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From: SSRM Security and Risk Management <ssr..._at_live.com>
To: <tscm-..._at_googlegroups.com>
Subject: RE: [TSCM-L] {3882} Re: Wiretap foes turn Obama's words against feds
Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2009 16:23:04 -0500
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While working for a company in the Pacific Northwest we were the target of =
multiple 'attacks' on our key personnel. Their homes were burgled repeated=
ly and the offices and warehouse as well. While WE knew these breakins had=
occurred we could not convice police or law enforcement to even send an in=
vestigator. The company lost confidential client lists - in fact their ent=
ire customer database as well as copies of documentation, orders etc. , ins=
taller's lists, suppliers everything. Several key pieces of R & D were als=
o perloined as well.
Who did it was never a question in our minds as the company was very cuttin=
g edge and threatened major players in the power utilities industry. Wire =
taps, b-n-e, distant eavesdropping the whole gambit were used. The short v=
ersion is that by the time I was hired to 'help' the company had already he=
moraged beyond salvation.
The corporate leadership was very nieve and felt that none of this sort of =
thing could happen in America. It did and does.
K. P. Seavy, CPO
WARNING: The contents of this electronic communications are copyrighted, pr=
oprietary and confidential in nature and are intended solely for the person=
(s), organization(s) or group listed in the TO address line. Any use or mi=
suse of the contents of this message by persons or organizations other than=
the intended receipient constitute unlawful use and will be prosecuted. I=
F YOU ARE NOT the intended reciepient, please delete this message now.
From: marc...._at_gmail.com
To: TSCM-..._at_googlegroups.com
Subject: [TSCM-L] {3882} Re: Wiretap foes turn Obama's words against feds
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2009 23:58:18 -0500
Hello Mr. Atkinson,
I have a question. You say all attorneys need to have their offices and=
homes checked for bugging devices monthly. My question is: Do you have any=
information about the people who are planting these bugs and/or devices in=
peoples private homes and offices? How is someone able to get into someone=
s home? That is breaking and entering a habitat. Is it that bad that a pers=
on can not even go to work without some creep entering their home to plant =
some sorry eavesdropping device? How is a person able to bypass security? C=
an you show me a person who is not with the CIA or affiliates that has thes=
e kinds of abilities? I mean can you show me an example of a creep that has=
gotten caught? If so, how was he busted? What mistakes did he make? I want=
to know not because I am a creep but because I hate these creeps and I wan=
t to know any kind of hiteck technique or tactic that you have seen or hear=
d of that they have come up with. Maybe something from the past or maybe he=
re recently. Do you have any information like this? I have a very strong in=
terest in counter surveillance. How can it be easy for anyone even an exper=
t to enter someones home without the owners knowledge? I mean any partially=
attentive person would have a feeling or know if someone were disrespectin=
g and/or invading their privacy am I right or wrong. Thank you for your tim=
e and consideration. Sincerely, Mr. M Hanks Sr.
----- Original Message -----
From: James M. Atkinson
To: TSCM-L
Sent: Thursday, July 09, 2009 22:38
Subject: [TSCM-L] {3879} Wiretap foes turn Obama's words against feds
All attorneys need to have their offices and homes checked for bugging devi=
ces monthly, but not by the same company each time.
Instead, put together a list of TSCM people within 200-250 miles of their l=
ocation... NOT *** PI's *** who also "do sweeps" (with two suitcases), but =
actual, experienced electronics folks who spend most of their time performi=
ng sweeps. The use of a PI is fine for general investigative work, overall =
security work, and EP type of work, but not for bug sweeps. In fact, a real=
ly smart attorney will have a number of PI's who all work as outside contra=
ctors, as well as a large number of subject matter experts they can call on=
for services, advice, or opinions (including sweepers).
The attorney should contract directly to the TSCM company for service, and =
avoid involving anybody outside of an extremely close circle of people who =
can be depended on to maintain absolute silence about the upcoming inspecti=
on. It is often wise to engage the PI firm that provides general investigat=
ive or security services during the sweep, but who does not provide the act=
ual sweep itself.
PI's should make note here, that you can do your customers a lot better ser=
vice if you provide security only for the sweep, and let an outside firm co=
me it with all the technical gizmo, gadgets, ladders, lights, test equipmen=
t, and appropriate vehicles, and experience. You will also do your customer=
a better deal if you let them pay the sweep company separate from your bil=
lings for time (in this case the law firm pays you for your security and co=
ordination services).
The PI who does this will also end up making way more money in the long run=
as they are not laying out money (most PI's will not lay down more then a =
few grand) for gear that they only use a few days a month (if they are luck=
y), and then are lucky to make only a few hundred bucks a day.
For attorneys the way that you handle this is to call upon the security com=
pany or PI firm that you use on a regular basis, and with whom you have an =
ongoing relationship for a wide variety of services. Then you engage a swee=
p firm to come in to check a small area, and once the engagement is schedul=
ed you call your local PI or security company up and have them come stand w=
atch over the area to be inspected until the sweep person can get their a f=
ew days later. Of course if you are going to have multiple offices checked =
you are going to of course need multiple security people or PI’s (one per=
room), and if you have a really large series of offices you may need to ev=
en station security people at the doors of all phone rooms and wiring close=
ts.
If you are a PI or a security person you can see where I am going with this=
… Take a law firm that would like to have 3 attorneys offices checked for=
bugs. This project is estimated to take at least 5-6 days once the sweep f=
olks get into the 3 rooms, but they will also need access to the phone room=
as well, in addition to two wiring closets. This means that at any given t=
ime you will need at least 6 people (one to cover each room, plus one relie=
f person), plus someone to provide coverage outside the building, or in the=
hallways. This adds of to time… a lot of time in fact. Given that there =
are only a few dozen sweep people in the entire country (yeah, yeah, I know=
every PI thinks they can do sweeps), this means that it is going to take a=
few days to line up a sweep unless it is done well in advance, on a quasi-=
random basis, and even then you still coverage by security people before an=
y sweep to lock down the place against any live devices being removed.
Even if the attorney (CEO, etc) doesn’t actually have a bug sweep perform=
ed, this sporadic flurry of security lockdown will freak out any eavesdropp=
er. Hence, if the PI understands the logistics of a sweep, and understands =
how to freak out an eavesdropper they can run through this drill, and only =
occasionally bring in an actual TSCM person.
The eavesdropper will even become complacent because they will see these vi=
sible security flurries, but no sweep equipment as seen and will assume tha=
t it was just a ruse. The eavesdropper may at some time discover that the l=
ockdown was in fact a ruse in and of itself, and that the TSCM folks were a=
ctually performing a sweep in between these lock-down flurries. In some cas=
es there may even be a high profile lockdown, or an invisible lockdown. The=
sweep may be done in a way that is visible, or invisible. The staff of the=
law firm may know that a sweep is going to be performed the upcoming weeke=
nd, or the sweep may happen right under the noses of the employees and they=
have no clue what is really going down.
Better to let a real sweep company come in for a couple of days to do a pro=
per job (with hundreds, if not thousands of pounds of equipment) and slowly=
clear each room, each phone, and each wire one at a time.
The goal is to totally confound the spy, to trick them, and to draw them ou=
t, to cause them confusion, and to exploit this confusion to flush both the=
m and their bugs out.
I would note that just because a federal, state, or local agency does somet=
hing under presumed authority, or just because a executive order was writte=
n, or some political order was handed down does not mean that an eavesdropp=
ing project was legal and within the limits of the law.
The law is the law, is the law... it does not bend... either somebody is ai=
ding by the law or they are breaking it. Government employees for centuries=
have justified breaking the law at the behest of their lords and masters, =
and often they feel that their illegal conduct is justified by the illusion=
of the greater good, or for some political traction or power maneuver.
The FBI, DEA, USSS, USPS, etc has historically flaunted the eavesdropping l=
aws, and each has a long history of using illegal bugs, break-in, burglarie=
s, and wiretaps for political advantage, and in cases where their was absol=
utely no criminal case to be made, but only political agendas to be pursued=
. COINTELPRO is one of the classic examples (major humiliation when hundred=
s of FBI and other folks lost their jobs when this program got exposed), bu=
t there have been many other similar programs over the years.
Bottom line is all attorneys need to have their offices, their computers, t=
heir phones, their wires, their ceilings, basements, walls, furniture, thei=
r homes, and anything and everything that even remotely involves client con=
tact, records, or other data checked out on a regular basis. Just because i=
nformation can not be used against your target directly, does not mean that=
it, you, they, or it will not be targeted.
Eavesdroppers need to realize that someone is hunting them, and that the pe=
rson who is hunting them may be better at catching spies, than the eavesdro=
pper is at doing the spying. Of course if the bugging is legally on the up =
and up, and the eavesdropper knows their business then they will have zero =
problem convincing a judge to issue a protective order, and the TSCM firm w=
ill have zero problem giving the customer back all of their money.
[Hint: If a TSCM firm gives you back your money, declines to give you a rep=
ort, and for some reason the project suddenly takes way less time then orig=
inally estimated then you can safely assume that you are screwed, or are ab=
out to be screwed. Generally, a legitimate TSCM practitioner will not accep=
t money for a sweep that they have a sitting judge to wave them off of (law=
enforcement officers can not legally wave a TSCM’er off, only a sitting =
judge can do that). If a legitimate wave-off does in fact happen the TSCM s=
pecialist will find some reason to wrap the project up early (oops, equipme=
nt broke), will evade providing a report either verbally or in writing (oop=
s, computer crashed), and will not request any further funds (nah, don’t =
worry about the rest of the bill), and will most likely return any funds th=
ey have already been given (maybe now, maybe later). Also, some TSCM folks =
carry a special insurance policy that covers them in advance for any situat=
ion where a legal court ordered wave-off happens so that the insurance comp=
any pay them so long as they did not accept any further monies from the cli=
ent once they were put under a protective order (in writing), AND all monie=
s paid were refunded to the client in a timely manner, AND no report of any=
kind was made to the client in regards to bugs being present, or not being=
present.
Once a lawyer or law firm has an established relationship with a TSCM firm =
it is wise to have another attorney retain the TSCM specialists services on=
a project-by-project basis, and then for the second attorney to act as cou=
nsel to the first attorney. This second attorney actually engages the outsi=
de TSCM firm (and security and/or PI firm), and the sweep is performed for =
the first attorney at the direction of the second attorney. Then once first=
attorney’s office is confirmed to be free of bugs the roles get reversed=
(after the books are totally closed on the first assignment), the TSCM pra=
ctitioner gets engaged by the first attorneys who is acting on behalf of th=
e second attorney and the second attorneys office then gets checked for bug=
s, and so on. When a law firm has a sweep performed it may be wise to have =
an odd-man-out who represents the other lawyer(s) in the firm. There are so=
me law firms who actually handle their sweeps via an outside associate so t=
hat nobody in the main office has even the slightest idea that sweeps are b=
eing performed.
I know this all sounds terribly confusing, but imagine the poor eavesdroppe=
r who is half blind and sitting out in some un-air-conditioned listening po=
st in boxers and a t-shirt, trying to figure out if the cleaning crew reall=
y is a cleaning crew, if that low slung soccer mom van is really for people=
or sweep gear, and if the latest security lockdown is for a real sweep, of=
merely a ruse for a sweep that has already taken place.
Eavesdroppers are terrified of not knowing, and illegal eavesdroppers are m=
ore terrified still… so keep the eavesdroppers off balance, keep them gue=
ssing, and do sweeps that are virtually invisible to the eavesdroppers.
…and PI’s, please, please, please partner up with or work with several =
TSCM firms or TSCM practitioners and let them teach you how to choreograph =
sweeps. I promise you that you will make way more money then trying to do s=
weeps yourself, and your clients will be much happier with the end results=
… especially if your clients are attorneys.
-jma
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/07/09/BADQ18LP9H.DT=
L&tsp=1
Wiretap foes turn Obama's words against feds
Bob Egelko, Chronicle Staff Writer
Thursday, July 9, 2009
(07-09) 15:38 PDT SAN FRANCISCO -- An Islamic charity challenging former P=
resident George W. Bush's wiretapping program in a San Francisco federal co=
urt cited candidate Barack Obama's words Thursday in arguing that a preside=
nt has no power to unilaterally order eavesdropping on Americans.
Lawyers for the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation introduced their brief by qu=
oting Obama's words in December 2007: "Warrantless surveillance of American=
citizens, in defiance of FISA, is unlawful and unconstitutional."
FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, requires the gover=
nment to get a warrant from a court that meets in secret before interceptin=
g messages between Americans and suspected foreign terrorists. Bush acknowl=
edged in 2005 that he authorized such surveillance four years earlier and s=
aid he had constitutional authority to take such actions during wartime.
Chief U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker in San Francisco has scheduled a he=
aring Sept. 1 on whether Al-Haramain has the right to sue the government an=
d, if so, whether it was wiretapped unconstitutionally. It would be the fir=
st hearing on the legality of the surveillance program since a federal cour=
t panel assigned lawsuits from around the nation to Walker in 2007.
The government accidentally gave Al-Haramain a classified document in 2004 =
reportedly showing that two of the organization's lawyers had been wiretapp=
ed. Al-Haramain returned the document at the government's request and has b=
een barred from relying on it in court, but has argued that federal officia=
ls' public statements show it was the target of electronic surveillance - a=
critical fact in establishing its right to sue.
Obama administration lawyers have not said whether they consider the survei=
llance program legal, an issue they may address in a filing due Aug. 5. Ins=
tead, they contend the suit would damage national security if allowed to pr=
oceed, and have resisted Walker's orders to let Al-Haramain's attorneys rev=
iew the classified document to help them argue against dismissal.
In Thursday's filing, the now-defunct Islamic organization said ample publi=
c evidence showed that it had been wiretapped during an investigation that =
led the Bush administration to designate it as a terrorist group in 2004, a=
classification it disputes.
Al-Haramain said a 2007 speech by a deputy FBI director - who mentioned tha=
t the group had been under surveillance during the terrorism investigation =
- indicated that federal agents had eavesdropped on phone conversations in =
2004 allegedly linking the organization to Osama bin Laden. Other governmen=
t officials and lawyers have made statements pointing to the same conclusio=
n, the group said.
Challenging the Bush administration's argument that the president has inher=
ent power to order surveillance, Al-Haramain quoted Obama and his future at=
torney general, Eric Holder, who said in a June 2008 speech that Bush had a=
cted "in direct defiance of federal law."
This is the time, Al-Haramain's lawyers told Walker, for the judge to decid=
e what the group called the central question in the case: "May the presiden=
t of the United States break the law in the name of national security?"
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=-----------------------
-------------------------
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web:
http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 E-mail: mailto:jm..._at_tscm.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/jamesmatkinson
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=-----------------------
-------------------------
No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed from the
enemy until it is ripe for execution. - Machiavelli, The Prince, 1521 <BR
_________________________________________________________________
Insert movie times and more without leaving Hotmail®.
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While working for a company in the Pacific Northwest we were the target of =
multiple 'attacks' on our key personnel. Their homes were burgled rep=
eatedly and the offices and warehouse as well. While WE knew these br=
eakins had occurred we could not convice police or law enforcement to even =
send an investigator. The company lost confidential client lists - in=
fact their entire customer database as well as copies of documentation, or=
ders etc. , installer's lists, suppliers everything. Several key=
pieces of R & D were also perloined as well. <BR>
<BR>Who did it was never a question in our minds as the company was very cu=
tting edge and threatened major players in the power utilities industry.&nb=
sp; Wire taps, b-n-e, distant eavesdropping the whole gambit were used.&nbs=
p; The short version is that by the time I was hired to 'help' the company =
had already hemoraged beyond salvation. <BR>
<BR>
The corporate leadership was very nieve and felt that none of this sort of =
thing could happen in America. It did and does.<BR><BR><STRONG><FONT =
size=3 face="Times New Roman">K. P. Seavy, CPO</FONT></STRONG><BR>WARNI=
NG: The contents of this electronic communications are copyrighted, proprie=
tary and confidential in nature and are intended solely for the person(s), =
organization(s) or group listed in the TO address line. Any use or mi=
suse of the contents of this message by persons or organizations other than=
the intended receipient constitute unlawful use and will be prosecuted.&nb=
sp; IF YOU ARE NOT the intended reciepient, please delete this message now.=
<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR> <BR>
<HR id=stopSpelling>
From: marc...._at_gmail.com<BR>To: TSCM-..._at_googlegroups.com<BR>Subject: [TSCM=
-L] {3882} Re: Wiretap foes turn Obama's words against feds<BR>Date: Thu, 9=
Jul 2009 23:58:18 -0500<BR><BR>
<STYLE>
</STYLE>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>Hello Mr. Atkinson,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial> I have a question. You =
say all attorneys need to have their offices and homes checked for bugging =
devices monthly. My question is: Do you have any information about the peop=
le who are planting these bugs and/or devices in peoples private homes and =
offices? </FONT><FONT size=2 face=Arial>How is someone able to get into=
someones home? That is breaking and entering a habitat. Is it that ba=
d that a person can not even go to work without some creep entering their h=
ome to plant some sorry eavesdropping device? How is a person able to bypas=
s security? Can you show me a person who is not with the CIA or affiliates =
that has these kinds of abilities? I mean can you show me an example of a c=
reep that has gotten caught? If so, how was he busted? What mistakes did he=
make? I want to know not because I am a creep but because I hate these cre=
eps and I want to know any kind of hiteck technique or tactic that you have=
seen or heard of that they have come up with. Maybe something from th=
e past or maybe here recently. Do you have any information like this? I hav=
e a very strong interest in <STRONG>counter</STRONG> surveillance. How can =
it be easy for an</FONT><FONT size=2 face=Arial>yone even an expert to =
enter someones home without the owners knowledge? I mean any partially atte=
ntive person </FONT><FONT size=2 face=Arial>would have a feeling or kno=
w if someone were disrespecting and/or invading their </FONT><FONT size=2=
face=Arial>pr</FONT><FONT size=2 face=Arial>ivacy am I right or wron=
g. Thank you for your time and consideration. Sincerely, Mr. M Hanks Sr.</F=
ONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>----- Original Message ----- </DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; PAD=
DING-RIGHT: 0px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px" dir=ltr>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial; BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; font-color: black"><B>=
From:</B> <A title=jm..._at_tscm.com href="mailto:jm..._at_tscm.com">James M.=
Atkinson</A> </DIV>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A title=TSCM-..._at_googlegroups=
.com href="mailto:TSCM-..._at_googlegroups.com">TSCM-L</A> </DIV>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Thursday, July 09, 2009 22:38<=
/DIV>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> [TSCM-L] {3879} Wiretap foe=
s turn Obama's words against feds</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>All attorneys need to have their offices and homes checked f=
or bugging devices monthly, but not by the same company each time. <BR>&nbs=
p;<BR>Instead, put together a list of TSCM people within 200-250 miles of t=
heir location... NOT *** PI's *** who also "do sweeps" (with two suitcases)=
, but actual, experienced electronics folks who spend most of their time pe=
rforming sweeps. The use of a PI is fine for general investigative work, ov=
erall security work, and EP type of work, but not for bug sweeps. In fact, =
a really smart attorney will have a number of PI's who all work as outside =
contractors, as well as a large number of subject matter experts they can c=
all on for services, advice, or opinions (including sweepers). <BR> <B=
R>The attorney should contract directly to the TSCM company for service, an=
d avoid involving anybody outside of an extremely close circle of people wh=
o can be depended on to maintain absolute silence about the upcoming inspec=
tion. It is often wise to engage the PI firm that provides general investig=
ative or security services during the sweep, but who does not provide the a=
ctual sweep itself.<BR> <BR>PI's should make note here, that you can d=
o your customers a lot better service if you provide security only for the =
sweep, and let an outside firm come it with all the technical gizmo, gadget=
s, ladders, lights, test equipment, and appropriate vehicles, and experienc=
e. You will also do your customer a better deal if you let them pay the swe=
ep company separate from your billings for time (in this case the law firm =
pays you for your security and coordination services).<BR> <BR>The PI =
who does this will also end up making way more money in the long run as the=
y are not laying out money (most PI's will not lay down more then a few gra=
nd) for gear that they only use a few days a month (if they are lucky), and=
then are lucky to make only a few hundred bucks a day.<BR> <BR>For at=
torneys the way that you handle this is to call upon the security company o=
r PI firm that you use on a regular basis, and with whom you have an ongoin=
g relationship for a wide variety of services. Then you engage a sweep firm=
to come in to check a small area, and once the engagement is scheduled you=
call your local PI or security company up and have them come stand watch o=
ver the area to be inspected until the sweep person can get their a few day=
s later. Of course if you are going to have multiple offices checked you ar=
e going to of course need multiple security people or PI’s (one per room)=
, and if you have a really large series of offices you may need to even sta=
tion security people at the doors of all phone rooms and wiring closets. <B=
R> <BR>If you are a PI or a security person you can see where I am goi=
ng with this… Take a law firm that would like to have 3 attorneys offices=
checked for bugs. This project is estimated to take at least 5-6 days once=
the sweep folks get into the 3 rooms, but they will also need access to th=
e phone room as well, in addition to two wiring closets. This means that at=
any given time you will need at least 6 people (one to cover each room, pl=
us one relief person), plus someone to provide coverage outside the buildin=
g, or in the hallways. This adds of to time… a lot of time in fact. Given=
that there are only a few dozen sweep people in the entire country (yeah, =
yeah, I know every PI thinks they can do sweeps), this means that it is goi=
ng to take a few days to line up a sweep unless it is done well in advance,=
on a quasi-random basis, and even then you still coverage by security peop=
le before any sweep to lock down the place against any live devices being r=
emoved.<BR> <BR>Even if the attorney (CEO, etc) doesn’t actually hav=
e a bug sweep performed, this sporadic flurry of security lockdown will fre=
ak out any eavesdropper. Hence, if the PI understands the logistics of a sw=
eep, and understands how to freak out an eavesdropper they can run through =
this drill, and only occasionally bring in an actual TSCM person.<BR> =
<BR>The eavesdropper will even become complacent because they will see thes=
e visible security flurries, but no sweep equipment as seen and will assume=
that it was just a ruse. The eavesdropper may at some time discover that t=
he lockdown was in fact a ruse in and of itself, and that the TSCM folks we=
re actually performing a sweep in between these lock-down flurries. In some=
cases there may even be a high profile lockdown, or an invisible lockdown.=
The sweep may be done in a way that is visible, or invisible. The staff of=
the law firm may know that a sweep is going to be performed the upcoming w=
eekend, or the sweep may happen right under the noses of the employees and =
they have no clue what is really going down.<BR> <BR>Better to let a r=
eal sweep company come in for a couple of days to do a proper job (with hun=
dreds, if not thousands of pounds of equipment) and slowly clear each room,=
each phone, and each wire one at a time.<BR> <BR>The goal is to total=
ly confound the spy, to trick them, and to draw them out, to cause them con=
fusion, and to exploit this confusion to flush both them and their bugs out=
.<BR> <BR>I would note that just because a federal, state, or local ag=
ency does something under presumed authority, or just because a executive o=
rder was written, or some political order was handed down does not mean tha=
t an eavesdropping project was legal and within the limits of the law. <BR>=
<BR>The law is the law, is the law... it does not bend... either some=
body is aiding by the law or they are breaking it. Government employees for=
centuries have justified breaking the law at the behest of their lords and=
masters, and often they feel that their illegal conduct is justified by th=
e illusion of the greater good, or for some political traction or power man=
euver.<BR> <BR>The FBI, DEA, USSS, USPS, etc has historically flaunted=
the eavesdropping laws, and each has a long history of using illegal bugs,=
break-in, burglaries, and wiretaps for political advantage, and in cases w=
here their was absolutely no criminal case to be made, but only political a=
gendas to be pursued. COINTELPRO is one of the classic examples (major humi=
liation when hundreds of FBI and other folks lost their jobs when this prog=
ram got exposed), but there have been many other similar programs over the =
years.<BR> <BR>Bottom line is all attorneys need to have their offices=
, their computers, their phones, their wires, their ceilings, basements, wa=
lls, furniture, their homes, and anything and everything that even remotely=
involves client contact, records, or other data checked out on a regular b=
asis. Just because information can not be used against your target directly=
, does not mean that it, you, they, or it will not be targeted.<BR> <B=
R>Eavesdroppers need to realize that someone is hunting them, and that the =
person who is hunting them may be better at catching spies, than the eavesd=
ropper is at doing the spying. Of course if the bugging is legally on the u=
p and up, and the eavesdropper knows their business then they will have zer=
o problem convincing a judge to issue a protective order, and the TSCM firm=
will have zero problem giving the customer back all of their money.<BR>&nb=
sp;<BR>[Hint: If a TSCM firm gives you back your money, declines to give yo=
u a report, and for some reason the project suddenly takes way less time th=
en originally estimated then you can safely assume that you are screwed, or=
are about to be screwed. Generally, a legitimate TSCM practitioner will no=
t accept money for a sweep that they have a sitting judge to wave them off =
of (law enforcement officers can not legally wave a TSCM’er off, only a s=
itting judge can do that). If a legitimate wave-off does in fact happen the=
TSCM specialist will find some reason to wrap the project up early (oops, =
equipment broke), will evade providing a report either verbally or in writi=
ng (oops, computer crashed), and will not request any further funds (nah, d=
on’t worry about the rest of the bill), and will most likely return any f=
unds they have already been given (maybe now, maybe later). Also, some TSCM=
folks carry a special insurance policy that covers them in advance for any=
situation where a legal court ordered wave-off happens so that the insuran=
ce company pay them so long as they did not accept any further monies from =
the client once they were put under a protective order (in writing), AND al=
l monies paid were refunded to the client in a timely manner, AND no report=
of any kind was made to the client in regards to bugs being present, or no=
t being present.<BR> <BR>Once a lawyer or law firm has an established =
relationship with a TSCM firm it is wise to have another attorney retain th=
e TSCM specialists services on a project-by-project basis, and then for the=
second attorney to act as counsel to the first attorney. This second attor=
ney actually engages the outside TSCM firm (and security and/or PI firm), a=
nd the sweep is performed for the first attorney at the direction of the se=
cond attorney. Then once first attorney’s office is confirmed to be free =
of bugs the roles get reversed (after the books are totally closed on the f=
irst assignment), the TSCM practitioner gets engaged by the first attorneys=
who is acting on behalf of the second attorney and the second attorneys of=
fice then gets checked for bugs, and so on. When a law firm has a sweep per=
formed it may be wise to have an odd-man-out who represents the other lawye=
r(s) in the firm. There are some law firms who actually handle their sweeps=
via an outside associate so that nobody in the main office has even the sl=
ightest idea that sweeps are being performed.<BR> <BR>I know this all =
sounds terribly confusing, but imagine the poor eavesdropper who is half bl=
ind and sitting out in some un-air-conditioned listening post in boxers and=
a t-shirt, trying to figure out if the cleaning crew really is a cleaning =
crew, if that low slung soccer mom van is really for people or sweep gear, =
and if the latest security lockdown is for a real sweep, of merely a ruse f=
or a sweep that has already taken place.<BR> <BR>Eavesdroppers are ter=
rified of not knowing, and illegal eavesdroppers are more terrified still=
… so keep the eavesdroppers off balance, keep them guessing, and do sweep=
s that are virtually invisible to the eavesdroppers.<BR> <BR>…and PI=
’s, please, please, please partner up with or work with several TSCM firm=
s or TSCM practitioners and let them teach you how to choreograph sweeps. I=
promise you that you will make way more money then trying to do sweeps you=
rself, and your clients will be much happier with the end results… especi=
ally if your clients are attorneys.<BR> <BR>-jma<BR><BR><BR><BR><A hre=
f="
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/07/09/BADQ18LP=
9H.DTL&tsp=1">
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009=
/07/09/BADQ18LP9H.DTL&tsp=1</A> <BR><BR>Wiretap foes turn Obama's wor=
ds against feds<BR>Bob Egelko, Chronicle Staff Writer<BR><BR>Thursday, July=
9, 2009<BR><BR> (07-09) 15:38 PDT SAN FRANCISCO -- An Islamic charity=
challenging former President George W. Bush's wiretapping program in a San=
Francisco federal court cited candidate Barack Obama's words Thursday in a=
rguing that a president has no power to unilaterally order eavesdropping on=
Americans.<BR><BR>Lawyers for the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation introduce=
d their brief by quoting Obama's words in December 2007: "Warrantless surve=
illance of American citizens, in defiance of FISA, is unlawful and unconsti=
tutional." <BR><BR>FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,=
requires the government to get a warrant from a court that meets in secret=
before intercepting messages between Americans and suspected foreign terro=
rists. Bush acknowledged in 2005 that he authorized such surveillance four =
years earlier and said he had constitutional authority to take such actions=
during wartime.<BR><BR>Chief U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker in San Fran=
cisco has scheduled a hearing Sept. 1 on whether Al-Haramain has the right =
to sue the government and, if so, whether it was wiretapped unconstitutiona=
lly. It would be the first hearing on the legality of the surveillance prog=
ram since a federal court panel assigned lawsuits from around the nation to=
Walker in 2007.<BR><BR>The government accidentally gave Al-Haramain a clas=
sified document in 2004 reportedly showing that two of the organization's l=
awyers had been wiretapped. Al-Haramain returned the document at the govern=
ment's request and has been barred from relying on it in court, but has arg=
ued that federal officials' public statements show it was the target of ele=
ctronic surveillance - a critical fact in establishing its right to sue.<BR=
><BR>Obama administration lawyers have not said whether they consider the s=
urveillance program legal, an issue they may address in a filing due Aug. 5=
. Instead, they contend the suit would damage national security if allowed =
to proceed, and have resisted Walker's orders to let Al-Haramain's attorney=
s review the classified document to help them argue against dismissal.<BR><=
BR>In Thursday's filing, the now-defunct Islamic organization said ample pu=
blic evidence showed that it had been wiretapped during an investigation th=
at led the Bush administration to designate it as a terrorist group in 2004=
, a classification it disputes.<BR><BR>Al-Haramain said a 2007 speech by a =
deputy FBI director - who mentioned that the group had been under surveilla=
nce during the terrorism investigation - indicated that federal agents had =
eavesdropped on phone conversations in 2004 allegedly linking the organizat=
ion to Osama bin Laden. Other government officials and lawyers have made st=
atements pointing to the same conclusion, the group said.<BR><BR>Challengin=
g the Bush administration's argument that the president has inherent power =
to order surveillance, Al-Haramain quoted Obama and his future attorney gen=
eral, Eric Holder, who said in a June 2008 speech that Bush had acted "in d=
irect defiance of federal law."<BR><BR>This is the time, Al-Haramain's lawy=
ers told Walker, for the judge to decide what the group called the central =
question in the case: "May the president of the United States break the law=
in the name of national security?" <BR><BR><BR>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-------------------------<BR> James M. Atkinson  =
; &n=
bsp; Phon=
e: (978) 546-3803<BR> Granite Island Group &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; Fax: (978=
) 546-9467<BR> 127 Eastern Avenue #291 &n=
bsp; Web: =
<A href="
http://www.tscm.com/">
http://www.tscm.com/<BR></A> Glouces=
ter, MA 01931-8008 &nb=
sp; E-mail: <A href="mailto:jm..._at_tscm.com">mailto:jm..._at_tscm=
.com<BR></A> <B>  =
; <A href="
http://www.linkedin.com/in/jamesmatkinson">h=
ttp://www.linkedin.com/in/jamesmatkinson<BR></A></B>-----------------------=
---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
--<BR> No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed from=
the <BR> enemy until it is ripe for execution. - Machiavelli, The Pri=
nce, 1521 <BR<BR></html>
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Received on Sat Mar 02 2024 - 00:57:17 CST