[00:19.000 --> 00:22.620] [SPEAKER_00]: We're sorry, you must first dial a zero when calling this number.
[00:22.860 --> 00:25.380] [SPEAKER_00]: Will you please hang up and try your call again later?
[00:25.660 --> 00:26.320] [SPEAKER_00]: Thank you.
[02:13.730 --> 02:15.550] [SPEAKER_01]: And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:15.610 --> 02:16.810] [SPEAKER_01]: The program is Off The Hook.
[02:16.930 --> 02:18.970] [SPEAKER_01]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
[02:19.690 --> 02:21.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:21.650 --> 02:24.470] [SPEAKER_01]: Hi, New York and everyone listening.
[02:25.470 --> 02:26.810] [SPEAKER_02]: What's with the voice, Kyle?
[02:26.810 --> 02:27.990] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh no, everything's fine.
[02:27.990 --> 02:28.870] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm fine over here.
[02:28.910 --> 02:30.450] [SPEAKER_02]: You sound like Casper Milky Toast.
[02:31.390 --> 02:32.550] [SPEAKER_02]: Are you okay there?
[02:32.950 --> 02:36.270] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh no, yeah, I just made it in last minute here.
[02:36.270 --> 02:37.270] [SPEAKER_02]: Everything going all right, Sport?
[02:37.690 --> 02:39.130] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh yeah, oh, I'm fine.
[02:39.390 --> 02:40.970] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh gee, yeah, I'm all right.
[02:41.270 --> 02:42.630] [SPEAKER_01]: Take a drink of that coffee.
[02:42.750 --> 02:43.930] [SPEAKER_01]: That'll perk you up.
[02:44.570 --> 02:47.470] [SPEAKER_01]: Out there in Signal-land, we have Rob T.
[02:47.610 --> 02:47.990] [SPEAKER_01]: Firefly.
[02:48.590 --> 02:49.450] [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[02:49.830 --> 02:50.790] [SPEAKER_01]: We have Gila.
[02:51.370 --> 02:51.850] [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[02:52.170 --> 02:54.230] [SPEAKER_01]: And out in Super Signal-land, we have Alex.
[02:54.870 --> 02:55.590] [SPEAKER_05]: You do indeed.
[02:55.670 --> 02:56.150] [SPEAKER_05]: Hello.
[02:57.190 --> 02:58.310] [SPEAKER_05]: It's Thursday here.
[02:58.990 --> 03:00.730] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, how am I not surprised?
[03:00.910 --> 03:01.970] [SPEAKER_01]: Where are you this week?
[03:02.810 --> 03:03.690] [SPEAKER_05]: I'm in Geneva.
[03:04.130 --> 03:06.370] [SPEAKER_05]: I'm coming at you from Switzerland.
[03:06.370 --> 03:11.210] [SPEAKER_05]: I think this is a first for me, despite having been in Geneva many times in the last decade.
[03:11.570 --> 03:13.530] [SPEAKER_01]: Have you bought a sandwich yet in Switzerland?
[03:15.170 --> 03:15.610] [SPEAKER_01]: Sandwich?
[03:15.750 --> 03:15.890] [SPEAKER_01]: No.
[03:16.130 --> 03:16.510] [SPEAKER_01]: Try it.
[03:17.470 --> 03:19.770] [SPEAKER_01]: You'll get what's known as sticker shock.
[03:20.890 --> 03:22.210] [SPEAKER_05]: Oh, well, yeah.
[03:22.470 --> 03:25.650] [SPEAKER_05]: Pretty much everything here is obscenely expensive, especially in Switzerland.
[03:25.910 --> 03:33.930] [SPEAKER_05]: I'm sorry, especially in Geneva, where you basically have to be either on the expense account of an IGO, an oligarch, or a money launderer to afford anything.
[03:34.130 --> 03:36.150] [SPEAKER_01]: Except for the people who live there, Alex.
[03:36.690 --> 03:40.490] [SPEAKER_01]: It's very Amero-centric, what you just said there, that it's obscenely...
[03:40.490 --> 03:42.990] [SPEAKER_01]: To them, that's normal, and we're cheap.
[03:43.550 --> 03:44.090] [SPEAKER_01]: All right?
[03:44.210 --> 03:44.830] [SPEAKER_01]: That's how it works.
[03:44.830 --> 03:45.190] [SPEAKER_01]: Is that right?
[03:45.310 --> 03:45.470] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[03:45.470 --> 03:46.110] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, it is.
[03:46.350 --> 03:49.490] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, when I traveled to Switzerland, I was amazed by that.
[03:49.570 --> 03:52.210] [SPEAKER_01]: But then when I went to former Yugoslavia, I was amazed at how cheap things were.
[03:55.070 --> 03:58.210] [SPEAKER_01]: It's pretty amazing how the world works in different ways.
[03:58.930 --> 03:59.870] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, it was crazy.
[03:59.970 --> 04:07.490] [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, I was at a bar earlier this evening, and I think a Negroni was around 21 Swiss francs for a drink.
[04:07.490 --> 04:09.030] [SPEAKER_05]: I don't even know what that is in U.S.
[04:09.090 --> 04:11.010] [SPEAKER_05]: dollars, but it's obscene.
[04:11.330 --> 04:17.290] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, you don't know it's obscene if you don't know what a Swiss franc translates to, but I can tell you it's very expensive.
[04:18.190 --> 04:19.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Everything is very expensive.
[04:19.830 --> 04:22.290] [SPEAKER_05]: The dollar is not doing exactly well right now.
[04:22.430 --> 04:23.070] [SPEAKER_05]: No, no.
[04:23.890 --> 04:27.650] [SPEAKER_01]: It's not doing very well over here either, so it's not doing well anywhere.
[04:28.610 --> 04:29.010] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[04:29.510 --> 04:31.390] [SPEAKER_01]: But yeah, okay, so you're over there.
[04:31.490 --> 04:34.630] [SPEAKER_01]: We're not doing Overtime this week, but we are doing a show.
[04:35.510 --> 04:40.010] [SPEAKER_01]: And we, of course, accept your letters, oth@2600.com.
[04:40.150 --> 04:42.050] [SPEAKER_01]: Last week, we had a call-in show, which was pretty lively.
[04:43.150 --> 04:49.190] [SPEAKER_01]: But this week, it's back to the same old news summaries and things like that.
[04:49.590 --> 05:01.110] [SPEAKER_01]: You guys hear the story out of Seattle, but I think it's out of a couple of places, where somehow, you know those crosswalk signals where you press the button and some obnoxious voice says, wait.
[05:02.190 --> 05:07.570] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, apparently, somebody figured out how to make them say something else because they're hackable.
[05:07.730 --> 05:08.630] [SPEAKER_01]: Did you know they were hackable?
[05:09.250 --> 05:09.730] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[05:10.530 --> 05:11.930] [SPEAKER_01]: Last week, this happened.
[05:12.570 --> 05:16.690] [SPEAKER_01]: Crosswalk signals began broadcasting an unusual political message.
[05:16.850 --> 05:32.390] [SPEAKER_01]: Now, whoever hacked this, not only did they hack it, they were clever about it because they made an AI-generator, Jeff Bezos, who started criticizing local tax policies while having people standing next to the don't walk sign, basically waiting for him to shut up.
[05:33.050 --> 05:37.110] [SPEAKER_01]: So this was shared all over social media.
[05:37.430 --> 05:42.370] [SPEAKER_01]: One message appeared to mimic Bezos saying, Hi, I'm Jeff Bezos.
[05:42.570 --> 05:46.410] [SPEAKER_01]: This crosswalk is sponsored by Amazon Prime with an important message.
[05:46.410 --> 05:48.010] [SPEAKER_01]: Please don't tax the rich.
[05:48.190 --> 05:51.570] [SPEAKER_01]: Otherwise, all the other billionaires will move to Florida, too.
[05:53.390 --> 05:53.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[05:54.230 --> 05:58.190] [SPEAKER_01]: These unauthorized recordings apparently are part of a political protest.
[05:58.510 --> 06:06.190] [SPEAKER_01]: They targeted multiple intersections in Seattle's tech-heavy South Lake Union neighborhood and the bustling University District.
[06:06.270 --> 06:07.450] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I've been to the University District.
[06:07.570 --> 06:08.550] [SPEAKER_01]: It doesn't always bustle.
[06:08.770 --> 06:10.790] [SPEAKER_01]: It bustles during business hours.
[06:10.990 --> 06:14.370] [SPEAKER_01]: But yeah, you know, you want bustling midtown Manhattan.
[06:14.510 --> 06:15.350] [SPEAKER_01]: That's bustling still.
[06:15.350 --> 06:27.490] [SPEAKER_01]: But anyway, the timing aligns with recent discussions in the state legislature regarding a proposed tax increase on residents with financial assets exceeding $50 million.
[06:28.050 --> 06:32.670] [SPEAKER_01]: That's according to the Seattle ABC affiliate KOMO, K-O-M-O.
[06:33.450 --> 06:37.290] [SPEAKER_01]: Senate Democrats in Washington state are advocating for tax hikes targeting some of the wealthiest.
[06:37.390 --> 06:39.050] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, well, that's a whole other story.
[06:39.450 --> 06:43.130] [SPEAKER_01]: We're interested in the tech behind this.
[06:43.130 --> 06:53.690] [SPEAKER_01]: Now, Seattle Department of Transportation said it responded to the locations where the fake audio messages have been used, saying it had removed the recordings in all locations where the tampering occurred.
[06:53.770 --> 06:56.870] [SPEAKER_01]: Did they need to bring a truck to remove the recordings?
[06:56.990 --> 06:58.570] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I don't know what was involved here.
[06:59.110 --> 07:08.650] [SPEAKER_01]: The audio recordings, they say, at crosswalks, play a critical role for people who are blind or have limited vision, helping them to cross streets safely.
[07:08.650 --> 07:13.550] [SPEAKER_01]: We are concerned that someone would disregard people's safety to make a political statement.
[07:13.810 --> 07:19.510] [SPEAKER_01]: We take this matter seriously and have been working as fast as we can to respond to the situation.
[07:20.130 --> 07:25.230] [SPEAKER_01]: We are also working with our vendor to explore stronger security measures to prevent future hacking.
[07:25.450 --> 07:26.350] [SPEAKER_01]: Now, that's what I'm interested in.
[07:26.370 --> 07:27.570] [SPEAKER_01]: What were the security measures?
[07:27.690 --> 07:29.130] [SPEAKER_01]: How was this done?
[07:30.630 --> 07:38.750] [SPEAKER_01]: I asked AI for some help on this because people weren't much of help on this particular subject, but artificial intelligence proved to be a little bit.
[07:38.870 --> 07:43.570] [SPEAKER_01]: But I just want to address the issue of this could cause hazards and danger.
[07:43.750 --> 07:45.850] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, it can if you're stupid about it.
[07:45.930 --> 07:50.010] [SPEAKER_01]: If you say something like, oh, it's clear to go now when actually it's red.
[07:50.070 --> 07:51.110] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, that's very dangerous.
[07:51.610 --> 07:57.990] [SPEAKER_01]: But if you're not irresponsible, you can play a humorous message and it won't hurt anybody, certainly.
[07:58.250 --> 08:01.830] [SPEAKER_01]: It kind of reminds me of that day back in 1997.
[08:02.290 --> 08:03.270] [SPEAKER_01]: You guys remember this?
[08:03.330 --> 08:13.570] [SPEAKER_01]: When somebody, somebody hacked a sign on the New York City subway escalator at the Citigroup Center, you know, the one that said, have a nice day.
[08:13.750 --> 08:16.710] [SPEAKER_01]: And instead, they made it, say, 2600 Magazine.
[08:17.630 --> 08:21.130] [SPEAKER_01]: And that basically was our masthead, which we used for the next issue.
[08:22.190 --> 08:27.570] [SPEAKER_01]: And all of the media reported on this as if it was some kind of terrorist infiltration.
[08:28.190 --> 08:30.050] [SPEAKER_01]: People were saying nobody was injured.
[08:31.190 --> 08:32.770] [SPEAKER_01]: The sign said, have a nice day.
[08:32.870 --> 08:35.730] [SPEAKER_01]: It said something else for a few minutes and everybody freaked out.
[08:35.930 --> 08:42.690] [SPEAKER_01]: This, obviously, there's going to be some overblown reaction to something as what I consider to be harmless.
[08:43.190 --> 08:45.890] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, anything can be used in a dangerous way.
[08:46.010 --> 08:48.110] [SPEAKER_01]: But I don't think that was the intent here.
[08:48.210 --> 08:49.530] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't think anybody was at risk.
[08:49.810 --> 08:52.350] [SPEAKER_06]: It is interesting that they are working with the vendor.
[08:52.350 --> 08:58.290] [SPEAKER_06]: So it kind of tells you that there isn't really much they can do at the moment other than respond and, like, remove the messages.
[08:58.490 --> 09:14.050] [SPEAKER_06]: I'm also curious if there's any way to actually look at what is sent to them or stored in the form of a recording, what that file looks like, and if that's something of interest to them and how boring it was made by the author of it.
[09:14.410 --> 09:14.890] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh-huh.
[09:16.270 --> 09:18.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Any thoughts or theories out in the second one?
[09:18.930 --> 09:19.190] [SPEAKER_01]: Rob?
[09:19.990 --> 09:21.150] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, there is.
[09:21.270 --> 09:35.490] [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, for folks curious about how you could have fun with these crosswalk buttons, specifically, Deviant Ollam, who is a security researcher a lot of us know, put a video on his YouTube about it back in August of 2024.
[09:35.970 --> 09:40.430] [SPEAKER_07]: You can find that if you go onto YouTube and search for Hacker Fun with Traffic Controls and Crosswalk Buttons.
[09:40.550 --> 09:41.290] [SPEAKER_07]: That's the title of it.
[09:41.410 --> 09:43.510] [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, so we can blame him then, right?
[09:43.630 --> 09:46.010] [SPEAKER_01]: Everybody can blame him because he's the one who got the knowledge out.
[09:46.150 --> 09:46.930] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, all right.
[09:47.210 --> 09:47.610] [SPEAKER_07]: Absolutely.
[09:47.610 --> 09:49.630] [SPEAKER_07]: I think we can all safely blame Deviant.
[09:49.630 --> 09:50.750] [SPEAKER_07]: It's hacker tradition.
[09:50.950 --> 09:51.550] [SPEAKER_01]: Hacker tradition.
[09:51.730 --> 09:52.610] [SPEAKER_01]: Blame the messenger.
[09:52.870 --> 09:53.530] [SPEAKER_01]: But go ahead.
[09:53.710 --> 09:54.530] [SPEAKER_01]: I want to hear this.
[09:55.230 --> 09:56.490] [SPEAKER_07]: But I do...
[09:56.490 --> 10:01.470] [SPEAKER_07]: I am sort of of two minds about this because I love messing with, you know, things in public like this.
[10:01.530 --> 10:03.230] [SPEAKER_07]: I love the technical hacker aspect.
[10:03.450 --> 10:14.290] [SPEAKER_07]: But on the other hand, this is a safety device that is critical for people in certain communities, the blind community and things like that, who depend on being able to hear the audible signal.
[10:14.290 --> 10:24.870] [SPEAKER_07]: So I would just say if anyone is going to mess with these, make sure to also put the intended signal of like weight or cross or whatever sound clip you're replacing in there.
[10:25.410 --> 10:27.590] [SPEAKER_07]: Keep it functional while having some fun with it.
[10:27.770 --> 10:32.610] [SPEAKER_01]: Isn't there also a beep that goes on either while it's safe to cross or while it's not safe to cross?
[10:32.730 --> 10:34.070] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know the difference myself.
[10:34.230 --> 10:36.950] [SPEAKER_01]: But I don't know if the beep is hackable.
[10:37.050 --> 10:40.070] [SPEAKER_01]: That's something people definitely shouldn't touch if they are able to touch that.
[10:40.610 --> 10:43.430] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, or maybe you could make the beep play some chip tunes or something.
[10:43.550 --> 10:43.810] [SPEAKER_07]: I don't know.
[10:44.030 --> 10:49.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I asked artificial intelligence how this happened because I didn't find the page that you found.
[10:49.790 --> 10:52.810] [SPEAKER_01]: And basically, I got a pretty good explanation.
[10:53.030 --> 11:00.230] [SPEAKER_01]: I've been getting some good explanations recently for some really obscure references of various things from artificial intelligence.
[11:00.230 --> 11:13.670] [SPEAKER_01]: So yeah, basically, the primary method seems to involve a mobile application reportedly once freely available from Polara, P-O-L-A-R-A, a leading manufacturer of pedestrian signal systems.
[11:13.850 --> 11:18.910] [SPEAKER_01]: This app was intended for convenient configuration of the crosswalk units by authorized personnel.
[11:19.590 --> 11:25.570] [SPEAKER_01]: Now, there's also a possibility of a Bluetooth connection, the app connecting to nearby crosswalk systems via Bluetooth.
[11:25.570 --> 11:31.110] [SPEAKER_01]: There's default password possibilities, critical security flaws, use of default pins or passwords.
[11:31.630 --> 11:40.070] [SPEAKER_01]: Polara's own documentation reportedly states that the default passcode is 1, 2, 3, 4.
[11:40.250 --> 11:40.610] [SPEAKER_01]: 4?
[11:40.770 --> 11:41.010] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[11:41.210 --> 11:41.870] [SPEAKER_01]: No, I wasn't sure.
[11:42.070 --> 11:42.670] [SPEAKER_01]: I wasn't sure.
[11:42.850 --> 11:43.930] [SPEAKER_01]: It went to the other page.
[11:44.050 --> 11:47.330] [SPEAKER_01]: And it's the purchaser's responsibility to change it.
[11:47.690 --> 11:52.850] [SPEAKER_01]: It's highly suspected that other installations never bothered to update this.
[11:52.850 --> 12:04.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, now, um, as far as gaining access, with the configuration app and a default or easily guessed password, unauthorized individuals can likely gain access to the settings of the crosswalk audio system.
[12:05.010 --> 12:09.810] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, the app allows users to configure the spoken messages triggered by button presses.
[12:10.050 --> 12:14.890] [SPEAKER_01]: This includes the standard wait, walk, or walk light is on prompts.
[12:15.450 --> 12:23.150] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know why you need more than that amount of time, because apparently somebody was able to put a whole political spiel in there.
[12:23.450 --> 12:27.230] [SPEAKER_01]: When does the walk sign ever have to say something that lasts 30 seconds?
[12:27.790 --> 12:30.550] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, it's either you walk or you don't walk.
[12:31.090 --> 12:38.850] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, then hackers are able to upload their own audio files, including AI-generated voices mimicking celebrities and satirical messages.
[12:39.210 --> 12:46.990] [SPEAKER_01]: The app also reportedly allows for the installation of language packs, uh, which in this case appeared to be the custom audio.
[12:47.730 --> 12:53.590] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, and as mentioned, the, uh, the altered, uh, messages featured voices that were spoofed by artificial intelligence.
[12:53.590 --> 12:55.870] [SPEAKER_01]: We think we, I mean, you know, who knows?
[12:56.010 --> 12:56.930] [SPEAKER_01]: You don't know who did this.
[12:57.570 --> 13:02.570] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, so, um, uh, the, basically that's, uh, that's, that's the method.
[13:02.690 --> 13:06.150] [SPEAKER_01]: I think that, uh, falls in line with what people are, are, are saying so far.
[13:06.770 --> 13:09.090] [SPEAKER_01]: I'd like to know, you know, are there default passwords?
[13:09.190 --> 13:12.110] [SPEAKER_01]: How do we, uh, check these things to make sure they're safe?
[13:12.110 --> 13:16.050] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, I, I, uh, you know, I see a road trip ahead.
[13:17.930 --> 13:18.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead, Alex.
[13:19.690 --> 13:30.630] [SPEAKER_05]: Well, one of the things that strikes me is, is, um, I guess a bit of a surprise is that all of these crosswalks seem to be locally managed at the crosswalk themselves.
[13:30.910 --> 13:38.690] [SPEAKER_05]: And there isn't some kind of overarching central management by which all of the recordings are, are made uniform.
[13:38.690 --> 13:43.950] [SPEAKER_05]: It seems like there is a way to have individual recordings and individual crosswalks.
[13:44.290 --> 13:47.570] [SPEAKER_05]: That's, that's really interesting and neat to me.
[13:48.050 --> 14:03.610] [SPEAKER_05]: And, and I think would really be the only way that you could do this unless, unless the, the breach was of some central system and they only decided to implement these spoofed voices at certain crosswalks for whatever reason.
[14:03.610 --> 14:13.970] [SPEAKER_01]: I actually, I actually can address that because what I've noticed pressing, pressing some of these buttons is that it doesn't just say walk, it says walk across, and then it gives the name of the street.
[14:14.730 --> 14:21.930] [SPEAKER_01]: So apparently the people who designed this thought it would be a good idea to let people know what street they're crossing, even though you can never hear it over the traffic.
[14:22.550 --> 14:29.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, it just, uh, to me, it seemed kind of absurd that, uh, you wouldn't know what street you were crossing if you had walked all the way to it.
[14:29.230 --> 14:32.430] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, or, you know, it's, it's on a street sign, I guess.
[14:32.530 --> 14:32.650] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[14:32.750 --> 14:36.910] [SPEAKER_01]: If you were blind and you, you didn't know what street you had walked up to, it's, it's convenient.
[14:37.590 --> 14:47.550] [SPEAKER_01]: So, um, uh, for that purpose, I, I, I suppose it's a, it's a good idea, but that's probably why it's a locally recordable, um, um, file at least.
[14:47.550 --> 14:53.890] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know if they record it there or if they, um, uh, transport it via some kind of telecommunications technique.
[14:54.450 --> 14:55.890] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, I don't know.
[14:56.030 --> 14:57.130] [SPEAKER_01]: We need to learn more about this.
[14:57.310 --> 14:57.630] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead.
[14:57.630 --> 14:59.850] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, that, I mean, that makes sense to me.
[15:00.070 --> 15:02.410] [SPEAKER_05]: Uh, I, I think you're probably right about that.
[15:02.550 --> 15:12.090] [SPEAKER_05]: That, that's why it would have this, this local management, um, of the, of the audio and then the ability to upload certain, uh, certain audio there.
[15:12.210 --> 15:27.150] [SPEAKER_05]: But it also seems to me like then you might be able to accommodate Rob's concern here, which would be that whoever's hacking these or decides to hack these in the future and replace the audio could then also put some kind of preface in the hack recording that says,
[15:27.790 --> 15:29.990] [SPEAKER_05]: you know, Hey, wait, the light is red.
[15:30.310 --> 15:30.870] [SPEAKER_05]: Don't go anywhere.
[15:30.990 --> 15:36.910] [SPEAKER_05]: But by the way, this is Jeff Bezos or this is Mark Zuckerberg and, um, uh, or Elon Musk or whatever.
[15:36.910 --> 15:37.230] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[15:37.230 --> 15:43.390] [SPEAKER_01]: And if anything is going to make you run out into traffic, it's hearing that, you know, that's true.
[15:43.630 --> 15:43.790] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[15:43.910 --> 15:43.990] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[15:44.130 --> 15:44.870] [SPEAKER_05]: Quite, quite possibly.
[15:45.170 --> 15:56.470] [SPEAKER_05]: However, I do have to say though, that, um, in, in as dangerous as it might be, I, I think that, you know, probably certainly low risk that somebody who heard that voice would then decide to cross the road though.
[15:56.690 --> 16:04.030] [SPEAKER_05]: I can understand where you're coming from, Rob, but, but hopefully, uh, you know, nobody's running into the street when they, when they hear Jeff Bezos complain about taxes.
[16:04.030 --> 16:17.410] [SPEAKER_05]: This is probably something they've probably heard before, but I do have to say, this is, I think a particularly ingenious and funny and very kind of hacker spirit oriented in hack to me.
[16:17.650 --> 16:21.230] [SPEAKER_05]: And these kinds of shenanigans bring me great joy to hear.
[16:21.390 --> 16:25.210] [SPEAKER_05]: This is the kind of hacker spirit that I like to see people engaging in.
[16:25.550 --> 16:27.930] [SPEAKER_05]: It's definitely illegal in some respects.
[16:28.090 --> 16:36.090] [SPEAKER_05]: I'm not promoting illegality in any way, but I do think this is a certain kind of civil disobedience and hacktivism that, um, we should be encouraging.
[16:37.010 --> 16:37.450] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[16:37.510 --> 16:39.010] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, it's, it's, it's funny.
[16:39.170 --> 16:41.510] [SPEAKER_01]: It's not, it's not, uh, completely irresponsible.
[16:41.990 --> 16:47.110] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, and keep in mind, uh, how long have we had, uh, talking don't walk signs?
[16:47.610 --> 16:50.410] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, we've survived pretty long without that.
[16:50.710 --> 16:57.350] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, in fact, uh, many places we didn't even have walk signs or even traffic lights that, you know, we're resilient.
[16:57.350 --> 16:59.070] [SPEAKER_01]: We can get past these little hurdles.
[16:59.310 --> 17:08.570] [SPEAKER_01]: So having a temporary change or something that makes you just stop and think for a moment, um, that's, uh, it, it, it shouldn't be something we panic over.
[17:08.930 --> 17:11.170] [SPEAKER_01]: I do want to know exactly how it works though.
[17:11.890 --> 17:13.710] [SPEAKER_01]: I intend to find that one way or another.
[17:13.930 --> 17:14.330] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[17:14.390 --> 17:27.550] [SPEAKER_01]: Something else that happened, which, uh, probably a lot of people in New York city don't know about, but, uh, you might be interested because it could happen to you out in, uh, Suffolk County, Long Island, uh, everybody seems, uh, within a 50 mile radius.
[17:27.890 --> 17:33.330] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, and I believe, and unless somebody corrects me, I believe this only applies to landlines.
[17:34.530 --> 17:41.570] [SPEAKER_01]: Everybody last week got a phone call at about 1230 in the morning from the Suffolk County police department.
[17:41.990 --> 17:49.770] [SPEAKER_01]: And basically it was an automated notification went out as what they call the silver alert system, uh, formerly the code red system.
[17:50.430 --> 17:55.450] [SPEAKER_01]: And, uh, it was about, um, uh, a missing person, uh, a nonverbal autistic team.
[17:55.890 --> 18:02.110] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, and, uh, basically they were telling everybody to look out for this kid and woke everybody up in the process.
[18:02.530 --> 18:09.330] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, so obviously it had a bit of a backlash, uh, in that, um, many people thought that wasn't exactly the best way to go about this.
[18:09.870 --> 18:17.070] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, the thing is, I didn't know that Suffolk County police could do this, could simply call call everybody.
[18:17.690 --> 18:26.250] [SPEAKER_01]: Also, you know, I have to ask if this only went to landlines, that's not very smart because obviously, uh, most people have cell phones these days.
[18:26.250 --> 18:36.750] [SPEAKER_01]: I think we all know that, uh, if you're trying to reach everybody, you're only going to reach the people that you're waking up at 1230 in the morning who have landlines and are pretty cranky about it.
[18:37.030 --> 18:42.150] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, so, you know, the, the, the thinking here seems to be a little backwards.
[18:42.870 --> 18:50.550] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, and, uh, you know, I, I, I just wonder how, how else you can get the word out for something urgent like this.
[18:50.630 --> 18:54.810] [SPEAKER_01]: And by the way, they found the kid, they found the kid before they started making the phone calls.
[18:54.810 --> 18:59.250] [SPEAKER_01]: So clearly, clearly the system has, uh, much to be desired.
[18:59.550 --> 19:10.330] [SPEAKER_01]: The people running it have much to be desired, but did you guys know the cops can just call everybody in a certain range in a matter of seconds that could happen in Manhattan.
[19:10.510 --> 19:13.110] [SPEAKER_01]: Imagine calling everybody in Manhattan, every phone.
[19:13.290 --> 19:14.770] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, you know, I have so many questions.
[19:14.910 --> 19:18.050] [SPEAKER_01]: I want to know, did, um, uh, did offices get called?
[19:18.250 --> 19:20.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Did the cops call themselves?
[19:20.610 --> 19:23.670] [SPEAKER_01]: Did, uh, did students in dormitories get called as well?
[19:24.010 --> 19:28.270] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, you know, basically, um, uh, how did this thing work?
[19:28.370 --> 19:29.790] [SPEAKER_01]: I think there's something else we need to know about.
[19:29.950 --> 19:30.970] [SPEAKER_01]: Any, any, any thoughts, guys?
[19:32.950 --> 19:36.890] [SPEAKER_07]: I would be really interested to know the, uh, the thought behind this.
[19:36.990 --> 19:48.850] [SPEAKER_07]: I'm thinking like the reason they might've just gone for landlines is there are, I think, historical rules on the books regarding things like telemarketing and stuff where landlines and mobile phones are a completely different deal because mobile phones,
[19:49.310 --> 20:00.810] [SPEAKER_07]: uh, in the past have been, um, every phone call you received also charged you, uh, versus just, uh, landlines where you pick up a call and it doesn't cost you anything unless it's a collect call or something like that.
[20:00.990 --> 20:14.050] [SPEAKER_07]: So there might be some connection to that for the reason that they only went for landlines, but I would really be interested to see the numbers of how many people they're actually reaching, um, with this because it is, um, the year of the common era, 2025.
[20:14.050 --> 20:14.350] [SPEAKER_07]: 2025.
[20:14.730 --> 20:18.630] [SPEAKER_07]: And I think a lot of their, a lot of their target audience don't have landlines anymore.
[20:18.770 --> 20:30.090] [SPEAKER_01]: But, you know, Rob, think about what you're saying here, that only landlines would be targeted because, uh, it's, it's not right to call cell phones based on some old billing practices that really no longer apply.
[20:30.230 --> 20:46.050] [SPEAKER_01]: But cell phones are the phones that people who are outside will have, whereas the landlines are where the people who are sleeping or, you know, so they're not going to see a missing person, but the people more likely to see a missing person are the ones with mobile phones.
[20:46.250 --> 21:01.690] [SPEAKER_01]: Now, of course, since we've messed up area codes and 631 no longer means Suffolk County necessarily, and you can have all kinds of area codes on your cell phone, uh, you know, this has to be done through a geographical system, not an area code system.
[21:01.810 --> 21:02.750] [SPEAKER_01]: It's going to be effective, Kyle.
[21:03.470 --> 21:03.950] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[21:04.070 --> 21:14.850] [SPEAKER_06]: And in the case of cell phones, I'm surprised, or I'm wondering if, uh, SMS is what it would default to instead of a voice call because cell phones are capable of receiving those kinds of messages.
[21:15.090 --> 21:37.130] [SPEAKER_06]: And we are familiar with weather alerts and other sorts of regional, um, messaging that's done on a different, um, mode of, of that, but is text-based and people may not be as startled or they might have, uh, uh, the ability to change the, the alert settings and not be interrupted in the middle of sleep or something.
[21:37.490 --> 21:37.570] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[21:37.690 --> 21:37.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[21:37.910 --> 21:43.810] [SPEAKER_06]: But it, does anybody know if cell phones were, they were not at all, they were excluded from the list?
[21:43.930 --> 21:45.670] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't, I don't think so.
[21:45.870 --> 21:48.150] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't, unless you have like forwarding or something.
[21:48.150 --> 21:51.230] [SPEAKER_01]: I should know somebody with a 631 cell phone, but I haven't found them yet.
[21:51.370 --> 21:56.790] [SPEAKER_01]: And, um, um, I, I haven't heard reports and I've seen it said that this goes to landlines.
[21:57.050 --> 22:06.770] [SPEAKER_06]: So until, until there's any evidence that I am a little curious why, uh, it wasn't augmented or that why those numbers didn't, instead of getting a voice call, receive messages.
[22:06.970 --> 22:15.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Cause, because like you said, they're out in, in, in the, uh, the outside of a home, they're mobile, they're, they're going to be on the roads and stuff.
[22:15.910 --> 22:16.270] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead, Rob.
[22:16.750 --> 22:23.010] [SPEAKER_07]: I can address that because I used to live in Suffolk County and that's when I got my phone number that I still have now on my cell phone.
[22:23.010 --> 22:24.470] [SPEAKER_07]: It's in the 631 area code.
[22:24.610 --> 22:26.510] [SPEAKER_07]: And I did not get a call about this.
[22:26.630 --> 22:28.310] [SPEAKER_07]: Um, I don't live in Suffolk County anymore.
[22:28.490 --> 22:34.410] [SPEAKER_07]: So, um, you know, it's, it's, uh, it's an out of place area code, but, uh, if it were just going by area codes, I would have gotten it.
[22:34.530 --> 22:34.730] [SPEAKER_07]: I think.
[22:35.690 --> 22:36.090] [SPEAKER_06]: Interesting.
[22:36.270 --> 22:39.350] [SPEAKER_06]: And you didn't get any kind of SMS regarding this incident either, right?
[22:39.390 --> 22:40.330] [SPEAKER_06]: Or any kind of alert?
[22:40.830 --> 22:41.490] [SPEAKER_06]: No, nothing.
[22:41.850 --> 22:42.250] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[22:42.470 --> 22:42.850] [SPEAKER_01]: And okay.
[22:42.890 --> 22:50.150] [SPEAKER_01]: So we can say that if you have a 631 cell phone number and you weren't in 631 at the time, you likely did not get an alert.
[22:50.310 --> 22:58.430] [SPEAKER_01]: We can also say that people who had, uh, cell phones with different area codes in the 631 area code physically did not get an alert.
[22:58.570 --> 23:05.630] [SPEAKER_01]: So all we need to know now is people with 631 area code cell phones who were also in the 631 area at the time.
[23:05.790 --> 23:09.550] [SPEAKER_01]: I suspect they probably didn't get alerts, but it would be nice to confirm that.
[23:09.730 --> 23:09.850] [SPEAKER_01]: Gila.
[23:10.230 --> 23:27.910] [SPEAKER_08]: I am looking right now at the Suffolk County, New York webpage, their office of emergency management talking about Suffolk alert, uh, the official emergency notification system used by the Suffolk County emergency managers, which appears to be different than the system that was activated.
[23:27.910 --> 23:30.510] [SPEAKER_08]: Suffolk alert seems to be opt in.
[23:31.650 --> 23:37.850] [SPEAKER_08]: Um, they, wow, there's a whole safety alert profile situation you can sign up for.
[23:38.030 --> 23:40.070] [SPEAKER_08]: They talk about leaving messages.
[23:41.010 --> 23:44.530] [SPEAKER_08]: Um, but again, it's an opt in system.
[23:44.530 --> 23:50.270] [SPEAKER_08]: So I'm not like, I'm looking, I don't see anything.
[23:50.450 --> 23:54.670] [SPEAKER_08]: I looked for silver alert and they're giving out bracelets.
[23:54.970 --> 24:07.570] [SPEAKER_08]: So if you live in Suffolk County and you have someone who lives in your home who has dementia or something similar and has a tendency to wander, you can put a bracelet on them that will, whoever finds them can call the police and they'll get them back to where they need to go.
[24:08.070 --> 24:14.210] [SPEAKER_08]: But, um, yeah, I'm just not, this is very strange.
[24:14.410 --> 24:14.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[24:14.790 --> 24:17.390] [SPEAKER_01]: I think the strangest thing about this was that nobody knew about it.
[24:17.490 --> 24:20.370] [SPEAKER_01]: And it just happened in the middle of the night, the worst possible time.
[24:21.170 --> 24:32.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, and, um, you know, basically the Suffolk County police, uh, department's reaction to this is that, uh, yeah, we're going to, we're going to change the system so that somebody higher up in command has to approve it.
[24:32.570 --> 24:35.910] [SPEAKER_01]: Not at all addressing people that were upset or scared.
[24:36.110 --> 24:38.910] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, when your phone rings in the middle of the night, you tend to get a little terrified.
[24:39.250 --> 24:41.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, and I'm sure a lot of people did.
[24:41.390 --> 24:45.090] [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, that's, that says nothing about the person who is missing.
[24:45.190 --> 24:50.590] [SPEAKER_01]: Obviously you want that person to be found, but you know, is waking somebody up the way to do that?
[24:51.690 --> 24:52.230] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know.
[24:52.310 --> 24:52.890] [SPEAKER_01]: Alex, did you have something?
[24:52.970 --> 24:53.110] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead.
[24:55.330 --> 24:55.690] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah.
[24:55.930 --> 24:59.610] [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, what, why couldn't they use an Amber alert for this?
[24:59.710 --> 25:01.810] [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, isn't this the whole purpose of the Amber alert?
[25:02.050 --> 25:05.090] [SPEAKER_01]: I think there is a, it wasn't, it wasn't an Amber alert.
[25:05.250 --> 25:06.210] [SPEAKER_01]: It was a silver alert.
[25:06.930 --> 25:07.290] [SPEAKER_06]: Silver.
[25:07.490 --> 25:07.590] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[25:07.730 --> 25:09.410] [SPEAKER_06]: There is a color code for it.
[25:09.470 --> 25:13.130] [SPEAKER_01]: Even though the person was a teenager has nothing to do with the color of your hair.
[25:13.530 --> 25:13.710] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[25:13.770 --> 25:14.650] [SPEAKER_06]: It was like they're lost.
[25:15.650 --> 25:17.890] [SPEAKER_01]: And Amber is named after a girl too.
[25:18.050 --> 25:19.630] [SPEAKER_01]: It's got nothing to do with a color there either.
[25:19.970 --> 25:23.730] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know why all these misassigned color names are.
[25:23.810 --> 25:30.810] [SPEAKER_06]: So it was coded and this was a tool they used, the landline call function.
[25:31.110 --> 25:31.250] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[25:31.750 --> 25:31.870] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[25:31.990 --> 25:33.810] [SPEAKER_01]: But imagine how this could be abused.
[25:33.970 --> 25:40.110] [SPEAKER_01]: Imagine how, you know, somebody, you know, if the person who hacked the traffic lights can figure out how, it didn't hack the traffic lights actually.
[25:40.190 --> 25:40.390] [SPEAKER_01]: I'm sorry.
[25:40.590 --> 25:43.490] [SPEAKER_01]: I hacked the audio signal in the walk signals.
[25:44.070 --> 25:50.330] [SPEAKER_01]: If they were able to hack this and make funny phone calls in the middle of the night, that, yeah, it wouldn't be so funny then, would it?
[25:50.570 --> 25:51.050] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead, Gila.
[25:51.570 --> 25:51.950] [SPEAKER_08]: Sorry.
[25:52.010 --> 25:53.210] [SPEAKER_08]: I did find a little more detail.
[25:53.570 --> 25:56.370] [SPEAKER_08]: I'm on the Long Island subreddit right now.
[25:56.490 --> 26:02.950] [SPEAKER_08]: People are talking about this and someone said, I work in a hospital overnight and every line in my offices rang simultaneously.
[26:03.550 --> 26:03.810] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[26:03.850 --> 26:05.350] [SPEAKER_01]: That answers one of my questions.
[26:05.490 --> 26:05.870] [SPEAKER_01]: Cool.
[26:06.070 --> 26:06.290] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[26:06.430 --> 26:07.750] [SPEAKER_01]: I didn't think to go to Reddit.
[26:07.950 --> 26:08.830] [SPEAKER_01]: Why didn't I go to Reddit?
[26:10.110 --> 26:11.490] [SPEAKER_01]: Stupid, stupid, stupid, stupid.
[26:11.570 --> 26:15.110] [SPEAKER_08]: Someone else on Reddit says they got the phone call on a cell phone.
[26:17.050 --> 26:22.830] [SPEAKER_08]: The number was from Greenport, but the message was AI generated about the missing autistic teen.
[26:24.810 --> 26:28.110] [SPEAKER_08]: No mention of teen on the Amber Alert site.
[26:29.930 --> 26:33.410] [SPEAKER_08]: People are saying that they have a landline, but it's hooked up to a fax machine.
[26:33.730 --> 26:37.910] [SPEAKER_08]: And that's just, they kept getting the fax number message.
[26:38.230 --> 26:42.710] [SPEAKER_08]: So the thing that's interesting to me is that Suffolk County police is saying, we didn't do this.
[26:43.270 --> 26:43.990] [SPEAKER_01]: They did.
[26:44.150 --> 26:45.050] [SPEAKER_01]: They said they did it.
[26:45.350 --> 26:46.310] [SPEAKER_01]: When did they say they didn't do it?
[26:46.770 --> 26:49.630] [SPEAKER_08]: So apparently the fire department did it.
[26:51.310 --> 27:00.410] [SPEAKER_08]: And I saw something in the article that you had open, Rob, that said they had found the, the youth, the youth.
[27:00.910 --> 27:03.890] [SPEAKER_08]: And they, okay.
[27:04.110 --> 27:09.270] [SPEAKER_08]: Police said detectives were notified of the missing teen about 6.30 PM Thursday and had Suffolk Fire Rescue issue the calls.
[27:09.590 --> 27:12.390] [SPEAKER_01]: The subresidents received calls as late as 1 AM Friday.
[27:12.390 --> 27:12.490] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[27:12.970 --> 27:13.550] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead.
[27:13.610 --> 27:13.870] [SPEAKER_01]: Your turn.
[27:14.470 --> 27:16.750] [SPEAKER_08]: The police said the missing teen was located on...
[27:16.750 --> 27:17.830] [SPEAKER_01]: Identified as a 19-year-old male.
[27:18.290 --> 27:20.470] [SPEAKER_08]: Was located unharmed on Little East Neck Road.
[27:20.610 --> 27:21.230] [SPEAKER_01]: In West Babylon.
[27:21.610 --> 27:22.850] [SPEAKER_08]: Just before midnight Thursday.
[27:23.550 --> 27:23.990] [SPEAKER_08]: So...
[27:24.470 --> 27:25.770] [SPEAKER_01]: We have the same story.
[27:28.490 --> 27:35.790] [SPEAKER_08]: But I think the fact that this needs to be coordinated and it needs to be something that lives in one place, I think.
[27:35.790 --> 27:36.230] [SPEAKER_08]: Mm-hmm.
[27:36.730 --> 27:41.970] [SPEAKER_08]: And the fact that it didn't and then it, am I allowed to say?
[27:43.050 --> 27:44.530] [SPEAKER_08]: Never mind, I'm not even going to try.
[27:46.090 --> 27:51.410] [SPEAKER_08]: It got completely confused.
[27:52.050 --> 27:57.770] [SPEAKER_08]: And again, like I can imagine every phone line in a place ringing.
[27:59.110 --> 27:59.830] [SPEAKER_08]: That's terrifying.
[28:00.090 --> 28:00.830] [SPEAKER_08]: At 12.30 in the morning.
[28:00.870 --> 28:01.110] [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, that's a important part, man.
[28:01.310 --> 28:02.050] [SPEAKER_08]: At 12.30 in the morning.
[28:02.130 --> 28:02.790] [SPEAKER_01]: 12.30 in the morning.
[28:03.750 --> 28:04.730] [SPEAKER_01]: After they found the guy.
[28:05.390 --> 28:05.510] [SPEAKER_01]: Mm-hmm.
[28:05.510 --> 28:07.890] [SPEAKER_01]: That really is the ultimate irony.
[28:08.050 --> 28:08.950] [SPEAKER_01]: So, I don't know.
[28:09.230 --> 28:13.290] [SPEAKER_01]: I'd like to know if other places around the country, around the world, have similar systems.
[28:13.450 --> 28:14.130] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, it's one thing.
[28:14.850 --> 28:21.910] [SPEAKER_01]: I know there are phone chains of, say, you know, there's a school shooting or something that the school district calls the parents and things like that.
[28:21.910 --> 28:23.190] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, but it's on a much smaller scale.
[28:23.330 --> 28:28.530] [SPEAKER_01]: This is an entire county, it appears, and it doesn't seem to be any limit.
[28:28.630 --> 28:31.290] [SPEAKER_01]: I was impressed by how quickly all the calls went out.
[28:31.750 --> 28:36.430] [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, also, was the phone network able to handle that?
[28:36.610 --> 28:46.370] [SPEAKER_01]: Because, you know, back when I really was playing with phones, I could tie up the entire phone network pretty easily just by tying lines together.
[28:46.690 --> 28:55.530] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, there used to be these recordings that would tell you that the number you have reached has been disconnected, and then it would basically transfer to nothing.
[28:56.210 --> 29:03.330] [SPEAKER_01]: And if you were able to, say, transfer that to another line that did the same thing, you'd be tying up two lines.
[29:03.950 --> 29:09.690] [SPEAKER_01]: And I don't know what it took to reset those lines, but it would take a couple of days to reset those lines.
[29:09.890 --> 29:18.970] [SPEAKER_01]: I know because in my, you know, prankish days, I did that maybe five or six times, pairing lines together and sending them away into the ether.
[29:19.610 --> 29:23.650] [SPEAKER_01]: And then when you called that disconnected number, you didn't get a recording anymore.
[29:23.790 --> 29:30.730] [SPEAKER_01]: You got a fast, busy signal because they couldn't access the recordings because they were all tied up by no more than 10 phone calls.
[29:30.950 --> 29:39.310] [SPEAKER_01]: So for something like this to be able to happen so quickly and throughout the entire county, although, you know, how many landlines are left?
[29:39.390 --> 29:39.670] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know.
[29:39.770 --> 29:40.570] [SPEAKER_01]: Maybe there aren't that many.
[29:40.570 --> 29:46.270] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, it just seems like, um, uh, it was an impressive feat, even though it was an annoying one.
[29:46.650 --> 29:47.050] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes, Alex.
[29:48.350 --> 30:02.790] [SPEAKER_05]: Well, apropos of your misspent youth tying up lines, I think it's, it's right to then bring up the, the real issue here is I think, you know, if you, if you think about this in the context of current events and what happened with the salt typhoon hack,
[30:02.990 --> 30:19.890] [SPEAKER_05]: where we saw Chinese threat actors compromising U.S. telecommunications infrastructure in particular, the access that the CLEA system would afford to law enforcement, CLEA being the communications access to law enforcement of communications lawful, uh,
[30:20.150 --> 30:21.210] [SPEAKER_05]: God, what the hell is the name?
[30:21.470 --> 30:23.710] [SPEAKER_05]: But, uh, what is CLEA?
[30:23.830 --> 30:33.690] [SPEAKER_05]: Basically CLEA is the law that says that, um, uh, law enforcement has to have some kind of lawful access to a, a telephone line.
[30:33.790 --> 30:38.630] [SPEAKER_05]: If there's a judicial warrant for them to access particular communications, right?
[30:38.630 --> 30:42.290] [SPEAKER_05]: And that's what these Chinese threat actors did was they access these particular systems.
[30:42.790 --> 30:48.850] [SPEAKER_05]: So what if this system in Suffolk County or air or any place had fallen into the wrong hands, right?
[30:49.190 --> 30:51.310] [SPEAKER_05]: Now imagine the chaos that you could cause.
[30:51.870 --> 31:03.950] [SPEAKER_05]: Imagine Emmanuel, what would happen if Rebel had access to the system and what he could do to telephone lines and radio shows and Overtime, that he could make all the lines ring at the same time.
[31:04.370 --> 31:16.190] [SPEAKER_05]: Maybe this is what he used to do, the WBAI back in the nineties and how he always got on, uh, and how he ended up being the first caller for so many years, every single week.
[31:17.570 --> 31:23.550] [SPEAKER_01]: That's, um, that's, that's, uh, definitely something to, uh, to think about and, uh, and live in fear of.
[31:23.890 --> 31:30.970] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, and by the way, uh, CLEA, uh, for those of us who are able to visit Wikipedia communications assistance for law enforcement law enforcement act.
[31:31.150 --> 31:31.810] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, I remember it.
[31:31.810 --> 31:35.590] [SPEAKER_01]: But you know, it also stands for commission on accreditation for law enforcement agencies.
[31:36.130 --> 31:37.610] [SPEAKER_01]: That's a, that's a different CLEA.
[31:37.710 --> 31:39.490] [SPEAKER_01]: And there's also a CLEA plant.
[31:39.750 --> 31:40.330] [SPEAKER_01]: Did you know that?
[31:41.290 --> 31:44.650] [SPEAKER_01]: Boy, Wikipedia, boy, that's a deep dive down Wikipedia.
[31:45.050 --> 31:47.930] [SPEAKER_01]: We could spend the whole hour on it, but we don't have a whole hour.
[31:48.030 --> 31:49.130] [SPEAKER_01]: We only have a few minutes left.
[31:49.270 --> 32:05.290] [SPEAKER_01]: And I, you know, I can't believe I have to repeat myself, but, um, yeah, uh, apparently, um, the, uh, the defense, uh, chief, uh, defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, um, gave out a whole lot of, um, information he shouldn't have given out on a signal call.
[32:05.610 --> 32:05.950] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[32:05.990 --> 32:07.250] [SPEAKER_01]: We talked about this a couple of weeks ago.
[32:07.350 --> 32:08.550] [SPEAKER_01]: It happened a second time.
[32:08.710 --> 32:14.970] [SPEAKER_01]: He did it again, except this time he did it with his brother and his wife and his lawyer and a whole bunch of other people.
[32:15.690 --> 32:16.090] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[32:16.350 --> 32:26.930] [SPEAKER_01]: But basically he, um, he, he, he took the information from a secure communications channel that the U.S. central command used, and then he posted it into this signal chat.
[32:27.110 --> 32:33.630] [SPEAKER_01]: He was having with dozens of other people, you know, like it was some kind of kegger that they were all hanging out at.
[32:33.750 --> 32:37.510] [SPEAKER_01]: And Hey, look, look at what I found out of what we're going to do next.
[32:38.150 --> 32:40.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, NBC news reported this.
[32:40.250 --> 32:52.210] [SPEAKER_01]: And, um, basically, um, the launch times, bomb drop times, the U.S. war planes that were about to strike Houthi targets in Yemen, um, details that multiple officials have said is highly classified.
[32:52.330 --> 32:53.670] [SPEAKER_01]: Hegseth insists that they're not.
[32:53.910 --> 32:57.450] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, they were taken from secure U.S. central command communications.
[32:58.110 --> 33:18.430] [SPEAKER_01]: And, uh, that was, um, confirmed by a second individual, uh, that the information that was posted in the second chat was identical to the sensitive operations details shared in the first chat, which included members of Trump's national security council and the editor of the Atlantic by accident,
[33:18.590 --> 33:18.950] [SPEAKER_01]: supposedly.
[33:19.630 --> 33:20.410] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, yeah.
[33:20.510 --> 33:29.270] [SPEAKER_01]: So basically the second chat group where Hegseth posted the Yemen airstrike information, the first leaked signal chat accidentally included, uh, the editor as, as mentioned.
[33:29.450 --> 33:35.070] [SPEAKER_01]: Now he has not directly acknowledged that he set up the second chat, which had more than a dozen people on it.
[33:35.570 --> 33:39.590] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, and, uh, he continues to attack anyone who brings it up.
[33:39.870 --> 33:42.830] [SPEAKER_01]: I said repeatedly, nobody is texting war plans.
[33:42.930 --> 33:43.710] [SPEAKER_01]: He told Fox news.
[33:43.950 --> 33:45.750] [SPEAKER_01]: I look at war plans every day.
[33:46.190 --> 33:47.950] [SPEAKER_01]: What was shared over signal then.
[33:48.050 --> 33:53.770] [SPEAKER_01]: And now, however you characterize it was informal, unclassified coordinations for media coordinations and other things.
[33:53.790 --> 33:54.950] [SPEAKER_01]: That's what I've said from the beginning.
[33:55.910 --> 33:57.750] [SPEAKER_01]: And that's what he's going to say to the bitter end.
[33:58.350 --> 34:00.550] [SPEAKER_01]: Question is, when is that bitter end going to come?
[34:00.990 --> 34:09.210] [SPEAKER_01]: I've already, I've already predicted on a different radio show that it'll be within a week, but I'm open to all kinds of other counter, uh, counter bets here.
[34:11.850 --> 34:16.610] [SPEAKER_07]: Maybe we're only 99% on OPSEC rather than the full 100% at this point.
[34:17.030 --> 34:19.310] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't think, I don't think we're anywhere close to a hundred percent.
[34:21.430 --> 34:30.750] [SPEAKER_06]: I'm still stuck on the commission to become a accredited law enforcement agency since like pretty much nobody's, nobody's really doing that with cybersecurity now.
[34:30.910 --> 34:35.190] [SPEAKER_06]: Like, like how much is the application if we want to like, you know, do some policing?
[34:35.990 --> 34:36.790] [SPEAKER_06]: Good question.
[34:36.950 --> 34:37.990] [SPEAKER_06]: I want to be the web police.
[34:38.530 --> 34:39.010] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[34:39.070 --> 34:42.290] [SPEAKER_01]: It just seems like nobody in this administration really cares anymore.
[34:42.670 --> 34:44.670] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, the rules just gone out the window.
[34:44.670 --> 34:46.170] [SPEAKER_01]: They're doing whatever they want.
[34:46.170 --> 34:49.350] [SPEAKER_06]: There's definitely, definite loafing going on.
[34:49.550 --> 34:49.590] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[34:49.590 --> 34:52.630] [SPEAKER_01]: Because Trump has said, you know, I'm, I'm not going to do anything about this.
[34:52.790 --> 34:53.670] [SPEAKER_01]: He has my support.
[34:53.990 --> 35:01.570] [SPEAKER_01]: Although, you know, there's, um, uh, there, there's thinking in, in, you know, the, um, the hallways that maybe he's actually looking to get rid of him.
[35:01.930 --> 35:03.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, but he hasn't yet.
[35:03.410 --> 35:08.930] [SPEAKER_01]: And this guy has access to a lot of sensitive information, can cause a lot of harm.
[35:09.390 --> 35:10.470] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, not Leon Panetta.
[35:10.590 --> 35:13.890] [SPEAKER_01]: You might remember, uh, uh, Leon Panetta, uh, former defense secretary.
[35:14.170 --> 35:20.610] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, he said, it's unheard of to have a secretary of defense committing these kinds of serious security breaches.
[35:21.030 --> 35:27.350] [SPEAKER_01]: Developing attack plans for defensive reasons is without question the most classified information you can have.
[35:27.470 --> 35:33.510] [SPEAKER_01]: Whatever you think of Panetta, whatever you think of the system, this can't be right.
[35:33.910 --> 35:39.650] [SPEAKER_01]: This, this, this, this is not something that, um, is, is, is good for anyone, you know?
[35:39.830 --> 35:44.870] [SPEAKER_01]: And, uh, maybe the people that you're about to bomb, if they somehow get wind of it, but, uh, it's not likely.
[35:45.190 --> 35:58.790] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, but other people getting access to this information, getting access to other information, getting, um, um, their foot in the door of sensitive private information that, um, should not be shared with adversaries.
[35:59.150 --> 36:03.230] [SPEAKER_01]: I'm sure Alex, you can, you could go on about this and really scare the pants off us.
[36:04.190 --> 36:23.070] [SPEAKER_05]: I, I could, I could talk about this for hours and about how inappropriate it is and, and how there's literally no parity with how a government, government employee who has access to, to, to classified information and, and especially classified information of this nature,
[36:23.250 --> 36:28.430] [SPEAKER_05]: an imminent war plan for an attack that's about to happen.
[36:28.610 --> 36:38.610] [SPEAKER_05]: I mean, it's just absolutely insane to me that the secretary of defense would mishandle this type of classified information in such an egregious manner.
[36:39.070 --> 36:45.110] [SPEAKER_05]: And, and not just broadcasting it out on to one single group, but now onto two.
[36:45.710 --> 36:55.410] [SPEAKER_05]: And it doesn't make any sense to me why he would be sharing information with his personal lawyer about these particular types of plans either.
[36:55.690 --> 36:59.050] [SPEAKER_05]: That's what's just so mystifying.
[36:59.410 --> 37:12.830] [SPEAKER_05]: But, but let's talk about what would happen if you were an ordinary government employee and not somebody who was a, a, a directly handpicked servant of the president of the United States here.
[37:12.990 --> 37:20.110] [SPEAKER_05]: Somebody who had, I think, demonstrated time and again fealty to the president and, um, and, and would do his bidding.
[37:20.110 --> 37:27.270] [SPEAKER_05]: If you were just an ordinary DOD employee and you did this, you would have your security clearance immediately removed.
[37:27.770 --> 37:35.730] [SPEAKER_05]: You would be probably the subject of a criminal referral over to the Department of Justice for a violation of the Espionage Act.
[37:36.030 --> 37:40.510] [SPEAKER_05]: You would never be able to hold a security clearance again for the rest of your life.
[37:40.750 --> 37:42.130] [SPEAKER_05]: You would be terminated.
[37:42.450 --> 37:47.530] [SPEAKER_05]: You would, I think, find it very difficult to ever work in government again.
[37:47.990 --> 37:55.690] [SPEAKER_05]: And I think the rest of your life would probably be compromised in some way or another because of this massive black mark on your employment history.
[37:56.210 --> 37:57.270] [SPEAKER_05]: Now, what do we get?
[37:57.410 --> 37:58.790] [SPEAKER_05]: What do we see on the other hand?
[37:58.910 --> 38:14.230] [SPEAKER_05]: We see Hegseth, the secretary of defense, with the president coming to his rescue and coming to his defense and justifying this egregious mishandling of sensitive information that could have put lives of American service members at risk.
[38:15.850 --> 38:27.130] [SPEAKER_05]: The other thing that comes to mind as well is the fact that this president of the United States has repeatedly in the past made statements about U.S.
[38:27.330 --> 38:39.030] [SPEAKER_05]: service members who had lost their lives or service members who were war heroes, people like John McCain, prisoners of war, who gave their blood for this country and essentially called them losers.
[38:39.030 --> 38:39.290] prisoners.
[38:39.770 --> 38:47.690] [SPEAKER_05]: He does not have respect for the service members of this country in a way that the commander in chief should.
[38:48.010 --> 38:57.110] [SPEAKER_05]: And I think the fact that he's standing so squarely behind Pete Hegseth and Emmanuel, this is where I get back to your initial question here is, what's the alternate prediction?
[38:57.310 --> 38:59.450] [SPEAKER_05]: I think the prediction is Hegseth's going to ride this out.
[38:59.570 --> 39:01.630] [SPEAKER_05]: I don't think he's going to be fired.
[39:01.750 --> 39:09.770] [SPEAKER_05]: I think it's going to be totally fine because what matters is guilty, not any kind of misconduct.
[39:09.930 --> 39:11.810] [SPEAKER_05]: Misconduct doesn't matter if you're loyal.
[39:11.970 --> 39:29.930] [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, when you mentioned that quote about veterans or people who are captured being losers, I believe it was Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic who revealed that quote, that he being the person who was added in to the first signal chat, supposedly by accident.
[39:30.130 --> 39:30.890] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes, Rob, go ahead.
[39:31.670 --> 39:32.290] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[39:32.470 --> 39:44.310] [SPEAKER_07]: And on the subject of security clearance, we probably remember not too long ago when Trump very loudly revoked the security clearances of a bunch of people on his crap list.
[39:44.910 --> 39:59.430] [SPEAKER_07]: That includes President Biden, Kamala Harris, the former Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, New York's Attorney General, Letitia James, who had the audacity to investigate Trump and, you know, prosecute him.
[40:00.010 --> 40:06.410] [SPEAKER_07]: And a whole bunch of other politicians and government workers who at one point had security clearances.
[40:06.690 --> 40:11.050] [SPEAKER_07]: It's so important that they have their clearance revoked because Trump saw them as a threat.
[40:11.150 --> 40:18.610] [SPEAKER_07]: But we can have a signal chat where some guy's lawyer just happens to get all this, you know, highly classified, highly dangerous information.
[40:19.070 --> 40:22.230] [SPEAKER_07]: And, you know, a wrist might be slapped if that.
[40:22.550 --> 40:27.270] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, you know, I think we've proven the case that the people running things are inept.
[40:27.890 --> 40:28.950] [SPEAKER_01]: They don't care.
[40:29.050 --> 40:30.510] [SPEAKER_01]: They are bullies.
[40:30.710 --> 40:32.490] [SPEAKER_01]: And they're trying to intimidate everybody.
[40:32.990 --> 40:35.450] [SPEAKER_01]: The question now is, what do we do about it?
[40:35.570 --> 40:39.170] [SPEAKER_01]: And I think continuing to fight back is really the only thing we can do.
[40:39.330 --> 40:42.270] [SPEAKER_01]: We're seeing it now a lot more than we were seeing it weeks ago.
[40:42.410 --> 40:43.910] [SPEAKER_01]: We're seeing Harvard fighting back.
[40:44.050 --> 40:49.690] [SPEAKER_01]: We're seeing a bunch of universities finally stepping up to Trump and refusing to be intimidated by him.
[40:49.830 --> 40:51.430] [SPEAKER_01]: He's getting more and more irrational.
[40:51.430 --> 41:01.330] [SPEAKER_01]: And I think it's important to push him into as much irrationality as we possibly can so that he basically is unable to continue doing what he is doing.
[41:02.010 --> 41:13.130] [SPEAKER_01]: Now, just today, actually, it was yesterday, a federal judge, and yes, federal judges are still doing their job, despite the fact that Trump is intimidating them as well, or trying to.
[41:14.170 --> 41:18.670] [SPEAKER_01]: Basically, remember the Voice of America got taken off the air and shut down?
[41:18.930 --> 41:36.630] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, a judge undid that yesterday and said that, yeah, you can't do that, and ordered the administration to halt its effort to continue shutting them down, as well as Radio Free Asia and the Middle East broadcasting networks did not apply to Radio Free Europe,
[41:36.670 --> 41:39.830] [SPEAKER_01]: however, and Radio Liberty, I believe.
[41:40.490 --> 41:42.190] [SPEAKER_01]: Not sure exactly why that is.
[41:42.310 --> 41:47.470] [SPEAKER_01]: But the interesting thing is that, and this is something that hopefully our listeners can help with.
[41:48.050 --> 41:55.190] [SPEAKER_01]: I like to listen to shortwave radio, you know, what is still out there, and that means, you know, Voice of America is going to come back at some point.
[41:55.570 --> 41:56.930] [SPEAKER_01]: I want to hear them when they do.
[41:57.110 --> 41:59.590] [SPEAKER_01]: I want to find the frequency that they're going to be broadcasting on.
[41:59.710 --> 42:00.950] [SPEAKER_01]: They don't broadcast to this country.
[42:01.030 --> 42:06.290] [SPEAKER_01]: They broadcast all around the world, but you can pick them up since they broadcast out of this country.
[42:06.510 --> 42:12.190] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, you're not the intended recipient if you're an American, but if you're traveling, you often do hear them on local stations.
[42:12.190 --> 42:12.690] [SPEAKER_01]: Absolutely.
[42:12.990 --> 42:14.550] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, that's true.
[42:14.670 --> 42:16.830] [SPEAKER_01]: They do air some content.
[42:17.150 --> 42:18.510] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, rebroadcast on FM.
[42:18.690 --> 42:21.670] [SPEAKER_01]: They're not supposed to aim their signal at the United States.
[42:21.770 --> 42:25.290] [SPEAKER_01]: But the interesting thing, and for those of you who say, oh, this is just, you know, U.S.
[42:25.390 --> 42:26.790] [SPEAKER_01]: propaganda, no real loss.
[42:26.970 --> 42:27.750] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, consider this.
[42:27.890 --> 42:32.270] [SPEAKER_01]: Trump has basically defined the voice of America as the voice of radical America.
[42:32.470 --> 42:40.570] [SPEAKER_01]: He accused the outlet, which delivers news to countries limited press freedom, of spreading anti-American and partisan propaganda.
[42:42.070 --> 42:50.730] [SPEAKER_01]: So, yeah, you know, you might call it propaganda for the United States, but that's not how the people running the United States feel about it right now.
[42:52.390 --> 42:59.570] [SPEAKER_01]: As far as outlets from particular governments, Voice of America was not one of the worst.
[42:59.810 --> 43:09.870] [SPEAKER_01]: And it'll be good to hear them come back on and be able to say something to the people of the rest of the world, because, you know, we're cutting ourselves off an awful lot from the rest of the world.
[43:10.150 --> 43:10.390] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead, Rob.
[43:10.970 --> 43:16.750] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, VOA News is a really interesting entity, because it's actually part of the U.S.
[43:16.910 --> 43:17.930] [SPEAKER_07]: Agency for Global Media.
[43:17.930 --> 43:24.870] [SPEAKER_07]: That is a government agency that oversees all non-military United States international broadcasting, and it's funded by Congress.
[43:25.530 --> 43:29.610] [SPEAKER_07]: It's not your standard media outlet.
[43:29.610 --> 43:31.490] [SPEAKER_07]: It is a function of the government.
[43:31.870 --> 43:44.310] [SPEAKER_07]: And on their own site, they note the VOA firewall and saying, an essential guarantee of the journalistic credibility of Voice of America content is the firewall enshrined in the 1994 U.S.
[43:44.730 --> 43:45.730] [SPEAKER_07]: International Broadcasting Act.
[43:45.930 --> 43:48.290] [SPEAKER_07]: The firewall prohibits interference by any U.S.
[43:48.550 --> 43:58.210] [SPEAKER_07]: government official in the objective independent reporting of news, thereby safeguarding the ability of our journalists to develop content that reflects the highest professional standards of journalism free of political interference.
[43:58.210 --> 44:00.290] [SPEAKER_07]: And it goes on and on along those lines.
[44:00.470 --> 44:03.570] [SPEAKER_07]: And I have found VOA fascinating for a long time.
[44:03.750 --> 44:08.530] [SPEAKER_07]: You can actually listen to a lot of their programming in podcast form on their website.
[44:09.670 --> 44:20.930] [SPEAKER_07]: And, you know, it's been interesting to listen to it through the first Trump administration, the Biden administration, and what's going on now.
[44:21.450 --> 44:29.510] [SPEAKER_07]: And yeah, it's not really, in my estimation, it's not seemed like any sort of lackey thing or propaganda thing.
[44:29.690 --> 44:31.790] [SPEAKER_07]: It's just been kind of no-frills reporting.
[44:32.270 --> 44:37.350] [SPEAKER_07]: And I'm really interested in why the administration sees it as a threat.
[44:37.730 --> 44:43.290] [SPEAKER_01]: The administration sees anything as a threat that criticizes it or does not follow blindly.
[44:43.510 --> 44:48.510] [SPEAKER_01]: You can only imagine what they think about us, what they think about this radio station.
[44:48.610 --> 44:51.430] [SPEAKER_01]: That's why we need our listeners to support WBAI.
[44:51.590 --> 44:53.510] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, they're going to come after our tax-free status.
[44:53.510 --> 44:54.470] [SPEAKER_01]: That's what they're doing now.
[44:54.610 --> 44:56.510] [SPEAKER_01]: That's what Trump is, his latest...
[44:58.450 --> 45:08.750] [SPEAKER_01]: Now, the way he is, you know, utilizing his strategy is to take his enemies and just try and get them to not be tax-exempt anymore.
[45:08.990 --> 45:14.330] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, like the ACLU and Amnesty International, whatever.
[45:14.930 --> 45:20.050] [SPEAKER_01]: Anybody he does not agree with, he will go after and try to make things as hard as possible.
[45:20.230 --> 45:24.890] [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, these groups losing their tax-free status, it could be the end of them.
[45:24.970 --> 45:25.610] [SPEAKER_01]: And he knows that.
[45:26.150 --> 45:29.470] [SPEAKER_01]: So, yeah, it's bullying tactics.
[45:29.470 --> 45:30.670] [SPEAKER_01]: We have to stand up to it.
[45:30.730 --> 45:31.530] [SPEAKER_01]: We have to be aware of it.
[45:31.570 --> 45:36.010] [SPEAKER_01]: We have to not back down and not be afraid, even though it's scary.
[45:36.170 --> 45:37.190] [SPEAKER_01]: It absolutely is scary.
[45:37.650 --> 45:38.290] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead, Kyle.
[45:38.290 --> 45:47.030] [SPEAKER_06]: Well, it's just an important time to remember your roots, remember what you're about, your core principles, and stick with those.
[45:47.170 --> 45:56.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Keep your work and value available to people and stay as independent as possible.
[45:56.890 --> 46:08.790] [SPEAKER_06]: I think that a lot of different institutions in learning and in communication and press are reminded of that in all of these obsessions.
[46:09.050 --> 46:09.610] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead, Alex.
[46:10.710 --> 46:14.190] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, I think that... I want to echo what Kyle is saying here.
[46:14.290 --> 46:17.110] [SPEAKER_05]: And I think, you know, this is important to remember that we're a community here.
[46:17.230 --> 46:18.330] [SPEAKER_05]: We're listening together.
[46:18.490 --> 46:19.510] [SPEAKER_05]: We're broadcasting together.
[46:20.210 --> 46:23.630] [SPEAKER_05]: It's so important to support WBAI, to keep us here.
[46:23.730 --> 46:26.550] [SPEAKER_05]: You don't want the radio station to go the way of the trilobite.
[46:26.810 --> 46:28.290] [SPEAKER_05]: You don't want us to be extinct.
[46:28.470 --> 46:30.750] [SPEAKER_05]: We don't want to be a relic, a thing of the past.
[46:30.990 --> 46:32.110] [SPEAKER_05]: And that's what will happen.
[46:32.390 --> 46:37.330] [SPEAKER_05]: If you think that other people are going to support the station and keep it alive, it's we who have to do it.
[46:37.390 --> 46:39.150] [SPEAKER_05]: The people are listening right now, this community.
[46:39.450 --> 46:44.110] [SPEAKER_05]: Those of you who are listening on a podcast, you're listening live, you know, you're here for a reason.
[46:44.230 --> 46:44.990] [SPEAKER_05]: We need your support.
[46:45.210 --> 46:48.350] [SPEAKER_01]: Rob Gila, do you have info on how people can show their support?
[46:49.850 --> 46:50.230] [SPEAKER_08]: Absolutely.
[46:50.230 --> 46:56.370] [SPEAKER_08]: People can give at buddy.wbai.org, and you can become a regular donor.
[46:57.230 --> 46:59.810] [SPEAKER_08]: This will help you become a member of the station.
[46:59.970 --> 47:05.470] [SPEAKER_08]: It will help us have to ask you for money less because when we have regular income we know is coming in, we know it's coming in.
[47:05.510 --> 47:06.650] [SPEAKER_08]: We don't have to ask you for it.
[47:06.770 --> 47:15.090] [SPEAKER_08]: If you'd rather call us, if you'd rather make your pledge by phone, please feel free to give a call to 833-WBAINBYC.
[47:15.450 --> 47:21.310] [SPEAKER_08]: But if you just want the numbers, that's 833-922-4692.
[47:22.590 --> 47:24.050] [SPEAKER_08]: Please feel free to make your donation.
[47:24.390 --> 47:28.610] [SPEAKER_08]: Also, at the moment, we are a non-profit 501c3.
[47:28.850 --> 47:37.770] [SPEAKER_08]: And if you have tax-advantaged ways to give to us, if you have an IRA that you need to make a required minimum donation from, we can take that off your hands.
[47:37.770 --> 47:41.690] [SPEAKER_08]: If you have a donor-advised fund, we're happy to help you distribute those proceeds as well.
[47:43.110 --> 47:48.230] [SPEAKER_08]: Your giving to WBAI is tax-deductible and a really wonderful way to help the community.
[47:48.230 --> 47:51.430] [SPEAKER_01]: We only have two minutes left, so I want to quickly just read this headline.
[47:51.610 --> 47:54.030] [SPEAKER_01]: We won't really have time to discuss it, but I do want people to know.
[47:54.490 --> 48:06.150] [SPEAKER_01]: A whistleblower complaint says that billionaire Elon Musk's team of technologists may have been responsible for a significant cybersecurity breach, likely of sensitive case files at America's federal labor watchdog.
[48:06.830 --> 48:25.990] [SPEAKER_01]: Basically, the complaint was addressed to Republican Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Tom Cotton and his Democratic counterpart, Mark Warner, and made public last Tuesday by the Group Whistleblower Aid, draws on the testimony of Daniel Berulis, an information technology staffer at the National Labor Relations Board.
[48:26.790 --> 48:43.830] [SPEAKER_01]: Basically, the NLRB, a New Deal-era agency that is tasked with protecting workers' rights to organize and join unions, has for years been a target of America's corporate titans, including Elon Musk, some of whom are now seeking to have the agency's power declared unconstitutional.
[48:43.830 --> 48:55.390] [SPEAKER_01]: In an affidavit, Berulis said he had evidence that Doge staffers were given extraordinarily sweeping access to the NLRB systems, which house sensitive case files.
[48:55.510 --> 49:08.930] [SPEAKER_01]: He said that beginning in early March, logging protocols created to audit users appeared to have been tampered with, and that he had detected the removal of about 10 gigabytes worth of data from NLRB's network sometime thereafter.
[49:08.930 --> 49:11.010] [SPEAKER_01]: There's a lot more to say about this story.
[49:11.110 --> 49:22.150] [SPEAKER_01]: It's super disturbing, but also really, really typical of the kinds of things that are happening now with Doge, with the Trump administration, with the inner workings of this nation right now.
[49:22.350 --> 49:31.110] [SPEAKER_01]: And here at Off The Hook, here at WBAI, we hope to continue to be around to report on them as they happen, and warn people before they happen.
[49:32.310 --> 49:33.070] [SPEAKER_01]: Final words?
[49:35.450 --> 49:39.910] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, keep doing what you're doing out there, and let us know of your projects that you're doing.
[49:40.010 --> 49:40.850] [SPEAKER_07]: We love to hear about them.
[49:41.070 --> 49:43.090] [SPEAKER_07]: oth@2600.com.
[49:43.230 --> 49:52.390] [SPEAKER_07]: Find us at Off The Hook at masto.hackers.town, or Off The Hook on Bluesky, and elsewhere, other places.
[49:52.590 --> 49:57.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, we're in some places that we've lost track of, so you might find us in places that we've forgotten about.
[49:57.310 --> 49:58.010] [SPEAKER_01]: Let us know if you do.
[49:58.690 --> 50:02.750] [SPEAKER_06]: Stay hopeful, and curious, and support hackers.
[50:03.150 --> 50:03.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[50:03.990 --> 50:09.210] [SPEAKER_06]: Your fellow and unknown hackers around the world and in your locale.
[50:09.350 --> 50:09.950] [SPEAKER_06]: Please do.
[50:10.130 --> 50:12.670] [SPEAKER_01]: Just like in a movie, they may be your final hope.
[50:13.190 --> 50:14.030] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know.
[50:14.690 --> 50:16.310] [SPEAKER_01]: It's worth thinking about.
[50:16.630 --> 50:34.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Also, to listen to this show, I know that WBAI archives have been having a bit of trouble recently, so be sure to go to 2600.com/offthehook for basically a list of all the shows we have ever done, and no gaps.
[50:35.350 --> 50:36.970] [SPEAKER_01]: oth@2600.com.
[50:37.070 --> 50:37.550] [SPEAKER_01]: See you next week.
[50:37.630 --> 50:37.830] [SPEAKER_01]: Good night.