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[00:43.840 --> 00:45.060] [SPEAKER_00]: This is a recording.
[00:53.570 --> 00:55.230] [SPEAKER_09]: Oh, I ripped it off the wall.
[00:56.250 --> 00:58.170] [SPEAKER_09]: I cut myself while shaving.
[00:58.830 --> 01:00.710] [SPEAKER_09]: Now I can't make a call.
[01:01.510 --> 01:03.510] [SPEAKER_09]: We couldn't get much worse.
[01:04.210 --> 01:06.050] [SPEAKER_09]: But if they could, they would.
[01:06.330 --> 01:08.950] [SPEAKER_09]: From Diddley Bum, for the best, it's back from worst.
[01:09.630 --> 01:11.470] [SPEAKER_09]: I hope that's understood.
[01:11.670 --> 01:12.550] [SPEAKER_09]: From Diddley Bum!
[02:29.490 --> 02:31.530] [SPEAKER_02]: And a very good evening to everybody.
[02:31.610 --> 02:34.070] [SPEAKER_02]: The program is Off The Hook.
[02:34.510 --> 02:37.950] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm Emmanuel Goldstein here with you, joined tonight by Kyle.
[02:38.230 --> 02:38.530] [SPEAKER_02]: Hello.
[02:38.870 --> 02:42.110] [SPEAKER_02]: Out in Signal-land, we have Alex.
[02:42.750 --> 02:43.430] [SPEAKER_03]: You do.
[02:43.810 --> 02:44.170] [SPEAKER_03]: Hello.
[02:44.630 --> 02:45.150] [SPEAKER_02]: Welcome.
[02:45.410 --> 02:48.190] [SPEAKER_02]: And as you can see, we have a skeleton crew tonight.
[02:48.570 --> 02:50.330] [SPEAKER_02]: We are not doing overtime.
[02:50.970 --> 02:55.810] [SPEAKER_02]: And in fact, we likely will not be on at all next week.
[02:55.830 --> 03:10.590] [SPEAKER_02]: Reason for that is very sad because our good friend, Greg Newby, who has been on this radio show so many times and has been a part of our lives, a part of the Hope Conference, a part of the magazine, Hope 16, a part of the Hope 16.
[03:10.590 --> 03:13.190] [SPEAKER_02]: And he is not in good shape.
[03:13.310 --> 03:22.810] [SPEAKER_02]: Those of you who are at the closing ceremonies of Hope 16 know that he appeared on video from Whitehorse in the Yukon.
[03:24.390 --> 03:29.790] [SPEAKER_02]: And he was diagnosed in March, late March, with pancreatic cancer.
[03:30.090 --> 03:34.690] [SPEAKER_02]: And it has progressed relentlessly.
[03:34.690 --> 03:46.630] [SPEAKER_02]: And he has tried everything and held out hope and been one of the strongest people I think I can ever recall having known.
[03:47.870 --> 03:51.850] [SPEAKER_02]: And he entered hospice today in Whitehorse.
[03:52.670 --> 03:56.610] [SPEAKER_02]: And by all accounts, does not have much longer to go.
[03:59.570 --> 04:01.310] [SPEAKER_02]: So Kyle and I are going to head up there.
[04:03.110 --> 04:05.810] [SPEAKER_02]: Hopefully we can hang out with him one more time.
[04:06.710 --> 04:10.230] [SPEAKER_02]: And I don't think we can do radio.
[04:10.430 --> 04:12.150] [SPEAKER_02]: I just don't think we can do that next week.
[04:12.730 --> 04:13.290] [SPEAKER_02]: We'll see.
[04:13.450 --> 04:13.750] [SPEAKER_02]: We'll see.
[04:14.310 --> 04:18.510] [SPEAKER_02]: Alex, I know, you've crossed paths with Greg many times.
[04:20.610 --> 04:25.090] [SPEAKER_02]: This, you know, it's just weird seeing this happen.
[04:25.210 --> 04:27.930] [SPEAKER_02]: Of course, it happened with Kevin Mitnick several years ago.
[04:28.270 --> 04:33.570] [SPEAKER_02]: The exact same damn disease that we seem to know so little about.
[04:33.570 --> 04:34.790] [SPEAKER_02]: It's so relentless.
[04:34.810 --> 04:36.110] [SPEAKER_02]: It's so unforgiving.
[04:36.550 --> 04:39.530] [SPEAKER_02]: And it's so unpredictable.
[04:39.830 --> 04:45.670] [SPEAKER_02]: Something, you know, beginning of March, Greg was healthy as ever.
[04:45.830 --> 04:48.810] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, one of the healthiest people I think I know took care of himself.
[04:49.150 --> 04:55.870] [SPEAKER_02]: He was the guy that ran the multi-marathon over the course of days in Alaska.
[04:56.250 --> 04:57.550] [SPEAKER_02]: Kyle and I were his support team.
[04:57.550 --> 04:58.930] [SPEAKER_01]: It's an ultramarathon.
[04:59.210 --> 04:59.730] [SPEAKER_02]: Ultramarathon.
[04:59.830 --> 05:00.030] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[05:00.230 --> 05:04.150] [SPEAKER_02]: I can't even get the word right, let alone pull something like that off.
[05:04.370 --> 05:15.270] [SPEAKER_02]: This is somebody who walked miles every day, had a vegan diet, was just somebody who paid attention to his health.
[05:15.270 --> 05:22.390] [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, sometimes, fate has different ideas.
[05:22.830 --> 05:25.470] [SPEAKER_02]: And it's just really hard to wrap your head around.
[05:25.750 --> 05:34.910] [SPEAKER_02]: So, you know, we had a very emotional connection at those closing ceremonies where everybody in the audience was waving at Greg.
[05:34.910 --> 05:37.070] [SPEAKER_02]: It was so moving and so beautiful.
[05:37.850 --> 05:43.370] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know how we move forward without his wisdom, his strength, his perseverance.
[05:44.950 --> 05:48.250] [SPEAKER_02]: I'll tell you, you know, we never would have found a new home without him.
[05:48.250 --> 05:53.770] [SPEAKER_02]: He is the one who found St. John's University as a venue for a conference like Hope.
[05:53.950 --> 06:04.770] [SPEAKER_02]: So, we have a lot to remember, a lot to be thankful for, but a lot to be angry about, too, because he had so much ahead of him.
[06:04.770 --> 06:05.290] [SPEAKER_02]: So much.
[06:05.710 --> 06:10.650] [SPEAKER_02]: So, yeah, that's the story for next week.
[06:10.790 --> 06:16.250] [SPEAKER_02]: And, of course, if you're out there and you want to send a message to Greg, we will relay that to him.
[06:16.670 --> 06:21.810] [SPEAKER_02]: Just email us, oth@2600.com, oth@2600.com.
[06:22.470 --> 06:23.230] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead, Alex.
[06:25.170 --> 06:43.210] [SPEAKER_03]: I want to echo what you said, Emmanuel, about Greg and being such an extraordinary guy, such a special part of the Hope Conference, involved in so many things that I think really personified the values of the hacker subculture that we've come to love and know so well.
[06:43.310 --> 06:46.170] [SPEAKER_03]: And I'm talking in particular about Project Gutenberg.
[06:46.170 --> 06:48.730] [SPEAKER_03]: He's been involved in for many, many years.
[06:49.690 --> 06:53.030] [SPEAKER_03]: You know, and it's basically a volunteer digital library.
[06:53.430 --> 06:57.010] [SPEAKER_03]: And, you know, not just lending out digital books and things like that.
[06:57.010 --> 06:58.650] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, they were fighting legal battles.
[06:58.830 --> 07:04.690] [SPEAKER_03]: Greg and I had many discussions about copyright and illegal battles that they had fought and that were ahead of them.
[07:05.310 --> 07:11.970] [SPEAKER_03]: So, I mean, this guy is not only, I think, strong as an ox, but he's a fighter as well.
[07:11.970 --> 07:15.930] [SPEAKER_03]: And I think he embodies that fighting spirit that's within all of us.
[07:16.210 --> 07:25.330] [SPEAKER_03]: But I also want to correct something you said about Greg as well, Emmanuel, which is that you don't know how we're going to move on without him.
[07:26.050 --> 07:27.690] [SPEAKER_03]: We're not going to move on without him.
[07:27.810 --> 07:29.090] [SPEAKER_03]: He's always going to be with us.
[07:29.210 --> 07:32.370] [SPEAKER_03]: He's always going to be part of the HOPE Conference.
[07:32.370 --> 07:34.450] [SPEAKER_03]: He's going to be part of this community.
[07:34.450 --> 07:36.110] [SPEAKER_03]: He brought so much to it.
[07:36.710 --> 07:40.910] [SPEAKER_03]: And I think has imbued us with so much wisdom and so much spirit.
[07:41.430 --> 07:44.530] [SPEAKER_03]: Greg will always be part of this culture, I think.
[07:44.650 --> 07:46.110] [SPEAKER_03]: So I just want to correct you on that.
[07:46.190 --> 07:46.910] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, no, absolutely.
[07:46.910 --> 08:00.170] [SPEAKER_02]: I remember when we first met him online, we were asking for volunteers for the conference to help out with all the things that it entails.
[08:00.530 --> 08:03.970] [SPEAKER_02]: And this new guy just wrote in, and his last name was Newby.
[08:04.050 --> 08:09.950] [SPEAKER_02]: And if you're part of the hacker community, you know that a newbie is basically the lowest rung of the ladder.
[08:11.270 --> 08:13.450] [SPEAKER_02]: And we thought it was a joke.
[08:13.550 --> 08:15.050] [SPEAKER_02]: We thought somebody was having fun with us.
[08:15.930 --> 08:18.170] [SPEAKER_02]: But, of course, it was not a joke.
[08:18.170 --> 08:18.770] [SPEAKER_02]: It was serious.
[08:19.070 --> 08:28.870] [SPEAKER_02]: And we met one of the most productive, creative, imaginative, talented people we are ever going to be graced with knowing.
[08:31.290 --> 08:34.050] [SPEAKER_02]: So, yeah, you know, I have no idea how we're getting up there.
[08:34.190 --> 08:36.110] [SPEAKER_02]: I have no idea exactly what the plan is.
[08:36.190 --> 08:39.670] [SPEAKER_02]: But I just know we have to do something and hang out with him.
[08:39.670 --> 08:43.410] [SPEAKER_02]: If we have that opportunity, we're going to take it.
[08:44.430 --> 08:48.230] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't even know if airplanes are going to be flying because of government shutdowns.
[08:48.410 --> 08:49.730] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know about borders.
[08:49.870 --> 08:50.990] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know about any of this.
[08:51.090 --> 08:51.750] [SPEAKER_02]: And I don't care.
[08:51.930 --> 08:52.650] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't care.
[08:53.690 --> 08:54.650] [SPEAKER_02]: We'll push through.
[08:54.950 --> 08:55.910] [SPEAKER_02]: We'll do what we have to do.
[08:57.370 --> 08:57.730] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[08:57.910 --> 09:00.190] [SPEAKER_02]: So, that's our mindset right now.
[09:00.270 --> 09:04.090] [SPEAKER_02]: As you can see, probably not the best mindset for radio in the weeks ahead.
[09:04.090 --> 09:09.370] [SPEAKER_02]: However, tonight, we're here at WBAI and we'll be taking phone calls tonight.
[09:09.590 --> 09:10.450] [SPEAKER_02]: No overtime.
[09:11.310 --> 09:12.350] [SPEAKER_02]: Just phone calls.
[09:12.730 --> 09:13.430] [SPEAKER_02]: Not yet.
[09:13.610 --> 09:13.950] [SPEAKER_02]: Not yet.
[09:13.950 --> 09:17.550] [SPEAKER_02]: We'll let you know when the time is right to dial in.
[09:17.950 --> 09:20.230] [SPEAKER_02]: Because we have some other things to talk about as well.
[09:21.010 --> 09:23.530] [SPEAKER_02]: There's been a bunch of news.
[09:24.410 --> 09:27.890] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, not just the thing we were talking about last week, which, boy, that sure...
[09:27.890 --> 09:33.790] [SPEAKER_02]: I think we might have been the first show to cover the Jimmy Kimmel story because it just happened right before we went on the air.
[09:34.730 --> 09:39.410] [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, we received a bunch of pushback from some listeners.
[09:39.450 --> 09:41.790] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't have it in front of me, but I know we got a bunch of letters.
[09:41.910 --> 09:50.470] [SPEAKER_02]: In fact, if we were gauging listener feedback, we would have to say that the vast majority of people do not want us talking about freedom of speech issues.
[09:50.610 --> 09:51.810] [SPEAKER_02]: They call it politics.
[09:52.010 --> 09:54.930] [SPEAKER_02]: They call it just Trump bashing.
[09:55.150 --> 09:56.430] [SPEAKER_02]: And they think we should not do that.
[09:56.430 --> 09:58.390] [SPEAKER_02]: And some of them think we should be prosecuted for doing that.
[09:58.490 --> 09:58.870] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm not kidding.
[10:00.630 --> 10:03.150] [SPEAKER_02]: Does that represent the majority of WBAI listeners?
[10:03.290 --> 10:05.810] [SPEAKER_02]: Because it represents the majority of people who write to us.
[10:06.070 --> 10:11.190] [SPEAKER_02]: So the rest of you, maybe this is something to look at.
[10:11.370 --> 10:18.570] [SPEAKER_02]: Because sometimes people are very quiet when we need them to make noise.
[10:19.570 --> 10:24.530] [SPEAKER_02]: And I can't think of a time in history where your noise has not been more needed.
[10:24.530 --> 10:27.110] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, I hear plenty from the other side.
[10:27.290 --> 10:37.590] [SPEAKER_02]: I hear plenty of becoming a victim, a victim of diversity and equality and freedom and things like that.
[10:37.690 --> 10:51.630] [SPEAKER_02]: And I just hear not a whole lot from other people that really should be making their lives challenging, as challenging as our lives have been made by all the craziness going on.
[10:51.630 --> 10:57.790] [SPEAKER_02]: And that's not really a controversial statement or something worthy of arguing.
[10:58.130 --> 11:00.590] [SPEAKER_02]: We are living in crazy times now.
[11:02.170 --> 11:05.070] [SPEAKER_02]: If you don't see that, you're intentionally not seeing that.
[11:05.590 --> 11:07.650] [SPEAKER_02]: There's just no other way I can phrase it.
[11:07.770 --> 11:10.210] [SPEAKER_02]: So, oth@2600.com.
[11:10.290 --> 11:11.050] [SPEAKER_02]: Send us your feedback.
[11:11.050 --> 11:13.290] [SPEAKER_02]: If we're doing things you hate, let us know that.
[11:13.410 --> 11:15.030] [SPEAKER_02]: And so far, that seems to be the majority.
[11:15.610 --> 11:21.990] [SPEAKER_02]: But if we're doing things that you like or you want to add to it in some way, also write to us and let us know that.
[11:22.230 --> 11:23.650] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, your words matter.
[11:23.670 --> 11:24.870] [SPEAKER_02]: And that's a good way to prove it.
[11:25.530 --> 11:32.910] [SPEAKER_02]: And boy, the days, weeks, months, years ahead are going to have a lot of history.
[11:33.290 --> 11:34.870] [SPEAKER_02]: A lot of history attached to them.
[11:34.870 --> 11:35.650] [SPEAKER_02]: So, okay.
[11:35.850 --> 11:40.570] [SPEAKER_02]: That story, we are not focusing on tonight because we focused on it last week.
[11:40.670 --> 11:42.470] [SPEAKER_02]: And it's kind of run its course.
[11:43.510 --> 11:46.210] [SPEAKER_02]: It's, you know, the whole thing is not over, obviously.
[11:46.430 --> 11:49.450] [SPEAKER_02]: But that particular episode is.
[11:49.550 --> 11:50.950] [SPEAKER_02]: But we have something new to talk about.
[11:52.290 --> 11:55.750] [SPEAKER_02]: Anybody catch this Secret Service press release yesterday?
[11:56.990 --> 11:57.430] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[11:58.890 --> 12:00.150] [SPEAKER_02]: Basically, I'm going to read it.
[12:00.230 --> 12:04.150] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm going to read it word for word because I love reading press releases.
[12:04.870 --> 12:05.370] [SPEAKER_02]: The U.S.
[12:05.410 --> 12:17.250] [SPEAKER_02]: Secret Service dismantled a network of electronic devices located throughout the New York tri-state area that were used to conduct multiple telecommunications-related threats directed towards senior U.S.
[12:17.390 --> 12:22.970] [SPEAKER_02]: government officials, which represented an imminent threat to the agency's protective operations.
[12:23.450 --> 12:30.270] [SPEAKER_02]: This protective intelligence investigation led to the discovery of more than 300 co-located SIM servers.
[12:30.830 --> 12:31.890] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, SIM servers.
[12:31.990 --> 12:32.350] [SPEAKER_02]: That's a thing.
[12:32.350 --> 12:37.350] [SPEAKER_02]: And 100,000 SIM cards across multiple sites.
[12:38.990 --> 12:39.630] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[12:40.110 --> 12:46.930] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, if you don't know what that means, welcome to the club because, you know, we haven't usually talked in those terms before.
[12:47.130 --> 12:59.270] [SPEAKER_02]: In addition to carrying out anonymous telephonic threats, these devices could be used to conduct a wide range of telecommunications attacks.
[12:59.270 --> 13:13.710] [SPEAKER_02]: This includes disabling cell phone towers, enabling denial of services attacks, and facilitating anonymous encrypted communication between potential threat actors and criminal enterprises.
[13:14.470 --> 13:29.030] [SPEAKER_02]: So what I'm hearing here is that these things could be used to communicate between people and and they could be used to disable cell towers and establish denial of service attacks and things like that.
[13:29.090 --> 13:29.510] [SPEAKER_02]: They could be.
[13:29.770 --> 13:32.210] [SPEAKER_02]: No evidence that they have been, but these things could be.
[13:33.530 --> 13:36.950] [SPEAKER_02]: I could probably walk into a Circuit City, or I'm sorry, Best Buy.
[13:37.070 --> 13:38.910] [SPEAKER_02]: I keep thinking Circuit City is still open.
[13:39.230 --> 13:41.210] [SPEAKER_02]: And find enough equipment to do that.
[13:41.210 --> 13:55.350] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, this is a good point because the way that something could be used, and that's, I think, the crux of it, how is it being used in this particular case is part of what you would conclude from an investigation.
[13:56.590 --> 14:05.390] [SPEAKER_01]: All the basic uses, because how you might use it one way would probably necessitate the equipment to do a variety of things.
[14:05.810 --> 14:23.150] [SPEAKER_01]: So if you're using it for testing or for something else, that you could access the network en masse in another way that is maybe more heinous or scary for the headlines doesn't necessarily mean that's the conclusion of an investigation.
[14:23.150 --> 14:24.310] [SPEAKER_01]: So you raise a good point.
[14:24.590 --> 14:33.750] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, I'm just really, really doubtful anytime I see any kind of government release these days because it's almost always filled with bravado and lies.
[14:34.290 --> 14:38.530] [SPEAKER_02]: So I have to assume that there's a fair amount of both in this.
[14:39.390 --> 14:50.950] [SPEAKER_02]: Anyway, while forensic examination of these devices is ongoing, early analysis indicates cellular communications between nation-state threat actors and individuals that are known to federal law enforcement.
[14:51.530 --> 14:53.530] [SPEAKER_02]: You really have to read between the lines here.
[14:53.610 --> 14:58.770] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, so they know some of the people involved here, and they know that they're talking to people in other countries.
[14:58.770 --> 15:04.590] [SPEAKER_02]: Again, I'm looking for something really exciting here and hasn't exactly been expressed yet.
[15:04.910 --> 15:05.310] [SPEAKER_02]: U.S.
[15:05.570 --> 15:15.650] [SPEAKER_02]: Secret Service Director Sean Curran said the potential for disruption to our country's telecommunications posed by this network of devices cannot be overstated.
[15:16.490 --> 15:17.750] [SPEAKER_02]: The U.S.
[15:18.010 --> 15:31.630] [SPEAKER_02]: Secret Service's protective mission is all about prevention, and this investigation makes it clear to potential bad actors that imminent threats to our protectees will be immediately investigated, tracked down, and dismantled.
[15:33.250 --> 15:38.010] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, well, yeah, the bad actors might get a clear message here.
[15:38.070 --> 15:39.150] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm not getting the clear message.
[15:39.830 --> 15:43.690] [SPEAKER_02]: You found rooms filled with SIM servers and SIMs.
[15:44.370 --> 15:45.290] [SPEAKER_02]: I'd like to know more.
[15:45.350 --> 15:46.190] [SPEAKER_02]: How did you find them?
[15:46.370 --> 15:48.010] [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, what led you to this?
[15:48.110 --> 15:50.190] [SPEAKER_02]: What makes you think they're about to be used?
[15:50.190 --> 15:51.850] [SPEAKER_02]: What's going on, guys?
[15:51.970 --> 15:52.330] [SPEAKER_02]: Tell us.
[15:53.090 --> 15:53.690] [SPEAKER_02]: Let's continue.
[15:53.830 --> 16:01.030] [SPEAKER_02]: These devices were concentrated within 35 miles of the Global Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, now underway in New York City.
[16:02.090 --> 16:09.670] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, there were also 35, you know, within 35 miles of every decent pizza place.
[16:09.670 --> 16:11.470] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, I don't know, what does that prove?
[16:12.910 --> 16:17.150] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, yeah, they were within a certain distance between things that were happening.
[16:18.150 --> 16:28.750] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, given the timing, location, and potential for significant disruption to New York telecommunications posed by these devices, the agency moved quickly to disrupt this network.
[16:28.950 --> 16:30.030] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, again, timing.
[16:31.370 --> 16:32.710] [SPEAKER_02]: You were dictating the timing.
[16:32.850 --> 16:34.090] [SPEAKER_02]: You were the one who rated them.
[16:34.190 --> 16:35.250] [SPEAKER_02]: So that's the timing.
[16:35.410 --> 16:36.050] [SPEAKER_02]: What were they...
[16:36.050 --> 16:37.070] [SPEAKER_02]: What's their timing?
[16:37.230 --> 16:37.550] [SPEAKER_02]: Were they...
[16:37.550 --> 16:38.910] [SPEAKER_02]: Was there a ticking clock or something?
[16:38.910 --> 16:42.170] [SPEAKER_02]: Was somebody saying they were going to do something at a certain time, on a certain day?
[16:43.830 --> 16:44.850] [SPEAKER_02]: The U.S.
[16:44.870 --> 16:47.110] [SPEAKER_02]: Secret Service's Advanced Threat...
[16:47.110 --> 16:48.190] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, I'm embarrassed now.
[16:48.270 --> 16:49.590] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know how to pronounce inter...
[16:49.590 --> 16:50.090] [SPEAKER_02]: Inter...
[16:50.090 --> 16:50.890] [SPEAKER_02]: Interdiction?
[16:51.290 --> 16:51.770] [SPEAKER_02]: Interdition?
[16:52.250 --> 16:52.730] [SPEAKER_01]: Interdiction.
[16:52.910 --> 16:53.390] [SPEAKER_02]: Interdiction.
[16:53.650 --> 16:54.010] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[16:54.210 --> 16:55.410] [SPEAKER_02]: I've never said that word before.
[16:55.570 --> 16:56.610] [SPEAKER_02]: It's a weird word.
[16:56.710 --> 16:56.950] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm sorry.
[16:57.410 --> 17:07.170] [SPEAKER_02]: A new section of the agency dedicated to disrupting the most significant and imminent threats to our protectees is conducting this investigation.
[17:07.750 --> 17:10.170] [SPEAKER_02]: This investigation is currently ongoing.
[17:10.390 --> 17:10.490] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[17:10.610 --> 17:14.230] [SPEAKER_02]: First of all, whoever wrote this, don't say this investigation twice in a row.
[17:14.390 --> 17:16.090] [SPEAKER_02]: That just sounds really bad.
[17:17.710 --> 17:19.790] [SPEAKER_02]: The Department of Homeland Security's...
[17:21.390 --> 17:22.610] [SPEAKER_02]: They got a problem here.
[17:22.690 --> 17:26.010] [SPEAKER_02]: The Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Investigations?
[17:26.570 --> 17:27.630] [SPEAKER_02]: That's their name?
[17:28.730 --> 17:29.590] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, Lord.
[17:29.790 --> 17:36.070] [SPEAKER_02]: The Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the NYPD...
[17:36.710 --> 17:37.310] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, wait.
[17:37.350 --> 17:37.950] [SPEAKER_02]: There's more in a sentence.
[17:38.070 --> 17:38.370] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm sorry.
[17:38.770 --> 17:39.330] [SPEAKER_02]: That was a comma.
[17:39.470 --> 17:42.530] [SPEAKER_02]: As well as other state and local law enforcement partners.
[17:43.410 --> 17:44.170] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, I'm sorry.
[17:44.190 --> 17:44.630] [SPEAKER_02]: Another comma.
[17:44.770 --> 17:44.870] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[17:45.770 --> 17:49.690] [SPEAKER_02]: Provided valuable technical advice and assistance in support of this investigation.
[17:49.690 --> 17:59.270] [SPEAKER_02]: I think we could have provided better advice because I'm as puzzled ending that as I was when I started.
[17:59.410 --> 18:06.130] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, the Secret Service has specific goals, so they're not going to be as interested in answering some of the questions that you're talking about.
[18:06.250 --> 18:14.210] [SPEAKER_01]: And then, of course, the people that they partnered with to help reach certain conclusions aren't going to want to talk about their methods and source...
[18:14.210 --> 18:15.670] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, maybe they're not the right people.
[18:15.770 --> 18:16.610] [SPEAKER_01]: ...who, how, and why.
[18:16.610 --> 18:22.650] [SPEAKER_02]: Maybe they're not the right people to write the press releases then, because I have questions, all the media has questions, and questions are good, and people need to know.
[18:23.670 --> 18:35.150] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, it's also strategic, because if they do know some of the answers to some of these things, it may not be as useful for future investigations or for additional parts of this current...
[18:35.150 --> 18:37.250] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, this has never happened before, at least as far as I know.
[18:37.430 --> 18:43.210] [SPEAKER_02]: But, you know, one thing I did get out of this press release is that, okay, all these horrible things can happen to the cell networks.
[18:44.110 --> 18:44.770] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, you know what?
[18:44.770 --> 18:46.510] [SPEAKER_02]: If we were using landlines, this wouldn't be an issue.
[18:46.610 --> 18:48.590] [SPEAKER_02]: So, maybe that's the solution.
[18:48.750 --> 18:49.770] [SPEAKER_02]: Maybe that's the lesson here.
[18:49.930 --> 18:59.350] [SPEAKER_02]: We keep saying this week after week, but all of this that the Secret Service has been pointing to is basically a threat to cell phone service.
[19:00.130 --> 19:05.390] [SPEAKER_02]: That could happen, and there wasn't any indication that it actually was happening, did happen, or was imminent.
[19:05.670 --> 19:07.010] [SPEAKER_02]: At least not that they've revealed.
[19:07.010 --> 19:17.930] [SPEAKER_01]: But weren't there, like, clandestine, like, switching and call centers and stuff in the days of wired phone systems?
[19:17.970 --> 19:20.170] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, people did similar types of things.
[19:20.370 --> 19:22.030] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, it wasn't quite like this.
[19:22.170 --> 19:23.770] [SPEAKER_01]: No, not as capable.
[19:23.770 --> 19:33.090] [SPEAKER_02]: Because people weren't walking around the streets at demonstrations and things like that, having their location or their communications intercepted.
[19:33.090 --> 19:33.830] [SPEAKER_02]: True, true.
[19:33.950 --> 19:36.990] [SPEAKER_02]: So, this is, you know, I'm curious what this is.
[19:37.050 --> 19:37.830] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm not saying it's nothing.
[19:37.830 --> 19:40.510] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm just saying we're not really being told what's going on.
[19:40.610 --> 19:43.670] [SPEAKER_01]: I was really interested in the pictures, just the way they're arranged.
[19:44.230 --> 19:46.870] [SPEAKER_01]: Assuming everything was still connected the way they were found.
[19:47.010 --> 19:47.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Very nice and neat.
[19:47.710 --> 20:07.350] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, and you can kind of see and think about the pathways of connection, and it looks like all of the different devices that hold the SIMs are connected through a smaller switch, and then that's connected to something that looks maybe like part of a mesh wireless,
[20:07.530 --> 20:08.610] [SPEAKER_01]: like a back-end network.
[20:08.830 --> 20:15.430] [SPEAKER_01]: But it's, I guess, stuff that a more in-depth story about this is going to have to talk about.
[20:15.430 --> 20:19.970] [SPEAKER_02]: There is an in-depth story that I just picked up here from Bloomberg, I believe.
[20:20.190 --> 20:20.530] [SPEAKER_02]: The U.S.
[20:20.610 --> 20:32.170] [SPEAKER_02]: Secret Service investigation into a suspicious network of communication devices in the New York City area came after threatening phone calls were made to two White House aides and a top law enforcement official.
[20:32.170 --> 20:33.830] [SPEAKER_02]: That's according to people familiar with the matter.
[20:33.930 --> 20:35.310] [SPEAKER_02]: It would have been nice to have that in the press release.
[20:35.750 --> 20:46.990] [SPEAKER_02]: The calls, which originated with a network of phone technology through the New York area, spurred the Secret Service to mount the investigation that uncovered the clandestine telecom ring that was revealed on Tuesday.
[20:47.230 --> 20:48.590] [SPEAKER_02]: Boy, what a sentence that is.
[20:48.770 --> 21:05.070] [SPEAKER_02]: The nature of the targets and their proximity to President Donald Trump convinced investigators they were facing a coordinated campaign rather than ordinary harassment by someone attempting a phishing scam or other low-level fraud, according to the people familiar with the probe.
[21:05.470 --> 21:19.370] [SPEAKER_02]: A Secret Service intelligence team known as the Advanced Threat Interdiction Unit found a network of more than 300 servers, 100,000 SIM cards, scattered across the New York area, concealed in unmarked buildings and apartments.
[21:19.690 --> 21:27.890] [SPEAKER_02]: So-called SIM farms allow bulk messaging that can be used by cyber criminals for fraud, swatting, and other illicit activity.
[21:28.110 --> 21:43.370] [SPEAKER_02]: The equipment was concentrated in affluent suburbs, including Greenwich, Connecticut, and Armonk, New York, as well as the New York City borough of Queens and Northern New Jersey, forming what officials said was a circle around the metropolitan region's cellular infrastructure,
[21:43.610 --> 21:46.670] [SPEAKER_02]: or the United Nations, if you feel like saying that.
[21:47.150 --> 21:53.310] [SPEAKER_02]: Investigators said the system had been used both by foreign governments and by criminal groups inside the U.S.
[21:53.390 --> 21:54.510] [SPEAKER_02]: What, they banded together?
[21:54.750 --> 21:54.990] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[21:54.990 --> 22:02.770] [SPEAKER_02]: And was capable of sending out mass spam messages, placing anonymous calls, and overwhelming emergency lines.
[22:03.870 --> 22:14.430] [SPEAKER_02]: The discovery came as more than 150 world leaders were arriving in Manhattan for the United Nations General Assembly when New York becomes one of the most heavily secured places in the world.
[22:14.910 --> 22:18.130] [SPEAKER_02]: Matt McCool, this guy's name is actually McCool.
[22:18.310 --> 22:19.610] [SPEAKER_02]: He is that cool.
[22:20.010 --> 22:21.470] [SPEAKER_02]: He was on TV and everything.
[22:21.470 --> 22:29.870] [SPEAKER_02]: The special agent, who was in charge of the Secret Service's New York field office, said the timing, the location, the proximity of the network had the potential to impact the U.N.
[22:31.270 --> 22:36.330] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, people close to Trump began receiving threats immediately after his electoral victory in November.
[22:37.650 --> 22:46.830] [SPEAKER_02]: Howard Lutnick, the then Cantor Fitzgerald chief, who now serves as Commerce Secretary, received an email warning of a bomb at his Upper East Side home.
[22:47.510 --> 22:58.390] [SPEAKER_02]: Brooke Rollins, our old friend Lee Zeldin, and Pete Hegseff, who were also chosen by Trump for cabinet positions, reported threats as well, some in the form of swatting calls.
[22:58.870 --> 23:05.370] [SPEAKER_02]: Some outside experts questioned whether the SIM farms could have produced the disruption suggested by officials.
[23:05.370 --> 23:16.230] [SPEAKER_02]: The number of servers and SIM cards seized wouldn't likely disableize networks built to handle millions of users in the New York area, said Alexander Erbelis, chief information...
[23:16.230 --> 23:17.310] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, it's got your name, Alex.
[23:17.310 --> 23:20.730] [SPEAKER_02]: Chief Information Security Officer of Ethereum Name Service.
[23:21.260 --> 23:26.990] [SPEAKER_02]: It's common to confuse proximity with intent and find conspiracies in coincidence, he said.
[23:27.610 --> 23:40.690] [SPEAKER_02]: Finding a SIM farm of this magnitude is more likely indicative of a criminal enterprise focusing on high-volume fraud through SMS phishing rather than on an operation interested in disrupting the U.N.
[23:40.850 --> 23:41.570] [SPEAKER_02]: General Assembly.
[23:41.570 --> 23:44.610] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm like, wait a minute, this was you, Alex.
[23:44.930 --> 23:48.130] [SPEAKER_02]: My goodness, you slipped into the story I was reading.
[23:48.710 --> 23:48.910] [SPEAKER_03]: Okay.
[23:49.230 --> 23:50.110] [SPEAKER_03]: That was I.
[23:50.310 --> 23:51.570] [SPEAKER_02]: Nice hack there.
[23:51.770 --> 23:52.790] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, well, there we go.
[23:53.010 --> 23:54.130] [SPEAKER_02]: Do go on then.
[23:54.230 --> 23:56.570] [SPEAKER_02]: Tell us, give us some more of your insight.
[23:57.270 --> 23:59.410] [SPEAKER_03]: Well, yeah, I think that this...
[23:59.410 --> 24:10.710] [SPEAKER_03]: Well, first off, I didn't realize that Special Agent McCool had used the same word that I had used in my quote, namely proximity.
[24:10.990 --> 24:18.310] [SPEAKER_03]: So when I said it's common to confuse proximity with intent, it's basically like saying, Special Agent McCool, you're totally wrong.
[24:19.190 --> 24:22.990] [SPEAKER_03]: And even though I do believe that, I didn't mean to be such a jerk about it.
[24:22.990 --> 24:24.170] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, it doesn't make him uncool.
[24:24.410 --> 24:25.470] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, he's still cool.
[24:25.750 --> 24:26.510] [SPEAKER_02]: He's still cool.
[24:26.610 --> 24:27.570] [SPEAKER_02]: He could still be wrong, though.
[24:27.990 --> 24:28.410] [SPEAKER_03]: That's right.
[24:28.410 --> 24:32.170] [SPEAKER_03]: And I think he'd be even cooler if he acknowledged that he was wrong, right?
[24:32.290 --> 24:33.530] [SPEAKER_03]: Because that's a...
[24:33.530 --> 24:35.370] [SPEAKER_03]: You know, I think that's fundamental to being cruel.
[24:35.370 --> 24:37.350] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm sure by the end of the hour, we'll get a statement.
[24:37.650 --> 24:39.350] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, we very well may.
[24:39.770 --> 24:49.770] [SPEAKER_03]: But from the outset, I thought this was like such a totally bogus story because just like you said, Emmanuel, it's very difficult to unpack what the hell was going on with these particular details.
[24:50.030 --> 24:57.070] [SPEAKER_03]: So a Bloomberg reporter contacted me yesterday and I gave him that quote about this.
[24:57.130 --> 25:09.750] [SPEAKER_03]: I said, you know, like, I don't see how or why this type of SIM farm would be used to disrupt the communications network when there's quite literally like 10 million other phones in the area that are active at any particular time.
[25:09.970 --> 25:22.270] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, maybe you could try to swarm and overwhelm one particular cell tower, but the types of resiliency and the capacity that's built into the New York telecommunications infrastructure probably is more...
[25:23.130 --> 25:32.650] [SPEAKER_03]: is stronger than any individual SIM farm or SIM farms around Armonk and Greenwich, Connecticut could actually facilitate.
[25:32.710 --> 25:40.670] [SPEAKER_03]: So my thought on this was that this is probably something that's used for massive SMS phishing fraud, right?
[25:40.790 --> 25:41.590] [SPEAKER_03]: So, or smishing.
[25:41.830 --> 26:02.370] [SPEAKER_03]: You know, those types of messages you get that tell you, like, for instance, that you have some kind of overdue toll bill and try to impersonate, you know, the Vermont DMV or the New York State DMV or the Connecticut DMV and they try to use local numbers with local exchanges in your particular area to convince you that this is more real,
[26:02.550 --> 26:02.670] [SPEAKER_03]: right?
[26:02.770 --> 26:14.610] [SPEAKER_03]: And that you're actually dealing with your local DMV or it could be used to impersonate organizations like Coinbase and say something like, you know, your withdrawal code is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
[26:14.810 --> 26:22.550] [SPEAKER_03]: If you haven't asked for this, call this 800 number and then you begin to get scammed by some more sophisticated scammer who's going after your digital asset.
[26:22.690 --> 26:25.610] [SPEAKER_03]: So I think this is just run-of-the-mill fraud.
[26:25.610 --> 26:38.110] [SPEAKER_03]: I think that they triangulated if that's even the right way that they came across this because it seems like somebody sent a threatening message to some Trump aide or some Trump-related or administration-related person.
[26:38.770 --> 26:41.870] [SPEAKER_03]: Secret Service then triangulated these... on these farms.
[26:42.050 --> 26:45.050] [SPEAKER_03]: And the reason why it was the Secret Service here was because they...
[26:45.630 --> 26:46.390] [SPEAKER_03]: of what they mentioned.
[26:46.530 --> 26:48.010] [SPEAKER_03]: They're protecting their protectees.
[26:48.170 --> 26:49.330] [SPEAKER_03]: They have...
[26:49.330 --> 26:55.850] [SPEAKER_03]: their charges are certain government officials and cabinet-level members that Secret Service has to protect.
[26:56.070 --> 27:01.830] [SPEAKER_03]: So they investigated these threats, triangulated on these locations and found server farms...
[27:02.590 --> 27:03.990] [SPEAKER_03]: SIM farms, I'm sorry.
[27:04.210 --> 27:06.710] [SPEAKER_03]: And they're not really familiar with this technology.
[27:06.810 --> 27:08.930] [SPEAKER_03]: So I think that they got it all wrong.
[27:09.270 --> 27:10.750] [SPEAKER_03]: That's my guess here.
[27:10.930 --> 27:19.930] [SPEAKER_03]: I wonder if I'll be proven wrong this week when some massive telecommunications attack on the New York telecommunications infrastructure happens.
[27:19.930 --> 27:21.670] [SPEAKER_03]: But I would doubt it.
[27:22.370 --> 27:23.490] [SPEAKER_03]: I think we're right.
[27:24.050 --> 27:27.370] [SPEAKER_03]: And I think history's proven that we're usually right.
[27:28.130 --> 27:31.070] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, that's a pretty heavy-handed statement there.
[27:31.150 --> 27:33.550] [SPEAKER_02]: But we'll go with it and see.
[27:33.750 --> 27:35.610] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, I kind of would like to...
[27:36.750 --> 27:40.530] [SPEAKER_02]: I'd like to have seen what would have happened had this thing been unleashed.
[27:40.670 --> 27:41.370] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm very curious.
[27:42.170 --> 27:42.570] [SPEAKER_02]: But...
[27:42.570 --> 27:43.370] [SPEAKER_03]: Well, you know...
[27:43.370 --> 27:47.830] [SPEAKER_03]: And one other point I want to make here, too, is that the crazy thing is is you have the Sim Farm, right?
[27:47.870 --> 27:49.610] [SPEAKER_03]: And they mentioned all these different locations.
[27:49.610 --> 27:51.170] [SPEAKER_03]: And 300 servers, right?
[27:51.570 --> 27:55.530] [SPEAKER_03]: But they don't talk about any kind of forensic analysis of these particular servers.
[27:55.670 --> 28:02.990] [SPEAKER_03]: You're not going to know really what these things are for and what they've been used to do without a forensic analysis of these 300 servers.
[28:03.110 --> 28:07.330] [SPEAKER_03]: Secret Service, I've worked with them numerous times in the past on forensic analyses.
[28:07.330 --> 28:08.310] [SPEAKER_03]: And they're very good.
[28:08.430 --> 28:09.610] [SPEAKER_03]: They have a lot of experts there.
[28:09.730 --> 28:10.850] [SPEAKER_03]: But this stuff takes time.
[28:11.290 --> 28:24.770] [SPEAKER_03]: I think they got ahead of themselves with a press release and a forensic analysis of these machines will very likely reveal that they were used in ordinary SIM fraud and not as part of some coordinated attack on the telecommunications infrastructure to target the U.N.
[28:24.850 --> 28:25.270] [SPEAKER_03]: General Assembly.
[28:25.430 --> 28:26.030] [SPEAKER_02]: No, I think you're right.
[28:26.090 --> 28:28.790] [SPEAKER_02]: And I think they were trying to get credit ahead of the U.N.
[28:28.870 --> 28:29.490] [SPEAKER_02]: General Assembly.
[28:29.750 --> 28:35.770] [SPEAKER_02]: Had they waited maybe a week, it would have been a lot more factual and valid.
[28:35.770 --> 28:38.370] [SPEAKER_02]: But, Kyle, we're going to open up phone lines.
[28:38.590 --> 28:40.030] [SPEAKER_02]: I just want to test the dial tone.
[28:40.150 --> 28:42.850] [SPEAKER_02]: Can you give us a dial tone here just to make sure we have a decent line?
[28:43.110 --> 28:43.530] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[28:45.030 --> 28:45.790] [SPEAKER_02]: And hit a button.
[28:47.150 --> 28:48.030] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, that sounds good.
[28:48.190 --> 28:50.730] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, so the line quality is good.
[28:51.410 --> 28:55.230] [SPEAKER_02]: We are going to open up the phone lines and we're going to give out the phone number.
[28:55.410 --> 28:58.470] [SPEAKER_02]: And the phone will not work until I finish giving out the phone number.
[28:58.570 --> 29:01.130] [SPEAKER_02]: So if you know the phone number already in our dialing, it's not going to work.
[29:01.250 --> 29:03.410] [SPEAKER_02]: So everyone has to have an equal shot here.
[29:04.010 --> 29:09.190] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, phone number 802-321-4225.
[29:09.990 --> 29:13.810] [SPEAKER_02]: That's our phone number for people listening on WBAI.
[29:14.450 --> 29:24.350] [SPEAKER_02]: And just tell us anything that's on your mind concerning the stories we've talked about or maybe something else going on in the world of technology or news or whatnot.
[29:24.770 --> 29:28.750] [SPEAKER_02]: And we can continue talking about this until phone calls start pouring in.
[29:30.310 --> 29:32.510] [SPEAKER_02]: So did you have anything else, Alex or Kyle?
[29:33.410 --> 29:39.110] [SPEAKER_01]: I was just wondering, like, it's not necessarily that any one block can handle 10 million calls.
[29:39.290 --> 29:43.470] [SPEAKER_01]: So I'm curious if we're actually as sure as Alex is saying.
[29:43.670 --> 29:46.090] [SPEAKER_01]: But I don't know either, necessarily.
[29:46.410 --> 29:55.890] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, yeah, maybe it wouldn't shut down the whole city, but an area close to the UN where a lot of people are trying to use the network, it could make spots where there isn't service.
[29:56.150 --> 29:57.010] [SPEAKER_01]: Anyway, I'll pick this up.
[29:57.090 --> 29:58.350] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, we have our first phone call.
[29:58.490 --> 30:01.910] [SPEAKER_02]: And I should tell people it might be hard for you to hear Alex.
[30:01.910 --> 30:05.230] [SPEAKER_02]: Alex, please speak up if you are talking directly to the caller.
[30:05.710 --> 30:09.370] [SPEAKER_02]: Otherwise, the caller, you might just have to talk to Kyle and myself.
[30:09.830 --> 30:11.050] [SPEAKER_02]: Let me say good evening.
[30:11.350 --> 30:13.110] [SPEAKER_02]: You are on off the hook.
[30:13.290 --> 30:13.570] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[30:13.570 --> 30:38.610] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, I think it's kind of cynical to talk about that thing about the cell phone hacking and so on, as if on that happens right when the UN has their conference without talking about what happened with Netanyahu's military junta using pages, right?
[30:38.790 --> 30:39.530] [SPEAKER_04]: Blowing it up.
[30:41.630 --> 30:43.910] [SPEAKER_04]: Never is that mentioned now, right?
[30:44.170 --> 30:58.430] [SPEAKER_04]: And not only that, also what happened to our data in health, from health care, from all our government agencies that were stolen, basically, they were hacked.
[30:59.070 --> 31:00.690] [SPEAKER_04]: Nothing is mentioned.
[31:00.850 --> 31:01.870] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, we only have an hour.
[31:02.110 --> 31:02.270] [SPEAKER_04]: Nothing is mentioned.
[31:02.550 --> 31:03.570] [SPEAKER_02]: We only have an hour.
[31:03.570 --> 31:08.950] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, but the thing is, it has to be put in perspective.
[31:09.330 --> 31:13.290] [SPEAKER_04]: We cannot just pick out one single item and then dance around that.
[31:13.650 --> 31:15.370] [SPEAKER_04]: We have to see the whole picture.
[31:15.670 --> 31:18.170] [SPEAKER_04]: And the whole picture is much bigger.
[31:18.390 --> 31:20.270] [SPEAKER_04]: There's much more behind it.
[31:20.350 --> 31:21.370] [SPEAKER_04]: And that's what I want to say.
[31:21.490 --> 31:21.930] [SPEAKER_02]: That's all.
[31:21.970 --> 31:22.190] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[31:22.370 --> 31:22.570] [SPEAKER_02]: All right.
[31:22.630 --> 31:23.630] [SPEAKER_02]: Thanks for your call.
[31:23.770 --> 31:25.670] [SPEAKER_02]: I would have liked to have known more about what the big picture is.
[31:25.770 --> 31:27.550] [SPEAKER_02]: But, yeah, things are connected.
[31:27.650 --> 31:28.090] [SPEAKER_02]: Absolutely.
[31:28.730 --> 31:32.310] [SPEAKER_02]: All this use of technology in ways it was not intended to be used.
[31:32.310 --> 31:36.650] [SPEAKER_01]: There has been a lot of bad things successively going on.
[31:36.770 --> 31:37.570] [SPEAKER_02]: So, it's not just me.
[31:37.730 --> 31:37.850] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[31:38.070 --> 31:38.270] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[31:38.530 --> 31:38.890] [SPEAKER_02]: All right.
[31:39.070 --> 31:40.310] [SPEAKER_02]: That's a fair assessment.
[31:40.490 --> 31:41.510] [SPEAKER_01]: I think he's on to it.
[31:41.570 --> 31:41.730] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[31:41.770 --> 31:43.150] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, that's definitely a factor.
[31:43.510 --> 31:45.290] [SPEAKER_02]: 802-321-4225.
[31:45.890 --> 31:51.210] [SPEAKER_02]: We are taking phone calls here on Off The Hook up until we go off the air tonight.
[31:51.350 --> 31:54.350] [SPEAKER_02]: And we'll see what happens in the future.
[31:54.530 --> 31:54.870] [SPEAKER_02]: Good evening.
[31:55.130 --> 31:56.550] [SPEAKER_02]: You're on Off The Hook.
[31:56.650 --> 31:56.890] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[31:57.430 --> 31:58.110] [SPEAKER_05]: Hi, Emmanuel.
[31:58.450 --> 31:58.670] [SPEAKER_05]: Okay.
[31:59.190 --> 32:02.990] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, Ravel, let me just say you call every week on Overtime.
[32:03.090 --> 32:07.530] [SPEAKER_02]: So, let's make this extra quick so that other people who listen to the radio show get a chance to call.
[32:07.670 --> 32:08.350] [SPEAKER_02]: You have one minute.
[32:08.490 --> 32:10.150] [SPEAKER_05]: Yeah, Carol, because my battery's low.
[32:10.190 --> 32:12.790] [SPEAKER_02]: I hope you were listening to me when I said that because I'm not saying it again.
[32:13.330 --> 32:16.030] [SPEAKER_05]: Sounds like I'm on a long-distance call because I still hear a hum.
[32:16.030 --> 32:20.970] [SPEAKER_05]: Anyway, I was wondering how did some things like networks...
[32:20.970 --> 32:22.110] [SPEAKER_05]: Like, you've...
[32:22.110 --> 32:24.650] [SPEAKER_05]: At 2600.com, you have your own server.
[32:24.750 --> 32:27.950] [SPEAKER_05]: You don't use, like, cloud computing, like, things like that.
[32:27.970 --> 32:31.450] [SPEAKER_05]: You have your own server and your own files, right?
[32:31.630 --> 32:33.310] [SPEAKER_02]: I avoid the cloud like the plague.
[32:34.310 --> 32:34.990] [SPEAKER_05]: What is that?
[32:35.170 --> 32:37.450] [SPEAKER_02]: I say I avoid the cloud like the plague.
[32:37.550 --> 32:38.290] [SPEAKER_02]: It's like a plague cloud.
[32:38.470 --> 32:38.910] [SPEAKER_02]: Right, of course.
[32:39.370 --> 32:40.090] [SPEAKER_05]: So you have...
[32:40.090 --> 32:41.510] [SPEAKER_05]: So companies could just not have...
[32:41.510 --> 32:45.990] [SPEAKER_05]: Like, when you go to 2600.com, it goes right to your site at your location.
[32:46.490 --> 32:48.170] [SPEAKER_05]: The files and the pictures are all there.
[32:48.170 --> 32:48.450] [SPEAKER_05]: Oh, I see.
[32:48.450 --> 32:49.250] [SPEAKER_02]: I see what you're doing.
[32:49.330 --> 32:58.370] [SPEAKER_02]: What Rebel's doing here is demonstrating social engineering, trying to get me to give out information about our site so that he is armed with more data that he can use.
[32:58.530 --> 33:01.110] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, I'm not falling for that trick because I wasn't born yesterday.
[33:01.310 --> 33:04.530] [SPEAKER_02]: So, Rebel, I'll just say, yeah, we have a unique system.
[33:04.570 --> 33:05.050] [SPEAKER_02]: How it works?
[33:06.490 --> 33:06.770] [SPEAKER_05]: What?
[33:07.190 --> 33:08.830] [SPEAKER_05]: Like, not 2600.
[33:08.830 --> 33:09.470] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't think he heard me.
[33:09.550 --> 33:10.610] [SPEAKER_02]: It's a shoebox.
[33:11.110 --> 33:11.350] [SPEAKER_02]: Uh-huh.
[33:12.110 --> 33:13.370] [SPEAKER_02]: Rebel, you have 10 more seconds.
[33:14.290 --> 33:14.550] [SPEAKER_05]: Okay.
[33:14.850 --> 33:20.390] [SPEAKER_05]: So, basically, you could have a PC like you guys have a PC that, you know, that does it.
[33:21.290 --> 33:23.990] [SPEAKER_05]: And so, how does there, like, a big...
[33:23.990 --> 33:25.670] [SPEAKER_05]: Like, you could still have, like, a mainframe, too?
[33:26.130 --> 33:30.330] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, we have a mainframe and an IBM XT that we have to...
[33:30.950 --> 33:32.490] [SPEAKER_02]: We can't possibly get into that.
[33:32.670 --> 33:33.190] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm sorry.
[33:33.290 --> 33:37.650] [SPEAKER_02]: We can't possibly give you the specifics.
[33:37.850 --> 33:45.150] [SPEAKER_02]: But, you know, you can set up your own system on any kind of box that you decide to get.
[33:45.670 --> 33:49.170] [SPEAKER_02]: Run Linux, you know, run all sorts of different things.
[33:49.390 --> 33:50.430] [SPEAKER_02]: Set up mail servers.
[33:50.690 --> 33:52.330] [SPEAKER_02]: Set up web pages.
[33:53.150 --> 33:54.470] [SPEAKER_02]: But it takes study.
[33:54.570 --> 33:55.270] [SPEAKER_02]: It takes time.
[33:55.390 --> 33:56.310] [SPEAKER_02]: It takes commitment.
[33:56.550 --> 33:57.430] [SPEAKER_01]: And collaboration.
[33:57.990 --> 33:58.950] [SPEAKER_01]: Do not do the...
[33:58.950 --> 33:59.490] [SPEAKER_01]: Try to do...
[33:59.490 --> 34:01.030] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, try to do everything yourself.
[34:01.030 --> 34:02.430] [SPEAKER_01]: Definitely get help.
[34:02.650 --> 34:09.290] [SPEAKER_01]: Find ways that you can offload the learning curve.
[34:09.430 --> 34:12.750] [SPEAKER_01]: Because it does take some reading and some understanding of it.
[34:12.810 --> 34:13.070] [SPEAKER_01]: Absolutely.
[34:13.190 --> 34:15.130] [SPEAKER_01]: And there's lots of ways to go about it.
[34:15.230 --> 34:26.050] [SPEAKER_01]: If you would like to tell us your favorite mainframe operating system or your favorite mainframe to hack, please write us at oth@2600.com.
[34:26.190 --> 34:29.450] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, but, you know, let's move away from mainframes because it's kind of passe.
[34:31.390 --> 34:34.130] [SPEAKER_02]: People can do this kind of thing through laptops now.
[34:34.290 --> 34:35.110] [SPEAKER_02]: It's not hard.
[34:35.270 --> 34:35.890] [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, it is hard.
[34:36.030 --> 34:37.050] [SPEAKER_02]: It's not easy.
[34:37.350 --> 34:38.910] [SPEAKER_02]: But it's also not impossible.
[34:39.510 --> 34:48.850] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, that's kind of the hacker way that we take on things that are challenging and a lot of people think are impossible, but we do it anyway.
[34:49.150 --> 34:52.330] [SPEAKER_02]: And if you're having trouble, go to a meeting, talk to some people.
[34:53.270 --> 34:54.190] [SPEAKER_02]: Ask Around.
[34:54.410 --> 34:59.410] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, you'll get people who might make fun of you for asking questions.
[34:59.590 --> 35:01.050] [SPEAKER_02]: They're not the right people to talk to, obviously.
[35:01.270 --> 35:08.090] [SPEAKER_02]: But there are lots and lots of other people who are happy to teach and give you all kinds of information.
[35:08.250 --> 35:16.290] [SPEAKER_02]: But I think the important thing here is just not do it like everybody else, not simply use the cloud for everything and trust them.
[35:16.630 --> 35:19.510] [SPEAKER_02]: My God, you can't trust the tech companies.
[35:20.110 --> 35:35.130] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, Google today, or was it yesterday, announced they were letting everybody back onto YouTube who was basically spreading all kinds of dangerous COVID misinformation back in 2020 and election denial and all that kind of thing.
[35:35.250 --> 35:37.430] [SPEAKER_02]: It's okay now because they want to get closer to Trump.
[35:37.550 --> 35:38.630] [SPEAKER_02]: They literally said that.
[35:38.770 --> 35:40.450] [SPEAKER_02]: They want to get closer to Trump.
[35:40.990 --> 35:42.370] [SPEAKER_02]: So don't trust them.
[35:42.470 --> 35:43.850] [SPEAKER_02]: You cannot trust these companies.
[35:43.970 --> 35:45.110] [SPEAKER_02]: You can only trust yourself.
[35:45.450 --> 35:46.990] [SPEAKER_02]: So learn as much as you can.
[35:47.190 --> 35:48.070] [SPEAKER_02]: All right, we have another phone call.
[35:48.270 --> 35:48.710] [SPEAKER_02]: Good evening.
[35:48.710 --> 35:49.810] [SPEAKER_02]: You're on Off The Hook.
[35:49.930 --> 35:50.170] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[35:52.270 --> 35:52.890] [SPEAKER_02]: Speak up.
[35:52.950 --> 35:53.210] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[35:53.390 --> 35:53.630] [SPEAKER_02]: You're on.
[35:53.710 --> 35:53.890] [SPEAKER_02]: Hello?
[35:54.090 --> 35:54.310] [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[35:54.690 --> 35:55.110] [SPEAKER_07]: Hello?
[35:55.310 --> 35:55.990] [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, you're on the air.
[35:56.070 --> 35:56.350] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[35:57.250 --> 35:57.970] [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, I'm sorry.
[35:58.190 --> 36:07.890] [SPEAKER_07]: I just wanted to say I used to work at Cablevision back in the day when Napster and people were downloading the music and all that stuff.
[36:08.010 --> 36:08.150] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[36:08.570 --> 36:11.650] [SPEAKER_07]: Charles Dolan, he used to be really nice into his son.
[36:12.230 --> 36:13.870] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, anyway, I won't even go there.
[36:14.230 --> 36:15.010] [SPEAKER_07]: That's fascinating.
[36:15.930 --> 36:17.210] [SPEAKER_07]: We had to...
[36:17.210 --> 36:19.210] [SPEAKER_07]: I was a customer service rep, right?
[36:19.370 --> 36:19.630] [SPEAKER_08]: Uh-huh.
[36:19.790 --> 36:31.350] [SPEAKER_07]: And they laid off all the American engineers and they trained us about the motherboard and how to ping a modem and how to check the nodes.
[36:32.290 --> 36:32.810] [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[36:32.810 --> 36:35.490] [SPEAKER_07]: And I don't know what DHCP serve or whatever.
[36:35.790 --> 36:41.050] [SPEAKER_07]: Anyway, whenever I got that call, they said, transfer the call to me because he's networking.
[36:41.330 --> 36:47.610] [SPEAKER_07]: But make a long story short, I think they're trying to make America poor again because I'm looking for work.
[36:47.770 --> 36:55.310] [SPEAKER_07]: And every time I call about my mortgage or make a payment for Chase, I'm getting the Philippines or I'm getting somebody in India.
[36:55.570 --> 36:56.990] [SPEAKER_07]: But we need to work here.
[36:57.330 --> 37:03.710] [SPEAKER_07]: I'm out of a job and, you know, I know how to do these things.
[37:03.950 --> 37:06.930] [SPEAKER_07]: When IP config, I don't even think they do that anymore.
[37:07.010 --> 37:12.510] [SPEAKER_07]: But what I'm saying is we need to have people working here.
[37:12.850 --> 37:14.150] [SPEAKER_07]: You guys have a great day.
[37:14.270 --> 37:14.610] [SPEAKER_07]: Thank you.
[37:14.750 --> 37:15.530] [SPEAKER_02]: Thank you for that call.
[37:16.230 --> 37:26.230] [SPEAKER_02]: And she raises a great point because outsourcing and paying people next to nothing, that's what these companies will always do.
[37:26.250 --> 37:27.950] [SPEAKER_02]: It's the easy way for them.
[37:28.070 --> 37:29.190] [SPEAKER_02]: It's the cheap way for them.
[37:29.330 --> 37:34.390] [SPEAKER_02]: They do not care about the people over there and they certainly don't care about the people over here.
[37:35.810 --> 37:40.670] [SPEAKER_02]: Let's not treat those people over there as if they're the enemy because they're not.
[37:40.670 --> 37:52.790] [SPEAKER_02]: They're going through the same The true enemy are those who are making money off of them and us and reaping the benefits and not sharing the rewards at all.
[37:53.150 --> 37:54.670] [SPEAKER_02]: It's really sad.
[37:54.770 --> 37:55.170] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead, Alex.
[37:55.570 --> 37:58.210] [SPEAKER_03]: And I think this is about to get worse as well.
[37:58.390 --> 38:06.750] [SPEAKER_03]: As the caller indicated, everybody's looking for work for the people to whom these jobs have been outsourced overseas in the Philippines and India and Ireland, etc.
[38:07.310 --> 38:16.590] [SPEAKER_03]: They're about to lose their jobs, too, because, as you'll see and probably have experienced, many companies don't even like to push you through to some kind of call center now.
[38:16.750 --> 38:18.230] [SPEAKER_03]: They want you to go and use their website.
[38:18.330 --> 38:28.930] [SPEAKER_03]: They want you to use their website more and more and more because they're getting rid of these personnel, even the overseas personnel that are so much cheaper than hiring a U.S.
[38:29.030 --> 38:36.250] [SPEAKER_03]: person, because we're now using AI-powered chatbots to handle all these types of requests.
[38:36.250 --> 38:38.050] [SPEAKER_03]: So you're not even going to be interacting with a human.
[38:38.210 --> 38:39.730] [SPEAKER_03]: You're going to be interacting with a chatbot.
[38:39.970 --> 38:45.090] [SPEAKER_03]: In many cases, you probably already have been interacting with chatbots and just thought that they were humans.
[38:45.970 --> 38:46.370] [SPEAKER_03]: So...
[38:46.370 --> 38:47.490] [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, go ahead, Kyle.
[38:47.650 --> 38:49.370] [SPEAKER_01]: I think there's really room for policy.
[38:49.530 --> 38:55.670] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I know that's like an ugly way to go with solutions, but there really should be kind of a standardized way.
[38:55.850 --> 39:11.090] [SPEAKER_01]: And I think that's a fair point that automation is now the sort of shiny thing that everybody wants to deploy to add efficiencies and ultimately find new sources of revenue...
[39:11.090 --> 39:11.490] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't.
[39:11.710 --> 39:13.270] [SPEAKER_01]: ...in getting rid of these jobs.
[39:13.290 --> 39:15.690] [SPEAKER_01]: I think people should have those jobs.
[39:15.890 --> 39:25.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Maybe these automated things should offload some of the more mundane or things that can be handled with automation, but there should always be a way to contact someone.
[39:25.230 --> 39:45.690] [SPEAKER_01]: And as the caller said, having someone that's local, someone that's friendly, that might understand what's going on exactly and understand the context of the thing is always crucial, I think, to really finding a quick resolution to vexing issues, technical issues,
[39:45.690 --> 39:46.210] [SPEAKER_01]: or otherwise.
[39:46.490 --> 39:48.110] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, it's gotten worse and worse.
[39:48.310 --> 39:49.490] [SPEAKER_02]: It's a true nightmare.
[39:49.490 --> 39:56.190] [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, have you tried to solve problems online with big companies?
[39:56.570 --> 39:59.250] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, you cannot reach a human.
[39:59.510 --> 40:02.230] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, a friend of ours got hacked on Xbox.
[40:02.710 --> 40:05.890] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, we don't play Xbox here, but a lot of people do.
[40:06.170 --> 40:14.910] [SPEAKER_02]: And somebody got into their account and wiped it out and took all the games that they had accumulated over years.
[40:16.170 --> 40:19.570] [SPEAKER_02]: And they can't even reach a human being at Microsoft.
[40:19.790 --> 40:20.990] [SPEAKER_02]: Microsoft apparently owns Xbox.
[40:21.150 --> 40:21.510] [SPEAKER_02]: They didn't know that.
[40:22.110 --> 40:25.650] [SPEAKER_02]: And, I mean, this is what people have to deal with.
[40:25.790 --> 40:32.670] [SPEAKER_02]: Has this ever happened to anybody we know other than this poor person that has to deal with this?
[40:32.910 --> 40:33.990] [SPEAKER_02]: It's crazy.
[40:33.990 --> 40:35.710] [SPEAKER_02]: How do you get through to a human being?
[40:35.770 --> 40:36.490] [SPEAKER_02]: How do you do that?
[40:36.630 --> 40:40.530] [SPEAKER_02]: How do you get somebody on the phone who will say, yeah, I can take care of that?
[40:40.530 --> 40:48.170] [SPEAKER_02]: But something that you have paid for, something that you have proof that belongs to you, and you can't even get a human being.
[40:48.310 --> 40:57.210] [SPEAKER_02]: All you get are these bots that will pass judgment and say, wait 20 days, 30 days, whatever, and we'll make a decision.
[40:57.210 --> 40:59.250] [SPEAKER_02]: Even though it's not a human making a decision.
[40:59.830 --> 41:01.250] [SPEAKER_02]: And you're at the mercy of them.
[41:01.310 --> 41:02.070] [SPEAKER_02]: You can't do anything.
[41:02.330 --> 41:03.450] [SPEAKER_02]: You can't do a damn thing.
[41:03.530 --> 41:08.390] [SPEAKER_02]: And by the time you get to the point where you can appeal whatever their decision is, it's too late.
[41:08.630 --> 41:10.310] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, too much time has gone by.
[41:10.530 --> 41:11.630] [SPEAKER_02]: This is insane.
[41:11.770 --> 41:13.230] [SPEAKER_02]: This is Orwellian.
[41:13.450 --> 41:16.670] [SPEAKER_02]: This is the nightmare that we've been warned about.
[41:18.170 --> 41:22.210] [SPEAKER_02]: I am fearful of our future on so many levels.
[41:22.890 --> 41:27.530] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, there should always be levels of recourse.
[41:27.650 --> 41:34.630] [SPEAKER_01]: You shouldn't just have a totally unattended customer service or non-existent customer service option.
[41:34.630 --> 41:54.130] [SPEAKER_01]: And these sort of reviews and things like that, where you have to go through a process and you get kind of a yes or a no, there should be really clear appeals and other ways to seek recourse.
[41:54.130 --> 42:04.370] [SPEAKER_01]: This has come in into a lot of situations when people are trying to recover things, if they got locked out of something with their family.
[42:04.470 --> 42:06.330] [SPEAKER_02]: I haven't played a video game in a long, long time.
[42:06.330 --> 42:10.290] [SPEAKER_02]: I just assumed people were getting those cartridges and saving them.
[42:10.690 --> 42:13.990] [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, when they want to play a game, they just take it off the shelf and insert it.
[42:14.470 --> 42:22.230] [SPEAKER_02]: But, no, everyone is connected to some portal someplace, and you don't have control over the things that you bought.
[42:22.310 --> 42:23.570] [SPEAKER_02]: And that's okay.
[42:23.590 --> 42:24.270] [SPEAKER_02]: That's normal.
[42:24.390 --> 42:25.670] [SPEAKER_01]: It's really expensive, too.
[42:25.770 --> 42:26.230] [SPEAKER_02]: And it's super expensive.
[42:26.430 --> 42:27.090] [SPEAKER_02]: And these are kids.
[42:27.210 --> 42:28.950] [SPEAKER_02]: These are kids that are being victimized by this.
[42:29.750 --> 42:32.270] [SPEAKER_02]: So, yeah, Xbox should hang their head in shame.
[42:32.290 --> 42:33.290] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm sure they're not the only one.
[42:33.770 --> 42:34.670] [SPEAKER_02]: Alex, let me have a caller.
[42:34.770 --> 42:34.990] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[42:35.610 --> 42:37.910] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, so I just wanted to say that they...
[42:37.910 --> 42:41.050] [SPEAKER_03]: Like the caller had mentioned, you know, there's a human element to this.
[42:41.050 --> 42:44.350] [SPEAKER_03]: And I think, as our caller really indicated, you know, she had empathy.
[42:44.610 --> 42:56.550] [SPEAKER_03]: She felt the pain of these people, I guess, when they couldn't get on the Internet, and they were trying to configure DHCP and had to go through into technical support and could understand and feel their frustration, calm them down, in a sense.
[42:56.690 --> 42:59.910] [SPEAKER_03]: That brings a lot to the table, I think, for these particular companies.
[42:59.910 --> 43:03.870] [SPEAKER_03]: You're never going to have that type of empathy, real empathy, from an AI chatbot.
[43:04.230 --> 43:06.270] [SPEAKER_03]: But speaking of callers, why don't we take our next one?
[43:06.530 --> 43:10.710] [SPEAKER_02]: And our address, oth@2600.com, if you want to write us with your questions or anything like that.
[43:10.710 --> 43:13.890] [SPEAKER_02]: And by the way, I should point out, she was talking about Cablevision.
[43:14.530 --> 43:15.990] [SPEAKER_02]: That became known as Optimum.
[43:16.350 --> 43:17.730] [SPEAKER_02]: Now it's known as Altice.
[43:17.930 --> 43:21.010] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, when companies change their names that many times, they're up to something, I think.
[43:21.410 --> 43:21.530] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[43:21.770 --> 43:22.750] [SPEAKER_02]: All right, we have a caller.
[43:22.870 --> 43:23.190] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[43:23.290 --> 43:23.970] [SPEAKER_02]: You're on the air.
[43:26.070 --> 43:27.130] [SPEAKER_06]: Hi, can you hear me?
[43:27.290 --> 43:28.030] [SPEAKER_06]: It's Pete from Queens.
[43:28.290 --> 43:29.050] [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, how are you doing?
[43:29.210 --> 43:29.550] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[43:30.130 --> 43:30.710] [SPEAKER_06]: Good, how are you?
[43:30.710 --> 43:39.810] [SPEAKER_06]: I had a question, maybe more for Alex, about the legalities of encryption going forward.
[43:39.810 --> 43:57.550] [SPEAKER_06]: If some antagonistic administration tries to make all types of encryption illegal and to slow down communications between individuals that want to be monitored, what risks are there for encryption for individual use?
[43:57.550 --> 44:01.150] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, first, Alex, I'm going to ask you to say a sentence and see if the caller can hear you.
[44:01.230 --> 44:03.010] [SPEAKER_02]: If they can, continue.
[44:03.190 --> 44:05.590] [SPEAKER_02]: And if not, caller, please listen on the radio.
[44:05.710 --> 44:06.330] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead, Alex.
[44:06.550 --> 44:07.350] [SPEAKER_03]: Okay, great.
[44:07.530 --> 44:09.350] [SPEAKER_03]: So this is a sentence I'm going to say.
[44:09.630 --> 44:10.390] [SPEAKER_02]: Did you hear that?
[44:10.670 --> 44:11.610] [SPEAKER_02]: Did you hear that, caller?
[44:12.170 --> 44:14.010] [SPEAKER_03]: It was jumbled, but I heard him say something.
[44:14.070 --> 44:14.770] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, that's how he talks.
[44:14.890 --> 44:16.270] [SPEAKER_02]: But okay, go ahead, Alex.
[44:16.350 --> 44:16.950] [SPEAKER_02]: Let's give it a shot.
[44:17.070 --> 44:19.390] [SPEAKER_02]: But have your radio handy in case you can't hear.
[44:19.870 --> 44:20.550] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, sure.
[44:20.550 --> 44:26.410] [SPEAKER_03]: I think these are battles that we had really kind of fought and won, you would say, back in the 90s.
[44:26.470 --> 44:32.970] [SPEAKER_03]: When you go back to things like the Clipper chip, which was this encryption scheme that the government had proposed back in the 90s.
[44:33.010 --> 44:36.130] [SPEAKER_03]: And it was supposedly going to encrypt all your communications.
[44:36.390 --> 44:37.150] [SPEAKER_03]: You could encrypt your email.
[44:37.330 --> 44:38.210] [SPEAKER_03]: You could encrypt your faxes.
[44:38.370 --> 44:39.970] [SPEAKER_03]: You could encrypt your telephone calls.
[44:40.090 --> 44:51.590] [SPEAKER_03]: But the big problem was that the key to decrypt all of this was escrowed with the government so that they would be able to decrypt all your communications and essentially perform a wiretap on anybody that they wanted.
[44:51.930 --> 44:57.590] [SPEAKER_03]: And so I think, you know, that was a terrible idea way back in the 90s.
[44:57.730 --> 45:08.230] [SPEAKER_03]: And the hacker community and the cypherpunk community, and I think the community that generally has common sense, you know, we all proposed this, and it was defeated.
[45:08.230 --> 45:23.970] [SPEAKER_03]: And so I think we're seeing now law enforcement attitudes towards encryption changing and seeing it now as something that's really bad, that can hide criminal activity, and that phones should be subject to automatic decryption.
[45:24.150 --> 45:42.050] [SPEAKER_03]: We have laws like CALEA, the Communications Assessment to Law Enforcement Act, that mandates that telecommunications providers have to have some form of way of authorizing a lawful criminal intercept if a warrant has been issued on probable cause by a judge to intercept somebody's communications.
[45:42.350 --> 45:47.890] [SPEAKER_03]: So there are some laws that we have on the books that mandate the compromise of our communications.
[45:47.890 --> 46:02.830] [SPEAKER_03]: But when we're talking about email messages and we're talking about SMS communications, I think it'd be very hard for the government at this point to outlaw encryption just, you know, across the board here because there are so many ways that we can use encryption.
[46:02.830 --> 46:06.230] [SPEAKER_03]: There are so many apps that use encryption by default.
[46:06.730 --> 46:16.370] [SPEAKER_03]: This public key cryptography is a thing that's used in signal, it's used in wire, it's used in telegram, it's used in, you know, all these apps that are bog standard that you can get on your iPhone.
[46:16.590 --> 46:23.590] [SPEAKER_03]: And you can always revert back to PGP, to, you know, pretty good privacy and encrypt your messages using a public and private key.
[46:23.850 --> 46:26.170] [SPEAKER_03]: So I think it'd be really hard for them to try to do it.
[46:26.530 --> 46:30.290] [SPEAKER_03]: If they try to enforce something like that, it would have to be through selective prosecution.
[46:30.290 --> 46:33.770] [SPEAKER_03]: So I think our chances of getting around this are really good.
[46:33.930 --> 46:40.610] [SPEAKER_03]: I think the toothpaste is out of the bottle and I really hope that this is not one of the situations where I'm proven wrong.
[46:40.750 --> 46:42.470] [SPEAKER_02]: And I really hope the caller was able to hear you.
[46:42.550 --> 46:43.410] [SPEAKER_02]: Were you able to hear that caller?
[46:43.410 --> 46:53.270] [SPEAKER_06]: I think I heard the last bit of it, and I'm glad to hear that Alex is positive, not positive, but like hopeful that encryption will be safe.
[46:54.830 --> 46:55.550] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know.
[46:55.750 --> 47:04.510] [SPEAKER_06]: We're living in unprecedented times, but it's nice that we might be able to still use encryption to get, you know, messages passed by Sneakernet or something.
[47:04.930 --> 47:05.050] [SPEAKER_02]: Right.
[47:06.350 --> 47:06.830] [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[47:06.850 --> 47:07.390] [SPEAKER_06]: That's all I got.
[47:07.610 --> 47:08.230] [SPEAKER_06]: Thank you for your call.
[47:08.510 --> 47:08.850] [SPEAKER_02]: Take care.
[47:09.010 --> 47:12.430] [SPEAKER_02]: I think we have time for one more call, 802-321-4225.
[47:12.430 --> 47:22.050] [SPEAKER_02]: You know, the only thing I would add to that, Alex, is that just because it's difficult for them to prove this or whatnot doesn't mean they're not going to try.
[47:22.210 --> 47:23.330] [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, they're suing Harvard.
[47:23.570 --> 47:24.550] [SPEAKER_02]: They're suing the New York Times.
[47:24.750 --> 47:27.310] [SPEAKER_02]: They're suing ABC for the programs they put on.
[47:28.550 --> 47:33.110] [SPEAKER_02]: It's crazy what this administration will try to do, even though there is absolutely no sense behind it.
[47:33.690 --> 47:35.430] [SPEAKER_02]: So it's entirely...
[47:35.430 --> 47:35.630] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, yeah.
[47:35.710 --> 47:36.910] [SPEAKER_02]: Don't take Tylenol either, I'm told.
[47:37.910 --> 47:40.390] [SPEAKER_02]: So there's just so much nonsensical nonsense.
[47:40.950 --> 47:41.810] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, that's the thing.
[47:41.810 --> 47:44.550] [SPEAKER_02]: Nonsensical nonsense going on at...
[47:44.550 --> 47:46.810] [SPEAKER_02]: I can't say they're not going to try.
[47:47.230 --> 47:48.290] [SPEAKER_02]: They won't succeed.
[47:48.290 --> 47:49.690] [SPEAKER_02]: They can succeed, technically.
[47:50.070 --> 47:51.930] [SPEAKER_02]: And I'm certain legally as well.
[47:52.050 --> 47:52.190] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[47:52.630 --> 47:53.530] [SPEAKER_02]: One more phone call.
[47:53.610 --> 47:53.910] [SPEAKER_02]: Good evening.
[47:54.090 --> 47:54.950] [SPEAKER_02]: You're on Off The Hook.
[47:54.970 --> 47:55.270] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[47:56.650 --> 47:57.170] [SPEAKER_08]: Hey.
[47:57.830 --> 47:59.670] [SPEAKER_08]: It's hurricane season.
[47:59.670 --> 48:15.550] [SPEAKER_08]: So I heard Starlink, who swooped in to save the day for all the people who became off-grid and perhaps wanted to stay off-grid down like Asheville kind of people.
[48:15.750 --> 48:23.370] [SPEAKER_08]: That is, I heard, a community among many that were like, hmm, maybe we could start fresh and just be a completely off-grid community.
[48:24.230 --> 48:46.570] [SPEAKER_08]: So, meshnet, how about you guys telling the world the great news that people are ready to be deployed to, you know, set up mesHNet for everybody during the next disaster relief mobilization?
[48:47.210 --> 48:47.610] [SPEAKER_02]: Uh-huh.
[48:48.170 --> 48:49.490] [SPEAKER_02]: Is that what you're telling us?
[48:50.230 --> 48:52.670] [SPEAKER_08]: I'm hoping you'll tell me who's ready.
[48:53.050 --> 48:54.030] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, we're ready.
[48:54.210 --> 48:55.850] [SPEAKER_02]: We're ready and willing and able, I think.
[48:56.190 --> 48:56.970] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, absolutely.
[48:56.970 --> 49:04.190] [SPEAKER_01]: We need guides and maybe someone can put together and organize information around it.
[49:04.330 --> 49:14.490] [SPEAKER_01]: Maybe parts lists, things that people have found helpful or common challenges when connecting or otherwise building one of these.
[49:14.490 --> 49:29.610] [SPEAKER_01]: But certainly for disaster relief and all kinds of alternative networks, there was, I believe, a talk or some vending that went on at HOPE that talked a lot about mesh, NYC Mesh, and other mesh networks.
[49:29.830 --> 49:31.510] [SPEAKER_01]: So, it's a fantastic technology.
[49:31.510 --> 49:34.230] [SPEAKER_01]: And it is not just for criminal gangs.
[49:34.250 --> 49:35.070] [SPEAKER_01]: It's for everybody.
[49:35.430 --> 49:36.870] [SPEAKER_01]: These are our airwaves.
[49:36.950 --> 49:38.150] [SPEAKER_01]: I think that's what we have to remember.
[49:38.310 --> 49:39.690] [SPEAKER_01]: These are the public airwaves.
[49:39.690 --> 49:43.870] [SPEAKER_01]: And we can use them how we see fit within the guidelines and all that.
[49:44.010 --> 49:45.030] [SPEAKER_01]: So, great idea.
[49:45.190 --> 49:47.530] [SPEAKER_02]: Those videos will be coming online fairly soon.
[49:47.590 --> 49:48.510] [SPEAKER_02]: We've just been swamped.
[49:48.570 --> 49:50.470] [SPEAKER_02]: But I'm glad that came up.
[49:50.550 --> 49:52.990] [SPEAKER_02]: And mesh, NYC Mesh is something we're going to continue talking about.
[49:53.310 --> 49:54.190] [SPEAKER_02]: It's interesting, too.
[49:54.250 --> 49:55.830] [SPEAKER_02]: The caller mentioned Asheville, North Carolina.
[49:55.870 --> 49:57.270] [SPEAKER_02]: And that brings back memories.
[49:57.470 --> 50:01.030] [SPEAKER_02]: A year ago, when our friend Greg was in North Carolina.
[50:01.030 --> 50:11.770] [SPEAKER_02]: And we were worried for his safety then, never having the slightest hint that he would be facing such a much greater threat with pancreatic cancer this year.
[50:13.130 --> 50:16.190] [SPEAKER_02]: So, Alex, I know you had something else to add before we sign off tonight.
[50:16.930 --> 50:17.090] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[50:17.310 --> 50:20.650] [SPEAKER_03]: Well, you know, that's a somber note to mention Greg there.
[50:20.750 --> 50:24.770] [SPEAKER_03]: But I really hope that you guys make it over to him, you know, and send him my best.
[50:24.870 --> 50:25.450] [SPEAKER_03]: Send him my love.
[50:26.270 --> 50:28.490] [SPEAKER_03]: And I love what the caller said as well.
[50:28.670 --> 50:31.830] [SPEAKER_03]: I think decentralized Internet access is awesome.
[50:31.910 --> 50:35.050] [SPEAKER_03]: And we need to support projects like NYC Mesh even more.
[50:36.010 --> 50:36.490] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah.
[50:36.650 --> 50:44.250] [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, are we equipped for a one-minute description of meshnet for anybody who might not know what we're talking about?
[50:44.630 --> 50:45.110] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[50:45.170 --> 50:45.550] [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead, Alex.
[50:45.990 --> 50:46.490] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, sure.
[50:46.650 --> 50:52.030] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, meshnets are basically like physical networks of interconnected devices, antennas.
[50:52.390 --> 50:54.470] [SPEAKER_03]: It's usually run by community members.
[50:54.470 --> 50:58.410] [SPEAKER_03]: People connect directly to each other rather than to some kind of centralized server.
[50:59.090 --> 51:03.950] [SPEAKER_03]: And Internet traffic is routed through that meshnetwork that is created through volunteers.
[51:04.270 --> 51:11.310] [SPEAKER_03]: And each participant's node would then relay messages to other nodes and then ultimately over to the wider Internet.
[51:11.530 --> 51:16.150] [SPEAKER_03]: So, it's basically like community-driven Internet that's decentralized rather than centralized.
[51:16.390 --> 51:16.790] [SPEAKER_03]: It's awesome.
[51:17.010 --> 51:24.410] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, it's really helpful because you can build so many services, so many things temporarily or permanently on top of that business models.
[51:24.630 --> 51:27.630] [SPEAKER_01]: People get access through their community.
[51:27.630 --> 51:32.150] [SPEAKER_01]: And it's got a lot of possibility in all kinds of situations.
[51:32.150 --> 51:33.790] [SPEAKER_01]: So, absolutely great ideas.
[51:33.790 --> 51:35.990] [SPEAKER_01]: And I'd love to talk more about that in the future.
[51:36.170 --> 51:45.870] [SPEAKER_02]: I think this is the time for meshnet to shine, along with many other ways that people are being empowered through communications means.
[51:46.030 --> 51:54.350] [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, not to have it rely on billionaires, not to have it rely on centralized sources as we've been doing in the past because they always seem to let us down.
[51:55.030 --> 51:55.490] [SPEAKER_02]: All right.
[51:55.530 --> 51:56.770] [SPEAKER_02]: That's going to have to be the last word.
[51:56.930 --> 51:57.570] [SPEAKER_02]: Please write to us.
[51:57.670 --> 52:01.430] [SPEAKER_02]: We have a message for Greg, oth@2600.com.
[52:02.330 --> 52:10.450] [SPEAKER_02]: We probably will not be on next week as Kyle and I will be heading up to Whitehorse to see Greg one more time.
[52:10.710 --> 52:13.790] [SPEAKER_02]: And we'll be back as soon as we can.
[52:13.950 --> 52:19.210] [SPEAKER_02]: And we'll have updates through our various social media platforms and things like that.
[52:19.410 --> 52:21.390] [SPEAKER_02]: In the meantime, please support WBAI.
[52:21.470 --> 52:24.770] [SPEAKER_02]: give2wbai.org, buddy.wbai.org.
[52:25.590 --> 52:27.150] [SPEAKER_02]: And for Off The Hook, this is Emmanuel.
[52:27.650 --> 52:28.170] [SPEAKER_02]: Good night.