34:56.970 --> 34:59.070]  [SPEAKER_03]: Tell a friend, ask a neighbor if they've pledged.
[34:59.550 --> 35:06.030]  [SPEAKER_03]: Talk to your peers, talk to your children or parents or whomever is in your world.
[35:06.710 --> 35:15.550]  [SPEAKER_03]: Ask them how they feel about maybe contributing a little bit to the station because every little bit of it adds up and every bit of it will go to our operating costs.
[35:15.550 --> 35:28.570]  [SPEAKER_03]: And keep programming like this and free speech alive and well here in New York City, a place where the spectrum is getting ever more full of commercialized and ad-ridden content.
[35:28.930 --> 35:30.650]  [SPEAKER_03]: And this here, this is an oasis.
[35:30.650 --> 35:41.510]  [SPEAKER_03]: And we are supporting that and supporting WBAI as a longstanding member of the Pacific Network and community radio here in New York City.
[35:41.510 --> 35:45.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: And now, more than ever, that voice is sorely needed.
[35:45.070 --> 35:49.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: And we are a non-commercial oasis, as Kyle says.
[35:49.630 --> 35:52.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: We don't accept commercials, obviously.
[35:52.390 --> 35:56.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: We don't even accept underwriting, which many, many non-commercial radio stations do.
[35:56.990 --> 36:01.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: We feel it would tarnish our message and compromise what it is we're trying to say.
[36:03.150 --> 36:04.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: So we depend on our listeners.
[36:05.150 --> 36:06.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: You're our investors.
[36:06.090 --> 36:07.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: You're the ones that matter.
[36:07.210 --> 36:14.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: So by calling 516-620-3602 and pledging whatever you can afford, you're voting for us.
[36:14.410 --> 36:20.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: And going to give2wbai.org, pledging in that manner, that also is an incredible way of helping us.
[36:20.670 --> 36:22.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: And this is the last week of the fundraiser.
[36:22.310 --> 36:24.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: We will be back to normal programming next week.
[36:25.390 --> 36:29.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: And hopefully with the brand new studio, only $2,500 away.
[36:29.350 --> 36:30.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's incredible.
[36:30.330 --> 36:34.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, you know, I'm not saying anybody should pledge more than what they can afford.
[36:34.630 --> 36:38.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: But I know there's at least one person listening who can pledge $2,500 and put us over the top on that.
[36:39.030 --> 36:39.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: I know that.
[36:40.150 --> 36:44.270]  [SPEAKER_01]: And the number for that person and all other people, 516-620-3602.
[36:44.370 --> 36:44.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: Thank you.
[36:45.870 --> 36:48.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, here's a story that is really fascinating.
[36:49.130 --> 36:51.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: I know, Kyle, you took a very keen interest in this.
[36:51.170 --> 36:57.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: We've been hearing over the weeks that the city of Baltimore has been under siege because of ransomware.
[36:58.450 --> 37:08.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: Ransomware is basically when your files get encrypted and you have to pay somebody invariably in Bitcoin or some cryptocurrency in order to get some kind of a key to unlock it.
[37:09.010 --> 37:14.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: And, of course, you have to assume they're telling the truth when they send you that email and say, pay us.
[37:14.870 --> 37:20.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's basically, it comes about by clicking on a bad link, opening up an attachment, various other methods.
[37:21.170 --> 37:22.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: Of spreading malware.
[37:23.490 --> 37:28.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: The interesting thing about this, the city of Baltimore, I think it's been three weeks or something.
[37:29.130 --> 37:30.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: They've been dealing with this.
[37:30.410 --> 37:31.610]  [SPEAKER_01]: Thousands of computers have been frozen.
[37:31.810 --> 37:32.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: Email shut down.
[37:32.990 --> 37:36.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: Real estate sales, water bills, health alerts, all kinds of things like that have been disrupted.
[37:37.630 --> 37:41.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: But, you know who wrote the malware that did this to them?
[37:41.730 --> 37:43.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: Our friends over at NSA.
[37:44.230 --> 37:44.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's true.
[37:45.150 --> 37:45.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's true.
[37:45.690 --> 37:46.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: They wrote this.
[37:47.470 --> 37:50.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: And they lost control of the tool.
[37:50.830 --> 37:51.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: The tool they wrote.
[37:51.590 --> 37:52.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's called Eternal Blue.
[37:53.650 --> 38:04.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: It was allegedly picked up by state hackers in North Korea, Russia, more recently China, to cut a path of destruction around the world, leaving billions of dollars in damage.
[38:04.710 --> 38:09.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: And imagine anybody else who's just interested in causing mayhem was able to pick this up.
[38:09.630 --> 38:17.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, over the past year, the cyber weapon has boomeranged back and it's now showing up in the NSA's own backyard because they're in Maryland as well.
[38:17.910 --> 38:20.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: And it's basically happening all over America.
[38:20.910 --> 38:25.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: All kinds of little towns and cities from Pennsylvania to Texas are being affected.
[38:26.750 --> 38:32.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, the NSA's connection to the attacks on these American cities has not been previously reported.
[38:32.970 --> 38:34.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: We learned this in the New York Times, actually.
[38:35.950 --> 38:45.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, the agency has refused to discuss or even acknowledge the loss of its cyber weapon dumped online back in April 2017 by a still unidentified group calling itself the Shadow Brokers.
[38:46.270 --> 38:54.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: Years later, the agency and the FBI still don't know whether the Shadow Brokers are foreign spies or disgruntled insiders.
[38:54.210 --> 38:58.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: Years later, Thomas Ridd is a security, cybersecurity expert at Johns Hopkins.
[38:58.910 --> 39:11.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: He called the Shadow Brokers episode the most destructive and costly NSA breach in history, more damaging than the Edward Snowden 2013 leaks, if you consider that to be a bad thing.
[39:12.670 --> 39:18.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: The government has refused to take responsibility or even to answer the most basic questions, says Mr. Ridd.
[39:18.510 --> 39:23.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: Congressional oversight appears to be failing and the American people deserve an answer.
[39:23.310 --> 39:25.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, NSA and FBI declined to comment.
[39:26.130 --> 39:31.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: But yeah, you know, do you remember a bunch of years ago, there was something called the Melissa virus.
[39:32.550 --> 39:36.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: This guy in New Jersey wrote it and he didn't release it.
[39:36.550 --> 39:44.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: He printed it on USENET and he was arrested for that, not for running it, for releasing it, for basically writing it and having it available.
[39:44.570 --> 39:45.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: How is this any different?
[39:46.050 --> 39:47.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: Except it's much, much worse.
[39:47.450 --> 39:54.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: They wrote this horrible thing and basically released it through not having secure systems.
[39:54.550 --> 39:56.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: And they don't want to take any responsibility for this.
[39:57.970 --> 40:03.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: It really seems unconscionable to me that this is the source of such a horrible thing.
[40:03.550 --> 40:04.050]  [SPEAKER_02]: Absolutely.
[40:04.050 --> 40:09.930]  [SPEAKER_02]: This was the NSA putting together a tool, a tool made out of malware for their own ends, for their own use.
[40:09.930 --> 40:16.310]  [SPEAKER_02]: And they lost control of it because when software is set up to do things on its own, sometimes it's just going to get unleashed.
[40:16.570 --> 40:21.350]  [SPEAKER_02]: There was that case years ago with the bit of malware that was meant to affect just nuclear power plants.
[40:21.410 --> 40:23.330]  [SPEAKER_02]: And it got out on someone's USB drive.
[40:24.450 --> 40:24.810]  [SPEAKER_02]: And...
[40:24.810 --> 40:25.490]  [SPEAKER_02]: Stuxnet.
[40:25.650 --> 40:26.290]  [SPEAKER_02]: Stuxnet, yes.
[40:27.010 --> 40:29.270]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, some poor dope brings it out on a thumb drive.
[40:29.270 --> 40:35.730]  [SPEAKER_02]: And suddenly this highly laser-focused weapon ends up just messing things up on a grander scale.
[40:35.930 --> 40:36.290]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[40:36.430 --> 40:37.150]  [SPEAKER_02]: And that's...
[40:37.150 --> 40:48.770]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's a basic fact of information security that if you have a vulnerability, say it's a vulnerability you're exploiting, you're, say, a three-letter agency, you found this vulnerability, you've written the software to exploit it.
[40:49.270 --> 40:54.110]  [SPEAKER_02]: And it's a basic fact of InfoSec that you're never going to be the only one who knows about that vulnerability.
[40:54.350 --> 40:56.110]  [SPEAKER_02]: If you found it, someone else can find it.
[40:56.190 --> 41:03.030]  [SPEAKER_02]: And if you have this tool, someone else can have that tool, whether it's your version that leaks out or whether somebody else just happens upon the same thing and writes one of their own.
[41:03.330 --> 41:07.590]  [SPEAKER_02]: So this is why, you know, responsible disclosure is important.
[41:08.410 --> 41:13.670]  [SPEAKER_02]: The NSA is not doing that because they don't want people to be able to defend against their own bit of malware.
[41:13.670 --> 41:16.270]  [SPEAKER_02]: So you end up crashing the city of Baltimore.
[41:18.470 --> 41:19.470]  [SPEAKER_03]: Indeed, yeah.
[41:19.650 --> 41:25.210]  [SPEAKER_03]: The Stuxnet was famously used for the nuclear centrifuges in Iran.
[41:25.470 --> 41:32.650]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it was theorized that it was developed as a tool by state entities such as Israel or the U.S.
[41:32.770 --> 41:36.010]  [SPEAKER_03]: or both or neither, deniably.
[41:36.190 --> 41:43.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: But that exploited Siemens process control equipment that used the SCADA protocol.
[41:43.310 --> 41:48.150]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it was very well devised and was used to great effect.
[41:48.370 --> 41:56.030]  [SPEAKER_03]: It stopped centrifuges in Iran that were processing uranium and enriching it for, I think, non-medical purposes.
[41:56.190 --> 41:56.830]  [SPEAKER_03]: Let's put it that way.
[41:57.330 --> 42:02.410]  [SPEAKER_03]: And anyway, there's a couple critiques here.
[42:02.550 --> 42:05.370]  [SPEAKER_03]: Stop me if I start levitating and jumping out of my chair.
[42:05.370 --> 42:20.510]  [SPEAKER_03]: But one thing I'm hearing in this is, as Rob said, its responsible disclosure has been, I think, superseded by creating marketplaces to buy, sell, and trade exploits like this.
[42:20.510 --> 42:37.850]  [SPEAKER_03]: A long time ago, we reported on sites like Metasploit and other places where vulnerabilities and things you could exploit in particular systems and software were being traded and not traded necessarily, but sold, rather.
[42:37.850 --> 42:50.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: And that proliferation, along with a lot of the private computer security renaissance, you know, everybody has got their red teams and they're all, you know, consultants and stuff nowadays.
[42:50.890 --> 42:51.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: They're everywhere.
[42:52.950 --> 43:02.330]  [SPEAKER_03]: But I think the unintended consequence is that the entities that are interested and have the budgets to buy this stuff are the government, are the NSA.
[43:02.590 --> 43:06.190]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, if they're not developing it internally, they will buy it from these marketplaces.
[43:06.190 --> 43:17.870]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, yeah, you're a hacker, you know, and long ago, you didn't want to get busted because you found something and you think it's cool and it does something cool, but you don't want to, you know, take advantage of people or hurt people.
[43:18.010 --> 43:20.170]  [SPEAKER_03]: But there are entities that do.
[43:20.390 --> 43:40.710]  [SPEAKER_03]: And what we did by creating these markets and proliferating these consultancies who have their own little toolboxes of proprietary stuff is that we made it desirable for hackers who may not have means, who find stuff instead of submitting it and getting published and having the company respond by fixing the thing,
[43:40.910 --> 43:52.850]  [SPEAKER_03]: in these cases, in this case, Microsoft, they end up trying to make a buck and they have really no ability to control how it's used once they sell that information.
[43:52.850 --> 43:57.110]  [SPEAKER_03]: And so, what this did, this became an information arms race.
[43:57.310 --> 44:00.770]  [SPEAKER_03]: And in this case, the NSA did it internally.
[44:01.250 --> 44:11.690]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the codename Eternal Blue stands for Eternal Blue Screen because it was prone to crashing and doing the blue screen of death on Windows machines.
[44:11.690 --> 44:16.770]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it exploits the SMB protocol or some aspect of SMB in Windows.
[44:17.010 --> 44:24.410]  [SPEAKER_03]: But essentially, they really, really worked to find this vulnerability and then they sat on it for five years.
[44:24.550 --> 44:34.390]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it was so fruitful and they used it to such great effect that they just, they continue to use it and sit on it for five years.
[44:34.550 --> 44:35.650]  [SPEAKER_03]: They never told Microsoft.
[44:36.450 --> 44:36.890]  [SPEAKER_03]: Microsoft.
[44:36.890 --> 44:46.890]  [SPEAKER_03]: And as in the Stuxnet case, Microsoft security researchers were the ones to report on that, I think, at one of the chaos communication congresses.
[44:47.710 --> 44:51.610]  [SPEAKER_03]: But at an event, a security event, they discussed Stuxnet.
[44:51.770 --> 44:54.370]  [SPEAKER_03]: The same sort of response came from Microsoft.
[44:54.550 --> 45:00.750]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I have to say, in light of this article, Microsoft is actually, of course, they're motivated because their customer base is suffering.
[45:00.750 --> 45:07.370]  [SPEAKER_03]: But they're coming out as really sober and their attitude about this is like, no, this is wrong.
[45:07.570 --> 45:12.350]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it, of course, affects their bottom line and people's trust in their operating systems.
[45:12.590 --> 45:19.910]  [SPEAKER_03]: But again, we hear from Microsoft, yeah, this thing that we patched a while ago, it, you know, it's really bad.
[45:20.050 --> 45:22.010]  [SPEAKER_03]: And, you know, it came about and was being used.
[45:22.790 --> 45:27.250]  [SPEAKER_03]: And of course, you know, here we are listening with bated breath on how Microsoft is dealing with this.
[45:27.250 --> 45:29.950]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the fact is, a lot of computers were not patched.
[45:30.050 --> 45:43.510]  [SPEAKER_03]: And Microsoft's security arm is dealing with this like daily because state actors and people that are copycats with this malware that was released and out in the wild after the NSA lost control of it.
[45:43.510 --> 45:57.510]  [SPEAKER_03]: This is particularly useful for small state and local entities and businesses that really, they just want to like sell gravel or, you know, fix roads or supply water to like 1500 people in God knows where.
[45:57.730 --> 46:09.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: But those machines aren't, you know, they aren't they aren't in an organization that is, you know, teaming with money and, you know, IT departments that can be tasked with fixing all this stuff.
[46:09.930 --> 46:14.330]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, invariably, they are a great attack vector.
[46:14.550 --> 46:23.270]  [SPEAKER_03]: These small companies, these small towns that have machines, yeah, they have a Windows machine and they don't consider themselves a target, a traditional target.
[46:23.490 --> 46:24.950]  [SPEAKER_03]: You know, they're not a big infrastructure.
[46:25.210 --> 46:36.090]  [SPEAKER_03]: But the exploitation of them en masse becomes this large soft target that can create revenue.
[46:36.090 --> 46:39.530]  [SPEAKER_03]: And that is what this Shadow Brokers team is after.
[46:39.850 --> 46:41.890]  [SPEAKER_03]: And they're really keen to raise money.
[46:42.010 --> 46:47.070]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the last thing I want to say is that I think Baltimore is not paying as a point of pride.
[46:47.070 --> 46:50.890]  [SPEAKER_03]: But I also think that they're really trying to find out who they are.
[46:51.090 --> 46:57.150]  [SPEAKER_03]: And by leading them on or not paying, refusing to pay, they can maybe continue to communicate and try to find out who they are.
[46:57.250 --> 46:58.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: Does it really matter who they are at this point?
[46:59.090 --> 47:00.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: The tool is out there.
[47:00.430 --> 47:02.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: The tool is what's causing the problems.
[47:02.830 --> 47:08.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: It was written by an essay, used God knows how many times on foreign adversaries.
[47:08.370 --> 47:12.610]  [SPEAKER_01]: And this is just... it's a wake-up call to us because this is how the game is played.
[47:12.730 --> 47:19.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: We act all self-righteous when we discover that Russian hackers were trying to dominate or influence our election.
[47:19.730 --> 47:21.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: That is how the game is played.
[47:21.690 --> 47:23.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: Nothing should be surprising about that.
[47:23.750 --> 47:24.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: This is what we do.
[47:24.950 --> 47:25.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: This is what they do.
[47:26.410 --> 47:27.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: It happens all the time.
[47:28.550 --> 47:33.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: And if you want to make any changes, you look to your own organizations.
[47:33.330 --> 47:40.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: You look to your own intelligence agencies, your own governmental policies, and you see if those are things that you support.
[47:40.150 --> 47:41.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: And if so, this is the payback.
[47:41.990 --> 47:42.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: This is what happens.
[47:42.970 --> 47:43.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: Somebody finds it.
[47:44.030 --> 47:45.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: Somebody uses it against you.
[47:45.930 --> 47:48.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: And that's what Eternal Blue is.
[47:48.650 --> 47:49.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's what it's all about.
[47:49.450 --> 48:01.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: And I think NSA needs to take ownership of that and deal with the consequences and figure out a way to, I guess, make it not so harmful, though.
[48:01.550 --> 48:03.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know what possible way there is at this point.
[48:04.490 --> 48:08.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: Like Kyle said, they didn't tell Microsoft about it for five years.
[48:08.770 --> 48:13.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: And then when the breach happened, they kind of had to talk about it at that point.
[48:14.310 --> 48:16.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: The Baltimore attack took place on May 7th.
[48:17.010 --> 48:19.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: It was one of those classic ransomware assaults.
[48:20.410 --> 48:22.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: Screens of city workers suddenly locked.
[48:22.550 --> 48:26.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: A message in flawed English demanded about $100,000 in Bitcoin to free their files.
[48:27.190 --> 48:29.030]  [SPEAKER_01]: We're watching you for days, said the message.
[48:29.470 --> 48:30.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: We won't talk more.
[48:30.730 --> 48:31.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: All we know is money.
[48:31.630 --> 48:32.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hurry up.
[48:33.210 --> 48:34.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: And one of those messages.
[48:35.830 --> 48:37.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: So they have not paid.
[48:38.150 --> 48:41.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: Their systems remain locked up for the most part.
[48:41.430 --> 48:42.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: They've restored some.
[48:42.630 --> 48:48.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: The thing that really kind of bugs me about this, had they been keeping diligent backups, they could have just restored from that.
[48:48.430 --> 48:56.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: And that is something that I see so many times, whether it's individuals or whether it's companies or whether it's governments, they don't have a good backup plan.
[48:56.630 --> 48:59.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: And sometimes a backup involves putting things in the cloud.
[48:59.370 --> 49:01.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, if you're good with that, then do that.
[49:01.390 --> 49:02.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: But do something.
[49:02.350 --> 49:05.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: Don't assume that things are just going to be peachy every single day.
[49:05.590 --> 49:06.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because things like this happen.
[49:06.750 --> 49:08.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: And sometimes they're from down the block.
[49:08.250 --> 49:09.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: Sometimes they're from across the ocean.
[49:09.670 --> 49:11.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: But they will happen at some point.
[49:11.310 --> 49:12.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: And if they don't happen, you know what?
[49:12.590 --> 49:13.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: A hard drive will fail.
[49:13.570 --> 49:16.030]  [SPEAKER_01]: And then you won't have your data because of that.
[49:16.150 --> 49:18.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: So these backups are hugely important.
[49:18.790 --> 49:21.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: And don't just replace one backup with another.
[49:21.430 --> 49:25.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: Keep an old backup in case something happens that corrupts everything within the past year.
[49:26.130 --> 49:27.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: Have a backup from a year ago.
[49:27.430 --> 49:28.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: Have a backup from a month ago.
[49:28.610 --> 49:29.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: Have a backup from a week ago.
[49:29.770 --> 49:33.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: And keep updating the weekly one, and then replace the monthly one with that.
[49:33.790 --> 49:36.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's simple to do, but you have to start doing it.
[49:36.490 --> 49:39.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: Once you start, it becomes second nature.
[49:40.010 --> 49:47.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: In this particular situation, I don't know how it's going to wind up, but it's a wake-up call, I think, for all of us.
[49:47.990 --> 49:49.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, I would just add OS diversity.
[49:50.610 --> 50:05.390]  [SPEAKER_03]: And also, in other words, having more than one operating system in your shop or in your business, it's not easy for everyone, but if you just run Windows or you just want to run Apple, that can become a difficulty.
[50:05.610 --> 50:14.010]  [SPEAKER_03]: But if you have a lot of different systems, and also how you set up your IT infrastructure, do you have subnetting going on and stuff like that?
[50:14.170 --> 50:24.950]  [SPEAKER_03]: Also, not particularly easy, but it's really helpful by adding just some additional layers to things and segmenting parts of your network and so on.
[50:25.730 --> 50:34.970]  [SPEAKER_03]: And, you know, just practical things that can protect you from the sort of viruses or malware that people are experiencing.
[50:35.570 --> 50:47.190]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, one should hope that other cities are looking at Baltimore right now and taking an extra hard look at their own operational security practices and maybe working toward preventing something like this happening to them.
[50:47.610 --> 50:53.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: I also wanted to mention, in the few minutes we have left, by the way, phone number again, 516-620-3602.
[50:53.370 --> 50:54.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: Pledge what you can afford.
[50:54.970 --> 51:06.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: Get the hacker portrait of yourself or a loved one or a hated one or whatever by calling 516-620-3602, pledging $100 and asking for that.
[51:06.270 --> 51:10.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: We also have the Hacker Digest lifetime subscription available at that same number.
[51:10.650 --> 51:13.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: But the Huawei ban, am I saying it right?
[51:14.110 --> 51:14.610]  [SPEAKER_03]: Huawei.
[51:14.790 --> 51:15.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: Huawei, that's it.
[51:16.070 --> 51:16.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: Huawei.
[51:17.050 --> 51:32.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: Huawei, the Chinese phone company that is being banned in the United States, thanks to Trump and others, that is actually, according to the New York Times, threatening wireless service in some of our remote areas because many small carriers depend on inexpensive equipment from the Chinese company.
[51:32.890 --> 51:43.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: I just think it's kind of ironic that we're concerned about this Chinese phone company doing the bidding of the Chinese government, hence spying on us.
[51:44.430 --> 51:47.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: Google goes about and, at the behest of the U.S.
[51:47.470 --> 51:50.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: government, bans them from using Android.
[51:50.870 --> 51:52.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, doesn't that seem like the same thing?
[51:52.590 --> 51:57.990]  [SPEAKER_01]: They're basically, at the behest of the government, doing its bidding and cutting off access.
[51:58.250 --> 52:02.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: We're afraid that they will do something similar to that to us in the future.
[52:02.850 --> 52:05.050]  [SPEAKER_01]: What is... I know there is a difference.
[52:05.250 --> 52:08.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: I know one is much more of a totalitarian regime.
[52:08.070 --> 52:10.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: But the mentality is very similar.
[52:10.310 --> 52:22.030]  [SPEAKER_02]: It also seems just a bit bananas to me because, I mean, I don't know if you could find a piece of electronic equipment in any of our pockets or maybe even in this room that didn't at least have part of it come from a factory in China.
[52:22.910 --> 52:29.330]  [SPEAKER_02]: What's making an example out of this one company going to really do if the big bad now is supposed to be Chinese equipment?
[52:30.530 --> 52:32.050]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, I hear what you're saying.
[52:32.210 --> 52:37.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: And indeed, there is some nationalism that is rife with nationalism in here.
[52:37.310 --> 52:41.410]  [SPEAKER_03]: You know, you can kind of take different sides very quickly.
[52:41.610 --> 52:43.550]  [SPEAKER_03]: But there is nuance as well.
[52:43.850 --> 53:04.750]  [SPEAKER_03]: And in my opinion, it's good to remember that, yes, the NSA is deeply entrenched in the telecommunications network for both private telcos, ISPs, and the service providers, search engines, whatever you want to call Alphabet or, you know, Google, etc.
[53:06.110 --> 53:10.850]  [SPEAKER_03]: They, however, are independent private entities.
[53:10.850 --> 53:19.710]  [SPEAKER_03]: They are operating within a market that requires them to provide products and make money independently of the government.
[53:19.970 --> 53:25.770]  [SPEAKER_03]: The distinction with Huawei is they are not doing things at the behest of the Chinese government.
[53:25.950 --> 53:28.950]  [SPEAKER_03]: They, for all intents and purposes, are the Chinese government.
[53:29.090 --> 53:31.610]  [SPEAKER_03]: And that means they're being bankrolled by them too.
[53:31.610 --> 53:39.010]  [SPEAKER_03]: That means they don't have to wait until they can maybe afford to, like, possibly research new telephone switching systems.
[53:39.210 --> 53:58.010]  [SPEAKER_03]: They are absolutely funded by the government to accelerate the development of those technologies because it would position them in the international telecommunications market to take advantage of having their wholly backdoored equipment within different systems.
[53:58.010 --> 54:17.330]  [SPEAKER_03]: I'm not saying that, you know, Nokia or Lucent or whatever switching provider AT&T or other operators are considering right now for 5G and other generations of whatever's going to replace switching system 7.
[54:17.530 --> 54:23.090]  [SPEAKER_03]: But they are at least in a position where they're being coerced, not by design.
[54:23.090 --> 54:25.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: Is that any different, though, than U.S.
[54:25.730 --> 54:30.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: government bankrolling the airline industry, which would not survive without that funding?
[54:31.090 --> 54:32.750]  [SPEAKER_03]: I absolutely agree.
[54:33.010 --> 54:37.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: I think there's, again, there's many double standards and so on.
[54:37.810 --> 54:42.250]  [SPEAKER_03]: But I do think that, you know, and I feel the same way about the petroleum industry.
[54:42.250 --> 54:45.230]  [SPEAKER_03]: And, you know, but that's that is a different market.
[54:45.610 --> 55:03.510]  [SPEAKER_03]: And again, I don't I mean, I know the the airlines are subsidized heavily and and thus we have less train and other sorts of mass transit that, you know, this fast ability to fly would come in.
[55:03.650 --> 55:04.870]  [SPEAKER_03]: And don't get me started.
[55:05.210 --> 55:05.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, my God.
[55:05.510 --> 55:06.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: China would build the trains.
[55:06.610 --> 55:11.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's why they're so against trains in our government, because China would probably be the ones building it.
[55:11.130 --> 55:12.270]  [SPEAKER_01]: Look what they did in their own country.
[55:12.450 --> 55:12.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: Right.
[55:13.090 --> 55:18.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, and also, let's not forget that quantity matters when it comes to jet fuel and airplanes.
[55:18.570 --> 55:29.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: And if you can prop up with people using planes and jet fuel, you can make the cost of large planes that are maybe military versions much cheaper.
[55:29.450 --> 55:33.270]  [SPEAKER_03]: So it's cheaper for Boeing to build tankers or it's cheaper for Lockheed to build fighters.
[55:33.490 --> 55:43.330]  [SPEAKER_03]: If more of the technology transfer to consumer goods is, you know, helping on the sort of civilian side of that.
[55:43.510 --> 55:44.630]  [SPEAKER_03]: And that goes to jet fuel, too.
[55:44.850 --> 55:48.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: I just think that it's it's basically a choice that we have.
[55:48.350 --> 55:51.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: Do you want NSA spying on you or do you want China spying on you?
[55:51.570 --> 55:52.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: Which which would you choose?
[55:52.710 --> 55:58.570]  [SPEAKER_03]: I would want to use encryption, knowing that the NSA is probably spying and one of them is going to get through.
[55:58.970 --> 56:00.130]  [SPEAKER_01]: And I don't I don't see the difference.
[56:00.190 --> 56:02.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, I don't care if China knows what I'm doing.
[56:02.210 --> 56:05.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: I kind of care a little bit more because NSA is just down the road.
[56:05.310 --> 56:06.010]  [SPEAKER_03]: I disagree.
[56:06.370 --> 56:07.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, OK, fine.
[56:07.130 --> 56:07.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: You can have the NSA.
[56:08.070 --> 56:09.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'll go with China, see where that gets me.
[56:09.870 --> 56:10.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't see why they would care.
[56:11.090 --> 56:12.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: I know it's a lot more complicated than that.
[56:13.110 --> 56:20.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: But I just don't like these people in charge now making these kinds of decisions because invariably they are the wrong decisions.
[56:20.250 --> 56:21.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: And we're gonna have to leave it at that.
[56:22.010 --> 56:23.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: Please give us a call.
[56:23.870 --> 56:29.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: Pledge whatever you can support, whatever you can afford and support us in these last few minutes.
[56:30.470 --> 56:33.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: 516-620-3602.
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[56:37.170 --> 56:38.990]  [SPEAKER_01]: The lifetime subscription of that.
[56:39.690 --> 56:41.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: And write to us.
[56:41.350 --> 56:43.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: oth@2600.com.
[56:43.830 --> 56:44.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: And we'll see you next week.
[56:45.370 --> 56:46.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: Have a good night.