Off The Hook - 2023-01-25

[00:00.000 --> 00:03.940]  [SPEAKER_01]: Activist Sharon Salam speaks out for WBAI.
[00:04.040 --> 00:16.720]  [SPEAKER_09]: We should be moving forward, collecting the funds that we need to make sure that our station is whole and that it can do its job as it has done for me in the past.
[00:16.960 --> 00:38.000]  [SPEAKER_09]: When all of this stuff happened to me many, many years ago in 1989, I didn't get very many opportunities to speak out in regards to the wrong that was done to my son and the other boys in the Central Park Jaga case, as it was called at that time.
[00:38.460 --> 00:41.540]  [SPEAKER_09]: Very few people stepped up.
[00:41.760 --> 00:43.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yes, Like It Is was there.
[00:44.540 --> 00:47.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: WBAI was there and a few others.
[00:47.480 --> 00:59.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: Majority of those stations that let people like myself speak and tell them what was going on on the other side, those stations are gone.
[00:59.360 --> 01:04.820]  [SPEAKER_09]: If we lose WBAI, where do we go to get our words out?
[01:04.940 --> 01:08.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: Where do we go if you've been arrested unjustly?
[01:08.660 --> 01:13.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: Where do you go if someone's taken your children unfairly?
[01:13.340 --> 01:15.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: Where do you go to seek justice?
[01:15.780 --> 01:20.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: We must keep this station alive, alive.
[01:22.380 --> 01:23.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: WBAI.
[01:23.800 --> 01:29.680]  [SPEAKER_01]: This is listener-sponsored, locally-controlled WBAI New York.
[01:29.980 --> 01:37.560]  [SPEAKER_11]: And the previous program was Economic Update with Professor Richard Wolford, Wednesdays at 6.30 p.m.
[01:38.440 --> 01:40.020]  [SPEAKER_11]: here on WBAI.
[01:40.020 --> 02:01.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: Stay tuned for Off The Hook coming up, and again, if you consider supporting this radio station and haven't done it yet, well, this is a great opportunity than any to do it now.
[02:02.800 --> 02:10.960]  [SPEAKER_11]: 2-1-2-2-0-9-2-9-5-0, or go to gift to WBAI.org online, and you'll be glad you did.
[02:11.480 --> 02:27.000]  [SPEAKER_11]: As I've mentioned before, WBAI is now 63 years being part of the Pacifica Radio Network, part of the Pacifica Foundation, and it's because of people like yourself made it happen.
[02:27.780 --> 02:31.000]  [SPEAKER_11]: Now stay tuned for Off The Hook coming up.
[02:45.240 --> 02:52.140]  [SPEAKER_13]: Due to telephone company facility trouble in the area you are calling, your call cannot be completed at this time.
[02:52.440 --> 02:53.700]  [SPEAKER_13]: Please try your call later.
[02:54.280 --> 02:55.280]  [SPEAKER_13]: 078-T.
[02:56.700 --> 02:57.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: We're sorry.
[02:58.000 --> 03:04.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: The number you have reached, 99.5 WBAI, is now Off The Hook.
[03:09.260 --> 03:13.760]  [SPEAKER_05]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[03:14.700 --> 03:19.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[03:19.880 --> 03:24.580]  [SPEAKER_05]: We couldn't get much worse, but if they could, they would.
[03:24.840 --> 03:27.480]  [SPEAKER_05]: Bum-dee-lip-bump, but the best expect from worst.
[03:28.100 --> 03:29.980]  [SPEAKER_05]: I hope that's understood.
[03:30.360 --> 03:31.100]  [SPEAKER_05]: Bum-dee-lip-bump!
[04:36.530 --> 04:38.390]  [SPEAKER_17]: And a very good evening to everybody.
[04:38.490 --> 04:40.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: The program is Off The Hook.
[04:40.690 --> 04:42.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this.
[04:43.070 --> 04:46.410]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wednesday evening, joined tonight by Kyle.
[04:46.890 --> 04:48.090]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, I'm right here.
[04:48.470 --> 04:52.050]  [SPEAKER_17]: And out there in Skype-land, I see Rob T. Firefly.
[04:52.790 --> 04:53.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good evening.
[04:54.610 --> 04:56.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: And Arseny, you're joining us again.
[04:57.690 --> 04:58.790]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yes, hello.
[04:59.110 --> 05:04.090]  [SPEAKER_17]: Arseny, you may remember from many years ago, used to be one of the co-hosts of this particular program.
[05:04.730 --> 05:07.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: And in fact, you've just flown in from London, I believe.
[05:08.750 --> 05:09.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, yes.
[05:09.630 --> 05:10.730]  [SPEAKER_17]: You didn't have to do that.
[05:10.890 --> 05:12.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, you could have been on the show from London.
[05:12.530 --> 05:15.190]  [SPEAKER_17]: You didn't have to fly all the way back here just to be on the show.
[05:15.270 --> 05:15.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: Back here in person.
[05:15.950 --> 05:16.190]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[05:17.090 --> 05:18.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: And we also have a special guest.
[05:18.950 --> 05:23.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: Lorax is joining us from Distributed Denial of Secrets, one of our favorite organizations.
[05:24.130 --> 05:24.730]  [SPEAKER_17]: Greetings, Lorax.
[05:26.150 --> 05:26.550]  [SPEAKER_00]: Hi.
[05:26.770 --> 05:27.810]  [SPEAKER_00]: Thanks for having me on.
[05:28.190 --> 05:32.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're going to get to a very big story involving you folks in just a moment.
[05:32.810 --> 05:36.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: But first, we're going to just go through some of the things that have happened over the past week.
[05:36.610 --> 05:41.150]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's kind of our usual hodgepodge of smart things and stupid things.
[05:41.470 --> 05:44.030]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, we'll try and race through this as quickly as possible.
[05:45.350 --> 05:45.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[05:46.090 --> 05:47.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, by the way, Rob, Gila's not here.
[05:47.890 --> 05:49.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, is she coming with her?
[05:49.310 --> 05:49.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: She is not.
[05:49.910 --> 05:50.530]  [SPEAKER_15]: She is on her way.
[05:50.650 --> 05:52.570]  [SPEAKER_15]: She is caught in the wonderful weather out there.
[05:53.250 --> 05:55.110]  [SPEAKER_15]: And so, she'll be here at some point.
[05:55.250 --> 05:55.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[05:55.470 --> 06:00.050]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I should also point out, Alex is currently on a plane from London to here.
[06:00.190 --> 06:03.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: But his plane, unlike Arseny's plane, is getting here after the show.
[06:04.670 --> 06:08.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: And if you remember, the last time we tried to talk to Alex on a plane, it did not go well.
[06:08.090 --> 06:09.270]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're not even going to try to do that again.
[06:09.810 --> 06:14.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't know what's going on in London or why everybody is in such a rush to get back here, but whatever.
[06:14.690 --> 06:19.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, in any case, I'll be very happy to provide very bad legal advice.
[06:19.470 --> 06:19.730]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[06:19.810 --> 06:20.230]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's fine.
[06:20.570 --> 06:22.410]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's, you know, that's great.
[06:23.370 --> 06:34.910]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, so now, speaking of degrees and accomplishments and things like that, MBA, Master's of Business Administration, that's quite an achievement, don't you think?
[06:34.910 --> 06:39.150]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's something that a lot of people strive for, and they work hard, they study.
[06:39.830 --> 06:49.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: And Adam ChatGPT passed an MBA exam given by a Wharton professor.
[06:49.510 --> 06:49.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[06:50.950 --> 07:09.390]  [SPEAKER_17]: Professor Christian Tiewicz, who authored the research paper, Would ChatGPT3 Get a Wharton MBA, a prediction based on its performance in the operations management course, said that the bot scored between a B- and a B on the exam.
[07:09.750 --> 07:23.370]  [SPEAKER_17]: The bot score shows its remarkable ability to automate some of the skills of highly compensated knowledge workers in general, and specifically the knowledge workers in the jobs held by MBA graduates, including analysts, managers, and consultants.
[07:24.130 --> 07:32.110]  [SPEAKER_17]: The bot did an amazing job at basic operations management and process analysis questions, including those that are based on case studies.
[07:33.050 --> 07:35.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: As you recall, we were playing with this last week on the air.
[07:35.990 --> 07:39.550]  [SPEAKER_17]: We were writing poems and songs and even film screenplays.
[07:39.550 --> 07:42.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: And it wasn't doing badly, I have to say.
[07:42.790 --> 07:46.390]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's a little frightening how on the mark this can be sometimes.
[07:46.390 --> 07:54.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: But there's all kinds of concern over how this could be taking over our lives in one way or another.
[07:54.630 --> 08:00.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: Certainly Google is concerned because it might do a better job of searching online than Google does.
[08:00.430 --> 08:03.310]  [SPEAKER_17]: And they haven't had competition in a very long time.
[08:04.310 --> 08:12.270]  [SPEAKER_17]: Experts who work in both artificial intelligence and education have acknowledged that bots like ChatGPT could be...
[08:12.270 --> 08:13.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: I keep saying it wrong.
[08:14.450 --> 08:14.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: GPT.
[08:15.130 --> 08:15.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes, I said it right.
[08:15.750 --> 08:15.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[08:16.050 --> 08:16.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: They need a better name.
[08:17.490 --> 08:20.090]  [SPEAKER_17]: It could be a detriment to education in the future.
[08:20.390 --> 08:28.310]  [SPEAKER_17]: In recent interviews, some educators and experts say they are not yet concerned, but they expect to be concerned really, really soon.
[08:28.310 --> 08:33.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: There's a student in Princeton who has written an app, and we believe he's human.
[08:33.910 --> 08:34.590]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're not sure yet.
[08:34.830 --> 08:35.910]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hasn't really been verified.
[08:36.170 --> 08:46.910]  [SPEAKER_17]: But supposedly this human student has built an app that helps detect whether a text was written by a human being or using artificial intelligence tool, ChatGPT.
[08:47.650 --> 08:53.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: Of course, that's exactly the kind of thing that ChatGPT would do to fool us.
[08:53.850 --> 08:56.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, you know, I'm a bit wary here.
[08:56.330 --> 09:03.210]  [SPEAKER_08]: And what's stopping ChatGPT from using that app on itself, on its own stuff to, like, improve it?
[09:03.830 --> 09:04.310]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[09:04.510 --> 09:05.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, you're right.
[09:05.390 --> 09:12.710]  [SPEAKER_17]: It could use the work that Edward Tian, which is the human name that's being used here, devoted all this time to.
[09:12.810 --> 09:26.490]  [SPEAKER_17]: He said in a recent tweet that the algorithm behind his app called GPT-0 can quickly and efficiently detect whether an essay is ChatGPT or human written.
[09:27.250 --> 09:33.370]  [SPEAKER_17]: As you know, it's exploded in popularity recently for its ability to spit out coherent essays on virtually any topic in just seconds.
[09:34.670 --> 09:36.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, fun projects.
[09:36.830 --> 09:40.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: I think this is what we need to be doing.
[09:40.650 --> 09:42.710]  [SPEAKER_17]: Just, you know, create as much mischief as possible.
[09:42.710 --> 09:46.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: I had it write an essay on George Santos.
[09:46.770 --> 09:51.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, keep in mind, this thing only goes up to 2019, is it?
[09:52.230 --> 09:54.230]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is that where its knowledge base cuts off?
[09:54.270 --> 09:54.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: I thought it was 2021.
[09:55.050 --> 09:55.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: It might be 2021.
[09:56.550 --> 09:57.070]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[09:57.150 --> 10:00.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: But that's still before we all found out the truth about George Santos.
[10:01.070 --> 10:06.490]  [SPEAKER_17]: So this thing read back this essay that the current George Santos could have written.
[10:06.610 --> 10:07.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: It was full of praise.
[10:07.350 --> 10:11.110]  [SPEAKER_17]: And this guy will make a great congressman, et cetera, et cetera, all his accomplishments.
[10:11.450 --> 10:12.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: So that was a bit of fun.
[10:13.710 --> 10:20.250]  [SPEAKER_17]: And there's no limit to the other kinds of things that you can do with this to create mischief and mayhem.
[10:20.390 --> 10:35.530]  [SPEAKER_17]: I was thinking of taking a controversial subject, let's say something like nuclear power, and writing a letter to a local newspaper in favor of it, and then writing another letter opposed to it, both written by the bot and both getting published, I'll bet.
[10:36.850 --> 10:37.970]  [SPEAKER_08]: That would be brilliant.
[10:38.110 --> 10:38.210]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[10:38.370 --> 10:40.650]  [SPEAKER_08]: Just side by side alone.
[10:40.950 --> 10:42.290]  [SPEAKER_17]: We don't need humans anymore, can we?
[10:42.610 --> 10:44.390]  [SPEAKER_08]: Contrasting the arguments.
[10:46.430 --> 10:47.210]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yes, go ahead, Rob.
[10:47.890 --> 10:53.970]  [SPEAKER_15]: This business about ChatGPT earning an MBA, it's very entertaining.
[10:53.970 --> 10:57.810]  [SPEAKER_15]: I'm wondering how long it is until we have to call it Dr. ChatGPT.
[10:57.810 --> 11:13.510]  [SPEAKER_15]: But this also talks to, a lot of teachers are talking about completely revamping how they teach subjects in high school, in college, to specifically avoid the pitfalls of being prone to ChatGPT being used to cheat.
[11:13.850 --> 11:22.370]  [SPEAKER_15]: And so this is a funny story about the bot, but it's also kind of a funny story about the requirements to earn an MBA from Wharton.
[11:22.370 --> 11:26.490]  [SPEAKER_15]: And so they're going to have to reconsider how they hand these things out.
[11:28.070 --> 11:28.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah, I guess...
[11:28.490 --> 11:33.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: I have a business degree, by the way, and, you know, it's not rocket science.
[11:34.130 --> 11:35.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, yeah, I guess not.
[11:36.850 --> 11:41.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: And you're going to have some competition in the very near future, I would say, from machines.
[11:42.630 --> 11:47.090]  [SPEAKER_15]: Gila is actually listening to the show right now and texting me from Parts Unknown.
[11:47.090 --> 11:51.370]  [SPEAKER_15]: She says she would love to watch ChatGPT have to defend its dissertation.
[11:52.310 --> 11:59.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, you know, you could write songs in the style of particular bands and artists and things like that.
[11:59.850 --> 12:03.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: You can make arguments based on the logic of certain people.
[12:03.450 --> 12:07.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: You could recreate debates, presidential debates, between different candidates.
[12:07.330 --> 12:09.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: All sorts of interesting things like that.
[12:09.870 --> 12:11.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm thinking of all the fun applications.
[12:11.870 --> 12:16.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: We'll get to all the dire applications and how this can really be used to hurt us.
[12:16.170 --> 12:27.710]  [SPEAKER_17]: But I think staying away from it, as many people have suggested, is not the right thing to do because you have to plunge into the danger and see just what exactly it's capable of before you can figure out a way to get past it.
[12:27.870 --> 12:30.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: And that's what we're all about here in this show.
[12:31.710 --> 12:35.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, another technology that's been in the news lately is facial recognition.
[12:35.650 --> 12:45.230]  [SPEAKER_17]: As you know, if you have upset the people at Madison Square Garden in any way, they will keep you out of various venues that they own.
[12:45.230 --> 12:55.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: Local elected officials are now crying foul on Madison Square Garden's ban on certain lawyers and the use of facial recognition technology to impose it.
[12:56.970 --> 13:09.230]  [SPEAKER_17]: Manhattan State Senator Brad Hoylman-Sigal and a bunch of other politicians gathered outside Madison Square Garden on Sunday to demand its controversial CEO, James Dolan, end the practices.
[13:09.830 --> 13:16.410]  [SPEAKER_17]: Over the last six months, we've seen extraordinary, courageous, and alarming use of biometric technology, said Hoylman-Sigal.
[13:17.250 --> 13:18.410]  [SPEAKER_17]: Obviously, there's a pattern here.
[13:18.530 --> 13:23.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: There's a pattern of James Dolan punishing who he views as his corporate adversaries.
[13:23.170 --> 13:27.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: And the thing about this story is these are not people who are criminals.
[13:27.670 --> 13:32.530]  [SPEAKER_17]: These are not people who are a danger or a threat to the operations of Madison Square Garden or any other venue.
[13:33.010 --> 13:41.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: These are people that work for the same company that is involved in a lawsuit against Madison Square Garden Enterprises or one of his companies.
[13:41.830 --> 13:54.270]  [SPEAKER_17]: And it just shows you how easy it is to misuse this technology in a way that can really hurt people, hurt innocent people who are just there to see a game or a concert or something like that.
[13:54.990 --> 13:57.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, it's interesting to see politicians getting involved.
[13:57.990 --> 13:58.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: New York Daily News, look at this.
[13:58.830 --> 14:00.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: They printed a big picture of James Dolan.
[14:00.470 --> 14:07.310]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, if you want to take his face and ban him from your events, I guess you can do that.
[14:08.010 --> 14:08.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: We are...
[14:09.270 --> 14:12.730]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, we don't use facial technology at Hope, do we?
[14:12.910 --> 14:15.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: Maybe it's worth it just so we can ban him.
[14:15.950 --> 14:16.530]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know?
[14:16.670 --> 14:17.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: What do you think?
[14:18.610 --> 14:19.490]  [SPEAKER_08]: Certainly possible.
[14:19.830 --> 14:19.910]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[14:20.590 --> 14:24.090]  [SPEAKER_08]: Creative ways people can retaliate.
[14:24.270 --> 14:24.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: Mm-hmm.
[14:24.730 --> 14:26.930]  [SPEAKER_08]: With the same kind of attitude.
[14:27.410 --> 14:27.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[14:27.870 --> 14:29.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: I've never had the chance to play with facial technology.
[14:30.910 --> 14:32.390]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, facial recognition technology.
[14:32.630 --> 14:36.050]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's something that I'd like to mess around with a little bit.
[14:36.370 --> 14:36.530]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[14:38.250 --> 14:42.090]  [SPEAKER_15]: Wasn't it at the second Hope Conference that everyone was wearing masks of Kevin Mitnick?
[14:42.770 --> 14:44.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: That was the first Hope Conference.
[14:44.550 --> 14:46.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: That was 1994 we were doing that.
[14:46.430 --> 14:46.590]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[14:47.230 --> 14:48.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: That confused a lot of people.
[14:48.990 --> 14:50.630]  [SPEAKER_17]: But we didn't have facial recognition technology.
[14:50.730 --> 14:51.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: Go ahead, Arseny.
[14:51.670 --> 14:52.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[14:52.230 --> 15:03.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, are there consents when you go to, like, a sporting event or a concert or whatever that they can use your face to, as a way to, you know, verify you or something?
[15:03.470 --> 15:11.290]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, there might be a sign at the door that says, by going through this door, you're agreeing that facial recognition technology will be looking at your face.
[15:11.290 --> 15:16.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I don't know many people who would turn around and say, yeah, I'm just going to give up my ticket now because of that.
[15:17.510 --> 15:25.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: But the point is, if you do go through that door and they, for whatever reason, decide they don't like you, they can kick you out.
[15:25.310 --> 15:26.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: And it just seems like a real abuse.
[15:27.090 --> 15:29.510]  [SPEAKER_12]: I had a big fright when I came into the country.
[15:29.510 --> 15:35.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: Not today, but last time, where I was a global entry member, but I was then...
[15:35.050 --> 15:36.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: It expired.
[15:36.070 --> 15:39.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: But I went to the machine to check, you know, was it working or not?
[15:41.230 --> 15:42.730]  [SPEAKER_12]: And you go up to the machine.
[15:43.170 --> 15:47.450]  [SPEAKER_12]: So global entry allows you to get through customs very quickly just by putting your passport in.
[15:47.770 --> 15:51.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I'd given them my fingerprints before, but I'd never given my face.
[15:52.090 --> 15:54.370]  [SPEAKER_12]: They have my picture, but, you know, it was just a picture.
[15:54.590 --> 16:02.390]  [SPEAKER_12]: In any case, you come up to the machine and it scanned my face and immediately just knew everything about me and said, hey, your membership expired.
[16:03.730 --> 16:06.990]  [SPEAKER_12]: So why do I still remember my face if it expired?
[16:07.690 --> 16:09.150]  [SPEAKER_17]: Why wasn't your fingerprint enough?
[16:10.370 --> 16:19.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, but usually you'd have to put your fingerprint in the machine, but now it just takes a picture, you know, it just, the webcam is always on and it's reading you.
[16:19.390 --> 16:23.130]  [SPEAKER_12]: And it's frightening because I've never given a biometric kind of face scan.
[16:23.270 --> 16:25.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's just, it's taken my picture enough times that it can recognize me.
[16:25.890 --> 16:28.310]  [SPEAKER_17]: And it could probably do that without you going right up to the machine, too.
[16:28.550 --> 16:29.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'll bet it can get you in a crowd.
[16:30.850 --> 16:31.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wow, that's true.
[16:31.850 --> 16:32.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: That is frightening.
[16:33.810 --> 16:36.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, over to the inevitable department.
[16:37.210 --> 16:38.550]  [SPEAKER_17]: T-Mobile got hacked.
[16:38.710 --> 16:43.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: 37 million customers had their data stolen back in November.
[16:43.530 --> 16:45.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: T-Mobile said a bad actor.
[16:45.990 --> 16:46.450]  [SPEAKER_17]: You think?
[16:46.590 --> 16:47.370]  [SPEAKER_17]: A bad actor?
[16:47.530 --> 16:54.950]  [SPEAKER_17]: This wasn't somebody who was just out to do good and spread the knowledge about 37 million people?
[16:55.010 --> 16:55.850]  [SPEAKER_08]: They're doing a favor.
[16:56.470 --> 16:57.490]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, okay.
[16:57.710 --> 17:04.030]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, 37 million current customers were victims of a November data breach.
[17:04.950 --> 17:10.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: Regulatory filing last Thursday, that's when the company said the hacker stole customer data.
[17:11.370 --> 17:16.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: That included names, billing addresses, emails, phone numbers, dates of birth.
[17:17.330 --> 17:19.950]  [SPEAKER_17]: Why does T-Mobile need all this information in the first place?
[17:19.950 --> 17:25.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, I've been asking this question ever since they started, or since they were Omnipoint.
[17:26.090 --> 17:27.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: Why do you need all this information?
[17:27.710 --> 17:31.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: And many times you can give them fake information and still have an account.
[17:32.550 --> 17:35.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's not impossible, but it's more and more difficult.
[17:35.930 --> 17:40.190]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, social security number, you know, dates of birth.
[17:40.190 --> 17:41.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, they don't need all that.
[17:41.990 --> 17:42.570]  [SPEAKER_17]: They really don't.
[17:42.570 --> 17:44.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: But yet they insist on getting it all from you.
[17:45.610 --> 17:55.730]  [SPEAKER_17]: Anyway, the information can easily be compiled with other stolen or publicly available information used by scammers to steal people's identities or steal money.
[17:56.370 --> 18:04.250]  [SPEAKER_17]: And, of course, T-Mobile says, working with law enforcement, I don't know what they're going to do at this point, they've begun to notify customers whose information may have been breached.
[18:04.250 --> 18:12.710]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I'll bet, I'll just bet, when they notify these customers, they're going to offer them a free period of enrollment in a program that monitors their credit report.
[18:13.430 --> 18:18.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: And they can sign up and pay for it after that period of time has ended.
[18:18.250 --> 18:31.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: It almost seems like a promotion, you know, when people get hacked or have their identity stolen that entitles you to a free year or 18 months of this service.
[18:32.370 --> 18:36.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: Anyway, the wireless carrier did not indicate what it might do to remedy the situation.
[18:36.990 --> 18:37.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: Of course not.
[18:38.390 --> 18:47.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: It noted it could be on the hook for significant expenses because of the hack, although the company said it doesn't expect the charges will have a material effect on T-Mobile's bottom line.
[18:49.290 --> 18:54.090]  [SPEAKER_17]: They hired an external cybersecurity team to investigate after they found out about this.
[18:54.570 --> 18:58.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: They were able to discover the source of the breach and stop it a day after it was discovered.
[18:58.510 --> 19:02.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: The company says it continues to investigate the breach but believes it is fully contained.
[19:03.370 --> 19:06.410]  [SPEAKER_17]: Protecting our customers' data remains a top priority.
[19:07.030 --> 19:10.730]  [SPEAKER_17]: And we see where that top priority gets us.
[19:11.750 --> 19:15.490]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, over to some of the smarter news.
[19:15.650 --> 19:21.410]  [SPEAKER_17]: Appliance makers, Whirlpool, LG, they're a bit baffled by this.
[19:21.410 --> 19:26.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: They added Wi-Fi to all their dishwashers and ovens and refrigerators.
[19:27.190 --> 19:27.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: They made apps.
[19:28.510 --> 19:34.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: But only 50% or less of their owners have connected to Wi-Fi.
[19:35.050 --> 19:42.450]  [SPEAKER_17]: And they don't understand why aren't people connecting their dishwashers and their ovens and refrigerators to the Internet.
[19:42.450 --> 19:45.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: And apparently, most people don't think that's a good idea.
[19:46.770 --> 19:48.850]  [SPEAKER_17]: Most people must be listening to us.
[19:48.950 --> 19:49.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: So that's great.
[19:49.930 --> 19:52.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: Don't connect your damn refrigerator to the Internet.
[19:52.670 --> 19:53.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: What do you need to do that for?
[19:54.390 --> 19:55.850]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, yeah, sure.
[19:56.010 --> 20:03.850]  [SPEAKER_17]: There might be an instance where you're, you know, delayed on a train and you want to, you know, turn something down a little bit.
[20:03.850 --> 20:13.190]  [SPEAKER_17]: Or you can just be a little bit inconvenienced and not have the refrigerator be the gateway to people hacking your entire home network.
[20:13.570 --> 20:18.390]  [SPEAKER_17]: Because oftentimes, these devices have default passwords that people don't change.
[20:18.530 --> 20:23.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: And it's just all kinds of security holes as a result.
[20:23.910 --> 20:29.030]  [SPEAKER_17]: Anyone here ever put their refrigerator on the Internet or their oven or their dishwasher?
[20:30.150 --> 20:32.970]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, like, I'm always thinking about this.
[20:32.970 --> 20:38.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: I got into those automatic vacuum robots, that vacuum.
[20:38.930 --> 20:43.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I can, right now, I can go on my phone and turn on my vacuum cleaner in Russia.
[20:44.170 --> 20:46.150]  [SPEAKER_05]: Why would you want to do that?
[20:47.870 --> 20:50.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: I've always turned it on when I'm in the house.
[20:50.490 --> 20:50.750]  [SPEAKER_05]: Uh-huh.
[20:51.470 --> 20:56.310]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, which actually kind of defeats the purpose of having it do it by, you know, having all that.
[20:57.790 --> 21:06.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: But, you know, thinking a lot about why, the circuits for these kind of small Wi-Fi connections, they're really small.
[21:07.050 --> 21:09.070]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, they don't take up a lot of energy.
[21:09.310 --> 21:12.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: And it is easier to connect to the device if you need to for some reason.
[21:13.010 --> 21:15.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, for whatever reason, you'd need to connect to your dishwasher.
[21:17.830 --> 21:20.090]  [SPEAKER_12]: And a great reason would be for diagnostics.
[21:20.130 --> 21:23.350]  [SPEAKER_12]: If it's broken, it would be easy to connect to it.
[21:23.430 --> 21:25.530]  [SPEAKER_12]: But I don't think that's what they're doing.
[21:26.830 --> 21:29.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm just happy that so many people aren't doing this.
[21:29.650 --> 21:43.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, we talk about things like this week after week, and it just seems sometimes like people are just following blindly into the world of high tech without asking questions and, you know, buying the same thing over and over again because it's built in obsolescence.
[21:43.930 --> 21:49.190]  [SPEAKER_17]: But in this particular case, I think people are doing the right thing by not adding these things to their network.
[21:49.330 --> 21:50.630]  [SPEAKER_17]: There's no reason to do that.
[21:50.950 --> 21:54.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: And hopefully that's a trend that continues.
[21:54.170 --> 21:57.090]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, so we're going to dive right back down into the stupid again.
[21:58.190 --> 22:04.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: Every so often, you see a headline where you just are so disgusted by it, you don't want to continue reading, but we have to.
[22:04.550 --> 22:05.030]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's our job.
[22:05.570 --> 22:10.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: The lights have been on at a Massachusetts school for over a year because no one can turn them off.
[22:12.210 --> 22:14.230]  [SPEAKER_17]: How do you continue reading a story like this?
[22:14.310 --> 22:15.270]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, let's see what happens.
[22:15.850 --> 22:24.070]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, for nearly a year and a half, a Massachusetts high school has been lit up around the clock because the district can't turn off the roughly 7,000 lights.
[22:24.170 --> 22:34.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: In the sprawling building, the lighting system was installed at Minichug Regional High School when it was built over a decade ago and was intended to save money and energy.
[22:34.770 --> 22:48.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: But ever since the software that runs it failed on August 24th, 2021, the lights in the Springfield Suburbs School have been on continuously, costing taxpayers a small fortune.
[22:48.290 --> 22:55.190]  [SPEAKER_17]: We are very much aware this is costing taxpayers a significant amount of money, said the assistant superintendent of finance.
[22:55.870 --> 23:01.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: How does that person still have a job at the Hampton-Wilverham Regional School District?
[23:01.470 --> 23:04.270]  [SPEAKER_17]: And we've been doing everything we can to get the problem solved.
[23:04.650 --> 23:05.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: Have you?
[23:05.410 --> 23:05.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: Really?
[23:06.090 --> 23:10.630]  [SPEAKER_17]: Because, you know, I feel like the guy in WarGames who just, you know, says, can't you just unplug the damn thing?
[23:11.570 --> 23:12.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's insane.
[23:12.330 --> 23:26.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: How can you design a system that you can't bypass, that literally keeps lights on, and there is no way for you to figure out how to just turn the power off?
[23:26.350 --> 23:27.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hey, you know, talk to the electric company.
[23:27.770 --> 23:31.570]  [SPEAKER_17]: Maybe they can just turn all the power off and then reset the thing somehow.
[23:31.790 --> 23:32.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: There's got to be a way.
[23:32.850 --> 23:33.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: But this is insane.
[23:33.670 --> 23:58.290]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, I think it has something to do along the lines of what Arseny was saying with that integration to the systems that are inconvenient and sort of hard to get to places that, by having this, it allows you to do things remotely without having to send someone into a machine room somewhere.
[23:58.710 --> 23:59.470]  [SPEAKER_08]: There are lights.
[23:59.570 --> 24:00.150]  [SPEAKER_17]: A light switch.
[24:00.330 --> 24:01.850]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, the easiest thing in the world.
[24:01.850 --> 24:10.850]  [SPEAKER_08]: It may have been, like, relying on something that was just unaccessible and broken, and they would have had nothing were it bypassed.
[24:11.470 --> 24:12.950]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm all in favor of convenience.
[24:12.950 --> 24:17.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm all in favor of gizmos and, you know, the modern things of the day.
[24:18.370 --> 24:22.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: But you always need a way to get around it if and when it fails.
[24:22.970 --> 24:23.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: It always fails.
[24:23.690 --> 24:25.450]  [SPEAKER_17]: It always will fail one way or another.
[24:25.830 --> 24:29.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: But these people, they installed a system that there's no way around.
[24:29.470 --> 24:31.490]  [SPEAKER_17]: It failed, and they're screwed.
[24:31.490 --> 24:37.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: And they're making the taxpayers of the area pay for their stupidity.
[24:37.250 --> 24:39.390]  [SPEAKER_17]: I really don't think they should be held accountable for this.
[24:39.470 --> 24:45.730]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is something that was a really, really bad decision, and those kinds of bad decisions should be held accountable.
[24:46.090 --> 24:47.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: Rob, and welcome, Gila.
[24:47.530 --> 24:48.090]  [SPEAKER_17]: I see you made it.
[24:48.810 --> 24:49.090]  [SPEAKER_07]: Thank you.
[25:01.490 --> 25:04.490]  [SPEAKER_15]: Like, show a film or project something onto their whiteboard.
[25:04.830 --> 25:10.050]  [SPEAKER_15]: They've figured out that they can reach up into the sockets and unscrew the light bulbs manually in order to darken the room.
[25:11.070 --> 25:12.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's being credited to hackers?
[25:12.970 --> 25:15.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: Like, literally knowing how to unscrew a light bulb?
[25:15.990 --> 25:16.850]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, you know what?
[25:16.850 --> 25:17.810]  [SPEAKER_15]: Well, how many seizures does it take?
[25:17.910 --> 25:21.310]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, with all the bad press we get, I guess we can take that.
[25:21.790 --> 25:23.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, we do know how to unscrew a light bulb.
[25:23.670 --> 25:24.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: We can manage that.
[25:24.990 --> 25:26.210]  [SPEAKER_08]: We have to stay on task.
[25:26.370 --> 25:29.550]  [SPEAKER_08]: You have to get accomplished what you're there for completed.
[25:29.910 --> 25:31.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: So, by any means.
[25:31.850 --> 25:32.110]  [SPEAKER_08]: Wow.
[25:32.670 --> 25:36.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: Arseny, we didn't point out that you normally live in Russia.
[25:37.630 --> 25:38.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, not anymore.
[25:39.370 --> 25:39.990]  [SPEAKER_17]: Not anymore.
[25:40.190 --> 25:40.670]  [SPEAKER_12]: Disclaimer, disclaimer.
[25:40.990 --> 25:41.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: Fortunately, yes.
[25:42.170 --> 25:45.730]  [SPEAKER_17]: But when you were there, this kind of thing wouldn't happen, right?
[25:46.990 --> 25:49.570]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, it's interesting.
[25:50.490 --> 25:54.710]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think these problems are just, you know, universal stupidity is universal.
[25:55.490 --> 25:59.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: True, but keeping the lights on, period, is a challenge in many parts of the world.
[25:59.750 --> 26:06.850]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't think they'd be so quick to jump into this, you know, super, quote-unquote, modern, efficient way of doing it.
[26:10.480 --> 26:13.420]  [SPEAKER_12]: The smart home thing is getting out of hand everywhere.
[26:15.840 --> 26:17.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: But this is not a smart home.
[26:17.400 --> 26:18.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is a stupid school.
[26:18.580 --> 26:19.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is a stupid school.
[26:20.080 --> 26:20.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is a stupid design.
[26:20.300 --> 26:22.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, it's just wrong.
[26:22.520 --> 26:22.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[26:23.140 --> 26:30.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: And now, for the ultimate, we're going to go into something that we always knew was going to happen at some point.
[26:30.380 --> 26:37.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: We always knew, at one point in history or another, the no-fly list would be compromised.
[26:38.520 --> 26:41.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: And that is exactly what has happened.
[26:41.180 --> 26:45.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: And that is why Lorax from Distributed Denial of Secrets is joining us tonight.
[26:45.640 --> 26:51.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: Lorax, maybe you're the best person to simply tell us what happened.
[26:51.440 --> 26:56.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: There's a story in the Daily Dot that really does a good job of describing it.
[26:56.620 --> 27:04.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: But you guys are on top of all of these security breaches and leaks and embarrassments.
[27:04.100 --> 27:08.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: But this one, I mean, we're talking, I think, over a million names of people.
[27:09.120 --> 27:13.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: And we're talking, you know, some of them are legitimate terrorist types.
[27:14.260 --> 27:16.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: And some of them are eight-year-olds.
[27:16.600 --> 27:18.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: There's all kinds of variety here.
[27:18.540 --> 27:21.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: But can you tell us how this happened?
[27:23.040 --> 27:23.940]  [SPEAKER_00]: Can you hear me?
[27:24.220 --> 27:25.220]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes, we hear you fine.
[27:25.780 --> 27:25.980]  [SPEAKER_00]: Great.
[27:26.860 --> 27:32.220]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, so the Daily Dot was the first outlet that reported it.
[27:33.200 --> 27:45.960]  [SPEAKER_00]: And it was a small regional airline from Ohio that I think is part of United commuter service called Commute Air.
[27:46.760 --> 27:58.860]  [SPEAKER_00]: And the security researcher was browsing Jenkins servers on Chinese shodan, which I guess is called Zumai.
[27:58.860 --> 28:10.320]  [SPEAKER_00]: And came across some keywords that made her think that this was an aviation-related entity.
[28:10.940 --> 28:14.740]  [SPEAKER_00]: And eventually they found the no-fly list.
[28:15.720 --> 28:23.760]  [SPEAKER_00]: Maia Arson Crimew was the hacker who reported this breach.
[28:25.040 --> 28:30.980]  [SPEAKER_00]: And the Daily Dot also was checking the data set pretty early.
[28:30.980 --> 28:36.200]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that they were collaborating before that story came out.
[28:37.820 --> 28:39.020]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, yeah.
[28:39.540 --> 28:48.460]  [SPEAKER_00]: There were more than a million and a half lines on the Excel spreadsheet for the no-fly list.
[28:48.460 --> 28:50.600]  [SPEAKER_00]: There are two parts of this data set.
[28:50.600 --> 29:07.680]  [SPEAKER_00]: There's the no-fly.csv, and then there's the selectees.csv, which is a smaller list of names of people who aren't necessarily banned from flying, but they are selected for increased screening.
[29:09.000 --> 29:15.840]  [SPEAKER_00]: And it's sort of up to the discretion of the TSA agent on duty whether they can fly or not that day.
[29:15.840 --> 29:19.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, the file is actually called no-fly.csv.
[29:19.300 --> 29:23.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's not like they were trying to make it at all hard to find.
[29:26.580 --> 29:27.140]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[29:27.320 --> 29:37.800]  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, this is a small airline, and it sounds like this server was something that they were using for testing purposes.
[29:39.580 --> 30:01.080]  [SPEAKER_00]: The original people who found the leak, they didn't know when the list was dated from, but before the first Daily Dot piece came out, the airline issued a statement saying that it was from 2019, so it wasn't the most up-to-date list of names on the no-fly list,
[30:01.080 --> 30:06.100]  [SPEAKER_00]: but it was a genuine list from Snapshot from 2019, which is pretty recent.
[30:07.640 --> 30:09.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: That is incredible.
[30:09.280 --> 30:20.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: What has been the response so far from the airline industry, from governments around the world, at having this information just made public, I guess?
[30:22.540 --> 30:32.140]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, it hasn't been made public in that the researcher has restricted access to the data set.
[30:32.420 --> 30:55.540]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that Maya replied to maybe a few hundred requests for the data, and DDA Secrets has a bigger archive of data sets, and we have this category called limited distribution, where we routinely put data sets in this category that are for requests from researchers.
[30:55.880 --> 31:26.300]  [SPEAKER_00]: So it's not that the list is public, anybody can search for it or find it, yet it's restricted to people who have published research in the past and who can be generally considered that they won't leak the full data set, because we think that it would cause more discrimination of the people who are perhaps on this list than they've already been through just by being put on the list.
[31:27.040 --> 31:29.240]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's like there's no due process.
[31:29.260 --> 31:32.340]  [SPEAKER_00]: There's often no way to get yourself off the list.
[31:32.520 --> 31:35.300]  [SPEAKER_00]: There are names on the list of people who have been dead for years.
[31:35.300 --> 31:38.460]  [SPEAKER_00]: As you mentioned, there's children on the list.
[31:38.720 --> 31:49.820]  [SPEAKER_00]: So both Maya and DDA Secrets think that for harm reduction, it's best if we don't publish the full list.
[31:50.060 --> 31:50.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: Absolutely.
[31:50.640 --> 31:52.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, and that's extremely responsible.
[31:52.360 --> 32:09.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: I just worry, you know, if somebody had gotten to this first before that researcher was able to find this, then that list would indeed be public, or even worse, just given to certain people who really shouldn't have it and used for nefarious purposes.
[32:10.600 --> 32:22.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: But has there been any kind of pushback from other organizations or governments, the fact that you have access to it at all?
[32:24.880 --> 32:26.160]  [SPEAKER_00]: Nothing official.
[32:26.620 --> 32:33.200]  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, I heard that there was a Republican Congress person who wants to launch an investigation.
[32:33.440 --> 32:38.800]  [SPEAKER_00]: It might be an investigation of the airline for leaving this sort of data on the open web.
[32:38.920 --> 32:49.340]  [SPEAKER_00]: It might be shooting the messenger, which often happens with hacking cases where they go after the security researcher who found the vulnerability.
[32:50.960 --> 33:00.480]  [SPEAKER_00]: We don't know, but it could also just be looking into the fact that there is this ballooning no-fly list.
[33:01.540 --> 33:02.660]  [SPEAKER_00]: The names...
[33:02.660 --> 33:15.340]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think the number of names, the amount of names on it should be surprising, because previous reports of the no-fly list have listed things like 81,000 was reported in 2018.
[33:15.340 --> 33:19.720]  [SPEAKER_00]: In 2011, I think it was 16,000 people who were on the list.
[33:21.140 --> 33:34.820]  [SPEAKER_00]: But if there's a million and a half rows, some of them are duplicates, but one can assume that there's more than 100,000 names on this list now.
[33:34.820 --> 33:45.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, it mentions that the recently freed Russian arms dealer, Victor Bout, he had over 16 potential aliases as well.
[33:45.800 --> 33:48.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: But that's probably an exception.
[33:48.900 --> 33:52.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: And even if you divide this in half, that's still 500,000 names.
[33:52.780 --> 33:55.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's a lot of names of people who can't fly.
[33:55.740 --> 33:57.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: What does it mean if you show up on this list?
[33:57.840 --> 34:00.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're just barred from getting on a plane, period?
[34:00.900 --> 34:01.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: No questions asked?
[34:03.060 --> 34:04.900]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, I think it is the U.S.
[34:04.980 --> 34:05.760]  [SPEAKER_00]: no-fly list.
[34:05.920 --> 34:10.700]  [SPEAKER_00]: So I don't know how far outside the U.S.
[34:10.760 --> 34:15.000]  [SPEAKER_00]: that sort of ban would travel.
[34:15.320 --> 34:26.840]  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, the FAA controls a lot of air rules around the world, but it is specifically a U.S.
[34:26.920 --> 34:27.680]  [SPEAKER_00]: no-fly list.
[34:28.240 --> 34:33.480]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, yeah, I don't know the answer to that question.
[34:33.480 --> 34:39.130]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that it would depend.
[34:39.370 --> 34:43.950]  [SPEAKER_00]: Like you said, like the Victor Bout was on the list more than a dozen times.
[34:43.950 --> 34:45.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: That was unusual.
[34:46.090 --> 34:50.230]  [SPEAKER_00]: A lot of the names only have like four or five variations.
[34:51.330 --> 34:59.790]  [SPEAKER_00]: Some of the names are only on there once, so they're not all duplicated to that extent.
[35:00.230 --> 35:04.810]  [SPEAKER_00]: But I do think that they have problems with Cyrillic alphabets in the U.S.
[35:04.870 --> 35:05.530]  [SPEAKER_00]: no-fly list.
[35:05.670 --> 35:10.230]  [SPEAKER_17]: I was going to ask, how do other alphabets and languages get translated?
[35:10.230 --> 35:23.310]  [SPEAKER_17]: One thing that the researcher said, it's just crazy to me how big that terrorism screening database is, and yet there is still very clear trends towards almost exclusively Arabic and Russian-sounding names throughout the million entries.
[35:23.950 --> 35:27.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: And that's something that is definitely cause for concern.
[35:27.650 --> 35:30.250]  [SPEAKER_17]: I just wonder how many innocent people are caught up in that.
[35:32.570 --> 35:46.990]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I mean, like, some of the names on the list were children who are four, eight years old, or seven years old, who one would assume have not committed any terrorism at that age.
[35:47.310 --> 35:52.470]  [SPEAKER_00]: And they are just related to someone who was on the no-fly list.
[35:53.070 --> 36:04.110]  [SPEAKER_00]: And so there's names like that that are totally just attempt at predictive policing or something like that.
[36:04.550 --> 36:07.490]  [SPEAKER_00]: And then there's a lot of dead people on the list as well.
[36:08.270 --> 36:10.350]  [SPEAKER_00]: Osama bin Laden is on there a few times.
[36:10.830 --> 36:11.310]  [SPEAKER_00]: He is.
[36:11.490 --> 36:11.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wow.
[36:11.870 --> 36:15.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, okay, so what kind of information do they give for Osama bin Laden, the home address?
[36:15.470 --> 36:16.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, they didn't have the home address, right?
[36:16.890 --> 36:17.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's the whole point.
[36:17.930 --> 36:24.310]  [SPEAKER_00]: The list is redacted and only includes name and date of birth.
[36:24.570 --> 36:32.250]  [SPEAKER_00]: So there are other columns that have been redacted either by the airline or by someone else before.
[36:33.230 --> 36:37.110]  [SPEAKER_00]: So the list just includes the name and then the date of birth.
[36:37.230 --> 36:44.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: So why would it be redacted if it was being used to basically keep these people off planes?
[36:47.270 --> 36:48.290]  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't know.
[36:48.630 --> 36:57.490]  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't know how the list was used in the testing environment that Commute Air had left it open on the Internet.
[36:58.910 --> 37:01.710]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, you know, that's something I can't wrap my head around.
[37:01.910 --> 37:03.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: They're using it for testing purposes.
[37:03.330 --> 37:05.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: Why not use a testing file?
[37:05.270 --> 37:09.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: Why use the real file with real information in it?
[37:09.130 --> 37:10.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: It just seems like a really bad idea.
[37:12.230 --> 37:13.810]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, that's the thing.
[37:13.950 --> 37:15.570]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's like this was on Jenkins server.
[37:15.850 --> 37:17.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: The list was old, right?
[37:17.770 --> 37:18.830]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's from 2019.
[37:20.690 --> 37:29.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: And then the format CSV, I think, would have a lot of trouble with those alphabets we mentioned.
[37:30.070 --> 37:33.210]  [SPEAKER_12]: But then the question is like, you know, shouldn't there be...
[37:33.210 --> 37:34.870]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, this information is pretty sensitive.
[37:35.470 --> 37:41.630]  [SPEAKER_12]: Shouldn't there be, you know, enforced rules on how it's used by the airlines?
[37:42.390 --> 37:43.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: One would think.
[37:43.670 --> 37:50.270]  [SPEAKER_17]: But again, we see this time and time again where these rules, if they even exist, just are ignored or bypassed.
[37:54.380 --> 38:10.260]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, when it comes to use of PII like this, a lot of organizations who have a testing environment set up, like, from a technical standpoint, it's the easy way out to just take a snapshot of the real data, move it into the testing environment, and do what playing with it you have to.
[38:10.780 --> 38:13.820]  [SPEAKER_15]: To come up with new data would take work.
[38:13.880 --> 38:15.300]  [SPEAKER_15]: And it would be too much like work.
[38:15.300 --> 38:30.740]  [SPEAKER_15]: And even when it's, like, ultra-sensitive PII and newsmaking stuff like the no-fly list, I think the temptation had to be there to just use what they had rather than do things basically the safe way.
[38:31.780 --> 38:32.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[38:32.740 --> 38:36.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: And for the benefit of listeners, we've mentioned Jenkins and Shodan.
[38:36.900 --> 38:45.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: Does anyone want to give an explanation as to what those are, just so people have a better sense as to how this data exists and how it was compromised?
[38:46.700 --> 38:48.920]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, I don't know.
[38:49.040 --> 38:54.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: Shodan is a search engine of sorts for things that are open and online.
[38:54.460 --> 38:56.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: I don't know much more about it.
[38:56.320 --> 38:59.820]  [SPEAKER_08]: Can someone else elaborate on how these tools were used?
[39:02.910 --> 39:03.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: No?
[39:04.290 --> 39:06.170]  [SPEAKER_12]: No, so I can talk about Jenkins.
[39:06.410 --> 39:09.050]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, it's a way to process builds.
[39:09.350 --> 39:15.850]  [SPEAKER_12]: So if you are working on software that's not released, it's still internal.
[39:16.810 --> 39:22.550]  [SPEAKER_12]: You would use a software like Jenkins to deploy it or move it down the pipeline.
[39:23.610 --> 39:23.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[39:24.290 --> 39:32.270]  [SPEAKER_17]: And Shodan, as Kyle said, is used to find things like video cameras and various other...
[39:32.270 --> 39:33.330]  [SPEAKER_12]: That's what I thought it was.
[39:33.510 --> 39:35.770]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know what form it is, if you're programmed.
[39:36.030 --> 39:37.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: Is it compatible with washing machines?
[39:38.270 --> 39:39.510]  [SPEAKER_15]: You would find washing machines.
[39:39.510 --> 39:48.710]  [SPEAKER_15]: It probably can be, because it basically exists to find the kind of servers that Internet-connected devices of various types would have on the Internet.
[39:49.310 --> 39:55.110]  [SPEAKER_15]: So just various things that are connected up and making their presence known, Shodan finds them, and you can search them.
[39:55.250 --> 40:00.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: So that's what this researcher was doing, and I imagine researchers are doing this constantly.
[40:00.130 --> 40:01.530]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is that right, Lorax?
[40:02.490 --> 40:06.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I think that step one, boredom.
[40:07.270 --> 40:12.310]  [SPEAKER_00]: Like so many of my other hacks, this story starts with me being bored and browsing Shodan.
[40:12.870 --> 40:30.070]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, technically it was Zumai, which is the Chinese Shodan, looking for exposed Jenkins servers, which I think Maya has done before and successfully found source code, which was the theme.
[40:30.210 --> 40:42.570]  [SPEAKER_00]: And one of the main leaks that they used to put out on their Telegram channel was like source code that was exposed in these sorts of testing environments.
[40:42.990 --> 40:48.390]  [SPEAKER_00]: So this was very much within the theme of how Maya usually works.
[40:48.390 --> 40:52.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: So when something is found, what is generally the next step after that?
[40:56.080 --> 40:58.240]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think it depends on the person.
[40:59.000 --> 41:12.340]  [SPEAKER_00]: We at DDoS Secrets hear from a lot of sources who have a higher than average curiosity for what is out there and what can be discovered.
[41:13.160 --> 41:26.800]  [SPEAKER_00]: I know that Maya has been criticized for basically like not reporting this directly to the company and leaving everyone else out.
[41:27.000 --> 41:33.540]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think Maya did report it to the company and the company fixed it before the news report came out.
[41:33.540 --> 41:46.320]  [SPEAKER_00]: But Maya also involves journalists and communicates to the public when these sorts of things happen, which a lot of security researchers criticize it for.
[41:48.300 --> 41:51.160]  [SPEAKER_00]: But yeah, so it really depends on the person.
[41:51.540 --> 42:00.260]  [SPEAKER_00]: We at DDoS Secrets frequently hear from sources who find data that they think needs to make it out to the public.
[42:00.260 --> 42:08.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, when someone contacts you, you generally are very responsible with the data that is shared.
[42:08.880 --> 42:24.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: As you mentioned before, only researchers or certain journalists are even allowed to view something of this nature rather than just posting it online somewhere where anybody could just download it and use it for all sorts of nefarious purposes.
[42:24.840 --> 42:29.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Do you get any pushback to that policy?
[42:30.520 --> 42:44.960]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, all the time, people who wish that they had access to our limited distribution data sets are like challenging our decision to keep something on the sort of redacted stream.
[42:44.960 --> 42:56.100]  [SPEAKER_00]: But yeah, we basically don't have the staff to redact the PAI from everything that we archive.
[42:56.700 --> 43:02.520]  [SPEAKER_00]: And we do publish a lot publicly.
[43:02.760 --> 43:12.360]  [SPEAKER_00]: There are a lot of data sets that don't consist of mainly like PAI for people who are unrelated to like the public interest.
[43:12.360 --> 43:30.580]  [SPEAKER_00]: If it's data of politicians and like corporations, then that's different than if it's like a database of all of the citizens from a given jurisdiction and their like ID numbers and their addresses.
[43:32.500 --> 43:48.240]  [SPEAKER_00]: So we get pushback on both sides, I think, from people who wish that we published more like torrents and public access data sets and also from people who like don't think that we should archive hacked data at all.
[43:48.760 --> 43:52.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, if you're annoying people on both sides, you're probably doing something right.
[43:52.940 --> 43:55.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: So that's a good thing.
[43:55.240 --> 44:03.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: But how do you compare yourself to other organizations such as WikiLeaks in the past when they would simply publish all this information?
[44:03.080 --> 44:11.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: I guess that's probably the difference right there is they would publish a lot of this and not restrict access in many occasions.
[44:11.440 --> 44:14.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: At times they did, but they've been criticized for not doing that.
[44:14.600 --> 44:17.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: And that's what DDoS Secret seems to do differently.
[44:18.180 --> 44:23.960]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I don't think that WikiLeaks had a category for like reserved data sets.
[44:25.900 --> 44:27.180]  [SPEAKER_00]: Different reasons.
[44:27.440 --> 44:36.160]  [SPEAKER_00]: They've also like published less stuff and added less stuff to their archive over the years, like volume.
[44:37.260 --> 44:41.080]  [SPEAKER_00]: And then we have, I mean, there are a lot of differences.
[44:41.540 --> 44:46.300]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that DDoS Secret tries to be less centralized around one person.
[44:46.500 --> 45:01.000]  [SPEAKER_00]: We try to have like multiple people doing multiple things so that if one person gets locked up or disappears, then the work wouldn't necessarily stop.
[45:01.000 --> 45:10.900]  [SPEAKER_00]: We have a non-profit in the United States, which I don't think that WikiLeaks has officially a non-profit.
[45:11.080 --> 45:14.280]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that they're registered as a for-profit corporation in Iceland.
[45:14.560 --> 45:18.920]  [SPEAKER_00]: And then they have like some non-profits in Germany that process donations for them.
[45:19.820 --> 45:27.100]  [SPEAKER_00]: But they're not necessarily reporting their own finances in the way that we are to the IRS.
[45:29.120 --> 45:30.020]  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't know.
[45:30.140 --> 45:34.060]  [SPEAKER_00]: There's a lot of differences between us.
[45:34.720 --> 45:35.320]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[45:35.540 --> 45:45.980]  [SPEAKER_00]: I do think that because WikiLeaks doesn't publish or doesn't archive stuff in a reserved way, they've had to make different decisions about stuff that they put out there.
[45:48.580 --> 46:01.840]  [SPEAKER_00]: So it's working for us so far, although this week with the amount of requests for the no-fly list, the system sort of like slows down when you're just humans processing these requests.
[46:02.280 --> 46:02.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: I can imagine.
[46:03.160 --> 46:10.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, have you been targeted by any kind of agency or threatened with all sorts of legal action?
[46:12.520 --> 46:20.020]  [SPEAKER_00]: In the past, we have lost a server to a law enforcement seizure in Germany.
[46:20.300 --> 46:25.140]  [SPEAKER_00]: This was in 2020, I believe.
[46:25.380 --> 46:25.740]  [SPEAKER_00]: 2020.
[46:26.060 --> 46:28.300]  [SPEAKER_00]: Blue Leaks, you covered it at the time.
[46:28.440 --> 46:33.760]  [SPEAKER_00]: But we published more than 250 gigabytes of data from U.S.
[46:33.820 --> 46:45.260]  [SPEAKER_00]: law enforcement, fusion centers, and training facilities, and they got one of our public distribution servers taken offline that was in Germany.
[46:45.740 --> 46:52.300]  [SPEAKER_00]: We did lose some data, some indexed data, and like a search engine at the time, so that was pretty annoying.
[46:52.300 --> 47:06.520]  [SPEAKER_00]: But recently, we haven't had any new letters or indications that the no-fly list in particular has pissed anybody off.
[47:06.520 --> 47:07.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wow.
[47:07.920 --> 47:20.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, how can people reach you if they find themselves in that particular situation where they've discovered something and they want someone responsible to be able to guide how or if it's released?
[47:20.500 --> 47:22.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: How would they make that initial contact?
[47:24.380 --> 47:30.040]  [SPEAKER_00]: We have an email address, submissions at ddosecrets.com.
[47:30.040 --> 47:42.640]  [SPEAKER_00]: We also have chat accounts that they can contact if they don't want to put it in an email and talk to us about the data set.
[47:43.860 --> 48:02.340]  [SPEAKER_00]: We ask that sources contact us after they have a full copy of the data set and not when they're, like, in the middle of anything because we don't want to be, you know, involved in anything that happens until, like, the data has been reviewed by them.
[48:03.600 --> 48:05.840]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, yeah, contact us.
[48:07.100 --> 48:08.160]  [SPEAKER_00]: Contact us.
[48:08.480 --> 48:14.700]  [SPEAKER_00]: Details for, like, what's the most up-to-date way to reach us is on ddosecrets.com.
[48:14.820 --> 48:16.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I imagine people can make contributions as well.
[48:18.820 --> 48:23.980]  [SPEAKER_00]: Contributions, yeah, there are a few ways that people can contribute to the project.
[48:24.260 --> 48:28.080]  [SPEAKER_00]: The most helpful way is, like, seeding the torrents.
[48:28.200 --> 48:38.560]  [SPEAKER_00]: Like, when we put new data out, download it and leave your connection open so that other people can grab it quickly and efficiently.
[48:40.320 --> 48:47.320]  [SPEAKER_00]: We are also, like, a registered nonprofit so people can donate to us and get a tax write-off.
[48:50.560 --> 48:54.800]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, ddosecrets.charity is where we have sort of, like, a donation page.
[48:55.080 --> 48:55.280]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay.
[48:56.180 --> 48:57.660]  [SPEAKER_00]: Was that what you meant by contribute?
[48:57.980 --> 48:58.400]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes, absolutely.
[48:58.420 --> 48:59.460]  [SPEAKER_00]: Other things that I missed?
[48:59.620 --> 48:59.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[48:59.740 --> 49:15.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: Because this kind of thing is, it takes such courage and it takes, you know, such fortitude in just continuing day by day to try and share this information in a responsible way.
[49:16.000 --> 49:21.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, on that note, what kinds of requests have you been getting for the no-fly list?
[49:21.300 --> 49:22.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: Some of them might be funny.
[49:25.080 --> 49:45.300]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I mean, because this sort of made a big splash on TikTok, we've been getting a lot of, like, high school students who are really interested in this, like, relic from the 2001 era of, like, a no-fly list.
[49:45.300 --> 49:46.020]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh-huh.
[49:47.520 --> 49:56.860]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, there's, like, a lot of that, which, I mean, I hate to say no to, but I also, yeah.
[49:57.240 --> 50:01.880]  [SPEAKER_00]: I remember myself in high school and I wasn't necessarily the most responsible researcher.
[50:03.920 --> 50:05.780]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, there's been some of that.
[50:05.920 --> 50:13.040]  [SPEAKER_00]: There's definitely been, like, intelligence community, like, international intelligence community.
[50:13.040 --> 50:19.760]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that the Brazil Secret Service approached Maya and asked for it, and Maya was like, no.
[50:19.980 --> 50:21.260]  [SPEAKER_00]: Wait, they don't have it already?
[50:21.920 --> 50:24.480]  [SPEAKER_00]: The Secret Service of Brazil doesn't have access to this?
[50:25.040 --> 50:26.140]  [SPEAKER_00]: Uh, yeah.
[50:26.440 --> 50:27.780]  [SPEAKER_00]: I guess that the U.S.
[50:27.980 --> 50:33.140]  [SPEAKER_00]: has locked down access to this data to certain countries.
[50:33.340 --> 50:35.540]  [SPEAKER_00]: That sort of does show up in the list.
[50:35.640 --> 50:44.620]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's like, which countries have intelligence-sharing mechanisms with the U.S., because those countries would have more names on the list.
[50:44.820 --> 50:51.280]  [SPEAKER_00]: I know that, like, Ireland has quite a few, like, Irish names on the list.
[50:51.300 --> 50:52.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: Like members of the IRA or something.
[50:53.860 --> 50:54.340]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[50:54.820 --> 50:59.460]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, but there's, like, a lot of countries on names on there.
[50:59.760 --> 51:01.320]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, there was a report from Italy.
[51:01.320 --> 51:09.360]  [SPEAKER_00]: Italy, they found, like, mobsters and communists from, um, what's it called?
[51:09.440 --> 51:10.220]  [SPEAKER_00]: The Red Brigade.
[51:10.340 --> 51:11.100]  [SPEAKER_00]: Oh, the Red Brigade.
[51:11.100 --> 51:11.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: I remember them.
[51:12.080 --> 51:12.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: From the 70s.
[51:12.820 --> 51:13.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wow.
[51:13.800 --> 51:14.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[51:14.500 --> 51:16.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's, um...
[51:16.240 --> 51:16.700]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, the Red Brigade.
[51:16.700 --> 51:19.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's probably a badge of honor for many people to be on the list.
[51:20.060 --> 51:21.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: That is simply incredible.
[51:21.880 --> 51:23.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hey, we're down to our last minute or so.
[51:23.620 --> 51:28.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: Anybody out in the Skype line have any questions for Lorax before we go for the on-air part of the show?
[51:31.480 --> 51:31.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: No?
[51:33.260 --> 51:35.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, Robert, your lips are moving, but I'm not hearing anything.
[51:36.760 --> 51:38.000]  [SPEAKER_15]: Um, thanks for...
[51:38.000 --> 51:39.020]  [SPEAKER_15]: Just thanks for keeping it going.
[51:39.300 --> 51:46.900]  [SPEAKER_15]: And, uh, yeah, uh, the URL for DDoSsecrets, again, is D-D-O-S-S-E-C-R-E-T-S?
[51:47.100 --> 51:48.260]  [SPEAKER_15]: No, just one S.
[51:48.480 --> 51:49.160]  [SPEAKER_15]: Just one S.
[51:49.260 --> 51:49.680]  [SPEAKER_15]: D-D-O-S.
[51:50.240 --> 51:55.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: I would get the other domain, too, just in case somebody types that wrong, because I imagine a lot of people do.
[51:55.780 --> 51:59.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: And, Ken, your domain still can't be typed on Twitter, right?
[52:00.340 --> 52:00.780]  [SPEAKER_00]: Correct.
[52:01.020 --> 52:06.380]  [SPEAKER_00]: You can't put DDoSsecrets.com on Twitter, but you can put DDoSsecrets.charity on Twitter.
[52:06.600 --> 52:07.020]  [SPEAKER_00]: Oh, okay.
[52:07.580 --> 52:08.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, folks, try it.
[52:08.920 --> 52:13.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: If you type DDoSsecrets.com on Twitter, uh, your message will not go through.
[52:13.640 --> 52:14.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: It'll fail.
[52:14.300 --> 52:15.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: Even private messages.
[52:15.400 --> 52:16.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's the most insane thing.
[52:16.980 --> 52:19.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I don't know of anyone else that that happens to.
[52:19.600 --> 52:21.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's, it's really, it's really silly.
[52:21.020 --> 52:26.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: But indicative of the kinds of challenges that you face when, when you're involved in something like this.
[52:26.840 --> 52:28.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um, Lark, any, any final words from you?
[52:28.880 --> 52:31.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: Things you want people on, uh, listening to the radio to know about?
[52:33.300 --> 52:34.960]  [SPEAKER_00]: No, I mean, thanks for having me.
[52:35.060 --> 52:36.080]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's great to chat.
[52:36.180 --> 52:38.440]  [SPEAKER_00]: I'll stick around for the after show.
[52:38.700 --> 52:39.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Great, great.
[52:39.860 --> 52:42.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, and that after show, by the way, is called Overtime.
[52:42.620 --> 53:01.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: It takes place on YouTube on Channel2600, or you can click on the link that appears at the top of, um, the 2600.com webpage, and we can take phone calls over there, which we can't do over the radio right now because we're not at the radio station, but hopefully someday we will be again.
[53:01.920 --> 53:02.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[53:02.500 --> 53:04.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's, uh, it for this week.
[53:04.120 --> 53:05.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're off next week.
[53:05.720 --> 53:11.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: And, um, as I said, we'll be on YouTube in just a couple of minutes, eight o'clock p.m.
[53:11.580 --> 53:13.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: on Channel2600.
[53:13.360 --> 53:13.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good night.
[53:21.080 --> 53:29.200]  [SPEAKER_06]: So many destination places going to so many places, but the weather is much better, and the food is so much cheaper.
[53:30.840 --> 53:40.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I help her with her baggies, for the baggage is so heavy, I hear the planners ready by the gateway to take my love away.
[53:41.620 --> 53:50.620]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I can't believe that you're breathing, you're screaming, and it's getting me so.
[53:52.220 --> 53:54.240]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's getting me so.
[53:54.240 --> 53:57.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: Hello, everybody.
[53:59.580 --> 54:00.220]  [SPEAKER_06]: Hey.
[54:00.820 --> 54:01.460]  [SPEAKER_06]: Bye.
[54:01.680 --> 54:01.840]  [SPEAKER_06]: Bye.
[54:01.840 --> 54:01.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: Bye.
[54:01.880 --> 54:02.020]  [SPEAKER_06]: Love.
[54:06.000 --> 54:11.820]  [SPEAKER_06]: Fly her away, fly her away, fly her away.
[54:14.760 --> 54:20.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: You've got a smiling face, you took my leg to another place.
[54:20.940 --> 54:25.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: Fly her away, fly her away.
[54:28.140 --> 54:32.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: The place on the moon, the traces of love we had in places.
[54:32.040 --> 54:36.500]  [SPEAKER_06]: A turning in my mind, how I wish I'd be much stronger.
[54:37.580 --> 54:41.700]  [SPEAKER_06]: For the wheels are turning faster as I hear the winds are blowing.
[54:42.040 --> 54:44.700]  [SPEAKER_06]: I know that she is leaning on a jet plane.
[54:45.080 --> 54:47.000]  [SPEAKER_06]: We're down the runaway.
[54:49.140 --> 54:53.700]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I can't believe that you're bleeding, you're bleeding.
[54:55.520 --> 54:57.820]  [SPEAKER_06]: And it's getting me so...
[54:59.100 --> 55:02.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's getting me so cold.
[55:02.980 --> 55:03.820]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[55:06.360 --> 55:07.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[55:07.660 --> 55:13.460]  [SPEAKER_06]: You've got a smiling face, you took the wild love so far away.
[55:13.940 --> 55:16.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: Fly her away, fly her away.
[55:17.300 --> 55:17.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[55:20.440 --> 55:21.480]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[55:21.480 --> 55:27.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: You've got a smiling face, you took my leg to another place.
[55:28.060 --> 55:32.020]  [SPEAKER_06]: Fly her away, fly her away.
[55:38.500 --> 55:41.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: Once again, a reminder, Off The Hook is not on next week.
[55:41.340 --> 55:45.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: However, there will be 2600 meetings a week from this coming Friday.
[55:45.080 --> 55:52.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: So please visit 2600.com/meetings to see where your local hacker meeting will be taking place.
[55:52.220 --> 55:54.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Again, stay tuned for Overtime over on YouTube.
[55:54.680 --> 55:56.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: And keep listening to WBAI.
[55:56.500 --> 56:00.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: I can't believe that you're bleeding, but sleepy.
[56:02.060 --> 56:04.860]  [SPEAKER_06]: And it's getting me so...
[56:06.240 --> 56:09.000]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's getting me so cold.
[56:10.100 --> 56:10.560]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[56:13.060 --> 56:14.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[56:14.380 --> 56:19.740]  [SPEAKER_06]: You've got a smiling face, you took my heart to another place.
[56:20.580 --> 56:23.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: Fly her away, fly her away.
[56:24.160 --> 56:24.640]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[56:24.640 --> 56:26.460]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[56:27.280 --> 56:28.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[56:28.440 --> 56:33.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: You've got a smiling face, you took my heart to another place.
[56:34.440 --> 56:37.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: Fly her away, fly her away.
[56:38.140 --> 56:38.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[56:39.360 --> 56:40.640]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[56:41.420 --> 56:42.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[56:42.360 --> 56:48.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: You've got a smiling face, you took my heart so far away.
[56:48.460 --> 56:51.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: Fly her away, fly her away.
[56:51.960 --> 56:52.560]  [SPEAKER_06]: And more!
[57:02.560 --> 57:04.880]  [SPEAKER_16]: This is Ralph Poyter.
[57:05.200 --> 57:09.780]  [SPEAKER_16]: Join me and others every Wednesday, 8 to 9 p.m.
[57:09.960 --> 57:14.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: Eastern Time on WBAI 99.5 on your radio.
[57:15.960 --> 57:32.160]  [SPEAKER_16]: It would appear the human movement is such that at any moment in history, there are too few that understand possibilities of existence that would benefit all who inhabit this planet and are willing to act on this understanding.
[57:32.700 --> 57:35.480]  [SPEAKER_16]: This program will feature that few.
[57:36.000 --> 57:40.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: What are your views on these issues that impact your life today?
[57:40.780 --> 57:44.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: What are your views on America today?
[57:44.580 --> 57:48.000]  [SPEAKER_16]: What are your views on America's future?
[57:48.500 --> 57:49.660]  [SPEAKER_16]: Can we talk?
[57:50.220 --> 57:54.840]  [SPEAKER_16]: Call in, 212-209-2877.
[57:54.840 --> 57:57.200]  [SPEAKER_16]: Wednesday, 8 to 9 p.m.
[57:57.200 --> 58:01.340]  [SPEAKER_16]: on WBAI 99.5 on your radio.
[58:04.320 --> 58:16.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: And welcome, everybody, to Off The Hook Overtime, where we continue the discussion that just aired on WBAI for Off The Hook, and we do it on the Internet, on YouTube.
[58:16.960 --> 58:22.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: And we can take your phone calls, but not right now, not yet, because we still have other things to discuss.
[58:22.380 --> 58:23.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: First, we're going to make sure everybody made it.
[58:23.860 --> 58:26.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: Kyle, well, you're in the same room as me, so I'm pretty sure you made it.
[58:26.880 --> 58:30.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, I feel like I've arrived.
[58:31.020 --> 58:34.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: I'm coming in clearly, maybe a little dynamic.
[58:34.980 --> 58:37.680]  [SPEAKER_08]: I was going to look at that thing that I do, but continue.
[58:37.880 --> 58:39.440]  [SPEAKER_08]: I was listening to what you're saying.
[58:39.740 --> 58:40.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, good.
[58:41.480 --> 58:43.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, look at our levels, make sure they're okay.
[58:44.260 --> 58:46.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: And Rob and Gila, you made it okay?
[58:47.140 --> 58:48.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: We have, yes.
[58:48.060 --> 58:48.480]  [SPEAKER_10]: We have.
[58:49.380 --> 58:59.320]  [SPEAKER_10]: If I can just throw one thing out there, pursuant to my tardiness in the previous hour, urban exploration is cool.
[59:00.800 --> 59:06.800]  [SPEAKER_10]: If you feel the need to put yourself on the train tracks during rush hour, don't do that.
[59:07.600 --> 59:09.240]  [SPEAKER_10]: That is why I was late.
[59:09.680 --> 59:10.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wait, what happened?
[59:11.860 --> 59:20.080]  [SPEAKER_10]: Someone was on the subway tracks near our home, so they shut down all the trains running into our part of Queens.
[59:20.380 --> 59:20.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[59:21.180 --> 59:27.540]  [SPEAKER_10]: So, if you feel the need to be on the train tracks, please don't.
[59:27.840 --> 59:37.880]  [SPEAKER_10]: Call 988 if you need to, but a 40-minute trip home took two hours, and also it's raining and snowing.
[59:38.280 --> 59:40.460]  [SPEAKER_10]: So, I'm sorry I was late.
[59:40.820 --> 59:42.960]  [SPEAKER_10]: Don't get on the train tracks, for the love of God.
[59:43.400 --> 59:45.140]  [SPEAKER_10]: That's my public service announcement for the day.
[59:45.340 --> 59:53.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: And 988, for those who don't know, is the suicide prevention three-digit code now, which is an unusual one because there are still phone numbers that begin with 988.
[59:53.380 --> 59:55.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, I'm not exactly sure how...
[59:55.160 --> 01:00:02.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm not going to call it to test it, but I think you have to pause a little bit after 988, or maybe you have to dial an area code now before any exchange.
[01:00:03.940 --> 01:00:10.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: I would have used one of the other numbers that, you know, like 711.
[01:00:10.520 --> 01:00:11.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: Does anybody know what that's for?
[01:00:12.440 --> 01:00:13.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: Probably not.
[01:00:13.340 --> 01:00:17.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: And it probably would be more useful to use it that way, but what do I know?
[01:00:17.160 --> 01:00:17.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm digging.
[01:00:18.560 --> 01:00:19.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, for digging.
[01:00:19.600 --> 01:00:21.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: How many people are digging cables?
[01:00:21.400 --> 01:00:21.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, come on.
[01:00:21.900 --> 01:00:23.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: They can have an 800 number or something.
[01:00:24.280 --> 01:00:25.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's 811, isn't it?
[01:00:25.760 --> 01:00:26.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: See, we don't even know.
[01:00:26.900 --> 01:00:27.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: 811.
[01:00:27.320 --> 01:00:27.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: What's 811?
[01:00:27.960 --> 01:00:28.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: What's 211?
[01:00:28.920 --> 01:00:29.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: Huh?
[01:00:29.340 --> 01:00:29.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: Nobody knows.
[01:00:30.800 --> 01:00:31.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:00:31.700 --> 01:00:33.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're still checking to make sure people made it.
[01:00:33.280 --> 01:00:33.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: Arseny, you're okay?
[01:00:34.140 --> 01:00:34.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: You made it to Skype?
[01:00:35.200 --> 01:00:35.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes.
[01:00:35.360 --> 01:00:36.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: To YouTube Land.
[01:00:36.800 --> 01:00:36.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hello.
[01:00:37.580 --> 01:00:39.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: And Lorax, you're joining us as well, right?
[01:00:40.660 --> 01:00:41.900]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I'm here for a bit.
[01:00:42.180 --> 01:00:42.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: Great.
[01:00:42.940 --> 01:00:51.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, during the break, I had a little talk with our friend over at ChatGPT.
[01:00:51.640 --> 01:00:56.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I asked a favor.
[01:00:56.700 --> 01:00:58.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: Actually, I lost a window.
[01:00:58.900 --> 01:01:04.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: I asked the bot to write a poem about the no-fly list.
[01:01:05.840 --> 01:01:07.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: And this is rather beautiful, I think.
[01:01:08.320 --> 01:01:10.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: Are you guys ready for some culture here?
[01:01:10.600 --> 01:01:10.700]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[01:01:11.060 --> 01:01:11.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:01:11.440 --> 01:01:15.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: Beneath the skies so blue and wide, a list exists that's not so kind.
[01:01:17.620 --> 01:01:18.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: I have to make it through this.
[01:01:18.820 --> 01:01:23.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: The no-fly list, a name so dire for those whose name it holds, a fire.
[01:01:24.420 --> 01:01:34.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: A name on this list is a curse, a mark of suspicion, a blot that's worse, a label of guilt without a trial, a sentence without a chance to dial.
[01:01:34.940 --> 01:01:41.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: The reasons for being on this list may be secret, known only by a select.
[01:01:42.380 --> 01:01:43.660]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, that's kind of clumsy there.
[01:01:43.660 --> 01:01:49.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: No recourse, no way to clear one's name, a Kafkaesque nightmare, a perpetual shame.
[01:01:49.000 --> 01:01:59.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, if you find yourself on this list, you may feel like you've been missed by justice and by liberty, but know that you're not alone.
[01:01:59.760 --> 01:02:00.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: You'll see.
[01:02:01.240 --> 01:02:05.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: For there are others on this list who share your plight and your twist.
[01:02:05.300 --> 01:02:09.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's hope one day we'll all be free from the no-fly list and its tyranny.
[01:02:11.440 --> 01:02:16.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: Come on, I think that's better than anything else could come up with in the 30 seconds it took to make that.
[01:02:17.460 --> 01:02:19.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: What, are you applauding with your fingers there?
[01:02:20.400 --> 01:02:20.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:02:21.260 --> 01:02:22.060]  [SPEAKER_10]: He was.
[01:02:22.060 --> 01:02:24.780]  [SPEAKER_10]: I was just going to ask, could you stop asking it to write poems?
[01:02:24.780 --> 01:02:26.500]  [SPEAKER_10]: Because the poems are making my head hurt.
[01:02:26.680 --> 01:02:27.040]  [SPEAKER_10]: They're bad.
[01:02:27.080 --> 01:02:27.960]  [SPEAKER_10]: They're very, very bad.
[01:02:28.180 --> 01:02:31.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: People have always had this antagonistic view towards poems and poets.
[01:02:32.720 --> 01:02:37.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I just think, you know, digital poetry is, it may be our future.
[01:02:37.160 --> 01:02:37.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't know.
[01:02:39.620 --> 01:02:45.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: Any questions that folks had for Lorax or about DDoS secrets before we open things up to phone calls?
[01:02:45.980 --> 01:02:52.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think, again, for the listeners out there, we have a little chat so we don't talk over each other.
[01:02:52.700 --> 01:02:58.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: So, like, how do you guys draw the line on what is too much personal information?
[01:02:58.460 --> 01:03:03.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Because, like, some of the innocent people are getting stuck in these data leaks.
[01:03:03.080 --> 01:03:10.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: And it's, like, that side could potentially be kind of furthering, you know, problems for people.
[01:03:13.450 --> 01:03:16.090]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, yeah.
[01:03:16.430 --> 01:03:38.210]  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, when there's, like, a large collection of ID scans or, like, a list of names linked to other personal identifying information, then it's, it, um, makes a data set, uh, candidate for the limited distribution section.
[01:03:39.450 --> 01:03:39.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[01:03:40.150 --> 01:03:40.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: Like, like this one.
[01:03:41.210 --> 01:03:45.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, a lot of information is not, is not being shared.
[01:03:45.610 --> 01:03:47.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, it was redacted to start with.
[01:03:48.890 --> 01:03:49.930]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, that's true.
[01:03:49.930 --> 01:03:54.190]  [SPEAKER_00]: Even, like, this spreadsheet was redacted when it came to us.
[01:03:54.430 --> 01:04:01.010]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, but this, this data set is, like, all personal information.
[01:04:01.010 --> 01:04:09.650]  [SPEAKER_00]: There isn't, like, a portion of the data set that we would have released that wouldn't have just, like, personal data in it.
[01:04:09.870 --> 01:04:17.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, um, yeah, this one was pretty obvious that it was on the list for limited distribution.
[01:04:17.710 --> 01:04:32.790]  [SPEAKER_00]: The ones that are tougher are when it's, like, an email inbox of a public figure and you don't, um, and, like, not all of the attachments are able to be text-searched.
[01:04:33.410 --> 01:04:43.070]  [SPEAKER_00]: So those are a bit harder to, like, parse through and find and make sure that there isn't, like, a list of everybody in the country and their ID number.
[01:04:43.270 --> 01:04:45.190]  [SPEAKER_12]: Especially if it's, like, half a terabyte.
[01:04:45.710 --> 01:04:46.170]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[01:04:47.770 --> 01:04:56.390]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, so a lot of data sets get put in the limited distribution category while they're being reviewed for what's in there.
[01:04:56.590 --> 01:05:08.910]  [SPEAKER_00]: And then if they can be redacted or if there's a portion of the data set that can be released, uh, then it's put in the public, uh, access portion.
[01:05:09.910 --> 01:05:24.570]  [SPEAKER_00]: Something that, like, um, something that, like, I think that happened with was, um, there was a ransomware crew that hacked, um, a law firm in Chicago, I think.
[01:05:24.570 --> 01:05:45.630]  [SPEAKER_00]: And it ended up being, like, a lot of PII, but then within their, um, yeah, the Jones Day law firm, within the Jones Day, like, emails, there was a section that was part of the law firm's review of the city of Chicago's use of violence.
[01:05:45.630 --> 01:05:54.190]  [SPEAKER_00]: And so those were, like, within a data set that might have a lot of PII, there was a portion that we found that could be publicly released.
[01:05:54.190 --> 01:06:11.130]  [SPEAKER_00]: because these were, like, emails produced by politicians in the city of Chicago, um, so, yeah, that, that was, I forget, like, the time, how long it took to find the portion of the data set that could be publicly released, um, but, yeah.
[01:06:12.390 --> 01:06:12.910]  [SPEAKER_00]: Go ahead, Rob.
[01:06:14.090 --> 01:06:24.130]  [SPEAKER_15]: So, um, Lorax, uh, if, uh, if you're comfortable talking about it, uh, would you mind, uh, saying a little bit about what led you to get involved with this kind of work and with Dira Secrets?
[01:06:25.730 --> 01:06:26.410]  [SPEAKER_00]: Sure.
[01:06:26.810 --> 01:06:28.690]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, well, I'm a journalist.
[01:06:28.690 --> 01:06:45.950]  [SPEAKER_00]: I went to journalism school and was reporting on protests and social movements and stuff, like, from when I was in university and writing, like, school papers and stuff.
[01:06:47.450 --> 01:06:49.910]  [SPEAKER_00]: And I started covering the police.
[01:06:50.770 --> 01:07:10.890]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think my first job in journalism, I was working for, like, a website in Toronto and the G20 came to town and so there was, like, a huge security, like, build up in the city and just, like, cameras going up everywhere and a lot of, like, money being poured into the police for this,
[01:07:10.890 --> 01:07:11.850]  [SPEAKER_00]: like, three-day event.
[01:07:11.850 --> 01:07:28.410]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, so I started covering them and I wrote about this, like, law that they got, um, secretly enacted, which, like, basically suspended civil liberties in the area around the summit.
[01:07:28.410 --> 01:07:32.570]  [SPEAKER_00]: And I was very interested in this process.
[01:07:32.650 --> 01:07:41.810]  [SPEAKER_00]: And so I started, like, filing freedom of information requests for data about this decision to suspend civil liberties around the summit.
[01:07:41.810 --> 01:07:45.770]  [SPEAKER_00]: And it took, like, like, years before I got anything useful.
[01:07:45.990 --> 01:07:55.850]  [SPEAKER_00]: I made it one of my, um, graduation projects and I never got anything back from, from Canada because I'm based in Canada.
[01:07:56.610 --> 01:08:03.930]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, so it just, like, journalists talk a lot about the freedom of information system being broken.
[01:08:04.550 --> 01:08:07.590]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, and I've found that in my work.
[01:08:07.590 --> 01:08:11.330]  [SPEAKER_00]: And when I started working with leaks, it's so different.
[01:08:11.550 --> 01:08:17.290]  [SPEAKER_00]: Like, you just get, like, gigabytes or terabytes worth of stuff at one time.
[01:08:17.590 --> 01:08:20.050]  [SPEAKER_00]: Uh, and you have to sort through it.
[01:08:20.150 --> 01:08:32.570]  [SPEAKER_00]: And it's so different than working as a journalist and just, like, clawing and, um, just, like, working so hard to get, like, one document back from the government.
[01:08:32.910 --> 01:08:47.090]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, so yeah, I guess that I came at it from Um, that experience of needing documentation for my stories and not being able to get it any other way than from hacks or leaks.
[01:08:49.110 --> 01:08:49.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: Fascinating.
[01:08:50.270 --> 01:09:04.950]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, I imagine, um, there are probably entities out there that try to clog your inbox with all kinds of garbage, you know, to slow down the processing of actual leaks that you might, um, um, be forwarded or, or information.
[01:09:04.950 --> 01:09:07.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um, is that a problem for you guys?
[01:09:11.410 --> 01:09:23.270]  [SPEAKER_00]: Uh, I mean, I think that there's people who try to submit stuff that's not interesting a lot, but we have a pretty fine-tuned radar for it at this point.
[01:09:23.510 --> 01:09:33.830]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, and you can usually tell when someone's trying to waste your time versus when they actually have a lot of data.
[01:09:33.830 --> 01:09:41.950]  [SPEAKER_00]: People submit stuff that's, like, not actually hard to find, or it's from, like, a public website, or they just scraped, like, some government database.
[01:09:42.450 --> 01:09:42.590]  [SPEAKER_07]: Mm-hmm.
[01:09:42.690 --> 01:09:47.850]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, like, there's some of that, but, like, you can always figure that out pretty quickly.
[01:09:47.850 --> 01:10:05.390]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, and yeah, there's a lot of, like, overselling to, like, saying, I got all of this data from this really interesting entity, but it might not necessarily have anything valuable in a large, like, container of stuff.
[01:10:05.630 --> 01:10:08.990]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, there's some of that, yeah.
[01:10:08.990 --> 01:10:13.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: And how are people's identities protected if they do send you something?
[01:10:14.150 --> 01:10:24.370]  [SPEAKER_17]: Do they, uh, when you communicate with them, do you have, um, any kind of sensitive information that you have to make sure doesn't get, um, uh, exposed in any way?
[01:10:25.510 --> 01:10:35.650]  [SPEAKER_00]: Uh, we encourage our sources to stay anonymous and not to tell us who they are and to communicate with encryption with us so that other people also don't know who they are.
[01:10:35.650 --> 01:10:50.130]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, some sources want us to know who they are, like, if they're a whistleblower, um, this can be relevant to the, uh, ability that they have to speak to a data set.
[01:10:50.410 --> 01:10:57.830]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, there's different kinds of sources, but, like, in general, our advice is to stay anonymous.
[01:10:58.430 --> 01:11:04.930]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, we will make no effort to identify our sources and, yeah.
[01:11:07.170 --> 01:11:23.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, and, you know, I, I've noticed many times, um, uh, people have difficulty, uh, protecting themselves and you have to sort of coach them and say, don't, don't tell me this or don't communicate in this way because you could be tracked or you could be identified,
[01:11:23.510 --> 01:11:34.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: uh, if, um, if you don't take certain precautions, um, and that's, that's always worrisome, especially if somebody is, is dealing with, uh, sensitive information, they might not even know the gravity of it.
[01:11:36.690 --> 01:11:56.370]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, for sure, and I think that, like, that's one reason why we don't have a secure drop or run a secure drop, because I don't think that we would be confident that, um, we have the infrastructure to maintain this sort of, like, physical, safe, um, box that a secure drop requires,
[01:11:56.490 --> 01:12:02.310]  [SPEAKER_00]: like, they, you need a lot of investment and staff in order to keep something like that going.
[01:12:02.310 --> 01:12:07.130]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, our methods of contact are more temporary.
[01:12:07.130 --> 01:12:08.310]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's a chat account.
[01:12:08.470 --> 01:12:11.510]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, it's, uh, an email address.
[01:12:11.850 --> 01:12:26.750]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, so we always will have an initial contact and then graduate to, like, more specific methods to transfer data depending on the needs of the source.
[01:12:27.390 --> 01:12:30.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: And have you ever been pressured to give up information about a source?
[01:12:37.370 --> 01:12:42.110]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, like, like, you know, legal filing or something like that?
[01:12:42.350 --> 01:12:48.350]  [SPEAKER_00]: Like, no, it hasn't happened that we have either been held or questioned about a source.
[01:12:48.350 --> 01:12:49.770]  [SPEAKER_00]: Mm-hmm.
[01:12:50.190 --> 01:12:50.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's good.
[01:12:51.850 --> 01:12:52.370]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[01:12:52.370 --> 01:12:59.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: And hopefully it stays that way, because, uh, that's something that, that journalists everywhere have to deal with, um, being pressured to give up their sources.
[01:12:59.390 --> 01:13:04.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: And as most journalists, um, are, are quite firm in saying that we will not do that.
[01:13:04.670 --> 01:13:07.950]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, but, uh, the threats get, uh, thrown around quite a bit.
[01:13:08.250 --> 01:13:17.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um, we're talking with, uh, Laura X from distributed denial of secrets about the, um, uh, recently revealed no-fly list that was sitting around on a server.
[01:13:18.230 --> 01:13:22.290]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, pretty much unprotected, as is the case with so many things.
[01:13:22.670 --> 01:13:24.410]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, and we're going to take phone calls in just a minute.
[01:13:24.530 --> 01:13:25.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: I just wanted to ask Laura X one more thing.
[01:13:26.290 --> 01:13:33.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: Are there any particularly memorable, um, um, revelations that, uh, you can speak to?
[01:13:33.670 --> 01:13:38.590]  [SPEAKER_17]: Things that people have said, look what I found, uh, whether things you've used or not used?
[01:13:40.770 --> 01:13:42.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: In a no-fly list specifically?
[01:13:43.190 --> 01:13:44.570]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, no, other, other examples.
[01:13:46.570 --> 01:13:52.250]  [SPEAKER_00]: Oh, uh, I mean, it's, it's hard to just, like, pick one.
[01:13:52.550 --> 01:14:05.290]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that the, from the recent stuff that we've put out, uh, there's been, there's a big story in the Financial Times this week.
[01:14:05.290 --> 01:14:07.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: Actually, yes, you guys were mentioned in the Financial Times.
[01:14:08.010 --> 01:14:10.090]  [SPEAKER_17]: I think it was today, uh, but very recently.
[01:14:10.370 --> 01:14:10.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[01:14:10.470 --> 01:14:11.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes, tell us about that.
[01:14:12.950 --> 01:14:29.110]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, yeah, that was based on one of the Russian leaks, uh, which is publicly available from Capital Legal Services, um, a law firm that represents, among other clients, the Wagner Group, which is a mercenary army.
[01:14:29.110 --> 01:14:57.950]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, Bellingcat revealed the owner and operator of the Wagner Group recently, and, and so, um, yeah, there's some information in the Financial Times, as well as in Open Democracy, uh, about how Wagner uses these lawyers to do their dirty work, basically.
[01:14:57.950 --> 01:15:06.510]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, but this is, like, a dataset that we put out many months ago, but is primarily in Russian.
[01:15:06.850 --> 01:15:15.290]  [SPEAKER_00]: And so, indexing it, translating it, and putting it in front of researchers has taken months.
[01:15:15.710 --> 01:15:18.810]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, so, but it's an interesting story for sure.
[01:15:18.810 --> 01:15:25.590]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's called Wagner, Inc., A Russian Warlord and His Lawyers, um, in the Financial Times.
[01:15:28.430 --> 01:15:29.470]  [SPEAKER_00]: And, yeah.
[01:15:30.830 --> 01:15:36.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: In Open Democracy, I don't have the headline in front of me, but it's not paywalled there, so...
[01:15:36.710 --> 01:15:37.770]  [SPEAKER_00]: Definitely look it up.
[01:15:38.030 --> 01:15:39.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes, because, uh, Financial Times was paywalled.
[01:15:39.750 --> 01:15:40.630]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um, yeah.
[01:15:40.950 --> 01:15:48.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, uh, one more time before we take phone calls, uh, can you give out the, uh, website and, and ways people can, uh, make contact or make contributions?
[01:15:49.690 --> 01:16:02.370]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, we are ddosecrets.com, d-d-o-s-e-c-e-r-e-t-s.com, um, or .charity is for our donation page.
[01:16:03.370 --> 01:16:08.950]  [SPEAKER_00]: And people can send us data, people can send us requests for limited distribution data.
[01:16:08.970 --> 01:16:18.890]  [SPEAKER_00]: If, um, if you need, uh, some of our reserve data for your research, get in touch with our email address, press at ddosecrets.com.
[01:16:19.870 --> 01:16:20.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: Great.
[01:16:20.570 --> 01:16:24.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: And, um, our phone number is 802-321-4225.
[01:16:24.770 --> 01:16:26.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's 802-321-HACK.
[01:16:27.470 --> 01:16:33.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, if you have been war-dialing us for the last half hour, we're not going to pick you up, because we know you don't want to talk about what we're talking about.
[01:16:35.110 --> 01:16:37.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's, it's just a, a way that we figured that out.
[01:16:37.450 --> 01:16:39.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, people call when we give the phone number out.
[01:16:39.990 --> 01:16:43.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: If they call before that, they, they, uh, want to talk about something else, which is fine.
[01:16:43.410 --> 01:16:49.370]  [SPEAKER_17]: But right now we'd like to keep it to the subject that we've been discussing for the past, uh, hour and 20 minutes.
[01:16:49.570 --> 01:16:54.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: So 802-321-4225, uh, is our phone number.
[01:16:54.270 --> 01:16:59.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: If you have any questions for Lorax or any, uh, thoughts about the, uh, the no-fly list.
[01:16:59.770 --> 01:17:04.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um, and, uh, it, it being left lying around on, on the server.
[01:17:04.730 --> 01:17:08.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, or any other thoughts about, um, um, security breaches in general?
[01:17:09.110 --> 01:17:10.390]  [SPEAKER_17]: We'd certainly like to hear about that.
[01:17:10.550 --> 01:17:11.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: 802-321-4225.
[01:17:12.590 --> 01:17:14.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: What's our, what's our phone status, Kyle?
[01:17:14.410 --> 01:17:17.550]  [SPEAKER_17]: Are we still being war-dialed by, by one number or?
[01:17:18.070 --> 01:17:20.530]  [SPEAKER_08]: Um, uh, yes, I think it's settling.
[01:17:20.890 --> 01:17:21.910]  [SPEAKER_08]: Let's put it that way.
[01:17:21.910 --> 01:17:28.670]  [SPEAKER_08]: There's a little bit of, uh, uh, dynamic situation that is sorting itself out.
[01:17:28.670 --> 01:17:30.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, sometimes people who do that aren't even listening.
[01:17:30.950 --> 01:17:38.290]  [SPEAKER_17]: And so they don't even hear us say, we're not going to pick up the phone if you're, if you're calling us over and over again, uh, before we even give the phone number out.
[01:17:38.470 --> 01:17:40.050]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's just, you know, it's, it's, it's better.
[01:17:40.190 --> 01:17:42.110]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, there's that, that rush of people.
[01:17:42.270 --> 01:17:50.470]  [SPEAKER_08]: As soon as you give the number out, obviously every, uh, handset is, is, uh, picked up and people are frantically dialing.
[01:17:50.470 --> 01:17:52.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: The phone system overloads sometimes and nobody can get through.
[01:17:53.030 --> 01:17:53.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: That happens too.
[01:17:53.890 --> 01:17:55.250]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's a real, uh, hassle.
[01:17:55.370 --> 01:17:57.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: At the radio station, we have 10 lines.
[01:17:57.310 --> 01:17:57.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: So that's easy.
[01:17:57.970 --> 01:17:59.230]  [SPEAKER_17]: We could just go to the next line here.
[01:17:59.230 --> 01:17:59.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: We have one.
[01:18:00.170 --> 01:18:01.590]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, uh, it's a little bit more tricky.
[01:18:01.930 --> 01:18:10.190]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, so if you have any questions, uh, for Lorax or for any of us, uh, on, um, on, on the issues we've talked about tonight, please 802-321-4225.
[01:18:10.730 --> 01:18:13.070]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, give it a couple of minutes to, uh, to settle in.
[01:18:13.070 --> 01:18:16.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um, Arseny, it looks like you have something you wanted to say.
[01:18:17.050 --> 01:18:17.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: No?
[01:18:17.810 --> 01:18:18.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:18:18.390 --> 01:18:19.310]  [SPEAKER_17]: You look farther there.
[01:18:19.650 --> 01:18:21.450]  [SPEAKER_17]: Rob, you definitely look like you have something to say.
[01:18:23.630 --> 01:18:24.630]  [SPEAKER_17]: Again, you're muted.
[01:18:26.010 --> 01:18:26.370]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes.
[01:18:26.950 --> 01:18:27.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: Go ahead.
[01:18:27.550 --> 01:18:28.550]  [SPEAKER_15]: That's twice I've done that now.
[01:18:29.010 --> 01:18:34.230]  [SPEAKER_15]: Um, I, I just wanted to mention that if you're in the United States, uh, you can also call us toll free.
[01:18:34.470 --> 01:18:39.310]  [SPEAKER_15]: Um, if that matters to you, you can call us at 833-755-2600.
[01:18:39.310 --> 01:18:44.410]  [SPEAKER_15]: Or you could call us at our regular toll number, 802-321-4225.
[01:18:45.890 --> 01:18:46.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:18:46.490 --> 01:18:51.530]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I understand that call is still coming in, so nobody else can get through as long as that person is wardarling us, is that right?
[01:18:53.130 --> 01:19:06.750]  [SPEAKER_08]: Um, yeah, it's, it's, uh, definitely exercising the wires, which I've heard is, uh, with older, uh, systems, the, the wires need to be warmed up.
[01:19:07.350 --> 01:19:07.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:19:07.910 --> 01:19:08.250]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know what?
[01:19:08.250 --> 01:19:09.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm gonna try a new tack here.
[01:19:09.610 --> 01:19:10.450]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, pick up the phone.
[01:19:10.710 --> 01:19:12.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: We'll, we'll, we'll use reason here.
[01:19:12.730 --> 01:19:14.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's see if that, uh, that...
[01:19:15.930 --> 01:19:16.650]  [SPEAKER_13]: I'm not ready.
[01:19:16.770 --> 01:19:17.110]  [SPEAKER_13]: I'm not ready.
[01:19:17.730 --> 01:19:20.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's, that's the noise that it makes when you pick up and you're not ready.
[01:19:20.610 --> 01:19:21.110]  [SPEAKER_17]: Do we have somebody?
[01:19:22.030 --> 01:19:22.390]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah.
[01:19:22.510 --> 01:19:23.110]  [SPEAKER_08]: Why don't you try now?
[01:19:23.110 --> 01:19:24.310]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is somebody on the line?
[01:19:25.870 --> 01:19:26.210]  Yes.
[01:19:26.570 --> 01:19:27.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hi, Rebel.
[01:19:27.310 --> 01:19:27.490]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:19:27.610 --> 01:19:29.150]  [SPEAKER_17]: We figured, we figured it was you.
[01:19:29.550 --> 01:19:35.910]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um, can we ask you to call us back in 15 minutes unless you have a specific question concerning DDoS secrets?
[01:19:36.970 --> 01:19:43.230]  [SPEAKER_03]: Um, um, if Osama is, um, uh, DDoS secrets, I heard on the, uh, off the hook show.
[01:19:43.450 --> 01:19:46.190]  [SPEAKER_03]: Uh, maybe Adolf Hitler's on the no fly list.
[01:19:46.850 --> 01:19:47.710]  [SPEAKER_03]: Is that possible?
[01:19:47.710 --> 01:19:50.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, that's the question you're going to ask.
[01:19:50.950 --> 01:19:55.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um, okay, Lorax, I guess maybe if you want to address that.
[01:19:55.990 --> 01:19:56.950]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I can handle that.
[01:19:57.030 --> 01:19:57.290]  [SPEAKER_00]: Go ahead.
[01:19:57.630 --> 01:20:01.870]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, no, Adolf Hitler is not on the no fly list.
[01:20:02.150 --> 01:20:06.670]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, Jerry Adams from the IRA is on the no fly list.
[01:20:07.030 --> 01:20:07.230]  [SPEAKER_00]: Really?
[01:20:07.230 --> 01:20:08.210]  [SPEAKER_00]: Wasab and Aladdin.
[01:20:08.770 --> 01:20:08.870]  [SPEAKER_00]: Wow.
[01:20:09.490 --> 01:20:19.610]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, some fun names from, like, yeah, other dead people, but not, no, there's no Adolf Hitler.
[01:20:19.830 --> 01:20:21.150]  [SPEAKER_17]: I imagine U.S.
[01:20:21.310 --> 01:20:31.710]  [SPEAKER_17]: citizens that would be the most interesting, uh, to, to find out that they were on the no fly list, particularly, uh, members of, of, of the government, you know, that, uh, fell into disfavor or something like that.
[01:20:31.710 --> 01:20:32.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: Former officials, yeah.
[01:20:32.310 --> 01:20:34.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: Former officials, uh, that you might not want leaving.
[01:20:35.610 --> 01:20:35.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um.
[01:20:36.050 --> 01:20:39.790]  [SPEAKER_00]: There are some Nazis on the no fly list.
[01:20:40.510 --> 01:20:50.910]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, like, it was from 2019, not, not after January 6th, so there's less Nazis than might be on it now.
[01:20:50.910 --> 01:20:52.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: But after Charlottesville, though.
[01:20:52.470 --> 01:21:02.150]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, Charlottesville names are on there, um, other white supremacists from Charlottesville, as reported by Emily Gorsensky.
[01:21:02.650 --> 01:21:02.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh-huh.
[01:21:02.930 --> 01:21:19.290]  [SPEAKER_00]: Um, so they found James Alex Fields, the Charlottesville terrorist, um, Greg Conti, and his neo-Nazi alias, Greg Ritter, uh, is in the select T-list, which isn't the no fly, but they are enhanced, like, enhanced screening lists.
[01:21:19.730 --> 01:21:19.890]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh-huh.
[01:21:20.130 --> 01:21:28.430]  [SPEAKER_00]: Also, Elliot Robert Klein and his neo-Nazi alias, Eli Mosley, is on the select T-list.
[01:21:28.430 --> 01:21:30.650]  [SPEAKER_00]: So there are some Nazis on the list.
[01:21:30.710 --> 01:21:31.610]  [SPEAKER_00]: How about Tucker Carlson?
[01:21:31.790 --> 01:21:32.390]  [SPEAKER_00]: Did you find that name?
[01:21:34.030 --> 01:21:34.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh...
[01:21:35.350 --> 01:21:36.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't know.
[01:21:36.490 --> 01:21:36.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: Probably.
[01:21:37.030 --> 01:21:38.730]  [SPEAKER_17]: Probably not at this stage, but at some point.
[01:21:39.470 --> 01:21:40.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um, Rebel, any further questions?
[01:21:41.670 --> 01:21:42.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, he's gone?
[01:21:42.890 --> 01:21:43.070]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:21:43.410 --> 01:21:43.710]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wow.
[01:21:44.230 --> 01:21:46.090]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, 802-321-4225.
[01:21:46.090 --> 01:21:47.070]  [SPEAKER_17]: We have another phone call?
[01:21:47.210 --> 01:21:47.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: Kyle?
[01:21:48.190 --> 01:21:49.390]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're making all kinds of hand gestures.
[01:21:49.530 --> 01:21:49.990]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't know what that means.
[01:21:50.110 --> 01:21:50.230]  [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, yeah.
[01:21:50.310 --> 01:21:50.950]  [SPEAKER_08]: Why don't you try now?
[01:21:51.170 --> 01:21:51.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:21:51.490 --> 01:21:51.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good evening.
[01:21:51.970 --> 01:21:52.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're on Off Talk Overtime.
[01:21:54.110 --> 01:21:54.350]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[01:21:54.410 --> 01:21:57.670]  [SPEAKER_04]: No, I just wanted to ask, uh, we're talking about the no-fly list.
[01:21:59.050 --> 01:21:59.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes.
[01:21:59.370 --> 01:21:59.630]  [SPEAKER_17]: Go ahead.
[01:22:00.890 --> 01:22:01.090]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[01:22:01.150 --> 01:22:02.190]  [SPEAKER_04]: No, I just had a quick question.
[01:22:02.370 --> 01:22:04.450]  [SPEAKER_04]: Is this no-fly list, is it a secret?
[01:22:04.670 --> 01:22:07.330]  [SPEAKER_04]: I mean, can you just go online and see if your name is on this list?
[01:22:07.330 --> 01:22:08.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, no.
[01:22:09.210 --> 01:22:11.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, Lorix, you wanna speak to that?
[01:22:13.970 --> 01:22:16.450]  [SPEAKER_00]: Uh, no, it's, you can't.
[01:22:16.610 --> 01:22:27.350]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's not, it's also not a top secret document or anything that's classified because, um, the government hands it out to so many airlines that they can't classify it.
[01:22:27.430 --> 01:22:36.090]  [SPEAKER_00]: So it's not like a top secret document or anything like that, but it's also not a very open data set that, that has leaked before.
[01:22:37.810 --> 01:22:40.730]  [SPEAKER_04]: What, what, what would be the point of not just making it public?
[01:22:40.970 --> 01:22:43.970]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know, you know, if you're only on that, you don't even bother trying to get on the plane.
[01:22:44.130 --> 01:22:45.470]  [SPEAKER_04]: Like, why would they just put it out there?
[01:22:47.130 --> 01:22:57.950]  [SPEAKER_00]: Uh, because there's a lot of possible negative consequences for people whose names are on the list through no fault of their own, um, people who are underage, people who are dead.
[01:22:58.410 --> 01:23:11.630]  [SPEAKER_17]: Um, I imagine you wouldn't want to tell somebody who is, uh, you know, uh, a criminal mastermind that they're on the no-fly list or, you know, is this ever used for, for actually capturing somebody who's wanted?
[01:23:14.070 --> 01:23:16.670]  [SPEAKER_00]: Uh, yeah, I don't know.
[01:23:17.890 --> 01:23:27.030]  [SPEAKER_00]: I imagine a lot of people know that they're on the no-fly list already and don't fly.
[01:23:27.030 --> 01:23:34.690]  [SPEAKER_12]: If you have an alias and that alias is on the list, um, then you know that you can't use that one anymore.
[01:23:34.910 --> 01:23:35.050]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[01:23:35.410 --> 01:23:35.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: Right.
[01:23:36.250 --> 01:23:36.710]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good point.
[01:23:37.170 --> 01:23:38.270]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, caller, any other questions?
[01:23:39.230 --> 01:23:46.110]  [SPEAKER_04]: No, I was just gonna say, cause I'm pretty sure, like, I was just wondering, cause I'm sure there's, like, regular people, not like, the Adolf Hitler type.
[01:23:46.270 --> 01:23:51.750]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm talking just regular folks whose names are just on there by mistake, who I'm pretty sure would be curious to see if their name is on there.
[01:23:51.810 --> 01:23:54.010]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know, it would be nice if they just published a list.
[01:23:54.350 --> 01:23:55.550]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm sure there's, like, mistakes.
[01:23:55.730 --> 01:23:57.730]  [SPEAKER_04]: People whose names got on there by mistake, or whatever.
[01:23:58.330 --> 01:23:58.870]  [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know.
[01:23:58.930 --> 01:24:00.210]  [SPEAKER_04]: It would have been nice if it was published.
[01:24:03.090 --> 01:24:04.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, that's a good point.
[01:24:06.650 --> 01:24:07.110]  [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[01:24:07.190 --> 01:24:07.490]  [SPEAKER_04]: Thank you.
[01:24:07.610 --> 01:24:08.470]  [SPEAKER_04]: Have a great show.
[01:24:08.830 --> 01:24:09.150]  [SPEAKER_17]: Thanks.
[01:24:09.150 --> 01:24:09.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: Thanks for your call.
[01:24:10.530 --> 01:24:15.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: I imagine, Lorex, that's something that you're constantly weighing over at DDoS Secrets.
[01:24:15.890 --> 01:24:24.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: The public benefit for this knowledge getting out, and the benefit for keeping certain things, you know, private, as they've been.
[01:24:26.190 --> 01:24:31.110]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, there's a lot of people who've written in to be like, am I on the list?
[01:24:31.250 --> 01:24:32.590]  [SPEAKER_00]: Is my relative on the list?
[01:24:32.650 --> 01:24:34.030]  [SPEAKER_00]: I just want to look up one name.
[01:24:34.030 --> 01:24:34.550]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh-huh.
[01:24:35.730 --> 01:24:40.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: And we haven't come up with a way to, like, do that in a privacy-preserving way.
[01:24:40.830 --> 01:24:48.990]  [SPEAKER_00]: If anybody has, like, an idea of how to permit those sorts of, like, lookups, then get in touch with us.
[01:24:49.870 --> 01:25:07.310]  [SPEAKER_00]: But I think that there's a lot of potential for abuse for that sort of function of just, like, false positives, looking up a name, and then being like, oh, this person's on the no-fly list, so I'm gonna add them to my own list of whatever.
[01:25:07.530 --> 01:25:15.370]  [SPEAKER_00]: Like, people in Brazil who the Brazilian Secret Service wanted to put on their lists.
[01:25:15.370 --> 01:25:18.730]  [SPEAKER_00]: They just wanted to, like, cheat-cheat from the U.S.
[01:25:18.810 --> 01:25:24.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: list and hurry up their own creation of something like this.
[01:25:24.810 --> 01:25:28.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: So I don't think that that's the direction that we want to see things going either.
[01:25:29.230 --> 01:25:35.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is this the kind of information that any employee at an airline would be able to get access to?
[01:25:37.810 --> 01:25:38.870]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think so.
[01:25:40.930 --> 01:25:41.910]  [SPEAKER_00]: But I don't know.
[01:25:42.010 --> 01:25:43.030]  [SPEAKER_00]: I've not worked in aviation.
[01:25:43.790 --> 01:25:57.870]  [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, I think that probably many employees at an airline who are doing bookings or those sorts of things would be able to access a version of this list.
[01:25:57.870 --> 01:26:05.110]  [SPEAKER_17]: Would somebody taking a booking on the phone say, oh, excuse me, sir, you're on the no-fly list, so we can't continue with this?
[01:26:05.110 --> 01:26:07.090]  [SPEAKER_17]: Would they actually be that courteous to tell you that?
[01:26:07.230 --> 01:26:08.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: Or would they just let you go to the airport?
[01:26:08.650 --> 01:26:10.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think that they'd tell you if you're on a list.
[01:26:10.870 --> 01:26:14.590]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think they would just, like, refuse your booking or...
[01:26:14.990 --> 01:26:18.390]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I don't know how it would work.
[01:26:20.170 --> 01:26:21.250]  [SPEAKER_17]: But we're learning more.
[01:26:21.330 --> 01:26:22.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're learning more by the day.
[01:26:22.510 --> 01:26:23.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: We have another phone call?
[01:26:23.830 --> 01:26:24.190]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:26:24.450 --> 01:26:24.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good evening.
[01:26:24.990 --> 01:26:25.910]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're on Off The Hook Overtime.
[01:26:26.770 --> 01:26:27.130]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yes.
[01:26:27.470 --> 01:26:33.350]  [SPEAKER_03]: The way you could get around the no-fly list is I put my real name, because you've got a show ID, but I put a fake birth...
[01:26:33.350 --> 01:26:35.350]  [SPEAKER_03]: Like, they ask you to put your birth date.
[01:26:35.490 --> 01:26:36.950]  [SPEAKER_03]: I just put a different birth date.
[01:26:37.130 --> 01:26:38.150]  [SPEAKER_03]: They don't check your birth date.
[01:26:38.270 --> 01:26:43.090]  [SPEAKER_03]: All they do is check that your name is on the ticket, your name is on your ID, and that's it.
[01:26:43.170 --> 01:26:44.550]  [SPEAKER_03]: Your birth date is not on your ticket.
[01:26:46.230 --> 01:26:47.530]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm not sure about that.
[01:26:47.810 --> 01:26:51.230]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, well, if you're flying... Have you ever tried that internationally?
[01:26:52.910 --> 01:26:53.630]  [SPEAKER_03]: Not internationally.
[01:26:53.630 --> 01:26:54.070]  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay.
[01:26:54.310 --> 01:27:00.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: I suggest if you try that internationally, you might get a different response than if you try it domestically, because they do tend...
[01:27:01.300 --> 01:27:03.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, they're gonna match it against your passport, obviously.
[01:27:03.720 --> 01:27:04.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, is there a no-fly list for international?
[01:27:05.380 --> 01:27:06.100]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, I think...
[01:27:06.100 --> 01:27:08.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, they don't have a no-fly list for domestic or international?
[01:27:08.860 --> 01:27:09.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, I think the no...
[01:27:09.820 --> 01:27:12.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, actually, Laura, you could clear this up.
[01:27:12.980 --> 01:27:16.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is the no-fly list for domestic flights as well as international?
[01:27:19.270 --> 01:27:22.490]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I mean, I also don't know the answer to that question.
[01:27:22.610 --> 01:27:26.460]  [SPEAKER_00]: I know that this list has a lot of non-U.S.
[01:27:26.620 --> 01:27:27.460]  [SPEAKER_00]: citizens on it.
[01:27:28.860 --> 01:27:31.140]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's probably mostly non-U.S.
[01:27:31.740 --> 01:27:32.220]  [SPEAKER_00]: citizens.
[01:27:33.060 --> 01:27:37.620]  [SPEAKER_00]: But I don't know... I mean, Commute Air is also a domestic airline.
[01:27:37.640 --> 01:27:39.620]  [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think that they fly internationally.
[01:27:40.480 --> 01:27:49.280]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, like, the jurisdiction of the airline that this leak comes from was a domestic U.S.
[01:27:49.840 --> 01:27:49.840]  jurisdiction.
[01:27:49.840 --> 01:28:01.660]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, if I was an airline, which is a sentence I don't say very often, but if I was, I probably wouldn't want somebody flying locally who's on an international do-not-fly list.
[01:28:01.660 --> 01:28:03.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: I just think that it could be awkward.
[01:28:06.560 --> 01:28:10.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: Rebel, and any last question from you, since I want to open up the phone lines?
[01:28:10.700 --> 01:28:12.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: Why would you have a toll-free number?
[01:28:13.320 --> 01:28:15.440]  [SPEAKER_03]: People don't really need toll-free numbers anymore.
[01:28:16.170 --> 01:28:23.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: Because one of our listeners asked for it, and we were being nice, and now you're saying we don't need it.
[01:28:23.200 --> 01:28:24.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, I don't know.
[01:28:24.220 --> 01:28:31.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: Maybe there are people who don't have access to a regular phone line, or...
[01:28:31.000 --> 01:28:36.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: I know there's no pay funds anymore, so it's hard to use just a pay fund to call without putting a coin in.
[01:28:36.630 --> 01:28:37.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: But there could be a situation.
[01:28:37.940 --> 01:28:42.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm sure there's somebody out there who will call the toll-free number and tell us why.
[01:28:43.060 --> 01:28:44.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, but then you're paying for the call.
[01:28:45.760 --> 01:28:46.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: Actually, we're not.
[01:28:46.620 --> 01:28:48.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: Whoever donated the line is.
[01:28:49.180 --> 01:28:49.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: Isn't that right, Rob?
[01:28:50.640 --> 01:28:54.120]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, our friend of the show, Lucky225, set that up for us.
[01:28:54.220 --> 01:28:56.100]  [SPEAKER_15]: And we're very grateful to him.
[01:28:56.200 --> 01:29:00.760]  [SPEAKER_15]: And whatever it costs, we do not... we're not responsible for it.
[01:29:00.840 --> 01:29:01.620]  [SPEAKER_15]: It was a nice donation.
[01:29:02.450 --> 01:29:04.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, hopefully we don't get a big fat bill in a few months.
[01:29:05.000 --> 01:29:07.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, that would... that wouldn't be nice.
[01:29:07.840 --> 01:29:08.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: But yes, thanks for that.
[01:29:09.040 --> 01:29:10.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, so maybe I'll call back in 15 minutes with my...
[01:29:10.980 --> 01:29:12.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, no, Rebel, this counts.
[01:29:13.160 --> 01:29:14.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: You've made two phone calls so far, so...
[01:29:14.980 --> 01:29:16.800]  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, so I'll call... let me get my list.
[01:29:17.020 --> 01:29:17.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: I'm back in New York.
[01:29:17.540 --> 01:29:18.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: A list?
[01:29:18.340 --> 01:29:19.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: What do you mean a list?
[01:29:19.540 --> 01:29:19.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[01:29:20.720 --> 01:29:22.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: My list of things to tell you.
[01:29:22.940 --> 01:29:24.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: A list of things to tell you.
[01:29:24.020 --> 01:29:24.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, my God.
[01:29:24.540 --> 01:29:25.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is what we have to deal with.
[01:29:25.600 --> 01:29:26.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, I'm back in New York.
[01:29:27.100 --> 01:29:28.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're back in New York.
[01:29:28.180 --> 01:29:28.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:29:29.400 --> 01:29:32.780]  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, call area called 518-502...
[01:29:32.780 --> 01:29:33.280]  [SPEAKER_03]: I'll just tell you.
[01:29:33.320 --> 01:29:36.320]  [SPEAKER_03]: I'm not going to do the calling because I know you have people on.
[01:29:37.950 --> 01:29:38.660]  [SPEAKER_03]: 518-502...
[01:29:38.660 --> 01:29:40.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wait, what are you giving us?
[01:29:40.100 --> 01:29:41.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: What are you giving us a phone number?
[01:29:41.300 --> 01:29:42.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's the Albany area.
[01:29:42.540 --> 01:29:43.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: I can tell that.
[01:29:43.100 --> 01:29:44.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: But why are you giving us a phone number?
[01:29:46.050 --> 01:29:47.450]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, because it says...
[01:29:47.440 --> 01:29:49.700]  [SPEAKER_03]: It reminds me of AI.
[01:29:50.100 --> 01:29:52.320]  [SPEAKER_03]: It just says, hello, what do you want?
[01:29:52.620 --> 01:29:53.820]  [SPEAKER_03]: Shall I maybe call...
[01:29:53.820 --> 01:29:56.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, yeah, but you could be calling a person who happens to talk that way.
[01:29:57.590 --> 01:30:06.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I don't want to call somebody at 830 on a Wednesday night and antagonize them, especially if they sound like a robot.
[01:30:10.190 --> 01:30:10.910]  [SPEAKER_03]: Remember, 1111...
[01:30:10.910 --> 01:30:16.850]  [SPEAKER_17]: We talked about calling the White House, and I said 1414 was the extension that I usually would call when I was calling the White House.
[01:30:17.470 --> 01:30:19.470]  [SPEAKER_07]: 1111 is the White House, because when it...
[01:30:19.470 --> 01:30:20.770]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, it's all the White House.
[01:30:21.110 --> 01:30:22.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: 456 Exchange is all the White House.
[01:30:22.550 --> 01:30:25.490]  [SPEAKER_17]: But I was saying the President's office, which you shouldn't call.
[01:30:27.250 --> 01:30:35.510]  [SPEAKER_03]: But 456-1111 is the White House, because after it says, please dial whatever it wants to dial, the two digits, it says, thank you for calling the White House.
[01:30:35.510 --> 01:30:39.030]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, I know, but again, the whole 456 exchange is the White House.
[01:30:39.470 --> 01:30:40.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, yeah.
[01:30:40.610 --> 01:30:42.390]  [SPEAKER_03]: What, the White House has 10,000 phone numbers?
[01:30:42.690 --> 01:30:45.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, they don't have 10,000 phone numbers, but they have the whole exchange.
[01:30:47.950 --> 01:30:52.710]  [SPEAKER_17]: When you call a 202-456 number that says, we are not the White House, let me know.
[01:30:54.010 --> 01:30:55.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's a number I'm interested in.
[01:30:55.170 --> 01:30:56.990]  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, what about 9901?
[01:30:57.930 --> 01:30:59.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, what else, Rebel?
[01:30:59.750 --> 01:31:00.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: We do have to move on.
[01:31:01.630 --> 01:31:05.850]  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, so the 518 number is, you know, it says, what do you want?
[01:31:07.250 --> 01:31:08.610]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, something like that.
[01:31:08.750 --> 01:31:10.430]  [SPEAKER_03]: Like, I don't know, I forgot what it says.
[01:31:10.490 --> 01:31:11.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: How did you find this number?
[01:31:12.230 --> 01:31:19.370]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, because I get calls from these numbers, these 516 numbers, and these, you know, numbers in like Illinois and Michigan and all.
[01:31:19.570 --> 01:31:23.510]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it's, you know, would you like Medicare and all things like that?
[01:31:23.510 --> 01:31:26.790]  [SPEAKER_03]: Like, we have a special offer for you from Marriott or whatever.
[01:31:27.110 --> 01:31:29.150]  [SPEAKER_03]: And when you call it, it's a different thing.
[01:31:29.150 --> 01:31:29.730]  [SPEAKER_17]: Mm-hmm.
[01:31:30.690 --> 01:31:32.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's because they're not calling you from that number.
[01:31:32.810 --> 01:31:34.290]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're calling somebody who did not call you.
[01:31:34.750 --> 01:31:43.530]  [SPEAKER_17]: So you're actually the person making the call now to somebody and annoying them because their number was just used as a forgery on your caller ID.
[01:31:44.970 --> 01:31:45.450]  [SPEAKER_03]: Right.
[01:31:46.390 --> 01:31:49.530]  [SPEAKER_17]: So you shouldn't call them because you're not calling the people who called you.
[01:31:51.490 --> 01:31:52.510]  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, what else?
[01:31:52.810 --> 01:31:54.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't think that landed.
[01:31:54.570 --> 01:31:55.230]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, let's see.
[01:31:55.530 --> 01:31:58.030]  [SPEAKER_03]: 703-818-5216.
[01:31:58.030 --> 01:32:01.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: Again, again, you know, these numbers have not been vetted.
[01:32:01.510 --> 01:32:04.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: I prefer not giving out phone numbers unless, you know...
[01:32:04.810 --> 01:32:05.890]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, it's a wrong number.
[01:32:06.150 --> 01:32:07.730]  [SPEAKER_17]: Maybe it's a wrong number.
[01:32:07.950 --> 01:32:11.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: Every number you call is a wrong number if they're not expecting your call.
[01:32:11.930 --> 01:32:13.470]  [SPEAKER_03]: No, they get numbers.
[01:32:13.790 --> 01:32:17.870]  [SPEAKER_03]: Instead of going doo-doo-doo, John, I know you have each...
[01:32:17.870 --> 01:32:23.430]  [SPEAKER_03]: H-1, H-5, you know, like they give you a recording and it's no intercept recording.
[01:32:23.590 --> 01:32:25.530]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's now, oh, we're sorry.
[01:32:25.650 --> 01:32:32.050]  [SPEAKER_03]: You dialed a number that is not available, but I can help you find a number in your area, a business or whatever.
[01:32:32.310 --> 01:32:43.690]  [SPEAKER_03]: Like when a business disconnects their phone number, they now, instead of having that recording saying, this number's been disconnected or whatever, it says, you know, there's this ad saying, I can help you find another business in the area.
[01:32:44.710 --> 01:32:45.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's a little creepy.
[01:32:46.970 --> 01:32:48.290]  [SPEAKER_03]: That, you know, that I could demonstrate.
[01:32:48.470 --> 01:32:50.230]  [SPEAKER_03]: That I could call because it's, you know, a business.
[01:32:50.410 --> 01:32:51.110]  [SPEAKER_03]: Do you want to hold?
[01:32:51.550 --> 01:32:55.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, let's do this, but then we want to open the phone lines to other people.
[01:32:55.430 --> 01:32:55.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, yeah.
[01:32:56.210 --> 01:32:56.510]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[01:33:01.730 --> 01:33:02.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, that's right.
[01:33:02.390 --> 01:33:03.250]  [SPEAKER_17]: He puts us on hold.
[01:33:04.330 --> 01:33:06.550]  [SPEAKER_17]: We have to wait for him to...
[01:33:07.510 --> 01:33:08.010]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, wait.
[01:33:08.190 --> 01:33:08.930]  [SPEAKER_03]: Emmanuel, hold on.
[01:33:09.670 --> 01:33:10.310]  [SPEAKER_03]: Hold on, Emmanuel.
[01:33:10.450 --> 01:33:11.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, I'm happy to hold.
[01:33:12.130 --> 01:33:12.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: Rebel, thank you for this.
[01:33:19.840 --> 01:33:20.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: How long are we going to wait?
[01:33:21.440 --> 01:33:22.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: I say 30 seconds.
[01:33:23.040 --> 01:33:23.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: Give the phone over.
[01:33:24.040 --> 01:33:24.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: Here he is.
[01:33:24.440 --> 01:33:27.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: If the phone call cannot be completed, we can help you.
[01:33:27.420 --> 01:33:29.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wait, you're just repeating what you said.
[01:33:29.320 --> 01:33:30.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: Can we hear it?
[01:33:30.180 --> 01:33:31.120]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, I just...
[01:33:31.120 --> 01:33:33.200]  [SPEAKER_03]: For some reason, I want to try and get a call.
[01:33:33.520 --> 01:33:33.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: I'm coming.
[01:33:34.400 --> 01:33:34.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: But anyway...
[01:33:34.980 --> 01:33:36.660]  [SPEAKER_17]: You don't know how to make a three-way call, do you?
[01:33:37.780 --> 01:33:39.220]  [SPEAKER_03]: I do know how to make a three-way call.
[01:33:39.360 --> 01:33:39.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: I'd make a three-way call.
[01:33:39.860 --> 01:33:41.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Then make a three-way call right now.
[01:33:41.700 --> 01:33:42.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: Go ahead, do it.
[01:33:42.380 --> 01:33:43.760]  [SPEAKER_03]: Hold on, let's try it again.
[01:33:45.220 --> 01:33:46.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: I think what's happening...
[01:33:47.220 --> 01:33:48.700]  [SPEAKER_17]: I think he can only connect...
[01:33:48.700 --> 01:33:50.100]  [SPEAKER_03]: Hold on, I'm going to add a call.
[01:33:50.140 --> 01:33:51.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: Stop saying you're going to put us on hold.
[01:33:51.560 --> 01:33:52.540]  [SPEAKER_17]: We know you're going to put us on hold.
[01:33:53.260 --> 01:33:57.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: So I think what happens is he can't three-way until it actually picks up.
[01:33:57.900 --> 01:34:01.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: But when it picks up, it's past the point that he's trying to demonstrate.
[01:34:02.620 --> 01:34:04.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: So this is never going to be accomplished.
[01:34:05.020 --> 01:34:05.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's never going to work.
[01:34:06.040 --> 01:34:07.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, that's what I think it's happening.
[01:34:07.200 --> 01:34:08.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: It used to be called supervision.
[01:34:09.500 --> 01:34:10.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: Somebody would have to pick up.
[01:34:10.780 --> 01:34:12.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's fun and exciting.
[01:34:13.140 --> 01:34:14.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, I'm glad someone thinks so.
[01:34:17.280 --> 01:34:18.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: Only a few more seconds, folks.
[01:34:18.860 --> 01:34:19.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: And then we'll move on.
[01:34:19.980 --> 01:34:22.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: 802-321-4225 is our phone number.
[01:34:24.100 --> 01:34:25.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: Rebel, that is amazing.
[01:34:25.640 --> 01:34:27.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wow, where'd you find that?
[01:34:29.540 --> 01:34:30.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: Rebel, are you there?
[01:34:30.700 --> 01:34:32.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: It just turned into a busy signal.
[01:34:34.640 --> 01:34:36.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's a cutting edge right here.
[01:34:36.200 --> 01:34:39.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: Agila, it looks like you have something to contribute to this fascinating discourse.
[01:34:39.940 --> 01:34:42.040]  [SPEAKER_10]: Actually, something to contribute to this fiasco.
[01:34:42.300 --> 01:34:42.860]  [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, wow.
[01:34:43.020 --> 01:34:44.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: All kinds of noises now.
[01:34:44.540 --> 01:34:45.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: Sorry about that.
[01:34:45.280 --> 01:34:45.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: Go ahead.
[01:34:45.480 --> 01:34:45.780]  [SPEAKER_10]: Wow.
[01:34:47.240 --> 01:35:00.440]  [SPEAKER_10]: Because when Rebel began giving out an Albany area code, my first instinct was, I don't know about y'all, but I looked at the website for Commute Air and they have a facility in Albany.
[01:35:00.580 --> 01:35:03.820]  [SPEAKER_10]: So I thought he was giving us that number and it wasn't that number.
[01:35:04.200 --> 01:35:06.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, it was some poor robot sounding person.
[01:35:06.640 --> 01:35:08.080]  [SPEAKER_10]: No, I'm well aware of that.
[01:35:08.220 --> 01:35:11.800]  [SPEAKER_10]: But when he said 518, I was like, ooh, maybe he's giving us the Commute Air number.
[01:35:11.940 --> 01:35:12.060]  [SPEAKER_10]: No.
[01:35:12.440 --> 01:35:26.240]  [SPEAKER_10]: But it's interesting to me that in addition to all of the safety implications and privacy implications and all those things, my other question is, are there going to be repercussions for Commute Air coming out of this?
[01:35:26.760 --> 01:35:36.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, you know, if you leave something like the no-fly list lying around on a server and somebody finds it and it becomes a big public scandal as a result of that, I would imagine there would be some fallout.
[01:35:37.020 --> 01:35:38.620]  [SPEAKER_10]: I would like to think so.
[01:35:38.860 --> 01:35:46.880]  [SPEAKER_10]: And given the fact that a couple weeks, when was it the end of December when Southwest Airlines completely melted down?
[01:35:48.020 --> 01:35:59.540]  [SPEAKER_10]: And people were saying that part of it was because they don't have the same kind of hub-and-spoke, smaller carrier network that a lot of the other large airlines do.
[01:35:59.780 --> 01:36:02.580]  [SPEAKER_10]: Commute Air is a local carrier for United.
[01:36:03.260 --> 01:36:10.380]  [SPEAKER_10]: And they have hubs in Houston, Denver, and one other place that I'm forgetting right now.
[01:36:10.560 --> 01:36:21.500]  [SPEAKER_10]: So if that subsidiary were not allowed to continue to operate as part of the United network, what kind of repercussions would that have nationwide?
[01:36:22.400 --> 01:36:23.800]  [SPEAKER_10]: That was where my mind went.
[01:36:24.680 --> 01:36:27.240]  [SPEAKER_10]: Which I suppose proves I'm just not really a privacy researcher.
[01:36:27.920 --> 01:36:28.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yeah.
[01:36:28.980 --> 01:36:29.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right, folks, a situation...
[01:36:29.980 --> 01:36:31.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: They'll probably get fined, though.
[01:36:31.320 --> 01:36:33.940]  [SPEAKER_12]: It wouldn't be like, you're out of business.
[01:36:34.940 --> 01:36:35.240]  [SPEAKER_10]: True.
[01:36:35.520 --> 01:36:38.780]  [SPEAKER_10]: But could, I mean, would United end the relationship?
[01:36:39.340 --> 01:36:48.260]  [SPEAKER_12]: And actually, so actually, you know, coming from Russia, where relationships suddenly get cut very quickly, that could actually...
[01:36:48.260 --> 01:36:55.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: So it could be that these guys get fined and United wants to cut any risk associated with this kind of data leak.
[01:36:55.980 --> 01:36:57.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, if it's that bad.
[01:36:57.760 --> 01:36:58.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't think it's...
[01:36:58.840 --> 01:37:01.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, I don't think the FAA thinks it's that bad.
[01:37:01.900 --> 01:37:05.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right, folks, situation right now at the phone is Rebel is just calling us nonstop.
[01:37:05.800 --> 01:37:09.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, listen, let's just finish the conversation.
[01:37:09.360 --> 01:37:13.540]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hopefully, we can open up the phone lines to somebody else and somebody else can dial quicker.
[01:37:14.040 --> 01:37:15.540]  [SPEAKER_17]: 802-321-4225.
[01:37:16.200 --> 01:37:18.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: Kyle, let's pick up and end this.
[01:37:19.000 --> 01:37:19.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: Go ahead.
[01:37:21.340 --> 01:37:21.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: Kyle?
[01:37:22.100 --> 01:37:22.660]  [SPEAKER_17]: You there?
[01:37:22.860 --> 01:37:23.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:37:23.980 --> 01:37:24.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: Nobody's there.
[01:37:24.900 --> 01:37:25.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: Who's calling, then?
[01:37:26.340 --> 01:37:26.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: There's a dial tone.
[01:37:27.200 --> 01:37:29.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: You just got in between calls, I think.
[01:37:29.120 --> 01:37:29.260]  [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, great.
[01:37:29.260 --> 01:37:29.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:37:30.180 --> 01:37:31.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: So I've kind of invited him to call now.
[01:37:33.020 --> 01:37:33.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: Is he there?
[01:37:33.380 --> 01:37:34.280]  [SPEAKER_08]: You really want to talk to him?
[01:37:34.280 --> 01:37:34.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: Is he there?
[01:37:34.920 --> 01:37:35.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, it's right now.
[01:37:35.800 --> 01:37:36.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: through the phone line.
[01:37:37.280 --> 01:37:38.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hey, Rebel, is that you?
[01:37:39.320 --> 01:37:39.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, yes.
[01:37:40.100 --> 01:37:41.500]  [SPEAKER_03]: What happened was...
[01:37:41.500 --> 01:37:42.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: It doesn't matter what happened.
[01:37:42.960 --> 01:37:43.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: It didn't work.
[01:37:44.620 --> 01:37:48.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're going to give you one more minute to finish whatever it is you need to say.
[01:37:48.200 --> 01:37:50.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: But we need to open up the phone lines for other people.
[01:37:50.360 --> 01:37:51.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: So please, go ahead.
[01:37:51.320 --> 01:37:51.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:37:52.000 --> 01:37:55.120]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, what happened was it didn't work because I got number...
[01:37:55.780 --> 01:37:57.160]  [SPEAKER_03]: The supervision doesn't take it.
[01:37:57.320 --> 01:37:57.700]  [SPEAKER_03]: It just...
[01:37:57.700 --> 01:38:00.420]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's like a recording that says...
[01:38:00.420 --> 01:38:05.920]  [SPEAKER_03]: You know, that's a recording that says the phone system and when supervision...
[01:38:06.080 --> 01:38:07.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're aware of this.
[01:38:07.980 --> 01:38:08.300]  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay.
[01:38:08.660 --> 01:38:10.100]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, that's probably why that's that.
[01:38:10.640 --> 01:38:12.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, let's see.
[01:38:13.600 --> 01:38:14.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: Let's see.
[01:38:14.340 --> 01:38:14.620]  [SPEAKER_03]: What else?
[01:38:15.040 --> 01:38:15.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're down to...
[01:38:15.780 --> 01:38:17.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: You lost 30 seconds there.
[01:38:17.180 --> 01:38:17.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, yeah.
[01:38:17.640 --> 01:38:19.020]  [SPEAKER_03]: About the airline thing.
[01:38:19.240 --> 01:38:23.460]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, Southwest Airlines because they don't have an updated computer system.
[01:38:25.100 --> 01:38:30.040]  [SPEAKER_03]: I'm glad I went to where I was on my vacation in January and not December.
[01:38:30.340 --> 01:38:32.580]  [SPEAKER_03]: But I missed by one day.
[01:38:33.400 --> 01:38:34.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: One day.
[01:38:34.140 --> 01:38:35.160]  [SPEAKER_03]: Remember when I was in Arizona?
[01:38:35.580 --> 01:38:44.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: I came to California the day before they shut down the whole entire airspace nationwide for like...
[01:38:44.640 --> 01:38:46.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: From like 9 o'clock in the morning to like 5.
[01:38:47.180 --> 01:38:49.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, they did have a massive computer problem.
[01:38:49.980 --> 01:38:52.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: We didn't mention that actually on the show when that happened.
[01:38:52.980 --> 01:38:54.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: But yeah, that was a big deal.
[01:38:55.600 --> 01:39:00.020]  [SPEAKER_00]: And this data leak had nothing to do with that, by the way.
[01:39:00.060 --> 01:39:02.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, this data leak had absolutely nothing to do with that.
[01:39:02.940 --> 01:39:07.660]  [SPEAKER_17]: Although, you know, if you can't access anything, you can't access a no-fly list ether I would imagine.
[01:39:07.680 --> 01:39:08.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, it would be a big problem.
[01:39:09.800 --> 01:39:10.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[01:39:11.340 --> 01:39:12.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, Rebel, finish up.
[01:39:14.000 --> 01:39:14.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: All right.
[01:39:14.480 --> 01:39:15.280]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, yeah, so I missed that.
[01:39:15.360 --> 01:39:20.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: By one day, I was flying out at like something like one o'clock in the afternoon mountain time.
[01:39:20.320 --> 01:39:22.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, I would not have been able to...
[01:39:22.260 --> 01:39:32.000]  [SPEAKER_03]: Had I been there a day later, I would have been stuck until like maybe seven o'clock or maybe the next day because the thing lasted the whole day and then there was like delays afterwards or something.
[01:39:32.220 --> 01:39:34.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: We all really dodged a bullet there.
[01:39:35.100 --> 01:39:35.500]  [SPEAKER_03]: Right.
[01:39:35.700 --> 01:39:36.300]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, let's see.
[01:39:36.400 --> 01:39:36.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: What else?
[01:39:37.660 --> 01:39:38.460]  [SPEAKER_03]: I guess...
[01:39:38.460 --> 01:39:38.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: Let's see.
[01:39:38.920 --> 01:39:40.000]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, that's that.
[01:39:40.140 --> 01:39:45.660]  [SPEAKER_17]: At this point, saying our farewells until next time would be in order.
[01:39:45.780 --> 01:39:46.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, I guess until next week.
[01:39:47.620 --> 01:39:48.760]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yes, next week.
[01:39:48.960 --> 01:39:49.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: There's more things to say.
[01:39:50.400 --> 01:39:50.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[01:39:50.920 --> 01:39:55.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: But thank you for calling and updating us and we'll figure out...
[01:39:55.820 --> 01:39:58.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: You know, I don't hear the phone when I...
[01:39:58.360 --> 01:40:01.920]  [SPEAKER_03]: when somebody's calling in the last caller that I called in and I didn't hear him.
[01:40:02.680 --> 01:40:04.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: You know, you're not hearing me.
[01:40:04.520 --> 01:40:04.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: I don't think...
[01:40:04.980 --> 01:40:05.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: Let me just...
[01:40:05.900 --> 01:40:06.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: We hear you.
[01:40:07.040 --> 01:40:08.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: We definitely are hearing you.
[01:40:09.580 --> 01:40:11.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: And the world is hearing you.
[01:40:11.800 --> 01:40:15.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: Listen, Rebel, we have to open up the phone lines because we have a limited amount of time here.
[01:40:15.380 --> 01:40:18.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, I'm not sure I'm being heard.
[01:40:19.640 --> 01:40:20.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: Okay.
[01:40:20.260 --> 01:40:20.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, Rebel.
[01:40:21.020 --> 01:40:22.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, we'll talk to you again soon.
[01:40:23.140 --> 01:40:25.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: 802-321-4225 is our phone number.
[01:40:26.660 --> 01:40:31.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: And now, this is the opportunity for anybody else in the world to give us a call.
[01:40:31.460 --> 01:40:37.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: Just please pick up the phone line and you have to dial one first, obviously, in most parts of the country.
[01:40:38.200 --> 01:40:41.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: 802-321-4225 or country code one if you're outside the country.
[01:40:41.660 --> 01:40:45.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: We certainly like to hear from people in other parts of the world as we've heard from many, many times.
[01:40:46.200 --> 01:40:51.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: Asia, Europe, South America, anywhere, please.
[01:40:51.580 --> 01:40:53.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: 802-321-4225.
[01:40:53.800 --> 01:41:03.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: Any other thoughts about these data leaks or no-fly list or airlines or anything in particular?
[01:41:03.320 --> 01:41:03.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: Rob?
[01:41:04.760 --> 01:41:08.900]  [SPEAKER_15]: Just, I checked that the caller volume is pretty low on YouTube.
[01:41:09.680 --> 01:41:12.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't know what else we can do about this.
[01:41:12.500 --> 01:41:14.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: If we raise it anymore, it feeds back.
[01:41:14.860 --> 01:41:16.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's a YouTube issue.
[01:41:16.200 --> 01:41:17.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm not sure what causes it.
[01:41:18.580 --> 01:41:19.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: But we have another phone call.
[01:41:19.980 --> 01:41:20.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good evening.
[01:41:20.740 --> 01:41:22.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're on Off The Hook Overtime.
[01:41:22.760 --> 01:41:22.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: Go ahead.
[01:41:24.240 --> 01:41:24.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[01:41:24.620 --> 01:41:24.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hi.
[01:41:24.900 --> 01:41:25.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Can you hear me?
[01:41:25.640 --> 01:41:25.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes.
[01:41:27.100 --> 01:41:27.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[01:41:27.800 --> 01:41:31.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: A few years ago, I discovered this very cool website.
[01:41:31.280 --> 01:41:40.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: it had links to the live broadcast feed for MSNBC, CNN, and several other cable channels.
[01:41:40.880 --> 01:41:45.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: Unfortunately, a few days ago, I saw that it went offline.
[01:41:45.620 --> 01:41:59.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: And I wanted to know, would you guys know of any good message board or discussion forum that I could post a question to to see if there are any other similar websites like that out there that I could go to?
[01:41:59.500 --> 01:42:02.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: What was the old website called?
[01:42:02.960 --> 01:42:17.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: It was called it was HTTPS colon forward slash forward slash watchnewslive.tv And it had been around for several years.
[01:42:17.640 --> 01:42:22.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: And it was great because you didn't need to install any software on your computer.
[01:42:22.660 --> 01:42:33.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: You just clicked on the link that was marked with the channel like MSNBC, CNN, or PBS and it would take you right to their feed on your computer.
[01:42:34.280 --> 01:42:36.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: And like I said, the site is gone.
[01:42:37.220 --> 01:42:40.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: And I'd love to find another site like that.
[01:42:41.080 --> 01:42:51.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: And if you guys know of any or like I said, if you know of any message boards or discussion forums where there'd be people that would know that kind of information.
[01:42:51.380 --> 01:42:53.380]  [SPEAKER_15]: It looks like Rob might have some information.
[01:42:53.520 --> 01:42:53.800]  [SPEAKER_15]: Go ahead, Rob.
[01:42:54.520 --> 01:43:09.960]  [SPEAKER_15]: Well, I don't have information about this particular site, but I can say, first of all, for like legal and legit ways to watch such things, you can usually go separately to like the CNN website or the MSNBC website if you're a cable subscriber.
[01:43:10.240 --> 01:43:15.420]  [SPEAKER_15]: And there are ways to put your cable subscription info in there and watch those channels legitimately.
[01:43:15.420 --> 01:43:26.940]  [SPEAKER_15]: I think what you found was probably, and I'm not familiar with this site, so I may be wrong, but what you had was probably a not-so up-and-up way of watching these.
[01:43:27.600 --> 01:43:30.040]  [SPEAKER_15]: And if you're looking for something like that...
[01:43:30.040 --> 01:43:32.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, like a red box kind of thing, sort of.
[01:43:32.000 --> 01:43:32.180]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[01:43:32.540 --> 01:43:50.060]  [SPEAKER_15]: But I think if you're looking for the community where people talk about those kind of things, just go to search engines and put in the name of the old site and you might find other areas in which people are talking about that old site and possibly talking about newer sites if what you're looking for is like message boards and things.
[01:43:51.280 --> 01:44:11.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, but also to latch on to what Rob said, you put in the information if you happen to be a cable subscriber or if you happen to know somebody who is a cable subscriber who will give you their information because it doesn't cost them anything to do that and then that gives you access to feeds without actually having to be a customer yourself.
[01:44:12.980 --> 01:44:13.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right.
[01:44:13.560 --> 01:44:16.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, unfortunately I'm not a cable customer right now.
[01:44:16.600 --> 01:44:24.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: I have some cash flow issues and my subscription only covers my Internet connection.
[01:44:25.020 --> 01:44:28.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: It doesn't give me access to getting cable channels.
[01:44:28.960 --> 01:44:30.660]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, and TV used to be completely free.
[01:44:30.840 --> 01:44:31.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: In fact, it still is.
[01:44:33.100 --> 01:44:42.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm not a big fan of the digital TV system, but you can put an antenna outside and pick up some channels and sub-channels.
[01:44:42.540 --> 01:44:45.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: And sometimes the sub-channels are actually different cable networks.
[01:44:46.420 --> 01:44:47.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: Not often, but it does happen.
[01:44:48.000 --> 01:44:50.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: And you might find some channels that nobody else can see as well.
[01:44:51.840 --> 01:44:58.140]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, this is pretty much also a very good time to start investigating things like some more sources for news.
[01:44:58.320 --> 01:45:06.600]  [SPEAKER_15]: You can look at some non-profit things like WBAI or similar community resources that you might have where you live.
[01:45:08.020 --> 01:45:08.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[01:45:08.880 --> 01:45:09.140]  [SPEAKER_15]: All right.
[01:45:09.320 --> 01:45:09.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right.
[01:45:09.860 --> 01:45:15.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, I appreciate your input and I'll try and pursue those other options.
[01:45:15.020 --> 01:45:16.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let us know how you do and good luck.
[01:45:17.040 --> 01:45:17.660]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right.
[01:45:17.780 --> 01:45:18.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: Thank you.
[01:45:18.200 --> 01:45:18.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: Have a good night.
[01:45:18.920 --> 01:45:19.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: Take care.
[01:45:20.060 --> 01:45:20.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:45:20.320 --> 01:45:30.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's just keep it open for maybe one more phone call and hopefully somebody wants to talk about the data leaks or security in general or anything else.
[01:45:30.780 --> 01:45:33.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: Any other thoughts from you folks out there in Skype-land?
[01:45:34.980 --> 01:45:43.220]  [SPEAKER_00]: I forgot to plug that we also published this week just like a simplified data server.
[01:45:43.620 --> 01:45:46.740]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's data.datasecrets.com Okay.
[01:45:46.860 --> 01:45:49.300]  [SPEAKER_00]: And it's like a list of our public data sets.
[01:45:49.440 --> 01:45:55.000]  [SPEAKER_00]: There's more than 17 terabytes of public data there for easy download.
[01:45:55.320 --> 01:45:57.640]  [SPEAKER_00]: Torrents are still like the best way to get our stuff.
[01:45:57.900 --> 01:46:01.940]  [SPEAKER_00]: But yeah, this data.datasecrets.com is back.
[01:46:02.140 --> 01:46:02.720]  [SPEAKER_00]: So that's nice.
[01:46:03.000 --> 01:46:03.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, that's great.
[01:46:03.880 --> 01:46:04.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: That really is helpful.
[01:46:05.140 --> 01:46:09.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: And as you said, if people can run torrents for you, that is extremely helpful as well.
[01:46:11.120 --> 01:46:11.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[01:46:12.120 --> 01:46:16.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, you know, I can't thank you enough for what you do, for what the organization does.
[01:46:17.780 --> 01:46:30.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: without something like DDoS secrets around, you know, we would never hear about many of these things or they would wind up in the wrong hands, being treated irresponsibly.
[01:46:32.120 --> 01:46:38.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: And then that comes down on all of us because then the hacker community is seen as the problem and as a real threat.
[01:46:39.000 --> 01:46:47.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: In this particular case, you know, I see people acting responsibly and also exposing the tremendous security vulnerabilities that exist out there.
[01:46:48.300 --> 01:47:01.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: And to think of these researchers that are just out there looking for these things, it makes me feel secure, you know, knowing that there are people on the lookout for blatant security violations and holes that you could drive a bus through.
[01:47:02.860 --> 01:47:07.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's the kind of thing that they tell you doesn't exist, but it does, it always does.
[01:47:08.040 --> 01:47:11.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: And, you know, we've been dealing with these kinds of things for decades.
[01:47:13.280 --> 01:47:20.720]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I think that without DDoS secrets, things would sort of like come and go and disappear and become harder to find.
[01:47:23.180 --> 01:47:29.580]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that the benefit that we bring is that people can be like, oh, remember that breach from a couple years ago?
[01:47:29.840 --> 01:47:36.640]  [SPEAKER_00]: I wonder what that data can teach me about the current state of the world.
[01:47:36.640 --> 01:47:43.900]  [SPEAKER_00]: So we are a good place for like continuity so that hacks don't just come and go and not get archived anywhere.
[01:47:44.800 --> 01:47:45.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: Absolutely.
[01:47:45.780 --> 01:47:48.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hey, we're going to give it one more minute if anybody wants to give us a call.
[01:47:49.400 --> 01:47:53.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: 802-321-4225-802-321-HACK is our phone number.
[01:47:54.280 --> 01:47:58.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: If you have any thoughts or questions or opinions, please feel free to give us a call.
[01:47:58.920 --> 01:48:11.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: And of course, you can also email us oth@2600.com and in case you didn't catch it at the end of the show, we do have 2600 meetings a week from this Friday because we are not on next week.
[01:48:12.660 --> 01:48:17.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: But the meetings take place the first Friday of every month and they take place all around the world.
[01:48:17.820 --> 01:48:23.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: And there is one here in New York City, which I imagine, Rob, you have something to say about it?
[01:48:24.980 --> 01:48:33.200]  [SPEAKER_15]: The one in New York City will be happening on February 3rd and at the City Group building on 53rd and Lexington.
[01:48:33.840 --> 01:48:48.560]  [SPEAKER_15]: And also after this particular meeting, a bunch of us are going out to a sort of informal memorial gathering, remembering our friend Jim, past contributor to this program and regular in the New York City 2600 scene since time and memorial.
[01:48:48.840 --> 01:48:55.120]  [SPEAKER_15]: So if you come to our next 2600 meeting, just keep an eye up and a bunch of us will be going on to do that afterward.
[01:48:57.000 --> 01:48:57.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[01:48:58.180 --> 01:49:00.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: Memories of Jim will be quite an event.
[01:49:01.020 --> 01:49:01.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: Absolutely.
[01:49:02.460 --> 01:49:09.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: And again, you can check out where meetings are taking place around the world, 2600.com/meetings.
[01:49:10.420 --> 01:49:12.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: And we're calling it, right, Kyle?
[01:49:12.880 --> 01:49:13.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're calling it?
[01:49:13.340 --> 01:49:13.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: No more calls?
[01:49:14.100 --> 01:49:15.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, we're done for the night.
[01:49:17.200 --> 01:49:27.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: Lorax, I can't thank you enough for spending time with us and informing everyone about what you folks are up to over there and throughout the Internet, throughout the planet.
[01:49:29.280 --> 01:49:36.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's good to know people like you are there and data is being dealt with maturely and responsibly.
[01:49:36.260 --> 01:49:42.140]  [SPEAKER_00]: well, thanks for also the work that you do and thanks for inviting us on.
[01:49:42.740 --> 01:49:43.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[01:49:44.260 --> 01:49:49.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's it for us folks tonight and we'll see you again in another two weeks.
[01:49:50.480 --> 01:49:51.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good night everyone.