[00:00.000 --> 00:01.160] [SPEAKER_11]: Thank you again.
[00:01.440 --> 00:01.880] [SPEAKER_11]: Thank you.
[00:02.200 --> 00:02.960] [SPEAKER_06]: Thank you for having me.
[00:03.180 --> 00:12.380] [SPEAKER_14]: And to all of you in my audience, I look forward to speaking with you again next week when we will continue this kind of programming.
[00:13.720 --> 00:20.980] [SPEAKER_09]: The previous program was Economic Update with Richard Wolff, heard Wednesdays at 6.30 p.m.
[00:21.000 --> 00:23.580] [SPEAKER_09]: right after the WBAI Evening News.
[00:23.580 --> 00:25.060] [SPEAKER_09]: It is now 7 p.m.
[00:25.140 --> 00:28.660] [SPEAKER_09]: Stay tuned for Off The Hook, coming up.
[00:31.420 --> 00:32.380] [SPEAKER_01]: We're sorry.
[00:32.680 --> 00:38.680] [SPEAKER_01]: The number you have reached, 99.5 WBAI, is now Off The Hook.
[00:44.320 --> 00:48.780] [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[00:49.740 --> 00:54.340] [SPEAKER_04]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[00:55.380 --> 00:59.620] [SPEAKER_04]: It could be yet much worse, but if it could, it would.
[00:59.820 --> 01:02.540] [SPEAKER_04]: A million bucks for the best, it's paid for the worst.
[01:03.200 --> 01:05.860] [SPEAKER_04]: I hope that's on this good Monday night.
[02:17.130 --> 02:19.610] [SPEAKER_15]: And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:19.670 --> 02:21.970] [SPEAKER_15]: The program is Off The Hook.
[02:22.110 --> 02:25.110] [SPEAKER_15]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:25.690 --> 02:26.650] [SPEAKER_07]: Yes, I made it.
[02:26.710 --> 02:26.970] [SPEAKER_07]: I'm here.
[02:27.210 --> 02:27.530] [SPEAKER_15]: You're here?
[02:27.650 --> 02:27.770] [SPEAKER_15]: Great.
[02:28.030 --> 02:28.270] [SPEAKER_15]: Awesome.
[02:28.670 --> 02:33.550] [SPEAKER_15]: And joining us through telephony, the magic of telephony, is Rob T. Firefly.
[02:34.270 --> 02:35.150] [SPEAKER_02]: Good evening.
[02:35.590 --> 02:35.910] [SPEAKER_15]: Gila.
[02:36.450 --> 02:37.010] [SPEAKER_02]: Hello.
[02:37.010 --> 02:38.750] [SPEAKER_15]: And Alex.
[02:39.510 --> 02:40.330] [SPEAKER_15]: Good evening.
[02:40.810 --> 02:42.030] [SPEAKER_15]: How are you all doing this week?
[02:43.490 --> 02:44.790] [SPEAKER_02]: We're doing well.
[02:45.290 --> 02:47.110] [SPEAKER_02]: Gila and I just have had a full day.
[02:47.290 --> 02:48.210] [SPEAKER_10]: We certainly have.
[02:48.470 --> 02:57.910] [SPEAKER_10]: Through the good graces of our hero, TurboVax, we went to the Javits Center today and got our first shots.
[02:58.070 --> 02:58.790] [SPEAKER_15]: Get out.
[03:01.170 --> 03:03.530] [SPEAKER_15]: No, seriously, get out, because I am jealous.
[03:03.850 --> 03:05.330] [SPEAKER_15]: You, you, wow.
[03:05.630 --> 03:06.090] [SPEAKER_15]: So, so...
[03:06.090 --> 03:06.690] [SPEAKER_10]: Do you want to see my Band-Aid?
[03:06.810 --> 03:14.210] [SPEAKER_15]: The thing that we talked about two weeks ago on these very airwaves, you used to your advantage to get a vaccine this early.
[03:14.370 --> 03:14.570] [SPEAKER_15]: Wow.
[03:14.710 --> 03:15.250] [SPEAKER_15]: I am impressed.
[03:15.430 --> 03:15.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Very much.
[03:15.930 --> 03:16.250] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes.
[03:16.470 --> 03:16.750] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes.
[03:16.750 --> 03:20.270] [SPEAKER_15]: Tell us what you did as far as using the TurboVax system.
[03:20.430 --> 03:22.050] [SPEAKER_15]: How did it, how did you get the appointment?
[03:22.770 --> 03:23.250] [SPEAKER_10]: Absolutely.
[03:23.590 --> 03:32.530] [SPEAKER_10]: So, I was, I had Twitter open, and I saw that TurboVax mentioned that, like, 7,000 appointments had just opened at the Javits Center.
[03:32.730 --> 03:34.750] [SPEAKER_10]: And I said, well, this is worth checking out.
[03:36.930 --> 03:44.530] [SPEAKER_10]: And, yeah, I think within 10 minutes of figuring it out, I had secured an appointment both for myself and for Rob.
[03:46.150 --> 03:52.630] [SPEAKER_10]: And we went today, and it was, honestly, a very smooth process from start to finish.
[03:52.790 --> 03:56.530] [SPEAKER_10]: We were inside the Javits Center for 45 minutes, maybe.
[03:56.710 --> 03:57.290] [SPEAKER_05]: Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.
[03:58.150 --> 03:59.210] [SPEAKER_10]: It was fantastic.
[03:59.570 --> 04:01.810] [SPEAKER_10]: I cannot say enough good about the whole process.
[04:02.150 --> 04:02.590] [SPEAKER_15]: Wow.
[04:03.050 --> 04:04.970] [SPEAKER_15]: That is, that is incredible.
[04:05.650 --> 04:06.490] [SPEAKER_15]: That's, that's amazing.
[04:06.510 --> 04:08.350] [SPEAKER_15]: I'm so happy that you guys managed to do that.
[04:08.350 --> 04:11.950] [SPEAKER_15]: But, um, one by one, we're all getting the vaccine.
[04:12.230 --> 04:16.130] [SPEAKER_15]: And I hope that we're able to help the listeners, uh, as much as possible.
[04:16.390 --> 04:21.670] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, two weeks ago, the, the show is in the archives, 2600.com, uh, slash, off the hook.
[04:21.930 --> 04:23.590] [SPEAKER_15]: You can see, uh, all of our shows.
[04:23.710 --> 04:31.830] [SPEAKER_15]: And we talked about various tips, ways that you can, um, um, beat the system and, and get an appointment, um, focusing primarily on New York.
[04:31.830 --> 04:38.210] [SPEAKER_15]: But we are willing to look into any other state, uh, that has a system, uh, there are always tricks.
[04:38.410 --> 04:44.710] [SPEAKER_15]: And people in the hacker community, um, are sharing these tricks, are, are, are helping people get appointments.
[04:44.710 --> 04:47.710] [SPEAKER_15]: This is when our skills really, really come in handy.
[04:47.750 --> 04:51.950] [SPEAKER_15]: I must have, uh, gotten a couple of dozen appointments for people over the past couple of weeks.
[04:52.170 --> 04:53.750] [SPEAKER_15]: And, um, it always works.
[04:53.930 --> 04:54.990] [SPEAKER_15]: It always works at some point.
[04:55.050 --> 04:56.310] [SPEAKER_15]: You don't get what you want necessarily.
[04:56.310 --> 04:57.750] [SPEAKER_15]: You might not get it tomorrow.
[04:58.210 --> 04:59.470] [SPEAKER_15]: It might not be until mid-April.
[04:59.790 --> 05:01.690] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, but at least it's something.
[05:01.830 --> 05:08.750] [SPEAKER_15]: And, um, and even if, um, even if you don't get it immediately, you will get it fairly soon.
[05:08.990 --> 05:10.150] [SPEAKER_15]: Things are, are, are looking good.
[05:10.270 --> 05:13.970] [SPEAKER_15]: So the important thing is, uh, to, uh, to keep trying and to take it seriously.
[05:14.570 --> 05:20.750] [SPEAKER_07]: If you have any stories about it, I've, I've, I've, uh, always, uh, you can write us oth@2600.com.
[05:21.110 --> 05:21.370] [SPEAKER_15]: Yes.
[05:21.750 --> 05:22.870] [SPEAKER_15]: Alex looks like you have something to say.
[05:24.650 --> 05:30.790] [SPEAKER_06]: No, I think it's wonderful that, uh, Rob and Gila were able to do this and, uh, and that you've been helping so many people as well.
[05:30.790 --> 05:33.790] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, this is a, you know, I, I think a great thing.
[05:34.030 --> 05:38.190] [SPEAKER_06]: We're hopefully well on our way towards mass vaccination and something like herd immunity.
[05:38.410 --> 05:38.730] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[05:38.910 --> 05:40.130] [SPEAKER_15]: It's, it's especially good.
[05:40.250 --> 05:47.330] [SPEAKER_15]: People who are good at video games, which I'm not, by the way, uh, I think they have special skills here that would definitely, uh, help out.
[05:47.330 --> 05:56.810] [SPEAKER_15]: Because, uh, the way the New York state system works, if you have an auto refresh going, uh, well, the first thing you have to do, you have to stop the auto refresh so you don't lose what, what just came up on the screen.
[05:57.010 --> 06:05.050] [SPEAKER_15]: And then you have to quickly, uh, go into the window within a window, scroll down because the, uh, the select, uh, button doesn't appear right away.
[06:05.190 --> 06:05.910] [SPEAKER_15]: You have to scroll down.
[06:05.910 --> 06:12.730] [SPEAKER_15]: You can use a combination of a tab and return keys to do this quickly, but you have to get it in the right order or you lose.
[06:12.730 --> 06:15.850] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, it literally takes place within three seconds.
[06:16.170 --> 06:18.730] [SPEAKER_15]: And, um, that's how, that's how the system is right now.
[06:19.010 --> 06:25.250] [SPEAKER_15]: And I, I, I can't imagine people who are not at all computer literate attempting this.
[06:25.470 --> 06:33.010] [SPEAKER_15]: Think of, you know, your, your elderly parents or grandparents or aunts or uncles, help them out, contact them, see if they've gotten their appointments yet.
[06:33.410 --> 06:36.590] [SPEAKER_15]: Other people are able to get appointments through doctors or I know NYU.
[06:36.590 --> 06:39.850] [SPEAKER_15]: If you're a patient there, uh, they have a whole lot of openings.
[06:40.290 --> 06:46.050] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, there are all kinds of, uh, and of course, as pharmacies, uh, are, are offering, uh, vaccines as well.
[06:46.570 --> 06:51.310] [SPEAKER_15]: One, one trick somebody mentioned to me is, um, to call a pharmacy and ask if they have a cancellation list.
[06:51.590 --> 07:01.590] [SPEAKER_15]: And if they do, uh, that means if, um, if they have leftover doses, uh, in a particular day and people haven't shown up, they'll call you assuming that you qualify.
[07:01.690 --> 07:05.430] [SPEAKER_15]: And for pharmacies right now, uh, it's only 65 and over.
[07:05.690 --> 07:07.950] [SPEAKER_15]: The comorbidities, uh, aren't part of the pharmacies.
[07:08.230 --> 07:10.350] [SPEAKER_15]: Um, but they will be soon at some point.
[07:10.350 --> 07:15.090] [SPEAKER_15]: And when they get to, uh, I think one C is the next, uh, category here in New York state.
[07:15.090 --> 07:18.090] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, a lot more people will be, uh, will be eligible as well.
[07:20.470 --> 07:23.710] [SPEAKER_07]: Any other vaccine stories that, uh, go ahead, Alex.
[07:25.090 --> 07:25.690] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, sure.
[07:25.770 --> 07:39.250] [SPEAKER_06]: I was just going to mention that, you know, in, in light of, of Rob Aguila getting the vaccine today in the New York Post, there was, at least this morning in the New York Post, there was an article about all of the various desperate systems.
[07:39.250 --> 07:42.810] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, it was very similar to what we had described two weeks ago.
[07:43.070 --> 07:43.630] [SPEAKER_15]: It probably was.
[07:43.790 --> 07:48.110] [SPEAKER_15]: I mean, the New York Post, really, you read that, Rag, it probably is word for word what we said.
[07:49.370 --> 07:49.770] [SPEAKER_06]: Well...
[07:49.770 --> 07:50.850] [SPEAKER_15]: It wouldn't be the first time.
[07:51.790 --> 07:54.830] [SPEAKER_06]: It does have some, some good local news, I think.
[07:55.070 --> 08:01.650] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, look, it's not, uh, you know, the pinnacle of truth in any sense, but, you know, look, I, I do like it for the stories, especially early in the morning.
[08:02.470 --> 08:15.790] [SPEAKER_06]: But, in reading through this article, it was very long for a New York Post article, and about all of these different systems and the manners, the different manners in which you can try to obtain a vaccine, whether it's going through a pharmacy, whether it's going through the turbo vaccine,
[08:16.070 --> 08:18.190] [SPEAKER_06]: whether it's going through medical systems.
[08:18.190 --> 08:32.290] [SPEAKER_06]: And it is, it was just obvious to anybody who was reading this that it is so disconnected and so discombobulated, in a sense, that, you know, people are starting to really just throw up their hands and say, well, I guess now, even though I'm eligible,
[08:32.450 --> 08:33.510] [SPEAKER_06]: now is not my time.
[08:33.890 --> 08:35.710] [SPEAKER_06]: But I don't think that that's right.
[08:35.710 --> 08:42.570] [SPEAKER_06]: I think we need to continue to encourage people to try to use these systems, to try to figure out how to navigate effectively around them.
[08:42.570 --> 08:55.450] [SPEAKER_06]: To listen to the show that we did two weeks ago, especially with the trick, Emmanuel, that you had identified, that allows the page to refresh with additional vaccine appointments, simply by changing the ZIP Code.
[08:55.630 --> 08:58.370] [SPEAKER_06]: And I would really encourage people to use that tip and trick.
[08:58.590 --> 08:59.710] [SPEAKER_15]: That's the New York City system.
[08:59.890 --> 09:02.750] [SPEAKER_15]: It's changing the last digit of the ZIP Code makes the page refresh.
[09:02.870 --> 09:04.470] [SPEAKER_15]: You just have to keep doing that over and over again.
[09:05.310 --> 09:06.010] [SPEAKER_06]: Which is great.
[09:06.130 --> 09:07.590] [SPEAKER_06]: And that's on the New York City system.
[09:07.610 --> 09:08.070] [SPEAKER_06]: Is that correct?
[09:08.250 --> 09:08.410] [SPEAKER_15]: Yes.
[09:09.230 --> 09:09.410] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[09:09.410 --> 09:10.710] [SPEAKER_15]: Or it was last time I checked.
[09:11.610 --> 09:12.030] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[09:12.030 --> 09:21.910] [SPEAKER_06]: And look, and to continue to look outside of New York as well, but always to keep an eye on the changing regulations about out-of-state vaccines.
[09:22.570 --> 09:40.550] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, even if you are able to get a vaccine, let's say, in a place like New Jersey or Pennsylvania, and you may live in New York or in surrounding areas, if you're an out-of-stater, that day of the vaccine, you always want to make sure that you are up-to-date with respect to whatever documentation they may require to get that vaccine,
[09:40.550 --> 09:41.950] [SPEAKER_06]: because it could change overnight.
[09:42.190 --> 09:42.310] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[09:42.390 --> 09:44.270] [SPEAKER_15]: You don't want to take an interstate trip for nothing.
[09:44.970 --> 09:49.990] [SPEAKER_15]: In fact, you'd have to take two, because you have to get the next second shot.
[09:51.190 --> 09:53.610] [SPEAKER_15]: Rob Gila, what did they tell you about the second shot?
[09:53.750 --> 09:54.770] [SPEAKER_15]: When do you have to come back for that?
[09:55.430 --> 10:01.330] [SPEAKER_10]: They said that our second shot appointments have already been made, that we just have to show up three weeks from today.
[10:01.330 --> 10:03.630] [SPEAKER_10]: If we can come around the same time of day, that's great.
[10:04.030 --> 10:06.830] [SPEAKER_10]: And all we need to bring with us for the second shot is our card.
[10:07.190 --> 10:09.430] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, the card that they gave us today when we got our first shot.
[10:09.550 --> 10:10.350] [SPEAKER_15]: You get a card?
[10:10.350 --> 10:13.750] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, that's a new CDC immunization card.
[10:13.930 --> 10:14.130] [SPEAKER_15]: Really?
[10:14.270 --> 10:16.410] [SPEAKER_15]: And I can show that at various places for discounts.
[10:16.610 --> 10:17.750] [SPEAKER_07]: It's a part of the whole...
[10:17.750 --> 10:18.070] [SPEAKER_10]: It's not a bad card.
[10:18.530 --> 10:19.090] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[10:19.910 --> 10:21.230] [SPEAKER_10]: And it was actually very funny.
[10:21.710 --> 10:25.090] [SPEAKER_10]: In the observation section, there was...
[10:25.090 --> 10:30.910] [SPEAKER_10]: Because the site at the Javits Center is staffed by the National Guard, right?
[10:31.110 --> 10:31.850] [SPEAKER_10]: It is...
[10:31.850 --> 10:36.770] [SPEAKER_10]: So there are military personnel walking around in uniform.
[10:37.430 --> 10:43.290] [SPEAKER_10]: And one of them said, Okay, now if you're going to take a picture of your card, don't put it on social media.
[10:43.550 --> 10:49.410] [SPEAKER_10]: And he walked over to a young person who was sitting there with his phone and said, I said, don't put it on social media.
[10:50.150 --> 10:53.250] [SPEAKER_10]: It was very funny because this thing has your full name and your date of birth on it.
[10:53.790 --> 10:57.490] [SPEAKER_15]: And so a National Guard person is going around giving cyber tips to kids?
[10:59.230 --> 11:00.870] [SPEAKER_10]: Basically, that is what happened today.
[11:01.010 --> 11:01.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes.
[11:02.030 --> 11:02.430] [SPEAKER_15]: Wow.
[11:02.430 --> 11:06.030] [SPEAKER_10]: It was a fascinating day from start to finish.
[11:06.670 --> 11:19.190] [SPEAKER_15]: Hey, I'd like to play a piece from one of our favorite commentators, who we played a couple of weeks ago, actually, involving certain events that are taking place in the country right now.
[11:19.210 --> 11:27.290] [SPEAKER_15]: This is from Corey Forrester, who has a lot to say about a lot and is a great comedian as well as others.
[11:27.290 --> 11:36.770] [SPEAKER_15]: But listen to some of these comments on some developments taking place regarding the vaccine in other states.
[11:37.450 --> 11:39.930] [SPEAKER_11]: Hey, Governor Greg Abbott, have you done it?
[11:40.070 --> 11:41.530] [SPEAKER_11]: Have you got it out of your system?
[11:41.710 --> 11:48.890] [SPEAKER_11]: Do you feel like all the conservatives and Republicans think of you as the rooting, tooting, shooting Texas f***ing cowboy that you want to be looking all tough?
[11:49.050 --> 11:50.870] [SPEAKER_11]: We can't have no mask mandates.
[11:51.090 --> 11:52.470] [SPEAKER_11]: This ain't really freedom.
[11:52.730 --> 11:54.430] [SPEAKER_11]: People are going to f***ing die.
[11:55.710 --> 12:04.830] [SPEAKER_11]: There's a huge difference in this f***ing Orwellian bulls*** that you all conjure up in your brain where nobody has any freedom and Big Brother's watching you all the time.
[12:04.950 --> 12:11.910] [SPEAKER_11]: There's a huge difference in that and just being f***ing safe to be f***ing safe because you care about people.
[12:12.290 --> 12:12.910] [SPEAKER_11]: And you care...
[12:12.910 --> 12:17.050] [SPEAKER_11]: Also, when did you and Marjorie Taylor Greene become the scientists all of a sudden?
[12:17.190 --> 12:21.050] [SPEAKER_11]: Now you're, well, because of all the vaccines and we can just open back up to 100 bullets.
[12:21.230 --> 12:23.370] [SPEAKER_11]: Or is it that you thought like, hey, you know what?
[12:23.370 --> 12:31.670] [SPEAKER_11]: We can just open Texas back up since there's not as many people since we let a lot of them f***ing freeze to death.
[12:31.990 --> 12:35.630] [SPEAKER_11]: Naturally, there will be more social distancing going on.
[12:35.810 --> 12:37.650] [SPEAKER_11]: Is that the logic going through your brain?
[12:37.870 --> 12:39.510] [SPEAKER_11]: This is so goddamn dumb.
[12:39.910 --> 12:42.130] [SPEAKER_11]: The f***ing checks aren't even here.
[12:42.330 --> 12:42.830] [SPEAKER_11]: Alright?
[12:43.150 --> 12:44.670] [SPEAKER_11]: Yes, people are getting vaccinated.
[12:44.870 --> 12:45.870] [SPEAKER_11]: Things are looking better.
[12:46.050 --> 12:47.830] [SPEAKER_11]: But we're still f***ing not there.
[12:47.830 --> 12:49.690] [SPEAKER_11]: Jesus God!
[12:50.230 --> 12:57.750] [SPEAKER_11]: How much more do you old white men gotta sling your dicks around while everybody f***ing dies and suffers?
[12:59.050 --> 13:00.530] [SPEAKER_11]: F*** you, man!
[13:00.670 --> 13:01.330] [SPEAKER_11]: Come on!
[13:04.150 --> 13:05.830] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, I could not say it better.
[13:06.230 --> 13:08.370] [SPEAKER_15]: Corey Forrester with more commentary.
[13:08.370 --> 13:09.010] [SPEAKER_15]: Look him up.
[13:09.170 --> 13:10.130] [SPEAKER_15]: He's on Twitter.
[13:10.430 --> 13:12.170] [SPEAKER_15]: I'm sure YouTube all over the place.
[13:13.650 --> 13:14.550] [SPEAKER_15]: What do you guys think?
[13:16.850 --> 13:18.170] [SPEAKER_02]: That was a bit subtle.
[13:18.290 --> 13:21.290] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm not quite sure I understand completely what they're trying to say.
[13:21.290 --> 13:22.650] [SPEAKER_15]: He should be more direct, I think.
[13:22.650 --> 13:35.150] [SPEAKER_07]: He's, of course, referencing the recent disaster with power outages and the overall sort of free system.
[13:36.470 --> 13:50.970] [SPEAKER_07]: It's kind of a nice parallel to his redress over the use of the term freedom because that's exactly what created that isolated power system and so many people were affected in Texas.
[13:50.970 --> 13:51.550] [SPEAKER_07]: Right.
[13:51.710 --> 13:57.810] [SPEAKER_15]: But also, I mean, just in the last day or two, having all the restrictions pretty much lifted.
[13:57.930 --> 14:05.530] [SPEAKER_15]: Like, you know, just wishing it away, saying that because things are getting better, you know what, no more masks, no more crowd control.
[14:06.210 --> 14:08.110] [SPEAKER_15]: And this is how we lose.
[14:08.230 --> 14:28.430] [SPEAKER_15]: This is how all the gains that we have made by all the sacrifices we have made, that is how it's lost, through idiocy, through the governors of Texas, of Mississippi, of Florida, you know, there's not enough attention being paid to the idiocy going on in these places and the people that will die as a result of it.
[14:28.810 --> 14:31.130] [SPEAKER_15]: It's really disgusting.
[14:31.130 --> 14:34.430] [SPEAKER_15]: And I think we need to focus a lot more attention on that.
[14:35.410 --> 14:35.890] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay.
[14:36.050 --> 14:38.590] [SPEAKER_15]: So, we have other stories to...
[14:38.590 --> 14:40.350] [SPEAKER_15]: Alex, do you have something to say as well?
[14:40.910 --> 14:51.770] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I wanted to provide a short anecdote about this very situation, which is, you know, I went to a veterinarian this past week here in Pennsylvania.
[14:52.050 --> 14:58.670] [SPEAKER_06]: My dog, Beagle, she wound up hurting her back, slipping on some ice or something, and she wasn't herself, so I had to bring her to the vet.
[14:58.670 --> 15:01.730] [SPEAKER_06]: It was not the ordinary vet that I would usually go to.
[15:01.930 --> 15:06.690] [SPEAKER_06]: The vet I usually go to is very cautious about coming into the office.
[15:06.690 --> 15:09.830] [SPEAKER_06]: They come to your car, they take the dog, you never step in foot into the office.
[15:10.330 --> 15:27.310] [SPEAKER_06]: This other vet, though, that I went to, I won't name it, but it was the polar opposite, where you took your dog or a cat, whatever it is, whatever your animal was, into the waiting room, and you're in there in this enclosed space, and they weren't following any kind of mask mandate.
[15:27.530 --> 15:33.250] [SPEAKER_06]: The employees had masks on, but people could be in the waiting room without any mask on.
[15:33.550 --> 15:44.590] [SPEAKER_06]: In fact, there was one individual, one man there, who was probably in his 30s, a big dog, you know, drove a pickup truck, and he's just sitting there in this enclosed space with no mask on whatsoever.
[15:44.590 --> 15:50.830] [SPEAKER_06]: And I'm thinking to myself, how goddamn inconsiderate can you be to all these people around you?
[15:51.170 --> 16:02.190] [SPEAKER_06]: And I'm thinking about it from his perspective, in that he probably never got sick and doesn't believe in COVID or thinks the virus is some kind of hoax.
[16:02.310 --> 16:02.810] [SPEAKER_06]: Who knows?
[16:02.910 --> 16:06.190] [SPEAKER_06]: I'm putting all these thoughts into his head, you know, trying to empathize.
[16:06.270 --> 16:07.950] [SPEAKER_15]: You're also assuming he drives a pickup truck.
[16:08.770 --> 16:09.890] [SPEAKER_06]: No, he did drive.
[16:09.930 --> 16:10.370] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, he did drive.
[16:10.470 --> 16:11.010] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay, sorry.
[16:11.650 --> 16:26.470] [SPEAKER_06]: And whether you have to think about this, if this person has been able to get through this past year without having contracted the virus, it's in large part due to other people wearing masks, right?
[16:26.590 --> 16:29.670] [SPEAKER_06]: Because masks are about protecting those around you.
[16:29.810 --> 16:30.870] [SPEAKER_06]: It's common courtesy.
[16:30.870 --> 16:35.010] [SPEAKER_06]: It's like what the, you know, this comedian that you just played had mentioned.
[16:35.190 --> 16:40.350] [SPEAKER_06]: It's not about protecting yourself in as much as it is about protecting other people around you.
[16:40.590 --> 16:43.510] [SPEAKER_06]: And I saw something in that waiting room that I never saw before.
[16:43.990 --> 16:52.270] [SPEAKER_06]: There was a woman who was trying to comply in some respects with the mask mandate by using her hair around her face.
[16:52.390 --> 16:54.330] [SPEAKER_06]: She wrapped her hair around her face.
[16:54.470 --> 16:55.770] [SPEAKER_06]: She had her hair wrapped around her face.
[16:55.830 --> 16:56.710] [SPEAKER_06]: I couldn't figure out...
[16:56.710 --> 16:57.730] [SPEAKER_06]: That's not going to help.
[16:57.910 --> 16:59.370] [SPEAKER_14]: That doesn't help, Alex.
[17:00.110 --> 17:01.250] [SPEAKER_14]: That's wishful thinking.
[17:01.690 --> 17:05.670] [SPEAKER_06]: Her long locks of brown hair she's using as a mask.
[17:05.670 --> 17:06.830] [SPEAKER_06]: I'd never seen that before.
[17:06.850 --> 17:10.250] [SPEAKER_06]: I thought to myself, I have to get the hell out of here.
[17:10.550 --> 17:11.610] [SPEAKER_06]: This is dangerous.
[17:12.710 --> 17:14.230] [SPEAKER_06]: And I felt weird.
[17:14.370 --> 17:17.730] [SPEAKER_06]: But, you know, I made up some excuse saying, you know, I need to take some work calls.
[17:17.730 --> 17:19.430] [SPEAKER_06]: I'm just going to be hanging out in the parking lot.
[17:19.530 --> 17:20.690] [SPEAKER_06]: They seem to get it.
[17:22.250 --> 17:25.390] [SPEAKER_06]: But anyway, that's my mask anecdote from last week.
[17:25.470 --> 17:26.650] [SPEAKER_15]: Now, where did this happen?
[17:27.750 --> 17:28.750] [SPEAKER_06]: This is in Pennsylvania.
[17:28.750 --> 17:29.410] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, in Pennsylvania.
[17:29.690 --> 17:32.190] [SPEAKER_15]: I was about to say, give me the address of the place in New York.
[17:32.390 --> 17:37.070] [SPEAKER_15]: I'll go down there myself, you know, because, I mean, I do see a lot of idiocy.
[17:37.310 --> 17:39.790] [SPEAKER_15]: I do see stupidity, but I also see it challenged.
[17:39.790 --> 17:44.630] [SPEAKER_15]: And I see it overwhelmed by smart people who are following guidelines.
[17:45.190 --> 17:46.570] [SPEAKER_15]: And, you know, that is so important.
[17:46.570 --> 17:48.350] [SPEAKER_15]: And you have to reinforce that wherever possible.
[17:48.450 --> 17:49.790] [SPEAKER_15]: But, you know, it all goes to leadership.
[17:49.790 --> 18:02.890] [SPEAKER_15]: If you have a president or a governor or a mayor who is telling you that it doesn't apply to you and that science is subjective, you're going to make the wrong decisions.
[18:03.230 --> 18:05.710] [SPEAKER_15]: And that's where you lay the blame.
[18:05.870 --> 18:07.530] [SPEAKER_15]: And that's where we should be focusing the attention.
[18:07.750 --> 18:08.990] [SPEAKER_15]: Not seeing that enough.
[18:09.130 --> 18:13.350] [SPEAKER_15]: And that's really tragic because we could be so much further along.
[18:13.350 --> 18:19.690] [SPEAKER_15]: And we are making great strides because of the vaccine and because of the effort so many people are making.
[18:19.690 --> 18:21.130] [SPEAKER_15]: But we could be so much better.
[18:21.970 --> 18:24.190] [SPEAKER_15]: So, just extremely frustrating.
[18:25.010 --> 18:28.150] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay, so we have some interesting stories.
[18:28.810 --> 18:33.330] [SPEAKER_15]: Actually, a very interesting story which is kind of the elephant in the room.
[18:33.530 --> 18:38.310] [SPEAKER_15]: We talked about Parler over the past few weeks, months.
[18:38.730 --> 18:47.630] [SPEAKER_15]: But there was another conservative social media platform that we haven't really talked about very much called Gab.
[18:47.990 --> 18:48.990] [SPEAKER_15]: Have you heard about Gab?
[18:48.990 --> 18:49.850] [SPEAKER_15]: Have we talked about Gab?
[18:50.030 --> 18:51.150] [SPEAKER_15]: I don't think we've really mentioned it.
[18:51.750 --> 18:57.530] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, it's a right-wing social media website, I guess, is one way to describe it.
[18:57.590 --> 18:58.610] [SPEAKER_15]: But it's really more than that.
[18:59.430 --> 19:00.530] [SPEAKER_15]: They have been hacked.
[19:01.090 --> 19:02.510] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, this always seems to happen.
[19:03.870 --> 19:12.230] [SPEAKER_15]: CEO Andrew Torba said on Twitter, and I'm not making this up, said that demon hackers were to blame.
[19:13.090 --> 19:15.250] [SPEAKER_15]: Demon hackers were to blame.
[19:15.930 --> 19:18.750] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, I mean, okay, let's look at the good in that.
[19:18.990 --> 19:23.830] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay, by saying demon hackers, he's implying that hackers by default aren't demons.
[19:24.010 --> 19:25.550] [SPEAKER_15]: So you have to call them demon hackers.
[19:26.130 --> 19:29.410] [SPEAKER_15]: Maybe hackers are good in his eyes, but these are demon hackers.
[19:29.930 --> 19:38.390] [SPEAKER_15]: But then he went and used a transphobic slur to describe them, which really is revealing, quite revealing.
[19:38.830 --> 19:48.710] [SPEAKER_15]: Now, Wired actually reported that a hacker who goes by the name Jack Sparrow, and I can't even tell you what letters are capitalized and what letters are not capitalized in that name.
[19:49.450 --> 19:53.690] [SPEAKER_15]: Jack Sparrow and my little anonymous revival project.
[19:54.490 --> 19:55.990] [SPEAKER_15]: That's a great handle, I think.
[19:56.310 --> 19:56.630] [SPEAKER_07]: MLARP.
[19:57.270 --> 19:57.590] [SPEAKER_15]: What?
[19:58.670 --> 19:58.990] [SPEAKER_07]: MLARP.
[19:59.590 --> 20:00.330] [SPEAKER_15]: What does that mean?
[20:00.430 --> 20:01.550] [SPEAKER_15]: Oh, you mean you're spelling it out.
[20:01.670 --> 20:01.830] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay.
[20:02.030 --> 20:02.810] [SPEAKER_07]: I was trying to make sense.
[20:02.810 --> 20:03.510] [SPEAKER_07]: Does that mean something?
[20:03.530 --> 20:03.950] [SPEAKER_07]: I don't know.
[20:04.070 --> 20:05.050] [SPEAKER_07]: I tried to make sense of it.
[20:05.150 --> 20:05.850] [SPEAKER_07]: That's all I could come up with.
[20:05.850 --> 20:08.270] [SPEAKER_15]: Ever since all the real names were taken, I can't keep up.
[20:08.430 --> 20:10.190] [SPEAKER_15]: You know, people are spelling things with numbers and symbols now.
[20:10.410 --> 20:10.970] [SPEAKER_07]: Got to keep up.
[20:12.110 --> 20:17.770] [SPEAKER_15]: Anyway, so Jack Sparrow, or Jack Sparrow, I don't even know.
[20:17.850 --> 20:18.850] [SPEAKER_15]: Someone tell me how to pronounce it.
[20:19.010 --> 20:23.590] [SPEAKER_15]: And my little anonymous revival project carried out the hack to expose Gab's users.
[20:24.730 --> 20:32.970] [SPEAKER_15]: Private messages from some 15,000 Gab users were used to create a data set of more than 40 million posts from the site.
[20:32.970 --> 20:40.510] [SPEAKER_15]: 40 million posts, including private posts, user profiles, some users hashed passwords, passwords for groups.
[20:40.670 --> 20:45.770] [SPEAKER_15]: They were all affected by the hack, which used an SQL injection vulnerability.
[20:45.770 --> 20:47.550] [SPEAKER_15]: Might have some more details on that in a bit.
[20:48.070 --> 20:51.710] [SPEAKER_15]: To siphon some 70 gigs of data.
[20:52.550 --> 20:53.590] [SPEAKER_15]: 70 gigs.
[20:54.290 --> 21:07.490] [SPEAKER_15]: Now, activist data transparency group distributed denial of secrets, known as DDoS secrets, I guess that's how you pronounce it, plans to share the data with researchers and journalists but says it's not releasing it publicly due to privacy concerns.
[21:08.190 --> 21:16.370] [SPEAKER_15]: In a simpler, more ordinary time, it would be an important sociological resource, according to a blog post on that wiki site.
[21:16.510 --> 21:25.930] [SPEAKER_15]: In 2021, though, it's also a record of the culture and the exact statements surrounding not only an increase in extremist views and actions, but an attempted coup.
[21:26.870 --> 21:35.210] [SPEAKER_15]: Speaking of which, this is all very relevant because tomorrow is supposedly the day that Trump comes back and takes the helm at the White House.
[21:35.450 --> 21:44.450] [SPEAKER_15]: March 4th, the day that lives in conspiracy theorists' minds as the day of infamy.
[21:45.290 --> 21:52.250] [SPEAKER_15]: And they are basically, I think they canceled the House of Representatives tomorrow because they really think something is going to happen.
[21:52.590 --> 21:57.710] [SPEAKER_15]: Honestly, I don't see how it's possible with all the National Guard basically taking over the city there.
[21:58.550 --> 21:59.530] [SPEAKER_15]: But you know what?
[21:59.630 --> 22:01.970] [SPEAKER_15]: If they want to try that, I think they should.
[22:02.150 --> 22:08.330] [SPEAKER_15]: I think they should show their true colors and show up and, you know, now we'll have more information on these people.
[22:08.570 --> 22:09.770] [SPEAKER_15]: That's how you find out.
[22:14.600 --> 22:23.380] [SPEAKER_07]: And the information just continues with, I think, the initial change from one platform to another.
[22:23.700 --> 22:36.600] [SPEAKER_07]: The real area of interest, and I'm excited to know more about it is that transfer of people, at least in sort of the real sort of academic sense.
[22:38.080 --> 22:44.480] [SPEAKER_07]: But I think we're all ready to go and we're going to be able to learn a little bit more about that tonight.
[22:44.920 --> 22:45.040] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[22:45.860 --> 22:46.400] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay.
[22:47.060 --> 22:57.820] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, basically, concerning Gab, they've had an 800% spike in traffic since January 6th, since the attack on the Capitol.
[22:59.200 --> 23:02.060] [SPEAKER_15]: And its registered user numbers have doubled.
[23:02.200 --> 23:03.480] [SPEAKER_15]: That's according to National Public Radio.
[23:03.940 --> 23:13.740] [SPEAKER_15]: The Anti-Defamation League has called for investigation into Gab to determine whether the social media platform intentionally aided or abetted people who were involved in the riot.
[23:14.540 --> 23:17.700] [SPEAKER_15]: Now, this guy, Torba, found Gab in 2016.
[23:18.660 --> 23:26.260] [SPEAKER_15]: It was styled as a free speech alternative to other social media sites that didn't have enough free speech, apparently.
[23:26.580 --> 23:28.620] [SPEAKER_15]: It gained notoriety in 2018.
[23:28.640 --> 23:37.240] [SPEAKER_15]: You might remember this, when a man posted an anti-Semitic message on the site before driving to Pittsburgh and killing 11 people in a synagogue.
[23:38.320 --> 23:51.440] [SPEAKER_15]: Gab removed the account and cooperated with investigators, but they were dropped by their hosting platform and by PayPal, and its app was kicked out of both Google and Apple's app stores for violating hate speech policies.
[23:51.700 --> 23:54.320] [SPEAKER_15]: So, same old thing all over again.
[23:55.300 --> 23:55.700] [SPEAKER_15]: Wow.
[23:56.100 --> 23:59.180] [SPEAKER_15]: So, Alex, I believe we have some people joining us now?
[24:00.020 --> 24:01.400] [SPEAKER_06]: We do indeed.
[24:01.400 --> 24:24.140] [SPEAKER_06]: We are very lucky to have Zan, who is one of the major players with Distributed Denial of Secrets here with us tonight to talk about the Gab hack, the Gab leaks, and what Distributed Denial of Secrets is doing with this data, how they are distributing it to researchers,
[24:24.540 --> 24:39.200] [SPEAKER_06]: to threat analysts, to people who are doing analysis and research with respect to extremist groups and insurrections and with that, let me hand it over to Zan and say welcome to Off The Hook.
[24:39.340 --> 24:40.740] [SPEAKER_06]: We are so delighted to have you here.
[24:41.120 --> 24:41.460] [SPEAKER_15]: Yes, welcome.
[24:41.640 --> 24:44.020] [SPEAKER_13]: I am very happy to be here.
[24:44.180 --> 24:45.640] [SPEAKER_13]: Thank you for having me.
[24:46.580 --> 24:56.260] [SPEAKER_15]: Let me just ask right away, Zan, so Distributed Denial of Secrets, people are going to right away say, is this another version of WikiLeaks?
[24:56.360 --> 24:59.200] [SPEAKER_15]: What is the difference between these two organizations?
[24:59.760 --> 25:03.080] [SPEAKER_13]: Well, we are a transparency organization.
[25:03.080 --> 25:07.480] [SPEAKER_13]: We do believe that information should have the right to be free.
[25:07.480 --> 25:22.400] [SPEAKER_13]: We do accept leaks, but we are a little different from WikiLeaks in that we are a little bit more cooperative in our approach.
[25:23.020 --> 25:25.680] [SPEAKER_13]: We make decisions together as a group.
[25:25.680 --> 25:30.300] [SPEAKER_13]: We are not run solely on the whims of one person.
[25:31.160 --> 25:40.680] [SPEAKER_13]: We like to make our decisions based on everybody's wishes, not just on the wishes of one.
[25:42.800 --> 25:46.640] [SPEAKER_13]: We are run primarily by queer and trans people.
[25:47.400 --> 25:53.640] [SPEAKER_13]: We try to also take the wishes of the source more into account.
[25:53.680 --> 26:09.380] [SPEAKER_13]: For example, with the recent Gab leaks, the way that we decided to distribute it was not only based on privacy concerns for the users contained in the leaks, but also based on what the source wanted.
[26:09.600 --> 26:14.600] [SPEAKER_13]: The source agreed with how we released it.
[26:14.700 --> 26:17.360] [SPEAKER_13]: The source didn't want it as a public release.
[26:17.540 --> 26:19.800] [SPEAKER_13]: Oh, I'm sorry, you might see a cat or two.
[26:22.720 --> 26:23.920] [SPEAKER_15]: There's always a cat.
[26:24.440 --> 26:25.740] [SPEAKER_15]: They're quite welcome.
[26:26.760 --> 26:30.500] [SPEAKER_13]: But the source didn't want it released as a full public release.
[26:30.680 --> 26:40.040] [SPEAKER_13]: The source did want it released as a limited distribution or what we at DDoS describe as a limb disk.
[26:40.220 --> 26:51.640] [SPEAKER_13]: So we very much do also take the wishes of the source into the account, how they want it released, when they want it released, in what format they want it released as well.
[26:51.840 --> 26:53.400] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, I was struck by that.
[26:53.560 --> 26:58.680] [SPEAKER_15]: You mentioned the differences between Wikipedia and your organization.
[26:58.680 --> 27:02.320] [SPEAKER_15]: I can't imagine who the one you're referring to might be, but we'll skip over that.
[27:02.860 --> 27:04.660] [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, I can't really imagine.
[27:04.660 --> 27:30.200] [SPEAKER_15]: but as far as the release itself, what you folks have been doing seems really socially responsible as far as not wanting to invade anyone's privacy, reveal information of a personal nature, and only revealing this to journalists, researchers, people who treat it responsibly,
[27:30.840 --> 27:32.580] [SPEAKER_15]: when it certainly could be.
[27:33.140 --> 27:38.300] [SPEAKER_13]: Well, especially in Gab, a lot was pulled.
[27:39.460 --> 27:52.180] [SPEAKER_13]: And in it, we feel the data is a very valuable data set for people who want to research things like extremism and things like that.
[27:52.300 --> 27:58.360] [SPEAKER_13]: But also, in there, there was a lot of stuff that isn't applicable.
[27:59.240 --> 28:02.180] [SPEAKER_13]: You know, Gab is a very big platform.
[28:02.340 --> 28:13.740] [SPEAKER_13]: and while it is mostly a right-wing platform, there are just people that are there to talk about things like their day or their pets or what their kids did on any particular day.
[28:14.260 --> 28:16.300] [SPEAKER_13]: And they don't deserve to be boxed.
[28:16.400 --> 28:21.260] [SPEAKER_13]: They don't deserve to have their life splayed out to the world for everybody to see.
[28:21.400 --> 28:25.760] [SPEAKER_13]: They don't deserve to have their email address put out there, their password cracked.
[28:26.020 --> 28:27.380] [SPEAKER_13]: They don't deserve that.
[28:27.800 --> 28:46.980] [SPEAKER_13]: And while there is an undeniable interest for researchers and journalists that do things like track extremist groups, track hate groups, and things like that, you know, there absolutely is an undeniable value to that part of the data set.
[28:47.140 --> 28:59.960] [SPEAKER_13]: We also did want to preserve the privacy of people that were just there to talk about their day or their pets or their kids or complain about work or things like that.
[29:00.040 --> 29:04.040] [SPEAKER_13]: They do not deserve to have their lives laid bare like that.
[29:04.660 --> 29:06.060] [SPEAKER_15]: No, that makes sense.
[29:06.180 --> 29:22.320] [SPEAKER_15]: I can't help but think that if the tables were turned, the right-wing extremists would say that this is evidence of a Pizzagate-type conspiracy and that these private messages are actually coded messages and we have to reveal them all so that we can see if they're talking about cats,
[29:22.360 --> 29:24.800] [SPEAKER_15]: they're actually talking about insurrection or whatnot.
[29:25.200 --> 29:27.720] [SPEAKER_15]: And I'm glad to see cooler heads are prevailing here.
[29:31.040 --> 29:49.180] [SPEAKER_13]: And I mean, one of the things, excuse me, that the gab that Andrew Torba, the CEO of Gab said, was that, oh, you know, this is something that they're just doing for us, which is absolutely untrue.
[29:50.380 --> 30:09.540] [SPEAKER_13]: Distributed Denial of Secrets has multiple data sets that are considered limited distribution for a number of reasons that, you know, researchers or journalists or whoever want to get access to, they actually have to get in contact with distributed denial of secrets,
[30:09.720 --> 30:13.760] [SPEAKER_13]: they have to explain why they want the data set and things like that.
[30:13.940 --> 30:24.360] [SPEAKER_13]: We have a whole section on our website for data sets like that where, you know, it's just not of interest to the general public.
[30:24.640 --> 30:37.800] [SPEAKER_13]: That information does not need to be out there to the general public, but may, for one reason or another, be of interest to researchers or journalists or whoever.
[30:38.080 --> 30:39.160] [SPEAKER_15]: How about law enforcement?
[30:39.300 --> 30:45.960] [SPEAKER_15]: I mean, are you looking at a potential crime scene here as far as planning for things like coups and insurrections?
[30:46.600 --> 31:08.400] [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, law, maybe, but I think one of the things that we really want to focus on is getting it out to researchers who do track things like hate groups, because I think that a data set like this is really important to track the evolution of hate online.
[31:08.840 --> 31:14.080] [SPEAKER_13]: The Internet has become such a vector and such an echo chamber for hate groups.
[31:14.240 --> 31:40.120] [SPEAKER_13]: So it's so important to track how these things evolve online, not only so we can keep communities safe, but also so that, you know, maybe we can break that echo chamber, find out what they're saying, what they're doing, how they evolve, and maybe from that we can learn how to break that echo chamber and maybe de-radicalize.
[31:40.120 --> 31:43.420] [SPEAKER_13]: We can find new ways to maybe de-radicalize.
[31:47.380 --> 31:47.960] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[31:48.720 --> 32:02.200] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, and along those lines, Zan, you know, especially with regard to the issue of law enforcement having access to this, there may be evidence of criminal activity in this, but it's 70 gigabytes of data.
[32:02.400 --> 32:06.800] [SPEAKER_06]: And today, we often lose track of what 70 gigabytes is.
[32:06.960 --> 32:24.360] [SPEAKER_06]: If you think about something, that amount of data in comparison to the Panama Papers, which was 2.6 terabytes of data, which was a massive amount of data, 70 gigabytes sounds like it's not a lot of data, but it really, really is.
[32:24.620 --> 32:26.420] [SPEAKER_06]: 70 gigs is a huge amount of data.
[32:26.420 --> 32:42.980] [SPEAKER_13]: It's a huge amount of data, especially when you're considering it's text messages and DMs and password hashes, and these are things that normally don't take up a lot of space, and yet you have 70 gigs of it.
[32:43.120 --> 32:46.880] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, I believe there are no pictures or videos or anything like that included in this, right?
[32:48.900 --> 32:53.500] [SPEAKER_03]: No, there's no pictures or videos or any sort of media.
[32:54.280 --> 33:01.860] [SPEAKER_03]: the data does have the information that a university lab could use to download the media.
[33:02.300 --> 33:09.540] [SPEAKER_03]: It notes like gab posts that had pictures attached or and gives you URLs.
[33:10.350 --> 33:16.740] [SPEAKER_03]: And so if, you know, a particular research outfit wanted to use that to then retrieve that additional media, they could.
[33:18.340 --> 33:22.120] [SPEAKER_03]: But that didn't seem like the priority for us here.
[33:22.260 --> 33:24.440] [SPEAKER_15]: So 70 gigs, really is a lot.
[33:24.600 --> 33:26.920] [SPEAKER_15]: If it's just text, it is a lot.
[33:27.100 --> 33:30.440] [SPEAKER_15]: I mean, you know, 64K is a lot if it says something significant.
[33:30.900 --> 33:33.740] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, text and links to more data presumably.
[33:35.540 --> 33:35.940] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[33:36.240 --> 33:36.640] [SPEAKER_07]: Go ahead, Alex.
[33:37.100 --> 33:40.400] [SPEAKER_06]: And along those lines too, we're talking about this is a massive amount of data.
[33:40.620 --> 33:44.480] [SPEAKER_06]: You mentioned and rightly said that there's a lot of contact information.
[33:44.480 --> 33:47.760] [SPEAKER_06]: There's a lot of ways that this data can be misused.
[33:47.940 --> 34:07.160] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think one of the things that we often forget about too is when these things happen, when the parlor leaks happened and Internet archivists were able to scarf down massive amounts of parlor related data while it was in its death throes and it's still being resurrected in weird places and platforms these days.
[34:07.720 --> 34:11.620] [SPEAKER_06]: The communities on these platforms tend to break apart.
[34:11.880 --> 34:14.980] [SPEAKER_06]: They tend to segment or balkanize in certain ways.
[34:15.500 --> 34:28.240] [SPEAKER_06]: And if you release this data publicly, if you just released it all out, these extremist groups could then use that data, use that contact information to reform, to regroup, to put together a new platform.
[34:28.480 --> 34:40.100] [SPEAKER_06]: So I think there are ways in which this data can be weaponized by the extremists themselves, not just by researchers or law enforcement or archivists that we need to take into account as well.
[34:40.280 --> 34:48.300] [SPEAKER_06]: And that's why I love that Distributed Denial of Secrets is doing the responsible thing here in limiting the distribution to researchers.
[34:48.300 --> 34:56.720] [SPEAKER_06]: And I'm wondering if there's going to ever be a limited or subset of the data that will be pushed out to the public itself.
[34:58.040 --> 35:03.160] [SPEAKER_13]: Do you yeah, sorry, my wife is sitting next to me.
[35:04.800 --> 35:08.960] [SPEAKER_13]: I'm the best, one of the co-founders of Distributed Denial of Secrets.
[35:09.220 --> 35:09.420] [SPEAKER_13]: Welcome.
[35:09.640 --> 35:16.740] [SPEAKER_13]: And my wife is sitting next to me throughout this interview so you may hear some interjections.
[35:18.040 --> 35:20.880] [SPEAKER_13]: So I will pass this over to them.
[35:21.540 --> 35:27.420] [SPEAKER_03]: So on the issue of a public release, it's something that we're definitely interested in.
[35:29.100 --> 35:42.940] [SPEAKER_03]: That brings with it some challenges though in terms of time because there's some things that just would absolutely have to be removed like the hashed passwords and the passwords for the groups which are all plain text.
[35:44.160 --> 35:48.040] [SPEAKER_03]: And then there's a lot of discussions that we need to have beyond that.
[35:48.240 --> 35:51.040] [SPEAKER_03]: Stuff like the email addresses for verified accounts.
[35:51.700 --> 35:54.840] [SPEAKER_03]: What do we do with posts that are marked private?
[35:55.260 --> 35:57.640] [SPEAKER_03]: Do we make it just public posts?
[35:57.940 --> 35:58.460] [SPEAKER_03]: Blah, blah, blah.
[35:59.020 --> 36:05.760] [SPEAKER_03]: And even after we have all those discussions that still takes time to execute because you're talking
[36:12.940 --> 36:39.080] [SPEAKER_03]: and just decided to offer it up LIMDIS straight to journalists and researchers was so that we didn't have to introduce this long waiting period because there's so much that's going on where this is very recent events contemporaneous events this is stuff that it's a historical archive but there's a lot of journalists and we've seen this in the response so far there's a lot of Journalists that could
[36:39.080 --> 36:41.480] [SPEAKER_03]: really use this data set now.
[36:43.080 --> 36:53.100] [SPEAKER_03]: And so by putting it out this way, we leave all of our options open and kind of get the best of both worlds.
[36:53.580 --> 37:02.700] [SPEAKER_03]: And that way, we also don't have to sacrifice any of the other things we're working on because we do have, you know, several other projects that we're dealing with.
[37:02.700 --> 37:06.400] [SPEAKER_15]: How selective are you with the researchers and the journalists?
[37:06.560 --> 37:17.540] [SPEAKER_15]: Because I'm thinking, you know, all it takes is one irresponsible person that doesn't care as much as you do about the privacy that could just reveal all kinds of information that really shouldn't be revealed.
[37:20.560 --> 37:32.500] [SPEAKER_03]: We're trying to right now just keep it at... we'll give more or less automatic replies and yeses to people that are very well established or, you know, work for...
[37:32.500 --> 37:35.680] [SPEAKER_03]: very firmly established outlet or institution.
[37:37.260 --> 37:47.340] [SPEAKER_03]: You know, like we get an email from someone using a Washington Post email address and we know it's legitimate or like New York Times, just going to go ahead and say, yeah, here you go.
[37:48.700 --> 37:52.480] [SPEAKER_03]: Same with think tanks and established researchers.
[37:53.540 --> 38:05.900] [SPEAKER_03]: There's... there's more room for discussion when it comes down to the freelancers because there's a lot of very, very intelligent, very valuable freelancers out there.
[38:05.900 --> 38:16.020] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, I see a lot of them still out there and I've worked with them in the past, but anyone can also call themselves a freelancer.
[38:16.240 --> 38:24.300] [SPEAKER_03]: So there's, there's some, there's some requests that we're letting sit for a little bit longer while we think about it or figure out exactly how to proceed.
[38:27.080 --> 38:34.100] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, you know, most of the people that we've had to, to turn down are just people that are going, oh, well, I'm just curious.
[38:35.180 --> 38:39.420] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, yeah, I just kind of want to see what's in there.
[38:39.900 --> 38:41.760] [SPEAKER_15]: I want to see if I'm mentioned anywhere.
[38:41.760 --> 38:42.520] [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah.
[38:43.300 --> 38:57.600] [SPEAKER_03]: And we, we have kind of an interesting dilemma with, um, anti-fascist groups that are requesting the data because I mean, pretty much everyone who's part of DDoS or connected to it in any way is, is anti-fascist.
[38:58.060 --> 39:02.420] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, you know, who, who, who likes, who likes fascism?
[39:03.040 --> 39:10.600] [SPEAKER_13]: Apparently a lot of people, but, uh, yeah, apparently if the number is more than zero, that's too many.
[39:10.600 --> 39:10.960] [SPEAKER_13]: Mm-hmm.
[39:11.300 --> 39:11.520] [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah.
[39:12.040 --> 39:13.900] [SPEAKER_15]: Um, but tell us about that dilemma.
[39:14.040 --> 39:14.700] [SPEAKER_15]: That's, that's interesting.
[39:15.380 --> 39:15.840] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[39:15.980 --> 39:24.560] [SPEAKER_03]: Because when we, when we get requests from anti-fascist groups, I mean, our immediate personal instinct and reaction is always to say yes.
[39:24.800 --> 39:27.540] [SPEAKER_03]: Cause you know, I mean, these are our comrades, these are our allies.
[39:27.880 --> 39:40.440] [SPEAKER_03]: We're, you know, all about anti-fascist work and direct action, but because of the situation, because of the role we're, we're acting in when we're, we're doing DDoS.
[39:40.600 --> 39:42.060] [SPEAKER_03]: stuff, DDoS secret stuff.
[39:42.420 --> 40:02.720] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, we have to look a little bit more closely at them and focus on anti-fascist groups that do research and they publish their findings because anti-fascists are flat out, undeniably some of the best researchers on, on fascists and fascism.
[40:02.720 --> 40:08.320] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, the, the, the only people that, you know, study fascism more than anti-fascists are fascists.
[40:08.520 --> 40:09.380] [SPEAKER_03]: That's very true.
[40:10.100 --> 40:10.700] [SPEAKER_05]: Mm-hmm.
[40:10.860 --> 40:18.800] [SPEAKER_03]: But at the same time, there's also a lot of anti-fascist groups that are much more focused on direct action.
[40:20.920 --> 40:33.840] [SPEAKER_03]: And, again, this is where we get into a little bit of a personal dilemma, because, like, personally, myself, big fan of direct action, but that's not what we're doing with DDoS.
[40:35.380 --> 40:45.740] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, you know, and we, we have to make sure that, like, okay, you're not, if we give this to you, uh, are you using it to, to research and identify things?
[40:45.740 --> 40:49.780] [SPEAKER_03]: Or are you using it to, like, mess up some Nazis' days?
[40:50.440 --> 41:06.200] [SPEAKER_03]: Because as much as we want to see the, the latter, um, that's, DDoS isn't and can't be in the Nazi harassing business, no matter how funny we think that would be, or how much of a public good it would be.
[41:06.360 --> 41:10.060] [SPEAKER_03]: That's not, that's not the role of DDoS secrets, and it can't be.
[41:10.060 --> 41:18.360] [SPEAKER_15]: No, you're, you're serving a very valuable role, and there are plenty of other, uh, organizations that are willing to take on the role of harassing Nazis, so you don't have to worry about that.
[41:18.460 --> 41:19.120] [SPEAKER_15]: That will be covered.
[41:19.320 --> 41:20.000] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, Rob.
[41:20.160 --> 41:23.700] [SPEAKER_03]: And to be clear, we're a big fan of those groups, for the most part.
[41:23.960 --> 41:40.040] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, if, if, if you punch a Nazi, or you just follow one down, play in a tuba so no one can hear them, whatever, you know, we're, we're watching the clips on TikTok, we're, we're watching the YouTube videos, and, you know, we're big fans of that.
[41:40.700 --> 41:41.060] [SPEAKER_15]: Awesome.
[41:41.320 --> 41:41.940] [SPEAKER_15]: Rob, go ahead.
[41:42.900 --> 41:45.820] [SPEAKER_02]: So, uh, Zan and Emma, thank you very much for, for joining us.
[41:46.260 --> 41:56.160] [SPEAKER_02]: Um, I, I wondered, you, you were talking about the sorts of individuals and organizations you do want to share this data with, and the way you're releasing it is, uh, is very fascinating.
[41:56.380 --> 42:03.120] [SPEAKER_02]: Have you had, like, a response in general, uh, if any, to the way you're, in which you're releasing this from, say, the journalists and the researchers?
[42:05.560 --> 42:14.340] [SPEAKER_03]: Uh, mostly just a few people that have questions about how Tor works, and how to extract and browse these particular files.
[42:15.280 --> 42:27.320] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, unsurprisingly, a lot of journalists are not very familiar with SQL databases, or forms of compression that isn't just .zip.
[42:28.580 --> 42:29.460] [SPEAKER_13]: Um...
[42:29.460 --> 42:32.520] [SPEAKER_13]: And yes, it was an S-Q-L-I.
[42:33.100 --> 42:33.500] [SPEAKER_13]: Oh, how embarrassing.
[42:33.500 --> 42:39.940] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, and apparently their chief technical officer also isn't very familiar with S-Q-L, um, uh, issues as well.
[42:40.220 --> 42:43.980] [SPEAKER_15]: Um, I'd like to go into a little bit about how this happened in the first place.
[42:43.980 --> 43:03.560] [SPEAKER_15]: Apparently, um, from the account of Fosco Morato, a former Facebook software engineer, uh, who in November became Gab's CTO, uh, and, um, uh, on Monday, I, I'm not sure if it's this week or, uh, a previous week, Monday, um, he, um, uh, or actually Gab removed the git commit from its,
[43:03.740 --> 43:13.380] [SPEAKER_15]: uh, from its website, uh, because, um, uh, the change that, um, that Fosco Morato made was a git commit.
[43:13.380 --> 43:20.140] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, and, uh, that, uh, that is what basically opened up the, um, uh, the security hole.
[43:20.320 --> 43:29.900] [SPEAKER_15]: The commit shows a software developer using the name Fosco Morato, introducing precisely the type of rookie mistake that could lead to the kind of breach that was reported over the weekend.
[43:30.340 --> 43:41.120] [SPEAKER_15]: Specifically, uh, a line strips the code of reject and filter, which are API functions that implement a programming idiom that protects against S-Q-L injection attacks.
[43:41.660 --> 43:52.760] [SPEAKER_15]: Um, and, uh, I guess, you know, we don't have to get into the, uh, uh, specifics here, uh, too much, um, but this is a rookie mistake is, is how it's being described in Ars Technica.
[43:53.040 --> 44:03.500] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, and, um, anybody can make mistakes, I suppose, but boy, this is something that, um, that really shouldn't happen in a, in, in, in a platform like this, correct?
[44:04.340 --> 44:22.380] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, I mean, the, when the source first told me that it was an S-Q-L-I vulnerability, um, because I never try to get too many details, because I don't want to know things that I could be compelled to, to testify about.
[44:22.880 --> 44:36.980] [SPEAKER_03]: Uh, but, you know, uh, but, you know, we do have to ask some basic questions, and they said it was S-Q-L-I, and, you know, for a while thought, like, okay, I wonder if that's just them trying to, you know, come up with something to help cover their tracks.
[44:36.980 --> 44:57.880] [SPEAKER_03]: It's a diversion, uh, because some sources will try and, you know, get clever like that, um, and after, after it became public, I started getting several people sending me messages, um, and little excerpts from the public gab code saying, I'm not positive,
[44:58.160 --> 45:00.840] [SPEAKER_03]: but it looks like you could execute arbitrary code here.
[45:00.840 --> 45:02.480] [SPEAKER_03]: People found multiple things.
[45:03.000 --> 45:03.300] Yeah.
[45:03.500 --> 45:04.380] [SPEAKER_13]: I've heard that.
[45:04.540 --> 45:12.560] [SPEAKER_13]: I, I've had friends look at the code multiple times and say, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here.
[45:12.680 --> 45:31.600] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, and, I mean, the, to kind of give everyone listening an idea of just how bad it is, when, when we were talking about it internally, whenever I first explained it to, to anyone, um, like, when I talked to Zan, or, you know, the other people, they're DDoS members,
[45:31.940 --> 45:39.500] [SPEAKER_03]: the, the, the way I explained it was, I want you to imagine the worst possible way gab could have been breached.
[45:39.960 --> 45:41.380] [SPEAKER_13]: And I went, no.
[45:42.980 --> 46:01.720] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, it goes, it goes beyond that, too, that in, in this Ars Technica piece, there's a, there's a, a section called Revisionist History, uh, besides the commit raising questions about gab's process for developing secure code, the social media site is also facing criticism for removing the commits from its website.
[46:01.960 --> 46:13.120] [SPEAKER_15]: Critics say the move violates terms of the Aferro General Public License, which governs gab's reuse of Mastodome, an open-source software package for hosting social networking platforms.
[46:13.380 --> 46:19.680] [SPEAKER_15]: Now, critics say the removal violates terms that require forked source code be directly linked from the site.
[46:19.680 --> 46:26.780] [SPEAKER_15]: The requirements are intended to provide transparency and to allow other open-source developers to benefit from the work of their peers at gab.
[46:27.300 --> 46:30.950] [SPEAKER_15]: Now, gab had long provided comments at code.gab.com.
[46:31.440 --> 46:39.480] [SPEAKER_15]: Then on Monday, the site suddenly removed all commits, including the ones that created and then fixed the critical SQL injection vulnerability.
[46:39.480 --> 46:50.820] [SPEAKER_15]: Now, get this, in their place, um, gab provided source code in the form of a zip archive file that was protected by the password, Jesus Christ is King, Trump won the election.
[46:51.040 --> 46:52.280] [SPEAKER_15]: I am not making that up.
[46:52.420 --> 46:52.920] [SPEAKER_15]: That is...
[46:52.920 --> 46:56.860] [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah, didn't they leave the password in plain text somewhere?
[46:57.360 --> 47:00.720] [SPEAKER_03]: Well, they had to, because it was, otherwise it was a violation.
[47:01.040 --> 47:03.700] [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah, they just left the password there.
[47:03.700 --> 47:11.860] [SPEAKER_03]: Real quick, just jumping back half a second, because you mentioned that the gab code is based off of Mastodon, you know, they did the fork.
[47:12.280 --> 47:15.300] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, I just want to be very clear for everyone listening.
[47:16.320 --> 47:18.600] [SPEAKER_03]: Gab introduced the vulnerability.
[47:18.600 --> 47:23.140] [SPEAKER_03]: I know we kind of said that earlier, but this was a hundred percent gab.
[47:23.340 --> 47:25.320] [SPEAKER_03]: They, they forked Mastodon.
[47:25.580 --> 47:29.240] [SPEAKER_03]: They got something that was, you know, pretty dang secure.
[47:30.180 --> 47:37.840] [SPEAKER_03]: And then they tweaked it and made it vulnerable on multiple fronts in the most embarrassing way possible.
[47:38.120 --> 47:39.200] [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, that, that...
[47:39.200 --> 47:41.440] [SPEAKER_03]: The SQI thing is not Mastodon.
[47:41.600 --> 47:42.900] [SPEAKER_03]: Please don't blame Mastodon.
[47:42.900 --> 47:44.660] [SPEAKER_15]: Yes, I'm very glad you made that point.
[47:44.740 --> 47:46.640] [SPEAKER_03]: This is all the white supremacists' fault.
[47:46.760 --> 47:48.420] [SPEAKER_15]: I'm very, no, I'm very glad you made that point.
[47:48.520 --> 47:55.420] [SPEAKER_15]: But also, I think they deserve some credit, because what, what you just described takes a bit of skill to take something secure and turn it into something so insecure.
[47:55.960 --> 47:56.780] [SPEAKER_15]: Alex, go ahead.
[47:57.680 --> 47:58.660] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, yeah.
[47:58.720 --> 48:05.080] [SPEAKER_06]: As a lawyer and someone who's also been a CISO, I mean, it's hard to get it right all the time, right?
[48:05.280 --> 48:07.760] [SPEAKER_06]: But it's also hard to get it that wrong.
[48:09.500 --> 48:09.980] [SPEAKER_06]: So...
[48:09.980 --> 48:11.660] [SPEAKER_06]: It takes some work.
[48:12.080 --> 48:14.560] [SPEAKER_06]: It does take some work, I think, to do it that poorly.
[48:14.780 --> 48:33.780] [SPEAKER_06]: But what I'm wondering about here, from a legal standpoint, you know, whenever there's a breach that affects a large amount of people, and especially on something like a social media platform like Gab, right, there may be some kind of regulatory scrutiny of those information security practices after the fact,
[48:33.960 --> 48:34.060] [SPEAKER_06]: right?
[48:34.060 --> 48:45.340] [SPEAKER_06]: So here, I'm wondering if, if Zan or Emma, you know what Gab had said about its cybersecurity posture before this particular breach.
[48:45.480 --> 48:53.400] [SPEAKER_06]: Did they hold themselves out as being, as respecting privacy and having a mature or enhanced cybersecurity posture?
[48:53.400 --> 48:57.120] [SPEAKER_06]: What did they say about cybersecurity before this breach happened?
[48:57.260 --> 49:05.020] [SPEAKER_06]: Because that could determine whether or not there is any kind of governmental or regulatory scrutiny into this breach after the fact.
[49:05.560 --> 49:10.140] [SPEAKER_03]: I can't quite answer that, but I can do you one better.
[49:10.140 --> 49:27.460] [SPEAKER_03]: I don't know what they were saying about their security before the breach, but I can tell you that after the breach, I think within a couple hours of Andy Greenberg at Wired reaching out to them for comment, they posted a blog post.
[49:29.280 --> 49:35.860] [SPEAKER_03]: And they said that they knew about the vulnerability and had patched it the week before.
[49:35.860 --> 49:39.360] [SPEAKER_03]: And it was very much still live.
[49:39.740 --> 49:53.640] [SPEAKER_03]: And because of the way Gab's PR handled it, Demon Hackers, a lot of people were watching as they edited the code in real time and removed the still active vulnerabilities.
[49:56.460 --> 50:13.600] [SPEAKER_03]: And one thing we haven't really gotten to yet, because just so much has been going on, because the vulnerabilities were still active, the source, Jack Sparrow, was able to get a little bit more.
[50:13.600 --> 50:26.120] [SPEAKER_03]: And the other day, we got an update of just the little bit from the window of when they first scraped and sent us the database and when they finally turned off all the vulnerabilities.
[50:26.780 --> 50:32.220] [SPEAKER_03]: So we're going to be adding that, I imagine, to what we're offering journalists pretty soon.
[50:32.360 --> 50:45.720] [SPEAKER_15]: Zan, I'm away in our last minute, so I just want to give you the opportunity, if there's a way people can help DDoS Secrets or any inspiration you can give to others that might be following the story with rapt attention.
[50:47.280 --> 51:01.940] [SPEAKER_03]: Zan, if you want to help out with anything, DDoS Secrets.com slash donate, it also has information on how you can contribute, and honestly, just spreading the word about everything we're doing is one of the most helpful things anyone can do.
[51:03.080 --> 51:07.880] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, I want to say, what you're doing is really inspirational and responsible, too.
[51:07.880 --> 51:15.840] [SPEAKER_15]: I can only imagine if leaks of the past had been handled this responsibly, I think we would have learned so much more from them in a timely fashion.
[51:16.080 --> 51:27.100] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, it's important when you have a ship to steer, you have to steer it and stick to that, you know, and not a waiver while you're handling stuff like this.
[51:27.100 --> 51:33.960] [SPEAKER_15]: In the 30 seconds or so we have left, can you tell us something about the history of the organization, how it started, how you guys were inspired?
[51:36.060 --> 51:53.580] [SPEAKER_03]: Some colleagues approached me basically saying, there's no leak projects or outlets that we feel we can support anymore, we kind of want to help you put together a new one, and they did.
[51:53.580 --> 52:03.460] [SPEAKER_03]: They kind of handed over a little bit of technical stuff for me, people I'd known for a few years, and slowly people have been joining up, helping out, and we've just been doing more and more ever since.
[52:04.500 --> 52:04.860] [SPEAKER_15]: Awesome.
[52:05.520 --> 52:05.980] [SPEAKER_15]: All right.
[52:06.040 --> 52:21.240] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, thank you very much for joining us, Zan and Emma from DDoS Secrets, and wow, what a story, and I'm sure it's going to get better as the weeks go by, and who knows what other platforms are out there as well.
[52:21.860 --> 52:30.140] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, we are going to be back at 8 o'clock for overtime at YouTube, youtube.com/Channel2600.
[52:30.140 --> 52:31.860] [SPEAKER_15]: You can find us there at 8 o'clock.
[52:32.000 --> 52:36.380] [SPEAKER_15]: We'll take your phone calls at 802-321-4225.
[52:36.740 --> 52:41.540] [SPEAKER_15]: You can write to us at Off The Hook, oth@2600.com.
[52:41.680 --> 52:47.220] [SPEAKER_15]: We'd love to hear your feedback, but we're going to take a short break now.
[52:47.220 --> 52:55.640] [SPEAKER_15]: This is from an album that just got released today by Leonard Summer, who is from the indigenous community of Canada.
[52:55.880 --> 52:56.860] [SPEAKER_15]: This is pretty awesome.
[52:57.020 --> 52:57.360] [SPEAKER_15]: Take a listen.
[55:57.620 --> 56:01.600] [SPEAKER_15]: And we're back for Off The Hook Overtime.
[56:01.600 --> 56:02.800] [SPEAKER_15]: Did you make it, Kyle?
[56:03.920 --> 56:04.720] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, I'm here.
[56:04.980 --> 56:05.520] [SPEAKER_15]: All right, great.
[56:06.220 --> 56:08.600] [SPEAKER_15]: And Alex, are you with us?
[56:09.660 --> 56:11.120] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, I'm better for worse.
[56:11.260 --> 56:12.480] [SPEAKER_15]: Rob, you make it?
[56:13.940 --> 56:15.040] [SPEAKER_02]: I believe so.
[56:15.560 --> 56:17.140] [SPEAKER_15]: Gila, are you in overtime?
[56:17.440 --> 56:18.820] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay, we're all in overtime.
[56:19.680 --> 56:21.260] [SPEAKER_15]: And Zan, you're also with us.
[56:22.560 --> 56:23.400] [SPEAKER_15]: I am.
[56:23.900 --> 56:27.180] [SPEAKER_15]: And I assume Emma is with us as well, off to the side.
[56:27.900 --> 56:29.620] [SPEAKER_15]: That was fantastic, that discussion.
[56:29.620 --> 56:33.420] [SPEAKER_15]: That really, I think, opened up a lot of eyes, certainly opened up my eyes.
[56:33.520 --> 56:38.140] [SPEAKER_15]: And what you folks are doing is really inspirational and important in history.
[56:40.120 --> 56:44.960] [SPEAKER_15]: So what we do with this, with overtime, is we open it up to callers if they choose to call in.
[56:45.280 --> 56:50.960] [SPEAKER_15]: The number is 802-321-HACK, 802-321-4225.
[56:51.720 --> 56:54.340] [SPEAKER_15]: We have a phone here that's ready to take calls.
[56:54.480 --> 56:56.540] [SPEAKER_15]: And sometimes we get calls, sometimes we don't.
[56:56.540 --> 56:58.160] [SPEAKER_15]: So we'll see if we get any tonight.
[56:58.440 --> 57:00.280] [SPEAKER_15]: And if we do, we'll put them on.
[57:00.280 --> 57:01.760] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, we're accepting them.
[57:02.120 --> 57:03.380] [SPEAKER_07]: So I'm at the ready.
[57:03.660 --> 57:06.740] [SPEAKER_07]: I will facilitate that as best I can.
[57:07.220 --> 57:07.440] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[57:07.940 --> 57:13.360] [SPEAKER_15]: I'm wondering if something's up with our connection, because I'm only seeing a very small number of connections.
[57:13.540 --> 57:14.880] [SPEAKER_15]: We always have issues with you two.
[57:14.980 --> 57:21.600] [SPEAKER_15]: But if we're doing something wrong, if we have something misconfigured, please let us know what it is, and we'll fix it for next time.
[57:22.180 --> 57:24.140] [SPEAKER_15]: But we should be there.
[57:24.300 --> 57:25.680] [SPEAKER_15]: It should be working.
[57:26.230 --> 57:27.980] [SPEAKER_15]: Rob, can you verify that we're on?
[57:28.860 --> 57:34.260] [SPEAKER_02]: I can see the YouTube stream, but I'm not seeing that...
[57:35.200 --> 57:36.920] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm not hearing us on it.
[57:37.280 --> 57:38.460] [SPEAKER_15]: You're not hearing us?
[57:38.460 --> 57:39.700] [SPEAKER_15]: I'm seeing our picture, but I'm not hearing us.
[57:39.780 --> 57:40.520] [SPEAKER_15]: Oh, for God's sake.
[57:41.500 --> 57:41.900] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay.
[57:42.700 --> 57:43.700] [SPEAKER_15]: Wow, this again.
[57:43.880 --> 57:44.200] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay.
[57:44.560 --> 57:45.440] [SPEAKER_07]: That's happened before.
[57:45.640 --> 57:46.980] [SPEAKER_15]: You want to explain what just happened, Tom?
[57:47.000 --> 57:47.500] [SPEAKER_15]: No, I don't.
[57:47.580 --> 57:48.200] [SPEAKER_15]: No, please do.
[57:48.280 --> 57:50.020] [SPEAKER_07]: We're having such a good conversation, though.
[57:50.180 --> 57:51.160] [SPEAKER_15]: We did have a good conversation.
[57:51.200 --> 57:54.200] [SPEAKER_15]: And the good news is that it's recorded on our end.
[57:54.260 --> 57:55.600] [SPEAKER_15]: It just wasn't going on over YouTube.
[57:55.680 --> 57:59.480] [SPEAKER_15]: But tell the folks what's going on, because our listenership just plummeted.
[57:59.480 --> 58:03.540] [SPEAKER_15]: It's because, well, I mean, we didn't have the right button hit, right?
[58:04.180 --> 58:05.980] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, it muted again.
[58:06.160 --> 58:07.020] [SPEAKER_07]: It muted again.
[58:07.200 --> 58:07.440] [SPEAKER_07]: Again.
[58:07.980 --> 58:08.300] [SPEAKER_15]: All right.
[58:08.460 --> 58:10.400] [SPEAKER_15]: So, again...
[58:10.400 --> 58:12.160] [SPEAKER_07]: Or rather, we didn't unmute.
[58:12.340 --> 58:12.940] [SPEAKER_15]: We didn't unmute.
[58:13.060 --> 58:13.480] [SPEAKER_15]: It's our fault.
[58:13.960 --> 58:17.160] [SPEAKER_15]: Zana, Emma, welcome again back to Off The Hook Overtime.
[58:17.520 --> 58:19.580] [SPEAKER_15]: And everybody else is joining us as well.
[58:19.700 --> 58:23.860] [SPEAKER_15]: Our phone number, 802-321-4225, 802-321-HACK.
[58:23.860 --> 58:31.800] [SPEAKER_15]: If there's any questions you'd like to ask or you want to join the conversation in any If you have something to contribute, by all means, dial that number.
[58:31.840 --> 58:34.780] [SPEAKER_15]: The phone will ring and the phone is plugged in this week, right?
[58:35.440 --> 58:36.480] [SPEAKER_07]: Yes, I said it before.
[58:36.820 --> 58:43.580] [SPEAKER_07]: I'll reiterate that I am accepting calls on behalf of the show.
[58:43.840 --> 58:46.460] [SPEAKER_07]: And I will facilitate this as best I can.
[58:46.520 --> 58:47.520] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, we weren't on last week.
[58:47.620 --> 58:50.420] [SPEAKER_15]: So this is the first time in two weeks that we've done overtime.
[58:50.780 --> 58:52.300] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, we really do want to hear from people.
[58:52.520 --> 58:55.260] [SPEAKER_07]: And we have some guests with us as well.
[58:55.260 --> 59:00.200] [SPEAKER_07]: So please, dial us and share what's on your mind.
[59:00.500 --> 59:04.660] [SPEAKER_15]: Zan, is there anything that you wanted to add that maybe you didn't get a chance to say on the radio?
[59:05.520 --> 59:06.100] [SPEAKER_15]: Or Emma?
[59:08.660 --> 59:09.660] [SPEAKER_13]: I don't think so.
[59:09.820 --> 59:13.080] [SPEAKER_13]: I think we... I think it covered... Oh, Alex over there.
[59:13.080 --> 59:13.560] [SPEAKER_15]: Alex, go ahead.
[59:15.120 --> 59:23.440] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, I was hoping, Zan, that either you or Emma might be able to speak to some of the past projects for Distributed Denial of Secrets as well.
[59:23.600 --> 59:28.560] [SPEAKER_06]: It's something we didn't get a chance really to dive into because we were so focused on the Gab hack.
[59:28.860 --> 59:39.320] [SPEAKER_06]: But I know that, you know, Distributed Denial of Secrets, at least in the summer of 2020, really gained a lot of national attention with the Blue Leaks that have occurred.
[59:39.580 --> 59:42.960] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think that's, you know, that's another gift that keeps on giving too, isn't it?
[59:42.960 --> 59:44.260] [SPEAKER_13]: It does.
[59:44.580 --> 59:56.160] [SPEAKER_13]: So Blue Leaks was a leak that was mainly information from fusion centers all across the United States.
[59:57.280 --> 01:00:00.800] [SPEAKER_13]: And it showed a lot of different things.
[01:00:00.940 --> 01:00:04.260] [SPEAKER_13]: We're actually still finding out a lot of the stuff that was in there.
[01:00:04.460 --> 01:00:24.340] [SPEAKER_13]: But I mean, it included everything from surveillance of Black Lives Matter protesters, to admission from law enforcement that they knew that it wasn't Black Lives Matter protesters that were starting violence, but white supremacists, to things like, you know,
[01:00:24.780 --> 01:00:34.720] [SPEAKER_13]: teenagers being put on domestic terrorists lists for making TikToks, to, I mean, there were use of forced documents in there.
[01:00:34.980 --> 01:00:36.440] [SPEAKER_13]: There were just so much.
[01:00:36.780 --> 01:00:41.700] [SPEAKER_13]: The Intercept has done a lot of great reporting on it.
[01:00:42.200 --> 01:00:58.760] [SPEAKER_13]: An independent newspaper in Maine called The Mainer has done exceptional work talking about the findings that are specific to Maine that were found in Blue Leaks.
[01:00:58.920 --> 01:01:02.320] [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, just, it's become just a treasure trove of documents.
[01:01:02.640 --> 01:01:08.700] [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, just outlining, uh, the ways in which police in the United States abuse their power.
[01:01:08.860 --> 01:01:15.780] [SPEAKER_13]: There was one document in there that I specifically, um, researched a lot.
[01:01:15.780 --> 01:01:27.580] [SPEAKER_13]: And it was basically, um, a primer on, for police on how to use just enough force against civilians not to get sued.
[01:01:27.580 --> 01:01:36.860] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, and I mean, it was really, if you read through the document, it was an absolutely horrific document.
[01:01:37.400 --> 01:01:53.900] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, it would take, uh, studies where, um, civilians had sued police for use of force and then go through them case by case and basically say, now, what did these officers do wrong?
[01:01:55.000 --> 01:01:59.580] [SPEAKER_13]: And the answer wasn't at all that they had used excessive force.
[01:02:00.400 --> 01:02:04.400] [SPEAKER_13]: The answer was, was that they hadn't used it correctly.
[01:02:05.960 --> 01:02:06.700] [SPEAKER_05]: Wow.
[01:02:07.000 --> 01:02:11.160] [SPEAKER_13]: And, um, this one case stuck out to me.
[01:02:11.400 --> 01:02:14.840] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, a black woman was driving her son to school.
[01:02:15.160 --> 01:02:16.220] [SPEAKER_13]: She was pregnant.
[01:02:16.980 --> 01:02:27.580] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, and she was pulled over for going, I think something minor, I think 32 miles an hour in a 25 mile an hour zone, something minor.
[01:02:28.060 --> 01:02:38.740] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, and, uh, she was asked to step out of her car and she did not.
[01:02:39.000 --> 01:02:40.560] [SPEAKER_13]: She refused to step out of her car.
[01:02:41.780 --> 01:02:47.720] [SPEAKER_13]: And the police report says that she made her arms stiff on the steering wheel.
[01:02:49.180 --> 01:02:52.280] [SPEAKER_13]: And that was considered resisting arrest.
[01:02:52.720 --> 01:02:59.500] [SPEAKER_13]: Uh, so the officer decided, so one of the officers decided to tase this visibly pregnant woman.
[01:02:59.920 --> 01:03:01.780] [SPEAKER_13]: They taste her in the thigh.
[01:03:01.780 --> 01:03:05.000] [SPEAKER_13]: They taste her and they taste her in the neck.
[01:03:05.400 --> 01:03:08.640] [SPEAKER_13]: And they did this all within a very short span of time.
[01:03:09.500 --> 01:03:20.260] [SPEAKER_13]: And the takeaway lesson from this case, according to this document was that they should have given her more time before they taste her in the neck.
[01:03:21.500 --> 01:03:22.120] [SPEAKER_15]: Wow.
[01:03:22.820 --> 01:03:28.800] [SPEAKER_15]: This document now it was distributed already inside police circles.
[01:03:29.060 --> 01:03:34.380] [SPEAKER_15]: You know, to me, a document like that should by default be leaked by somebody with a conscience.
[01:03:34.720 --> 01:03:40.980] [SPEAKER_13]: You know, I actually tried to tweet about it on my Twitter account and, uh, was banned by Twitter for it.
[01:03:41.060 --> 01:03:42.240] [SPEAKER_13]: I was forced to take it down.
[01:03:42.780 --> 01:03:46.060] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, it contained no personal information.
[01:03:46.440 --> 01:03:49.560] [SPEAKER_13]: Uh, it was just a document that had been distributed.
[01:03:49.940 --> 01:03:54.900] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, the person that does these trainings, he's a lawyer from Nevada.
[01:03:54.900 --> 01:04:00.400] [SPEAKER_13]: Uh, he proudly says on his website that he does these trainings for police.
[01:04:00.600 --> 01:04:10.820] [SPEAKER_13]: Uh, the only personal information contained within the document was his office address and office phone number.
[01:04:11.620 --> 01:04:18.160] [SPEAKER_13]: Any information available on the document was information that was freely available on his own website.
[01:04:18.280 --> 01:04:20.000] [SPEAKER_13]: I tried to tweet about it.
[01:04:20.340 --> 01:04:26.500] [SPEAKER_13]: Twitter forced me to take it down because, uh, they said it was PII.
[01:04:26.500 --> 01:04:27.320] [SPEAKER_15]: Go ahead, Alex.
[01:04:28.100 --> 01:04:43.720] [SPEAKER_06]: And, you know, along those lines too, uh, uh, stand it, it's, it's interesting to me too, because distributed denial of secrets deals with leaked materials, hacked materials, data that whistleblowers are providing to you so that you can distribute them to the public.
[01:04:43.720 --> 01:05:00.020] [SPEAKER_06]: But with respect to Twitter's new rules that prohibit references or, or links to hacked materials, that seems to, to really hit at the, a prime distribution channel for distributed denial of secrets.
[01:05:00.200 --> 01:05:07.640] [SPEAKER_06]: And my question is, have you come across this as a real barrier to getting the word out about these materials?
[01:05:07.960 --> 01:05:08.280] [SPEAKER_13]: Yes.
[01:05:08.440 --> 01:05:14.580] [SPEAKER_13]: Twitter actually, after blue leaks, Twitter actually banned the official, uh, distributed denial of secrets Twitter account.
[01:05:14.960 --> 01:05:25.900] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, recently they have changed their policy to say that they will not ban hacked materials unless they're being shared by the hacker themselves.
[01:05:26.340 --> 01:05:33.140] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, they now add a warning to the tweets saying that, uh, this information may have been obtained through hacking.
[01:05:33.700 --> 01:05:40.580] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, however, they still have not reinstated the distributed denial of secrets Twitter account.
[01:05:41.380 --> 01:05:54.620] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, and they still, uh, anytime you try to tweet anything with a DDoS secrets URL, they ban that.
[01:05:54.920 --> 01:05:58.820] [SPEAKER_13]: The, uh, distributed denial of secrets URL is banned on Twitter.
[01:05:59.000 --> 01:06:00.780] [SPEAKER_13]: You can't tweet it at all.
[01:06:01.100 --> 01:06:03.020] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, I'm going to try doing that tonight.
[01:06:03.020 --> 01:06:04.980] [SPEAKER_15]: If you give me one, I'll try doing it tonight.
[01:06:05.160 --> 01:06:06.720] [SPEAKER_13]: And, uh, um, yeah.
[01:06:07.020 --> 01:06:24.300] [SPEAKER_13]: And any, we have to kind of like break apart our link if we want to ask people to donate, we have to, uh, yeah, we've had to find creative ways around that, uh, to get all, both our information out to ask for support, to pretty much do anything.
[01:06:24.520 --> 01:06:25.360] [SPEAKER_15]: Go ahead, Alex.
[01:06:26.980 --> 01:06:33.640] [SPEAKER_06]: This, this whole notion of, of hacked materials, I'm, you know, I'm using air quotes around hacked.
[01:06:34.260 --> 01:06:36.060] [SPEAKER_06]: They're, they're, they're exfiltrated.
[01:06:36.180 --> 01:06:36.660] [SPEAKER_06]: They're stolen.
[01:06:36.960 --> 01:06:38.240] [SPEAKER_06]: They're, you know, maybe they're hacked.
[01:06:38.380 --> 01:06:39.420] [SPEAKER_06]: Whatever they are, right.
[01:06:39.500 --> 01:06:51.400] [SPEAKER_06]: They're, they came from somebody else, but it seems to me that these new policy changes are going to have, uh, effects on people that they don't necessarily intend to affect, right?
[01:06:51.500 --> 01:06:56.020] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, these things are really to discourage criminals, right?
[01:06:56.120 --> 01:07:00.760] [SPEAKER_06]: They, they want to discourage criminal activity, not necessarily legitimate whistleblowing.
[01:07:00.760 --> 01:07:15.040] [SPEAKER_06]: And so by creating this broad policy, what may happen now is the, you know, this may be the germ or the inspiration of, of a new sort of criminal underground about information laundering.
[01:07:15.260 --> 01:07:23.040] [SPEAKER_06]: So materials that, that were hacked have to have some kind of regenerated provenance so that they can be distributed and shared on social media.
[01:07:23.320 --> 01:07:32.260] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think we saw the early stages of this with respect to the New York Post story about the Hunter Biden laptop, right?
[01:07:32.340 --> 01:07:48.640] [SPEAKER_06]: Where it seemed pretty clear that, you know, those were probably stolen materials, but it's, it's quite possible that a story was concocted so that they would not implicate the prohibition, uh, of Twitter for, for hacked materials or implicate that, that rule in any respect.
[01:07:48.880 --> 01:08:01.180] [SPEAKER_06]: So, you know, I, I think that, you know, the takeaway from this is that these platforms just really have to think about the unintended consequences of these particular rules.
[01:08:01.460 --> 01:08:15.960] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and we may look back on the, these is 2020 and 2021 is, is a, is a weird proving ground for the fact that we can, you know, really screw it up when it comes to, um, preventing whistleblowers from getting the word out.
[01:08:17.880 --> 01:08:23.220] [SPEAKER_13]: But they also have to think about, I think this is a question that tech companies have to face.
[01:08:23.480 --> 01:08:29.240] [SPEAKER_13]: And I mean, this is a tricky question, even within the law, what is the line between whistleblowing and hacking?
[01:08:29.740 --> 01:08:32.820] [SPEAKER_13]: Where, how do we consider one good and one bad?
[01:08:33.320 --> 01:08:42.060] [SPEAKER_13]: What is, I mean, because the information, the information contained in blue leaks is undeniably, it's a, it's valuable.
[01:08:42.060 --> 01:08:48.040] [SPEAKER_13]: The things that have come out of blue leaks are, are, are, are valuable.
[01:08:48.240 --> 01:09:02.080] [SPEAKER_13]: And what, one of the things that I've tried to push in a lot of the work that I do is that we need to expand the definition of what a whistleblower is.
[01:09:02.400 --> 01:09:11.180] [SPEAKER_13]: Whistleblowers, yes, can come from inside, but why do we exclude whistleblowers who may come from outside?
[01:09:11.520 --> 01:09:11.920] [SPEAKER_13]: Why?
[01:09:12.080 --> 01:09:15.380] [SPEAKER_13]: We need to expand our definition of what a whistleblower is.
[01:09:17.280 --> 01:09:18.340] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay, we have a phone call.
[01:09:18.580 --> 01:09:19.560] [SPEAKER_15]: I think we have a phone call.
[01:09:19.920 --> 01:09:20.760] [SPEAKER_15]: Um, good evening.
[01:09:21.080 --> 01:09:22.320] [SPEAKER_15]: You're on Off The Hook Overtime.
[01:09:23.080 --> 01:09:24.020] [SPEAKER_08]: Hello, good evening, all.
[01:09:24.200 --> 01:09:27.980] [SPEAKER_08]: Um, I am, I am the digital Osmanians.
[01:09:28.220 --> 01:09:29.360] [SPEAKER_08]: And I have like a question.
[01:09:29.360 --> 01:09:30.880] [SPEAKER_08]: It's more of a historical question.
[01:09:31.080 --> 01:09:32.200] [SPEAKER_08]: Um, and here it is.
[01:09:32.380 --> 01:09:48.460] [SPEAKER_08]: When like digital technology first started to be used by the masses, at the masses, the mainstream, did they think that they could like immortalize their ideas and information, meaning that could they, did they think that they could make it last forever?
[01:09:49.660 --> 01:09:50.480] [SPEAKER_08]: That's my question.
[01:09:50.620 --> 01:09:52.720] [SPEAKER_08]: I can, I'll, I'll hang up and listen.
[01:09:53.100 --> 01:09:53.350] [SPEAKER_08]: Thanks.
[01:09:53.880 --> 01:09:54.270] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay.
[01:09:54.430 --> 01:09:55.000] [SPEAKER_15]: Thank you for the call.
[01:09:55.230 --> 01:09:56.020] [SPEAKER_15]: Good question.
[01:09:56.300 --> 01:09:57.200] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, interesting question.
[01:09:57.680 --> 01:10:05.080] [SPEAKER_15]: Um, it's, you know, I, I think a lot of people, when they, when they delved into the digital world thought that it would be forever.
[01:10:05.340 --> 01:10:09.460] [SPEAKER_15]: And, um, I don't know if it is, I don't know if it isn't, it isn't.
[01:10:09.520 --> 01:10:09.700] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[01:10:09.770 --> 01:10:15.810] [SPEAKER_15]: I mean, sometimes people say when there's a scandal, it never disappears, but you know, try finding the first photographs you took on a digital camera.
[01:10:15.960 --> 01:10:16.660] [SPEAKER_15]: You can't do it.
[01:10:16.890 --> 01:10:21.840] [SPEAKER_07]: You know, it's things disappear or conversations from various phone generations.
[01:10:22.320 --> 01:10:22.720] [SPEAKER_07]: Absolutely.
[01:10:23.040 --> 01:10:25.930] [SPEAKER_15]: But books and pictures from the 1920s, they're still around.
[01:10:26.460 --> 01:10:27.100] [SPEAKER_15]: I don't know.
[01:10:27.230 --> 01:10:28.560] [SPEAKER_15]: You guys have any thoughts, Rob?
[01:10:29.900 --> 01:10:45.430] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, there, there was a, there was a very interesting, uh, someone was doing an AMA on Reddit, uh, because they were part of a certain part of early web culture and, uh, they were pulling out stuff from their records that were message board threads that you can't get on the Internet archive or anything like that anymore,
[01:10:45.430 --> 01:10:47.960] [SPEAKER_02]: but they happened to print them out onto paper.
[01:10:47.960 --> 01:10:56.140] [SPEAKER_02]: So this person has boxes of, you know, printer paper with, uh, with these messages, message threads that are now like this irreplaceable cultural artifact.
[01:10:56.730 --> 01:11:04.390] [SPEAKER_02]: And it, it, uh, that, that struck me as really funny how like there's a piece of digital culture that now only exists on paper somewhere because someone happened to print it.
[01:11:04.540 --> 01:11:09.520] [SPEAKER_02]: And, uh, yeah, I, I tried to put them in touch with our friends at Internet archive and, uh, and go from there.
[01:11:09.620 --> 01:11:09.720] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[01:11:09.770 --> 01:11:12.730] [SPEAKER_15]: Someone's going to come along and scan them and digitize them.
[01:11:12.810 --> 01:11:14.380] [SPEAKER_15]: And the whole process will go up again.
[01:11:14.810 --> 01:11:15.000] [SPEAKER_15]: Go ahead.
[01:11:15.160 --> 01:11:15.580] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, exactly.
[01:11:16.020 --> 01:11:26.350] [SPEAKER_10]: I remember feeling, and again, not necessarily being in the center of this at the time, but there being a sense that some of it was really ephemeral and that that was almost the point of it.
[01:11:26.560 --> 01:11:42.680] [SPEAKER_10]: You know, the idea of what you could do, what you could try, what you could try on and try new and try different that wasn't necessarily going to follow you around for the rest of your life and stuff where, you know, you had a screen name that wasn't necessarily traceable to who you were legally,
[01:11:43.080 --> 01:11:50.520] [SPEAKER_10]: governmentally, whatever, that was a whole new place where you could go on and role play things and try whatever you liked.
[01:11:50.520 --> 01:11:53.500] [SPEAKER_10]: The idea of what was ephemeral and not necessarily permanent.
[01:11:53.770 --> 01:11:54.220] [SPEAKER_13]: Go ahead, Zahn.
[01:11:54.930 --> 01:12:07.890] [SPEAKER_13]: And I think one of the things that did that DDo Secrets wants to do is there are these datasets that are so important and they should be preserved.
[01:12:08.180 --> 01:12:11.810] [SPEAKER_13]: They should be preserved for people to be able to see.
[01:12:12.040 --> 01:12:17.060] [SPEAKER_13]: These are datasets that are tied to important events.
[01:12:17.230 --> 01:12:24.930] [SPEAKER_13]: These are datasets that have value beyond just curiosity.
[01:12:25.300 --> 01:12:39.350] [SPEAKER_13]: These, I mean, with the, with right now with Gab, like Em said, you know, these are, this is relevant to what's going on in our world right now, you know, with the parlor leaks.
[01:12:39.540 --> 01:12:48.200] [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, some of the videos that were released in the parlor leaks were used in Trump's second impeachment trial.
[01:12:49.310 --> 01:13:08.800] [SPEAKER_13]: These are things that are relevant to our world and absolutely should be preserved, not only for their historical significance today, but so that they can be seen in the future so that we can learn from them.
[01:13:08.980 --> 01:13:11.840] [SPEAKER_15]: And I don't think that should be a surprise to anybody who participates here.
[01:13:11.930 --> 01:13:14.980] [SPEAKER_15]: You're in a public forum, a semi-public forum.
[01:13:14.980 --> 01:13:27.960] [SPEAKER_15]: If you're engaging in historical events, such as attempted coups, you might think that some of the words that you say will be preserved as an historic relic, and that might not work to your advantage.
[01:13:28.260 --> 01:13:28.890] [SPEAKER_15]: Go ahead, Alex.
[01:13:29.860 --> 01:13:45.220] [SPEAKER_06]: Building on this, this idea and this notion, though, I think it's really quite fascinating because what, what, what Zan is, is mentioning in this, this idea is that you have these historical events that may unfold in, in real time and in real life.
[01:13:45.380 --> 01:13:55.660] [SPEAKER_06]: And by real life, I mean physicality, but there is now this extra dimension to that physical event that should become part of the historical record of, of, of humankind.
[01:13:56.040 --> 01:14:00.100] [SPEAKER_06]: And that's something that we haven't had before until relatively recently.
[01:14:00.480 --> 01:14:18.880] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, and I, and I think it's absolutely fascinating because how do you, how could you understand, if you think about this from the perspective of future historians, how could they understand and interpret the January 6th, 2021 insurrection without the parlor data,
[01:14:19.350 --> 01:14:21.080] [SPEAKER_06]: without looking to the digital sphere?
[01:14:21.340 --> 01:14:23.310] [SPEAKER_06]: And you would have almost no context.
[01:14:23.580 --> 01:14:32.520] [SPEAKER_07]: That, uh, leads one to kind of imagine also that other dimension actually having influenced the historic event in physicality, in that physical realm.
[01:14:32.520 --> 01:14:48.390] [SPEAKER_07]: It came from the affinity groups themselves being able to leverage the technology, technological realm to find affinity and, and of course, then plan stuff like this, that becomes an action in history.
[01:14:48.850 --> 01:14:49.480] [SPEAKER_13]: Absolutely.
[01:14:49.520 --> 01:14:57.920] [SPEAKER_13]: There was massive online or organizing before, you know, Jen, Jen, Jen, January 6th.
[01:14:58.040 --> 01:15:08.270] [SPEAKER_13]: I think, uh, Michael Lee, um, put up a couple of graphs that show, uh, the spike in Gab users, you know, after certain dates.
[01:15:08.270 --> 01:15:32.980] [SPEAKER_13]: And it's just absolutely fascinating to see that, you know, after these significant dates, that there were just these absolute spikes in Gab users and absolutely a significant data point that after things like January 6th, you know, there's these huge,
[01:15:32.980 --> 01:16:00.620] [SPEAKER_13]: huge spikes of people just migrating, you know, over to Gab because, um, you know, they, they wanted that sort of echo chamber where they could, you know, freely express their ideas and their thoughts and their, you know, find their sort of affinity groups and where they could freely express their,
[01:16:01.770 --> 01:16:06.260] [SPEAKER_13]: whatever they wanted to express without fear of, you know.
[01:16:06.580 --> 01:16:28.000] [SPEAKER_07]: It almost kind of reminds me, uh, in a, like, kind of like a biological, uh, mimicry sense of, uh, uh, uh, uh, a kind of, uh, idea or, um, um, um, group that is connected in this way moving as it's damaged in one place.
[01:16:28.200 --> 01:16:37.760] [SPEAKER_07]: And that's, I think, a lot of how network, um, uh, and especially Internet, uh, networks are, um, supposed to sort of be able to heal in certain ways.
[01:16:37.930 --> 01:16:55.270] [SPEAKER_07]: And by keeping that group together, that action then is preserved, you could argue to a degree, because it's, uh, the group itself and a lot of that networked connectedness that gave rise to, um, calls to action.
[01:16:55.270 --> 01:17:10.930] [SPEAKER_07]: So it, by it moving from sort of one safe place to another in the ways you're describing, it's sort of trying to heal and preserve its amorphous, uh, uh, um, existence in that space, right?
[01:17:11.230 --> 01:17:12.140] [SPEAKER_07]: In, in some ways?
[01:17:12.140 --> 01:17:12.960] [SPEAKER_13]: Well, yes.
[01:17:13.200 --> 01:17:35.020] [SPEAKER_13]: And, and, and again, this is why we feel specifically the gab leaks are so important for researchers to look into because to find how that happens and to, to actually see that happening in real time, there's so, there's, there's not that many chances to do that,
[01:17:35.180 --> 01:17:45.350] [SPEAKER_13]: to actually see it happening in real time, to watch it happen, to see it happen, and to see the mechanisms of how exactly it does happen.
[01:17:46.300 --> 01:17:54.770] [SPEAKER_13]: And that's just such invaluable information, because if we can see how it happens, there's a chance that we can stop it.
[01:17:55.120 --> 01:18:02.100] [SPEAKER_15]: Now, how, how do you compare what just happened with gab with what happened previously with parlor as far as examining things in real time?
[01:18:03.310 --> 01:18:23.020] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, well, with, with parlor, I think, because it was mostly, um, videos and things like that, it didn't, it didn't give us that sort of, I mean, it, it did give us a look, but it was mostly media.
[01:18:23.020 --> 01:18:25.080] [SPEAKER_13]: It was mostly media to comb through.
[01:18:25.310 --> 01:18:27.120] [SPEAKER_13]: These are actually their words.
[01:18:27.380 --> 01:18:29.200] [SPEAKER_13]: These are actually their words.
[01:18:29.350 --> 01:18:33.620] [SPEAKER_13]: You can see, you can see what they say within themselves.
[01:18:33.620 --> 01:18:36.020] [SPEAKER_13]: You can see their attitudes.
[01:18:36.340 --> 01:18:41.160] [SPEAKER_13]: You can see their, you can see exactly how they plan things.
[01:18:41.160 --> 01:18:46.060] [SPEAKER_13]: You can see exactly what groups connect to which groups and how.
[01:18:46.310 --> 01:18:49.060] [SPEAKER_13]: You can see their associations.
[01:18:49.060 --> 01:18:51.850] [SPEAKER_13]: You can see, you know, everything.
[01:18:51.850 --> 01:18:53.500] [SPEAKER_13]: You can see who they're friends with.
[01:18:53.700 --> 01:18:57.730] [SPEAKER_13]: You can see, you know, exactly where they come from.
[01:18:57.730 --> 01:19:07.760] [SPEAKER_13]: You can see, you can see so much more when you actually can see their own, you can see them in their own words.
[01:19:08.340 --> 01:19:20.720] [SPEAKER_15]: I'm wondering if there are any people who are infiltrating Gab, who are now being exposed as infiltrators, and people that don't necessarily share the same, same philosophy, and how that might be affecting them.
[01:19:20.720 --> 01:19:32.520] [SPEAKER_13]: I'm sure there are, but I'm also sure that that is such a minority that... I mean, I've done work like that before.
[01:19:32.520 --> 01:19:34.540] [SPEAKER_13]: I've done infiltration work.
[01:19:34.540 --> 01:19:36.390] [SPEAKER_13]: I've done recon work.
[01:19:36.390 --> 01:19:41.730] [SPEAKER_13]: I've done all that work in an anti-fascist capacity.
[01:19:42.340 --> 01:19:43.700] [SPEAKER_13]: I've done that work.
[01:19:43.700 --> 01:19:52.660] [SPEAKER_13]: And I can absolutely tell you that it's going to be such a minority of the Gab users.
[01:19:53.480 --> 01:19:55.520] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, think of it this way.
[01:19:56.770 --> 01:20:06.980] [SPEAKER_03]: When there's a Nazi in front of you, you don't not punch the Nazi, because what if it's an anti-fascist pretending to be a Nazi to get close to them?
[01:20:06.980 --> 01:20:24.520] [SPEAKER_03]: Better treat this person well, and be friends, because maybe, you know, or if it's satirical, like, you have to take it at face value in those instances.
[01:20:24.520 --> 01:20:39.840] [SPEAKER_03]: You have to play the numbers, and the numbers are overwhelmingly that the people on Gab, especially the active users, because there were a lot of inactive users, it looks like, the people on Gab were people that were on Gab.
[01:20:41.620 --> 01:20:42.180] [SPEAKER_15]: Right.
[01:20:43.620 --> 01:20:45.460] [SPEAKER_15]: Let's just go to the fun of that one more time.
[01:20:46.340 --> 01:20:49.120] [SPEAKER_15]: 802321-HACK, 802321-4225.
[01:20:49.540 --> 01:21:02.890] [SPEAKER_15]: Our guests tonight, Zan and Emma, from DDoS Secrets, talking about the Gab leak, which is definitely having an effect in the conservative world tonight and for the last few nights.
[01:21:02.890 --> 01:21:03.600] [SPEAKER_15]: Go ahead, Rob.
[01:21:04.560 --> 01:21:21.120] [SPEAKER_02]: All right, while we're waiting for that phone call, Zan and Emma, I wondered if you have any advice, as people who have done the, you know, both kinds of work, like, what advice might you have for journalists, researchers, people like that, who are maybe not technical themselves,
[01:21:21.380 --> 01:21:23.840] [SPEAKER_02]: but interested in working with an organization like yours?
[01:21:31.020 --> 01:21:38.320] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, they're either thinking very carefully about what you just said, or, in fact, maybe we did lose them.
[01:21:39.680 --> 01:21:41.900] [SPEAKER_15]: Okay, do we know how to revive that connection?
[01:21:43.300 --> 01:21:45.300] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, that'll just take a second.
[01:21:45.300 --> 01:21:48.760] [SPEAKER_07]: So why don't you go ahead and let people call again?
[01:21:49.380 --> 01:21:55.380] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, not exactly being bombarded with phone calls, but I'll give the number out, and I'll give it out slowly so that you can do that while I'm talking.
[01:21:55.380 --> 01:22:02.600] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, 802 is the area code, and that, of course, is in the wonderful state of Vermont, but it's not really in Vermont, is it?
[01:22:02.780 --> 01:22:06.120] [SPEAKER_15]: It's a virtual number, so you're just typing that as a formality.
[01:22:06.800 --> 01:22:09.620] [SPEAKER_15]: Uh, 802-321-HACK.
[01:22:09.900 --> 01:22:15.240] [SPEAKER_15]: Now, if you don't have those little letters on your telephone, those letters turn into the numbers 4225.
[01:22:15.760 --> 01:22:20.640] [SPEAKER_15]: So, the phone number is 802-321-4225.
[01:22:21.660 --> 01:22:23.560] [SPEAKER_15]: Not sure how much longer I can drag this out.
[01:22:23.820 --> 01:22:26.960] [SPEAKER_15]: I'll keep talking while you try and reconnect the connection.
[01:22:27.600 --> 01:22:28.180] [SPEAKER_15]: We're connected?
[01:22:28.400 --> 01:22:29.140] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, they're with us.
[01:22:29.260 --> 01:22:30.200] [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, okay, I don't see them.
[01:22:30.360 --> 01:22:30.800] [SPEAKER_07]: I think so.
[01:22:30.960 --> 01:22:31.260] [SPEAKER_15]: All right.
[01:22:32.020 --> 01:22:32.780] [SPEAKER_15]: Zan, are you there?
[01:22:33.620 --> 01:22:34.540] [SPEAKER_15]: Oh, okay, great.
[01:22:34.700 --> 01:22:34.840] [SPEAKER_15]: Yep.
[01:22:35.020 --> 01:22:38.080] [SPEAKER_15]: Rob, you'll have to ask your question all over again, unless Zan heard you.
[01:22:38.760 --> 01:22:39.420] [SPEAKER_13]: I did not.
[01:22:39.560 --> 01:22:39.960] [SPEAKER_13]: I'm sorry.
[01:22:40.120 --> 01:22:40.320] [SPEAKER_13]: Okay, go ahead.
[01:22:40.800 --> 01:22:41.220] [SPEAKER_02]: Sorry about that.
[01:22:41.220 --> 01:22:51.320] [SPEAKER_02]: My question is, what advice might you have for people who are journalists or data scientists or the sort of people that you want having this data, but they're not themselves technical?
[01:22:51.320 --> 01:22:55.400] [SPEAKER_02]: What advice would you have for them when working with your organization or one like yours?
[01:23:00.590 --> 01:23:03.150] [SPEAKER_03]: Find someone you trust to partner with.
[01:23:03.990 --> 01:23:10.310] [SPEAKER_03]: We get a lot of requests for technical help on dealing with data or finding things.
[01:23:10.310 --> 01:23:14.950] [SPEAKER_03]: And when we can, we respond and we help.
[01:23:15.170 --> 01:23:18.250] [SPEAKER_03]: But that's usually not the case.
[01:23:20.430 --> 01:23:28.970] [SPEAKER_03]: So much of our time is focused on dealing with the releases themselves, the fallout, and just coordinating everything.
[01:23:29.270 --> 01:23:31.330] [SPEAKER_03]: We don't have time for that.
[01:23:33.310 --> 01:23:53.910] [SPEAKER_03]: So what we really just encourage people to do is find someone you trust to partner with who can either help you directly or is just willing to put up with your questions while you text them and say, okay, what is a SQL database and how do I make it go vroom?
[01:23:55.830 --> 01:23:56.830] [SPEAKER_13]: Make it vroom!
[01:23:56.950 --> 01:23:57.510] [SPEAKER_13]: Make it vroom!
[01:23:59.110 --> 01:23:59.670] [SPEAKER_15]: Wow.
[01:23:59.870 --> 01:24:00.510] [SPEAKER_15]: Go ahead, Alex.
[01:24:01.250 --> 01:24:09.170] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, with that in mind, it sounds like, you know, here's a niche industry, you know, that, you know, can be fulfilled, right?
[01:24:09.350 --> 01:24:27.110] [SPEAKER_06]: And have you thought about at all, perhaps, you know, creating a list of or soliciting for volunteers that can help others in retrieving and identifying, mining the data that would come from distributed denial of secrets so that it doesn't fall on, you know,
[01:24:27.170 --> 01:24:29.630] [SPEAKER_06]: the few in that you've already overstretched.
[01:24:31.430 --> 01:24:42.090] [SPEAKER_03]: For some projects, usually when the sources wishes allow us, we try and set up cooperative processes with different outlets.
[01:24:42.650 --> 01:25:03.770] [SPEAKER_03]: We did something like that with number 29 leaks, where we partnered with OCCRP and a couple dozen outlets, and we did that again last year with the Bahamas leaks, the Tax Evader Raider project, with European investigation set up.
[01:25:04.970 --> 01:25:15.430] [SPEAKER_03]: But a lot of times, sources aren't really willing to have stuff wait for six months or a year, and they want things to, to come through immediately.
[01:25:16.070 --> 01:25:19.190] [SPEAKER_03]: And in those instances, we're less able to do that.
[01:25:20.010 --> 01:25:35.750] [SPEAKER_03]: As far as, like, putting together lists of people, we try to stay away from things that could contaminate the processing of the data, or influence it.
[01:25:35.750 --> 01:25:43.430] [SPEAKER_03]: And telling people, oh, this is who you need to talk to about this, is one of the subtler ways we could do that.
[01:25:46.630 --> 01:26:00.930] [SPEAKER_03]: One thing we've seen with some similar projects at different times is it's very easy to interject either your agenda or your views onto something, and it taints the entire discussion.
[01:26:01.790 --> 01:26:11.050] [SPEAKER_03]: Uh, and especially when you are also acting as, for all intents and purposes, the primary source, people are always going to consult your stuff first.
[01:26:12.410 --> 01:26:20.030] [SPEAKER_03]: And one thing we believe very strongly in is giving people the freedom to figure out how to use the data themselves.
[01:26:20.410 --> 01:26:28.950] [SPEAKER_03]: And if we start off by telling them, do this, do this, don't do this, talk to these people, don't talk to these people.
[01:26:28.950 --> 01:26:31.910] [SPEAKER_03]: We're already boxing them in a lot.
[01:26:32.250 --> 01:26:40.570] [SPEAKER_03]: So we try to limit those strictures to things like, hey, don't, don't use these password hashes to, to try and hack anyone or anything.
[01:26:41.990 --> 01:26:42.870] [SPEAKER_15]: Makes sense.
[01:26:43.510 --> 01:26:44.050] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[01:26:44.130 --> 01:26:53.310] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, we're very sympathetic to the desire for that, but at this point, it's just a line we've felt more comfortable not crossing.
[01:26:54.710 --> 01:26:56.510] [SPEAKER_15]: I'm going to give the number out one more time.
[01:26:56.670 --> 01:26:59.530] [SPEAKER_15]: And if we don't get any calls, we're going to sign off in the next couple of minutes.
[01:26:59.650 --> 01:27:04.610] [SPEAKER_15]: So it's your last chance, you folks out there, 802-321-4225.
[01:27:04.910 --> 01:27:13.970] [SPEAKER_15]: If you wish to talk to us here at Off The Hook Overtime, we've got Zan and Emma from DDoS Secrets with us right now, talking about the gab hack or leak.
[01:27:14.190 --> 01:27:20.450] [SPEAKER_15]: And we also have the Off The Hook staff on hand to answer any questions you might have.
[01:27:20.550 --> 01:27:22.010] [SPEAKER_15]: Doesn't have to be about, about this topic.
[01:27:22.170 --> 01:27:27.570] [SPEAKER_15]: If there's anything else you want to, to, to share with us, but we're only going to hold this open for another couple of minutes.
[01:27:27.750 --> 01:27:30.470] [SPEAKER_15]: So 802-321-4225.
[01:27:30.950 --> 01:27:42.350] [SPEAKER_15]: And, you know, if there's one other thing I'm just very curious about regarding this, this whole chain of events, how do you think the media coverage overall has been?
[01:27:42.450 --> 01:27:43.510] [SPEAKER_15]: Has it been accurate?
[01:27:43.770 --> 01:27:48.150] [SPEAKER_15]: Has it, has it, have they gotten it or have they completely misrepresented what's going on here?
[01:27:49.910 --> 01:27:55.390] [SPEAKER_13]: The media coverage has mostly been accurate?
[01:27:56.230 --> 01:27:59.130] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, I've only noticed a couple of instances.
[01:27:59.830 --> 01:28:05.950] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, Hack Read initially made an error and very quickly corrected it.
[01:28:06.330 --> 01:28:12.310] [SPEAKER_03]: Uh, AV Club, which thankfully not many people turn to for this sort of news.
[01:28:12.310 --> 01:28:19.870] [SPEAKER_03]: AV Club reported that we owned up to the hack, uh, which is not even close to what happened.
[01:28:20.030 --> 01:28:21.730] [SPEAKER_03]: We're owning up to the leak.
[01:28:22.090 --> 01:28:25.750] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, you know, we've been very clear about these.
[01:28:25.950 --> 01:28:29.250] [SPEAKER_03]: This is the, the name for the hacktivists that, that did it.
[01:28:29.370 --> 01:28:36.070] [SPEAKER_03]: Like we don't, we don't hack data, but for the most part, it's, it's the, the coverage has been accurate.
[01:28:36.190 --> 01:28:41.350] [SPEAKER_03]: And that's been the one area where there's been some inaccuracies.
[01:28:42.030 --> 01:28:49.670] [SPEAKER_03]: Um, I'm not really counting things like Cassandra Fairbanks or RT's coverage in any of this, because obviously.
[01:28:53.050 --> 01:28:53.570] [SPEAKER_15]: Wow.
[01:28:54.210 --> 01:28:57.350] [SPEAKER_13]: Well, it's quite a... The response from Gab, though, has been less than stellar.
[01:28:57.750 --> 01:28:57.950] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[01:28:57.990 --> 01:28:58.510] [SPEAKER_15]: Oh, yeah.
[01:28:58.510 --> 01:28:59.650] [SPEAKER_15]: Let's talk about that a bit.
[01:29:03.380 --> 01:29:06.340] [SPEAKER_13]: The response from Gab has been less than stellar.
[01:29:06.900 --> 01:29:08.340] [SPEAKER_15]: They seem a bit miffed.
[01:29:09.160 --> 01:29:14.020] [SPEAKER_13]: They're, uh, as the kids like to say, big mad.
[01:29:17.100 --> 01:29:17.620] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[01:29:18.080 --> 01:29:18.320] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[01:29:18.320 --> 01:29:18.860] [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, they are.
[01:29:20.080 --> 01:29:30.740] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, which, you know, uh, is, um, nice for me and my family.
[01:29:32.420 --> 01:29:34.420] [SPEAKER_12]: It's the definition of a side perk.
[01:29:34.780 --> 01:29:35.000] [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[01:29:35.220 --> 01:29:37.820] [SPEAKER_12]: It's one of the side perks to the work that we do.
[01:29:39.020 --> 01:29:44.000] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, they, in one of the pieces I saw that they, they said they're working with law enforcement.
[01:29:44.600 --> 01:29:52.700] [SPEAKER_15]: And I'm wondering if, uh, you know, maybe other people are working with law enforcement, too, investigating them based on the things that are being revealed here.
[01:29:52.840 --> 01:29:58.860] [SPEAKER_15]: Because there is a lot of, uh, uh, planning for, for illegal things that, uh, took place on Gab.
[01:30:00.920 --> 01:30:01.440] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[01:30:01.760 --> 01:30:03.000] [SPEAKER_03]: And there's...
[01:30:04.440 --> 01:30:11.220] [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, Gab, Gab has been, Gab has been the subject of so many law enforcement investigations.
[01:30:11.220 --> 01:30:25.220] [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, uh, Robert Bowers, the, the man who walked into the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh and murdered 11 jewish people who were just there for Shabbat services.
[01:30:26.040 --> 01:30:30.840] [SPEAKER_13]: He, uh, he, uh, he was a avid user of Gab.
[01:30:31.160 --> 01:30:38.040] [SPEAKER_13]: Uh, he posted multiple... he had a long history of posting anti-Semitic messages to Gab.
[01:30:38.260 --> 01:30:41.780] [SPEAKER_13]: He posted one to Gab right before he committed the shooting.
[01:30:42.520 --> 01:30:51.740] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, there's another instance of Gab being served with, uh, papers because, uh, a man had been arrested for child porn.
[01:30:51.740 --> 01:30:57.000] [SPEAKER_13]: Uh, and law enforcement wanted to see if he had shared that child porn over Gab.
[01:30:57.360 --> 01:31:08.180] [SPEAKER_13]: Uh, there was another case in the UK where, um, neo-Nazis had been, um, arrested because of things they posted on Gab.
[01:31:08.420 --> 01:31:20.260] [SPEAKER_13]: There was a man who was also arrested because he, um, was posting, um, guides on how to hunt Muslims, jews, and immigrants on Gab.
[01:31:20.260 --> 01:31:26.760] [SPEAKER_13]: Uh, Gab has been the subject of multiple law enforcement investigations in the past.
[01:31:27.000 --> 01:31:28.960] [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, this is nothing new for Gab.
[01:31:29.140 --> 01:31:34.200] [SPEAKER_13]: Gab is an absolute cesspool of the worst of humanity.
[01:31:34.240 --> 01:31:37.680] [SPEAKER_13]: Gab is no stranger to law enforcement.
[01:31:38.400 --> 01:31:47.420] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, I'm sure it's only a matter of time before law enforcement says thank you to, uh, to the efforts of the Das Secrets for, uh, for, uh, revealing this ugliness.
[01:31:47.860 --> 01:31:48.980] [SPEAKER_15]: And they really should.
[01:31:49.080 --> 01:31:51.580] [SPEAKER_03]: Waiting for that phone call any day now.
[01:31:51.580 --> 01:31:54.840] [SPEAKER_12]: Any day now, they're gonna come knocking at our door.
[01:31:55.000 --> 01:31:57.260] [SPEAKER_12]: And I'm sure it's gonna be for a thank you.
[01:31:57.420 --> 01:31:58.380] [SPEAKER_12]: In a perfect world.
[01:31:58.600 --> 01:31:59.620] [SPEAKER_12]: They're gonna come with a plaque.
[01:31:59.800 --> 01:31:59.960] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[01:32:01.460 --> 01:32:03.320] [SPEAKER_15]: You're, you're doing, you're doing good work.
[01:32:03.540 --> 01:32:04.320] [SPEAKER_15]: And it's appreciated.
[01:32:04.560 --> 01:32:10.500] [SPEAKER_15]: And I hope that, uh, you're able to continue and, and, uh, provide us with a lot more truth that's out there.
[01:32:10.660 --> 01:32:12.180] [SPEAKER_15]: Because we need to, we need to hear it.
[01:32:12.240 --> 01:32:12.900] [SPEAKER_15]: We need to see it.
[01:32:13.420 --> 01:32:14.080] [SPEAKER_15]: It's important.
[01:32:14.080 --> 01:32:23.400] [SPEAKER_13]: And I mean, that's honestly one of the main purposes of what DDoS does.
[01:32:23.700 --> 01:32:28.600] [SPEAKER_13]: It's, it's information that needs to be out there.
[01:32:28.780 --> 01:32:31.720] [SPEAKER_13]: It is all in pursuit of just the truth.
[01:32:32.000 --> 01:32:38.860] [SPEAKER_13]: And we are not responsible if the truth does not look favorable to you.
[01:32:40.300 --> 01:32:41.160] [SPEAKER_13]: We're not.
[01:32:42.340 --> 01:32:49.940] [SPEAKER_13]: And I think the CEO of Gab knows that in this case, the truth is not looking favorable to him.
[01:32:50.540 --> 01:32:51.500] [SPEAKER_13]: Or Gab.
[01:32:53.200 --> 01:33:02.740] [SPEAKER_13]: And it has nothing to do with God or whatever other bullshit he's trying to claim it does.
[01:33:03.660 --> 01:33:09.140] [SPEAKER_13]: It has to do with the fact that his site got taken down by a f*cking SQLI.
[01:33:11.720 --> 01:33:14.380] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, you can never erase that, can you?
[01:33:14.600 --> 01:33:19.140] [SPEAKER_12]: Someone's shoelaces together and then they're laying down trying to chase you.
[01:33:19.400 --> 01:33:20.480] [SPEAKER_12]: That's literally...
[01:33:20.480 --> 01:33:22.280] [SPEAKER_12]: That doesn't happen!
[01:33:22.680 --> 01:33:26.100] [SPEAKER_12]: That's literally, like, the first lesson on hack this site.
[01:33:26.100 --> 01:33:27.160] [SPEAKER_12]: Come on!
[01:33:28.240 --> 01:33:29.680] [SPEAKER_12]: Like, come on!
[01:33:29.980 --> 01:33:34.800] [SPEAKER_12]: And, um, and, like, I, he, he, he's sad.
[01:33:35.140 --> 01:33:36.660] [SPEAKER_12]: He got the sads.
[01:33:36.660 --> 01:33:38.240] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, it's, it's a learning opportunity.
[01:33:38.240 --> 01:33:41.080] [SPEAKER_15]: It really is for, for people running these sites.
[01:33:41.540 --> 01:33:47.460] [SPEAKER_12]: It is, but also, like, he's just got the sads.
[01:33:47.600 --> 01:33:51.320] [SPEAKER_12]: Because, you know, his site got f*cking cromed.
[01:33:51.440 --> 01:34:06.040] [SPEAKER_12]: And, you know, and now he's trying to hide behind Jesus while he hurls transphobic insults and sends f*cking Nazis and QAnon adherents at my family and my friends.
[01:34:07.500 --> 01:34:10.540] [SPEAKER_15]: Didn't take long for, uh, True Colors to show, did it?
[01:34:10.880 --> 01:34:11.680] [SPEAKER_13]: Absolutely not.
[01:34:11.880 --> 01:34:12.600] [SPEAKER_13]: Absolutely not.
[01:34:12.780 --> 01:34:18.500] [SPEAKER_13]: You know, these people preach Jesus and Christianity, but the second you get them mad...
[01:34:19.500 --> 01:34:20.040] [SPEAKER_15]: Mm-hmm.
[01:34:21.220 --> 01:34:23.840] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, we want to thank you for what you, what you've done.
[01:34:24.020 --> 01:34:26.500] [SPEAKER_15]: Any, any last words from anyone else on, on the show?
[01:34:26.740 --> 01:34:27.140] [SPEAKER_15]: Alex?
[01:34:29.260 --> 01:34:30.020] [SPEAKER_15]: Alex, you're muted.
[01:34:30.280 --> 01:34:32.160] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, you're muted, Alex, unless you're just moving your mouth.
[01:34:32.700 --> 01:34:33.580] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, jeez.
[01:34:33.660 --> 01:34:42.080] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, I want to thank Zan and Emma for being here and also for, for taking full advantage of the fact that we are not right now regulated by the FCC.
[01:34:42.680 --> 01:34:43.340] [SPEAKER_15]: No, no.
[01:34:43.880 --> 01:34:44.900] [SPEAKER_15]: And we know that.
[01:34:45.020 --> 01:34:46.460] [SPEAKER_15]: And I, I think they know that as well.
[01:34:46.600 --> 01:34:49.000] [SPEAKER_07]: So, yeah, we're professionals here.
[01:34:49.100 --> 01:34:49.580] [SPEAKER_07]: We know what we're doing.
[01:34:49.900 --> 01:34:50.220] [SPEAKER_07]: Well done.
[01:34:50.800 --> 01:34:52.340] [SPEAKER_07]: How do you think we're going to take the calls?
[01:34:52.780 --> 01:34:54.300] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean...
[01:34:54.300 --> 01:34:55.020] [SPEAKER_15]: Again...
[01:34:55.020 --> 01:34:59.940] [SPEAKER_13]: I've done a few of these before I know where FCC ends.
[01:35:00.160 --> 01:35:01.540] [SPEAKER_15]: It's not the first day.
[01:35:02.220 --> 01:35:03.560] [SPEAKER_15]: One last time.
[01:35:03.720 --> 01:35:04.360] [SPEAKER_15]: It's not my first rubio.
[01:35:04.720 --> 01:35:10.080] [SPEAKER_15]: Give us DDoS info for the listeners so they can help and donate and...
[01:35:10.080 --> 01:35:11.240] [SPEAKER_03]: Follow along?
[01:35:11.400 --> 01:35:11.580] [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[01:35:13.200 --> 01:35:14.320] [SPEAKER_03]: DDoSsecrets.com.
[01:35:14.540 --> 01:35:15.360] [SPEAKER_03]: We've got a wiki.
[01:35:15.500 --> 01:35:17.040] [SPEAKER_03]: Organizes all of our releases.
[01:35:17.660 --> 01:35:19.220] [SPEAKER_03]: Makes it easy to search them.
[01:35:19.220 --> 01:35:25.040] [SPEAKER_03]: You can browse by country, by corporation, by type.
[01:35:25.980 --> 01:35:29.080] [SPEAKER_03]: And over on the sidebar, there's a little donate button.
[01:35:29.700 --> 01:35:32.420] [SPEAKER_03]: Can contribute all sorts of different ways.
[01:35:32.580 --> 01:35:34.060] [SPEAKER_03]: Bitcoin, traditional cash.
[01:35:34.200 --> 01:35:37.920] [SPEAKER_03]: We are a 501c3, so everything is tax deductible.
[01:35:38.360 --> 01:35:45.080] [SPEAKER_03]: And there's also some information at the bottom of the donate page on the kinds of hands-on help we need.
[01:35:45.080 --> 01:35:54.460] [SPEAKER_03]: If anyone wants to try and pitch in, you know, we are a very small group trying to move some very large rocks.
[01:35:54.940 --> 01:35:58.020] [SPEAKER_15]: And I'm going to mention your site on Twitter tonight and see what happens.
[01:35:58.640 --> 01:35:59.760] [SPEAKER_03]: Thank you very much.
[01:35:59.760 --> 01:36:01.020] [SPEAKER_03]: It's not going to work.
[01:36:02.060 --> 01:36:03.980] [SPEAKER_15]: Well, then I'll make it work somehow.
[01:36:03.980 --> 01:36:04.560] [SPEAKER_15]: I don't know.
[01:36:04.740 --> 01:36:05.780] [SPEAKER_03]: Thank you so much.
[01:36:06.680 --> 01:36:06.940] [SPEAKER_13]: Thank you.
[01:36:06.940 --> 01:36:07.620] [SPEAKER_03]: Have a good night.
[01:36:07.920 --> 01:36:08.840] [SPEAKER_03]: Please be well.
[01:36:09.080 --> 01:36:09.200] [SPEAKER_15]: Yes.
[01:36:09.640 --> 01:36:10.440] [SPEAKER_13]: Thank you.
[01:36:10.740 --> 01:36:11.320] [SPEAKER_13]: Stay safe.
[01:36:11.380 --> 01:36:11.820] [SPEAKER_13]: Hey, everybody.