How the A/V Industry Works
By: Renderman,
www.antiav.com
renderman@antiav.com
What do I remember most about DEFCON 7? The mosh pit of Anti-Virus
employees at the release of BO2K. Several dozen A/V people from
different
companies, risking life, limb and large insurance deductibles to get
their
company the first samples of BO2K was one of the funniest things I
remember.
At the time it made sense to risk injury to get a copy, the media would
reward the first company with a BO2K detection signature with immense
amounts of free advertising, after all this was the latest and greatest
Trojan/backdoor, right? Well, after seeing Dildog's presentation and
the
following open challenge to M$ to recall SMS server, the general
description
of BO2K changed. After initially trying BO2K on an isolated test
machine to
make sure I didn't screw myself, it has now become my primary method of
remote administration on a multiple system 9X/NT network because it is
just
a damn good program. My opinion now; the anti-virus industry people
didn't
need to be there. This was a well designed remote control product that
happened to be written by hackers, and as with any tool, in the wrong
hands
it can be dangerous.
In the months following defcon , products such as Softeyes
(http://www.softeyes.com), and
Investigator from Winwhatwhere (http://www.winwhatwhere.com/),
and other products that are designed to do much of what the A/V industry
says makes a program malicious are not scanned for. When a products can
advertise "watches and records everything about every window that gains
the focus. It records every keystroke, program name, window
title, URL, User and Workstation and the optional 'Silent Install'
feature will run the installation silently and invisibly" and not be
scanned for, it begs the question, how do you decide? Also you may
recall the problems that the folks over at NetBus had when they went
commercial and started charging for their product. They had a hard time
shedding the image of a hacking tool. This really rattled a lot of
peoples cages because the logic that was in use by the people who are
saying certain programs are malicious does not make sense when you add
these new programs to the mix. Just looking at C|net's technology
terror guide
(Technology
Terrors) you can see the number of products that aren't on any
A/V list that are as dangerous, if not more, than BO2K.
This whole thing boils down to the question; how do A/V companies decide
what criteria makes a piece of code worth being scanned for?
Well, rather than rant on like others might do, I went to the source.
I looked on A/V sites for a policy statement or a set of internal
guidelines. Nothing found. So I sent a mail like any other customer to
the customer support department (and if it existed, the A/V research
department as well) of the major A/V companies, Symantec, NAI, AVP,
Computer Associates, and Panda Software. There were others that could
also qualify, but these are what you find most on store shelves. To
all the companies I sent the same letter:
Dear Sir/Madam,
With recent events in the virus industry, it has become apparent to
myself and many others that there seems to be a definite bias when is
comes to how companies like yours determine what should and should not
be scanned for.
By what policy do you decide what should be scanned for and eliminated
and what is 'legitimate'? After an examination of your web site, no
policy statement could be found. Can you clarify by what criteria makes
a product malicious or a legitimate product?
Thanks
RenderMan
www.Hackcanada.com
As you can see, the letter states my conundrum and the clarification I
need, and I don't try to hide who I'm mailing as. I waited a couple
weeks for the responses to accumulate and re-sent some that I did not
receive responses from. In over two weeks I only received 3 responses.
First was a very quick response from Symantec customer support from a
gentleman who really was having a really bad day and I think and was not
happy to see me. Here is his message with my comments inserted
I can assure you that Symantec has absolutely no bias towards any
legitimate software developers (What makes a software developer
legitimate, is there a license I'm not aware of? I thought anyone could
code?) Arguments by some hackers that certain hacker tools are
actually legitimate commercial software are themselves extremely biased
to the point of not making any sense (I agree we are biased to a
point just as you are, but what makes something a hacker tool or a
mis-used administration tool?) A good news recent story about this
subject is available for reading at this web page, http://www.msnbc.com/news/287542.asp.
Both Symantec management and management at other Anti-Virus developers
are quoted in this article about this subject. We really would not have
anything further to add to these comments on this subject. (The
article does not really answer what I was asking.)
Best regards,
(name omitted)
After not answering my original question, I responded because I thought
they still had something they could add. This time I went and asked
exactly how they decide what should and should not be detected and give
an example:
Interesting article you reference, but it still does not answer my
question.
What is your companies policy on determining what should and should not
be detected in your Anti-Virus scans?
What is defined by your company as legitimate software developers? Are
independent developers not in the same boat as large companies such as
yourselves?
What is preventing Back Orifice 2000 from being a legitimate tool? In
the article you specified it says "anyone with the other half of the
Back Orifice software (the administration tool) can control the victims
PC from anywhere on the Internet". Can not the same be said for your
product pcAnywhere?
I really appreciate you trying to clear this question up for me.
RenderMan
www.Hackcanada.com
The bit about pcAnywhere was meant to try and get my point across that
the differences between good and evil code are blurred. I myself have
taken over the computers of friends (with permision) who use PC Anywhere
with out passwords and the affect is just the same as using BO2K.
His response was less than pleasant, but interesting. Again, here is a
transcription with my comments:
I'm afraid that this is not at all a legitimate question that you ask
here. (I'm a customer, I want to know so I can know if your product
will protect me from anything that can be bad.)
You know, you aren't even giving me the common courtesy of identifying
yourself. (ummm, I signed my name at the bottom, that usually is all
people do. The support center never stated anything about needing my
full information in order to receive customer support.)
Symantec Operates our discussion groups as a support resource for our
customers to use to get help from us. They are not meant for engaging in
debates like this. (Whoa, hold on, I really am a customer of Norton
A/V, and I'm asking a question, how do you decide what to scan for? This
is a customer inquiry.)
pcAnywhere in not designed to be to installing silently and secretly in
the background on a system. It was also not announced at a hackers
convention. (So if it announces it's presence but formats your drive
without asking it's OK? Since when does the location of announcement
mean anything about the product itself?)
(name omitted)
After that, I let him get back to blowing off other customers questions.
MS announced DirectX 2 at a conference done along the theme of ancient
Rome. Does this mean DirectX is a technology for guys in robes and
olive branches? I think not. Fortunately this response from Symantec
was not indicative of all the responses I received.
NAI customer support responded quickly as well, this time with a
definite different tone.
If a program reproduces itself, we call it a virus. If it does
something that the user does not expect, we call it a trojan. If it is
harmless and funny we call it a joke. (Not a bad though short
summary.)
There are other categories that could be considered such as Hack tools,
BackDoors, worms and Password Stealers. (Now it gets weird. Does
L0phtCrack count as a password stealer, or a hacktool, or as just
another damn good program?)
NAI wasn't clear but I was getting closer.
NAI also sent the 3rd and final response that really got me thinking.
Thanks for your question. The criteria although not obvious, is simple
among researchers. The detection's are mainly customer driven, that is
if a client requests detection of a particular problem then it is taken
into account. Many of the detection's received come from shared
collections, collections that are shared among A/V vendors. Some of the
detection's are from samples received from customers and others are from
sites referred to us from customers who feel there is a valid threat.
Regards,
(name omitted)
Sr Virus Support Analyst
AVERT - a division of nai
//* We eat viruses for breakfast, lock and load *//
Ding, Ding, Ding, We have a winner. The last line "others are from
sites referred to us from customers who feel there is a valid threat."
So, the A/V industry uses a common database and submissions from
customers..... I'm a customer and I want Investigator, softspy,
pcAnywhere and SMS scanned for. I submit to you samples of each to add
to your databases. There is no way to get BO2K off the lists, the media
just won't have it. But by using the normal submission procedure for
suspicious files, it may be possible to add other programs of similar
features to the database and make the A/V industry re-think itself.
I encourage everyone who has legitimate access to any program that can
be used maliciously, submit it to the A/V industry through their virus
submission e-mail addresses. A hacker's version of a letter writing
campaign. 1 person submitting these programs will be labeled a
crackpot, many on the otherhand will have an effect.
I for one want a level playing field. If there is a program on my
system that can record my keystrokes, passwords, bank account numbers
and ship it off anywhere without telling me, I want to know about it.
If a person wanted to use a trojan for nefarious purposes they need just
be a little creative. Just spend the $100 or so on Investigator or a
similar program, use something like Silk Rope to wrap the executable
with some benign little program and deploy at will. This is a common
tactic used to deploy trojans but with this method, not a word will be
uttered by any A/V product and the attacker can go along on his merry
way unfettered. So unless the A/V industry changes it's position on what
makes a piece of code malicious, smart trojan users will fly on by using
'legitimate' products. But why should they scan for those products?
After all, they weren't released at a hacker convention :-)
RenderMan
www.antiav.com
renderman@antiav.com
|