[00:31.140 --> 00:41.620] [SPEAKER_06]: And it's now 7 o'clock, you're listening to WBAI New York, and that means it's time for another edition of Off The Hook.
[02:33.370 --> 02:35.910] [SPEAKER_06]: And it's another exciting edition of Off The Hook.
[02:35.990 --> 02:38.970] [SPEAKER_06]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening, joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:39.310 --> 02:40.150] [SPEAKER_08]: Yes, I'm here.
[02:40.670 --> 02:45.450] [SPEAKER_06]: And over in Skype-land, where my voice always changes.
[02:45.690 --> 02:50.710] [SPEAKER_06]: Skype-land, we have Alex, who apparently is needed.
[02:50.830 --> 02:51.250] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, there you are.
[02:51.370 --> 02:51.550] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[02:51.750 --> 02:52.990] [SPEAKER_06]: Are you on a long delay tonight?
[02:55.110 --> 02:58.270] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, I was unmuting myself.
[03:00.430 --> 03:02.130] [SPEAKER_06]: Is someone playing a video game in your house?
[03:02.250 --> 03:04.350] [SPEAKER_06]: Because, boy, you're not sounding that great.
[03:05.490 --> 03:07.070] [SPEAKER_06]: I would check your connectivity.
[03:08.190 --> 03:08.830] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, yeah.
[03:09.730 --> 03:10.830] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't know right now.
[03:11.550 --> 03:12.850] [SPEAKER_10]: Let me shut up for a little bit.
[03:12.950 --> 03:14.190] [SPEAKER_06]: Barely making anything you're saying.
[03:14.370 --> 03:16.090] [SPEAKER_08]: You are on Earth, though, right, Alex?
[03:16.370 --> 03:17.350] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, I don't even know.
[03:19.770 --> 03:22.070] [SPEAKER_06]: If he wasn't on Earth, we'd hear him a lot clearer.
[03:22.070 --> 03:24.030] [SPEAKER_06]: You think it would be better if it was coming from, like, outer...
[03:24.030 --> 03:24.370] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, I think so.
[03:25.130 --> 03:26.230] [SPEAKER_06]: Alex, do some troubleshooting.
[03:26.430 --> 03:26.830] [SPEAKER_06]: Rob T.
[03:27.070 --> 03:28.150] [SPEAKER_06]: Firefly, welcome.
[03:28.850 --> 03:29.570] [SPEAKER_00]: Good evening.
[03:30.110 --> 03:30.710] [SPEAKER_06]: And Gila.
[03:31.330 --> 03:31.690] [SPEAKER_06]: Hello.
[03:32.230 --> 03:35.970] [SPEAKER_06]: We were not on last week, but we are on now, and we're going to make up for it.
[03:36.190 --> 03:39.850] [SPEAKER_06]: We have overtime coming up at 8 o'clock.
[03:39.850 --> 03:46.010] [SPEAKER_06]: You can go to our YouTube channel, Channel2600, or just click on the link on the main page of 2600.com.
[03:46.170 --> 03:47.190] [SPEAKER_06]: Meet us there at 8 o'clock.
[03:47.190 --> 03:57.230] [SPEAKER_06]: You can make phone calls or listen to this hour where you can't, because we're broadcasting from all sorts of remote places and trying to catch up with various news.
[03:57.430 --> 03:58.470] [SPEAKER_06]: Here's some good news.
[03:58.810 --> 04:01.130] [SPEAKER_06]: I always like to start with good news whenever possible.
[04:01.970 --> 04:16.610] [SPEAKER_06]: Cryptocurrency platform Poly Network said on Monday that almost all of the $610 million stolen this month in one of the biggest crypto heists has now been returned by the unknown person or persons behind the attack.
[04:16.990 --> 04:17.550] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[04:17.670 --> 04:20.010] [SPEAKER_06]: Who says hacking doesn't have honor?
[04:20.910 --> 04:30.590] [SPEAKER_06]: In a Twitter post, Poly Network said it had regained control of all the assets except for $33 million in stablecoin.
[04:32.330 --> 04:32.890] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[04:32.950 --> 04:34.330] [SPEAKER_06]: I'm trying to understand what I'm saying here.
[04:34.710 --> 04:36.130] [SPEAKER_06]: A stablecoin tether?
[04:36.370 --> 04:36.850] [SPEAKER_06]: Is that a thing?
[04:37.330 --> 04:38.070] [SPEAKER_06]: Does anybody know?
[04:38.870 --> 04:39.710] [SPEAKER_06]: Nobody knows?
[04:39.990 --> 04:40.170] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[04:40.450 --> 04:41.330] [SPEAKER_06]: We're all ignorant here.
[04:42.350 --> 04:42.910] [SPEAKER_10]: Tether...
[04:42.910 --> 04:44.010] [SPEAKER_06]: You know something, Alex?
[04:44.010 --> 04:44.870] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[04:45.070 --> 04:46.090] [SPEAKER_10]: Can you guys hear me okay?
[04:46.350 --> 04:46.890] [SPEAKER_06]: Barely.
[04:47.610 --> 04:47.850] [SPEAKER_10]: All right.
[04:47.970 --> 04:48.050] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[04:48.750 --> 04:53.270] [SPEAKER_10]: Tether is a coin that is pegged to the value of the U.S.
[04:53.370 --> 04:57.650] [SPEAKER_10]: dollar and is backed by certain other types of assets, as I understand.
[04:58.590 --> 04:59.150] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[04:59.230 --> 05:04.090] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, the network said it was in talks with Tether about unfreezing the funds.
[05:04.330 --> 05:07.770] [SPEAKER_06]: The hackers had previously said they did the attack for fun.
[05:08.510 --> 05:13.990] [SPEAKER_06]: Nothing like doing something for fun that carries over $600 million with it.
[05:14.570 --> 05:18.670] [SPEAKER_06]: They did that to expose a vulnerability in the platform's digital contracts.
[05:18.890 --> 05:20.190] [SPEAKER_06]: I'd say they found one.
[05:20.610 --> 05:23.210] [SPEAKER_06]: It was always their plan to return the tokens.
[05:23.750 --> 05:29.070] [SPEAKER_06]: Some blockchain analysts have speculated they just found it too difficult to launder so much stolen cryptocurrency.
[05:29.970 --> 05:36.410] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, there's always somebody there, you know, to cast aspersions and to say that their intentions were not good.
[05:36.410 --> 05:41.930] [SPEAKER_06]: But look, they returned a lot of it, most of it, the vast majority of it.
[05:42.010 --> 05:44.410] [SPEAKER_06]: If they kept $33 million, I don't know if that's such a big...
[05:44.410 --> 05:45.270] [SPEAKER_06]: That is a big deal.
[05:46.670 --> 05:59.450] [SPEAKER_06]: A lesser known name in the world of crypto, Poly Network is a decentralized finance platform that facilitates peer-to-peer transactions with a focus on allowing users to transfer or swap tokens across different blockchains.
[05:59.450 --> 06:02.430] [SPEAKER_06]: But I'm sure they never intended for the tokens to be swapped like this.
[06:03.750 --> 06:05.530] [SPEAKER_06]: I guess it's a happy ending, right?
[06:05.710 --> 06:13.050] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, they're still out $33 million, but I guess that's nothing compared to what we were facing or they were facing.
[06:15.790 --> 06:22.790] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, and look, I think that part of the lesson here too is, and this is something that we've been saying for a while, and I hope you guys can hear me a bit better.
[06:22.910 --> 06:23.250] [SPEAKER_10]: Much better.
[06:23.390 --> 06:23.810] [SPEAKER_10]: Is this any better?
[06:24.050 --> 06:24.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, good.
[06:26.350 --> 06:35.350] [SPEAKER_10]: Is that it is actually very difficult to launder significant amounts of cryptocurrency and turn it into fiat currency, turn it into real money that you can use in the real world.
[06:35.710 --> 06:54.670] [SPEAKER_10]: It's hard to push these things through what would be known as coin swappers or tumblers that push these coins through and make it very, very difficult to trace because you're turning them into other different types of coins, other currencies, and essentially putting it through a clearinghouse type of effect.
[06:54.870 --> 07:02.870] [SPEAKER_10]: But there's lots of new heuristics that you can use to identify residual bits of coins.
[07:02.950 --> 07:15.090] [SPEAKER_10]: There's lots of different tracing mechanisms that are out there, and I'm actually working on a couple of different matters right now where we're tracing cryptocurrency that was stolen and having a great deal of success with it.
[07:15.350 --> 07:19.670] [SPEAKER_10]: It's just sometimes very difficult to claw it back in a reasonable period of time.
[07:19.930 --> 07:25.390] [SPEAKER_10]: But finding cryptocurrency edged out into fiat currency can be really, really difficult.
[07:25.670 --> 07:44.710] [SPEAKER_10]: I would venture to say that these ransomware attackers, people that are doing ransomware as a service or the revils or the are evils, and they probably, I would guess, maybe take 10 or maybe 15 percent of whatever their haul is in cryptocurrency out into the real world.
[07:45.650 --> 08:04.390] [SPEAKER_06]: Alex, let me ask you, as someone involved in this, do you find it harder to be able to retrieve funds that have been stolen or funds that somebody has managed to lock themselves out of, either by forgetting a password or losing a hard drive or having a corrupted hard drive or various things like that?
[08:05.790 --> 08:12.510] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, in certain instances, I think it's nearly impossible to get funds back if they've lost the keys to a wallet.
[08:12.790 --> 08:32.810] [SPEAKER_10]: There are certain things, though, that depending upon how the cryptocurrency works and the smart contracts that underlie the cryptocurrency work, you may be able to do certain things like make a notation on the currency itself that was lost that indicates that it's essentially blacklisted or it's banned from any future use or being transferred,
[08:33.070 --> 08:44.510] [SPEAKER_10]: at which point, once that cryptocurrency is banned or sunk, you may be able to have an exchange or a coin reissued for that particular currency.
[08:44.510 --> 08:52.030] [SPEAKER_10]: But the exchanges and the platforms that run these coins, they don't like to do that that often.
[08:52.310 --> 08:59.490] [SPEAKER_10]: And it's a very long and burdensome process to prove that you are, in fact, the owner of those particular coins.
[08:59.710 --> 09:02.670] [SPEAKER_10]: It's pretty rare, but it does get done.
[09:02.670 --> 09:11.670] [SPEAKER_10]: And I think that it's harder to get that done in a situation where you may have just lost the coins as opposed to tracing out coins.
[09:11.670 --> 09:39.530] [SPEAKER_10]: Because there are certain ways where you can trace with damn near certainty the route that certain stolen funds have taken from the victim through various coin swapping services or Tumblr services and find where they... and actually freeze them where they end up before they are further transferred or edged out into fiat currency or pushed out through an over-the-counter service.
[09:39.530 --> 09:43.730] [SPEAKER_10]: So in the situation of theft, I feel like it's easier to make that case.
[09:44.290 --> 10:02.550] [SPEAKER_06]: Is there anything you could advise people who are maybe just dipping their toe into the world of cryptocurrency, mistakes not to make, ways to ensure that their funds don't go missing or get lost or get corrupted or anything like that, types of backing up that make sense,
[10:02.650 --> 10:04.370] [SPEAKER_06]: things that you... they... they... they shouldn't do?
[10:05.710 --> 10:14.970] [SPEAKER_10]: I think a lot of... I think there's a lot of common sense that goes into this and, you know, how you treat your... your wallets and, you know, very hard passwords.
[10:15.190 --> 10:17.510] [SPEAKER_10]: Use some kind of passphrase as opposed to a password.
[10:17.750 --> 10:22.970] [SPEAKER_10]: Don't use passwords that you've used elsewhere, you know, to... to secure your cryptocurrency walls.
[10:23.250 --> 10:38.830] [SPEAKER_10]: But I think a really great piece of advice, these days especially, is to be very, very wary of scams that involve cryptocurrency, phishing scams, voicemail scams, smishing scams, SMS scams.
[10:38.950 --> 10:48.330] [SPEAKER_10]: There is a massive amount of energy and activity directed towards stealing others as cryptocurrencies, especially from some of the larger exchanges.
[10:48.610 --> 10:59.070] [SPEAKER_10]: And this is the kind of activity that I watch in the DNS, in the domain name system every day, and the volume and velocity of phishing attacks targeting cryptocurrency holders.
[10:59.110 --> 11:15.050] [SPEAKER_10]: I think because there are more and more cryptocurrency holders every day, and a lot of people aren't necessarily that familiar with the types of scams or how they work, or the mechanics of various KYC or know your customer requirements from all of these exchanges,
[11:15.310 --> 11:20.830] [SPEAKER_10]: that that can be exploited very, very easily for a new user or a new holder of cryptocurrency.
[11:21.130 --> 11:22.950] [SPEAKER_10]: So be very, very careful of these scams.
[11:23.290 --> 11:28.730] [SPEAKER_06]: Be very careful of those acronyms, Alex, because KYC pronounced says KICK, and I don't think that's what you want to do to your customers.
[11:29.170 --> 11:32.050] [SPEAKER_10]: I know you love that, that KYC acronym, right?
[11:32.210 --> 11:32.390] [SPEAKER_10]: You know.
[11:33.030 --> 11:33.390] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[11:33.550 --> 11:38.850] [SPEAKER_06]: Hey, well, we've got a really interesting story here that we're going to be devoting some time to involving the Taliban.
[11:39.070 --> 11:40.330] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, they've seized U.S.
[11:40.750 --> 11:48.850] [SPEAKER_06]: military biometrics devices that could aid in the identification of Afghans who have assisted coalition forces.
[11:48.850 --> 11:52.310] [SPEAKER_06]: Current former military officials have told The Intercept.
[11:52.590 --> 12:00.150] [SPEAKER_06]: The devices are known as HIDE, H-I-I-D-E, Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment.
[12:00.450 --> 12:04.670] [SPEAKER_06]: They were seized last week during the Taliban's offensive.
[12:05.570 --> 12:12.670] [SPEAKER_06]: That's according to a joint special operations command official and three former U.S.
[12:12.850 --> 12:17.610] [SPEAKER_06]: military personnel, all of whom worried that sensitive data they contained could be used by the Taliban.
[12:17.750 --> 12:19.010] [SPEAKER_06]: By the way, that was actually two weeks ago.
[12:19.090 --> 12:20.270] [SPEAKER_06]: The story I'm reading is about a week old.
[12:20.890 --> 12:31.490] [SPEAKER_06]: HIDE devices contain identifying biometric data, such as iris scans and fingerprints, as well as biographical information, and are used to access large centralized databases.
[12:31.490 --> 12:33.550] [SPEAKER_06]: It's unclear how much of the U.S.
[12:33.870 --> 12:38.250] [SPEAKER_06]: military's biometric database on the Afghan population has been compromised.
[12:39.290 --> 12:41.070] [SPEAKER_06]: It was billed by the U.S.
[12:41.370 --> 12:44.230] [SPEAKER_06]: military as a means of tracking terrorists and other insurgents.
[12:45.210 --> 12:48.390] [SPEAKER_06]: But now biometric data on Afghans who assisted the U.S.
[12:48.970 --> 12:52.470] [SPEAKER_06]: has also been widely collected and used in identification cards.
[12:52.710 --> 12:53.650] [SPEAKER_06]: According to a U.S.
[12:54.010 --> 13:01.730] [SPEAKER_06]: military contractor, we process thousands of locals a day, had to ID, sweep for suicide vests, weapons, intel gathering, et cetera.
[13:02.310 --> 13:07.930] [SPEAKER_06]: HIDE was used as a biometric ID tool to help ID locals working for the coalition.
[13:09.330 --> 13:12.550] [SPEAKER_06]: And it's basically... this is really shocking.
[13:13.150 --> 13:14.210] [SPEAKER_06]: We know the U.S.
[13:14.290 --> 13:25.870] [SPEAKER_06]: military has long used these devices in the so-called war on terror and used biometrics to help identify Osama bin Laden during the 2011 raid on his Pakistani hideout.
[13:26.290 --> 13:37.570] [SPEAKER_06]: According to investigative reporter Annie Jacobson, the Pentagon had a goal to gather biometric data on 80% of the Afghan public to locate terrorists and criminals.
[13:37.790 --> 13:42.390] [SPEAKER_06]: And now those devices have fallen into the hands of the Taliban.
[13:42.470 --> 13:46.990] [SPEAKER_06]: So you can imagine what that could mean for people's safety.
[13:48.710 --> 14:00.650] [SPEAKER_06]: We have on the line with us Will Byrne, the director of Human Rights First Innovation Lab, who knows a thing or two about what is going on here.
[14:00.890 --> 14:02.170] [SPEAKER_06]: Will, welcome to the program.
[14:05.630 --> 14:06.970] [SPEAKER_06]: Thank you for having me.
[14:07.330 --> 14:10.410] [SPEAKER_06]: So this is a big deal, is it not?
[14:11.990 --> 14:13.230] [SPEAKER_01]: It is.
[14:13.490 --> 14:22.590] [SPEAKER_01]: We are very concerned about multiple different ways that the Taliban are using technology.
[14:22.590 --> 14:45.390] [SPEAKER_01]: But the advent of biometric data that could be in their hands at a relatively large scale across Afghans in the country is it's unprecedented, certainly in a humanitarian situation, like what we're facing in Kabul.
[14:45.830 --> 14:49.510] [SPEAKER_06]: Do you know how how big these devices actually are physically?
[14:50.410 --> 15:00.650] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, so the the handheld devices, so there's a number of issues, and sort of bits of the technology, as we understand it, that are in, in play.
[15:00.670 --> 15:11.670] [SPEAKER_01]: So the handheld devices were used by coalition forces, and they're essentially like a, you know, almost like a large gun, right?
[15:12.310 --> 15:25.730] [SPEAKER_01]: Almost like the size of a, like a super soaker or something, very strange looking devices, they do have capability of storing some data in the machine that can be pulled from, we are to understand.
[15:25.990 --> 15:36.950] [SPEAKER_01]: And so those devices were being used, as you mentioned, to actually create databases of Afghans that were working with coalition forces.
[15:37.210 --> 15:45.450] [SPEAKER_01]: So that database, from the standpoint of the Taliban, right, is like a laundry list of the type of folks that they would want to go after.
[15:45.630 --> 15:48.130] [SPEAKER_01]: So it's particularly concerning.
[15:48.450 --> 15:55.930] [SPEAKER_01]: There's actually quite a bit more data, biometric data that's out there in Afghanistan on Afghan citizens.
[15:56.210 --> 16:03.690] [SPEAKER_01]: The 2019 election used biometrics to register Afghan citizens that were voting.
[16:04.370 --> 16:11.930] [SPEAKER_01]: So the, there's, there are questions on the intelligence right now, whether the Taliban actually have access to these databases.
[16:11.930 --> 16:25.310] [SPEAKER_01]: So whether they can actually ID people that they're screening through existing cameras, um, and potentially these hide devices, we are operating as if, um, they have that potential or they will have that potential.
[16:25.490 --> 16:42.550] [SPEAKER_01]: So as a human rights organization, um, one of the things that makes our organization unique is that we are working with, we, we post fellowships with technologists working in, um, emerging technology, big data products, um, et cetera.
[16:42.990 --> 17:12.270] [SPEAKER_01]: And, uh, we've issued a guideline that, um, really became quite, um, you know, viral is the word quite circulated on social media around how, um, activists on the ground and citizens can evade, uh, tools like, uh, facial recognition, um, and, uh, fingerprint as well as iris scan efforts that could be used by the Taliban.
[17:12.570 --> 17:26.830] [SPEAKER_06]: Now, um, when you say, um, it could be used by the Taliban, a number of, uh, um, sources in this, um, intercept article actually, uh, says that it's quite possible that they, um, they would need additional tools to be able to process the data.
[17:27.290 --> 17:35.470] [SPEAKER_06]: But, uh, if say, um, an entity like Pakistan were to help, uh, well, then they could probably do it quite easily.
[17:35.650 --> 17:36.970] [SPEAKER_06]: They, they have these tools.
[17:37.190 --> 17:44.650] [SPEAKER_06]: So having these devices, having this data, um, we might as well assume that they will at some point have access to all the information.
[17:46.590 --> 17:47.110] [SPEAKER_01]: Correct.
[17:47.470 --> 18:02.910] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, and that's why we're raising, whether it's, whether it's via Pakistan, um, special, uh, special, I guess, secret security, uh, we know they have the capability or it's, or it's others.
[18:03.470 --> 18:13.990] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, it's, it's essentially a wild west scenario right now in terms of, uh, data that is available to the Taliban for use of identification.
[18:14.490 --> 18:34.090] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, we have a Saigon level humanitarian crisis unfolding currently in a couple people, um, putting their lives in danger, uh, uh, in the hundreds or thousands trying to get into the airport, um, with evacuations imminently shutting down most likely for Afghans.
[18:34.690 --> 18:57.430] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, but Saigon did not have this element at play in terms of, um, this level of ability of a hostile, um, potentially, um, revenge oriented, uh, power that now has access to, um, could have access to this database and the tools to, um, use it.
[18:57.950 --> 19:12.390] [SPEAKER_06]: So it's, it's one of the things that we keep coming back to on, on this program, uh, is, uh, basically imagining, uh, technology, both it's good aspects and it's bad aspects, but we always ask ourselves, well, what if the Nazis had this particular technology,
[19:12.630 --> 19:14.430] [SPEAKER_06]: what would they have done with it?
[19:14.430 --> 19:21.510] [SPEAKER_06]: And you think of things like databases and, uh, uh, just basically, uh, technological ways of tracking and finding people.
[19:22.010 --> 19:28.870] [SPEAKER_06]: And, um, that might make something that seems like a great advantage into something that could be a terrible nightmare.
[19:28.870 --> 19:31.650] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think that's what we're beginning to see right here.
[19:31.770 --> 19:34.870] [SPEAKER_06]: But one of the things I wanted to ask you, Willis is these devices are handheld.
[19:35.250 --> 19:37.030] [SPEAKER_06]: How were they left behind?
[19:37.230 --> 19:39.770] [SPEAKER_06]: How, how did they manage to fall into the hands of the Taliban?
[19:45.440 --> 19:51.300] [SPEAKER_01]: We wish we had a good answer for that as the, is, is the most direct way I can respond.
[19:51.300 --> 19:54.340] [SPEAKER_06]: I can see you were filtering quite a few possible responses there.
[19:56.680 --> 20:09.680] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, it's, um, the pace with which the withdrawal happened, um, um, that was incredibly disorganized and, um, and it's, it's, it's caused all kinds of problems.
[20:10.800 --> 20:16.380] [SPEAKER_06]: Is there a way perhaps that these devices can be bricked remotely or accessed in any way?
[20:16.560 --> 20:18.260] [SPEAKER_06]: Like, you know, something that Apple might do?
[20:21.320 --> 20:25.120] [SPEAKER_01]: That's something that we, um, and partners are looking into.
[20:25.360 --> 20:39.420] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, there are, it appears to be, um, some companies that could have the power to shut down, uh, access to remotely shut down access to some of the data that's in play.
[20:40.180 --> 20:42.860] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, so that is something we're working on.
[20:42.980 --> 20:50.040] [SPEAKER_01]: It's not, it's not an Apple or, um, you know, it's more data security firms that have contracted with the U.S. government.
[20:50.500 --> 20:52.740] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, so that is possible.
[20:52.940 --> 21:14.280] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, the other element of this that we're sort of dancing our way toward is, you know, with this issue of retention of biometric data in unstable societies and unstable, um, you know, political economies is, I mean, this, this, we hope will not result in,
[21:14.280 --> 21:25.700] [SPEAKER_01]: um, really even more tragic outcomes, but hopefully this sends a very clear message that, um, we need, we need policies and protocols in place.
[21:25.880 --> 21:43.240] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, if we're ever going to be collecting biometric data at the scale for securing remote deletion of that data in instances like this, you know, I would think that'd be something that we would have concluded decades ago, but, uh, we, we always see the stragglers that don't seem to get it until something like this happens.
[21:43.480 --> 21:44.240] [SPEAKER_06]: Rob, you had a question.
[21:45.100 --> 21:45.500] [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[21:45.780 --> 21:47.840] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, related to all that, well, thanks for joining us tonight.
[21:48.080 --> 22:03.020] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, but I I've been thinking about this a lot and they had to realize that, uh, they had, you know, cutting edge military equipment bought with, you know, the, the 20 year long, uh, budgets of, uh, everything that was being poured into the occupation there.
[22:03.740 --> 22:17.540] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, and it seems crazy that no one would have planned some kind of fail safe for like, what if we leave, where's the switch that we should pull to make sure that, uh, this stuff isn't useful to, uh, those who, who would, uh, pick it up after we leave it behind,
[22:17.560 --> 22:18.900] [SPEAKER_00]: or should we bring things with us?
[22:19.000 --> 22:35.020] [SPEAKER_00]: Like in, in a more perfect world, like what would they, what should they have done, um, when shutting this all down, when, when leaving to, uh, to ensure the safety of the people who, uh, cooperated with the coalition or, um, just, just people in general,
[22:35.360 --> 22:37.740] [SPEAKER_00]: um, who might've ended up in these databases.
[22:41.160 --> 22:41.600] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[22:41.820 --> 22:46.960] [SPEAKER_01]: And it's, it's relatively intuitive for, for once, once you stop and think about it, right.
[22:47.060 --> 23:05.340] [SPEAKER_01]: It's, um, if you are going to put these systems in place in this level of collection and database, um, you know, you're, you're populating databases like this in an unstable, uh, situation where that data could be repurposed for, um, grave harm and humanitarian,
[23:05.660 --> 23:25.200] [SPEAKER_01]: um, transgressions, should we say, then, um, as part of a contract, if you're a technology company and, and the U.S. military is, is, is, uh, reviewing that contract that the, it's not just about contracting the military itself, um, needs to have a clear game plan on,
[23:25.200 --> 23:37.080] [SPEAKER_01]: um, um, a simple and efficient way by week, by which this data can be, um, um, can be shut down and deleted from, from, from external access.
[23:37.680 --> 23:42.300] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, so this is a conversation that needs to be built, right.
[23:42.520 --> 23:47.480] [SPEAKER_01]: And, and grown when it comes to biometric, biometric, by use of biometric technologies.
[23:48.560 --> 23:49.080] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[23:49.240 --> 23:59.840] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, the other element, just to say it quickly is that, um, in, in creating a guide on how, you know, people can try to evade these technologies.
[24:00.760 --> 24:09.340] [SPEAKER_01]: For example, if you're walking in the public square and you've got, you've got cameras on you with, with this type of technology operating in the backend, it's very hard.
[24:09.660 --> 24:12.840] [SPEAKER_01]: It's very hard for, for, for, to evade these technologies.
[24:13.160 --> 24:27.620] [SPEAKER_01]: There's, um, you know, not to go into too much detail, but even, you know, people think putting a wig or glasses up, um, will work if these are detecting the bone structure of your face, um, and are highly, highly, uh, effective.
[24:27.860 --> 24:28.380] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead.
[24:28.480 --> 24:29.260] [SPEAKER_01]: Did you have something else, Rob?
[24:31.040 --> 24:31.760] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, no.
[24:32.160 --> 24:32.280] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[24:32.460 --> 24:33.140] [SPEAKER_06]: Alex, go ahead.
[24:34.480 --> 24:34.920] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[24:35.140 --> 24:36.660] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, thanks for coming on with us.
[24:36.740 --> 24:42.320] [SPEAKER_10]: And in full disclosure, I also work with human rights first on the technology advisory board.
[24:42.480 --> 24:51.400] [SPEAKER_10]: And I would like to invite everybody to take a look at the biometric evasion techniques that human rights first has published.
[24:51.400 --> 25:05.680] [SPEAKER_10]: They're available on human rights first.org and perhaps we can tweet this out and, or maybe put it in the show notes because those tactics and techniques for evading biometrics, they're, they're really interesting because what the, the document gets into,
[25:05.860 --> 25:13.420] [SPEAKER_10]: you dig into it is how effective some of these technologies really are and how difficult they are to evade as well had mentioned.
[25:13.660 --> 25:23.440] [SPEAKER_10]: But there are also some very simple recommendations for decreasing the probability that you would be detected by a biometric identification, like facial recognition systems.
[25:23.840 --> 25:35.000] [SPEAKER_10]: Sometimes it's as simple as taking an evasive measure, like putting your head down, you know, things like just that easy, uh, were, were kind of, um, uh, surprising to me to see in the document.
[25:35.000 --> 25:40.000] [SPEAKER_10]: So there are things I think that we can all take away about, uh, evading biometrics if we need to.
[25:40.140 --> 25:53.000] [SPEAKER_10]: And, and quite frankly, uh, Afghans who need to be evacuated, who worked with us forces are not the only ones facing biometric, uh, surveillance on, on massive scales these days, unfortunately.
[25:53.520 --> 26:02.400] [SPEAKER_10]: Uh, but we'll, I, I want to ask you, uh, and, and I think what human rights first is doing on this front is, is absolutely great critical cutting edge.
[26:02.740 --> 26:17.700] [SPEAKER_10]: Uh, and I'm not saying that because I'm, you know, partial to, to their efforts, but, uh, could you talk to us a little bit more about what human rights first in general is doing with respect to Afghanistan on the tech side and elsewhere?
[26:17.820 --> 26:21.940] [SPEAKER_10]: Because I think there's a lot of efforts underway and I think you're involved in quite a bit of it.
[26:24.280 --> 26:24.960] [SPEAKER_01]: Sure.
[26:25.400 --> 26:46.960] [SPEAKER_01]: So, uh, at a high level, um, part of what makes the effort of human rights first as a human rights organization, um, unique is that we essentially have a, a incubator of technologists that we're supporting to, um, apply, I mean, build, um, with code, uh,
[26:47.700 --> 26:54.960] [SPEAKER_01]: applications and tools that are useful now in the fight to protect people's human rights.
[26:55.180 --> 26:58.200] [SPEAKER_01]: So those tools range in our first cohort.
[26:58.320 --> 27:09.280] [SPEAKER_01]: And I should mention, we'll be taking on a second cohort of applicants and we'll be putting out an open call, um, to technologists to be a part of our next cohort, um, this fall.
[27:09.420 --> 27:13.780] [SPEAKER_01]: So would love to work through your all's channels to get the word out too.
[27:14.660 --> 27:36.080] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, right now we have, for example, a computer vision, AI tool that is really at the cutting edge of computer vision capability focused on detecting violence, um, and use of force in video, um, to flag that for, um, human rights violation, researchers and journalists and,
[27:36.080 --> 27:36.620] [SPEAKER_01]: and others.
[27:36.960 --> 27:59.600] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, we have a number of tools that are, uh, being used to counter, um, violent at register and track, um, and, um, surface violent white extremists, um, and their networks by scraping across many different data sources online and applying natural language processing and machine learning,
[27:59.820 --> 28:01.480] [SPEAKER_01]: um, to identify.
[28:01.480 --> 28:13.980] [SPEAKER_01]: So we're, we're, we have that tool working with pretty, um, in tandem with some pretty high profile, um, uh, prosecutions, um, that are underway in that area.
[28:14.200 --> 28:28.800] [SPEAKER_01]: And then I should mention, um, we have a tool that is also using machine learning to, um, track incidents of basically through language on social media incidents that are likely related to human rights violations.
[28:28.800 --> 28:36.940] [SPEAKER_01]: And that's something that we have in prototype that we're getting ready to apply for monitoring, um, in Afghanistan.
[28:37.300 --> 28:49.120] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, and so we're actually scrambling to get translation, uh, language capability in place for Pashto and Dari, which is the local languages, um, in place there.
[28:49.340 --> 29:02.300] [SPEAKER_01]: But that, um, unfortunately we are transitioning now from this sort of evacuation moment to what will most likely be a rolling human rights crisis, um, in Kabul.
[29:02.640 --> 29:13.020] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, and so we are looking to apply the best technology we can to, um, speed up our ability to detect where issues are happening.
[29:13.500 --> 29:29.980] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, so it's a really, um, I just started in the role, um, here as someone that's worked in at the sort of intersection of technology and social justice, my whole career, it's completely unique what the organization has been able to do and actually attract real technologists,
[29:30.160 --> 29:34.700] [SPEAKER_01]: um, and people, uh, like you, Alex to advise us.
[29:34.860 --> 29:44.780] [SPEAKER_01]: So, um, really appreciate the opportunity to join you all and, um, happy to hopefully build the, build the conversation, uh, even outside of this recorded one.
[29:45.160 --> 29:45.340] [SPEAKER_01]: Of course.
[29:45.560 --> 29:47.620] [SPEAKER_06]: It's, it's, it's so important, the work that you do.
[29:47.780 --> 29:51.920] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think that it'll, uh, it'll impact a lot of people who are listening.
[29:52.180 --> 30:04.380] [SPEAKER_06]: I want to read something from, uh, someone else from human rights first, Welton Chang, who said, I don't think anyone ever thought about data privacy or what to do in the event that this hide system fell into the wrong hands.
[30:04.480 --> 30:17.540] [SPEAKER_06]: Welton Chang, uh, chief technology officer, uh, moving forward, the U.S. military and diplomatic apparatus should think carefully about whether to deploy these systems again in situations as tenuous as Afghanistan.
[30:18.080 --> 30:26.300] [SPEAKER_06]: I would say, you know, uh, they, they should have thought of it before they did it this time because the risks just seem so obvious.
[30:26.460 --> 30:29.460] [SPEAKER_06]: Maybe it's because we do a show about this type of thing every single week.
[30:29.660 --> 30:36.620] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, but I don't know how they could miss the potential threat of having all this biometric data.
[30:36.840 --> 30:42.120] [SPEAKER_06]: I see that 80% of the, of the Afghan population, that was the goal of the Pentagon.
[30:42.680 --> 30:50.980] [SPEAKER_06]: And I wonder, you know, is this something that is, um, is being rolled out as a test so that they can do it here at some point?
[30:51.260 --> 30:59.600] [SPEAKER_06]: I, I find that usually things are tested first, either on the battlefield or in prisons before they're rolled out to the general public.
[30:59.600 --> 31:07.220] [SPEAKER_06]: And by the time it gets to that stage, they've, they've perfected all of the, um, imperfections and they, they've made it palatable.
[31:07.220 --> 31:12.120] [SPEAKER_06]: So people are willing to give up a little bit of, um, of privacy and freedom for the convenience.
[31:12.400 --> 31:16.000] [SPEAKER_06]: Do you think that's, um, uh, that, that's a realistic scenario?
[31:16.000 --> 31:17.400] [SPEAKER_06]: What, what I'm envisioning here?
[31:19.100 --> 31:28.640] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, forgive the humor, but if, if that's the case, um, they're doing a very poor job of, uh, uh, branding, branding this technology.
[31:28.860 --> 31:33.940] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't think this is something that's made it more popular in the eyes of American citizens.
[31:33.960 --> 31:34.820] [SPEAKER_01]: I would hope.
[31:35.860 --> 31:36.940] [SPEAKER_06]: I would hope so too.
[31:37.180 --> 31:55.320] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, they, they've gotten criticism, but you know, the only real criticism that, um, that I can see here is back in 2011, uh, the government accountability office criticized the Pentagon for not doing enough to ensure that other agencies had easy access to the information that they were gathering.
[31:55.320 --> 32:10.020] [SPEAKER_06]: So it wasn't that they were upset that they were doing this and collecting all this biometric information on, on, uh, regular everyday people, but that they didn't make it easier to share that information through every agency that was interested in looking at it.
[32:10.260 --> 32:13.840] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think that, you know, that is the kind of cluelessness.
[32:13.980 --> 32:27.880] [SPEAKER_06]: I think that is the theme here where they just don't see that this is bad collecting all this information and storing all this information is a horrible And I think we're going to see that play out in unimaginable, horrific ways.
[32:29.040 --> 32:29.580] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[32:30.040 --> 32:40.880] [SPEAKER_01]: It's a last thought I'll share on this, and then I'm actually involved in some final pushes on evacuation happening in Kabul, so I need to jump to that.
[32:40.880 --> 32:46.140] [SPEAKER_01]: But, you know, there are reasons.
[32:46.620 --> 32:54.180] [SPEAKER_01]: There are not just the United States government and governments that are using biometric technology to create this data.
[32:55.440 --> 32:58.100] [SPEAKER_01]: NGOs are doing this as well.
[32:58.600 --> 33:01.880] [SPEAKER_01]: And in some instances, there's been justification.
[33:02.840 --> 33:10.220] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, the World Food Program had a biometric program that they started for refugee camps.
[33:11.000 --> 33:17.780] [SPEAKER_01]: And the logic behind why it's useful makes sense in the instance that you're using it, right?
[33:17.860 --> 33:26.980] [SPEAKER_01]: It was logical that the United States would be trying to screen folks they were contracting with in the Afghan population in an unstable wartime environment.
[33:26.980 --> 33:43.180] [SPEAKER_01]: It's logical in the case of, you know, sometimes some of these programs are creating identification for people that have lost their financial and legal identity, and they have no record of it because they are refugees, for example.
[33:43.180 --> 33:46.940] [SPEAKER_01]: And so there's this notion that it can help with that.
[33:46.940 --> 33:48.180] [SPEAKER_01]: That makes sense.
[33:49.920 --> 34:08.160] [SPEAKER_01]: But not having a plan in place for what happens with this data, how is it actually secured, if the program is completely overrun, is untenable, can't happen again.
[34:08.160 --> 34:15.420] [SPEAKER_01]: And I would agree with Welton that, you know, it may be best practice to avoid collecting it all together.
[34:15.880 --> 34:18.660] [SPEAKER_06]: Kyle, very quickly, because Will's got to help with the...
[34:18.660 --> 34:23.420] [SPEAKER_08]: Well, I think it just speaks a little bit to the way we characterize a terrorist.
[34:23.780 --> 34:25.520] [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, the number you were reading was 80%.
[34:25.520 --> 34:26.900] [SPEAKER_08]: Was that 80% of the population?
[34:27.200 --> 34:28.920] [SPEAKER_06]: I believe that was correct, yeah.
[34:28.920 --> 34:41.180] [SPEAKER_08]: Amazing that it's billed as something to just really organize, control, and reference a database of terrorists, and that's the only implementation for it.
[34:41.260 --> 34:48.780] [SPEAKER_08]: And it creeps into, well, most everyone needs to be a part of this, just in case, or so we can go back and make sure we don't miss anyone.
[34:48.920 --> 34:55.620] [SPEAKER_06]: But I believe the information also indicated if this person was someone that could be worked with, or someone who was cooperating.
[34:55.620 --> 35:01.840] [SPEAKER_06]: And that's the real danger, if I'm not mistaken, that that information is also stored as part of the notes on the people.
[35:02.000 --> 35:02.600] [SPEAKER_06]: Is that correct, Will?
[35:06.250 --> 35:07.270] [SPEAKER_08]: I believe so.
[35:08.250 --> 35:08.630] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[35:08.830 --> 35:11.030] [SPEAKER_08]: So it's becoming this sort of, like, universal tool.
[35:11.130 --> 35:13.070] [SPEAKER_06]: Just, yeah, a database of everybody.
[35:13.310 --> 35:15.350] [SPEAKER_06]: Alex, I'm going to give you the last word, because Will's got to go.
[35:16.050 --> 35:16.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, sure.
[35:17.030 --> 35:19.010] [SPEAKER_10]: And thanks again, Will, for hopping on.
[35:19.010 --> 35:24.630] [SPEAKER_10]: I think this data, if you think about just the ordinary course of business records that the U.S.
[35:24.750 --> 35:30.110] [SPEAKER_10]: government is going to be generating in the course of a 20-year occupation, there's going to be paperwork.
[35:30.170 --> 35:35.470] [SPEAKER_10]: There's going to be other data and files that are associated with these Afghans that have assisted U.S.
[35:35.690 --> 35:36.090] [SPEAKER_10]: contractors.
[35:36.090 --> 35:52.890] [SPEAKER_10]: And if those are tied to an identity, and then that biometric data becomes available, let's say, with the assistance of the ISI or some technically adept members of the Taliban, then it becomes very, very problematic for these Afghans.
[35:53.010 --> 36:09.130] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, if you think about the fact that this is really a failure of data governance and data retention policies, frankly, if you think about it from a private sector perspective, what if Afghanistan had its own GDPR?
[36:09.710 --> 36:11.170] [SPEAKER_10]: How would we deal with this?
[36:11.250 --> 36:12.730] [SPEAKER_10]: This would be a major breach.
[36:12.910 --> 36:29.810] [SPEAKER_10]: If this is happening in the United States, there would be plenty of state laws that regulate the use of biometric identification technologies, and the release of which would start a flurry of class action lawsuits against whatever contractor this was or whatever private entity this was.
[36:29.810 --> 36:37.430] [SPEAKER_10]: But what are you going to do against the government of the United States, especially when it was occupying or at least residing in Afghanistan for so long?
[36:38.170 --> 36:45.590] [SPEAKER_10]: I think the doctrine of sovereign immunity would prevent anybody from seeking redress or legal remedy in the courts of at least the United States.
[36:46.070 --> 36:49.330] [SPEAKER_10]: But, I mean, I think Afghanistan, this is a case in point.
[36:49.950 --> 36:59.970] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, it's crazy to think, though, that when we talk now about Afghanistan passing laws, that we're talking about the Taliban passing those types of laws.
[37:00.170 --> 37:07.990] [SPEAKER_10]: So, fat chance that I think data governance and regulation of biometric technologies is going to hit on the legislative agenda anytime soon.
[37:07.990 --> 37:07.990] So,
[37:12.590 --> 37:14.430] [SPEAKER_10]: anyhow, Will, I know you've got to jump.
[37:15.450 --> 37:17.250] [SPEAKER_10]: It's wonderful to have you here.
[37:17.430 --> 37:22.670] [SPEAKER_10]: And unless anybody has any parting comments or questions, I think, you know, we'll let you get back to it.
[37:23.370 --> 37:24.890] [SPEAKER_10]: And thank you for your time.
[37:25.030 --> 37:30.210] [SPEAKER_06]: Just on behalf of Afghans, Americans, people all over the world, thank you for what you're doing.
[37:30.390 --> 37:32.810] [SPEAKER_06]: It makes a difference, and we need more of it.
[37:36.660 --> 37:37.420] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, thank you.
[37:37.660 --> 37:39.660] [SPEAKER_01]: Thanks for having me to see you all soon.
[37:39.960 --> 37:40.300] [SPEAKER_01]: All right.
[37:40.460 --> 37:40.800] [SPEAKER_06]: Good luck.
[37:41.940 --> 37:46.900] [SPEAKER_06]: And that was Will Byrne, the director of the Human Rights First Innovation Lab.
[37:47.320 --> 37:55.480] [SPEAKER_06]: And, Alex, since you're involved with that organization, can you give website information and ways people can get more information and get in contact and help out, perhaps?
[37:56.360 --> 37:57.260] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes, sure.
[37:57.420 --> 37:57.740] [SPEAKER_10]: Absolutely.
[37:58.040 --> 38:02.680] [SPEAKER_10]: And, by the way, I do want to mention that quote that you quoted from Welton Chang.
[38:03.360 --> 38:07.540] [SPEAKER_10]: Welton was on our show, if you recall, maybe about six or seven months ago.
[38:07.540 --> 38:12.940] [SPEAKER_10]: He was also from Human Rights First, and so pretty funny you picked that quote.
[38:13.500 --> 38:19.060] [SPEAKER_10]: Human Rights First, you can find them at humanrightsfirst.org.
[38:19.800 --> 38:23.260] [SPEAKER_10]: I think it's a fantastic website.
[38:23.260 --> 38:26.180] [SPEAKER_10]: There's a lot of information there you can find, I think, pretty easily.
[38:26.180 --> 38:51.500] [SPEAKER_10]: The biometric evasion technique document that Will and I were and the rest of you were discussing this evening on the show, as well as a slew of other information about their campaigns, topics, resources, media initiatives, fact sheets, and a lot of the other efforts underway with respect to the evacuation of Afghans right now.
[38:51.500 --> 38:52.960] [SPEAKER_10]: So, definitely check it out.
[38:53.100 --> 38:59.560] [SPEAKER_10]: They're a great organization to support, and I'm proud to be part of their technology advisory board.
[39:00.320 --> 39:01.200] [SPEAKER_06]: What a mess.
[39:01.380 --> 39:02.660] [SPEAKER_06]: What a mess this has turned into.
[39:03.060 --> 39:05.460] [SPEAKER_06]: Of course, you know, it's been a mess for 20 years.
[39:05.640 --> 39:15.420] [SPEAKER_06]: I remember, you know, just after 9-11, the throngs of people that were trying to stop this, trying to stop an invasion or occupation of Afghanistan.
[39:15.420 --> 39:15.960] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't understand why.
[39:16.100 --> 39:18.360] [SPEAKER_06]: Because it wouldn't work.
[39:18.620 --> 39:24.400] [SPEAKER_06]: Because the region, the country, has a history of repelling invaders.
[39:25.000 --> 39:26.720] [SPEAKER_06]: And this just took longer.
[39:26.900 --> 39:32.380] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, they just got over 10 years of Soviet occupation, where they kicked the Soviets out.
[39:32.380 --> 39:47.300] [SPEAKER_06]: And now the same thing has happened, but it's far more tragic because of all the waste, of all the militarization that has taken place in response that's made things so much worse.
[39:48.340 --> 39:53.200] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, I hope but hardly expect that there is a lesson that will be learned here.
[39:54.560 --> 40:06.500] [SPEAKER_06]: How do you hold out any hope for that when this comes on the heels of Vietnam and all sorts of other misadventures that we really should have learned something from?
[40:07.820 --> 40:09.100] [SPEAKER_06]: Such a tragedy.
[40:09.360 --> 40:11.900] [SPEAKER_06]: And, of course, the responsibility falls on everybody.
[40:12.140 --> 40:12.920] [SPEAKER_06]: It falls on Joe Biden.
[40:13.600 --> 40:16.000] [SPEAKER_06]: But, boy, it also falls on George W.
[40:16.100 --> 40:16.320] [SPEAKER_06]: Bush.
[40:16.340 --> 40:17.500] [SPEAKER_06]: It falls on Barack Obama.
[40:17.500 --> 40:29.720] [SPEAKER_06]: It certainly falls on Trump, who made this deal that excluded the Afghan government and just made things a whole lot more difficult, made the Taliban into an equal partner.
[40:29.800 --> 40:31.440] [SPEAKER_06]: And that's being forgotten.
[40:31.640 --> 40:32.580] [SPEAKER_06]: That's being forgotten.
[40:33.140 --> 40:34.020] [SPEAKER_06]: Yes, Rob, go ahead.
[40:34.760 --> 40:39.260] [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, this whole situation is fascinating in, you know, terrible and heartbreaking ways.
[40:39.260 --> 40:49.720] [SPEAKER_00]: And also needs to be, like, we need to keep the receipts from this and learn the lessons that it has to teach us about what is going to happen if we get into another situation like this.
[40:49.800 --> 40:54.840] [SPEAKER_00]: And maybe, you know, goodness willing, it'll prevent us from getting into something like that.
[40:54.920 --> 40:56.980] [SPEAKER_00]: But, yeah, Afghanistan repelled the Russians.
[40:57.260 --> 40:59.320] [SPEAKER_00]: Afghanistan, you know, has a history of this.
[40:59.440 --> 41:04.040] [SPEAKER_00]: But this time, we left all our really, really dangerous toys behind.
[41:05.000 --> 41:15.480] [SPEAKER_00]: And that's going to have, you know, that's going to keep having effects throughout the coming years on the people that are caught in this database.
[41:15.740 --> 41:18.040] [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, I am just fascinated.
[41:18.320 --> 41:27.700] [SPEAKER_00]: You know, when I had a day job that ended, they managed to shut off my email and shut off my access to the internal systems, as one expects during these things.
[41:27.700 --> 41:35.820] [SPEAKER_00]: And, you know, I don't know if the organizational abilities of the company in question should be directly compared to that of the U.S.
[41:36.200 --> 41:37.900] [SPEAKER_00]: military and everyone else that was involved.
[41:38.080 --> 41:39.940] [SPEAKER_00]: But, you know, it's not looking great.
[41:43.170 --> 41:43.990] [SPEAKER_06]: Alex, go ahead.
[41:45.110 --> 41:45.290] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[41:45.470 --> 41:54.110] [SPEAKER_10]: The other thing to mention about this particular type of data as well is that it's data about you as an individual person based on your biology.
[41:54.310 --> 41:55.890] [SPEAKER_10]: That's why we call it biometrics.
[41:55.890 --> 41:58.190] [SPEAKER_10]: That means it's not going to change.
[41:58.570 --> 42:05.410] [SPEAKER_10]: That the data in that database may be passed around to various other governments as well that are friendly to the Taliban.
[42:05.690 --> 42:11.430] [SPEAKER_10]: And for these people who are part of that database, it's going to make it easy to track them at the border.
[42:11.670 --> 42:23.970] [SPEAKER_10]: If they try to, let's say, you know, visit Iran or go into Pakistan, they may be branded as traitors or as collaborators with the great enemy, the United States of America.
[42:23.970 --> 42:30.610] [SPEAKER_10]: And perhaps abducted, tortured, mistreated because they were in that database.
[42:30.950 --> 42:39.210] [SPEAKER_10]: And so the power of data and the power of data to facilitate human rights abuses is what we're seeing playing out right now.
[42:39.450 --> 42:40.410] [SPEAKER_10]: It's absolutely terrifying.
[42:40.410 --> 42:59.930] [SPEAKER_10]: And I think it goes back really to what Will was talking about and why Human Rights First is so unique among human rights organizations because they understand the power of technology, the power that it can be used for good and the power that it can really be used for absolutely malicious and nefarious purposes.
[42:59.930 --> 43:05.950] [SPEAKER_10]: The very types of principles that we address on the show every week are embodied in that organization.
[43:06.800 --> 43:20.750] [SPEAKER_10]: And they do a lot of amazing work for refugees, asylum seekers, not just these humanitarian crises, but all throughout the year, there's cohorts of lawyers and private law firms that work with Human Rights First, technologists.
[43:20.750 --> 43:23.770] [SPEAKER_10]: The Technology Advisory Board, the Technology Advisory Board, I think, is absolutely fantastic.
[43:23.770 --> 43:33.310] [SPEAKER_10]: And a lot of these innovative projects that are happening right now really show that technology can be re-harnessed and used as a force for good.
[43:33.550 --> 43:38.190] [SPEAKER_10]: But we have to continually watch to make sure that it's not a force for bad.
[43:38.430 --> 43:40.690] [SPEAKER_06]: But I have a challenge for everybody here.
[43:40.690 --> 43:50.430] [SPEAKER_06]: Can you name a single government that exists now or has existed in the past that would not want this database on their citizens?
[43:50.850 --> 43:52.050] [SPEAKER_06]: A single one.
[43:52.710 --> 43:53.950] [SPEAKER_06]: Because I can't.
[43:54.270 --> 43:55.050] [SPEAKER_06]: I can't.
[43:55.170 --> 44:01.730] [SPEAKER_06]: Every government wants to know who its citizens are, what they are doing, what they're up to, what they are thinking.
[44:03.330 --> 44:07.650] [SPEAKER_06]: And wants that verifiable through fingerprints, iris scans, you name it.
[44:07.650 --> 44:13.550] [SPEAKER_06]: And so, it's not going to go away if we rely on their goodwill.
[44:13.730 --> 44:17.310] [SPEAKER_06]: It's only going to go away if we rely on our resistance to it.
[44:19.610 --> 44:20.310] [SPEAKER_06]: Alex?
[44:20.590 --> 44:23.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Look, I entirely agree.
[44:23.830 --> 44:33.490] [SPEAKER_10]: And another interesting bit of technology being used for purposes for which it wasn't ordinarily designed right now is...
[44:34.000 --> 44:35.870] [SPEAKER_10]: And our listeners can do this.
[44:35.870 --> 44:54.770] [SPEAKER_10]: If they have Snapchat on their phones, if you go into the Snap Map and go to Kabul Airport, the Hamid Qazai Airport, just swipe over to Afghanistan, zoom into Kabul Airport, and you can begin to see these sort of heat map looking things.
[44:55.010 --> 44:58.990] [SPEAKER_10]: And those generally are where people are congregated around the airports.
[44:58.990 --> 45:06.690] [SPEAKER_10]: And as you see those heat maps changing, those are indicative of where checkpoints are around the airport.
[45:06.690 --> 45:12.750] [SPEAKER_10]: If you're trying to get to the airport, I've seen a couple of people and a couple of colleagues post about this.
[45:12.890 --> 45:24.230] [SPEAKER_10]: And using social media platforms like Snapchat to gather open-source intelligence information and data about these checkpoints in Kabul is also incredibly fascinating.
[45:24.230 --> 45:28.650] [SPEAKER_10]: And really, I think, an innovative use of open-source intelligence.
[45:30.030 --> 45:30.630] [SPEAKER_06]: Wow.
[45:31.630 --> 45:32.550] [SPEAKER_06]: Interesting stuff.
[45:33.550 --> 45:34.290] [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[45:34.390 --> 45:38.970] [SPEAKER_06]: Let's move on to a couple of other things if we have time for it.
[45:39.010 --> 45:41.850] [SPEAKER_06]: There have been some data intrusions.
[45:41.930 --> 45:46.510] [SPEAKER_06]: T-Mobile says a hack has exposed personal data of 40 million people.
[45:46.510 --> 45:48.490] [SPEAKER_06]: It used to be that was a headline, remember?
[45:48.950 --> 45:52.550] [SPEAKER_06]: Even a million people having their 40 million people.
[45:53.150 --> 45:53.630] [SPEAKER_06]: Wow.
[45:55.110 --> 45:57.810] [SPEAKER_06]: Basically, names, birthdays, social security numbers.
[45:58.230 --> 46:01.110] [SPEAKER_06]: This is why whenever possible, you lie.
[46:01.270 --> 46:03.450] [SPEAKER_06]: You don't give your real information to these companies.
[46:03.610 --> 46:04.770] [SPEAKER_06]: They don't protect it.
[46:04.930 --> 46:06.650] [SPEAKER_06]: And before you know it, it's out there.
[46:07.090 --> 46:09.270] [SPEAKER_06]: And how are you going to change that information?
[46:09.390 --> 46:13.210] [SPEAKER_06]: How are you going to hide that information in the future when they're sharing it with the world?
[46:13.210 --> 46:19.550] [SPEAKER_06]: T-Mobile said in a statement it had been investigating the data breach since last week, which unfortunately was after it happened.
[46:20.710 --> 46:26.890] [SPEAKER_06]: And they were informed of claims made in an online forum that a bad actor had compromised T-Mobile systems.
[46:27.130 --> 46:30.310] [SPEAKER_06]: That's how they find out about these things on online forums.
[46:31.230 --> 46:37.570] [SPEAKER_06]: Some of the exposed data includes customers' first and last names, SSNs, driver's license, and other information.
[46:38.130 --> 46:42.690] [SPEAKER_06]: It also included the pins of about 850,000 active prepaid customers.
[46:42.690 --> 46:44.490] [SPEAKER_06]: So they got everything, pretty much.
[46:45.470 --> 46:52.570] [SPEAKER_06]: The company said it would reset pins for those prepaid customers and urged other customers to change their pins as well.
[46:53.570 --> 46:56.230] [SPEAKER_06]: And this is the part that really annoys me.
[46:56.510 --> 47:00.850] [SPEAKER_06]: It added that it would create a website to help customers take steps to further protect themselves.
[47:00.990 --> 47:02.570] [SPEAKER_06]: Like it was the customer's fault.
[47:02.770 --> 47:10.770] [SPEAKER_06]: And I've seen notices that go out to the customers who were affected saying, here are things that you shouldn't do if you want to protect your data.
[47:10.770 --> 47:12.670] [SPEAKER_06]: They're not the ones that lost the data.
[47:12.810 --> 47:16.810] [SPEAKER_06]: T-Mobile is the entity that didn't have proper security.
[47:16.990 --> 47:20.430] [SPEAKER_06]: We should all be sending them a note saying, this is what you need to do better.
[47:20.730 --> 47:21.450] [SPEAKER_06]: You know?
[47:21.630 --> 47:23.330] [SPEAKER_06]: Or maybe be in a different business.
[47:24.490 --> 47:25.390] [SPEAKER_06]: It's absurd.
[47:27.030 --> 47:32.890] [SPEAKER_06]: Now there's also a report that 70 million customer records from AT&T were breached.
[47:32.890 --> 47:35.490] [SPEAKER_06]: Almost like a response to this.
[47:39.810 --> 47:44.530] [SPEAKER_06]: Basically, AT&T is claiming this didn't happen.
[47:44.570 --> 47:46.870] [SPEAKER_06]: So it's kind of up in the air.
[47:49.270 --> 47:52.610] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't really have much more than that because this is coming off of a blog.
[47:53.610 --> 47:58.010] [SPEAKER_06]: But the reports are that 70 million customer records were breached in some kind of massive hack.
[47:58.970 --> 48:04.850] [SPEAKER_06]: And I guess we still have to find out if that's true and not just rumor mongering.
[48:05.830 --> 48:07.450] [SPEAKER_06]: But it's likely.
[48:07.670 --> 48:08.750] [SPEAKER_06]: It's possible.
[48:09.010 --> 48:11.090] [SPEAKER_06]: It's the kind of thing that happens all the time.
[48:11.690 --> 48:20.850] [SPEAKER_06]: And it's why we have to take steps against these companies before we trust them with anything.
[48:22.210 --> 48:23.610] [SPEAKER_06]: So use a PL box.
[48:23.750 --> 48:24.550] [SPEAKER_06]: Don't use your address.
[48:25.330 --> 48:26.990] [SPEAKER_06]: Don't give them your social security number.
[48:27.070 --> 48:30.470] [SPEAKER_06]: Give them some other form of ID that you don't mind if it gets out.
[48:31.050 --> 48:32.650] [SPEAKER_06]: If you have to even give them that at all.
[48:32.750 --> 48:33.910] [SPEAKER_06]: There's nothing wrong with being anonymous.
[48:34.090 --> 48:36.590] [SPEAKER_06]: There's nothing wrong with having alternate identities.
[48:37.390 --> 48:39.590] [SPEAKER_06]: There's nothing wrong with trying to confuse the system.
[48:40.210 --> 48:43.990] [SPEAKER_06]: And I feel that we try to follow the rules a little too much.
[48:44.190 --> 48:45.190] [SPEAKER_06]: And it always hurts us.
[48:45.870 --> 48:49.390] [SPEAKER_06]: Because these vast companies, they don't care.
[48:50.150 --> 48:51.630] [SPEAKER_06]: They don't take precautions.
[48:52.990 --> 48:57.510] [SPEAKER_06]: Your data is simply their means to make a profit.
[48:58.190 --> 48:59.690] [SPEAKER_06]: And they don't protect that.
[49:01.010 --> 49:01.710] [SPEAKER_06]: Yes, Rob?
[49:02.770 --> 49:11.850] [SPEAKER_00]: And what fascinates me about these cases, and especially T-Mobile, AT&T, the telecommunications industry, you'd think if anyone would lock their networks down.
[49:11.970 --> 49:15.590] [SPEAKER_00]: But we know better, especially those of us who are phone phreaks.
[49:15.590 --> 49:32.250] [SPEAKER_00]: But, you know, if I personally, as an individual, were responsible for the information, the personal identifying information about 100 million people, and I lost it, I screwed something up, I leaked it out there, I would probably suffer some repercussions for that.
[49:32.390 --> 49:33.530] [SPEAKER_00]: I would probably get sued.
[49:33.730 --> 49:36.030] [SPEAKER_00]: I might have, you know, charges brought against me, whatever.
[49:36.330 --> 49:38.890] [SPEAKER_00]: But, you know, what's going to happen to T-Mobile?
[49:39.030 --> 49:40.430] [SPEAKER_00]: What's going to happen to AT&T?
[49:41.370 --> 49:51.110] [SPEAKER_00]: Probably nothing, because it really doesn't matter when a company that's made of money and has many legislators that they've bought and paid for in position, you know, they don't get punished for things that they do wrong.
[49:51.250 --> 49:53.630] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, their stock might go down.
[49:53.870 --> 49:57.170] [SPEAKER_06]: There might be some profits that won't be as big as they could have been.
[49:57.470 --> 49:58.210] [SPEAKER_06]: But you know what?
[49:58.210 --> 49:59.310] [SPEAKER_06]: We're talking about T-Mobile.
[49:59.630 --> 50:03.030] [SPEAKER_06]: People are hearing about T-Mobile, and they're saying, hey, it's the name of a phone company.
[50:03.090 --> 50:05.130] [SPEAKER_06]: I need a phone company, and maybe I'll pick T-Mobile.
[50:05.370 --> 50:08.650] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, what are the odds of having another data breach after you already had one?
[50:08.650 --> 50:10.630] [SPEAKER_06]: It's like, lightning doesn't strike twice, does it?
[50:11.930 --> 50:12.770] [SPEAKER_06]: So, you're right.
[50:12.870 --> 50:13.250] [SPEAKER_06]: They don't lose.
[50:13.330 --> 50:13.770] [SPEAKER_06]: Go ahead, Alex.
[50:14.990 --> 50:17.990] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, look, on the other side of this...
[50:17.990 --> 50:18.010] [SPEAKER_10]: Really?
[50:18.110 --> 50:19.550] [SPEAKER_06]: You're going to pick another side to this?
[50:19.690 --> 50:22.230] [SPEAKER_06]: This is as black and white as it can possibly be.
[50:22.410 --> 50:25.130] [SPEAKER_06]: This is the Death Star, literally, that we're talking about.
[50:25.590 --> 50:26.010] [SPEAKER_06]: All right, fine.
[50:26.070 --> 50:26.290] [SPEAKER_06]: Go ahead.
[50:26.470 --> 50:34.030] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, the Death Star, I mean, yeah, the AT&T logo, the resemblance to the Death Star has always been pretty uncanny, I have to say.
[50:34.290 --> 50:34.650] [SPEAKER_10]: Intentional.
[50:34.650 --> 50:36.070] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I think that's my theory.
[50:37.110 --> 50:39.450] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, sorry about that, Thunderbird.
[50:39.710 --> 50:54.170] [SPEAKER_10]: But the issue I see here, though, is that we're faulting them for collecting this data, but they need this data in order to bill us and to run their systems, to send out mail, to I think a lot of it could probably be minimized.
[50:54.170 --> 50:56.370] [SPEAKER_06]: Why do they need a social security number, Alex?
[50:56.530 --> 50:59.530] [SPEAKER_06]: Why in God's name does a phone company need your social security number?
[51:00.770 --> 51:06.770] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, they probably shouldn't be retaining it for purposes other than for which it was originally retained.
[51:06.870 --> 51:08.670] [SPEAKER_06]: They need an address to send the bill to.
[51:08.790 --> 51:09.290] [SPEAKER_06]: That's all.
[51:09.490 --> 51:10.330] [SPEAKER_06]: They don't even need your name.
[51:10.430 --> 51:11.110] [SPEAKER_06]: They need an address.
[51:11.310 --> 51:12.290] [SPEAKER_06]: They need to just get paid.
[51:12.410 --> 51:13.130] [SPEAKER_06]: That's all they need.
[51:14.270 --> 51:19.290] [SPEAKER_10]: But to a certain extent here, I think we do have to be careful about blaming the victim here.
[51:19.410 --> 51:29.010] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, these companies, and as much as they are very much for profit and supposed to be stewards of our data, these are the companies that have been breached in one way or another.
[51:29.010 --> 51:29.670] [SPEAKER_10]: Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa.
[51:29.730 --> 51:30.650] [SPEAKER_06]: You said the victim.
[51:30.830 --> 51:31.670] [SPEAKER_06]: I thought you meant us.
[51:31.790 --> 51:32.750] [SPEAKER_06]: You mean they're the victim?
[51:33.110 --> 51:33.970] [SPEAKER_06]: We're the victim.
[51:34.190 --> 51:37.450] [SPEAKER_06]: We're the ones having our data passed all over the world.
[51:38.510 --> 51:39.270] [SPEAKER_10]: That's true.
[51:39.410 --> 51:40.950] [SPEAKER_10]: So there are multiple victims here.
[51:41.090 --> 51:50.030] [SPEAKER_10]: But I think we have to realize that the company is also a victim here, that there is inherent value to the data that was exfiltrated from them for a reason.
[51:51.170 --> 51:52.730] [SPEAKER_10]: Because people want it out there.
[51:52.830 --> 51:53.470] [SPEAKER_10]: They want to use it.
[51:53.550 --> 51:54.610] [SPEAKER_10]: There's too much of it out there.
[51:54.630 --> 51:55.670] [SPEAKER_10]: I completely agree.
[51:59.010 --> 51:59.550] [SPEAKER_10]: Hold on a second here.
[52:00.970 --> 52:01.410] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[52:01.950 --> 52:03.610] [SPEAKER_06]: That's an unusual way to make an argument.
[52:03.770 --> 52:06.990] [SPEAKER_06]: But look, they basically...
[52:06.990 --> 52:09.190] [SPEAKER_10]: I wasn't sure if you heard that.
[52:09.270 --> 52:13.950] [SPEAKER_10]: I had a call coming in through the same computer and using this new microphone thing.
[52:14.070 --> 52:14.890] [SPEAKER_10]: It's been weird.
[52:15.090 --> 52:19.330] [SPEAKER_10]: But yeah, I think, you know, look, these companies were breached.
[52:19.330 --> 52:20.730] [SPEAKER_10]: It is a...
[52:21.260 --> 52:25.090] [SPEAKER_10]: I think it's a big looming issue that it happens over and over and over again.
[52:25.350 --> 52:30.030] [SPEAKER_10]: And it's not enough, I agree, to just say, oh, well, cyber security is hard.
[52:31.350 --> 52:35.850] [SPEAKER_10]: But it is very difficult when you're warehousing this data to do it properly.
[52:35.850 --> 52:40.570] [SPEAKER_10]: I think everybody needs to redouble and recheck what their security controls are.
[52:40.570 --> 52:49.590] [SPEAKER_10]: It's not a simple fix by any means, but any exposure of personal identifying information will probably lead to some kind of governmental inquiry.
[52:49.710 --> 52:55.490] [SPEAKER_10]: And certainly, as Rob suggested, I think a slew of lawsuits as well.
[52:55.570 --> 53:00.330] [SPEAKER_06]: I just don't think we are wrapping our heads around 40 million people, what that means.
[53:00.330 --> 53:01.770] [SPEAKER_06]: How many people that is?
[53:02.010 --> 53:08.670] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, if you added up every Mets game since they came into existence and added the attendance, I don't think you'd reach 40 million.
[53:09.190 --> 53:09.950] [SPEAKER_06]: It's that many.
[53:11.050 --> 53:13.330] [SPEAKER_06]: I'm not sure about that, but it's a lot of people.
[53:13.870 --> 53:15.090] [SPEAKER_08]: It's like a sixth of the country, right?
[53:16.270 --> 53:17.670] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, something like that.
[53:17.950 --> 53:18.770] [SPEAKER_06]: It's huge.
[53:18.910 --> 53:19.370] [SPEAKER_08]: A little bit.
[53:19.550 --> 53:20.970] [SPEAKER_06]: And it's not even the biggest.
[53:21.330 --> 53:27.910] [SPEAKER_06]: And look, we don't seem to be getting anywhere because we've been reporting these stories for many years now, and it just keeps happening.
[53:28.130 --> 53:29.770] [SPEAKER_06]: So I just...
[53:29.770 --> 53:32.950] [SPEAKER_06]: I'm tired of buying the argument that, yeah, they're going to get better.
[53:33.910 --> 53:35.670] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't think it's in their interest to get better.
[53:35.670 --> 53:40.670] [SPEAKER_06]: I really don't, because if it were, this wouldn't be happening over decades.
[53:40.670 --> 53:53.570] [SPEAKER_06]: They would have taken this more seriously and not collected so much information about us and allowed it to fall into unauthorized hands so many times.
[53:53.690 --> 53:58.830] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, as Rob said, if any one of us did that, we'd be looking for another job.
[53:58.830 --> 54:00.090] [SPEAKER_06]: We'd be facing charges.
[54:00.450 --> 54:04.670] [SPEAKER_06]: All kinds of serious things would happen to us that do not happen to major corporations.
[54:04.670 --> 54:11.250] [SPEAKER_06]: I'm sorry, that's going to have to be the last word, except on overtime, which you can join us on in just a few minutes at 8 o'clock.
[54:11.490 --> 54:18.570] [SPEAKER_06]: Go to youtube.com/Channel2600, or go to the link that's on the 2600.com webpage.
[54:18.890 --> 54:21.630] [SPEAKER_06]: And you can call us and talk to us.
[54:22.030 --> 54:24.070] [SPEAKER_06]: And we'll be on there in just a few minutes.
[54:24.070 --> 54:29.390] [SPEAKER_06]: We lost a major octogenarian drummer in a rock and roll band.
[54:29.550 --> 54:35.390] [SPEAKER_06]: There's going to be a lot of octogenarian drummers in the years ahead, Charlie Watts from the Rolling Stones.
[54:36.050 --> 54:43.950] [SPEAKER_06]: I want to go out with a tribute where he basically played on the only song that has our name in it.
[54:44.570 --> 54:46.950] [SPEAKER_06]: So here's our tribute, and we'll see you next week.
[54:47.210 --> 54:47.790] [SPEAKER_06]: Good night.
[54:54.370 --> 54:58.190] [SPEAKER_04]: Sit in my bedroom late last night.
[55:00.970 --> 55:04.110] [SPEAKER_04]: Caught in the bed, it turned out the light.
[55:06.930 --> 55:10.030] [SPEAKER_04]: The sign has called my baby on the telephone.
[55:13.430 --> 55:17.370] [SPEAKER_04]: All I got was a naked, so it's off the hook.
[55:19.210 --> 55:20.490] [SPEAKER_04]: It's off the hook.
[55:22.310 --> 55:23.690] [SPEAKER_04]: It's off the hook.
[55:25.430 --> 55:26.790] [SPEAKER_04]: It's off the hook.
[55:28.570 --> 55:29.990] [SPEAKER_04]: It's off the hook.
[55:38.490 --> 55:41.790] [SPEAKER_04]: Talking so long, she hasn't set my mind.
[55:44.550 --> 55:47.930] [SPEAKER_04]: Why is your dog in such a long time?
[55:50.950 --> 55:54.270] [SPEAKER_04]: Maybe she's sleeping, maybe she's ill.
[56:22.520 --> 56:25.280] [SPEAKER_04]: Don't want to be afraid of what I find.
[56:28.020 --> 56:57.360] [SPEAKER_04]: I'm tired of letting her upset me all the time Back in the bed start to read my books Take my phone right off of the hook It's off the hook It's off the hook It's off the hook It's off the hook It's off the hook!
[56:59.180 --> 57:00.380] [SPEAKER_04]: It's off the hook!
[57:02.360 --> 57:03.460] [SPEAKER_04]: It's off the hook.
[57:05.520 --> 57:06.700] [SPEAKER_04]: It's off the hook.
[57:08.720 --> 57:09.840] [SPEAKER_04]: It's off the hook.
[57:11.900 --> 57:13.000] [SPEAKER_04]: It's off the hook.
[57:16.530 --> 57:17.910] [SPEAKER_06]: And welcome back, everybody.
[57:18.230 --> 57:21.950] [SPEAKER_06]: It's time for overtime on Off The Hook.
[57:22.390 --> 57:26.530] [SPEAKER_06]: Manuel here, Kyle there, and everyone's just getting back.
[57:26.630 --> 57:29.730] [SPEAKER_06]: We all take little breaks in the five minutes that we're given.
[57:29.730 --> 57:32.370] [SPEAKER_06]: Again, I'm told that we are actually on the air.
[57:33.490 --> 57:35.650] [SPEAKER_06]: However, that's incorrect because we're not on the air.
[57:35.830 --> 57:37.330] [SPEAKER_06]: We're on the net.
[57:37.610 --> 57:38.470] [SPEAKER_06]: But whatever.
[57:38.630 --> 57:39.930] [SPEAKER_06]: Maybe somebody's broadcasting us.
[57:40.170 --> 57:41.030] [SPEAKER_06]: Someone could do this.
[57:41.050 --> 57:42.530] [SPEAKER_06]: I could broadcast the YouTube stream.
[57:42.630 --> 57:43.530] [SPEAKER_07]: You mean from the stream, yeah.
[57:43.650 --> 57:43.990] [SPEAKER_07]: Why not?
[57:44.090 --> 57:44.250] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[57:44.450 --> 57:45.450] [SPEAKER_07]: You have our permission.
[57:45.650 --> 57:47.950] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, except we don't have to abide by FCC rules now.
[57:48.110 --> 57:50.650] [SPEAKER_06]: Although we still do, but we might not.
[57:50.830 --> 57:52.450] [SPEAKER_06]: And then it would be up to you.
[57:54.630 --> 57:57.050] [SPEAKER_06]: And yeah, we can take phone calls now, too.
[57:57.670 --> 57:59.290] [SPEAKER_06]: That's one of the reasons we can take phone calls.
[57:59.730 --> 58:02.790] [SPEAKER_06]: Our phone number, 802-321-4225.
[58:03.090 --> 58:05.910] [SPEAKER_06]: That's 802-321-HACK.
[58:07.650 --> 58:09.230] [SPEAKER_06]: And I don't know what you're pointing to, Kyle.
[58:09.870 --> 58:10.790] [SPEAKER_06]: You just pointed to something.
[58:11.230 --> 58:12.350] [SPEAKER_08]: Well, I hadn't heard it.
[58:12.410 --> 58:14.110] [SPEAKER_08]: I just wanted to know if you could test it.
[58:14.290 --> 58:14.690] [SPEAKER_06]: Test what?
[58:14.890 --> 58:16.090] [SPEAKER_08]: We don't have a call yet.
[58:16.590 --> 58:16.910] [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[58:17.090 --> 58:19.970] [SPEAKER_08]: Could you maybe turn it up so we can just see if it's there?
[58:20.130 --> 58:20.190] [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[58:20.410 --> 58:20.790] [SPEAKER_06]: Turn this?
[58:21.110 --> 58:21.870] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, yeah.
[58:22.050 --> 58:22.650] [SPEAKER_06]: We have a dial tone.
[58:23.310 --> 58:25.110] [SPEAKER_06]: Which means nobody can call because we have a dial tone.
[58:25.250 --> 58:25.890] [SPEAKER_08]: Well, now they can.
[58:26.070 --> 58:26.310] [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[58:26.470 --> 58:26.790] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, good.
[58:26.890 --> 58:26.970] [SPEAKER_08]: Good.
[58:27.070 --> 58:27.550] [SPEAKER_08]: Thanks for that.
[58:27.550 --> 58:29.030] [SPEAKER_06]: 802-321-4225.
[58:30.450 --> 58:37.550] [SPEAKER_06]: There is another story that broke this week that I like to spend a little bit of time on.
[58:37.970 --> 58:41.030] [SPEAKER_06]: And I wish we could have spent more time on it or any time on it on the air.
[58:41.550 --> 58:46.770] [SPEAKER_06]: But there is a content subscription platform called OnlyFans.
[58:46.910 --> 58:48.370] [SPEAKER_06]: You might have heard about this in the news.
[58:49.910 --> 58:53.570] [SPEAKER_06]: We had about 120,000 creators registered with the site.
[58:54.030 --> 59:03.450] [SPEAKER_06]: And after the pandemic left millions of people out of work and sex workers unable to safely meet with clients in person, people flocked to the platform, which was already well known for its adult content.
[59:03.450 --> 59:09.010] [SPEAKER_06]: And by the end of 2020, OnlyFans boasted 1 million creators and 80 million users.
[59:09.430 --> 59:10.530] [SPEAKER_06]: Call that success.
[59:11.670 --> 59:15.730] [SPEAKER_06]: Creators liked the control the platform gave them over the kind of work they wanted to do.
[59:15.830 --> 59:17.990] [SPEAKER_06]: But the more the site grew, the more nervous they got.
[59:18.890 --> 59:22.450] [SPEAKER_06]: OnlyFans is not going to last, but it is a hell of a ride.
[59:23.990 --> 59:28.210] [SPEAKER_06]: OnlyFans creator, Kimberly Kane, told the New York Times in May.
[59:29.270 --> 59:35.510] [SPEAKER_06]: That's rather dire for the basically...
[59:35.510 --> 59:40.190] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, actually, it's kind of confusing here when you say OnlyFans creator.
[59:41.050 --> 59:44.750] [SPEAKER_06]: I assume that meant she created OnlyFans, but she didn't, did she?
[59:44.870 --> 59:46.350] [SPEAKER_06]: She's just a creator on OnlyFans.
[59:46.350 --> 59:49.270] [SPEAKER_08]: It's how they describe users of their site.
[59:49.270 --> 59:53.970] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't like defining people in that way, because it just makes them seem like gods, you know?
[59:54.730 --> 59:55.130] [SPEAKER_06]: Creators?
[59:55.330 --> 59:57.010] [SPEAKER_06]: I would never call myself a creator.
[59:58.230 --> 59:58.630] [SPEAKER_06]: Creative?
[59:58.790 --> 01:00:00.970] [SPEAKER_06]: I'm creative, but I don't know.
[01:00:01.150 --> 01:00:02.790] [SPEAKER_06]: It's just, in this context...
[01:00:02.790 --> 01:00:05.410] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, so she didn't start the site itself.
[01:00:05.750 --> 01:00:12.410] [SPEAKER_06]: It made it sound like she was saying that they were going to take it away from the people that made the site, that started the site.
[01:00:13.010 --> 01:00:15.250] [SPEAKER_06]: They'll take it away from us, just like they do everything else.
[01:00:15.250 --> 01:00:16.670] [SPEAKER_06]: It's only a matter of time.
[01:00:16.850 --> 01:00:17.950] [SPEAKER_06]: And she was right.
[01:00:17.950 --> 01:00:33.630] [SPEAKER_06]: Last Thursday, the site announced it would ban sexually explicit content beginning in October in order to comply with the requests of the platform's banking partners and payout providers as it seeks to attract outside investors.
[01:00:34.050 --> 01:00:35.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Isn't that always the way?
[01:00:35.950 --> 01:00:45.230] [SPEAKER_06]: And as it turns out, bankers and credit card companies are extremely conservative in their policies.
[01:00:45.230 --> 01:00:53.510] [SPEAKER_06]: And they don't tolerate certain things that you might find is no problem for most of us.
[01:00:55.890 --> 01:01:03.770] [SPEAKER_06]: Basically, this was something that bothered a lot of people and was turning into a real issue.
[01:01:03.910 --> 01:01:04.970] [SPEAKER_06]: But I understand...
[01:01:04.970 --> 01:01:06.570] [SPEAKER_06]: Has it been resolved?
[01:01:06.750 --> 01:01:07.450] [SPEAKER_06]: Has it been changed?
[01:01:07.610 --> 01:01:08.690] [SPEAKER_06]: Rob, do you know something about this?
[01:01:10.050 --> 01:01:10.430] [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[01:01:10.630 --> 01:01:22.110] [SPEAKER_00]: Basically, they announced that they were going to ban what's known as sexually explicit content, and I think in October, and there was a huge outcry.
[01:01:22.230 --> 01:01:24.870] [SPEAKER_00]: There were people who depend on the platform for a living.
[01:01:25.050 --> 01:01:28.430] [SPEAKER_00]: That was only exacerbated by the pandemic and lockdown and everything else.
[01:01:28.910 --> 01:01:31.050] [SPEAKER_00]: It's a form of work that people find...
[01:01:31.050 --> 01:01:32.630] [SPEAKER_00]: that some people find they can do from home.
[01:01:32.910 --> 01:01:35.290] [SPEAKER_00]: And that worked for a lot of folks.
[01:01:35.290 --> 01:01:37.650] [SPEAKER_00]: And so, you know, it was a good thing.
[01:01:37.830 --> 01:01:50.270] [SPEAKER_00]: But the platform has been advertised for people like performers of all types, people with, you know, cooking lessons and yoga lessons and things like that.
[01:01:50.970 --> 01:01:54.190] [SPEAKER_00]: That's what it looks like in the ads, in the ad campaigns.
[01:01:54.430 --> 01:01:58.370] [SPEAKER_00]: But on practical terms, it was driven by sex workers.
[01:01:58.590 --> 01:02:04.870] [SPEAKER_00]: It was driven by people producing pornographic content, just like every technological innovation in our history.
[01:02:05.290 --> 01:02:11.010] [SPEAKER_00]: You know, home video, the Internet itself, commerce on the Internet, site security.
[01:02:11.330 --> 01:02:15.150] [SPEAKER_00]: So much of this was spearheaded by people in the adult entertainment industries.
[01:02:15.570 --> 01:02:19.390] [SPEAKER_00]: And OnlyFans was ready to drop all of that.
[01:02:19.590 --> 01:02:25.410] [SPEAKER_00]: But there was an outcry, and apparently OnlyFans was able to resolve the issues with their bank.
[01:02:25.450 --> 01:02:31.230] [SPEAKER_00]: That was the root of their policy change.
[01:02:31.370 --> 01:02:32.790] [SPEAKER_00]: And so they reversed the decision.
[01:02:33.470 --> 01:02:36.770] [SPEAKER_06]: Maybe not going with the first Christian bank of Alabama was a mistake.
[01:02:37.010 --> 01:02:39.270] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, maybe they should go with somebody a little bit more liberal.
[01:02:40.010 --> 01:02:41.890] [SPEAKER_06]: Because, you know, there are porn sites everywhere.
[01:02:42.050 --> 01:02:45.610] [SPEAKER_06]: I understand there's porn sites all over the place, and they take credit cards.
[01:02:45.730 --> 01:02:47.130] [SPEAKER_06]: So what is the issue?
[01:02:47.270 --> 01:02:50.990] [SPEAKER_09]: There are virtual banks everywhere, and they take, well, money.
[01:02:50.990 --> 01:02:52.150] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh-huh, there's cryptocurrency.
[01:02:52.750 --> 01:02:53.970] [SPEAKER_06]: That certainly doesn't care.
[01:02:54.990 --> 01:03:02.030] [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, but it turns out there is so much discourse that's coming of this, and a lot of it is really fascinating, even if you're not interested in the product itself.
[01:03:02.030 --> 01:03:22.990] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, because this, uh, the, the, the real, the real, uh, issue behind all of this is that the banks find themselves under pressure from organized evangelical activists, uh, conservatives, people like that, who, um, basically are using this as a way to legislate what people can do with their bodies.
[01:03:23.610 --> 01:03:28.950] [SPEAKER_00]: And, uh, you know, it's a roundabout way to come to it, but it, it, uh, it is something that's happening in the world.
[01:03:29.190 --> 01:03:45.730] [SPEAKER_00]: And, um, I think, based on what I'm seeing, it really seems like OnlyFans, maybe even if they thought they could, uh, get around this and keep paying their sex worker, uh, creators, um, were maybe interested in testing the waters to see if they could move away from the,
[01:03:45.730 --> 01:03:47.770] [SPEAKER_00]: the pornographic end of what they do.
[01:03:47.770 --> 01:03:57.450] [SPEAKER_00]: And, uh, realize that, uh, it failed and they weren't going to, uh, continue their business based on, uh, you know, the cooking classes and, and yoga mat stuff and whatever.
[01:03:57.810 --> 01:03:58.850] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, consider those waters tested.
[01:03:59.290 --> 01:04:01.950] [SPEAKER_06]: And, uh, I think maybe they, uh, they've had second thoughts.
[01:04:02.030 --> 01:04:04.230] [SPEAKER_06]: It just goes to show that public outcry matters.
[01:04:04.410 --> 01:04:05.630] [SPEAKER_06]: That's how you make change.
[01:04:05.630 --> 01:04:08.730] [SPEAKER_06]: And, uh, a lot of people have never even heard of OnlyFans before.
[01:04:08.910 --> 01:04:20.670] [SPEAKER_06]: Now they've gotten a lot of publicity and, uh, they, they are going to hold on, hopefully, to their, their, their client base and, um, not let this nonsense happen to them again.
[01:04:21.290 --> 01:04:21.730] [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[01:04:21.950 --> 01:04:32.270] [SPEAKER_00]: And there, there are so many ways that, uh, creative people have been, uh, have been able to make their living online by, you know, selling artwork, by, uh, you know, selling, um, items.
[01:04:32.270 --> 01:04:39.490] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, but, uh, so much of that has found itself under censorship restrictions because you can't do adult level stuff.
[01:04:39.690 --> 01:04:53.530] [SPEAKER_00]: Like, if I want to sell stuff as a creative artist, if I want to sell work as a performer, um, the instant it becomes what, uh, people would generally define as pornographic, it's almost impossible to get paid for it in any easy to use way.
[01:04:53.950 --> 01:05:02.190] [SPEAKER_00]: And, uh, that, that is, uh, that is by design from, uh, from people behind these organizations who find themselves, you know, exceeding to these policy decisions.
[01:05:04.310 --> 01:05:05.830] [SPEAKER_06]: Alex, it looks like you have something to say.
[01:05:07.510 --> 01:05:21.570] [SPEAKER_10]: I've, I've, I've always got something on my mind here, and I, I think it's this time that we shouldn't never underestimate the, the power of the dollar either in, in affecting this kind of change, uh, at OnlyFans in the, in the first place.
[01:05:21.570 --> 01:05:33.950] [SPEAKER_10]: And, uh, if you take this extrapolated to other contexts, other situations or scenarios, think about something other than a payment processor, for instance.
[01:05:34.150 --> 01:05:41.010] [SPEAKER_10]: Let's think about advertisers or advertising networks, which support a great deal of the web these days.
[01:05:41.010 --> 01:05:51.990] [SPEAKER_10]: Advertising, especially journalistic endeavors, and, and media outlets themselves, that don't put all of their content behind a paywall, generally rely on ads to be popped up.
[01:05:51.990 --> 01:06:14.430] [SPEAKER_10]: And let's say that there became a coalition of advertisers, some advertising network that had a lot of purchasing power, and really held sacred Christian values, Christian and family values, and then determined that something like the New York Times or Wired wasn't really sinking with those values.
[01:06:14.430 --> 01:06:22.710] [SPEAKER_10]: And that they began to, and that they began to pull all of their ads, and get all of their coalitions, and all of the coalition of their companies to, to pull all of their ads.
[01:06:22.810 --> 01:06:37.330] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, they could effectively change content, and change the, the voice of a lot of these outlets by the power of the dollar, which gets us full circle back to the reason why places like WBAI exists.
[01:06:37.550 --> 01:06:44.230] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, I know we're not on the air right now, but the Pacifica radio network is independent from all of that.
[01:06:44.230 --> 01:06:46.370] [SPEAKER_10]: And has been for... what is it, Emmanuel?
[01:06:46.610 --> 01:06:48.310] [SPEAKER_10]: I think it's over 60 years now.
[01:06:48.450 --> 01:06:51.690] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, more than that, because Pacifica started in 1949.
[01:06:52.050 --> 01:06:53.450] [SPEAKER_06]: WBAI started in 1960.
[01:06:54.730 --> 01:06:55.210] [SPEAKER_10]: Wow.
[01:06:55.210 --> 01:06:55.690] [SPEAKER_10]: Amazing.
[01:06:55.990 --> 01:06:57.690] [SPEAKER_10]: So, yeah, even longer than that.
[01:06:57.790 --> 01:07:07.890] [SPEAKER_10]: But, I mean, so these networks that are by design outside of that process are, I think, becoming fewer and far between and extraordinarily valuable.
[01:07:08.150 --> 01:07:14.110] [SPEAKER_10]: And, you know, I wish we were fundraising at the time because, you know, I'd say now's the time to become a WBAI buddy.
[01:07:14.230 --> 01:07:15.590] [SPEAKER_10]: But, hey, you still can.
[01:07:15.990 --> 01:07:17.630] [SPEAKER_06]: No one has ever said that before.
[01:07:17.650 --> 01:07:18.870] [SPEAKER_06]: I wish we were fundraising.
[01:07:19.910 --> 01:07:20.550] [SPEAKER_10]: That's true.
[01:07:20.850 --> 01:07:21.210] [SPEAKER_10]: Absolutely.
[01:07:21.870 --> 01:07:23.050] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, I don't miss that.
[01:07:23.050 --> 01:07:24.430] [SPEAKER_10]: I feel like I'm going to eat my words.
[01:07:24.610 --> 01:07:26.510] [SPEAKER_10]: We'll probably be fundraising before you know it, all right?
[01:07:27.050 --> 01:07:28.290] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, speaking of eating your words.
[01:07:29.330 --> 01:07:30.130] [SPEAKER_06]: We have a phone call.
[01:07:30.310 --> 01:07:31.350] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, let's go to the phone call.
[01:07:31.410 --> 01:07:31.730] [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[01:07:31.890 --> 01:07:33.170] [SPEAKER_06]: You're on Off The Hook Overtime.
[01:07:34.570 --> 01:07:38.530] [SPEAKER_03]: Hey, I wanted to add some context to the OnlyFans situation.
[01:07:38.850 --> 01:07:39.030] [SPEAKER_06]: Sure.
[01:07:40.150 --> 01:07:45.450] [SPEAKER_03]: I'm like a 3D creator, and I'm friends with a lot of people who make pornographic content.
[01:07:46.150 --> 01:07:48.290] [SPEAKER_03]: Specifically, it was mostly on Pornhub.
[01:07:48.510 --> 01:07:54.710] [SPEAKER_03]: And earlier this year, if you weren't a verified creator, you basically lost everything.
[01:07:55.050 --> 01:07:55.310] Wow.
[01:07:55.550 --> 01:07:58.570] [SPEAKER_03]: And those people I know ended up going to Patreon.
[01:07:58.710 --> 01:08:00.790] [SPEAKER_03]: They ended up going to OnlyFans.
[01:08:01.090 --> 01:08:05.210] [SPEAKER_03]: And they still have only, like, recovered a fraction of what they were earning.
[01:08:05.750 --> 01:08:09.790] [SPEAKER_03]: But it wasn't because of Christian evangelicals.
[01:08:09.910 --> 01:08:12.190] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, we can, you know, you can blame them for everything.
[01:08:12.410 --> 01:08:15.930] [SPEAKER_03]: But it's actually, like, reverberations of the PATRIOT Act.
[01:08:16.170 --> 01:08:16.570] [SPEAKER_05]: Really?
[01:08:16.570 --> 01:08:25.290] [SPEAKER_03]: Because back when, yeah, whenever they enacted the PATRIOT Act way back in the day, they deputized the banks to act.
[01:08:25.530 --> 01:08:28.270] [SPEAKER_03]: It's like, you know, financial arms of the government in a way.
[01:08:28.470 --> 01:08:32.130] [SPEAKER_03]: So that's, like, why you can't, like, get weed stuff done.
[01:08:32.290 --> 01:08:34.050] [SPEAKER_03]: But they would take, like, cartel money.
[01:08:34.050 --> 01:08:37.170] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, it's totally insane and backwards, right?
[01:08:37.510 --> 01:08:45.810] [SPEAKER_03]: But it's just really insane that, like, specifically the driving force behind all of this is MasterCard.
[01:08:46.210 --> 01:08:51.570] [SPEAKER_03]: Like, MasterCard is this insane rabbit hole, if you ever look into it.
[01:08:51.710 --> 01:09:03.490] [SPEAKER_03]: Like, whenever OnlyFans released, like, what was considered sexually explicit, it was MasterCard's, like, known list of things that porn sites can't have on them.
[01:09:05.670 --> 01:09:10.370] [SPEAKER_03]: But Pornhub and OnlyFans, they both got into trouble for basically the same thing.
[01:09:10.790 --> 01:09:17.810] [SPEAKER_03]: There were, like, child sex workers, people being forced into prostitution and forced onto the platform.
[01:09:18.030 --> 01:09:24.150] [SPEAKER_03]: And that was kind of, like, the entryway for them to start having, you know, this is happening on your platform.
[01:09:24.690 --> 01:09:29.510] [SPEAKER_03]: You're going to have to start, you know, banning sexually explicit content and we're not going to process your stuff.
[01:09:30.150 --> 01:09:30.610] [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[01:09:30.610 --> 01:09:33.950] [SPEAKER_03]: So we're seeing, like, that happening and it's just, it's real messy.
[01:09:34.910 --> 01:09:46.390] [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, that's interesting that you bring that up as a fallout from financial reporting laws that were instituted really as under the auspices of terror, like, anti-terror law, I think.
[01:09:46.610 --> 01:09:46.730] [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[01:09:46.730 --> 01:10:01.970] [SPEAKER_08]: Specifically, Freedom Act and PATRIOT Act refer to that and child sex trafficking, of course, being part of that kind of criteria where they want to exert this kind of control.
[01:10:02.270 --> 01:10:11.530] [SPEAKER_08]: But as you characterize it, it sort of became something that was unsupervised and then just left to the banks, right?
[01:10:12.670 --> 01:10:17.510] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, it's, it's, it's really, it's really insane and it's only going to get worse.
[01:10:17.510 --> 01:10:21.790] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, they're going to come for the porn people first.
[01:10:22.050 --> 01:10:26.690] [SPEAKER_03]: And, you know, a lot of people are like, yay, you know, porn's yucky, whatever, you know.
[01:10:27.690 --> 01:10:29.290] [SPEAKER_03]: Who says porn is yucky?
[01:10:29.470 --> 01:10:30.290] [SPEAKER_03]: I want to hear some of that.
[01:10:30.290 --> 01:10:36.610] [SPEAKER_03]: Well, you know, a lot of, there's actually a big movement, especially among, like, Generation Z that's very, like, anti-porn.
[01:10:36.770 --> 01:10:37.050] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh-huh.
[01:10:37.410 --> 01:10:38.830] [SPEAKER_03]: It's, it's very interesting.
[01:10:38.830 --> 01:10:42.250] [SPEAKER_03]: I don't know if maybe their parents watch too much of it, and that's them being edgy.
[01:10:42.630 --> 01:10:43.350] [SPEAKER_03]: I don't know.
[01:10:44.110 --> 01:10:46.810] [SPEAKER_06]: Rebelling against porn as, as, as part of growing up.
[01:10:46.910 --> 01:10:55.130] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, it's, it's actually, there's, like, a whole movement called, um, NoFap, where people refuse to masturbate because they think it'll make them more powerful as people.
[01:10:55.450 --> 01:10:57.670] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, yeah, the future is bright.
[01:10:57.870 --> 01:10:59.290] [SPEAKER_06]: The future is really bright.
[01:10:59.510 --> 01:11:01.730] [SPEAKER_06]: If I wasn't feeling pessimistic before, I am now.
[01:11:01.730 --> 01:11:10.770] [SPEAKER_08]: So, yeah, I think some of that came out of, like, a porn addiction, uh, becoming something that was really, uh, talked about widely, uh, more widely, right?
[01:11:11.730 --> 01:11:12.170] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[01:11:12.650 --> 01:11:13.510] [SPEAKER_08]: For, for that generation.
[01:11:14.130 --> 01:11:26.270] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, like, it's, it's just, it's, it's, we're in a very shady valley, and if, if we can start banning porn, we can start banning speech, and it's, I know, slippery slope fallacy and all that, but it really is something to think about.
[01:11:26.810 --> 01:11:28.530] [SPEAKER_03]: You know, it's, it's not good.
[01:11:29.010 --> 01:11:30.110] [SPEAKER_06]: Absolutely, absolutely.
[01:11:30.110 --> 01:11:33.550] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, thank you so much for the insight, and, uh, it's given us a lot to think about.
[01:11:34.390 --> 01:11:35.370] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, no problem, bye.
[01:11:35.590 --> 01:11:36.230] [SPEAKER_06]: All right, take care.
[01:11:37.470 --> 01:11:38.550] [SPEAKER_06]: What an amazing call.
[01:11:38.710 --> 01:11:40.330] [SPEAKER_06]: Wow, I've, I've learned so much.
[01:11:40.590 --> 01:11:40.950] [SPEAKER_06]: Pornhub.
[01:11:41.370 --> 01:11:43.190] [SPEAKER_06]: Pornhub being told not to have porn.
[01:11:43.730 --> 01:11:47.670] [SPEAKER_06]: It's, it's, it's more than half their name, and, oh, boy.
[01:11:48.910 --> 01:11:49.930] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, do you hear something, Rob?
[01:11:50.870 --> 01:12:04.670] [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, it's, it's fascinating, and I'm so glad we got a call from somebody who's actually closer to this and, and can speak from, uh, can speak from experience on it, because it's really, it's really something, and if, uh, if, uh, if you're out there and you have something to add on this,
[01:12:04.750 --> 01:12:19.450] [SPEAKER_00]: we would really love your phone call at, uh, 802-321-4225 or toll-free at 833-755-2600, um, because, yeah, we need to, we need to get everyone's voices in on this and, uh, hear about what's going on from all these different perspectives.
[01:12:19.690 --> 01:12:26.090] [SPEAKER_00]: And, yeah, as a creative, um, you know, it sucks when there's, uh, there's limits placed on what you're allowed to do.
[01:12:26.430 --> 01:12:36.070] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, there were so many other venues, uh, before OnlyFans that, uh, people who were creating sex work or, you know, adult entertainment, uh, could, uh, could go to.
[01:12:36.210 --> 01:12:50.010] [SPEAKER_00]: There was Patreon for a while, and then Patreon banned the porn, and, uh, there were other things, uh, similar things, but, uh, that, you know, one by one have fallen like dominoes, uh, because, um, banning adult content on their platforms, and OnlyFans was meant to be the one.
[01:12:50.170 --> 01:13:03.710] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, it was meant to be the one where you were allowed to do that sort of thing, and they kind of embraced it, but let that industry build them up into a major player and then, uh, seemed really willing to just, uh, throw, throw the adult producers under the bus.
[01:13:03.810 --> 01:13:07.070] [SPEAKER_06]: But there's a .xxx top-level domain, you know?
[01:13:07.470 --> 01:13:09.030] [SPEAKER_06]: What, what do people think that's for?
[01:13:09.030 --> 01:13:09.090] [SPEAKER_06]: Sure.
[01:13:09.410 --> 01:13:12.250] [SPEAKER_06]: And, and, uh, you, you can't shut this down.
[01:13:12.410 --> 01:13:19.710] [SPEAKER_06]: This is, this is, what, what the, I don't want to say it's what the net was built upon, but it's a major part of the net.
[01:13:20.370 --> 01:13:22.850] [SPEAKER_06]: And, uh, you can't just wish it away.
[01:13:23.310 --> 01:13:37.410] [SPEAKER_06]: But, you know, if, if nothing else, this kind of emphasizes the importance of having these alternative ways of paying people, and cryptocurrency has never looked so good, because they don't have to play by these rules.
[01:13:39.510 --> 01:13:44.590] [SPEAKER_08]: Absolutely, because you can, uh, build it in, in some ways, if, um, you're having some trouble.
[01:13:44.730 --> 01:13:51.650] [SPEAKER_08]: I'm sure there's been some talk or people trying different workarounds in the, in the interim, uh, as these policies are fluctuating.
[01:13:51.950 --> 01:13:54.610] [SPEAKER_08]: Um, and, uh, there has, it's interesting Pornhub was brought up.
[01:13:54.730 --> 01:14:02.210] [SPEAKER_08]: It's been, there's been a lot of investigative work around, um, some aspects of that platform and how it's been abused.
[01:14:02.370 --> 01:14:16.750] [SPEAKER_08]: And much in the way we've talked about, like, social media platforms cracking down, you know, how to, uh, control stuff that is against, definitely against your policy and, and how to show, of course, that it is concretely being managed in some way and,
[01:14:16.870 --> 01:14:20.570] [SPEAKER_08]: and, um, you know, enforced as, as build.
[01:14:21.090 --> 01:14:25.110] [SPEAKER_08]: And, um, we're really, um, um, happy to share.
[01:14:25.270 --> 01:14:35.330] [SPEAKER_08]: Anybody who does, um, know a bit more about this, uh, field, how, um, payment management systems are, are used and how, uh, much power they've been given.
[01:14:35.470 --> 01:14:41.770] [SPEAKER_08]: And if, if, um, if the scope of some of that legislation has changed, um, please share with us.
[01:14:41.830 --> 01:14:46.170] [SPEAKER_08]: We've, we've covered, um, some of those acts and so forth, uh, over the years.
[01:14:46.370 --> 01:14:52.070] [SPEAKER_08]: So, oth@2600.com, uh, to, to get your emails.
[01:14:52.370 --> 01:14:53.250] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, go ahead, Alex.
[01:14:54.030 --> 01:15:03.050] [SPEAKER_10]: To bounce off your, your comment about .xxx, in addition to that, there is also a .sex, .
[01:15:03.050 --> 01:15:07.450] [SPEAKER_10]: uh, generic top-level domain, and a .porn generic top-level domain.
[01:15:07.690 --> 01:15:12.150] [SPEAKER_10]: These were, uh, part of the expansion of the global domain name system.
[01:15:12.270 --> 01:15:15.390] [SPEAKER_06]: Someone explain to me the difference between .porn and .xxx.
[01:15:15.470 --> 01:15:16.170] [SPEAKER_06]: I'd like to know.
[01:15:16.810 --> 01:15:17.410] [SPEAKER_00]: The spelling.
[01:15:17.950 --> 01:15:20.570] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, they're different, they're different characters, basically.
[01:15:20.870 --> 01:15:26.490] [SPEAKER_10]: You know, that's, I mean, they're, they're owned and operated by different individuals, different registry operators.
[01:15:26.730 --> 01:15:29.450] [SPEAKER_06]: But we have 2600.xxx, but don't go there.
[01:15:29.590 --> 01:15:30.370] [SPEAKER_06]: You'll, you'll be disappointed.
[01:15:31.170 --> 01:15:32.030] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm sure.
[01:15:32.290 --> 01:15:32.410] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[01:15:32.690 --> 01:15:33.830] [SPEAKER_10]: I bet you would.
[01:15:34.070 --> 01:15:39.390] [SPEAKER_10]: But yeah, but there's two other top-level domains that are devoted entirely to this type of activity.
[01:15:40.010 --> 01:15:51.070] [SPEAKER_10]: Uh, and you know, ICANN saw fit to allow additional delegations into the root zone of the domain name system, uh, for .sex and .porn.
[01:15:51.070 --> 01:15:57.370] [SPEAKER_10]: And that was back in probably 2014, I think was when those were delegated, 2014, 2015, I would guess.
[01:15:57.790 --> 01:16:00.070] [SPEAKER_10]: It's like, they've been around for a long time and they're pretty popular.
[01:16:00.770 --> 01:16:01.450] [SPEAKER_00]: Go ahead, Rob.
[01:16:01.930 --> 01:16:17.070] [SPEAKER_00]: And, and just as someone who, uh, has been putting creative work on the net, you know, since, uh, time immemorial, it's been such a joy of the Internet to, uh, see people being able to make their own careers, to connect directly with, uh, people who appreciate,
[01:16:17.070 --> 01:16:18.790] [SPEAKER_00]: purchase, uh, enjoy their work.
[01:16:19.130 --> 01:16:25.010] [SPEAKER_00]: You know, so many traditional publishing industries have found themselves disrupted, um, by people who don't need them anymore.
[01:16:25.130 --> 01:16:28.770] [SPEAKER_00]: You don't need to, a record deal with a major label to put your album out there.
[01:16:28.850 --> 01:16:29.810] [SPEAKER_00]: You can just put it on the Internet.
[01:16:29.970 --> 01:16:34.850] [SPEAKER_00]: You don't need a TV studio or a TV network deal to, to put a video out there.
[01:16:34.950 --> 01:16:36.010] [SPEAKER_00]: You can just upload it yourself.
[01:16:36.530 --> 01:16:48.550] [SPEAKER_00]: And, uh, to find a segment of the population, a segment of the creative population excluded from that just because of the type they work, the type of work they put out, despite the fact that it's a type of work there is demonstrable demand for.
[01:16:48.950 --> 01:16:50.030] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, it sucks.
[01:16:50.150 --> 01:16:54.770] [SPEAKER_00]: It sucks, uh, seeing people, uh, seeing people, uh, legislated unfairly like that.
[01:16:55.410 --> 01:16:59.590] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, this kind of thing, this kind of thinking doesn't just, uh, affect porn.
[01:16:59.910 --> 01:17:07.950] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, whenever there's a corporation that feels it's going to inject its own moral values into something, you, you, you, you find situations like this.
[01:17:08.550 --> 01:17:10.310] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, this story came out recently.
[01:17:10.310 --> 01:17:15.770] [SPEAKER_06]: Well-intentioned hackers trying to teach online hygiene and safety are running into a problem on TikTok.
[01:17:16.230 --> 01:17:23.510] [SPEAKER_06]: The newer social media platforms algorithms can't distinguish between videos about criminal and ethical hacking.
[01:17:23.930 --> 01:17:32.230] [SPEAKER_06]: Marcus Hutchins, who rose to fame after temporarily stopping the WannaCry ransomware attack back in 2017, knows this problem well.
[01:17:32.310 --> 01:17:43.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Whenever he posts an educational video demonstrating hacking techniques bad actors use, TikTok's content moderation algorithm immediately removes it for seemingly violating policies against promoting criminal activity.
[01:17:44.170 --> 01:17:47.670] [SPEAKER_06]: And, uh, it also bans him from posting for a couple of days.
[01:17:48.030 --> 01:17:55.850] [SPEAKER_06]: The weird part is each time he's appealed the removals, TikTok has reinstated the video and Hutchins says he's not the only one.
[01:17:56.030 --> 01:17:58.890] [SPEAKER_06]: Everyone in cybersecurity is having this issue.
[01:17:59.230 --> 01:18:11.790] [SPEAKER_06]: TikTok spokesperson, Jamie Favaza, um, basically pointed to a section in the platform's guidelines that says educational content like Hutchins should be allowed.
[01:18:11.990 --> 01:18:18.090] [SPEAKER_06]: We recognize that some content that would normally be removed per our community guidelines could be in the public interest.
[01:18:18.390 --> 01:18:21.850] [SPEAKER_06]: Therefore, we may allow exceptions under certain circumstances.
[01:18:22.450 --> 01:18:23.490] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, interesting.
[01:18:23.770 --> 01:18:40.070] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, in this particular case, they're pointing to the algorithm as the cause of the problem, but it's, it's basically an extension of their policy saying, talking about criminal hacking is something we're going to forbid, even if it's in an educational setting.
[01:18:40.670 --> 01:18:42.690] [SPEAKER_06]: And this kind of thing always backfires.
[01:18:42.930 --> 01:18:51.130] [SPEAKER_06]: It always backfires and, and winds up, um, making people unable to post creative content or educational content.
[01:18:53.310 --> 01:18:58.670] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, I mean, look, it's a problem with any kind of algorithmic decision making at, at such a large scale.
[01:18:59.330 --> 01:19:10.510] [SPEAKER_10]: But, you know, if they're going to have any kind of community guidelines, they certainly can't be individually policed by, uh, a massive force of content regulators at, at TikTok to do it.
[01:19:10.710 --> 01:19:15.950] [SPEAKER_10]: They're going to have to have a, a large portion of this done via automation.
[01:19:16.170 --> 01:19:39.570] [SPEAKER_10]: But what boggles my mind in the situation is, if the same situation is arising time and time again, and then the same result is achieved mainly that the content is placed back up because it is founded, not violate the community standards, then why is there not some kind of white list for creators who continually have this problem?
[01:19:39.810 --> 01:19:43.670] [SPEAKER_10]: If your content doesn't, is found to have been flagged.
[01:19:43.730 --> 01:19:58.210] [SPEAKER_10]: And then after, let's say five reviews or 10 reviews, and every single time, it's found to not actually have violated community standards, but it's, it's always within that gray area, then why create this problem over and over and over again?
[01:19:58.210 --> 01:20:00.950] [SPEAKER_10]: You should have a white list for certain creators so you can avoid this.
[01:20:01.030 --> 01:20:13.210] [SPEAKER_10]: It's, it seems to me that they're operating on the assumption that users are going to do something bad and violate their community standards, despite empirical evidence to the contrary.
[01:20:13.550 --> 01:20:20.930] [SPEAKER_10]: And, and that's a problem that these platforms are going to continually have until they wake up and, and white list certain creators.
[01:20:21.030 --> 01:20:31.090] [SPEAKER_10]: And let's say there's some kind of anomalous event where certain content then is flagged by numerous individuals, people who reviewed it.
[01:20:31.210 --> 01:20:40.330] [SPEAKER_10]: You know, if all of a sudden Marcus Hutchins starts posting snuff films or something like that, let's say, hypothetically, he's going to get a lot of complaints.
[01:20:40.490 --> 01:20:44.130] [SPEAKER_10]: That's something that certainly would violate community standards that would jump out.
[01:20:44.390 --> 01:20:46.730] [SPEAKER_10]: And, and then you can remove the white list.
[01:20:47.110 --> 01:20:56.630] [SPEAKER_10]: But I think if creators are their business model, they need to, I think, be a little bit more respectful for those that are on the edges of their community guidelines.
[01:20:56.910 --> 01:21:07.870] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, the other issue with that is this list of this white list that, that you suggest that has to be something that's open and easy to get on.
[01:21:07.990 --> 01:21:11.770] [SPEAKER_06]: Not like Twitter with their, their little blue check, which takes decades.
[01:21:12.030 --> 01:21:19.950] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, it shouldn't be an elitist group that has certain rights that other people don't have because they're new or because they're unknown.
[01:21:20.390 --> 01:21:37.330] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, these platforms, if they're going to be anything like what they purport to be, they have to be open to everybody and allow other people to become, Oh, I don't want to say influencers, but, uh, recognized more recognized for what they do.
[01:21:37.450 --> 01:21:47.610] [SPEAKER_06]: Maybe there'd be less influencers because there'd be other people saying things and we wouldn't be, um, uh, devoting all our thinking power to what did this particular famous person say?
[01:21:48.510 --> 01:21:49.910] [SPEAKER_06]: It shouldn't be like that.
[01:21:49.990 --> 01:22:04.710] [SPEAKER_06]: In fact, what I like to do on Twitter is, uh, is sometimes just hear what people are saying without knowing who said, and it would be great app to have, you know, if, if you can read tweets and not know who said it and say, yeah, that's good.
[01:22:05.310 --> 01:22:10.550] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, but if Neil deGrasse Tyson says something, everybody likes it and there's a billion, uh, retweets.
[01:22:11.010 --> 01:22:16.430] [SPEAKER_06]: But if you say the same thing, two people say something and one of them is arguing with you.
[01:22:16.430 --> 01:22:24.110] [SPEAKER_06]: So yeah, we, we, we, we need some kind of, um, of a system where it's, uh, it's just more open to more people.
[01:22:24.350 --> 01:22:28.090] [SPEAKER_08]: I think some of his followers are actually stars and galaxies.
[01:22:28.530 --> 01:22:28.970] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[01:22:29.150 --> 01:22:29.990] [SPEAKER_08]: That's why there's so many.
[01:22:30.170 --> 01:22:30.850] [SPEAKER_06]: And influencers.
[01:22:31.170 --> 01:22:31.690] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh huh.
[01:22:32.030 --> 01:22:32.730] [SPEAKER_08]: Influencer stars.
[01:22:33.510 --> 01:22:34.250] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, that's right.
[01:22:34.370 --> 01:22:43.230] [SPEAKER_06]: There's only like certain stars that we, we look at, you know, there's Regulus, you know, there's, there's Sirius, but we don't look at the little dim stars.
[01:22:43.470 --> 01:22:45.090] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, I just call people dim stars.
[01:22:46.010 --> 01:22:47.390] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, we're all stars.
[01:22:47.530 --> 01:22:47.970] [SPEAKER_06]: How about that?
[01:22:48.530 --> 01:22:48.890] [SPEAKER_06]: We have a phone call.
[01:22:48.890 --> 01:22:49.490] [SPEAKER_06]: In the dope show.
[01:22:49.690 --> 01:22:50.030] [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[01:22:50.150 --> 01:22:51.070] [SPEAKER_06]: You're on off the hook.
[01:22:51.370 --> 01:22:51.890] [SPEAKER_06]: Overtime.
[01:22:52.170 --> 01:22:52.770] [SPEAKER_12]: Good evening.
[01:22:52.770 --> 01:22:53.310] [SPEAKER_12]: Off The Hook.
[01:22:53.450 --> 01:22:53.910] [SPEAKER_12]: Overtime.
[01:22:54.050 --> 01:22:55.290] [SPEAKER_06]: It's Bobson from Bulgaria.
[01:22:55.570 --> 01:22:56.430] [SPEAKER_06]: I assume you're in Bulgaria.
[01:22:57.330 --> 01:22:57.850] [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[01:22:58.730 --> 01:23:06.570] [SPEAKER_12]: Uh, there's an issue that I didn't hear you mention about, uh, payments being denied.
[01:23:07.270 --> 01:23:13.810] [SPEAKER_12]: The processing of payments being denied to that site that was in trouble recently.
[01:23:14.830 --> 01:23:15.730] [SPEAKER_12]: Probably the U.S.
[01:23:15.770 --> 01:23:17.170] [SPEAKER_12]: I don't remember its name.
[01:23:17.470 --> 01:23:19.650] [SPEAKER_06]: You mean the site we've been talking about for the last 20 minutes?
[01:23:21.350 --> 01:23:22.110] [SPEAKER_12]: Probably, yeah.
[01:23:22.530 --> 01:23:23.030] [SPEAKER_12]: Only fans?
[01:23:23.350 --> 01:23:26.390] [SPEAKER_12]: So, the issue is the freedom of speech violation.
[01:23:26.910 --> 01:23:27.130] [SPEAKER_06]: Bobson.
[01:23:27.130 --> 01:23:28.150] [SPEAKER_06]: Bobson, is it only fans?
[01:23:28.230 --> 01:23:29.030] [SPEAKER_06]: Is that what you're talking about?
[01:23:32.000 --> 01:23:32.740] [SPEAKER_06]: Can you hear me?
[01:23:35.600 --> 01:23:36.900] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, I think we lost Bobson.
[01:23:37.060 --> 01:23:37.600] [SPEAKER_06]: He was beeping.
[01:23:37.600 --> 01:23:38.220] [SPEAKER_06]: He'll call back.
[01:23:38.360 --> 01:23:39.720] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, why was he beeping?
[01:23:39.900 --> 01:23:40.460] [SPEAKER_06]: He'll call back.
[01:23:40.640 --> 01:23:40.860] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[01:23:41.280 --> 01:23:44.180] [SPEAKER_06]: But I think, I think he's talking about the thing we were talking about.
[01:23:44.380 --> 01:23:53.720] [SPEAKER_08]: It could be something funny with the system or, uh, service that he was employing or a service he was in being employed upon him without his knowledge.
[01:23:53.720 --> 01:23:54.480] [SPEAKER_08]: I don't know.
[01:23:54.640 --> 01:23:56.460] [SPEAKER_08]: Um, but we're available in here.
[01:23:56.580 --> 01:24:15.300] [SPEAKER_08]: It sounded like he was wanting to speak about the argument of, um, this being, uh, a limiting of sort of a speech, uh, a sort of, and, and I think really the association is, um, that it's a form of expression, sexual expression in this case.
[01:24:15.700 --> 01:24:18.380] [SPEAKER_08]: Um, but I'm curious what he thought about that.
[01:24:18.540 --> 01:24:23.720] [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, uh, perhaps, um, that, that was what I was hearing in his, uh, characterization of...
[01:24:23.720 --> 01:24:27.280] [SPEAKER_06]: If that's what he was, um, talking about in the first place.
[01:24:28.400 --> 01:24:29.100] [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, we don't know that.
[01:24:29.280 --> 01:24:32.200] [SPEAKER_06]: We don't know because he didn't get to finish the, the first paragraph that he was saying.
[01:24:33.180 --> 01:24:34.640] [SPEAKER_06]: 802... Excuse me.
[01:24:34.740 --> 01:24:35.740] [SPEAKER_06]: I can't eat on the radio.
[01:24:35.860 --> 01:24:37.600] [SPEAKER_06]: I can eat on YouTube, I found out.
[01:24:37.660 --> 01:24:39.920] [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, it doesn't, um, get flagged by the algorithm.
[01:24:40.080 --> 01:24:40.480] [SPEAKER_06]: No, it doesn't.
[01:24:40.680 --> 01:24:42.340] [SPEAKER_06]: 802-321-4225.
[01:24:42.560 --> 01:24:44.540] [SPEAKER_06]: There is a WBAI algorithm that will flag you.
[01:24:44.820 --> 01:24:45.780] [SPEAKER_06]: This might be Bobson.
[01:24:45.840 --> 01:24:46.240] [SPEAKER_06]: Who knows?
[01:24:46.640 --> 01:24:47.080] [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[01:24:47.400 --> 01:24:48.760] [SPEAKER_06]: You're on Off The Hook Overtime.
[01:24:48.960 --> 01:24:49.480] [SPEAKER_06]: Is this Bobson?
[01:24:50.260 --> 01:24:51.100] [SPEAKER_11]: Uh, good evening.
[01:24:51.180 --> 01:24:51.740] [SPEAKER_11]: No, it's not.
[01:24:51.920 --> 01:24:52.920] [SPEAKER_11]: It's, uh, Chris.
[01:24:53.420 --> 01:24:53.960] [SPEAKER_11]: Okay, Chris.
[01:24:53.960 --> 01:24:56.960] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, you'll have to, you have to be our Bobson for now.
[01:24:57.400 --> 01:24:59.120] [SPEAKER_11]: You're talking, I've got to turn down my radio here.
[01:24:59.380 --> 01:24:59.520] [SPEAKER_11]: Yes.
[01:24:59.520 --> 01:25:00.840] [SPEAKER_11]: You're talking about TikTok.
[01:25:01.220 --> 01:25:03.640] [SPEAKER_11]: And doesn't that site originate in Red China?
[01:25:03.860 --> 01:25:07.060] [SPEAKER_11]: And doesn't that provide security concerns by itself?
[01:25:07.060 --> 01:25:19.380] [SPEAKER_11]: I'm a little upset at the Red Chinese for giving me the Wuhan virus at a tourist event that, uh, they shook my hands and, uh, a bunch of Chinese tourists back in October of 2019.
[01:25:19.980 --> 01:25:22.480] [SPEAKER_06]: And if you want to make them upset, keep calling them Red Chinese.
[01:25:22.720 --> 01:25:23.340] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't like that.
[01:25:24.720 --> 01:25:25.500] [SPEAKER_11]: Communist China.
[01:25:25.800 --> 01:25:26.300] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, fine.
[01:25:26.620 --> 01:25:26.620] Yeah.
[01:25:26.980 --> 01:25:27.800] [SPEAKER_06]: People's Republic of China.
[01:25:28.000 --> 01:25:29.680] [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, they, they were Orientals.
[01:25:29.860 --> 01:25:30.760] [SPEAKER_11]: And I said, where are you from?
[01:25:30.820 --> 01:25:31.380] [SPEAKER_11]: They said, China.
[01:25:31.600 --> 01:25:32.180] [SPEAKER_11]: I said, Taiwan.
[01:25:32.380 --> 01:25:35.500] [SPEAKER_11]: They said, the people know the People's Republic of China very proudly.
[01:25:35.900 --> 01:25:37.500] [SPEAKER_11]: And then they shook our hands.
[01:25:37.660 --> 01:25:47.500] [SPEAKER_11]: And, and five days later, I, I, uh, and they stood very close and talked very close to us and put their arms around us for pictures and sat at the tables where we were later going to eat.
[01:25:48.220 --> 01:25:59.360] [SPEAKER_11]: And then, uh, then, uh, they, uh, uh, five days later, I collapsed on the floor of my kitchen and, uh, was taken away by ambulance.
[01:25:59.360 --> 01:26:04.520] [SPEAKER_11]: But, uh, they didn't, uh, they didn't know about the Wuhan virus at that time.
[01:26:04.660 --> 01:26:05.740] [SPEAKER_06]: And when was this?
[01:26:06.520 --> 01:26:08.000] [SPEAKER_11]: The, the Wuhan virus.
[01:26:08.120 --> 01:26:08.380] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, I know.
[01:26:08.500 --> 01:26:09.920] [SPEAKER_06]: But when did this happen?
[01:26:10.280 --> 01:26:12.060] [SPEAKER_11]: Oh, this happened in October.
[01:26:12.060 --> 01:26:15.120] [SPEAKER_11]: I was taken to the hospital October 25th of 2019.
[01:26:15.240 --> 01:26:20.180] [SPEAKER_11]: After that, I had, uh, a number of symptoms.
[01:26:20.720 --> 01:26:25.380] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, so you had, you had coronavirus before virtually anybody else.
[01:26:25.660 --> 01:26:26.140] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[01:26:26.140 --> 01:26:28.720] [SPEAKER_06]: You had coronavirus before virtually anybody else is what you're saying.
[01:26:29.080 --> 01:26:33.320] [SPEAKER_11]: Well, not before it was filling up the hospital's, uh, parking lots in, in Wuhan.
[01:26:35.840 --> 01:26:38.700] [SPEAKER_06]: And where were you, where were you at the time this happened?
[01:26:39.320 --> 01:26:44.360] [SPEAKER_11]: Uh, at the time, I, I belonged to the group called the Huntington Militia.
[01:26:44.540 --> 01:26:49.660] [SPEAKER_11]: We reenact, uh, events from, uh, 1775, the American Revolution.
[01:26:51.180 --> 01:26:55.900] [SPEAKER_11]: And, uh, Jim, I'm trying to get away from my speakers where you're speaking here.
[01:26:56.400 --> 01:27:01.760] [SPEAKER_11]: Um, oh, I've got to turn that volume down further.
[01:27:02.400 --> 01:27:06.980] [SPEAKER_11]: Uh, so, um, um, and I've lost my train of thought.
[01:27:07.120 --> 01:27:13.660] [SPEAKER_11]: So yeah, 2019 October is when, uh, October 20th was the last event.
[01:27:13.660 --> 01:27:17.800] [SPEAKER_11]: There were, seemed to be a lot of Orientals all summer, very well dressed.
[01:27:18.600 --> 01:27:27.240] [SPEAKER_11]: Um, and that's where they were sending, they were sending tourists to the United States, as Trump said, uh, to spread this virus around.
[01:27:27.540 --> 01:27:27.640] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[01:27:27.880 --> 01:27:30.680] [SPEAKER_06]: I, I, I, I, I gotta, I gotta stop there.
[01:27:30.860 --> 01:27:32.060] [SPEAKER_06]: There's just so much here.
[01:27:32.640 --> 01:27:35.800] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, no, no, this is, this is wrong.
[01:27:36.360 --> 01:27:45.860] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, using a term that is offensive, uh, and, uh, accusing an entire race of people of deliberately infecting us.
[01:27:46.480 --> 01:27:48.120] [SPEAKER_06]: I can overlook quoting Trump.
[01:27:48.380 --> 01:27:48.620] [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[01:27:48.720 --> 01:27:55.060] [SPEAKER_06]: That's, you know, it upsets me, but no, this is, I, I tried to listen as, as long as I could.
[01:27:55.200 --> 01:27:55.740] [SPEAKER_06]: I really did.
[01:27:56.100 --> 01:27:59.560] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, this is, it's, it's, it's utter nonsense, utter nonsense.
[01:28:01.200 --> 01:28:01.800] [SPEAKER_00]: Rob, go ahead.
[01:28:01.860 --> 01:28:05.780] [SPEAKER_00]: That, that was a historical reenactor and maybe he was just reenacting the cold war.
[01:28:05.940 --> 01:28:06.140] [SPEAKER_00]: Okay.
[01:28:06.400 --> 01:28:12.820] [SPEAKER_00]: That could be us from the fifties or something where, where that sort of thing was, uh, encouraged and acceptable.
[01:28:13.560 --> 01:28:15.040] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, yeah, I don't know.
[01:28:15.120 --> 01:28:15.260] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[01:28:15.300 --> 01:28:15.860] [SPEAKER_06]: This is Bobson.
[01:28:15.980 --> 01:28:18.120] [SPEAKER_06]: So, uh, uh, we, we turned the caller ID on.
[01:28:18.760 --> 01:28:19.740] [SPEAKER_06]: Hey, Bobson, are you there?
[01:28:22.360 --> 01:28:23.200] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh boy.
[01:28:23.620 --> 01:28:25.600] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know what kind of connection you have now.
[01:28:26.080 --> 01:28:26.840] [SPEAKER_06]: You hear this?
[01:28:27.060 --> 01:28:29.720] [SPEAKER_06]: Bobson, uh, smack your phone or something.
[01:28:30.620 --> 01:28:31.740] [SPEAKER_06]: You're super distorted.
[01:28:34.240 --> 01:28:35.980] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh no, this isn't working.
[01:28:36.080 --> 01:28:37.520] [SPEAKER_06]: Is there, is there something on our end?
[01:28:38.440 --> 01:28:38.920] [SPEAKER_06]: No?
[01:28:40.140 --> 01:28:42.000] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, Bobson, can you hear me?
[01:28:42.200 --> 01:28:43.600] [SPEAKER_06]: And, and just answer loudly.
[01:28:45.920 --> 01:28:48.020] [SPEAKER_06]: It's like talking to another form of life.
[01:28:48.860 --> 01:28:50.400] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, Kyle, say something into the phone.
[01:28:51.640 --> 01:28:52.460] [SPEAKER_05]: Hey, Bobson.
[01:28:54.200 --> 01:28:54.620] Okay.
[01:28:55.440 --> 01:28:59.120] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, you're, you sound fine, Kyle, but Bobson sounds like he's, uh, in another dimension.
[01:28:59.460 --> 01:29:03.660] [SPEAKER_06]: Bobson, please call us back again and, and, and call fast so we don't get the militia calling us.
[01:29:06.220 --> 01:29:08.480] [SPEAKER_06]: 8 0 2 3 2 1 4 2 2 5.
[01:29:08.580 --> 01:29:09.360] [SPEAKER_06]: Why am I giving out the phone number?
[01:29:09.400 --> 01:29:11.600] [SPEAKER_06]: I want Bobson to call, uh, and he knows the phone number.
[01:29:11.700 --> 01:29:17.200] [SPEAKER_06]: So hopefully he calls back and, uh, and we'll be able to talk about intelligent things.
[01:29:17.980 --> 01:29:18.760] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh my God.
[01:29:18.900 --> 01:29:22.460] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I just too much, too much hit me at, at, at once here.
[01:29:22.760 --> 01:29:29.700] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, basically trying to communicate with aliens from outer space and aliens from right here on earth.
[01:29:30.020 --> 01:29:34.460] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, this seems to be a call from Washington DC.
[01:29:34.600 --> 01:29:35.140] [SPEAKER_06]: You want to try this?
[01:29:35.340 --> 01:29:35.920] [SPEAKER_06]: Let's see what happens.
[01:29:36.640 --> 01:29:37.760] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh wait, that's Bobson again though.
[01:29:38.320 --> 01:29:39.440] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, we, I don't know.
[01:29:39.520 --> 01:29:40.900] [SPEAKER_06]: He's either on call waiting or he's here.
[01:29:41.540 --> 01:29:42.040] [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[01:29:42.200 --> 01:29:42.400] [SPEAKER_06]: Go ahead.
[01:29:44.780 --> 01:29:45.060] [SPEAKER_05]: Hello?
[01:29:45.380 --> 01:29:45.640] [SPEAKER_06]: Yes.
[01:29:46.920 --> 01:29:47.200] [SPEAKER_02]: Hi.
[01:29:47.560 --> 01:29:49.420] [SPEAKER_06]: You're, you're the Washington DC call, right?
[01:29:51.200 --> 01:29:52.540] [SPEAKER_02]: No, not in Washington DC.
[01:29:52.980 --> 01:29:55.820] [SPEAKER_06]: But your phone number is, are you not calling from a 2 0 2 number?
[01:29:56.860 --> 01:29:57.140] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[01:29:57.360 --> 01:29:57.520] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh-huh.
[01:29:57.660 --> 01:29:57.680] [SPEAKER_06]: See?
[01:29:58.940 --> 01:29:59.220] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[01:29:59.340 --> 01:30:00.480] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, we don't know where you actually are.
[01:30:00.560 --> 01:30:03.260] [SPEAKER_06]: We, we don't have that means of, uh, of... It's fine.
[01:30:03.420 --> 01:30:04.180] [SPEAKER_06]: What's on your mind?
[01:30:04.280 --> 01:30:05.180] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, we don't need to know where you are.
[01:30:05.280 --> 01:30:05.500] [SPEAKER_06]: Go ahead.
[01:30:05.560 --> 01:30:05.980] [SPEAKER_06]: What's on your mind?
[01:30:06.100 --> 01:30:10.160] [SPEAKER_13]: But I, I thought I'd call you guys because I heard you talking about OnlyFans.
[01:30:10.760 --> 01:30:17.760] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, and I had a girlfriend who recently had a problem with not OnlyFans, but, um, what is it called?
[01:30:18.620 --> 01:30:21.420] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, no, not Chatterbait.
[01:30:21.820 --> 01:30:22.140] [SPEAKER_13]: Chatterbait?
[01:30:22.340 --> 01:30:23.580] [SPEAKER_13]: Do you guys know what Chatterbait is?
[01:30:23.660 --> 01:30:24.760] [SPEAKER_06]: That's one I haven't heard about.
[01:30:25.080 --> 01:30:25.580] [SPEAKER_06]: Not heard it.
[01:30:25.920 --> 01:30:26.160] [SPEAKER_13]: Okay.
[01:30:26.220 --> 01:30:28.000] [SPEAKER_13]: I think it was the original OnlyFans.
[01:30:29.140 --> 01:30:48.040] [SPEAKER_13]: It's like her, um, her performances, I guess, um, and received payment, tokens, whatnot.
[01:30:48.460 --> 01:30:57.120] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, but she recently had trouble because she, I guess, had broadcasted something, was under the impression that there were only 30 or 40 viewers.
[01:30:57.740 --> 01:31:05.360] [SPEAKER_13]: However, I think either a bot or a person recorded the content and then started distributing it onto other websites.
[01:31:05.460 --> 01:31:09.220] [SPEAKER_13]: So now she's finding it popping up on hundreds of different websites.
[01:31:09.740 --> 01:31:13.720] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, and she, I guess she wanted it to be live and not exist afterwards.
[01:31:13.720 --> 01:31:14.920] [SPEAKER_13]: And it still is.
[01:31:15.100 --> 01:31:24.420] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, and so I was wondering if you guys knew, um, of any similar situations or if you think it's a lost cause, if you think it was a bot or an individual.
[01:31:24.740 --> 01:31:29.920] [SPEAKER_13]: Um, but I know that that's an issue that a lot of these creators, um, have.
[01:31:30.220 --> 01:31:53.020] [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, I, I hear this, um, in, in a lot of ways in resembling revenge porn and situations where people have been filmed maybe with permission and then, uh, someone distributes it without permission, um, even, and most, uh, importantly in, in, uh, vengeful ways.
[01:31:53.400 --> 01:31:57.600] [SPEAKER_08]: And, um, and so this, this seems like a little bit of an automated way, right?
[01:31:57.700 --> 01:32:16.180] [SPEAKER_08]: Like a way to, um, uh, scrape or, or capture live all of this, uh, data that people are monetizing, maybe, maybe, uh, exploiting vulnerability or some, um, uh, open network in some way and then trying to, uh, capitalize it.
[01:32:16.380 --> 01:32:25.340] [SPEAKER_08]: Maybe not even in a directly personal way, but, um, just to kind of automate content creation and then repackage it.
[01:32:25.420 --> 01:32:27.660] [SPEAKER_06]: It sounds like what points to the automation here.
[01:32:27.840 --> 01:32:29.920] [SPEAKER_06]: Why couldn't I just be a person deciding to do this?
[01:32:30.060 --> 01:32:32.160] [SPEAKER_13]: She said... Because I think it's a bot who's doing it.
[01:32:32.220 --> 01:32:33.140] [SPEAKER_13]: What, what tells you that?
[01:32:33.460 --> 01:32:44.340] [SPEAKER_13]: I think there are bots to go on because I, there was something, we did a lot of research into it and I think there are almost bots start to record all of these live streams on like the chatterbait or the only thing, but I'm not sure.
[01:32:44.560 --> 01:32:44.840] [SPEAKER_00]: Okay.
[01:32:45.200 --> 01:32:45.580] [SPEAKER_00]: All right.
[01:32:45.700 --> 01:32:46.120] [SPEAKER_00]: Rob, go ahead.
[01:32:46.940 --> 01:33:02.340] [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, there is, uh, there's a lot of this sort of thing that happens, um, and it's a matter of like what we would call forms of DRM and, uh, the, the, and the long and the short of it is that on a technological level, if somebody is watching something on their computer screen,
[01:33:02.520 --> 01:33:04.640] [SPEAKER_00]: they could just as easily record that screen.
[01:33:04.880 --> 01:33:16.260] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, no matter what it is, it's like, uh, you know, people watch a movie on Netflix and it's very commonplace for those movies on Netflix to be recorded on the viewer's end and then re-uploaded to like a BitTorrent site or things like that.
[01:33:16.860 --> 01:33:20.860] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, digital content is not lockable in any meaningful way.
[01:33:21.100 --> 01:33:22.100] [SPEAKER_00]: It's just difficult.
[01:33:22.260 --> 01:33:28.520] [SPEAKER_00]: It can be difficult to, uh, get past the, um, the, the security measures there, but it's never impossible.
[01:33:28.940 --> 01:33:45.600] [SPEAKER_00]: And, uh, I, while I'm not familiar with this particular, uh, sort of case happening on like a site, like a site, like a chatterbait, um, I think it's, it's very common for, um, any sort of streaming site to find themselves being recorded either by the people watching or,
[01:33:45.980 --> 01:33:51.040] [SPEAKER_00]: you know, by an account that is just using that to gather content, which it can then upload elsewhere.
[01:33:51.460 --> 01:33:59.460] [SPEAKER_00]: And in the field of like adult content, I think there is a huge sort of scene out there of people like recording something from here so they could reupload it everywhere else.
[01:33:59.960 --> 01:34:16.300] [SPEAKER_00]: And so, you know, if, if you fell victim to that, there, there are like entire businesses now that a lot of sex workers are using, which, uh, you know, exist to basically trawl the sites and look for your client's material and then send the, the DMCA notices and everything else.
[01:34:16.300 --> 01:34:23.220] [SPEAKER_00]: And much, much like, uh, Hollywood sends take down notices for people sharing movies or TV shows, whatever they don't have permission to.
[01:34:23.520 --> 01:34:27.020] [SPEAKER_00]: So I, it's, it's very, it's very sensible that it's sensible.
[01:34:27.160 --> 01:34:29.800] [SPEAKER_00]: It's very, um, commonplace that this sort of thing would happen.
[01:34:30.100 --> 01:34:37.020] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, and it sucks if, uh, it's something that you're putting out there just as a stream and you're hoping it doesn't get out there as a recorded thing.
[01:34:39.040 --> 01:34:41.000] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, Carla, did you have something to say to that?
[01:34:41.600 --> 01:34:52.100] [SPEAKER_13]: I said the problem with those DCMA or whatever reports is that sometimes if you do that and you use your real information, they'll blackmail you and ask for lots of money and it's a whole headache.
[01:34:53.520 --> 01:34:53.740] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[01:34:54.560 --> 01:34:54.820] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[01:34:54.900 --> 01:34:56.000] [SPEAKER_13]: That happens as well.
[01:34:57.220 --> 01:34:58.140] [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, absolutely.
[01:34:58.420 --> 01:35:17.160] [SPEAKER_08]: And, um, the, the, uh, the ability for people to capture, I think Rob's point about it could be a paying customer, someone that's paying for it, but they want it even for their private viewing at a later time, even though it's something that happens as sort of a real time service in this mutual video virtual,
[01:35:17.540 --> 01:35:26.900] [SPEAKER_08]: uh, session or, or, uh, instance, if they capture it, um, it's about the content creator maintaining control once it's sort of out of their control.
[01:35:27.060 --> 01:35:41.400] [SPEAKER_08]: And that's sort of a, I think a problem with the, the platform itself, billing it as kind of like Snapchat where we'll, we'll control this, you'll be maintain this and it'll go away or you, you can, uh, it will follow this one path.
[01:35:41.420 --> 01:35:48.280] [SPEAKER_08]: But as we know with, with, um, data streams and, and, uh, digital files, they can be copied very easily.
[01:35:48.540 --> 01:36:03.580] [SPEAKER_08]: And, and, um, and, uh, so there may be like precautions and things that people can take with the people that they're engaging this in this with, if, if something pops up somewhere and they know it was a certain user they interacted with, they can make,
[01:36:03.660 --> 01:36:05.760] [SPEAKER_08]: and it happens again or something you see a pattern.
[01:36:06.580 --> 01:36:13.520] [SPEAKER_08]: And like, uh, Rob was suggesting a way to, uh, take stuff down, maybe, uh, something that people consider or organize themselves.
[01:36:13.720 --> 01:36:24.940] [SPEAKER_06]: I think your, your, your best move at this point, you might not be able to, uh, uh, keep the material from being posted, but it sounds like you have the ability to figure out how it's being done.
[01:36:25.080 --> 01:36:31.260] [SPEAKER_06]: And if you can expose that, or if, if you can expose who is doing it, who is behind it, that's a powerful weapon.
[01:36:31.640 --> 01:36:37.260] [SPEAKER_06]: And that might help a lot of other people and, uh, and maybe help design a system where it's not so easy.
[01:36:38.480 --> 01:36:38.900] [SPEAKER_02]: Really?
[01:36:40.920 --> 01:36:41.340] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[01:36:41.880 --> 01:36:42.600] [SPEAKER_06]: Alex, did you have something?
[01:36:43.280 --> 01:36:43.600] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[01:36:43.880 --> 01:36:53.980] [SPEAKER_10]: And I think, you know, to, to Rob's point with the DMCA notices and things that this is a very tough situation because if it goes from the, excuse me, the, what was it called her?
[01:36:54.060 --> 01:36:56.120] [SPEAKER_10]: The chatter, chatterbox site?
[01:36:59.380 --> 01:36:59.740] [SPEAKER_06]: Chatterbait.
[01:37:00.340 --> 01:37:00.700] [SPEAKER_10]: Chatterbait.
[01:37:00.700 --> 01:37:00.940] [SPEAKER_10]: Chatterbait.
[01:37:01.100 --> 01:37:01.260] [SPEAKER_10]: Sorry.
[01:37:01.440 --> 01:37:01.620] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes.
[01:37:01.820 --> 01:37:03.420] [SPEAKER_10]: Chatterbait, uh, site.
[01:37:03.560 --> 01:37:04.320] [SPEAKER_10]: If it goes...
[01:37:04.320 --> 01:37:05.940] [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, I just, I just got the name too.
[01:37:06.020 --> 01:37:06.300] [SPEAKER_10]: I get the pun.
[01:37:06.520 --> 01:37:07.180] [SPEAKER_10]: I get the pun.
[01:37:07.480 --> 01:37:07.660] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[01:37:07.760 --> 01:37:08.060] [SPEAKER_10]: All right.
[01:37:08.160 --> 01:37:08.260] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[01:37:08.320 --> 01:37:08.640] [SPEAKER_10]: Me too.
[01:37:08.780 --> 01:37:08.900] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[01:37:09.420 --> 01:37:11.580] [SPEAKER_10]: It's like a, a pun grenade there.
[01:37:12.900 --> 01:37:22.040] [SPEAKER_10]: But if it goes from Chatterbait to various other websites, I would venture to guess many of them are going to be outside the United States.
[01:37:22.300 --> 01:37:25.020] [SPEAKER_10]: They might not respond to DMCA notices.
[01:37:25.260 --> 01:37:27.020] [SPEAKER_10]: They might not respond to lawyers.
[01:37:27.200 --> 01:37:28.980] [SPEAKER_10]: They might not respond to legal process.
[01:37:29.320 --> 01:37:42.360] [SPEAKER_10]: Uh, and, you know, and she's probably right that this, this can result in, uh, greater extortion fees, especially if there's any PII or facial recognition, let's say biometric databases again, coming up today.
[01:37:42.780 --> 01:37:53.280] [SPEAKER_10]: Uh, but if you can identify that particular person, then, you know, it's problematic, obviously, uh, and becomes a very ineffective method of, of whack-a-mole.
[01:37:53.600 --> 01:37:56.780] [SPEAKER_10]: And, um, I, I also think you're right too, Rob.
[01:37:56.860 --> 01:38:07.640] [SPEAKER_10]: Maybe the issue should be approached as, as one of, as like a copyright enforcement or, um, uh, like a brand protection system, a copyright protection system.
[01:38:08.080 --> 01:38:22.680] [SPEAKER_10]: And, you know, if only there were a way whereby let's say one file or image could be matched against an image remotely somewhere, you know, maybe like a hash matching technology, perhaps.
[01:38:22.680 --> 01:38:23.020] [SPEAKER_10]: All right.
[01:38:23.080 --> 01:38:24.440] [SPEAKER_06]: I see what you're doing there, Alex.
[01:38:24.680 --> 01:38:25.440] [SPEAKER_06]: I see what you're doing.
[01:38:25.620 --> 01:38:27.140] [SPEAKER_10]: That somebody could employ.
[01:38:27.280 --> 01:38:30.100] [SPEAKER_06]: You're, you're, you're defending that whole Apple thing all over again.
[01:38:30.240 --> 01:38:32.180] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, we'll get into that if you want to get into that again.
[01:38:32.220 --> 01:38:37.720] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm just thinking of another use case scenario here for, for victims of, of things like revenge porn.
[01:38:37.760 --> 01:38:40.580] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't think that would help in this case at all.
[01:38:40.740 --> 01:38:41.340] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't think.
[01:38:41.480 --> 01:38:43.860] [SPEAKER_10]: I think it would, it quite possibly would help.
[01:38:43.900 --> 01:38:48.200] [SPEAKER_10]: And if it didn't help, I think it would undermine your, your own arguments from the last time.
[01:38:48.480 --> 01:39:04.460] [SPEAKER_10]: Uh, anyhow, because if it, well, look, if it was an exact match of, of the file, uh, elsewhere, I think the hash matching technology here obviously would work, but if you're recreating a file, if you're recording a recording and you're not taking the actual file,
[01:39:04.620 --> 01:39:07.720] [SPEAKER_10]: that's going to be a different digital signature, it's going to have a different hash.
[01:39:07.920 --> 01:39:10.780] [SPEAKER_10]: So in all likelihood, hash matching probably wouldn't work.
[01:39:10.860 --> 01:39:25.840] [SPEAKER_10]: But I think that's, uh, I imagine there's got to be something akin to this, to what those brand protection, uh, systems do that, that troll various media outlets and things, but they might not have coverage on these, these weird new sites that pop up to disperse this,
[01:39:25.840 --> 01:39:27.580] [SPEAKER_10]: uh, sexually explicit content.
[01:39:28.060 --> 01:39:40.640] [SPEAKER_10]: Uh, and even if you go after one, they're probable, uh, they're very likely to be throwaway organization, something that can just pop up somewhere else in another jurisdiction, perhaps with another corporate entity.
[01:39:41.040 --> 01:39:44.860] [SPEAKER_10]: So it's a, it's a very, I think it's a very tough position to be in.
[01:39:44.960 --> 01:39:57.480] [SPEAKER_06]: I wonder if technology can be developed that, uh, would use facial recognition and then basically hunt for that face showing up and shut it down on whatever public sites might be displaying that particular face.
[01:39:57.580 --> 01:40:05.340] [SPEAKER_06]: And, but the only person that could, that could do that, that could say, revoke all instances of this face showing up is somebody that has that face.
[01:40:05.820 --> 01:40:06.660] [SPEAKER_06]: It's just a thought.
[01:40:06.760 --> 01:40:08.700] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, it's something I I'm thinking of right now.
[01:40:09.100 --> 01:40:09.460] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[01:40:09.560 --> 01:40:21.960] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, to, to an extent, I think that's what a lot of these, these brand protection systems will do that, that go out and look for counterfeit marketplaces and, and things like that, uh, usually as of products, right?
[01:40:22.200 --> 01:40:30.540] [SPEAKER_10]: Uh, and, and those will, to a certain extent, I think match hashes of the individual files, but there's also a, uh, visual similarity component to the way they work too.
[01:40:30.900 --> 01:40:31.300] [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[01:40:31.360 --> 01:40:32.860] [SPEAKER_06]: Go ahead, Robin, then we'll let the caller go.
[01:40:33.500 --> 01:40:33.740] [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[01:40:33.920 --> 01:40:41.680] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, like as we've, as we've spoken about on this program, uh, the facial recognition algorithms out there and in common use are still not very good.
[01:40:42.000 --> 01:40:46.300] [SPEAKER_00]: Um, they're, they're mostly, uh, they're mostly work on, I think white men and that's about it.
[01:40:46.540 --> 01:40:54.240] [SPEAKER_00]: But, um, but beyond that, like, and this is, this is a sad part of the, uh, of the reality for people trying to make a living with online content.
[01:40:54.640 --> 01:41:08.520] [SPEAKER_00]: Once you put something on the Internet, control of that file, theoretically, anybody else could copy it, could, uh, you know, make derivative files of it and, and whatever, and it could circulate around out there, um, outside of your control.
[01:41:08.900 --> 01:41:20.740] [SPEAKER_00]: And, uh, that, that's something that, uh, I think needs to be better, uh, better said and, uh, like educated out there among people who are, uh, thinking of going into this type of work because it is a real danger.
[01:41:21.120 --> 01:41:23.120] [SPEAKER_06]: I, I hope we were somewhat helpful.
[01:41:23.360 --> 01:41:25.060] [SPEAKER_06]: Any, any other questions or thoughts?
[01:41:25.780 --> 01:41:27.220] [SPEAKER_13]: No, you guys were wonderful.
[01:41:27.540 --> 01:41:32.880] [SPEAKER_13]: I don't think there's really any hope for her to get that content off the Internet, but she is desperate.
[01:41:33.300 --> 01:41:49.120] [SPEAKER_13]: So if you have any listeners or hackers for hire, please write in off the hook and maybe you guys can find my number and let me know, or I'll call in and check in because she really would do anything to get it off the Internet.
[01:41:49.280 --> 01:41:52.080] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, be sure to let her know that we support her.
[01:41:52.180 --> 01:41:59.380] [SPEAKER_06]: She has lots of, uh, of support out there and that, um, um, basically many people are going through similar things.
[01:41:59.560 --> 01:42:00.380] [SPEAKER_06]: She's not alone.
[01:42:01.700 --> 01:42:01.900] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[01:42:02.080 --> 01:42:02.980] [SPEAKER_02]: It's very tragic.
[01:42:04.220 --> 01:42:05.780] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, thank you.
[01:42:06.080 --> 01:42:06.660] [SPEAKER_02]: Thanks for your call.
[01:42:07.180 --> 01:42:07.640] [SPEAKER_06]: Take care.
[01:42:07.960 --> 01:42:08.180] [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[01:42:08.700 --> 01:42:12.580] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, Bobson from Bulgaria has been trying throughout that whole call to reach us.
[01:42:12.680 --> 01:42:13.420] [SPEAKER_06]: I've been watching the screen.
[01:42:13.640 --> 01:42:14.640] [SPEAKER_06]: Have you connected Kyle?
[01:42:15.500 --> 01:42:16.080] [SPEAKER_09]: Not yet.
[01:42:16.660 --> 01:42:16.800] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[01:42:17.120 --> 01:42:18.300] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, let me know when you connect.
[01:42:18.540 --> 01:42:19.000] [SPEAKER_09]: All right.
[01:42:19.060 --> 01:42:19.580] [SPEAKER_09]: I'll let you know.
[01:42:19.700 --> 01:42:19.880] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[01:42:20.480 --> 01:42:21.520] [SPEAKER_06]: There's nobody on the phone now.
[01:42:21.820 --> 01:42:25.440] [SPEAKER_09]: It is currently, uh, uh, not active.
[01:42:25.540 --> 01:42:25.780] [SPEAKER_09]: Okay.
[01:42:25.960 --> 01:42:26.260] [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[01:42:26.380 --> 01:42:28.640] [SPEAKER_06]: Because I just saw it ringing, but I guess it went to voicemail.
[01:42:29.200 --> 01:42:31.440] [SPEAKER_06]: Bobson, the phone line is open out there in Bulgaria.
[01:42:31.440 --> 01:42:34.220] [SPEAKER_06]: If you want to give us another try, I won't give out the phone number.
[01:42:34.300 --> 01:42:36.660] [SPEAKER_06]: So nobody else will, will hear it for the first time.
[01:42:37.320 --> 01:42:43.680] [SPEAKER_06]: Um, and hopefully we'll be hearing from, why do we want, did he have something to say that we were waiting for?
[01:42:43.800 --> 01:42:48.160] [SPEAKER_06]: He, you know, he wanted to talk about some site that we thought we had already talked about.
[01:42:49.660 --> 01:42:50.440] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, this is him.
[01:42:50.580 --> 01:42:51.140] [SPEAKER_06]: This is him now.
[01:42:51.300 --> 01:42:51.780] [SPEAKER_06]: So go ahead.
[01:42:52.620 --> 01:42:53.420] [SPEAKER_06]: Bobson, is this you?
[01:42:54.620 --> 01:42:55.620] [SPEAKER_12]: This is me, Emmanuel.
[01:42:55.840 --> 01:42:56.400] [SPEAKER_12]: Can you hear me?
[01:42:56.900 --> 01:42:57.260] [SPEAKER_06]: Yes.
[01:42:57.260 --> 01:42:58.700] [SPEAKER_06]: If this is Bobson, I can hear you.
[01:42:58.760 --> 01:43:00.000] [SPEAKER_06]: If it's not Bobson, then I can't.
[01:43:00.340 --> 01:43:01.260] [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, it's me.
[01:43:01.540 --> 01:43:02.020] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, good.
[01:43:02.160 --> 01:43:02.260] [SPEAKER_06]: Good.
[01:43:02.380 --> 01:43:02.740] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[01:43:03.160 --> 01:43:04.180] [SPEAKER_06]: Don't lose this connection.
[01:43:04.340 --> 01:43:05.740] [SPEAKER_06]: This is the best connection you've had all night.
[01:43:07.700 --> 01:43:15.320] [SPEAKER_12]: Well, so what I was trying to bring up earlier about the OnlyFans, is it issue?
[01:43:15.520 --> 01:43:16.640] [SPEAKER_06]: Yes, we were talking about it.
[01:43:17.360 --> 01:43:24.820] [SPEAKER_12]: Where their payment processing was denied them for unclear reasons and all that.
[01:43:25.660 --> 01:43:32.120] [SPEAKER_12]: I think it may be a freedom of speech issue in this case.
[01:43:32.420 --> 01:43:40.900] [SPEAKER_12]: And the reason I think that is because there was a movie, a quarter of a century ago, which was produced by Oliver Stone and another person.
[01:43:41.100 --> 01:43:50.540] [SPEAKER_12]: I don't remember their name, but it was directed by Milos Forman and it did dealt with a case that was in front of the Supreme Court in 1988.
[01:43:51.320 --> 01:43:53.420] [SPEAKER_12]: I'm talking about the movie The People vs.
[01:43:53.520 --> 01:43:54.440] [SPEAKER_05]: Larry Flint, yes.
[01:43:55.820 --> 01:44:10.340] [SPEAKER_12]: And in that movie, one of the things that became clear to me, as much as I may have felt uncomfortable about his magazine, is that it was a freedom of speech issue that they were trying to
[01:44:14.240 --> 01:44:14.960] [SPEAKER_12]: defend.
[01:44:14.960 --> 01:44:23.960] [SPEAKER_12]: And I'm not very, I haven't, I'm not familiar with the paperwork to the case or what have you.
[01:44:24.100 --> 01:44:43.060] [SPEAKER_12]: But I think maybe Alex, who's far more competent than me in legal matters, may look into how this thing may relate to that thing from the 1988 case in the Supreme Court, which was Flint vs.
[01:44:43.400 --> 01:44:43.940] [SPEAKER_12]: Falwell.
[01:44:44.660 --> 01:44:49.820] [SPEAKER_12]: And they are both passed by now.
[01:44:52.140 --> 01:44:59.520] [SPEAKER_12]: So, yeah, that's what I wanted to bring to the discussion.
[01:44:59.520 --> 01:45:01.220] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, Alex, you've been called upon.
[01:45:01.360 --> 01:45:01.980] [SPEAKER_06]: Any comments?
[01:45:03.280 --> 01:45:12.740] [SPEAKER_10]: I'd say, I think it's a long and sort of, you know, drawn out history of First Amendment jurisprudence, you know, from the 1980s onward.
[01:45:12.980 --> 01:45:15.940] [SPEAKER_10]: But I think it raises interesting issues.
[01:45:16.140 --> 01:45:24.600] [SPEAKER_10]: And I'll tell you, you know, these First Amendment issues and matters arise in a lot of places where you wouldn't ordinarily expect them to arise as well.
[01:45:24.780 --> 01:45:35.500] [SPEAKER_10]: And a lot of things are forms of expression that that wouldn't otherwise be be thought of as protected by the First Amendment.
[01:45:35.860 --> 01:45:37.960] [SPEAKER_10]: So it's something I'll take a look into.
[01:45:38.200 --> 01:45:41.560] [SPEAKER_10]: And I would say, you know, give me some, let me let me have a think about that one.
[01:45:41.660 --> 01:45:44.040] [SPEAKER_10]: I don't know how to answer it off the top of my head.
[01:45:44.520 --> 01:45:55.960] [SPEAKER_10]: But I will say, though, when it comes to the First Amendment, there's one thing that is definitely and has been found to recently fall outside the First Amendment.
[01:45:56.260 --> 01:45:59.840] [SPEAKER_10]: And that is child pornography, by the way.
[01:46:00.140 --> 01:46:04.180] [SPEAKER_10]: In case you were wondering, it's far less protected by the First Amendment.
[01:46:04.440 --> 01:46:19.820] [SPEAKER_10]: So if, for instance, there was a system devised on an individual device that would permit you to, let's say, match hashes of local files with other known files of, you know, sexually explicit material on faulty children.
[01:46:19.960 --> 01:46:21.500] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, you are asking for it, Alex.
[01:46:21.640 --> 01:46:22.800] [SPEAKER_06]: You are really asking for it.
[01:46:22.920 --> 01:46:27.700] [SPEAKER_10]: That was the Apple communicator issue, isn't it?
[01:46:28.760 --> 01:46:30.400] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes, that's exactly right.
[01:46:30.520 --> 01:46:30.660] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[01:46:30.900 --> 01:46:35.620] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm just going to bring every single question back to that in some way.
[01:46:36.800 --> 01:46:37.280] [SPEAKER_05]: Wow.
[01:46:37.480 --> 01:46:37.700] [SPEAKER_05]: Okay.
[01:46:37.800 --> 01:46:45.520] [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I wasn't expecting that from you, Alex, but if you feel like it, it's...
[01:46:45.520 --> 01:46:46.940] [SPEAKER_12]: Why not, right?
[01:46:47.440 --> 01:46:48.180] [SPEAKER_12]: Change it up a little.
[01:46:48.220 --> 01:46:50.260] [SPEAKER_06]: This is why judges love him so much.
[01:46:51.220 --> 01:46:53.680] [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, if you're going to do it, just don't lie, Alex.
[01:46:53.960 --> 01:47:00.100] [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, it's not recently that child pornography has been considered illegal.
[01:47:00.680 --> 01:47:06.440] [SPEAKER_08]: It's not like that recently changed like it was just a couple months ago.
[01:47:06.700 --> 01:47:10.140] [SPEAKER_08]: There was this big free-for-all of kid butt.
[01:47:11.800 --> 01:47:12.280] [SPEAKER_08]: Right.
[01:47:12.860 --> 01:47:13.180] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[01:47:13.360 --> 01:47:15.640] [SPEAKER_10]: Well, look, it wasn't a few months ago.
[01:47:15.740 --> 01:47:16.680] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, it's been around.
[01:47:16.880 --> 01:47:17.280] [SPEAKER_10]: It's a precedent.
[01:47:17.460 --> 01:47:18.800] [SPEAKER_10]: Obviously, it's been around for a long time.
[01:47:18.920 --> 01:47:29.540] [SPEAKER_10]: And pornography, you know, its constitutionality has been, you know, subject to a certain amount of scrutiny and certainly a lot of case law over the last several decades, too.
[01:47:30.320 --> 01:47:37.500] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, there was these famous cases where literally the Supreme Court had to decide whether or not something was pornographic.
[01:47:37.540 --> 01:47:42.640] [SPEAKER_10]: So they used to watch pornography in the, you know, the basement, I think, of the court.
[01:47:42.820 --> 01:47:42.960] [SPEAKER_05]: Wow.
[01:47:43.240 --> 01:47:44.760] [SPEAKER_10]: It's a very, very strange thing.
[01:47:46.100 --> 01:47:51.480] [SPEAKER_10]: You know, I don't think that's an old wives' tale, but I'm pretty sure that that court was actually doing it.
[01:47:51.520 --> 01:47:55.000] [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I'm not sure that was the issue in some of those cases.
[01:47:55.220 --> 01:48:09.680] [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, I've only seen the movie, as I said, from a quarter century ago, maybe not for decades now, but the Flint versus Fowell issue, they, no one was saying it wasn't pornography.
[01:48:09.820 --> 01:48:29.560] [SPEAKER_12]: And it was about how it was a freedom of speech issue, from what I remember of the legal side of it, which wasn't, which might not have been very accurately portrayed, you know, major Hollywood blockbuster as it turned out to be.
[01:48:30.960 --> 01:48:31.440] But...
[01:48:31.440 --> 01:48:33.020] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, well, that's it.
[01:48:33.100 --> 01:48:36.320] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, and I think that gets right to the heart of the issue here.
[01:48:36.400 --> 01:48:46.340] [SPEAKER_10]: And one of the famous quotes from the Supreme Court justice is that, you know, the pornography is incredibly, you know, it's very difficult to define, but you know it when you see it.
[01:48:47.420 --> 01:48:50.980] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, that's literally how they dealt with the issues of pornography.
[01:48:50.980 --> 01:48:52.780] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, I remember that one on the movie as well.
[01:48:53.760 --> 01:48:54.320] [SPEAKER_10]: No, was it?
[01:48:54.480 --> 01:48:55.880] [SPEAKER_10]: You know, I don't think I ever saw that.
[01:48:55.940 --> 01:48:58.380] [SPEAKER_10]: I think it was People versus Larry Flint, right?
[01:48:58.500 --> 01:49:00.220] [SPEAKER_10]: Is that what the name of the movie was?
[01:49:00.700 --> 01:49:01.140] [SPEAKER_10]: Yes.
[01:49:01.140 --> 01:49:06.520] [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, directed by Milos Forman, starring Woody Harrelson and some other...
[01:49:06.520 --> 01:49:06.640] [SPEAKER_10]: Right.
[01:49:07.840 --> 01:49:08.760] [SPEAKER_10]: Right, yeah.
[01:49:09.220 --> 01:49:10.140] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, interesting one.
[01:49:10.300 --> 01:49:14.440] [SPEAKER_10]: So, let me think on the other issues that you brought up, though, Bobson.
[01:49:14.820 --> 01:49:15.140] [SPEAKER_10]: So, yeah.
[01:49:16.080 --> 01:49:16.200] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[01:49:17.660 --> 01:49:23.600] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, well, he's puffing on his pipe now, so while he's doing that, I think we're going to move on to some other topics.
[01:49:23.640 --> 01:49:24.820] [SPEAKER_06]: Anything else, Bobson, from you?
[01:49:26.480 --> 01:49:35.980] [SPEAKER_12]: Well, no, I just thought I'd bring up that freedom of speech thing and speech thing, and I wish you a great evening.
[01:49:36.580 --> 01:49:39.940] [SPEAKER_12]: Thank you for the radio show and the follow-up.
[01:49:40.260 --> 01:49:41.800] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, thank you for being there and for calling.
[01:49:43.480 --> 01:49:45.220] [SPEAKER_12]: Sorry it took so many...
[01:49:45.220 --> 01:49:45.980] [SPEAKER_12]: Oh, it was worth it.
[01:49:46.060 --> 01:49:48.460] [SPEAKER_06]: It was worth all the efforts, and I'm glad you got through.
[01:49:49.940 --> 01:49:51.300] [SPEAKER_12]: Have a wonderful evening.
[01:49:51.440 --> 01:49:51.940] [SPEAKER_12]: All right, you too.
[01:49:52.020 --> 01:49:52.360] [SPEAKER_12]: Take care.
[01:49:52.500 --> 01:49:58.000] [SPEAKER_06]: Ladies and gentlemen, have a wonderful three in the morning or whatever time it is over there.
[01:49:58.460 --> 01:49:59.460] [SPEAKER_06]: Bobson from Bulgaria.
[01:50:01.340 --> 01:50:04.800] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, so Alex, you seem to want to talk about this whole Apple thing.
[01:50:05.100 --> 01:50:13.580] [SPEAKER_06]: You know, I'd like to just read a couple of remarks from someone who was involved in this.
[01:50:14.260 --> 01:50:19.900] [SPEAKER_06]: Basically, Jonathan Meyer, an assistant professor of computer science and public affairs at Princeton University.
[01:50:20.680 --> 01:50:23.180] [SPEAKER_06]: This is what he wrote in the Washington Post.
[01:50:23.400 --> 01:50:31.860] [SPEAKER_06]: We wrote the only peer-reviewed publication on how to build a system like Apple's, and we concluded the technology was dangerous.
[01:50:32.280 --> 01:50:36.560] [SPEAKER_06]: We're not concerned because we misunderstand how Apple's system works.
[01:50:36.660 --> 01:50:39.600] [SPEAKER_06]: The problem is we understand exactly how it works.
[01:50:39.740 --> 01:50:51.680] [SPEAKER_06]: Our research project began two years ago as an experimental system to identify CSAM, C-S-A-M, Child Sexual Abuse Material, in end-to-end encrypted online services.
[01:50:51.840 --> 01:51:10.920] [SPEAKER_06]: As security researchers, we know the value of end-to-end encryption, which protects data from third-party access, but we're also horrified that CSAM is proliferating on encrypted platforms, and we worry online services are reluctant to use encryption without additional tools to combat CSAM.
[01:51:11.080 --> 01:51:20.820] [SPEAKER_06]: We sought to explore a possible middle ground where online services could identify harmful content while otherwise preserving end-to-end encryption.
[01:51:20.900 --> 01:51:22.520] [SPEAKER_06]: The concept was straightforward.
[01:51:22.520 --> 01:51:28.180] [SPEAKER_06]: If someone shared material that matched a database of known harmful content, the service would be alerted.
[01:51:28.280 --> 01:51:31.580] [SPEAKER_06]: If a person shared innocent content, the service would learn nothing.
[01:51:31.680 --> 01:51:40.100] [SPEAKER_06]: People couldn't read the database or learn where the content matched, since that information could reveal law enforcement methods and help criminals evade detection.
[01:51:40.620 --> 01:51:44.360] [SPEAKER_06]: Knowledgeable observers argued a system like ours was far from feasible.
[01:51:44.680 --> 01:51:50.480] [SPEAKER_06]: After many false starts, we built a working prototype, but we encountered a glaring problem.
[01:51:50.740 --> 01:51:55.460] [SPEAKER_06]: Our system could be easily repurposed for surveillance and censorship.
[01:51:55.720 --> 01:51:58.940] [SPEAKER_06]: The design wasn't restricted to a specific category of content.
[01:51:59.220 --> 01:52:06.420] [SPEAKER_06]: A service could simply swap in any content-matching database, and the person using that service would be none the wiser.
[01:52:07.120 --> 01:52:13.920] [SPEAKER_06]: These are words coming from someone who has designed a system like Apple's that people are up in arms about.
[01:52:14.520 --> 01:52:16.960] [SPEAKER_06]: And I think, you know, that carries a lot of weight.
[01:52:17.180 --> 01:52:19.060] [SPEAKER_06]: That is something that we need to take seriously.
[01:52:19.060 --> 01:52:28.420] [SPEAKER_06]: When people who are behind this type of thing are saying, whoa, this is dangerous, and it can be misused, we have to ask ourselves, is that kind of thing worth it?
[01:52:30.880 --> 01:52:34.520] [SPEAKER_10]: Look, I respect the author of that article.
[01:52:34.800 --> 01:52:36.420] [SPEAKER_10]: I think he's well bona fide.
[01:52:36.720 --> 01:52:45.080] [SPEAKER_10]: But the fact of the matter is here, I read that article, I don't think it advanced the debate about this at all.
[01:52:45.380 --> 01:52:56.340] [SPEAKER_10]: Because it just parroted over and over and over again, the same arguments that are all premised on an identically erroneous assumption.
[01:52:56.920 --> 01:52:59.880] [SPEAKER_10]: That what you're reviewing here is content.
[01:53:00.160 --> 01:53:09.400] [SPEAKER_10]: What every single one of these articles, and all of these privacy advocates never mention in any of their articles, is a definition of what a hash is.
[01:53:09.620 --> 01:53:15.680] [SPEAKER_10]: And I would go out on a limb and say, they may not know how to define a hash.
[01:53:15.760 --> 01:53:29.840] [SPEAKER_10]: If you ask a lot of these privacy advocates, without any preparation time to explain to them what is a cryptographic hash and how does it work on a file, I bet you most of them are not going to know how to answer that question accurately.
[01:53:30.040 --> 01:53:36.540] [SPEAKER_10]: Because if they did, they wouldn't be making the same mistake over and over and over again about this particular system.
[01:53:38.000 --> 01:53:50.940] [SPEAKER_10]: The problem that everyone assumes, I'm sorry, the assumption that is the error amongst everybody is that this can be used to track some kind of concepts.
[01:53:51.280 --> 01:53:52.320] [SPEAKER_10]: It cannot.
[01:53:52.320 --> 01:53:55.180] [SPEAKER_10]: It can only be used to track files.
[01:53:55.500 --> 01:54:00.680] [SPEAKER_10]: Individual files have a fingerprint, essentially, called a hash.
[01:54:00.680 --> 01:54:04.560] [SPEAKER_10]: It's just a long string of numbers and letters.
[01:54:04.960 --> 01:54:08.380] [SPEAKER_10]: Something like an MD5 sum is very unique.
[01:54:08.600 --> 01:54:09.680] [SPEAKER_06]: Alex, we don't need to get into all that.
[01:54:09.820 --> 01:54:18.780] [SPEAKER_06]: But, you know, if you truly believe that the person who designed the system like this doesn't understand how a hash works, you're free to believe that.
[01:54:18.940 --> 01:54:19.700] [SPEAKER_06]: I think he does.
[01:54:19.700 --> 01:54:20.880] [SPEAKER_06]: I think he knows what he's talking about.
[01:54:21.000 --> 01:54:22.160] [SPEAKER_06]: But let me just ask you this.
[01:54:22.360 --> 01:54:25.780] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, let's say that I have a meme.
[01:54:25.980 --> 01:54:31.400] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, a meme of, say, a president of a country.
[01:54:31.840 --> 01:54:33.240] [SPEAKER_06]: That's not very flattering.
[01:54:33.240 --> 01:54:36.220] [SPEAKER_06]: And I pass that meme around to my friends.
[01:54:36.460 --> 01:54:38.060] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, it's a file.
[01:54:38.260 --> 01:54:39.440] [SPEAKER_06]: It's something we all share.
[01:54:39.680 --> 01:54:47.140] [SPEAKER_06]: And then the government says to Apple, whatever government it might be, you need to tell us if this hash exists on these phones.
[01:54:47.580 --> 01:54:49.480] [SPEAKER_06]: How is this any different?
[01:54:49.480 --> 01:54:54.040] [SPEAKER_06]: The hash is going to be the same because the file has been shared with all these people.
[01:54:54.360 --> 01:54:56.020] [SPEAKER_06]: It's the same damn thing.
[01:54:56.160 --> 01:54:57.040] [SPEAKER_10]: How is this not a threat?
[01:54:57.560 --> 01:55:03.640] [SPEAKER_10]: But any change to that file, anybody who crops it, anybody who changes the color, any change to that file?
[01:55:03.900 --> 01:55:04.940] [SPEAKER_06]: Why would anybody change it?
[01:55:04.980 --> 01:55:05.960] [SPEAKER_06]: What's the point of changing it?
[01:55:06.040 --> 01:55:06.860] [SPEAKER_06]: We're passing it around.
[01:55:06.860 --> 01:55:07.920] [SPEAKER_06]: It's like a baseball card.
[01:55:08.100 --> 01:55:11.660] [SPEAKER_10]: To make it bigger, to make it larger, to evade some kind of hash matching technology.
[01:55:12.480 --> 01:55:13.060] [SPEAKER_10]: That's how.
[01:55:13.180 --> 01:55:14.360] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, it would be very, very easy.
[01:55:14.500 --> 01:55:22.300] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, so your advice to avoid the gulag is if you get something that could be used against you, make sure you modify it a little bit so that the authorities will be fooled.
[01:55:22.660 --> 01:55:24.640] [SPEAKER_06]: That's our form of protection from now on.
[01:55:24.860 --> 01:55:30.860] [SPEAKER_10]: That would be an effective way to defeat the system, this mastermind system, you know, that's going to be out there tracking dissonance.
[01:55:30.940 --> 01:55:37.700] [SPEAKER_10]: Look, everybody's making this slippery slope argument about this technology and that it's going to be eventually misused.
[01:55:37.780 --> 01:55:38.920] [SPEAKER_10]: It's going to be used to track concepts.
[01:55:39.100 --> 01:55:40.640] [SPEAKER_10]: It cannot be used to track concepts.
[01:55:40.800 --> 01:55:48.340] [SPEAKER_10]: Sure, an individual file, but you got to remember the manufacturers of these devices have complete control over the operating system.
[01:55:48.520 --> 01:55:55.320] [SPEAKER_10]: If they are going to be forced to put in some kind of backdoor to monitor concepts, that can happen anyway.
[01:55:55.680 --> 01:55:57.720] [SPEAKER_10]: It has nothing to do with the technology.
[01:55:57.720 --> 01:56:00.140] [SPEAKER_06]: When it happens, we will be there to reveal it.
[01:56:00.200 --> 01:56:03.620] [SPEAKER_06]: But this is something that can be used in a very dangerous way.
[01:56:03.940 --> 01:56:10.300] [SPEAKER_06]: And, you know, the ACLU sees this, EFF sees this, and people who design such systems see this.
[01:56:10.500 --> 01:56:11.300] [SPEAKER_10]: And I think they're wrong.
[01:56:11.420 --> 01:56:24.760] [SPEAKER_10]: And I think they're wrong because of the very fact, and again, this is something that has been ignored in large part by the media, that this type of technology has been in place for many years already.
[01:56:25.020 --> 01:56:26.300] [SPEAKER_10]: It's been used by Google.
[01:56:26.460 --> 01:56:27.360] [SPEAKER_10]: It's been used by Facebook.
[01:56:27.360 --> 01:56:33.140] [SPEAKER_10]: I even mentioned last week a criminal prosecution that arose, I think an erroneous criminal prosecution.
[01:56:33.140 --> 01:56:36.520] [SPEAKER_10]: That's what I'm more afraid of with these types of situations, because I've seen it happen.
[01:56:36.780 --> 01:56:41.500] [SPEAKER_10]: But criminal prosecutions that arose from detection of CSAM in Google Photos.
[01:56:42.120 --> 01:56:45.740] [SPEAKER_10]: And so we have about 10 years, probably more.
[01:56:45.780 --> 01:56:52.260] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, but what you're not saying here is that that's a completely different system where you're uploading photos to a service.
[01:56:52.460 --> 01:56:54.880] [SPEAKER_06]: This is on your phone.
[01:56:55.140 --> 01:56:57.180] [SPEAKER_06]: Apple is going into your phone.
[01:56:57.360 --> 01:57:02.580] [SPEAKER_06]: And checking the hashes of files on your phone and reporting the ones that are objectionable.
[01:57:02.800 --> 01:57:03.800] [SPEAKER_06]: That is very different.
[01:57:04.160 --> 01:57:04.680] [SPEAKER_10]: They're only looking.
[01:57:04.800 --> 01:57:10.140] [SPEAKER_10]: They're only looking at files when they're about to be uploaded to the cloud, to their cloud.
[01:57:10.320 --> 01:57:15.720] [SPEAKER_10]: So these files that are imminently going to reside on Apple's own servers are being reviewed over there.
[01:57:16.020 --> 01:57:17.680] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, so can I just ask you this?
[01:57:17.680 --> 01:57:19.240] [SPEAKER_06]: Can I just ask you one question?
[01:57:19.240 --> 01:57:23.320] [SPEAKER_06]: They're looking at files that are about to be uploaded to their cloud service.
[01:57:23.920 --> 01:57:29.200] [SPEAKER_06]: What keeps them from looking at them even if they're not going to be uploaded?
[01:57:29.900 --> 01:57:33.200] [SPEAKER_06]: Is there some kind of technology in place that prevents them from doing that?
[01:57:33.840 --> 01:57:36.740] [SPEAKER_06]: Or just their good word that they won't?
[01:57:36.960 --> 01:57:39.340] [SPEAKER_10]: But that has nothing to do with matching hashes.
[01:57:39.520 --> 01:57:41.820] [SPEAKER_10]: They have the ability to do that no matter what.
[01:57:41.960 --> 01:57:44.000] [SPEAKER_10]: They can put anything they want on these phones.
[01:57:44.580 --> 01:57:58.660] [SPEAKER_10]: Matching a hash on one side, whether it's on the device or whether it's in the cloud, I really think is a distinction without a difference because what we're talking about is the ability of the technology to do something bad, which is the slippery slope argument.
[01:57:58.880 --> 01:58:15.380] [SPEAKER_10]: But my major premise here is that because we have over 10 years of data of this happening already, and we don't have some totalitarian regime misusing hash matching to track down dissidents, we know that it's not a slippery slope.
[01:58:15.380 --> 01:58:16.400] [SPEAKER_10]: It's a sticky slope.
[01:58:16.420 --> 01:58:21.140] [SPEAKER_10]: It hasn't moved at all because it's an idiotic way to try to track dissidents and people.
[01:58:22.100 --> 01:58:39.840] [SPEAKER_06]: I maintain that if you have a meme that says Lukashenko sucks on your iPhone and you're in Belarus and Apple has revealed how they're able to match hashes, I think there'll be a very strong interest in finding out who's got that on their phones and then they'll be visited.
[01:58:40.100 --> 01:58:46.780] [SPEAKER_06]: And if you can tell me that's not possible in light of what Apple says they are doing now, then I will say I'm wrong.
[01:58:46.920 --> 01:58:54.160] [SPEAKER_06]: But it seems to me you're saying that that is indeed possible and that the best defense is to crop the picture and change it some way so that you fool the authorities.
[01:58:54.480 --> 01:58:58.800] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm saying it's possible regardless of whether or not there's this hash matching technology on your phone.
[01:58:59.000 --> 01:59:04.240] [SPEAKER_10]: Because Apple basically owns these devices, they create the operating system.
[01:59:04.320 --> 01:59:07.040] [SPEAKER_10]: They can create any functionality they want into this.
[01:59:07.160 --> 01:59:16.980] [SPEAKER_10]: I would be much more concerned about the technology that is about to be implemented that detects nudity in text messages sent to children.
[01:59:17.420 --> 01:59:22.240] [SPEAKER_10]: That's some kind of algorithm that is looking at the content of the actual images.
[01:59:22.560 --> 01:59:30.560] [SPEAKER_10]: That's technology that could be used to find a photograph of Lukashenko much more effectively than matching the hash of the file.
[01:59:30.720 --> 01:59:37.700] [SPEAKER_06]: Because there's no content of... The fact that they were both announced at the same time tells me that that's exactly what the thinking is here.
[01:59:38.000 --> 01:59:41.860] [SPEAKER_10]: No, it was... I just think it was a very bad PR move for them.
[01:59:42.100 --> 01:59:47.900] [SPEAKER_10]: They didn't expect this backlash because people conflated the two technologies at issue at first.
[01:59:48.100 --> 01:59:53.400] [SPEAKER_10]: If they just announced the fact that they were going to be hash matching, that wouldn't have caused any fanfare.
[01:59:53.500 --> 01:59:58.440] [SPEAKER_10]: It would have actually probably been bad for them because Apple has not done this for so long.
[01:59:58.760 --> 02:00:05.720] [SPEAKER_10]: And you've got to remember, this is a company that really resisted the FBI and the United States government when they wanted them to build in a backdoor.
[02:00:05.880 --> 02:00:09.620] [SPEAKER_10]: It's a company that has built its brand reputation on being privacy conscious.
[02:00:09.780 --> 02:00:22.400] [SPEAKER_10]: So I think that they have probably gained a little bit of credibility in that they're not trying to build in some nefarious backdoor to enable autocratic regimes to track down dissidents here.
[02:00:22.500 --> 02:00:28.020] [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, we're talking about something that is non-content whatsoever.
[02:00:28.380 --> 02:00:37.180] [SPEAKER_10]: A hash is just a long string of numbers that exist in one way or another without respect to what that picture is of or what the file is.
[02:00:37.280 --> 02:00:43.380] [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, I can do a hash... It's listed in a database and it's very much about what is contained in that file or that picture.
[02:00:43.480 --> 02:00:44.200] [SPEAKER_06]: Kyle, you have something to say?
[02:00:44.320 --> 02:00:45.180] [SPEAKER_08]: I just want to extend this.
[02:00:45.320 --> 02:00:49.600] [SPEAKER_08]: I think the two things being released, I agree, they're both PR moves.
[02:00:49.800 --> 02:00:50.820] [SPEAKER_08]: I agree with that.
[02:00:50.940 --> 02:00:52.760] [SPEAKER_08]: And I think they were both concerning at the time.
[02:00:52.960 --> 02:00:55.940] [SPEAKER_08]: I don't think there was anything about that one or the other.
[02:00:56.120 --> 02:01:11.720] [SPEAKER_08]: This got a little bit more attention because of the confusion, I think, and about where some of this activity was being taken place and things like the Fourth Amendment and having some control over how your data is judged or when it is judged.
[02:01:12.380 --> 02:01:14.560] [SPEAKER_08]: Specifically, let's extend out.
[02:01:14.680 --> 02:01:16.660] [SPEAKER_08]: So this is being used.
[02:01:16.920 --> 02:01:18.240] [SPEAKER_08]: What about hash planting?
[02:01:18.680 --> 02:01:28.540] [SPEAKER_08]: Or if this is what we are using as the rubric to confirm that something has taken place, e.g.
[02:01:28.780 --> 02:01:29.700] [SPEAKER_08]: evidence, right?
[02:01:29.840 --> 02:01:32.920] [SPEAKER_08]: This is the rule of thumb we're going to use.
[02:01:33.360 --> 02:01:40.560] [SPEAKER_08]: What's stopping the authority just saying, yeah, we found several hash matches and that's it.
[02:01:40.680 --> 02:01:46.160] [SPEAKER_08]: I saw Mike Lindell with a whole lot of cascading text and characters.
[02:01:46.180 --> 02:01:47.080] [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, the matrix, yeah.
[02:01:47.100 --> 02:01:51.120] [SPEAKER_08]: And that looked like a lot of hash and, you know, hex.
[02:01:51.440 --> 02:01:55.240] [SPEAKER_08]: And so if he says that's what it is, you know, you know what I'm saying?
[02:01:55.360 --> 02:02:01.200] [SPEAKER_08]: Like that, that, so we, we decide that this is how we know evidence exists.
[02:02:01.620 --> 02:02:06.900] [SPEAKER_08]: What is stopping it from, you know, people plant it, you know, planting evidence is the thing.
[02:02:07.020 --> 02:02:24.240] [SPEAKER_08]: What if, what if it is simple, if it's so simple to get access to a device, if it was used by an authoritarian regime, which we know Apple operates in many of these countries, uh, uh, and, and parts of the world and arguably our own could be in that category in some ways.
[02:02:24.420 --> 02:02:27.180] [SPEAKER_08]: So like extending it out, what do you foresee?
[02:02:27.520 --> 02:02:33.320] [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, how do you, how do you plan in a world where this is just totally cool with everybody?
[02:02:33.880 --> 02:02:34.620] [SPEAKER_06]: Go ahead, Alex.
[02:02:35.320 --> 02:02:35.820] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[02:02:36.020 --> 02:02:41.400] [SPEAKER_10]: And look, unlike the rest of you guys, I actually agree, uh, in part with Kyle.
[02:02:41.760 --> 02:02:59.680] [SPEAKER_10]: So, you know, he's got that going for him, I think, but the, um, uh, I think, I think you're exactly right though about the, it's the principles that underlie what have the consequences of this technology that I think are, are frankly more problematic to me than the technology itself,
[02:02:59.680 --> 02:03:06.780] [SPEAKER_10]: because there's other erroneous assumptions that are built into the hash matching, uh, idea itself.
[02:03:06.780 --> 02:03:12.640] [SPEAKER_10]: And that's namely that whatever is on your phone, the owner of the phone is responsible for that content.
[02:03:12.900 --> 02:03:25.480] [SPEAKER_10]: It's just assuming that these are all single user devices, that they might not be out somewhere where, you know, 50, 60 people have access to them, you know, like in a public library, or let's say a poor community.
[02:03:25.700 --> 02:03:31.160] [SPEAKER_10]: How are you then going to figure out who's, who downloaded that, that material?
[02:03:31.600 --> 02:03:33.260] [SPEAKER_10]: Who's going to be charged criminally?
[02:03:33.400 --> 02:03:36.940] [SPEAKER_10]: And what kind of privacy violations is, is this going to arise to?
[02:03:37.260 --> 02:03:41.480] [SPEAKER_10]: Because whenever these hashes are matched and they meet a certain threshold, I think it was 30 of them.
[02:03:41.620 --> 02:03:42.940] [SPEAKER_10]: It was fairly generous number.
[02:03:43.500 --> 02:03:51.380] [SPEAKER_10]: It will then go to NICMIC, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, who then reports it to local law enforcement, possibly FBI as well.
[02:03:52.060 --> 02:03:56.100] [SPEAKER_10]: And that becomes probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant.
[02:03:56.460 --> 02:03:58.520] [SPEAKER_10]: Then the next thing you know, the police are in your house.
[02:03:58.720 --> 02:04:00.440] [SPEAKER_10]: Another thing, there's, go, go ahead.
[02:04:00.500 --> 02:04:12.160] [SPEAKER_08]: Sorry, I was just thinking of like airdrop too, like where you have unsolicited stuff that could match a hash, where you're basically, you're hash bombed on, on a train or something with, with stuff that will then...
[02:04:12.160 --> 02:04:13.020] [SPEAKER_06]: Hash bombed, wow.
[02:04:13.020 --> 02:04:15.680] [SPEAKER_08]: I'm just making up stuff, if that's where we're going with this.
[02:04:15.680 --> 02:04:17.200] [SPEAKER_06]: No, that's, you're writing the future is where you're doing.
[02:04:17.260 --> 02:04:21.500] [SPEAKER_08]: But I, I'm truly trying to take, you know, work through this with, you know, the conversation.
[02:04:21.800 --> 02:04:24.100] [SPEAKER_06]: Alex, we could talk about this all night and it is fun.
[02:04:24.520 --> 02:04:27.640] [SPEAKER_06]: I think, I think you, you should have a debate at Hope.
[02:04:27.860 --> 02:04:30.080] [SPEAKER_06]: I, I think it would be a good, a good conversation.
[02:04:30.520 --> 02:04:31.500] [SPEAKER_06]: Make people think about this.
[02:04:31.960 --> 02:04:37.280] [SPEAKER_06]: Get some civil libertarians on one side, a bunch of them, and then you on the other side, and it'll be...
[02:04:37.280 --> 02:04:38.740] [SPEAKER_10]: Me on the other side, yeah.
[02:04:38.940 --> 02:04:40.440] [SPEAKER_10]: We'll make sure people don't throw things.
[02:04:41.260 --> 02:04:42.820] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm a huge privacy advocate.
[02:04:42.960 --> 02:04:48.680] [SPEAKER_10]: I think people know that about me, but I just, I think this is the wrong battle to fight here when it's non-content.
[02:04:48.840 --> 02:04:53.880] [SPEAKER_10]: And, and look, you know, an important principle to remember is, you know, you can only die on a hill once.
[02:04:53.880 --> 02:04:57.560] [SPEAKER_10]: I just don't think this is the hill that these privacy advocates should die on.
[02:04:58.180 --> 02:04:58.760] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know.
[02:04:58.840 --> 02:05:02.300] [SPEAKER_06]: They seem to die on a lot of hills, but no, I, I, I hear you.
[02:05:02.420 --> 02:05:11.580] [SPEAKER_06]: And yes, yes, you, you are a privacy advocate, but I have to disagree with you here, but I respect your views and, and I look forward to continuing the, the, the dialogue.
[02:05:11.800 --> 02:05:12.840] [SPEAKER_09]: We have no more calls.
[02:05:13.000 --> 02:05:13.500] [SPEAKER_06]: We have no more calls.
[02:05:13.580 --> 02:05:14.260] [SPEAKER_06]: We have no more time.
[02:05:14.480 --> 02:05:15.180] [SPEAKER_06]: We're out of time.
[02:05:15.440 --> 02:05:16.060] [SPEAKER_06]: We're out of calls.
[02:05:16.880 --> 02:05:20.080] [SPEAKER_06]: But please write to us, oth@2600.com.
[02:05:20.260 --> 02:05:21.000] [SPEAKER_06]: Tune in next week.
[02:05:21.000 --> 02:05:23.620] [SPEAKER_06]: We'll be back both off the hook and Off The Hook Overtime.
[02:05:24.140 --> 02:05:26.440] [SPEAKER_06]: Please support WBAI however possible.
[02:05:26.600 --> 02:05:26.980] [SPEAKER_06]: 516.
[02:05:27.560 --> 02:05:28.780] [SPEAKER_06]: No, wait, that number doesn't work anymore.
[02:05:28.940 --> 02:05:33.080] [SPEAKER_06]: 212-209-2950 or give2wbai.org.
[02:05:33.240 --> 02:05:39.800] [SPEAKER_06]: And if you like what we did today, please support the station and tell them we're your favorite show, unless you can find a better one.
[02:05:40.060 --> 02:05:43.240] [SPEAKER_06]: It's possible until, uh, next week.
[02:05:43.460 --> 02:05:47.040] [SPEAKER_06]: It's manual for Kyle and, uh, and, and Rob and Alex and Gila.
[02:05:47.680 --> 02:05:48.220] [SPEAKER_06]: Good night.